RESEARCH PAPER 11/73
A more comprehensive and generous scheme is unlikely to materialise. Firstly, a grand plan for the region could not be devised while some countries are still in the throes of disorder. Which countries would receive aid? Would Syria and Bahrain, for example, be included? Secondly, strong and transparent political and economic institutions would be necessary to administer the aid properly. It will be some time before donors will have that confidence, even in Tunisia, which seems to be progressing most smoothly. Thirdly, who would provide the money? Western governments are in no position to provide much, since they are in the midst of their own financial crisis. The hydrocarbon-rich Gulf states could do a lot, but they are unlikely to want to set up a high-profile regional scheme, preferring to work discreetly with individual governments. The Gulf states will want to ensure that their money does not end up furthering Iran’s perceived ambitions, which could lead to any funds being delivered bilaterally, with conditions. The present circumstances mean that countries that want to encourage and influence the transitions in the region are likely to rely on other measures rather than just aid or loans. The US State Department appointed a special envoy in October to coordinate the US response to events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. He said that, in financially difficult times, the US might offer enhanced market access, debt forgiveness and capacity-building projects in the area of democracy and elections. In a recent article for the Washington Quarterly, Uri Dadush and Michele Dunne argue that access to western markets is the most important way in which Europe and the US can respond: The best instruments available are enhanced trade agreements that not only promote market access, but even more importantly maximize competitiveness-enhancing and job-promoting reforms in the Arab countries. ... Analogous to the process that successfully drew the formerly planned economies of Eastern Europe to liberal democracy, what is needed is a new and compelling vision for closer and more equitable economic relations both among Arab countries and between them and the trans-Atlantic community. 199
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Non-Arab perspectives
6.1
Iran
Iran initially welcomed the Arab uprisings. Strategically, the upheaval had the potential to remove long-term adversaries such as President Mubarak of Egypt and consequently weaken US influence in the region. Politically, Iran has tried to appropriate the Arab uprisings as akin to the 1979 Islamic revolution. The Iranian opposition Green Movement, however, brought hundreds of thousands onto the street in February in support of the North African uprisings (with a clear sub-text that events in North Africa should be linked to the 2009 Iranian opposition’s demonstrations against the contested election results). Hundreds were arrested and one person killed, according to the police, and the Green Movement’s two leaders Mir-Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi were placed under house arrest. 200
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Uri Dadush and Michele Dunne, “American and European Responses to the Arab Spring: What’s the Big Idea?”, The Washington Quarterly, 34:4, pp.131-45 “Huge obstacles face resurgent opposition after Iran marches”, Financial Times, 16 February 2011
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