New Zealand International Review - March/April 2024

FOCUS ON LATIN AMERICA

Cultural diplomacy

Medical co-operation

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NEW ZEALAND INTERNATIONAL

REVIEW

FOCUS ON LATIN AMERICA

2 Shared horizons: New Zealand–Latin America connections

Priscila Pilatowsky Goñi provides an overview of a relationship that has deep roots and strong prospects for the future.

6 New Zealand–Mexico diplomacy insights

Priscila Pilatowsky Goñi interviews Alfredo Pérez Bravo, Mexico’s ambassador to New Zealand.

10 Cuban foreign policy and New Zealand relations

Edgardo Valdés López examines Cuba’s foreign policy challenges since the 1959 Revolution, highlighting its successes in health diplomacy, international forums and efforts to overcome the US blockade.

13 Cultural diplomacy between New Zealand and Latin America

Lee Davidson examines the cultural diplomacy between New Zealand and Latin America, using a Mexican case study of museum and state collaboration in international exhibitions.

18 Cuba, New Zealand and doctors for the Pacific

Sharon McLennan highlights Cuba’s longstanding commitment to medical co-operation globally, particularly in the Pacific, and explores New Zealand’s involvement and contributions.

22 Presenting the Latin American option

Matthew O’Meagher discusses the history of the Latin America CAPE and what it reveals about recent New Zealand–Latin American relations.

26 Peter Fraser: towards a proper evaluation

Ken Ross reviews Sir Alister McIntosh’s efforts to write a definitive biography of New Zealand’s greatest statesman.

30 BOOKS

Sherine Tadros: Taking Sides: a memoir about love, war, and changing the world (James Kember).

31 OBITUARY

Kenneth John Aldred OBE (Ian McGibbon).

32 INSTITUTE NOTES

Managing Editor: IAN McGIBBON

Corresponding Editor: STEPHEN HOADLEY (Auckland)

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Shared horizons: New Zealand–Latin America connections

Priscila Pilatowsky Goñi provides an overview of a relationship that has deep roots and strong prospects for the future.

The Latin America–New Zealand relationship is multi-faceted. Diplomatic ties, trade links, sporting interests, university ties — all have contributed to the increasing connection between New Zealand and the diverse states of Latin America. The connection has a deep historical background, and is enhanced today by shared perspectives of many international issues and the growing presence of the Latin American community in New Zealand. Despite the difficulties caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, both regions are eager to explore new opportunities and ways to collaborate. By sharing common goals, they are striving to create a strong partnership for future growth and prosperity.

Latin America has become an important player in New Zealand’s international affairs. The Covid-19 pandemic has emphasised the need to diversify trade and establish new partnerships, leading New Zealand to explore opportunities in Latin America. While diplomatic relations between the two regions began in the late 20th century, many factors are now contributing to the increasing complexity of the exchanges. The Latin American population in New Zealand has grown significantly in recent years. Additionally, more and more New Zealanders are interested in visiting, studying and doing business with Latin America.

Despite the vast geographical distance, both Latin America and New Zealand participate in multilateral forums advocating for key issues such as nuclear non-proliferation, human rights, the environment and gender equality. They also share sporting interests, notably rugby.

It is important to understand the diversity of Latin America as a region. In 2024, six countries in the region will hold presidential elections, undoubtedly impacting powers like Mexico and Brazil, as well as significant economies like Panama and the Dominican Republic, and countries with threatened democracies like Venezuela and El Salvador. Beyond their borders, Latin America is attentive to upcoming elections in the United States, the growing competition with China and how the international situation, marked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Middle East conflict, could affect the region.

Dr Priscila Pilatowsky Goñi is the former chair of the NZIIA’s Palmerston North branch. She holds a PhD in history from El Colegio de México and has a keen interest in international affairs and Latin American political propaganda. She has a background in teaching and research in France, Germany, United States and New Zealand.

This article delves into the multi-faceted relationship between New Zealand and Latin America. It explores the historical roots of the relationship, trade exchanges and educational initiatives. As both regions navigate the complexities of the modern world, the bonds forged between them pave the way for a shared future of prosperity and co-operation.

Debated name

In the 19th century, French politician and economist Michel Chevalier first spoke of a ‘Latin’ America in his Lettres sur l’Amérique du nord.1

Our European civilization stems from a dual origin, the Romans and the Germanic peoples. It is subdivided into two

Dr Priscila Pilatowsky Goñi is the guest editor for the Latin America content of this issue, which is sponsored by the Latin America Centre for Asia–Pacific Excellence.

families, each distinguished by its special resemblance to each of the mother nations. One is Protestant, the other is Catholic. The two branches, the Latin and the Germanic, reproduced themselves in the New World. South America is, like Southern Europe, Catholic and Latin. North America belongs to a Protestant and Anglo-Saxon population.2

Chevalier’s vision of the two Americas dominated the 19th century, but the region’s name has been a matter of debate over time. Despite their geographical boundaries, many regions do not consider themselves part of Latin America.

Moreover, not all nations speak Spanish or Portuguese, and some areas are part of other countries, such as Puerto Rico, which is a freely associated territory of the United States.

The term ‘Latin America’ eventually gained acceptance as it includes all countries in the American continent where languages derived from Latin are spoken — Spanish, Portuguese and French — and also countries like Brazil and French Guiana. Latin America comprises 43 countries and is divided into South America, Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico. Spanish and Portuguese are the predominant languages, while French, English and Dutch are also spoken in the Caribbean.

According to Statista, there are approximately 492 million Spanish speakers globally, with 420 million residing in Latin America and the Caribbean.3 Diplomatic relations between New Zealand and Latin America began in the late 20th century. Presently, seven Latin American and Caribbean countries have embassies in New Zealand, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru. Other Latin American countries without embassies in New Zealand maintain bilateral relations through other countries, primarily China, Australia and Singapore.

Early ties

However, New Zealand and Latin America’s relations date back much further. For instance, New Zealand signed the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with Peru in 1850. In the early 20th century, discussions were held about developing steamship lines and commercial routes to facilitate the transportation of people and goods between Australia, New Zealand and Mexico.4

Historical records from the New Zealand digital newspaper archive Papers Past provide evidence of independent entrepre-

neurs promoting wool and meat trade. For instance, in 1936, a Sydney merchant, J. Bryce, mentioned that Mexico was looking to establish wool industries, which could open up export opportunities for New Zealand.5

In our present, one of the reasons to foster relations between Latin America and New Zealand is the continuous increase in the Latin American population in this country. According to data from the Stats NZ’s 2018 census, the Latin American population in New Zealand is 25,731 people. In the last decade, the Latin American population in New Zealand has grown, although the figures vary.

According to the census, the Latin American population tripled, from 6654 in 2006 to 25,731 in 2018. The records indicate that there are 6663 Brazilians, 2886 Chileans, 1620 Colombians, 1425 Mexicans (although the embassy reports around 3000), 1824 Argentines (the embassy reports around 7000 or 9000).6

One of the aspects that surprises the Latin American population the most is being considered as an ‘ethnic group’, which is culturally incompatible for a very diverse population, composed of people from very diverse ethnic backgrounds, altered throughout history.

One of the great advantages of New Zealand is that it has many initiatives that facilitate social cohesion and the carrying out of community activities. One of them is the ‘Community Matters’ project, which offers various financing plans to non-profit organisations. Another is the New Zealand Federation of Multicultural Councils, which has branches in the country’s main cities. On a micro level, Latin American communities extensively use social networks, especially Facebook, to support each other in matters of work, housing, children’s education, trade, sports and leisure. Some of the most renowned communities include ‘Comunidad de Latinos en Nueva Zelanda’, ‘Hola NZ’, ‘LatiNZ LatiNet NZ/AU’ and ‘Mujeres Latinas Viviendo en Nueva Zelanda’, among many others.

Visa scheme

Currently, New Zealand promotes visits by Argentinians, Brazilians, Chileans, Mexicans and Peruvians through the Working Holiday Visa programme. This programme allows young people aged eighteen to 35 to work in New Zealand and travel for a period of up to twelve months. Despite being an excellent opportunity, the number of available visas is limited compared

The New Zealand Pavilion at EduExpo Bogota,in 2018, with Ambassador Lucy Duncan in the centre (wearing pink).

to demand. Additionally, many young people face difficulties in finding employment during the period granted by the visa, leading certain embassies to pressure the New Zealand government to review these schemes.7 According to data from Immigration New Zealand, the majority of young people with approved visas choose to travel to Auckland, Wellington and Otago, and integrate into sectors such as agriculture, fishing, forestry, tourism and hospitality.8

The Covid epidemic’s effects, particularly border closures, restrictions on movement, and disruptions in supply chains, revealed New Zealand’s dependence on Asian countries, notably China.9 This situation underscored the necessity of seeking new contacts and markets, including in Latin America.10

Due to the diverse economies of Latin American countries, their trade relations with New Zealand vary. Presently, Mexico stands as New Zealand’s largest trading partner in Latin America. However, New Zealand maintains close ties with South America, especially with Brazil, Argentina and Chile, owing to the breadth of their agri-food industries.

New Zealand’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade is the most important agency in managing international trade, but partnerships and chambers of commerce also drive it. The Latin America Business Council (LANZBC) plays a pivotal role for Latin American and New Zealand entrepreneurs seeking connections and information. LANZBC organises events, offers guidance and advocates for measures that support trade.11 Similarly, the Latin America Centre for Asia–Pacific Excellence stands out. Established in 2017, it is a consortium of four New Zealand universities, funded by the Tertiary Education Commission, which conducts research in support of business and educational exchanges.12

Significant agreements

Currently, New Zealand and Latin America work together through significant treaties and agreements. New Zealand is an observer of MERCOSUR. In 2018, Minister of Trade and Export Growth David Parker visited Paraguay, engaging with Minister of Agriculture and Livestock Marcos Medina, Minister of Foreign Affairs Eladio Loizaga and a group of entrepreneurs from the country. Parker expressed keen interest in developing stronger ties with MERCOSUR, given that the member nations collectively constitute $2.42 trillion in GDP. 13

In 2005, the Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement was signed among Chile, New Zealand, Brunei and Singapore. Subsequently, Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the United States and Vietnam joined. However, the United States withdrew from the agreement in 2017. This treaty underwent revision, and in March 2018 the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) came into effect. Presently, the CPTPP includes Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, Vietnam, Peru, Mexico, Singapore, Canada, Australia, Japan and Malaysia.14

The CPTPP aims to dismantle tariff and fiscal barriers through common agreements, reduce disparities and create new economic opportunities for workers and small- and medium-sized enterprises, bolstered by advantageous legal frameworks and rules. It also seeks to liberalise services and investment and establish standards in various areas, such as intellectual property, e-commerce and the environment. For Latin American countries, the CPTPP signifies increased access to both interAmerican and Asia–Pacific markets, particularly in the fisheries, agriculture, forestry and mining sectors. According to data from the World Trade Organisation, Mexico’s trade with its CPTPP

partners increased from $71.359 billion in 2018 to $88.531 billion in 2022. Similarly, with the CPTPP, Peru saw an increase in product imports by over $368 million and exported $74 million.15

Sector organisation

Aside from treaties, various entities are organised around different sectors. Regarding the agricultural industry, the Cairns Group, formed in Australia in 1986, is notable. Its members include New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. This coalition seeks to liberalise trade by suspending trade tariffs, preventing them from escalating and eliminating domestic and export subsidies that limit trade among member countries.16 In Latin America, the Fontagro group has developed initiatives to foster scientific and technical co-operation. Its member countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Spain, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela.17

Antarctica, the fourth largest continent in the world, has brought New Zealand and the countries of South America closer together. Its geopolitical importance lies in its natural resources, geographical location and the interest it sparks in scientific research.

Countries bordering Antarctica, and with territorial interests in it, include Argentina, Australia, Chile and New Zealand. Relations date back to the establishment of the Scott Base by Sir Edmund Hillary to support the Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition, which later became a permanent base. In 1904, Argentina established the Orcadas Base.

In 1959, Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Norway, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, among others, signed the Antarctic Treaty. This treaty stipulates that the region shall only be used for peaceful purposes; there shall be freedom of scientific research and co-operation towards that end; and countries agree to exchange observations of scientific results, which shall be freely available.18

Student decline

One of the most severe impacts of the Covid epidemic was the decline in foreign students in New Zealand, who contribute a significant portion of university revenues. In May 2022, Chris Hipkins, then minister of education, announced his plan to travel to South America to discuss New Zealand primary schools’ intention to enrol foreign students, following the border closures during the pandemic. He announced that funding of $5 billion had been approved for education.19

According to OECD data, the number of Latin American students enrolled in tertiary education was 473,528 in 2013. This number increased to 685,593 in 2021. Most of them come from Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Colombia and Mexico.20

Education New Zealand is the government agency responsible for international agreements. Over the past years, it has carried out several projects to promote programmes that can benefit Latin Americans, especially through its agencies in Chile and Brazil.21

One of the recent initiatives is to increase the number of students through events such as the New Zealand Virtual Fair and Latin America Masterclasses. These events inform students about study offerings at New Zealand universities, tuition fees, the benefits of obtaining a New Zealand diploma and other advice. According to Education New Zealand, around 6000 international students enrolled in New Zealand universities in 2019.

Regarding support for New Zealand students to study in Lat-

in America, the Prime Minister’s Scholarship for Asia and Latin America opens each year, offering funding for enrolment costs, accommodation, flights and living expenses. This programme has supported more than 4155 students since 2013.22

Cultural exchange

Embassies organise a diverse range of events to promote cultural exchanges and provide insight into their respective nations. The Mexican embassy, for example, hosts several iconic celebrations such as ‘El Grito de Independencia’ and ‘Día de Muertos’ every year. In addition, the Latin American and Spain Film Festival is one of the most significant events, which has been a tradition for two decades. This festival is supported by embassies, academic institutions and cultural associations. It showcases a curated selection of ten films from various Latin American countries and is held in multiple cities to promote the region’s cinematic production. The festival also provides a platform for Latin American businesses to showcase their ventures, thereby contributing to the dissemination and promotion of the region’s cultural diversity.23

Furthermore, some museums, in collaboration with Latin American universities and occasionally with governmental support, have launched large-scale exhibitions. A recent example is ‘Nga Taniwha o Rupapa: Dinosaurs of Patagonia’, displaying fossil remains from this region. Similarly, the Latin America CAPE supported the exhibition ‘De la milpa a la mesa’, which highlighted the diversity and richness of Latin American agriculture, showcasing the farming experience and the dynamism of the Mexican market.

In addition to these embassy-led and museum initiatives, the Latin American community residing in New Zealand independently contributes to cultural diffusion through gastronomy, private events and festivities that, day by day, garner more followers in the country, thus enriching the social and cultural fabric of the nation.

Future expectations

The relationship between New Zealand and Latin America is characterised by a rich tapestry of connections, cultural ex-

changes and economic co-operation. From the early explorations and trade ventures of the 19th century to the contemporary initiatives aimed at fostering education, trade and diplomatic ties, both regions have forged a dynamic partnership grounded in shared aspirations.

The Latin American diaspora in New Zealand, along with the embassies’ initiatives, underscores the importance of people-to-people exchanges in strengthening bilateral relations. Moreover, the Covid epidemic has underscored the need for resilience and adaptability, prompting both regions to explore new avenues of collaboration.

As Latin America continues to emerge as a key player on the global stage, New Zealand stands ready to engage with the region, leveraging its expertise in areas such as agriculture, technology and sustainable development. Through multilateral agreements like the CPTPP and bilateral initiatives aimed at promoting culture, trade and investment, both regions are poised to unlock new opportunities for growth and prosperity.

NOTES

1. Michel Chevalier, Lettres sur l’Amérique du nord (Brussels, 1844), p.12.

2. Ibid.

3. Statista, ‘América latina y el Caribe, Datos estadísticos’(es.statista. com/temas/5605/america-latina-y-el-caribe/#topicOverview).

4. ‘New Zealand trade to Mexico’, Auckland Star, vol 31, no 64 (Mar 1900), p.3.

5. ‘New Zealand wool’, Otago Daily Times, 14 Apr 1936.

6. Stats NZ, ‘Latin American ethnic group’ (www.stats.govt.nz/ tools/2018-census-ethnic-group-summaries/latin-american).

7. Interview with Ambassador Alfredo Pérez Bravo (in following article in this issue).

8. Immigration New Zealand, ‘Working Holiday Scheme Visa Holder Survey Report’, Oct 2022 (www.immigration.govt.nz/documents/ media/working-holiday-scheme-visa-holder-survey-october2022-report.pdf).

9. ‘Is NZ too dependent on China for Trade?’, Exporter today, 12 Aug 2020 (exportertoday.co.nz/article/nz-too-dependent-china-trade).

10. ‘Beneficios comerciales entre Nueva Zelanda y América latina’, BizlatinHub, 26 Oct 2021 (www.bizlatinhub.com/es/beneficios-come rciales-nueva-zelanda-america-latina/).

11. ‘Latin America and New Zealand Business Council’ (www.lanzbc. co.nz/)

12. ‘Latin America Centre of Asia–Pacific Excellence’ (cape.org.nz/latinamerica-cape/).

13. ‘New Zealand explores ties with Mercosur’, 8 Mar 2018 (www.bee hive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-explores-ties-mercosur).

14. ‘MFAT, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership’ (www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/ free-trade-agreements-in-force/cptpp/).

15. Karol Trujillo Miranda et al, ‘Tratado Integral y Progresista de asociación Transpacífico’, Revista de Filosofía, vol 40, no 104 (2023), p.400 (doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7645301).

16. ‘The Cairns Group’ (www.cairnsgroup.org/).

17. Fontagro (digital.fontagro.org/nz-alc/).

18. Secretaría del Tratado Antártico, ‘El Tratado Antártico’ (www.ats. aq/s/antarctictreaty.html).

19. ‘Chris Hipkins to travel to North and South America to promote New Zealand to international students’, 12 May 2022 (www.newshub. co.nz/home/new-zealand/2022/05/chris-hipkins-to-travel-to-northand-south-america-to-promote-new-zealand-to-international-stude nts.html).

20. OECD Stat (stats.oecd.org/Index aspx?DataSetCode=EDU_ENRL_ MOBILE).

21. Education New Zealand (www.enz.govt.nz/).

22. Think New, New Zealand Education (scholarships.enz.govt.nz/).

23. Latin America and Spain Film Festival (www.lasffnz.co.nz/).

New Zealand’s Latin American and Caribbean Parliamentary Friendship Group meeting with the ambassadors of Chile, Mexico and Cuba and the deputy chief of mission of Brazil at Parliament in 2021

New Zealand–Mexico diplomacy insights

This interview with Mexico’s ambassador to New Zealand, HE Alfredo Pérez Bravo, provides a comprehensive overview of the bilateral relations between the two countries. Highlighting the 50th anniversary of their diplomatic ties, the ambassador discusses the growth in trade, cultural exchanges and challenges posed by geographical distance. Emphasising the impact of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), he suggests pragmatic strategies for future collaboration. Addressing the vibrant Mexican community in New Zealand, the interview also underscores the importance of modernising diplomatic relations, fostering individual connections and capitalising on mutual strengths for a more dynamic partnership.

HE Alfredo Pérez Bravo has been Mexico’s ambassador to New Zealand, with cross-accreditation to Samoa, Tonga and Tuvalu, since 2019. A career diplomat in the Mexican Foreign Service, with 48 years of service in the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he has, in the the past 34 years, represented Mexico in 52 countries in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia, Europe and Oceania.

Pilatowsky: How would you describe the current state of diplomatic relations between Mexico and New Zealand?

Pérez Bravo: The year 2023 marked a milestone in Mexico–New Zealand relations with the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of bilateral relations. Two events were held, in Auckland and Wellington, attended by entrepreneurs, academics and experts from various fields. These events gauged the pulse of the bilateral relationship and the different perspectives on its meaning. Mexico is New Zealand’s main trading partner in all of Latin America, putting us in a very peculiar situation.

I have been working at the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 48 years. When arriving in a country as an ambassador, it is crucial to analyse the presence of conflicts in the bilateral relationship. There are no conflicts in the case of Mexico and New Zealand, but rather the relationship has unfolded in a spirit of collaboration and friendship, supported by a high degree of agreement between both countries.

Despite the absence of conflicts, the relationship has not yet reached its full potential, considering the size and international importance of both nations. Mexico stands out as one of the main global players in foreign trade. For example, we are on the list of the top ten countries in the world in food production and on the list of the fifteen largest economies, surpassing our Latin American neighbours. New Zealand is a relatively small country with a population of 5 million, but it has an influential voice in multilateral forums. New Zealand has a series of attributes that make it an exemplary country in terms of minority inclusion, gender equality, respect for human rights, absence of corruption and transparency. Therefore, the relationship should be expanded in terms of trade, academics, culture and technology. The pandemic, which caused the closure of borders for more than two years, has been a significant obstacle, interrupting the exchange of people, delegations and key events for the bilateral relationship.

Currently, there is a process of relaunching the relationship underway to overcome the impasse caused by the pandemic. Over the past four decades, relations have focused on multilateral contacts, with a limited bilateral approach. Latin America has not been a priority in New Zealand’s foreign policy, as seen,

Priscila Pilatowsky Goñi interviews Alfredo Pérez Bravo, Mexico’s ambassador to New Zealand.

for example, in the speeches of the foreign ministers. This is understandable for many reasons, especially geographical ones. However, joint involvement in multilateral forums has been very active. Delegations from Mexico and New Zealand have worked together to advance positions and international documents. An example is our shared positions against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus, there are many coincidences, and on the bilateral front the relationship has been opening up over the past three decades, especially thanks to the growth of the Mexican community in New Zealand. Twenty-five years ago, there were about 50 Mexicans in New Zealand. Now there are around 3000 individuals.

Pilatowsky: What are the key areas of co-operation and collaboration between Mexico and New Zealand at this time?

Pérez Bravo: New Zealand and Mexico have a history of active collaboration in the multilateral arena. Over the past two years, the implementation of the first free trade agreement, known as the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership), has been a significant development. As founders of the agreement, Mexico and New Zealand have worked together to make this possible. During the pandemic, an interesting collaboration emerged between the two countries, particularly in the healthcare sector, given Mexico’s role as a producer of medical equipment. For example, Fisher & Paykel, a company with offices in Tijuana, experienced a surge in producing user-friendly respirators with the involvement of Mexican engineers. This collaboration led to an increase in trade as Mexico exported medical equipment, and New Zealand’s investments contributed to the increase in production.

Academic co-operation is another key area of interest. There is mutual interest between Mexican and New Zealand universities to establish deeper collaborations, but travel restrictions and economic impacts on university budgets have been significant obstacles. New Zealand universities have stopped receiving foreign students, which has significantly affected their revenue. In the case of Mexico, academic exchanges have primarily focused on the United States, with recent expansions to Europe and Asia.

Additionally, the cultural aspect has been crucial since my arrival four years ago. In New Zealand, I have observed a unique affinity for Mexican culture, particularly in terms of gastronomy. Even in small communities, there are Mexican restaurants, often with a Tex-Mex influence. It is interesting to note that many New Zealanders express having visited Mexico. Despite the geographical distance, New Zealanders who travel have chosen Mexico as a destination. This cultural connection remains easily and spontaneously maintained, unaffected by the distance. I al-

so observe that Mexican museum curators continue to collaborate with museums in New Zealand, such as Te Papa. Moreover, researchers have maintained contact with groups and universities in Mexico during the pandemic. This dynamic will continue to increase in the future.

Pilatowsky: New Zealand and Mexico are geographically distant. What opportunities and challenges does this present for strengthening ties?

Pérez Bravo: Having served as the head of eight embassies and been accredited as Mexico’s ambassador to 52 countries, I bring 34 years of experience in the ambassadorial rank. Over this period, my perspective on relationships has evolved into a more reasoned structure than in the early stages.

As I stated earlier, when assuming the role of ambassador, the initial task is to conduct an objective analysis of the state of the relationship. It goes beyond reviewing official documents; it is crucial to understand how Mexico is perceived in the host country. In my experiences in Russia, Malaysia and Portugal, there was limited information about Mexico. Many Kiwis, even those well-educated, sometimes view Mexico as a South American country and lack a clear understanding of our relationship with the United States. Providing accurate information becomes a challenge, especially when media coverage of Mexico may not be favourable.

In essence, the challenge lies in supplying information. In discussions with the Latin America CAPE (Centre for Asia–Pacific Excellence), I emphasise the need for a rigorous analysis of Latin America, as often it is viewed as a singular entity.

Drawing from my experience as an ambassador in Africa from 1990 to 1994, accredited to 39 countries, it is essential to recognise that Africa is not a homogenous entity but a collection of diverse nations. Similarly, the same misconception occurs here. Latin America is a region with vast economic disparities and distinct differences. Information gaps are crucial, as opportunities are identified based on awareness.

The challenge extends to Mexico and New Zealand. If you were to ask people in Mexico about New Zealand, their knowledge might be limited to its natural beauty and rugby. The interest arises from information and knowledge. We cannot ignore the geographical distance, but we must be aware of it.

Language plays a pivotal role. The Working Holiday Visa programme is a case in point. While there is considerable de-

Ambassador Alfredo Rogerio Pérez Bravo and family with Dame Patsy Reddy, Sir David Reddy and Phil Twyford when he presented his credentials at Government House in Wellington in November 2019

Ambassador Pérez Bravo with Governor-General Cindy Kiro and their respective spouses

mand from thousands of Mexicans eager to participate, Kiwis have a limited interest in going to Mexico due to the language barrier. This linguistic disparity influences the success of programmes and initiatives. As ambassador, I have advocated for the importance of the Spanish language, reaching out to universities like Victoria University of Wellington, emphasising its significance as the second most widely spoken language after English. Language serves as a crucial tool for fostering connections.

Pilatowsky: How would you describe the current trade and economic relations between both countries, and what advice would you give to entrepreneurs?

Pérez Bravo: Before the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership came into effect, there were no treaties, and the relationship between Mexico and New Zealand was quite modest. This agreement changed the commercial landscape. In the last three years, trade has grown by 40 per cent. Currently, our trade stands at over $700 million per year. When I arrived as ambassador, trade was around $440 or 450 million. Now it is over $700 million, but I suspect it is even higher because the figures are not entirely documented; there is a lot of unregistered trade. The treaty has given another dimension to the commercial relationship.

My advice to New Zealand entrepreneurs is that anyone looking to engage in any activity must first gather comprehensive information about the sector they want to participate in. Entering the vast Mexican market without adequate information or contacts can be challenging and fraught with risks. Therefore, it is essential to understand the markets, mechanisms and the CPTPP before engaging in any activity.

To navigate the Mexican market confidently, I advise entrepreneurs to follow these recommendations: firstly, consult other New Zealand companies operating in the country; secondly, ask companies from your country about their experience in Mexico; and lastly, find a good local partner. A good partner can provide quality information and guidance, allowing you to understand the terrain better. They can also provide information about notaries and lawyers and advise on where to go and where not to. It is equally important to consider the embassies, universities, non-governmental organisations, scientists and recognised chambers of commerce to gather valuable information.

Pilatowsky: What programmes or cultural exchange initiatives are currently in place between Mexico and New Zealand?

Pérez Bravo: Officially, the only programme currently operating is the Working Holiday Visa. There are no scholarships or official programmes to fund researchers, scientists or academics, or anything at an official level, which is a gap that needs to be addressed. Financial resources have been allocated to other areas. With new governments come new priorities and ways to support different sectors. New Zealand should keep this in mind while creating programmes that can support contributions in the scientific and academic realms.

In my opinion, after four years as ambassador, one of the most important sectors for Mexico is the training of human resources. I am convinced that New Zealand can offer us a lot in terms of human resource development. It has excellent universities, and many Mexicans pursuing post-graduate studies in New Zealand have made significant progress in their academic work thanks to the high level of study and research in New Zealand. There are sectors where Mexico should focus, especially in agro-industrial, genetic engineering and food productivity. In New Zealand, these sectors are very advanced. While Mexico has sought technology from the United States and Germany, in many regions of Mexico, such as the south-east, New Zealand’s innovation would be very useful, especially in the dairy industry and agri-industry.

For instance, Lincoln University has a magnificent research programme. A Mexican is currently studying in a post-doctoral programme on the possibilities of the land to increase plants’ nutrient absorption. Mexico allocates significant amounts of water for agriculture, while urban centres are thirsty for water and face significant leaks. We could learn from New Zealand on optimising water use in agriculture. Hence, there is a need to train Mexican human resources in New Zealand. An approach is needed that trains human resources but ensures that these resources will return to Mexico. Many people who come for training end up staying in New Zealand and do not generate benefits for Mexico.

Pilatowsky: What would you recommend to improve the procedures for Mexicans to study or conduct research in New Zealand?

Pérez Bravo: The change in priorities in the bilateral relations between New Zealand and Mexico has affected students and researchers. The immigration policy of New Zealand is highly restrictive, and obtaining a visa can be a challenging and timeconsuming process. This is a serious issue that needs to be addressed as many students from Africa, Latin America and the Middle East are facing difficulties in obtaining visas, despite having the means to fund their studies. In contrast, students from China, Korea, Malaysia and Japan have been arriving in New Zealand.

While attending a meeting organised by Education New Zealand, I learned about the appeal of studying at New Zealand universities. I found it surprising that there has been a significant decrease in the number of students from certain regions following the pandemic. For this reason, I advise students to prioritise the visa process as it can prevent them from having problems even if everything is arranged at the university.

Additionally, I have proposed to the governments of various Mexican states to fund the travel and tuition of ten young individuals to study in New Zealand. The commitment from the students would be to return to Mexico and apply their knowl-

Ambassador Pérez Bravo meets Prime Minister Chris Luxon

edge in the productive sector of the states. This will help in the progress of having specialists in Mexico.

I have also suggested increasing the number of work holiday visas in New Zealand. The current scheme allows young individuals to only find employment for three months, which makes it challenging to secure a job unless it is in the hospitality and services sectors. Therefore, it is essential to revise current immigration policies to make it easier for students and researchers to come to New Zealand.

Pilatowsky: What can you tell us about the role of the Mexican community in New Zealand and its contribution to the bilateral relationship?

Pérez Bravo: According to our census, there are around 3000 registered Mexicans in New Zealand. The majority of them, 80 per cent, are young individuals under the age of 50. Surprisingly, 70 per cent of them have a university degree, including individuals with master’s degrees, doctorates or post-doctorates. Mexicans in New Zealand are known for their high level of education, and most of them are well-placed in academia or in managerial positions in companies. Some even own their own businesses, such as restaurants. Being a well-educated group, Mexicans have a significant impact on the development of the society where they are located, especially when considering that New Zealand has a population of only 5 million people. The Mexican community has made a notable contribution to the bilateral relationship between Mexico and New Zealand, and I am proud of my relationship with this community.

Pilatowsky: Mexico and New Zealand have been active proponents of international organisations and initiatives. Are there specific global issues or forums where both countries consistently align?

33 Latin American countries, the United States and some European countries. This treaty gave rise to the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL). Additionally, both Mexico and New Zealand have joined forces in the fight for gender equality, disarmament, human rights and the protection of the environment.

Pilatowsky: How do you envision the future of the Mexico–New Zealand relationship, and what steps are being taken to further strengthen these ties?

Pérez Bravo: Relationships must learn to modernise, to adapt to the times, and in this regard I see that this relationship must become more pragmatic and effective. It should carefully define the niches that can enhance benefits for both parties and work from there to make that sector more dynamic and efficient, whether at an institutional or governmental level.

Another aspect to work on is to make the relationship increasingly about individuals rather than government departments. As there is a broad base of scientists, their personal contact with Mexican scientists is crucial for the relationship.

In the coming years, the focus of the relationship should shift towards a strategy of precision targeting specific areas, sectors and individuals, fostering greater exchange and interaction among people and aligning the multilateral efforts of Mexico and New Zealand with bilateral co-operation between the two countries. While there is excellent collaboration on international issues, there is minimal collaboration and communication at the bilateral level between New Zealand and Mexican institutions. The challenge is to make bilateral what is currently multilateral, finding synergy between these two areas.

Pilatowsky: As ambassador, what do you consider to be the most significant achievements in the relationship between Mexico and New Zealand during your tenure?

Pérez Bravo: I have been in my position for four years, and I will continue to serve for some more time. The original programme I brought, which focused on meetings and delegations, had to be abandoned due to the prolonged border closures that lasted for over two years. This atypical situation has defined my management style.

A significant accomplishment has been restoring Mexico to the forefront of New Zealand’s foreign policy. A key aspect of my efforts has involved defining and cultivating the specific niches that each country offers to the other. One example is the promotion of information about the CPTPP. We ensured that stakeholders, businesses and the public were well-informed about the benefits and implications of this agreement. This initiative has been pivotal in nurturing a more dynamic relationship with active participation across various sectors.

Pérez Bravo: We have observed a remarkable 95 per cent alignment in positions between Mexico and New Zealand on global issues. Few countries exhibit such a high degree of consistency. The significance lies in the positive energy generated by the collaborative engagement of Mexico and New Zealand within the international system. For example, we agree on the fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Mexico hosted the celebration of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), ratified by

Albeit less apparent, another achievement is the maintenance of a conflict- free relationship, especially in the realm of commerce. Another notable success of the Mexican embassy has been the attention devoted to the Mexican community in New Zealand. We played a crucial role in assisting over 400 stranded compatriots through co-ordinated rescues and establishing a newfound, close rapport between them and the embassy. We successfully organised celebratory events such as the Day of the Dead, created videos and interviews featuring community members and promoted academic gatherings, like a conference with twelve Mexican post-doctoral researchers in Christchurch. Despite facing logistical and international challenges, we sustained and bolstered the commercial relationship, particularly during the border closures.

Mexico and New Zealand have recently celebrated 50 years of diplomatic relations

Cuban foreign policy and New Zealand relations

Edgardo Valdés López examines Cuba’s foreign policy challenges since the 1959 Revolution, highlighting its successes in health diplomacy, international forums and efforts to overcome the US blockade.

Since the 1959 Revolution, Cuba’s foreign policy has faced numerous challenges. Despite discrediting campaigns and isolation attempts on the part of the United States, it has been strategically engaging with the global community. Its foreign policy has aimed at eliminating its isolation and promoting the truth about Cuba globally through various means as it has sought to overcome the adverse impact of the US blockade. It has done so in international forums and through a successful health diplomacy effort. Cuba has demonstrated resilience and commitment to UN principles. Despite facing hurdles, it actively collaborates with countries like New Zealand in healthcare, education and climate change mitigation.

Edgardo Valdés López was Cuba’s ambassador to New Zealand from 1919 to 2023, bringing with him extensive experience as a specialist and director in the Strategic Planning and Analysis Department at the General Political Planning Department of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His diplomatic career includes roles as third secretary in the Cuban embassies in Peru (1985), Ecuador (1988) and Mexico (1989), as well as active participation in Cuban delegations to ministerial conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement in Zimbabwe (1986) and Cyprus (1989).

Cuba’s foreign policy has faced significant challenges following the Revolution in 1959 and the hostile policy of the United States. In April 1960, Lester Mallory, the US deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, wrote:

The majority of Cubans support Castro…. There is no effective political opposition…. The only foreseeable means of alienating internal support is through disenchantment and disaffection based on economic dissatisfaction and hardship. He recommended ‘a line of action which… makes the greatest inroads in denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government.’1 In essence, that has been, and is, the focus of the US policy towards Cuba, a country smaller than the South Island of New Zealand, located 144 kilometres from a powerful neighbour that declares what they call ‘regime change’ as its goal.

In the 1960s, the United States imposed an economic, commercial and financial blockade against Cuba, which is still intensifying today and has an extra-territorial nature. They also broke diplomatic relations, suspended Cuba from the Organisation of American States and forced other countries in the region, except Mexico, to interrupt their ties with our island.

There was a deliberate attempt to make Cuba fail and isolate it in order to prevent the spread of what was considered a ‘bad example’. From that point on, disinformation and discredit campaigns were launched, along with various hostile acts, including the well-known military invasion of the Bay of Pigs.

Cuba’s foreign policy aimed to eliminate its isolation and promote the truth about Cuba globally through various means. This was achieved by building strong relationships with political parties, liberation movements and a vast network of solidarity organisations.

During his presidency, Barack Obama recognised that the US isolation policy against Cuba ended up isolating the United States. In the scenario after the disappearance of the Soviet Union and changes in many of Cuba’s main trading partners, the country’s foreign policy has prioritised mitigating the economic effects of the blockade. This involves not only denouncing the blockade but also supporting economic and commercial

relations, diversifying trade partners and promoting tourism and investments.

Global solidarity

Cuba’s doctors, teachers and technicians have provided their services on all continents, and numerous young people from different parts of the world have been trained in Cuban schools and universities.

During the Angolan War (1975–2002) President Agostinho Neto requested Cuba’s assistance in preserving Angola’s independence and defeating apartheid. As a result, thousands of Cubans contributed to the cause. Cuba also became an active member of the Non-Aligned Movement and even presided over it. Also in this context, Cuba’s links with the Soviet Union, China and the so-called socialist bloc helped to break the country’s isolation and lessen the economic effects of the US blockade. At that time, they called Cuba a ‘satellite’ of the Soviet Union, but when the planet disappeared, the supposed satellite continued on its own way.

Today, Cuba’s success in breaking its isolation is evident, with 126 embassies abroad, in addition to 20 consulates and five other official representations. Moreover, there are 113 embassies, eight consulates and two other official representations in Havana.

The Organisation of American States has been replaced by the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) as the main regional organisation, and Cuba is a founding member, and it does not include the United States. Cuba also has an active mechanism for political dialogue with the European Union, which does not share the hostile approach of the United States.

UN advocacy

Since 1992, the United Nations General Assembly has annually approved a resolution titled ‘The necessity of ending the economic, commercial, and financial embargo of the United States of America against Cuba’. This resolution is opposed only by the United States and Israel. Last 2 November, 187 countries, including New Zealand, voted in favour of the resolution, only one abstained, and again the United States and Israel voted against it. New Zealand expresses opposition to this policy in its responses to the UN secretary-general.

In 2023, Cuba presided over the Group of 77 plus China, which includes 134 countries and is the primary instance for consultation in the United Nations.

Last September, 116 delegations and over 30 heads of state or government met in Havana, in the presence of UN SecretaryGeneral Antonio Guterres, for a summit dedicated to the role of science in promoting development and Agenda 2030. The final statement emphasised the negative impact of unilateral sanctions on the development of nations.

Despite being a small country threatened by a powerful neighbour, Cuba is an active defender of the United Nations Charter and its principles. Cuba advocates for a world based on United Nations rules rather than US rules, which are altered based on US interests, as seen in Washington’s position on the current conflict between Israel and Palestine.

Cuba also demands the reform of the United Nations to make it truly democratic and participatory, with a transparent and democratised Security Council and a rejuvenated General

Assembly.

Despite being small countries, both Cuba and New Zealand are active in international organisations. Our work as members of the UN Security Council and the exchanges in this regard are a perfect example of our co-operation.

Global shifts

Cuba has significant political capital on the international scene, but transferring this support to the economic, commercial and financial field is complex, due to the strong influence of the United States and its extra-territorial laws, far beyond its borders.

Canada, Great Britain and several countries of the European Union are among Cuba’s main trading partners, tourism providers and investors. Businessmen from these countries view not having to compete with large American companies as an advantage, alongside the stability, security, highly qualified workforce, natural beauty and other benefits that Cuba offers. The Cuban government has relaxed regulations and expanded business and investment opportunities, providing additional incentives for these countries.

Some of these countries have passed laws to prevent the application of US blockade regulations on their territory due to their high volumes of trade and investment with Cuba. However, Washington’s control over international banking mechanisms complicates Cuba’s interaction with them. In other countries, like New Zealand, the government does not intervene to prevent the application of US regulations, despite opposing the sanctions policy. In both cases, the blockade discourages trade, investments and tourism.

Recently, the US policy’s impact has intensified as Donald Trump, for electoral reasons, added Cuba to the list of state sponsors of terrorism a week before leaving the White House. President Joe Biden has not reversed this decision, and he has relied on the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 to state that ‘the continued exercise of those authorities with respect to Cuba for one year is in the national interest of the United States’.2

However, Cuba’s relations with Latin America are very favourable. Regional integration and co-operation create attractive possibilities. Additionally, China and Russia play a more significant role on the international stage as economic actors,

t A demonstration organised by the Cuba Friendship Society outside the US consulate in Auckland in 2019

Cuban doctors prepare to leave for Jamaica to help fight Covid-19

Multilateral exchanges

Cuba has expressed its willingness to establish a more normal and constructive relationship with the United States based on mutual respect and equal conditions, which would benefit both countries. We have repeatedly shown our willingness to discuss any issue, and every agreement we have reached has been strictly followed by us, even in cases where Washington has not. Cuba’s development plans and foreign policy are designed to overcome the blockade for as long as necessary.

Despite the challenging global scenario, we continue to promote peace, multilateralism, co-operation and respect for international rules among all actors. Cuba and New Zealand share similar positions on the main issues of the international agenda, and we have a good bilateral relationship with a history of co-operation in different areas.

In 2003, eight Cuban specialists advised a literacy programme in New Zealand that started in three communities with 525 participants: two Maori and one South Islander Pacific. Later the programme covered more than five thousand participants, using the Cuba method ‘Yes, I can’.

We are committed to implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals and prioritise fighting climate change. We are working hard to promote co-operation in these areas from the presidency of the G77 plus China.

Specialists on agricultural issues from Cuba and New Zealand have exchanged valuable information on the ground despite the differences in climate and soil. New Zealand’s experiences and advice have been of great value to Cuba. However, trade and investment between the two countries are limited due to the extra-territorial effects of the US blockade.

countries with which Cuba has a stable strategic relationship. The questioning of unilateralism and dependence on the dollar, as well as the emergence of new mechanisms and groups, such as BRICS, the Union of Eurasian Nations, PetroCaribe, ALBA, among others, are also positive options for Cuba.

Health diplomacy

As of now, the success of Cuban vaccines against Covid-19 and the commendable work of Cuban doctors in European countries during the pandemic have generated greater knowledge and recognition of Cuba’s quality healthcare system and biotechnology industry. This has opened up new opportunities for Cuba’s medical and scientific co-operation, which was previously limited to only a few southern countries. Currently, Cuban doctors and nurses work in countries like Italy, Mexico, Vietnam and Qatar, to name a few countries with higher economic development than Cuba.

Cuba has provided medical assistance to the Pacific Islands, where Cuban doctors have saved lives in Kiribati, Vanuatu and Nauru. Until 2022, 220 professionals from that region graduated in Cuba, and 34 young people from the Pacific are currently studying medicine in Havana.

Cuba has a high number of doctors and nurses of recognised quality with years of experience working abroad, particularly in remote areas and with less-favoured population groups. The potential for joint work in the Pacific and the Caribbean is vast, and we can do a lot together on health issues, education, climate change mitigation and disaster management.

In the late 1990s, Cuban researchers’ work was useful for developing a vaccine to stop the spread of meningococcal B in New Zealand. The vaccine was used in the country between 2004 and 2011.

Cuba has been purchasing powdered milk from Fonterra for many years, and it exports coffee, rum and cigars to New Zealand. However, New Zealand nationals face limitations in interacting with Cuba, and local companies have difficulties making payments to their Cuban suppliers. For instance, New Zealand citizens cannot travel directly from the United States to Cuba or use the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA). Their credit cards may also be cancelled if used in Cuba.

Moreover, the Cuban embassy faces serious restrictions in operating with banks, and Cuban residents also face difficulties in interacting with their families in Cuba. These limitations hinder the growth and deepening of the relationship and cooperation between Cuba and New Zealand.

Cuba views foreign policy as a matter of survival and bases it on principles that are never negotiated for concessions or benefits. Despite the complex scenario and economic constraints, Cuba prioritises constructive interaction with the world. We are convinced that this scenario is an opportunity for change, given the evidence that the current order has failed.

NOTES

1. Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mallory) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom), 6 Apr 1960, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960 vol VI. Cuba (history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus195860v06/d499).

2. The White House, ‘Memorandum on the Continuation of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act’, number 2023-10 (www.whitehouse.gov/brief ing-room/presidential-actions/2023/09/13/memorandum-on-thecontinuation-of-the-exercise-of-certain-authorities-under-the-trading-with-the-enemy-act-3/).

A demonstration organised by the Cuba Friendship Society outside the US consulate in Auckland in 2019

Cultural diplomacy between New Zealand and Latin America

Lee Davidson uses a Mexican case study of museum and state collaboration in international exhibitions to reflect on New Zealand–Latin America cultural relations.

Cultural relations between New Zealand and Latin America include a wide range of activities from state-supported cultural diplomacy to non-state actors such as museums pursuing an international agenda to transnational networks of individual artists. The agreement to exchange two landmark exhibitions, Te Papa’s ‘E Tū Ake: Standing Strong’ and the Mexican Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia’s ‘Aztecs: Conquest and Glory’, was a landmark event. It not only provides a good example of museum and state co-operation in pursuit of intersecting objectives but also raises questions about how the value of cultural relations might be better evaluated and appreciated in order to ensure its future potential is realised.

In the early 1970s, ‘Portrait of Mexico’, one of the largest exhibitions ever seen in New Zealand toured the country. It featured sculpture, painting, ceramics, pottery, folk art and religious art, spanning 35 centuries from pre-Columbian to contemporary works and was accompanied by a team of Mexican experts who gave lectures and guided tours.1

International exhibitions are a common form of cultural diplomacy. Some are fully state funded to achieve foreign policy goals, while others involve non-state actors, such as museums, pursuing their own mission, market and diplomatic agendas, that are often aligned with national foreign policy agendas. Organised by the Mexican Secretaría de Cultura and the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council of New Zealand, ‘Portrait of Mexico’ was a seminal event in terms of cultural relations between New Zealand and Latin America. It took place at the same time as formal diplomatic relations between New Zealand and Mexico began in 1973. The 1970s also saw the establishment of the first dedicated Cultural Exchange Programme within New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.2

Dr Lee Davidson is an associate professor in museum and heritage studies at Te Herenga Waka Victoria University of Wellington. Her areas of expertise include visitor studies, intercultural museum practice, cultural diplomacy and international exhibitions.

Four decades later, a close relationship between Mexico’s Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia (INAH) and the Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa resulted in the exchange of two landmark exhibitions: ‘E Tū Ake: Standing Strong’ and ‘Aztecs: Conquest and Glory’. This first ever formal exhibition exchange between New Zealand and Mexico was the subject of an in-depth investigation of international exhibitions, cultural diplomacy and intercultural dialogue.³ This article gives an outline of the diplomatic work of this exchange as an example of museum and state co-operation in pursuit of intersecting objectives on the international stage. The case study also gives insight into the evolution of cultural exchanges and diplomacy with Latin America and considers its potential futures.

Brief history

While culture has long been implicated in international relations, the emergence of contemporary forms of cultural diplomacy can be traced to the post-Second World War era, when UNESCO established a programme to encourage member states to create exhibitions for international tours and ex-

Photo above: Part of the opening ceremony for the ‘Aztecs: Conquest and Glory’ exhibition

changes with the goals of ‘encouraging understanding among nations’.⁴ Mexico was an early adopter of touring cultural exhibitions to help achieve foreign policy goals. In the 1950s, the Mexican government presented a series of ambitious art exhibitions that toured extensively throughout Europe over the following decade.

These exhibitions were a phenomenal success in terms of public reach, with almost nine million visitors across Europe.⁵ They were a forerunner of the ‘blockbuster’ phenomenon which became popular from the 1970s onwards, with large exhibitions in major centres attracting millions of visitors to view national artistic and archaeological treasures.

In the 1980s, a pivotal moment in New Zealand’s cultural diplomacy took place with the US tour of the exhibition ‘Te Maori’, which attracted high visitation and widespread media coverage. The foreign ministry played a crucial role in facilitating the tour, with the aim of raising awareness of the country’s growing strategic importance, providing a platform to further explore trade, investment and tourism interests and enhancing the prestige of Māori.⁶

After its opening in 1998, Te Papa’s international touring activity was kick started with government funding of NZ$1.25 million to develop ‘The Lord of the Rings Motion Picture Trilogy — The Exhibition’, which toured to eight international venues in the mid-2000s, attracting an audience of over one million.7 Following this success, Te Papa received further government funding to develop ‘Whales|Tohorā’, which has been touring North America since 2007, drawing blockbuster audiences and critical acclaim.

Current debates

While highly successful in terms of public reach and media attention, blockbuster national exhibitions have been critiqued as often being ‘politically-safe’ forms of national branding that reinforce existing stereotypes.⁸ There is an inherent tension, critics argue, between the instrumentalism of cultural diplomacy in advancing national interests, on the one hand, and the achievement of some of its more lofty goals such as mutual understanding and dialogue, on the other.⁹

Cummings defines cultural diplomacy broadly as ‘the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding’,10 while Simon Mark is more precise: cultural diplomacy is carried out by governments in support of their foreign policy goals or diplomacy (or both), which might include raising a country’s profile through positive national branding and/or countering negative impressions.11 New Zealand’s official cultural diplomacy policies have tended to focus on forms of national

branding, with the Cultural Diplomacy International Programme (CDIP) established in 2004 to support cultural programmes that projected ‘a distinctive profile of New Zealand as a creative and diverse society with a unique, contemporary culture strongly rooted in its diverse heritage’.12

However, it has been observed that there is a decline in the state monopoly of cultural diplomacy and the increasing involvement of non-state actors.13 There are also calls for cultural diplomacy to be less nationalistic and focus instead on the promotion of global cultural citizenship.14 Rather than pursuing national and corporate interests, a cosmopolitan cultural diplomacy, Villanueva argues, might be based in ‘the recognition that the construction of a peaceful community of states matters as the highest goal for diplomacy’, and that its aim might be ‘constructing long-lasting friendly relations among states by inviting their societies to learn from each other in the construction of cosmopolitan cultural attitudes.’15 Considering these debates, our study of the Mexico–New Zealand exhibition exchange sought to understand how the project evolved, and what were the roles and drivers of both the museums and the state actors involved, and to what extent it promoted cosmopolitan values and intercultural dialogue.16

Partnership development

In the early 2000s Te Papa was interested in bringing exhibitions from places they had rarely received them from in the past, including the wider Pacific and Central and South America. In 2006, then Chief Executive Seddon Bennington visited Mexico and initiated discussions with the INAH. A period of several years followed during which connections were made and relationships established, a process that was assisted by the New Zealand embassy in Mexico. At the same time, Te Papa was in discussion with Melbourne Museum and the Australian Museum around the possibility of a collaborative venture to bring international exhibitions to Australasia, based on the principle that the three museums working together could secure and develop larger shows than were possible for one institution alone. A show coming from Mexico with large, heavy objects would be costly, so sharing the financial risk was appealing for Te Papa. For Mexico, the prospect of having the exhibition hosted by three of the largest museums in the South Pacific was attractive as it promised a more sizable audience.

Rather than charging fees for exhibitions, the Mexican government’s approach is to send and receive international exhibitions as part of a reciprocal exchange. At the time Te Papa was developing ‘E Tū Ake: Standing Strong’ as a touring exhibition, and it was agreed that this exhibition would be presented in Mexico City from April to July 2012. With the decision to exchange ‘E Tū Ake’ for an Aztec exhibition, the foundation of the cultural exchange based on a partnership between the INAH and a consortium of Australasian museums led by Te Papa was set in place.

While the exhibition exchange was initiated by the museums and sat outside New Zealand’s formal programme of cultural diplomacy, diplomatic agencies and the foreign policy environment played a crucial role, including growing government interest in strengthening ties with Latin America. In August 2000 the New Zealand government launched a Latin America strategy aimed at increasing its engagement with the region, including exchanges in the arts and culture field.17 During the first decade of the 21st century bilateral trade between Mexico and New Zealand doubled, and there was a ‘dramatic upsurge’ in cultural and educational links.18 In 2007, President Felipe Calderón vis-

John Key in Mexico City in 2013 with President Enrique Peña Nieto

ited New Zealand and pledged his commitment to an on-going strengthening of ties, while Prime Minister John Key made a similar commitment in Mexico City in March 2013, a few months before the opening of ‘Aztecs’ in Wellington.19

From the museum’s side, Michael Houlihan, chief executive from 2009 to 2014, was focused on building Te Papa’s international brand. Wen Powles, an experienced diplomat, was seconded to the national museum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade specifically to help develop an international strategy and was subsequently appointed as Te Papa’s international strategy advisor. The strategy sought to leverage the museum’s existing international reputation, while breaking into markets that were more challenging in terms of cultural and language differences, but that were important for New Zealand. In its 2012–13 Annual Report Te Papa described its international activities as ‘aligned with government priorities and… supported wholeheartedly by New Zealand’s diplomatic representatives around the world, and partner country representatives in Wellington’.20

State involvement

Bringing ‘Aztecs’ to New Zealand depended on government support and co-operation. Negotiations to secure contracts for the project were demanding, protracted and expensive. New Zealand’s embassy in Mexico was involved from the beginning, facilitating communications, hosting meetings and maintaining contact with INAH staff. At the ‘E Tū Ake’ opening ceremony, it provided New Zealand wines and hosted a small greeting event for INAH staff, and later invited them to the Mexican premieres of The Hobbit movies.

The Mexican embassy in Wellington also assisted to make the exchange successful, stepping in when necessary to help Te Papa navigate Mexican bureaucracy and secure insurance, welcoming INAH staff when they arrived and participating in pōwhiri at Te Papa. They also worked to soften relations between the INAH and Te Papa when the exhibition’s departure from Mexico was delayed. The ambassador played a key role in the opening and closing ceremonies for ‘Aztecs’, including organising a Mexican cultural group — coincidentally in the country for celebrations of 40 years of New Zealand–Mexico diplomatic relations — to perform at the opening event.

Ambassador Leonora Rueda felt that ‘Aztecs’ was the ‘top achievement’ during her tenure in New Zealand. It gave her the opportunity to talk about the culture and history of Mexico and show people that there was more to the country than what is portrayed in the media, for example in relation to export products, such as chillies and avocados, which were cultivated in pre-Hispanic times. As a former diplomat and Te Papa international advisor, Wen Powles also believes that ‘Aztecs’ helped strengthen the diplomatic relationship between the two countries.

Museum diplomacy

For museum professionals involved, the exchange had value in terms of building relationships, forming communities of practice, increasing understanding and enhancing the reputations of their institutions, as well as their countries. Some Te Papa staff spoke of the ‘diplomatic’ nature of their work, encompassing communication styles, open-mindedness and willingness to incorporate other perspectives, while being respectful and receptive to the feelings and needs of others. Māori concepts and museum practices were particularly important in fostering relationships and creating conditions for intercultural feelings and

understanding. Kanohi ki te kanohi is a physical interaction that conveys integrity and credibility. Manaakitanga expresses respect for the mana of others, generosity and reciprocity. These concepts were put into practice through the performance of welcoming ceremonies for visiting staff and the blessing of their collections — thereby acknowledging their mana. They had a profound impact on Mexican couriers and helped to build mutual respect and trust, cementing ‘professional friendships’ that were viewed as reciprocal and long-lasting. The day-to-day practice of manaaki, or hospitality, complemented these more formal protocols.

Our study, therefore, shows that museums are performing diplomacy through international exhibitions in ways that intersect with broader national agendas, and that while stated institutional intentions might focus on instrumental purposes, staff themselves held unmistakably cosmopolitan aspirations. To understand whether these exhibitions succeeded in creating a favourable, or countering a negative, image of a country, we asked visitors what their impressions of each country were before they visited the exhibition and whether or not they had changed as a result of their visit. Visitors to ‘Aztecs’ often had an existing negative impression of contemporary Mexico that they attributed to media reports and ‘crime dramas’. This included drug cartels, violence, corruption, over-population and poverty. More benign impressions included stereotypical images of a colourful and exotic country, Mexican food, tequila, sombreros and beach resorts.

There was a mixed response from visitors as to whether or not ‘Aztecs’ had changed their impressions of contemporary Mexico. Despite a small section at the end of the exhibition on the legacy of the Aztecs, many visitors left confused about what happened to the Aztecs post-conquest. So although visitors gained a greater understanding of Mexican history and were curious to learn more, the exhibition tended not to make a deep impact on their impressions of contemporary Mexico, particularly the sense that it was a dangerous place to travel.

While we have data from only a very small number of visitors to ‘E Tū Ake’, their thoughts are an interesting point of comparison because of a relative lack of prior knowledge about New Zealand among Mexicans and because the exhibition spoke about both the past and the present. Our interviewees’ impressions of New Zealand after visiting the exhibition were consistently positive: they were curious to learn more and they had a strong desire to travel there, although the cost was seen as prohibitive. Interestingly, even though the exhibition included stories of Māori protest and struggle that showed aspects of New Zealand society in a poor light, this did not lead to negative

Mexico’s Ambassador Alfredo Pérez Bravo opens the ‘De la Milpa a la Mesa — A Mexican Food Journey’ exhibition in Wellington in 2021

assessments of the country as a whole. Instead it was appreciated that the exhibition addressed the ‘reality’ and did not just show the ‘romantic’ side of the culture. In the context of Mexican society at least, this open reflection on ‘difficult’ histories generated admiration. This finding warrants further research: can exhibitions that tackle difficult issues such as conflict and protest, as part of an overall ‘hopeful’ story, be effective ambassadors in cultural diplomacy, engendering respect and admiration, perhaps even more so than sanitised or romanticised depictions of national cultures?

Visitor numbers to ‘Aztecs’ fell short of expectations, and this sparked debate about the financial value of international exhibitions versus their value as forms of cultural exchange and diplomacy, and the future sustainability of international exhibitions like ‘Aztecs’. Concern was expressed that Te Papa would now be inclined to take more commercial shows, like dinosaurs and lego, rather than doing exhibition exchanges that build international reputation and push intellectual boundaries. While recognising the importance of financial bottom lines, there was clear support among museum staff, visitors and other stakeholders for a broader understanding of the value of international exhibitions, including for the purposes of building national reputations and intercultural understanding.

Project legacies

The New Zealand–Mexico exchange was an ambitious project with a high financial cost, but clear benefits in terms of both

state and museum diplomatic agendas. Most of these benefits are not formally measured and evidenced, which is an obvious disadvantage in terms of advocating for future projects, and this issue needs addressing, as Leticia Pérez Castellanos and I discuss in our book Cosmopolitan Ambassadors. For now, given the cost and complexity, it seems unlikely that another similar project will be undertaken with Latin America, at least for some time to come.

One long-term outcome from the exchange has been the research collaboration it initiated between myself and Pérez Castellanos, who is professor at the Escuela Nacional de Conservación, Restauración y Museografía in Mexico City. Our meeting in Wellington in 2013, when she visited as part of the team organising ‘Aztecs’, led to the research project, publication of our book in English and Spanish, numerous conference presentations, articles (both academic and practitioner focused), symposia and workshops, all with the aim of promoting the benefits and best practice for cultural exchange, both with Latin America and, more broadly, in the interests of cosmopolitan values and intercultural dialogue.

In 2020 we received funding from the Latin America Centre of Asia–Pacific Excellence (LatAm CAPE), which was established in 2017 to enhance New Zealand’s engagement with Latin America, including by ‘broaden[ing] and deepen[ing] New Zealanders’ understanding of the region’s diverse cultures, societies, languages, politics, and economies’ and ‘enhanc[ing] New Zealand’s economic, trade, political, and cultural relationships within the region’.21 Our project with the LatAm CAPE included an internship programme for young creatives in New Zealand and Mexico focused on producing an exhibition about contemporary Mexican life and culture for a New Zealand audience, putting into practice what we had learned from our research. The exhibition aimed to create a space in which New Zealanders could hear Mexicans tell their own stories, to get beyond the clichés and stereotypes, and it deepened New Zealanders understanding and appreciation of Mexican history, language and culture, as well as the strong links and common interests between us. ‘De la Milpa a la Mesa — A Mexican Food Journey’ was first presented in Wellington in early 2021. It was so successful that we then toured the country, from Christchurch to Foxton and finally to Auckland. By the time it closed in May 2023, it had been seen by thousands of New Zealanders. Along with producing the exhibition, we undertook further research to evaluate the success of the process and trialled a survey tool aimed at collecting evidence of the impact of cultural diplomacy on audiences.

Looking ahead

During the last several years, LatAm CAPE has been a valuable partner in promoting cultural relations between New Zealand and Latin America. However, its funding is set to end in June 2024. An important legacy of its work is the Creative Collaborations on-line platform, launched in late 2023, as a curated survey of the partnership between Aotearoa New Zealand’s and Latin America’s creative economies. It showcases the projects, people, and institutions at the forefront of our creative engagement with Latin America. By sharing the diversity and prosperity of these partnerships, Creative Collaborations aims to spark new relationships and creative initiatives.22

The platform is the first attempt to map the extent of past and present cultural relations between New Zealand and Latin America and provides a valuable record and resource. It makes

Te Papa advertising the ‘Aztecs: Conquest and Glory’ exhibition

visible the impressive depth and diversity of these cultural relations, from single artist shows through to large touring exhibitions; exhibitions at regional museums and galleries through to major metropolitan institutions; and exhibitions focusing on indigenous cultural expression through to immersive digital media. On a more intimate scale, creatives from New Zealand and Latin America regularly meet up and work together through festivals, books, websites and other projects that enable them to share traditional creative expression with audiences, through film, dance, storytelling and theatre.

Much of this activity takes place without the benefit of an extensive infrastructure and funding to support it. It is evidence of what has been described as the ‘new’ cultural diplomacy which bypasses a state-centred, top-down approach, and emphasises mutuality, exchange and reciprocity, increasingly utilising new media to communicate directly with international audiences.23 Rather than focusing on projecting attractive national brands, these are transnational networks, often based on shared professional commitments, working towards a more harmonious world through collaborative cultural projects and dialogue.

NOTES

1. Portrait of Mexico’, Creative Collaborations (nd) (creativecollabora tions.nz/portrait-of-mexico, acc 23 Dec 2023).

2. Simon L. Mark, ‘A Comparative Study of the Cultural Diplomacy of Canada, New Zealand and India’ (unpub PhD thesis, University of Auckland, 2008).

3. Lee Davidson and Leticia Pérez Castellanos, Cosmopolitan Ambassadors: International Exhibitions, Cultural Diplomacy and the Polycentral Museum (Wilmington, Delaware, 2019).

4. Grace L. McCann Morley, ‘UNESCO’s Exchange of Exhibitions Program: The First Circulating Exhibition’, Museum, vol 3, no 4 (1950), p.284.

5. Carlos Molina, ‘Fernando Gamboa y Su Particular Versión de México’, Anales del Instituto de Investigaciones Estéticas, vol 27, no 87 (2013); Fernando Gamboa, ‘Exposición de arte mexicano en París’, in Carmen Gaitán (co-ord), Fernando Gamboa, embajador del arte mexicano (Mexico, 1991).

6. Mark, op cit.

7. Te Papa, ‘Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa Te Pūrongo ā Tau Annual Report 2007/08’ (Wellington, 2008); Mark, op cit.

8. Brian Wallis, ‘Selling Nations: International Exhibitions and Cultural Diplomacy’, in Daniel J. Sherman and Irit Rogoff, Museum Culture: Histories, Discourses, Spectacles (Minneapolis, 1944), pp.265–81.

9. Ien Ang, Yudhishthir Raj Isar and Mar Phillip, ‘Cultural Diplomacy: Beyond the National Interest?’, International Journal of Cultural Policy, vol 21, no 4, p.370 (2015); Melissa Nisbett, ‘New Perspectives on Instrumentalism: An Empirical Study of Cultural Diplomacy’, International Journal of Cultural Policy, vol 19, no 5 (2013), pp.557–75 (doi.org/10.1080/10286632.2012.704628); David Carter, ‘Living with Instrumentalism: The Academic Commitment to Cultural Diplomacy’, International Journal of Cultural Policy, vol 21, no 4 (2015), pp.478–93 (doi.org/10.1080/10286632.2015.1042470).

10. Milton Cummings, ‘Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A survey’, Cultural Diplomacy Research series (Washington DC, 2013) (www.americansforthearts.org/sites/default/files/MC Cpaper.pdf).

11. Mark, pp.62–4.

12. Ibid., p.153.

13. Patricia M. Goff, ‘Public Diplomacy at the Global Level: The Alliance of Civilizations as a Community of Practice’, Cooperation and Conflict, vol 50, no 3 (2015), pp.402–17 (doi org/10.1177/0010836715574915).

14. Ang, Isar and Phillips, p.370; Yudhishthir Raj Isar, ‘Culture in EU External Relations: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?’, International Journal of Cultural Policy, vol 21, no 4 (2015), pp.494–508; Carter, pp.478–93.

15. César Villanueva Rivas, ‘Cosmopolitan Constructivism: Mapping a Road to the Future of Cultural and Public Diplomacy’, Public Diplomacy Magazine (2010).

16. Davidson and Castellanos, op cit.

17. Mark, op cit.

18. Lourdes Aranda, ‘Mexico and New Zealand: growing ties’, NZ International Review, vol 35, no 5 (2010), p.15.

19. John Key, ‘New Zealand and Mexico: strengthening a 40-year relationship’, NZ International Review, vol 38, no 3 (2013), pp.25–6; Aranda, pp.15–19.

20. Te Papa, ‘Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa Te Pūrongo ā Tau Annual Report 2012/13’ (Wellington, 2013).

21. ‘About Us’, Centres of Asia–Pacific Excellence (nd) (cape.org.nz/ about-us/, acc 24 Dec 2023).

22. ‘About’, Creative Collaborations (nd) (creativecollaborations.nz/ about, acc 23 Dec 2023).

23. Goff, pp.402–17; Carter, pp.478–93.

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Cuba, New Zealand and doctors for the Pacific

Medical co-operation has been a well-known part of Cuba’s foreign policy for over five decades. What is less known is that country’s commitment to training doctors for the world, the reach of this programme into the Pacific and New Zealand’s involvement in the programme. Cuba’s connections in this part of the world, including the presence of Cuban doctors, has developed steadily in the last two decades. With a shared commitment to addressing healthcare challenges in the Pacific region, New Zealand has connected with this programme, addressing the key challenges inherent in bringing Cuban and Cuban-trained doctors to the region.

In 2017 a panel of Latin American diplomats assembled at the Latin American studies conference at Victoria University of Wellington. Asked to speak about connections between their nations and the Pacific region, most focused on trade and tourism opportunities. The final speaker was Mario Alzugaray, the Cuban ambassador to New Zealand at the time. Alzugaray raised a laugh with his claim to difference. His job, he said, was cigars and doctors.

Cuba’s legendary (and sometimes controversial) doctors are well known. Hundreds of thousands of Cuban doctors have served in Latin America and Africa in the five decades since the revolution. What is less known is Cuba’s commitment to training doctors for the world, and the reach of this programme into the Pacific. Over the past decade this co-operation has contributed to a doubling or more of doctor numbers in some countries in the region, including an increase in the total number of doctors in Kiribati from eighteen to 51. Remarkable increases have also been recorded in the Solomon Islands (79 to 170), Tonga (44 to 80), Vanuatu (27 to 67) and Tuvalu (seven to 27).

This article will provide some background to Cuban medical internationalism and the presence of Cuban doctors in the region, before exploring the ways in which New Zealand has connected with and contributed to this programme.

Cuban internationalism

Sharon McLennan is a senior lecturer in development studies at Massey University. She has teaching and research interests in critical and decolonial approaches to development, global citizenship and global health, and has a background in nursing and international volunteering.

Co-operation in health has been an essential component of Cuba’s foreign policy for more than five decades, and Cuban doctors, particularly those associated with the Henry Reeve International Medical Brigade, engage in a variety of activities aimed at providing healthcare services and expertise to countries in need. While this co-operation is most visible during crisis events, much of the work is

Sharon McLennan highlights Cuba’s longstanding commitment to medical co-operation globally, particularly in the Pacific, and explores New Zealand’s involvement and contributions.

Mario Alzugaray

usually directed towards long-term public and primary health care. This focus is particularly significant. It is based on the values of solidarity, equity and the right to health, and on Cuba’s experience building a relatively well performing health system that provides Cubans with better access to healthcare and longer life expectancies than those in many developed countries.1

Up until 1999 Cuban medical co-operation was largely focused on sending Cuban health professionals to serve in other nations. But Cuba has also recognised that having foreign doctors staff health systems indefinitely is unsustainable, and that ‘the ideal provider is a well-trained, homegrown health professional’.² To address this Cuba created medical scholarships for international students. Recipients study for six years at the Latin American School of Medicine (ELAM) in Cuba for free under the agreement that upon completion of their studies they return home to serve their communities. The purpose of the ELAM is, therefore, to train students from lower income and medically under-resourced communities who will go on to serve their countries.

Cuba’s commitment to universal health care and recognition of the value of primary care is deeply embedded in the education provided by the ELAM, ‘providing hands-on learning about social determinants’ effects on health; sharing responsibility for addressing spatial inequalities and delivering equitable, accessible services; going beyond pedagogical innovations to include integration of graduates into local health systems’.³

From the beginning, the ELAM’s goals reflected Cuba’s commitment to solidarity, internationalism and sustainable development, with programmes that aimed to build health care capacity in countries around the globe, educating doctors primarily for public service who have competencies in comprehensive primary care.4 While Cuban brigades continue to offer support, the scholarship programme is viewed as more empowering to local communities, and better equipped to serve their long-term needs.

Cuban assistance

The first nation in the wider Pacific region to receive Cuban assistance was the newly independent nation of East Timor. Over a decade Cuba trained nearly 1000 doctors at the ELAM and deployed 300 Cuban doctors to provide medical care and to supervise and further train students and new doctors. This programme spread across the South Pacific, with approximately 50 Cuban doctors serving in Kiribati, Nauru, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu between 1999 and 2017, including specialists in oncology, nephrology, psychiatry, endocrinology, internal medicine and others — many of whom were the only such specialists in country at that time.⁵

In addition, between 2014 and 2023 over 250 students from the Pacific were given scholarships to study in Cuba, including Cook Islands (one), Fiji (34), Kiribati (38), Micronesia (one), Nauru (four), Palau (seven), Solomon Islands (109), Tonga (fourteen), Tuvalu (21) and Vanuatu (25). As these newly trained doctors have returned home over the past decade the impact has been significant. Data presented at the thirteenth Pacific Health Ministers’ Meeting in 2019 shows a significant increase in the number of doctors employed by several Pacific ministries of health, including, as noted, a doubling of the number of doctors in Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Vanuatu.⁶ While there are no official reports on the impact of the Cuban programme and improvements cannot be solely linked to the Cuban programme, many key health statistics have continued to improve across the region.

Qualitatively, there have been some notable improvements

in health delivery with the return of the Cuban-trained doctors. For example, early in the programme, Cuban-trained doctors were identified as a driver in the strengthening of Kiribati’s health system,⁷ enabling doctors to spend more time with patients and deliver higher value care. This improvement was also seen by staff at Tungaru Central Hospital in Tarawa, Kiribati, where staff noted that since the beginning of the Cuban programme the number of departments at the hospital that had a full team (nurse, medical intern, registrar, specialist) had increased and the ability of the hospital to respond more promptly to afterhours medical care and emergency situations had improved.⁸

In addition to training doctors, Cuba provides support for health more generally. This includes high-level support as a dialogue partner of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), which was reiterated at the recent 52nd PIF Leaders’ Meeting in the Cook Islands where Cuba reasserted its commitment to friendship and co-operation, and support for the PIF Strategy 2050. Cuba also offers scientific and medical advice and support. This includes hosting a virtual meeting between Cuban and Pacific officials and health specialists during the pandemic to share experiences and knowledge in the fight against Covid-19, collaboration with Solomon Islands researchers on medicinal plants and a willingness to work with Pacific Islands and partner states to create a regional centre for the treatment of diabetes, which would draw on Cuba’s successful development and use of Heberprot P for the treatment of diabetic foot ulcers.

Diplomatic relationship

The relationship between New Zealand and Cuba dates back to the mid-20th century, a period marked by the global geopolitical shifts of the Cold War. Despite their geographical separation and differing political ideologies — New Zealand being a staunch advocate of Western liberal democracy and Cuba

Craig Hawke and Cuba’s Ambassador María del Carmen Herrera Caseiro sign the co-operation agreement to support Cuban health care in the Pacific Islands on 12 February 2015

embracing socialism under Fidel Castro — the two nations established diplomatic ties in 1972. This historic decision set the stage for a relationship that has weathered the challenges of ideological differences and persisted through the decades.

In recent years, alongside trade (including the importation of cigars and rum), New Zealand’s relationship with Cuba has included diplomatic engagement, cultural exchanges and cooperation in various areas such as healthcare, education and agriculture. New Zealand’s involvement in supporting Cuba’s programme to train doctors for Pacific Islands nations has been an important part of this, reflecting a shared commitment to addressing healthcare challenges in the Pacific region. New Zealand’s support for this programme addressed some of the key challenges inherent in bringing Cuban and Cuban-trained doctors to the region and includes direct co-operation through language training for Cuban doctors en route to work in Pacific nations, and less direct support to assist the integration of Pacific doctors trained in Cuba and elsewhere into practice.

Language training

While the provision of doctors is an important contribution to health in the region, Cuba is a Spanish-speaking country, and this creates a language barrier between Cuban doctors and Pacific health workers and communities. To help bridge this barrier, for many years New Zealand supported language training for Cuban doctors, with programmes for Cuban doctors provided by the Bay of Plenty English School.⁹ This began in February 2015 when Craig Hawke, acting chief executive of New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Cuban Ambassador María del Carmen Herrera Caseiro signed a co-operation arrangement, in which New Zealand agreed to fund and provide an eighteen-week English language training course for up to fif-

teen Cuban doctors, and to pay for the airfares of those doctors from Cuba to New Zealand and onwards to the islands when they finished the training course. At the time, Hawke called the agreement a significant milestone in New Zealand’s relationship with Cuba, and a practical, tangible piece of co-operation.10

This programme was renewed in 2017 for a further three years during a visit by then Minister of Foreign Affairs Gerry Brownlee to Cuba. In signing the renewal, Brownlee noted that since 2015 the arrangement had delivered positive results in the Pacific and emphasised New Zealand and Cuba’s shared interest in the Pacific and an on-going commitment to small islands developing states.11

Key role

New Zealand has also had an indirect but key role in addressing another major challenge, this time for Cuban-trained Pacific Islands doctors and their home countries — the need to complete internships before they could be licensed and practice independently as doctors. Previously medical graduates from across the Pacific had completed internships through the Fiji School of Medicine. However, at the same time that the first cohort of Cuban-trained doctors were due to return to Kiribati, the Fiji National University closed its internship programmes to applicants from non-Fijian medical schools.12 This created a major problem for smaller Pacific states as it came at a time when new actors were increasingly diversifying the training of Pacific students. In addition to Cuba’s ELAM, this included I-Shou University (Taiwan), Oceania University of Medicine (Samoa) and to a lesser extent institutions from Russia, Morocco, China and elsewhere.

Kiribati was one of the first Pacific states to welcome home a significant cohort of Cuban-trained medical graduates and needed an internship training programme fast. The Kiribati Internship Training Programme (KITP) was a creative strategy launched primarily in response to the return of the Cuban graduates.13 This was implemented by the Kiribati Ministry of Health and Medical Services with technical guidance from Fiji National University, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the World Health Organisation. While initially funded by Australia through DFAT and managed by Fiji National University, from 2017 to 2019 the KITP was supported through a bilateral agreement with New Zealand. The aim of the two-year programme was to facilitate the integration of foreign-trained medical graduates into Kiribati’s health system and to establish a pathway to full qualification so they can work as medical professionals.

The future

While New Zealand’s role in Cuba’s programme to provide doctors to the Pacific has not been large, it has been significant, providing support and assistance to help Pacific nations take advantage of Cuba’s doctors and medical training. The key role played by New Zealand as trilateral partner in the KITP and language programmes alongside MFAT’s emphasis on primary and universal health care14 — areas in which Cuba has particular expertise — indicates that there is room for co-operation that aims to not only provide curative services to Pacific people but also prevent illness in the first place.

This potential is evident in meetings between the Cuban ambassador and Māori leaders over the past three years. In 2020, the ambassador was gifted a Māori taonga made by royal carvers from the jaws of the whale that they had used to carve Kiingi Tuheitia a baton, symbolising his aspirations of future relations.

Ambassador Edgardo Valdés with Kiingi Tuheita, his wife Makau Ariki and chief of staff Archdeacon Ngira Simmonds on 24 October 2023

This was followed up with a meeting with iwi leader Tuku Morgan and other community leaders in September 2022 at Te Ohaaki Marae, where future co-operation, particularly in the field of health was discussed. In a private audience with Kiingi Tuheitia in October 2023, Cuba reiterated this support, stating Māori can ‘count on Cuba’.15

There is also potential for collaboration in biotech, including vaccine development. Despite the on-going US embargo, which makes access to supplies and equipment an on-going struggle, Cuba has an innovative and highly successful biotech sector, and was able to quickly develop effective Covid-19 vaccines, and to subsequently vaccinate a large portion (more than 90 per cent) of its population.16 In addition to vaccinating its own citizens, Cuba demonstrated its global solidarity through exports of vaccines and vaccine production technology.17

There has been considerable interest in New Zealand in Cuba’s model for vaccine development, and New Zealand has previously drawn on the work of Cuban researchers in the MeNZB meningococcal group B vaccine used in New Zealand between 2004 and 2011. In 2023 Cuban chemical research scientist Marianniz Díaz Hernández met with officials from Auckland’s Te Whānau o Waipaeira Trust, MFAT and the University of Auckland’s School of Medicine to discuss the experience of her country’s biotech industry and vaccine development.18 As Dr Nikki Turner, medical director of Auckland University’s Immunisation Advisory Centre, noted in an article in the New Zealand Doctor website:

Being fully government funded, Cuba’s biotech sector isn’t compromised by corporate interests and the work researchers undertake isn’t ‘siloed off’… [which] means you can put more of an equity lens on things and look at what the population actually needs. Whereas when you have large multinationals involved, their focus is often on where they can make a profit.19

While Cuba–New Zealand co-operation is relatively small, past, present and potential future collaborations with Cuba in health are significant. The co-operative effort in providing doctors for the Pacific underscores New Zealand’s commitment to enhancing healthcare capacity in the region, leveraging the expertise and resources of both nations. The exchange involves not only the provision of medical education but also the cultivation of a diverse and culturally sensitive healthcare workforce, and demonstrates how international partnerships can play a crucial role in addressing the unique challenges faced by Pacific Islands nations in terms of healthcare access and delivery. While the future of this co-operation under the current coalition government is unclear, there is considerable potential for Cuba to contribute to building a more resilient and sustainable healthcare infrastructure in the Pacific and here in New Zealand, forging bonds that extend beyond national borders for the betterment of the entire region.

NOTES

1. Carissa F. Etienne, ‘Cuba aims for Universal Health’, Pan American Journal of Public Health, vol 42, no 64 (2018), pp.1–2 (doi. org/10.26633/RPSP.2018.64); PAHO, ‘Country Profile: Cuba’ (2021)

(hia.paho.org/en/countries-2022/cuba-country-profile).

2. Conner Gorry, ‘Six Decades of Cuban Global Health Cooperation’, MEDICC Review, vol 21, no 4 (2019), p.86.

3. Ibid.

4. Sharon McLennan, Robert Huish and Christine Werle, ‘The gift of health: Cuba’s development assistance in the Pacific’, The Pacific Review, vol 35, no 1 (2022), pp.90–115 (doi.org/10.1080/09512748 .2020.1808053); Yoandra Muro Valle, Heidy CantilloVento, Mirvia Espino Suárez, Raúl Urquiaga Rodríguez, ‘La internacionalización en la ELAM: origen y vigencia’, Convención de Salud (2022) (con vencionsalud.sld.cu/index.php/convencionsalud22/2022/paper/ viewFile/2718/1268).

5. Felipe Delgado Bustillo, ‘Unidad Central de Cooperación Médica: Anuario 2017’, UCCM (2017); McLennan, Huish and Werle, pp.90–115.

6. Sharon McLennan and Christine Werle, ‘We are the ones who will have to make the change: Cuban health cooperation and the integration of Cuban medical graduates into practice in the Pacific’, Human Resources for Health, vol 21, no 36 (2023) (doi.org/10.1186/ s12960-023-00822-8); WHO, ‘Health workforce development in the Pacific — A deep dive into the Pacific Medical Workforce’, Thirteenth Pacific Health Ministers Meeting (www.who.int/westernpa cific/about/how-we-work/pacific-support/pacific-health-ministersmeetings).

7. Representaciones diplomáticas de Cuba en el exterior, ‘Minister for Local Government expresses appreciation for Cuba’s cooperation in the Pacific region’ (2016) (misiones.minrex.gob.cu/en/articulo/ minister-local-government-expresses-appreciation-cubas-coopera tion-pacific-region, acc 27 Jan 2017).

8. Sharon McLennan, Helen Leslie and Christine Werle, ‘The gift of health: Cuban medical cooperation in Kiribati’, Pacific Dynamics: Journal of Interdisciplinary Research, vol 7, no 1 (2023).

9. Representaciones diplomáticas de Cuba en el exterior, ‘Cuban doctors complete English training program in New Zealand’, 11 Apr 2017 (misiones.cubaminrex.cu/en/articulo/cuban-doctors-completeenglish-training-program-new-zealand).

10. RNZ Pacific, ‘NZ to help Cuban doctors with English’, 19 Feb 2015 (www. rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/266539/nz-to-help-cuban-doc tors-with-english).

11. Gerry Brownlee, ‘NZ to support training of Cuban doctors’, 29 Jun 2017 (www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-support-training-cuban-doc tors).

12. Rob Condon, Robbert J. Duvivier, Revite Kirition, Kafoa Berlin, Judy McKimm and Graham Roberts, ‘Medical internship programs in the Pacific: Current situation and future challenges’, Human Resources for Health Knowledge (Sydney, 2013).

13. Jemesa Tudravu and Graham Roberts, Independent External Review: Kiribati Medical Internship Training Program (KITP) (2019).

14. MFAT, ‘Pacific Regional Four Year Plan’, Oct 2021 (www.mfat.govt.nz/ en/countries-and-regions/australia-and-pacific/).

15. Representaciones Diplomáticas de Cuba en el Exterior, ‘Maori king receives the Cuban ambassador’, 24 Oct 2023 (misiones.cubaminrex.cu/en/articulo/maori-king-receives-cuban-ambassador).

16. Sandro Galea and Paul C. Erwin, ‘Improving the US and Global Pandemic Response: Lessons From Cuba’, American Journal of Public Health, vol 113, no 4 (2023), pp.361–3.

17. Achal Prabhala and Victor Ido, ‘Next pandemic, let Cuba vaccinate the world’, Washington Post, 1 Jun 2023; Mitchell Valdés-Sosa, ‘Despite U.S. Embargo, Cuba Aims to Share Homegrown Vaccine with Global South’, Democracy Now, 27 Jan 2022 (www.democracynow. org/2022/1/27/cuba_beat_covid_despite_us_embargo).

18. Stephen Forbes, ‘Still under sanctions, Cuba punches above its weight in biotech’, New Zealand Doctor, 4 Aug 2023 (www.nzdoc tor.co.nz/article/news/still-under-sanctions-cuba-punches-aboveits-weight-biotech).

19. Ian Powell, ‘Cuban Health System Lessons’, Scoop, 2 Sep 2023 (www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL2309/S00002/cuban-health-systemlessons.htm).

Dr Nikki Turner

Presenting the Latin American option

Matthew O’Meagher discusses the history of the Latin America CAPE and what it reveals about recent New Zealand–Latin American relations.

The Latin America Centre of Asia–Pacific Excellence (LatAm CAPE) at Victoria University of Wellington was created by the previous National-led government to prepare New Zealanders to engage and do business with Latin America. Through its programmes, resources and partnerships it has introduced exporters, students and other sectors of society to the economies and cultures of this neglected region and to successful ways of engaging with it. Its journey has revealed definite interest in greater links with Latin America, and its innovations have prepared the ground for relations to grow and for Latin America to appear on more Kiwis’ mental maps.

In June 2016 New Zealand’s Tertiary Education Minister Steven Joyce invited our nation’s universities to establish ‘Centres of Asia–Pacific Excellence’ as focal points for New Zealand’s relationships with North Asia, South-east Asia and Latin America. Underpinning this invitation was a belief in the importance of each region to our nation’s future economic success and a desire to unlock expertise on them within academia to benefit exporters, students and officials.1 I was in the room at Victoria University of Wellington when the minister extended this offer, and, as the president of the Latin America New Zealand Business Council at the time, I saw it as an unprecedented opportunity to strengthen our country’s ties to our Latin neighbours across the Pacific. Nine months later, therefore, I was delighted when the next tertiary education minister, Paul Goldsmith, also came to Victoria to announce that my university would host the Latin America and South-east Asia ‘CAPEs’ and the University of Auckland would host their North Asia peer.

Dr Matthew O’Meagher is the director of the Latin America Centre of Asia–Pacific Excellence at Victoria University of Wellington. He was previously the founding director of the New Zealand Centre for Latin American Studies, New Zealand’s first education counsellor for Latin America and president of the Latin America New Zealand Business Council.

How then to seize this opportunity? In keeping with the joint bid we had made, the three centres would be managed by a consortium of both these institutions, plus Waikato and Otago universities. Accordingly, our response to our mandate would need to draw on the interests and strengths of the four partners and be co-ordinated with them. Each centre was given clear riding instructions by our funding agency, the Tertiary Education Commission, and shown how our plans and outcomes would be monitored. Individually, we were told what our mission, objectives and expected impacts and outcomes were; for the ‘LatAm’ CAPE, they included creating ‘a step change in New Zealanders’ knowledge and skills relating to Latin America’ and enhancing ‘public awareness of the importance of Latin America to New Zealand and in the world’.² Collectively, also, we were asked to help New Zealand become better prepared to do business and engage with the Asia–Pacific region, to enhance economic, trade, political and cultural relationships there, and to focus most of our attention on two distinct spheres: small business and education. As we all began our work, furthermore, we were encouraged to achieve some ‘quick wins’.

First initiatives

To be useful to businesses, the LatAm CAPE had to start with two facts: most Kiwi exporters did not see Latin America as a market, nor did small and medium enterprises typically turn to academia for advice. The first fact put us in a different space from our North Asia and South-east Asia peers: whereas they had to differentiate themselves from other organisations helping Kiwis approach their regions, our challenge was — and is — to grow awareness of the benefits of doing business with Latin America. From our beginnings to the present, therefore, much of our work for businesses has focused on introducing the opportunity Latin America provides to exporters willing to enter its markets carefully and in an informed way, and on explaining why the region can be profitable for them — despite its absence from most trade forums and some negative stereotypes it bears. To overcome the second hurdle, meanwhile, we knew we had to innovate in the ways we transferred knowledge to make insights about Latin America available to smaller firms. In our early years, therefore, we created a range of accessible and high-quality outputs, from videos of Kiwis succeeding in Brazil through to workshops and exporter case studies. Because we were an unfamiliar entity, too, it made sense for us to develop some projects with established agencies like New Zealand Trade and Enterprise or New Zealand Story, who businesses already looked to for advice on market development options, and to speak at events by Latin American embassies or the Business Council to encourage exports there.

In the education sector our task was even bigger: aside from promising enrolments in Spanish courses Latin America was absent from New Zealand classrooms. To address the dearth of content on that region in our schools and to associate Latin America with creativity, therefore, we created trilingual resources to share New Zealand children’s stories and art about Latin America and an award-winning VR-based tool exploring sustainable tourism around Machu Picchu, then put them on a ‘TeachAPAC’ website established by a dedicated ‘cross-CAPE’ education team at Waikato. To start a talent pipeline of future leaders of Latin America, we worked with the Young Enterprise Trust to send cohorts of its ambitious entrepreneurial high school students to Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Argentina. And at the tertiary level, we worked with the other CAPEs on internship programmes and devised targeted mobility initiatives to complement Education New Zealand’s flourishing Prime Minister’s Scholarships for Latin America scheme and universities’ existing exchange programmes.

With another of our target clients, conversely, there was more of a base to build on. That client was the ‘public’, and

in them we saw an openness to Latin American culture and a chance to highlight cultural affinities. Because of its reach into towns and cities across our nation, therefore, we helped (and continue to help) Latin American embassies in Wellington market their annual Latin America and Spain Film Festival. Given the rugby connections between New Zealand and Argentina, we put on a half-time show at a Hurricanes–Jaguares game that generated a record number of visits to the Argentine embassy’s website, and to underline our base in academia we contracted educators, students and interns to produce an exhibition on Mexican food systems shown in Wellington, Christchurch, Foxton and Titirangi. More recently, too, we have switched from individual cultural projects to initiatives that cover the spectrum of the creative economies and reach wider constituencies. Over the last two years, we have run a national Aotearoa Spanish Language Week, in which we work with diaspora communities and high-profile individuals to promote the value of learning Spanish. Late last year, similarly, we launched a ‘Creative Collaborations’ website that ‘reveals the projects, people and institutions at the forefront’ of New Zealand’s ‘creative engagement with Latin America’.³

Extensive experience

Behind our CAPE’s early efforts were decades of experience our staff had acquired in fostering ties with Latin America. From 2020 onwards, however, the findings of annual polling we did of the New Zealand public and businesses informed our response to our mission as well. The results of these polls not only gave us an evidence base to test our assumptions and instincts against; they also showed us there was real interest among our compatriots in knowing more about Latin America. Among the most encouraging results were the fact that 84–87 per cent of business respondents between 2019 and 2021 thought Latin America was important to New Zealand; that 89–90 per cent of them thought knowledge of local ways of doing things was essential to success; that 71–84 per cent of them supported New Zealanders learning more Spanish or Portuguese; and that lack of knowledge or news about Latin America were among the biggest barriers to greater trade.4 In our most recent poll last November, in addition, we saw that business interest in Latin America had recovered from a decline in 2022, and that business respondents ‘nearly universally agreed that enjoyment and knowledge of languages and culture were important for business success’ there.⁵

The same blend of personal knowledge and poll evidence further encouraged us to support a distinguishing aspect of engagement with Latin America in any way we could: indigenous connections. From Chile in particular (but Brazil and Colombia as well) we saw a desire to learn about Māori experiences and interactions with the state in Aotearoa New Zealand, and in our polling we saw support for New Zealand entities to work with Latin American counterparts in promoting indigenous economic development. Across different stages of our own journey, therefore — and on top of the work a cross-CAPE Māori team at Waikato was doing to build an ecosystem of Māori students and businesses — we sponsored an MPI Māori agri-women’s delegation to Colombia, a Universities New Zealand indigenous languages revitalisation summit in Brazil, an indigenous education delegation to Chile, a programme introducing Māori and Pasifika businesses to Mexico and Colombia, a multilingual indigenous stories website from an alumna of that programme and an internship for one of the Waikato Māori team at the United Nations’ regional office in Santiago.

CAPE leaders meeting with the Latin American ambassadors in Wellington

t Joseph Michael presenting ‘Amazon Raised Up Sky’ at Te Papa

If we were to move the dial on connecting New Zealanders to Latin America, however, we knew we needed to win over hearts as well as minds. Our most ambitious project as we entered the current decade, therefore, was an ‘Amazon Raised Up Sky’ augmented reality tool we commissioned from the artist Joseph Michael, director of AUT’s ArtScience Lab. He was known to a team member through his work on projecting melting icebergs onto the UN building in New York, and in 2020 he turned his attention to capturing and visualising data on Amazonian ecosystems for us. By the end of that year he was presenting the fruits of filming in Brazil and a documentary about this new project filled venues and enthralled audiences throughout our land. In a second phase of the project, too, he converted this art, science and sustainability resource into an educational tool, ‘The Majestic Samaúma’, which was made available to schools through the CAPEs’ TeachApac website and Waikato’s Science Learning Hub.⁶ When our Waikato colleagues ran a large forum on global citizenship education last year, therefore, Michael was a natural choice to be an opening speaker.

Nimble responses

Making Joseph Michael’s work even more remarkable was the way he delivered it in the year Covid-19 hit. He was not the only one showing resourcefulness in connecting CAPE stakeholders to our regions during lockdowns, however; rather, the entire CAPE ecosystem found nimble new ways across 2020–21 to expose our diverse audiences to Latin America, North Asia and South-east Asia despite closed borders. For the LatAm CAPE, a prime example was our conversion of our study tours with Young Enterprise into domestic programmes which took new cohorts to the headquarters of New Zealand companies exporting to our region. A second and more orthodox change was our response to the disruption of supply chains through webinars and seminars exploring how Latin America could enter new dialogues around market diversification.⁷

To exacerbate the challenges we faced at this time, the CAPEs were simultaneously transforming ourselves in response to a scheduled mid-term review. In that review we were told that while we were all doing valuable things, the focus of the three centres was so different that stakeholders were struggling to understand what the overall CAPE project was about. To enhance our collective impact, therefore, we needed to streamline our activity, agree on a common strategy and build ‘stronger strategic relationships with complementary NZ organisations’.⁸ Over the course of that year, therefore, we developed a model for the next five years that focused on four ‘interconnected priority areas’, with ‘thought leaderships’ and ‘connectivity’ added to business and education. Alongside each CAPE’s embedded and strengthening work streams there would now be increased efforts to ‘leverage connections and partnerships’ and new programmes ‘to advance a whole-of-consortium approach to develop Asia–Pacific informed citizens’.9

From 2021 onwards, accordingly, new initiatives that touched all three CAPE regions arose to complement the continuing work of the headquarters teams to share subject matter expertise and content on their individual region. Prominent among these trans-regional innovations were the global citizenship and Māori ecosystem initiatives from Waikato noted above and an ‘Aotearoa Explorers’ children’s e-game and ‘Asia–Pacific Insights’ website developed at Otago. At the same time each CAPE consolidated its own portfolio. For the LatAm CAPE, new emphases included ‘building a critical mass of engagement to underpin wider, deeper and sustained relations with Latin

America; reframing the Latin America region in ways that raised awareness, challenged perceptions and grew understanding and capability; and fostering closer academic connections to address major issues of our time’.

One outcome of the tweaked approach produced immediate fruit and attracted international attention. ‘Winds of Change’ is a multi-disciplinary sustainability network between New Zealand and Chile that was imagined by an Otago academic, is delivered by Otago CAPE staff and is enabled and enriched by the LatAm CAPE deputy director. Through webinars, field trips and joint applied research projects it connects post-graduate students and early career professionals in both countries who are interested in addressing the common climate change challenges their societies face through the lenses of science, business, science policy and science communication.10 Now in its fourth year, Winds of Change has spawned two spinoffs: a parallel programme on North Asia with that CAPE and a multinational project created by one of its Chilean alumni, ‘The Ocean that Connects Us’, that sees school students at Auckland’s Rosmini College connecting with peers in Chile, Peru, Singapore, South Korea, India, the United States and Finland. Importantly, too, Winds of Change has become a valued contributor to official bilateral relations. In 2022 it featured in dialogues between then-Education Minister Chris Hipkins and Chile’s Ministry of Education and Council of Rectors, and in 2024 a visit of programme alumni to Chile is being planned with the New Zealand embassy’s assistance in Santiago.

Nor was Winds of Change the only new project to capitalise on the CAPEs’ inherent advantage over other entities introducing New Zealanders to the world: the privileged access to tertiary students they enjoyed through being based in universities. At the ‘cross-CAPE’ level, a professional development programme was developed by the North Asia CAPE for students attached to all three centres, new recruits were sent to NZIIA and Diplosphere conferences and the APEC Voices programme became a CAPEs responsibility. With borders re-opening, also, study tours resumed to all three CAPE regions, including an Open Doors mission to Chile last year to strengthen Spanish language capability. For the LatAm CAPE, however, our biggest push in this area was to create a Latin America Young Professionals Network under the Latin America New Zealand Business Council, or LANZBC, to mirror the Asia New Zealand Foundation’s Leadership Network. Behind this effort lay two impulses. First, we had had the privilege of interacting with some outstanding potential leaders of future relations with Latin America, so wanted to support their transition from the educational to professional worlds so they could become advocates for Latin American links in their workplaces. Second, this investment in the future was essential, as most of our country’s current business leaders were still not interested in the potential for trade with Latin America to boost our economy.

Changing conversations

As the history of New Zealand’s ties to Asia shows, it can take decades and even generations for a society to change the way it looks at a region, and for marginal markets to become central. Because the Latin America CAPE was funded to have immediate impacts not just long-term outcomes, however, we redoubled our efforts to influence the present as well. In line with the postReview strategy, we worked even closer with key stakeholders than we had since our birth. With the LANZBC, for example, we signed a strategic partnership and collaborated on events with ministers. With the NZTE, we co-developed a new set of videos

showcasing small and medium enterprises succeeding in Latin America and how that region was ‘bursting with opportunities’ for New Zealand exporters.11 With support from Education New Zealand, we joined minister Hipkins’ mission to Brazil and Chile as soon as international flights resumed. Invited by MFAT, we attended meetings of the government agencies most interested in Latin America. And supported by MFAT, NZTE, MPI, ENZ and the Ministry of Education, we developed a new data visualisation app, launched in February, that maps New Zealand’s ties to Latin America across business, diplomacy, education and society in ways that demonstrated that those links are far more widespread and numerous than is often appreciated.

In keeping with the CAPEs’ new focus on ‘connectivity’, too, we came up with another way to build a critical mass of multisector engagement to propel more relationships and show that New Zealanders were interacting with Latin America across diverse walks of life. Fortuitously, the last three years have seen a number of diplomatic anniversaries with Latin American nations, and these anniversaries have allowed us to organise events in Parliament that have brought together politicians, ambassadors, officials, academics, teachers, students, diaspora leaders and international affairs observers to celebrate bilateral ties in style. Many speakers or attendees at these gatherings have told us how honoured or touched they were to be part of these commemorations, while others have said that by hearing of connections beyond their own silos they learned about links between New Zealand and these countries of which they had no idea.

In our last months of current funding, furthermore, we have taken one further pioneering step to insert Latin America into more conversations about New Zealand’s future in uncertain times. Following the warm reception to a report on New Zealand’s trade relationship, barriers and opportunities with Latin America we commissioned last year,12 we commissioned four more studies that shine a light on significant but little-known aspects of our country’s ties with Latin America or speculate on new pathways to strengthen those ties. The themes of these studies are diplomatic synergies, supply chains and green transitions, trans-Tasman approaches to Latin America and Latin America and the South Pacific. And the research for them has revealed some significant points about the state of connections between New Zealand and Latin America today.

First, and most importantly — and despite most of their peers’ inattention to the region — influential businesspeople, officials, academics and commentators in our country see Latin America as important enough to New Zealand’s future to support these studies as formal advisers. Second, while they identify real hurdles to deeper relations, they also see niches where meaningful co-operation has occurred or could occur if fostered well. Certain themes kept recurring in their feedback as well, such as the common challenges New Zealand and its

Latin neighbours face, the number of areas in which they could work together, the need to strengthen transport connections, how language is a perceived barrier, the growing importance of Latin America’s strategic minerals, how international relations and supply chains are in flux, and how Māori–Pakeha relations and our nation’s green and independent reputation separate New Zealand out from other nations competing for Latin American attention. For several of these allies, too, perceptions of Latin America are critically important, as are the narratives we tell about the region through these commissioned studies and our other communications.

As we reflect on our journey as New Zealand’s only publicly funded entity focused on Latin America, therefore, we can draw important conclusions about the wider state of New Zealand’s links with this region. On the one hand, there is still much to do to put Latin America on Kiwis’ radars in non-superficial ways; on the other, we know from the generosity of our stakeholders in backing our work and from the impact it has had on participants there is an appetite for New Zealanders to become closer to Latin America. We have also seen that there are multiple ways to change perceptions, and that some sectors will be readier to change than others.

Timeframes matter too: in a context of geo-economic turbulence and constrained finances, we must attempt to shape the present, and seize advantageous openings like our new government’s interest in looking beyond our shores; simultaneously, though, we must also chip away patiently at barriers and stereotypes, and invest in how we want relations to look like when today’s youth become decision-makers. Above all, however, we must be realistic about present constraints in relations, but passionate about overcoming those constraints. The more we and other friends of Latin America in our society can do this, the more prospects there will be for Latin America to become an obvious choice for New Zealanders’ attention, like Asia now is.

NOTES

1. Steven Joyce, ‘$34.5 million for new Centres of Asia–Pacific Excellence’, 17 Jun 2016 (www.beehive.govt.nz/release/345-million-newcentres-asia-pacific-excellence), and Hansard, oral question 4, 5 Jul 2016.

2. Tertiary Education Commission, ‘Outcome statement for Latin America Centre of Asia–Pacific Excellence’ (www.tec.govt.nz/assets/ Publications-and-others/a19fea5cdf/Outcome-statement-for-LatinAmerica-CAPE.pdf).

3. creativecollaborations.nz/.

4. cape.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Kiwi-perceptions-of-Lat in-America-2021-presentation.pdf.

5. Talbot Mills Research, ‘General Public and Businesss results: CAPE – Latin America’, Nov–Dec 2023, p.2.

6. cape.org.nz/amazon-raised-up-sky/ and www.majesticsamauma. com/.

7. ‘Diversification as a Response to Trade Disruptions: Perspectives from New Zealand and Chile’ (youtu.be/_q5ragfke4A); ‘New Zealand, Mexico and North American Supply Chains’ (youtube/2AkxwVjWgkk); and ‘CAPE Business Series: Diversifying into new Asia–Pacific Markets’ (youtube/6BZ2G_n7XDs).

8. TEC, ‘Review of the Centre of Asia Pacific Excellence Fund, 2022’, p.3.

9. Centres of Asia–Pacific Excellency Strategy 2020–2025, and ‘Learn More about the CAPEs’ (cape.org.nz/about-us/).

10. ‘Winds of Change — Latin America’ (cape.org.nz/winds-of -change-latam/).

11. www.nzte.govt.nz/page/latin-america-bursting-with-opportunities.

12. cape.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Sense-Partners-NZLATAM-Trade-Report-30-June-2022.pdf.

The first Winds of Change field trip

Peter Fraser: towards a proper evaluation

For a quarter-century before his death, Sir Alister McIntosh contemplated crafting ‘a proper evaluation of Peter Fraser’s world contribution’. However, it was a casualty of his working on in Wellington’s corridors of power long after departing from his External Affairs/ Prime Minister era eyrie atop Parliament. He did gift an important statement on working with Fraser in wartime. McIntosh left also a legacy of Fraser material that will greatly enable future researchers to craft the biography Fraser warrants, which will properly shade the lightweight effort that Michael Bassett authored, with Michal King — essentially a decent enough social history of Peter Fraser’s years.

‘I’m being somewhat badgered about Peter Fraser. Of course it shows laziness and inertia that I haven’t done something over the years.… I’m now in a fix over a collaborator all very embarrassing as a matter of fact. I think I have left it too late.’ — Sir Alister McIntosh (1977)1

‘I think you were a bit grudging to the old boy. As Politicians go, he [Peter Fraser] was damned good.’ — Alister McIntosh (1951)2

‘When the outside world forced itself upon New Zealanders they found by unexpected good fortune a prime minister who was at his best in international affairs.’ — Gerald Hensley (2009)3

Alister McIntosh contemplated for a quarter-century crafting ‘a proper evaluation of Peter Fraser’s world contribution’.4 The exacting standards McIntosh would have imposed on himself had he journeyed on that task would have seen a classic emerge — Fraser warranted what McIntosh had in mind, a master-class in scholarship. McIntosh cherished eyeballing close friends, including the public scholars John Beaglehole and Fred Wood, who, too, were at the fore in ‘the slow business of his country [New Zealand] becoming articulate’5, particularly by promoting ‘our rightful place is in the South Pacific paddling our own canoe

Ken Ross was an analyst with the External Assessments Bureau, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet from 1976 until 2012. He has been a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London and the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra.

Ken Ross reviews Sir Alister McIntosh’s efforts to write a definitive biography of New Zealand’s greatest statesman.

Sir Alister McIntosh

Peter Fraser

as best we can’.⁶

In 1951 Beaglehole sought from McIntosh feedback on his draft obituary of the recently dead Fraser: in his response McIntosh explained

Points you don’t make I think are that his judgment was extraordinarily acute. His capacity to judge the implications of any move or any situation was really remarkable. His only recreation was talking and he recreated a lot, but he talked sensibly and delighted, perhaps too much so, in displaying his truly amazing range of knowledge on everything under the sun. He was quite the best-informed New Zealand politician I have ever known or heard of, and though he did not have the culture and the polish of Winston Churchill or of Smuts he could, when confronted with the same problems as they were in a conference, give just as shrewd and penetrating an analysis and an equally good judgment as to a course of action.

… his mind was a critical one rather than a constructive, but that should not be taken to mean that he did not have constructive ability of a very high order — he did. His main intellectual fault, I think, was the disorderliness of his mind, owing to the fact that he had not had the discipline of a formal education, but that in turn, did not mean that he could not think much more accurately than 99 other people out of a 100.7

At least three publishing houses, including Dan Davin’s Oxford University Press, were seeking in McIntosh’s last years his signature on a contract to do the ‘proper evaluation’ of Fraser.⁸

That did not come about. Instead, Frank Corner and Norman Kirk recalled him to the ‘corridors of power’, a story canvassed in my previous article.⁹

Source material

By the time of his death on 30 November 1978 McIntosh had generated a wealth of Fraser material for future scholars. His papers at the Alexander Turnbull Library have much and some of that material is already public.10 There are two even more important resources that he bequeathed to interested scholars. Foremost is his 11,050 words delivered to the New Zealand Historical Society on 8 June 1973: he spoke then of his having worked with Fraser through the Second World War. That presentation is a scholarly tour du force, though is well short of what he would have contemplated in his ‘proper evaluation’. McIntosh acknowledged glancingly to that audience that his envisaged ‘proper evaluation’ of Fraser was by then beyond his capacity to handle, explaining

I regret that this has been such a hotchpotch. I had not realised how difficult it would be to select and organise and compress my material. Naturally I’ve left out a great deal and given a somewhat unbalanced picture.11

The June 1973 presentation appears not to have been recorded. The complete text is now only accessible at the Alexander Turnbull Library.12 Two abbreviated versions have been published, neither acknowledging how McIntosh’s original presentation has so seriously been abridged. The New Zealand Journal of History article, published in 1976, has 10,000 words, while the version in the Margaret Clark edited Peter Fraser: Master

Politician (1998) has only 4450 words. However, McIntosh’s central perspective of Fraser was not lost from them: Only a full-scale biography based on thorough research could do justice to one of New Zealand’s ablest public men. As a politician holding power under well-nigh insuperable difficulties Fraser deserves the most careful study. He was also a statesman, of whom we have had so very few. Certainly no other New Zealand leader ever attained such stature and reputation overseas. This is something that his fellow countrymen have never fully appreciated. And I am beginning to wonder if history will, in fact, do him justice.

Of course he was a complex character, full of contradictions, but basically he was a man of integrity; a powerful personality. And having attained leadership he acted as a leader whom people had to respect rather than love.

He was not an easy man to work for. I was often exasperated with him, in common with many others. But I was also fascinated not only by the content of the work and the situations involved but also by the astonishing range of his knowledge and abilities. Moreover, I was continually confronted with the sobering realisation that on so many occasions and on so many issues his perspicacity, his judgements, his farsightedness and his courage and determination to pursue a particular course of action were infinitely superior to my own.13

Perceptive presentation

McIntosh’s original presentation was not the ‘hotchpotch’ that he had called it. He circulated his presentation to friends. One, his long-time confidant, Dick Campbell, by return mail reiterated the importance of McIntosh’s presentation for It happily recalls much of the complex, deep old stick that he was; rings wholly true; must leave anyone who had dealings with him pondering how he could be better portrayed, and admitting how hard it is, impossible probably, to get the real man over, these decades later, to those who didn’t know him.

For no one I ever knew (‘not even Coates’ may be added) have I more admiration; but I could get nowhere in putting him on paper. So I could sympathise with the strains you were honestly admitting in getting past incidents and portraying the man.14

Campbell injected his hope McIntosh would do the longer effort: he reiterated a dozen important episodes in Fraser’s contributions to world affairs that McIntosh must include in the proposed book.

McIntosh’s second generous bequest was a smorgasbord

t Peter Fraser on a visit to the headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Dwight Eisenhower, with other Commonwealth prime ministers in 1944. From left, William Lyon Mackenzie King (Canada), Winston Churchill (United Kingdom), Fraser, Eisenhower, Godfrey Huggins (Southern Rhodesia) and General Jan Smuts (South Africa)

of interviews he recorded during the 1970s. This material is only readable at the Turnbull Library as it remains unpublished. Of the interviews, McIntosh was his most lucid talking with longtime friend Keith Sinclair, who taped him on 14 January 1971, when researching Walter Nash.15 Erik Olssen had McIntosh in fine form on 16 August 1973, regaling on the dynamics between Fraser and John A. Lee.16 McIntosh’s subsequent interviews — with Fred Wood and Mary Boyd, and then with Michael King — were less successful. His memory was faltering and he had done too little preparation. Also, his interviewers were either too deferential (Wood/Boyd) or lacked knowledge of the subject (King). King’s interviews were done in 1978 and his transcripts far too often short-change McIntosh with gaps (indicating text not transcribed), mistaken personalities and outright mysterious individuals.17 Late in 2023 King’s tapes were newly listed on the Turnbull Library’s Tiaki search system for unpublished holdings; they are currently being digitalised.18 This material, expected to be accessible later this year, should be invaluable if a more thorough-going generation of transcripts are prepared — that would be an important contribution for future researchers of Peter Fraser and Alister McIntosh.

If McIntosh had made a go of the ‘proper evaluation’, he had good friends who would have passed over their own important recollections of Fraser. Foremost among them would have been Campbell and Geoffrey Cox; the latter tangled with Fraser numerous times during the Second World War. Cox’s recall of his first meeting with the prime minister in Cairo at the beginning of June 1941, immediately after the evacuation from Crete, was when Cox as General Freyberg’s junior intelligence officer had just been at Freyberg’s side for the ten-day Battle of Crete. Fraser had summoned Cox to instruct him to take charge of Freyberg’s publicity team so that New Zealand would be better informed of the division’s progress. Cox pushed back, arguing that he was now a fighting man, no longer a writer, and then offered the prime minister he could do a month-long consultancy to enumerate how Freyberg could best accomplish what Fraser sought. Cox’s report was a huge success as the prime minister and Freyberg got a top class effort for the remainder of the war from the colleagues Cox had suggested who would be the best fits for the publicity assignment. Thereafter, Fraser was periodically hassling McIntosh to make more use of Cox: that story I have covered in an earlier issue of this journal.19

Cautionary tale

There is a cautionary tale associated with McIntosh not having delivered his own proper evaluation of Fraser’s world contribution. No one else who has the necessary scholarly credentials has sought that challenge — Beaglehole, Wood, Gerald Hensley and David McIntyre have come closest in the course of their writings on the Second World War. Hensley’s talk ‘Peter Fraser at War’ is a smart, brief and crisp piece.20

Notwithstanding that for a quarter-century Michael King sought to deliver McIntosh’s envisaged Fraser, he had not the scholarly bent for that task (though he showed his strengths in literary biography). Jock Phillips in his recent Dictionary of New Zealand Biography entry for Michael canvasses capably King’s travails with his Peter Fraser project.21 King himself rarely commented publicly on that rueful experience with Fraser subsequent to McIntosh’s death, on 30 November 1978, but did make a brief mention in his talk ‘The Road to Oamaru’, an account of writing his Janet Frame biography, at the 2000 New Zealand International Arts Festival Writers Week. He explained then Christine Cole Catley introduced me to Alister McIntosh, who thought he might want help writing a book of memoirs. That meeting led to my beginning, and then not finishing, a life of Peter Fraser (it has since been completed by Michael Bassett, and published as a jointly authored book in March 2001). Fraser, like Te Puea, had turned out to be another whale: throughout his entire life cycle, he was visible, and traceable, only at widely spaced intervals.22

Important insight

King falling short on Fraser is captured by Keith Sinclair, who having authored two of New Zealand’s best political biographies — William Pember Reeves: New Zealand Fabian (1965) and Walter Nash (1976) — has good form for his ‘biography is not history’ comment. He added that ‘in a biography, events revolve around the person, and not vice versa’ and that ‘in mediocre biographies the person tends to disappear behind masses of detail or analysis of political, economic or other trends’.23 Sinclair’s insight explains that the two Michaels — Bassett and King — gave us a social history with Tomorrow comes the Song: A Life of Peter Fraser (2000). The jointly authored book reads as the third in a trilogy from Bassett — during the 1990s he had crafted prime ministerial biographies on Gordon Coates and Joseph Ward that were better fits in the social history genre. The book’s reviews displayed that this was so.24 At best, they were tepid to lukewarm. The most telling was by Barry Gustafson: ‘it falls short of an anatomy of either the inner core of Fraser the

Michael King

Geoffrey Cox

MFAT

Michael Bassett

man or the political party, government and systems he was a prominent part of for 40 years’.25

For a serious future Fraser biographer the Turnbull Library has considerable holdings of the two Michaels’ papers for their combined Fraser project. Also, much of the agony for King of his earlier aborted solo Fraser effort is there too, including the late 1980s draft of his then work-in-progress Fraser biography.26

Regarding his Fraser effort, Bassett got it right: ‘It has been a huge project, the largest I have undertaken.’27 He may have done well with Coates and Ward but he was no match for Fraser. His rueful reflection of Fraser that ‘People who fail to leave a large collection of personal papers are a real trial to their biographers’ is a most revealing statement for his comfort zone.28 When, no longer prime minister, Fraser left the prime minister’s suite taking just three cartons of papers with him. Compare this with his deputy Walter Nash, who departed office in 1949 (and similarly so in 1960 when he lost the prime ministership) taking ‘a vast tonnage of [official] papers [and depositing them] in his garage’.29

NOTES

1. McIntosh to George Fraser, 5 Jun 1977, Alexander Turnbull Library (ATL), 93-319-1/12. McIntosh’s reference to being ‘in a fix over a collaborator’ pre-dates Christine Cole Catley introducing Michael King to McIntosh later that year.

2. McIntosh to John Beaglehole, 17 Aug 1951, ATL, MS Papers-6759-179.

3. Gerald Hensley, Beyond the Battlefield: New Zealand and its Allies 1939–45 (Auckland, 2009), p.75.

4. Alister McIntosh, ‘Address on the occasion of his receiving an honorary doctorate from the University of Canterbury in 1965’, reprinted in Malcolm Templeton (ed), An Eye, An Ear and A Voice (Wellington, 1993), p.24.

5. Vincent O’Sullivan, Long Journey to the Border: A Life of John Mulgan (Wellington, 2003), p.34. O’Sullivan was referencing Mulgan in this quotation.

6. McIntosh to Carl Berendsen, 17 Jun 1943, in Ian McGibbon (ed), Undiplomatic Dialogue: Letters between Carl Berendsen and Alister McIntosh 1943–1952 (Auckland, 1993), p.31.

7. McIntosh to Beaglehole, 17 Aug 1951, ATL, MS Papers- 6759-179.

8. Ken Ross, ‘A leap in the dark’, NZ International Review, vol 49, no 1 (2024), pp.15–18, has the back-drop to McIntosh’s not undertaking his ‘proper evaluation’ of Peter Fraser.

9. Ibid.

10. McGibbon (ed), Undiplomatic Dialogue, and Ian McGibbon (ed), Unofficial Channels: Letters between Alister McIntosh and Foss Shanahan, George Laking and Frank Corner 1946–1966 (Wellington, 1999).

11. ATL, MS-Papers-6759-177 has the ‘as presented’ version plus McIntosh’s subsequent light revision of that text. These three sentences are not in either the subsequent article or the book chapter.

12. ATL, MS-Papers-6759-177 and MS-Papers-8181-184. The former is a folder in the McIntosh Papers; it contains several versions of the presentation. The second folder, an Ian Wards folder, has several pre-presentation drafts. Wards, then the chief historian in the Historical Publications Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, assisted McIntosh with dictation and typing support during the crafting of the presentation.

13. McIntosh, ‘Working with Peter Fraser in Wartime: Personal Reminiscences’, in NZ Journal of History, vol 10, no 1 (1976), p.13, and Margaret Clark (ed), Peter Fraser: Master Politician (Palmerston North, 1998), p.167.

14. Campbell to McIntosh, 3 Aug 1973, ATL, MS Papers 6759-177. Then in retirement in England, Campbell had known Fraser since 1930 and had worked closely with him since 1935, including chairing the first Public Service Commission (1946 to 1953), a job for which Fraser had had him return from London, where he had as the official secretary managed New Zealand House for a decade.

15. ATL, OHint–0218 18/22. Sinclair interviewed McIntosh on 14 January 1971.

16. Eric Olssen has provided the author with a copy of the transcript. Olssen, John A. Lee (Dunedin, 1977) reflects McIntosh insights and acknowledges him.

17. Transcripts of King’s interviews are at the Turnbull Library in folders 77-107-12 to 77-107-17 and MS-Papers-2096-1 and -2. The interviews were on 16, 21, 29 March; 6, 12, 18 and 26 April; 1, 12, 19, 27, 31 May; 3, 13, 22 July; 1, 4, 6, 12 and 30 August; 12 September; and 9, 27 November. (McIntosh died on 30 November 1978).

18. ATL, Series–1573, sub-series 1573-1, ‘Recordings about Peter Fraser’.

19. Geoffrey Cox, A Tale of Two Battles: A Personal Memoir of Crete and the Western Desert (London, 1987), pp.117–18, and Ken Ross, ‘Geoffrey Cox — New Zealand diplomat’, NZ International Review, vol 45, no 1 (2020), pp.22–5.

20. Gerald Hensley gave the talk to a Ministry of Culture and Heritage seminar on 6 April 2011.

21. Jock Phillips, ‘King, Michael’, Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, first published in 2022. Te Ara – the Encyclopedia of New Zealand.

22. Michael King, ‘Road to Oamaru’, in King’s Tread Softly For You Tread On My Life (Auckland, 2010), p.22. The whale reference is spelt out on page 21.

23. Keith Sinclair, ‘Political Biography in New Zealand’, in Jock Phillips (ed), Biography in New Zealand (Wellington, 1985), pp.32–3.

24. Jonathan Hunt, ‘The Rt Hon Peter Fraser’, NZ Listener, 31 Mar 2001, pp.60−2; James Watson in NZJH, vol 37, no 1 (2003); Jim McAloon in Political Science, vol 54, no 1 (2002); Tom Brooking in NZ Herald, 9 Mar 2001; Barry Gustafson, ‘Antipodean apparatchik’, New Zealand Review of Books, Aug 2001; and Bryce Harland in NZ International Review, vol 26, no 3 (2001).

25. Gustafson, op cit.

26. King to John Chilwell, 20 Dec 2001, ATL, 2012-028-148.

27. Michael Bassett to Rosemary Wildblood (Creative New Zealand), 19 Dec 1999, ATL, 2008-199-261.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., McIntosh to John A. Lee, 27 Jun 1966.

BOOKS

TAKING SIDES: a memoir about love, war, and changing the world

Author: Sherine Tadros

Published by: Scribe Publications, Melbourne and London, 2023, 272pp, A$32.99.

In an engaging memoir, Sherine Tadros traces her life and career as a broadcast journalist, from her upbringing in London through the establishment of Al Jazeera English in 2006 and assignments in Beirut, Gaza, Jerusalem and Cairo with that organisation and, later, with Sky News. A self-confessed ‘halfie’ born in England to Egyptian immigrant parents, with two degrees in politics from the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), Tadros paints a graphic picture of the challenges of reporting while trapped inside the war zone of Gaza in 2008, and of covering the uprisings that led to the ousting of President Mubarak in Cairo over the years 2011–13. Those challenges were personal: family getting caught up in events along the way, suffering sexual abuse in Cairo — and all the while trying to report dispassionately.

With other colleagues, Tadros was nominated for an Emmy Award for the coverage of the Gaza War of 2008, and in 2012 received on behalf of Al Jazeera a Peabody Award for its coverage of the Arab uprisings, notably in Egypt. These accolades came as a result of the highest-quality reporting in the face of the most difficult operating environments. Some of this is captured in the eight pages of colour photographs in the book.

It is a regrettable commentary on the world that there are numerous examples of war correspondents dating back many decades. Peter Arnett, John McBeth and, more recently, Charlotte Bellis are names well-known to their fellow New Zealand citizens. Amongst renowned women correspondents, Clare Hollingworth was the first to report that German troops were crossing the border into Poland in 1939 (and in her latter years was a great raconteur to those who gathered, as I did, in the Foreign Correspondents’ Club in Hong Kong). Much later Christiane Amanpour (whom Tadros cites in reference to the campaign for the release of the three Al Jazeera journalists detained in Cairo in 2013) and Lyse Doucet are among those who have reported from other troubled parts of the Middle East. Nor to overlook that it was from Sudan that a subaltern by the name of Winston Churchill reported for a British newspaper in the late 1890s, journalism not, however, being the profession by which he is most remembered.

Notes on reviewer

Tadros, however, is unusual in that while she became accustomed to the constant travel, dangerous environments, daily stress and deadlines for her international audience, she also came to realise that her ‘job ends at the wrong point’. Beyond the reporting on the suffering of refugees and others caught up in war, she wanted to do more about relieving those conditions. Coinciding with a personal upset in her life (her fiancé walking out on her on what would have been their wedding day), she had applied for and was successful in obtaining a position with Amnesty International as the deputy director of advocacy to the United Nations in New York. Tadros admits that while the role of a journalist was more than just neutral reporting, it did not go as far as activism. Indeed, as she notes, when she started as a journalist, ‘it was considered a slur to be called an activist’. But, she adds, things were changing.

The final third of the book covers her move to the world of diplomacy in New York, and the quite different challenges of the interaction of an non-governmental organisation with representatives of governments. Her description of the methods of navigating the UN system, especially with General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, are a sharp reminder to the outsider that diplomatic progress on issues like action to protect refugees or protect civilians in Gaza is far from straightforward. She is particularly scornful about President Trump’s UN ambassador, Nikki Haley, and her bullying tactics over Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Tadros notes that while the United States could and did exercise its veto on a draft resolution opposing the move in the Security Council, its own efforts to avoid being condemned in the General Assembly were roundly defeated. These sorts of manoeuvres are familiar enough to the professional diplomat, but they struck Tadros as quite shocking. They served as initial lessons for how her nongovernmental organisation had to be nimble in pursuing its objectives within the UN system. Interestingly, the Russo-Ukraine War has provided a similar outcome, with the General Assembly used successfully to condemn the invasion after efforts to do so in the Security Council were stymied by a Russian veto.

This is a frank and very personal memoir of the experiences of a journalist-turned-advocate. Understandably, it moves forward and back over time and might have benefited from a little more chronology, if not an index. That said, it remains a fascinating account of the personal transition of a conflict reporter and observer of events in the Middle East to a lobbyist at the United Nations for the protection of human rights.

JAMES KEMBER

Dr James Kember, vice-chair of the NZIIA’s Board, is a former diplomat whose overseas assignments included a four-year stint at the New Zealand UN Mission in New York.

OBITUARY

Kenneth John Aldred OBE

11 September 1937–26 January 2024

The NZIIA lost one of its life members with the passing of 86-year-old Ken Aldred. He was the institute’s Hawke’s Bay stalwart, an active member who brought skills from his United Kingdom experience to bear in creating a new branch.

Born in Bristol in the United Kingdom in 1937, Ken was brought up in difficult circumstances against the backdrop of the Second World War, and the austere post-war era. After leaving school at fifteen, he trained in men’s tailoring, then worked in many areas of industry and found himself ‘managing a factory in his very early twenties’. He later served as a company director, a work study efficiency expert and as an official in the Electrical Engineers Union. He also participated in non-governmental organisations, initially in a voluntary capacity.

Ken’s first involvement in campaigning was as part of the European Movement United Kingdom, a pro-European group which advocated for British entry to the European Economic Community. Once this goal was achieved on 1 January 1973, he co-ordinated events celebrating the outcome. In an extensive oral history interview conducted by the Imperial War Museum in 1988, he acknowledged that his political views were ‘rather widespread’. After dabbling with both major parties — his membership of both was ‘short-lived’ — he was determined to stand aside from party involvement, seeing an independent stance as helpful to his expanding non-governmental organisation role.

In 1981, amidst the furore over the deployment of US intermediate-range missiles in Europe as a counter to the Soviet Union’s stationing of SS20 missiles in its Eastern European satellites, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd asked the British Atlantic Committee to increase its public profile as a counter to the Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. Ken prepared a paper and, after it was accepted by the government, became the director of the BAC’s Regional Information Service, quickly raising its output. He believed strongly in deterrence, but remained moderate in his approach. It was important, in his opinion, that the United Kingdom maintained an independent nuclear capability.

These developments led to the creation of Peace Through NATO as a campaigning organisation, funded by the government. Ken became secretary-general, and as such responsible for the organisation’s name, personnel and policy. He carefully ensured that it was a non-bureaucratic organisation, capable of reacting to the challenges of the time. The organisation was active throughout the country, debating with CND. It had no

members, just ‘self-motivating groups of supporters’. During this time Ken also double-hatted as chair of the British group involved in the Committee for a Community of Democracies, and served as its international assistant secretary.

In 1994 the British Atlantic Committee merged with Peace Through NATO to form the Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom, at which time Ken stepped aside. Shortly after his departure, he was made an officer of the Order of the British Empire in the 1994 New Year honours. He then became director of the United Kingdom Council for Arms Control, an independent research body operating within the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College, London and also director and secretary of the British Council for Education in World Citizenship. He wrote and lectured extensively in these specialist areas, and was co-author of Superpowers in the Post-Cold War Era (1999).

Ken married Heather Brown, a New Zealander, and moved to Napier in January 2002. He continued working as an international security analyst, his main areas of interest relating to international security organisations with a particular focus on NATO, arms control, systems of government and the inter-relationship of citizenship and security issues. He remained a senior associate research fellow at King’s College, London, and became a member of the New Zealand Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia–Pacific.

Very soon after his arrival in Napier, Ken emerged as the driving force behind the establishment of the NZIIA’s Hawke’s Bay branch in 2003 and was its founding chair, a role he undertook until 2011. The new branch was notable for its innovative approach, as reflected in the double header meetings it organised to cater for its members’ differing situations. As chair he was a valued member of the institute’s National Council, his long non-governmental organisation experience proving valuable in the council’s deliberations. His contribution was recognised with his election as a life member in 2012.

Ken was actively involved in a range of voluntary community work in Napier. An active member of the Napier Rotary Club, he served as its president in 2008–09. He was also secretary and co-ordinator of Keep Napier Beautiful and chair of the Bay View Community Charitable Trust from 2002 to 2011.

Ken’s lively participation in the NZIIA’s affairs and thoughtful insights during discussions were always appreciated. He made a distinctive contribution and will be missed by all who were associated with him.

Ian McGibbon

INSTITUTE NOTES

National Office and branch activities

On 14 December a roundtable was held in Wellington on the long-range repercussions of the war in Ukraine with Ukraine’s ambassador to Australia and New Zealand, HE Vasyl Myroshnychenko. NZIIA life member Prof Roberto Rabel moderated the discussion.

Rt Hon Sir Michael Hardie Boys GNZM, GCMG, QSO, an honorary vice president of the NZIIA, died on 29 December. While governor-general from 1996 to 2001, he was patron of the NZIIA.

Board member Suzannah Jessep has been appointed director of the Asia New Zealand Foundation.

NZIIA life member and former Hawke’s Bay branch chair Ken Aldred passed away on 26 January. An obituary is to be found elsewhere in this issue.

Auckland

On 14 November the branch conducted a panel discussion on ‘What You Need to Know About Ukraine: the Past, Present and Future’, moderated by branch chair Prof Rouben Azizian. Kyrylo Cyril Kutcher (Massey University), Prof Natalia Chaban (University of Canterbury) and Associate Prof Olga Dodd (Auckland University of Technology) discussed the history and national identity of Ukraine, the role of media in the Russo-Ukraine War and Ukraine’s economic development and reconstruction.

On 30 November the branch, in conjunction with Massey

University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies, held a meeting to launch the book State of Threat, The Challenges to Aotearoa New Zealand’s National Security. The launch was followed by a panel discussion moderated by Prof Rouben Azizian with panellists book co-editor Associate Prof Wil Hoverd and chapter authors Associate Prof Damien Rogers, Dr Germana Nicklin and Jose Miguel Alonso-Trabanco, all from Massey University.

On 5 January 2024, several members of the NZIIA Auckland branch executive committee, together with the Pacific Cooperation Foundation, hosted a roundtable on China and regional security with Dr Oriana Skylar Mastro from Stanford University.

Christchurch

On 8 December the branch held a meeting, in conjunction with the Strategic Policy Division for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in conjunction with the University of Canterbury’s Department of Political Science and International Relations, to hear MFAT’s Joanna Anderson and Hannah Miller on ‘Navigating a Shifting World — New Zealand’s Place in a Heightened Geo-strategic Environment’.

Four days later the branch was addressed by David Gehenbeck, deputy chief of mission at the US embassy in Wellington, on ‘United States’ Continued Efforts to Combat Russia’s Illegal War Against Ukraine’.

The Auckland branch panel discussion on 14 November: from left, Rouben Azizian, Kyrylo Kutcher, Olga Dodd and Natalia Chaban

The Auckland book launch on 30 November: from left, Damien Rogers, Jose Miguel Alonso-Trabanco, Germana Nicklin and Wil Hoverd

The Auckland branch panel discussion on 14 November: from left, Rouben Azizian, Kyrylo Kutcher, Olga Dodd and Natalia Chaban

Nelson

The branch held its annual meeting and Christmas party on 29 November. In his chair’s report Oke Blaikie noted that the branch was in good heart with 70 family members and 47 individual members, with a waiting list of 20 (a limitation that stemmed mainly from the accommodation limitations at the branch’s golf club meeting venue). The nine meetings had seldom less than 90 attending to hear the presentations, some of which he described as ‘absolutely outstanding’. He paid tribute to the efforts of committee members Richard Griffin, Paul and Deborah Willis and Bill Unwin, who had or were about to retire from the committee. Officers elected were:

Chair — Oke Blaikie

Secretary — Gabrielle Hervey

Committee — Judy Finn, John Fitchett, Alison MacAlpine

The following meetings were held:

23 Nov David Melville (ecologist), ‘Diplomatic Godwits’.

25 Jan Sir Malcolm Grant CBE (former non-executive chairman of the National Health Service England), ‘Is Artificial Intelligence Likely to Bring About the End of the World as We Know It — and If So When?’.

22 Feb Rod Oram (journalist), ‘Leader or Laggard? New Zealand’s Foreign Policy in An Era of Global Ecological Crisis’.

Wairarapa

On 30 November Dr Bella Duncan (research fellow, Victoria University’s Antarctic Research Centre) addressed the branch about the recent changes in the Antarctic region and how it is an important part of the growing world-wide climate crisis.

Wellington

On 29 November, the branch hosted Dr Reuben Steff from the University of Waikato, who spoke on the topic ‘Our Region is Now a Strategic Theatre: New Zealand’s Balancing Response to China’.

The branch partnered with the Indian high commission in an end of year event on 5 December showcasing business, tourism and culture with a special focus on three states of India — Assam, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh.

On 14 December, the branch held a Christmas event in collaboration with the McGuinness Institute, a Wellington-based independent and non-partisan New Zealand think-tank, for the launch of its fifth edition of Nation Dates: Timelines of significant events

Addendum

The text below was inadvertently omitted from Prof Reuben Azizian’s article in the last issue (vol 49, no 1): Postscript: The current crisis in Gaza is a vivid example of how the principles of territorial security and selfdetermination have violently clashed again. There is no evidence of the direct impact of the Russo-Ukraine War on the Gaza confrontation, but some parallels in the two situations are obvious.

that have shaped the history of Aotearoa New Zealand. This book, which now includes 857 entries, beginning in 1769, is traditionally distributed to members of Parliament. At the event, attended by ambassadors and other members of the Wellington diplomatic community, McGuiness Institute chief executive and founder Wendy McGuinness talked about the book, followed by lunch and networking. The book is being distributed to Wellington diplomatic missions and is available to order from https://nationdatesnz.org.

Correction

An editorial glitch led to US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt being wrongly depicted as Theodore Roosevelt in Stephen Harris’s review article, ‘The view from behind the curtain’, in the last issue (vol 49, no 1, p.19).

Attendees at the National Office roundtable on Ukraine in Wellington on 14 December

Nelson’s re-elected chair Oke Blaikie

Wellington Branch chair Angus Middleton with Wendy McGuiness on 14 December

Jennifer Morgan, German state secretary and special envoy for climate change, addresses the Wellington branch on 8 November

AN INVITATION

If you are interested in international affairs and you are not already a subscriber to the New Zealand International Review, consider the advantage of receiving this magazine on a regular basis. New Zealand International Review completed its 48th year of publication in 2023. It continues to be the only national magazine exclusively devoted to international issues as they affect New Zealand. Issued bimonthly it is circulated throughout New Zealand and internationally. The NZIR is non-partisan, independent of government and pressure groups and has lively articles from local and international authors, with special emphasis on New Zealand’s international relations. It contains

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