LEGAL
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WHY I WOULD PREFER BINDING ARBITRATION, AS OPPOSED TO THE R.C. 3319.16 PROCEEDINGS, IN TERMINATION CASES BY DENNIS PERGRAM
U
nder Ohio law, termination cases are governed by R.C. 3319.16 unless there is a collective bargaining agreement providing for arbitration or the educator and the school board have agreed in a contract to have the termination matter resolved through binding arbitration. I have yet to see a principal’s contract or, for that matter, a contract of a superintendent, treasurer, or other administrator which provides for binding arbitration in a contract termination case in place of the procedure under R.C. 3319.16. It is my belief that school boards prefer R.C. 3319.16 proceedings as opposed to binding arbitration for several reasons, which I will discuss in this article.
of Public Instruction but is compensated by the school board. The referee conducts a termination hearing and makes a written report and a recommendation to the school board as to whether the school board proved at the termination hearing good and just cause to terminate the educator’s contract. Unfortunately, the referee’s recommendation is just that—a recommendation.
Under R.C. 3319.16, the school board initiates the termination by providing the educator with a specification of the grounds for termination. Under the current version of R.C. 3319.16, the only ground for termination is “other good and just cause.” The prior version of R.C. 3319.16 provided for termination in the event of gross inefficiency, immorality, willful and persistent violation of reasonable board of education rules, or other good and just cause. There are those who argue that the legislative change was intended by the legislature to make it easier for a school board to terminate an educator’s contract.
The matter then goes to the school board to consider the referee’s report and to decide whether to accept or reject the referee’s recommendation as to the termination of the educator’s contract. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a school board must, with respect to factual findings by the referee, give “due deference” to the findings or, in other words, must accept the factual findings of the referee unless they are against the greater weight of the evidence. Graziano v. Amherst Exempted Village Bd. of Edn., 32 Ohio St.3d 289 (1987). What often happens, however, is that a school board does not contest the factual findings of the referee but, rather, differs with the conclusion reached by the referee and then rejects the referee’s recommendation. So, in other words, the school board initiates the termination matter by issuing charges against the educator, it presents evidence at the termination hearing in support of the termination, and it then is permitted to accept or reject the referee’s recommendation.
Once the educator receives a specification of the grounds along with the notice of intent to terminate, the educator has a right to request a referee hearing and a referee is appointed by the State Superintendent
The recourse for the educator who receives determination from the school board that it has rejected a referee’s recommendation in favor of the educator is to appeal to the common pleas court in the county
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