2 How are external actors engaging in the Pacific?
The actors, interests and rate of interactions shaping international politics in the Pacific have changed significantly over the past decade. Already in 2018, Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) leaders recognised that they operated within an “increasingly complex regional security environment driven by multifaceted security challenges, and a dynamic geopolitical environment leading to an increasingly crowded and complex region”. 3 Since then, the region has become only more “crowded”, giving rise to ever more complexity in managing the relationships among actors.
As research from the Lowy Institute suggests, the rapidly increased volume and complexity of activity conducted by external actors in the Pacific (be it diplomatic, security, development or environmentally-focussed), is largely failing to translate into enhanced social, economic, environmental benefits for Pacific countries and the region as a whole. This makes it important for all state and non-state actors, including those from New Zealand, to better focus activity into tangible outcomes for Pacific countries and the region.4
Concentric circles
In understanding who the “external actors” are, a useful heuristic classifies state actors in the region in a series of concentric circles. In this classification:
• The first and innermost circle comprises Pacific Island countries that are members of the leading political regional organisation, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). 5
• The second, slightly wider circle includes two more PIF members, New Zealand and
Australia, which see themselves — and are viewed by some Pacific countries — as integral to the region.
• The third concentric circle encompasses a set of more powerful states on the Pacific Rim and beyond, including “traditional partners” such as the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), France and Japan, as well as “non-traditional partners” like China, Taiwan and Russia.
• The fourth and widest concentric circle captures a significant number of other “new” actors that are becoming increasingly active in the region, ranging from Indonesia, India and South Korea to Israel, Germany, and Norway.
The actors in the second, third, and fourth of these concentric circles have varied histories of engagement in the Pacific. These include periods of more or less violent colonisation, imperial rivalry, economic exploitation, nuclear testing and war, as well as more recent episodes of rising geopolitical tension and ideological contestation during the Cold War and the Global War on Terrorism.6 Notably, several Western powers continue to hold colonial territories in the Pacific, including the US (Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa), France (French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and New Caledonia), and the UK (Pitcairn Islands), which they invoke to justify their continued involvement in the region. It is also worth recalling that New Zealand has its own history of colonialism in the Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau (which remains a non-self-governing territory), Samoa (as a League of Nations mandatory power and then United Nations trustee), and Nauru (as co-
3 “Action Plan to Implement the Boe Declaration on Regional Security” Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (16 August 2019) at [2], available online: http://forumsec.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/BOE-document-ActionPlan.pdf (accessed 15 August 2024).
4 Mihai Sora, Jessica Collins & Meg Keen “The Great Game in the Pacific” Lowy Institute, available online: www.lowyinstitute.org/great-game-pacific-islands (accessed 23 August 2024).
5 These are: Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
6 Greg Fry Framing the Islands: Power and Diplomatic Agency in Pacific Regionalism (ANU Press, Canberra, 2019) at ch 9, 11.
mandatory power and then co-trustee). Some former colonial powers have favoured their past Pacific colonies in economic relations, disaster response and development support. The disparate, uneven and intersecting histories of these engagements by more or less ‘external’ states have ongoing effects on their relationships with Pacific countries and each other, both good and bad.
While the heuristic of concentric circles is useful, the evolving rhetoric and institutional practices in the region suggest a more fluid and flexible reality. Various “external” powers in the third and fourth concentric circles have advanced claims to be “Pacific nations” at various times, including the US and even Indonesia.7 The admission of New Caledonia and French Polynesia to full membership of the PIF in 2016 arguably granted France access to the innermost concentric circles. Guam and American Samoa are currently seeking to become associate members of the PIF, which would likewise offer the US a toehold in that organisation. 8 The memberships of other regional organisations include both colonising powers and colonised territories.9 Taiwan’s influence among Pacific countries has waned as China’s influence has expanded, and the UK has become markedly more engaged in the region in recent years. Other flows and feedback loops in domestic and international
politics, and in the relations between Pacific countries and “external” powers, make the boundaries between the concentric circles described above more permeable than they might initially appear.
Non-state actors
A focus on state actors does not provide a complete picture of the dynamics of geostrategic competition in the Pacific. In addition to the core United Nations agencies,10 other international organisations have become increasingly active, including multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, the European Union (EU), and a range of climatefocussed entities.11 Sometimes wielding financial power outstripping any country in the region, multinational corporations play potentially crucial roles in regional economic development plans, such as Google’s multibillion dollar “Pacific Connect Initiative”, which includes plans to lay subsea cables between several Pacific countries.12 A range of philanthropic entities have also become significant players, particularly in the area of conservation, such as the Bezos Earth Fund and the Waitt Foundation. These and other non-state actors interact with Pacific countries and “external” state actors in a variety of ways that affect their political relationships.
7 On Indonesia, see: Hipolitus Wangge “Indonesia’s Commitment to the Pacific Needs to Go Beyond Rhetoric” The Diplomat (online ed, Washington, D.C., August 31, 2023). https://thediplomat.com/2023/08/ indonesias-commitment-to-the-pacific-needs-to-go-beyond-rhetoric/ (accessed 15 August 2024).
8 Caleb Fotheringham “Guam and American Samoa get greenlight for Pacific Islands Forum associate membership” (13 August 2024) RNZ www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/524880/guam-andamerican-samoa-get-greenlight-for-pacific-islands-forum-associate-membership (accessed 21 August 2024).
9 For example, the members of the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) include France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, Tokelau, and Wallis and Futuna. The Pacific Community’s membership also includes the same countries and territories, plus the Pitcairn Islands.
10 See generally Graham Hassall The United Nations and the Pacific Islands (1st ed, Springer International Publishing AG, Cham, 2023).
11 Alexandre Dayant and others 2023 Key Findings Report (Lowy Institute, October 31, 2023) at 10, available online at: https://pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/Lowy-Institute-Pacific-Aid-Map-Key-FindingsReport-2023.pdf (accessed 15 August 2024).
12 See, e.g., Winston Qiu “Google to Invest $1billion to Expand Pacific Connect Initiative to Japan” (11 April 2024) Submarine Cable Networks www.submarinenetworks.com/en/systems/trans-pacific/proa/googleto-invest-$1billion-to-extend-pacific-connect-initiative-to-japan (accessed 21 August 2024).
Proliferation of security arrangements
The fluid and complex dynamics of engagement in the Pacific by external actors are evident in the evolution of security and defence arrangements. In response to the perceived threat of China’s growing influence in the region, “Indo-Pacific” strategies have proliferated over the past decade, from Japan to France, Germany, Netherlands, the EU and the US.13 External actors of various kinds have produced new statements of development and security policy, such as Australia’s “Pacific Step-Up”, New Zealand’s “Pacific Reset” and “Partnering for Resilience” frameworks, the US’s “Pacific Pledge”, the UK’s “Pacific Uplift”, Indonesia’s “Pacific Elevation”, and India’s “Act East”.14 Under the AUKUS trilateral security partnership, the UK and the US are assisting Australia to purchase nuclear-powered submarines to support their shared strategic goals in the Indo-Pacific.
Individual Pacific countries have entered into more than 60 security agreements with external actors, the vast majority of them with so-called “traditional” partners such as Australia (which is a party to more than
half), New Zealand, and the US.15 However, the security arrangements sought by “nontraditional” partners — in particular China’s security deal with the Solomon Islands,16 and proposed region-wide agreement with Pacific countries17 — have attracted much more media attention and concern in Westernaligned states. In a significant change in approach, Japan has also signalled an interest in entering into a security agreement with Pacific countries.18 These are just a few indicators of the rapid rise in engagements by external actors in the Pacific; others have taken the form of new diplomatic postings, state and military visits, and meetings of political leaders and officials. This increase in activity has predominantly been targeted towards serving the strategic interests of major powers, rather than Pacific peoples, heightening fears of conflict in the region.
Broadening security engagement
Particular forms of security engagement have become more salient to geostrategic rivalry in recent years. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is a site of significant competition and politicisation,19 particularly since the eruption of the Hunga Tonga-
13 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Summary (July 2021), available online at: www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/en_a4_indopacifique_synthese_rvb_cle068e51.pdf (accessed 15 August 2024); The Press and Information Office of the Federal Government “German government adopts guidelines for the Indo-Pacific region” www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/service/archive/indopacific-1781916 (accessed 15 August 2024); Josep Borrell “The EU and the Indo-Pacific: partners for a more stable and prosperous world” (2 February 2024) The Strategist www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-eu-and-theindo-pacific-partners-for-a-more-stable-and-prosperous-world/ (accessed 15 August 2024).
14 See generally Wallis and others Mapping Security Cooperation in the Pacific Islands (Department of Pacific Affairs, Research Report, 15 June 2021) at 4-7.
15 Prianka Srinivasan and Virginia Harrison “Mapped: the vast network of security deals spanning the Pacific, and what it means” The Guardian (online ed, London, 9 July 2024) www.theguardian.com/world/ article/2024/jul/09/pacific-islands-security-deals-australia-usa-china (accessed 15 August 2024).
16 Kate Lyons and Dorothy Wickham in Honiara “The deal that shocked the world: inside the China-Solomons security pact” The Guardian (online ed, London, 20 April 2022). www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/20/ the-deal-that-shocked-the-world-inside-the-china-solomons-security-pact (accessed 15 August 2024).
17 “China seeks Pacific islands deal on policing, security cooperation, document reveals” RNZ (25 May 2022) www.rnz.co.nz/news/world/467857/china-seeks-pacific-islands-deal-on-policing-security-cooperationdocument-reveals (accessed 15 August 2024); “China’s Pacific ambitions have been checked, for now” Economist Intelligence Unit (1 June 2022) www.eiu.com/n/chinas-pacific-ambitions-have-been-checkedfor-now/ (accessed 15 August 2024).
18 Mari Yamaguchi “Pacific Island leaders agree to enhance Japan’s role in the region amid growing China influence” (July 19, 2024) The Associated Press www.apnews.com/article/japan-pacific-islands-chinaleaders-096d8bbe7df978d03340426c8c9a5cd3 (accessed 15 August 2024).
19 See generally Wallis and others, above n 14, at 9-10.
Hunga Ha’apai volcano in Tonga in January 2022, which drew responses from defence personnel from other Pacific countries as well as “traditional” and “non-traditional” partners. 20 Transnational crime, 21 in particular the trafficking of illicit drugs, is another area of widespread concern with clear links between Pacific countries and lucrative drug markets in the US, Australia and New Zealand. 22 Since 2002, the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police have operated a Pacific Transnational Crime Network as a series of partnerships among Pacific countries’ law enforcement agencies to combat transnational crime in the Pacific. 23 In 2022, China floated the possibility of establishing a police training centre in the Solomon Islands, as part of a general increase in its police activity in the region. 24 That same year, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) began developing a Pacific Policing Initiative, including a large training facility for Pacific
countries’ police officers in Queensland and new arrangements to support the growth of the Solomon Islands police force. 25
Closely connected to transnational crime and border management, maritime security is another important area where geostrategic competition is growing. 26 Since 2016, the Australian Government has deployed 20 Guardian-class patrol boats to Pacific countries to assist with border security, search and rescue, and policing tasks. 27 China recently added 26 coast guard vessels to the register of authorised inspection vessels to operate in the convention area of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. 28 The US, France and the UK are also active players in this space. 29 The EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy extended a maritime capacity-building project to the Southern Pacific, aimed at combating maritime drug trafficking, human trafficking,
20 Major Cameron Jamieson “Cordination crucial for Tonga mission” Australian Government Defence (2 February 2022) www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2022-02-02/coordination-crucial-tonga-mission (accessed 15 August 2024); Anna Powles “Five things we learned about China’s ambitions for the Pacific from the leaked deal” The Guardian (online ed, London, Thursday 26 May 2022). www.theguardian.com/ world/2022/may/26/five-things-we-learned-about-chinas-ambitions-for-the-pacific-from-the-leaked-deal (accessed 15 August 2024).
21 See generally Wallis and others, above n 14, at 10-11.
22 Jose Sousa-Santos and Loene M. Howes “Policing Illicit Drugs in the Pacific: The Role of Culture and Community on the Frontline” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice (38, 2022) 364.
23 “Pacific Transnational Crime Network” Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police www.picp.co.nz/ptcn (accessed 15 August 2024).
24 Madison Watt and Stephen Dziedzic “China to consider funding new police training centre in Solomon Islands” ABC News (online ed, New York, 28 May 2022) www.abc.net.au/news/2022-05-28/chinaconsidering-funding-new-police-academy-in-solomons/101107682 (accessed 15 August 2024); Peter Connolly “China’s Police Security in the Pacific Islands” (May 30, 2024) The National Bureau of Asian Research www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-police-security-in-the-pacific-islands/w (accessed 15 August 2024).
25 Stephen Dziedzic “Australia moves to create new training centre for Pacific police deployed to regional crises, as China looks to strike policing deals” ABC News (online ed, New York, Friday 14 June 2024) https:// www.abc.net.au/news/2024-06-14/pacific-police-training-centre-brisbane-australia-response/103972858 (accessed 15 August 2024); Hon Anthony Albanese, Hon Jeremiah Manele MP “Australia-Solomon Islands Leaders’ meeting” Prime Minister of Australia (media statement, 26 June 2024), available online at: https:// www.pm.gov.au/media/australia-solomon-islands-leaders-meeting (accessed 15 August 2024).
26 See generally Wallis and others, above n 14, at 11-12; Rebecca Strating, Douglas Guilfoyle, Steven Ratuva, Joanna Wallis, “Commentary: China in the Maritime Pacific” Marine Policy (141, 2022) 105092.
27 Rojoef Manuel “Austal Delivers 20th The Defense Post (16 July 2024) www.thedefensepost.com/2024/07/16/ australia-20th-guardian-patrol-boat-austal/ (accessed 15 August 2024).
28 “HSBI: China Coastguard vessels will be entered on the WCPFC Register of Authorised Inspection Vessels” Western & Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (1 May 2024) www.wcpfc.int/node/53889 (accessed 15 August 2024); “Register of Inspection Vessels” Western & Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (6 March 2017) www.wcpfc.int/register-inspection-vessels (accessed 15 August 2024).
29 See, e.g., “New UK-Pacific Partnership to boost maritime security and ocean management” Pacific Community (media release, 6 June 2024) www.spc.int/updates/news/media-release/2024/06/new-ukpacific-partnership-to-boost-maritime-security-and-ocean (accessed 15 August 2024).
wildlife crime, and illicit financial flows linked to terrorism. 30 The results of the European Parliament election in June 2024, together with its Strategic Agenda 2024-2029, likely foreshadow an increased focus by the EU on security issues and strategic geopolitics in the region. 31
Aid and development
Flows of aid and development assistance are also used as instruments of geopolitical competition, posing additional demands and challenges for Pacific countries. According to the Lowy Institute’s tracking, the number of donors in the region has more than doubled from 31 in 2008 to 82 in 2021. 32 Australia stands out as the largest donor by far, accounting for approximately 40 per cent of official development finance to Pacific countries. 33 China’s share of official development finance is relatively small, dropping significantly since its peak in 2016. However, this does not necessarily entail a loss of influence in the region, as China has increasingly targeted its aid to specific countries, such as the Solomon Islands and Kiribati, expanded the proportion of grants in its official development finance,
and started to work more with and through multilateral development banks. 34 The Asian Development Bank is the second-largest provider of overseas development finance in the region, well ahead of the World Bank. 35
It is equally important to note the trends in the aims and purposes towards which aid is being directed. The past half-decade has seen record-high spending on infrastructure in the Pacific, boosted by the launch of the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP) in 2019, 36 while spending on education and health has declined in relative terms, especially when Covid-19 support programmes are excluded from the data. 37 Much of the concern about Chinese investment in the Pacific has concerned “dual use” infrastructure, such as the construction of strategically situated ports and airfields which could be used for both civilian and military purposes. 38 China has recently redirected its focus from large-scale infrastructure projects to “small and beautiful” projects with a green component. 39 Taiwan has likewise adopted a more targeted approach as the number of countries granting it diplomatic recognition has shrunk.40 Another “non-traditional donor”,
30 “The EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” European Commission (16 September, 2021) at 13 www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/jointcommunication_2021_24_1_en.pdf (accessed 15 August 2024); “Mission and Objectives” CRIMARIO (Critical Maritime Routes Indo Pacific Project) II available online: www. crimario.eu/mission-and-objectives/ (accessed 9 September 2024).
31 “Strategic Agenda 2024-2029” European Council (27 June 2024) available online: www.consilium.europa.eu/ media/4aldqfl2/2024_557_new-strategic-agenda.pdf (accessed 15 August 2024).
32 Dayant and others, above n 11; Meg Keen “Infrastructure for influence: Pacific Islands building spree” (31 October 2023) The Interpreter www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/infrastructure-influence-pacificislands-building-spree (accessed 15 August 2024).
33 Dayant and others, above n 11, at 7.
34 Alexandre Dayant, Meg Keen and Roland Rajah “Chinese aid to the Pacific: decreasing, but not disappearing” (25 January 2023) The Interpreter www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinese-aid-pacificdecreasing-not-disappearing (accessed 15 August 2024).
35 Dayant and others, above n 11, at 4.
36 Keen, above n 32.
37 Dayant and others, above n 11, at 4, 7.
38 Anne-Marie Brady “China in the Pacific: from ‘friendship’ to strategically placed ports and airfields” (20 April 2022) The Strategist www.aspistrategist.org.au/china-in-the-pacific-from-friendship-to-strategicallyplaced-ports-and-airfields/ (accessed 15 August 2024); Jonathan Barrett “Kiribati says China-backed Pacific airstrip project for civilian use” (May 13, 2021) Reuters www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/kiribati-sayschina-backed-pacific-airstrip-project-civilian-use-2021-05-13/ (accessed 15 August 2024).
39 Dayant and others, above n 11, at 5.
40 At 5-6.
India, has become more active in the region.41 The proportion of aid directed towards climate adaptation and mitigation has grown steadily, led by Australia (in absolute numbers) and Japan (as a proportion of its official development finance).42 Other important players include the EU and climate-specific multilateral organisations, such as the Global Environment Facility and the Green Climate Fund.43 Yet the overall amount of climate finance provided remains much lower than needed, and appears to include projects which are not fundamentally concerned with climate change mitigation or adaptation, even if marked as having a “significant” climate component.44
Heightened competition
As the above broad-brush outline should make clear, each external actor engages in the Pacific in different ways and for different purposes. The scale and nature of these activities can change significantly over time, driven by a variety of long-term and shortterm factors and objectives. However, the overall picture is of heightened competition — driven notably by the rise of Chinese engagements and reactive moves by “traditional” partners to maintain influence — in ways that are often disruptive to the established goals and relationships among Pacific countries. The next part of this report considers what forms of engagement Pacific countries have sought from external actors, in both word and action.
41 At 6.
42 At 9.
43 See, e.g., “Green-Blue Alliance for the Pacific” European Commission, https://international-partnerships. ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/green-blue-alliance-pacific_en (accessed 15 August 2024)
44 Dayant and others, above n 11, at 9-10.
3 What kinds of engagement do Pacific countries seek from external actors?
Blue Pacific Strategy
At a collective level, Pacific countries have expressed clearly what kinds of engagement they seek from external actors. The PIF’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent sets out the vision of Pacific leaders for the next quarter-century, centred on “a resilient Pacific Region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion and prosperity, that ensures all Pacific peoples can lead free, healthy and productive lives”.45 The 2050 Strategy calls for a “whole-of-region approach, the inclusion of all key stakeholders in supporting and delivering on our shared priorities, and engaging as the Blue Pacific Continent in strategically beneficial partnerships at the regional, multilateral and global level”.46
Indeed, from its first formulation at the UN Oceans Conference in 2017, the concept of the “Blue Pacific Continent” was aimed at “strengthen[ing] collective action… by putting ‘The Blue Pacific’ at the centre of the policy making and collective action” by PIF members in the context of “the current global uncertainty associated with shifts in geopolitics and globalization”.47
PIF leaders view the 2050 Strategy as a key tool of regional diplomacy with external actors. The seven key thematic areas outlined in the Strategy — political leadership and
regionalism, people-centred development, peace and security, resources and economic development, climate change and disasters, and technology and connectivity — clearly define the region’s collective priorities in their own words.\ Central to this vision is an “expanded concept of security” that includes human security, humanitarian assistance, environmental security, and resilience to climate change and other disasters,48 lending fresh urgency to the long-held vision of a peaceful and non-aligned Pacific region.49 Consistent with that tradition, PIF leaders have adopted a posture of “friends to all, enemies to none”, and have expressed dismay at how growing geostrategic competition in the region has tended to narrow their strategic choices and horizons. 50 As the recently appointed PIF Secretary-General, Baron Waqa, stated in his address to the Pacific National and Regional Security Conference in June 2024: 51
“Geopolitical manoeuvring means nothing to Pacific peoples who have cyclones coming over the horizon. Geopolitical manoeuvring means nothing to Pacific peoples who have water lapping at their doorsteps due to sea level rise. Geopolitical manoeuvring means nothing to Pacific peoples who are focused on building resilience, peace and prosperity for our
45 PIFS 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent (2022) at 6.
46 At 3.
47 Tuilaʻepa Saʻilele Malielegaoi “Remarks at the High-Level Pacific Regional Side event” Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (6 June 2017), available online at: www.forumsec.org/publications/remarks-hon-tuilaepalupesoliai-sailele-malielegaoi-prime-minister-independent-state (accessed 15 August 2024).
48 Action Plan to Implement the Boe Declaration on Regional Security, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat above n 3.
49 See generally Fry, above n 6, at ch 9; Steven Ratuva Contested Terrain: Reconceptualising Security in the Pacific (1st ed, ANU Press, Canberra, 2019).
50 Dame Meg Taylor DBE “Pacific-led Regionalism Undermined” (September 25, 2023) Asia Society Policy Institute www.asiasociety.org/policy-institute/pacific-led-regionalism-undermined (accessed 15 August 2024).
51 Baron Waqa, Secretary General “Remarks: Keynote Speech” Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (Pacific National and Regional Security Conference, Suva, Fiji, Monday 24 June 2024) www.forumsec.org/ publications/remarks-keynote-speech-secretary-general-baron-waqa-pacific-national-and-regional (accessed 15 August 2024).
families, communities, nations and our region.”
Principles for Dialogue and Engagement
Connected to the development of the 2050 Strategy, PIF leaders have promulgated a set of “Blue Pacific Principles for Dialogue and Engagement”. 52 Twenty-one countries have become Forum Dialogue Partners — including Japan, the US, the UK, China, and the EU — since the process was established in 1989. 53 PIF leaders are aware, of course, that some Dialogue Partners are geostrategic competitors in the region, and have expressed concern that this competition may distract from regional priorities and even lead to military conflict in the region. Intended to emphasise the importance of “genuine partnerships that reflect the collective priorities of the region”, the “Blue Pacific Principles” require: engaging with the full PIF membership; progressing PIF priorities; following a “partnership approach” in planning, programming and delivery; utilising existing regional and international mechanisms; and developing joint outcome statements and processes for implementation. 54 PIF leaders are currently considering the introduction of a tiered
approach to working with Dialogue Partners, in the context of an overall review of the regional architecture. One model being explored is the approach taken by ASEAN, which distinguishes between Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships, Dialogue Partnerships, Sectoral Dialogue Partnerships, and Development Partnerships. 55
These expressions of collective vision and intent have achieved limited successes in shaping the rhetoric, if not the behaviour, of external actors. The language of the “Blue Pacific” has been adopted in policy statements from New Zealand and Australia, 56 as would be expected from PIF members. Chinese President Xi Jinping has declared that his government “fully respects the unity and self-reliance of Pacific island countries, and supports them in implementing the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, contributing to the building of a peaceful, harmonious, secure, inclusive and prosperous Blue Pacific”.
57 The Biden administration’s Pacific Partnership Strategy likewise makes multiple references to the 2050 Strategy and commits the US “to address Pacific priorities working together with the Pacific, and to do so according to principles of Pacific regionalism, transparency, and
52 “Pacific Islands Forum Communiqué: Fiftieth Pacific Islands Forum: Tuvalu 13-16 August 2019) online at: www.forumsec.org/publications/fiftieth-pacific-islands-forum-tuvalu-13-16-august-2019 (accessed 15 August 2024).
53 Pacific Islands Forum “Partnerships” Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat www.forumsec.org/partnerships (accessed 15 August 2024).
54 PIFS, above n 52.
55 “Overview” ASEAN Secretariat www.asean.org/our-communities/asean-political-security-community/ outward-looking-community/external-relations/ (accessed 15 August 2024).
56 “Nanaia Mahuta to attend PIF Foreign Ministers’ Meeting” The Beehive (media release, 13 September 2023) www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nanaia-mahuta-attend-pif-foreign-ministers%E2%80%99-meeting (accessed 15 August 2024); “Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters to resume ‘Pacific reset’ plan again” RNZ (19 December 2023) www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/505062/foreign-affairs-minister-winston-peters-to-resumepacific-reset-plan-again (accessed 15 August 2024); “Australia’s International Development Policy for a Peaceful, Stable and Prosperous Indo-Pacific” Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (August 2023) www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/international-development-policy.pdf (accessed 15 August 2024).
57 “Xi expounds on China’s policy toward Pacific island countries” International Liason Department of the Communist Party of China (July 10, 2023) www.idcpc.gov.cn/english2023/ttxw_5749/202307/ t20230718_159301.html#:~:text=He%20pointed%20out%20that%20China,all%20countries%2C%20big%20 or%20small (accessed 15 August 2024).
accountability”. 58 The Quadrilateral Dialogue — comprising the US, India, Japan, and Australia — has affirmed its support for the objectives of the 2050 Strategy. 59 And in June 2022, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the UK and the US together launched an informal initiative, the Partners in the Blue Pacific, with the avowed aim of “further elevat[ing] Pacific regionalism, with a strong and united Pacific Islands Forum at its centre, as a vital pillar of the regional architecture and of our respective approaches in the region”.60
Blue-washing?
Yet there are reasons for wondering whether these pronouncements amount to much more than lip service, if not the “bluewashing” of geostrategic ambitions. It is doubtful whether the 2050 Strategy has made any real difference to Chinese activities in the region. The US Government’s Pacific Partnership Strategy is explicitly aligned to its Indo-Pacific strategy, which makes no mention of “Blue Pacific” priorities;61 Australia’s latest International Development Policy is also largely focussed on the Indo-Pacific, with little explicit alignment to the 2050 Strategy ; and New Zealand’s latest National Security
Strategy makes only one reference to the 2050 Strategy as compared with 12 references to the “Indo-Pacific”.62 Pacific leaders frequently view Indo-Pacific strategies as inconsistent with their priorities and values,63 especially when linked in practice with military initiatives such as AUKUS.64 The announcement of the Partners in the Blue Pacific, without prior consultation and agreement with PIF leaders, has similarly been criticised for co-opting the “Blue Pacific” narrative while disregarding the principles and processes for engagement established by the PIF.65 Cementing Pacific support required some quick diplomatic work and better alignment with key regional policies, including a rapidly organised second regional meeting and an effort to better align with the 2050 strategy. Greater effort along these lines will be needed in future.
Differences within the Pacific Islands Forum
Proclamations of collective solidarity by PIF leaders also sit somewhat uneasily with the differences that have emerged among Pacific countries in recent years. The crisis that emerged in 2021, when five Micronesian states threatened to withdraw from the PIF, appears
58 “Pacific Partnership Strategy of the United States” White House (September 2022) www.whitehouse.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Pacific-Partnership-Strategy.pdf at 5 (accessed 15 August 2024).
59 “Joint Statement from the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Tokyo” Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State (media note, July 29, 2024) www.state.gov/joint-statement-from-the-quad-foreignministers-meeting-in-tokyo/ (accessed 15 August 2024).
60 “Statement by Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States on the Establishment of the Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP)” White House (media note, June 24, 2022) www. whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/24/statement-by-australia-japan-newzealand-the-united-kingdom-and-the-united-states-on-the-establishment-of-the-partners-in-the-bluepacific-pbp/ (accessed 15 August 2024).
61 “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States” White House (February 2022) www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf (accessed 15 August 2024).
62 Jessica Collins and Meg Keen “What does the new International Development Policy mean for the Pacific?” The Interpreter (14 August 2023) www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-does-new-internationaldevelopment-policy-mean-pacific (accessed 15 August 2024).
63 Dame Meg Taylor DBE, above n 50; Mathew Doidge “EU-Pacific Development Relations and the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent” DIPLO Development Summaries (6, 2022) http://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/ items/e1c76602-ddbc-4aa7-a34d-5139e42db981 (accessed 15 August 2024).
64 Joseph Clark “AUKUS Partners Focus on Indo-Pacific Security in Shaping Joint Capabilities” US Department of Defense (April 10, 2024) www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3737569/aukus-partnersfocus-on-indo-pacific-security-in-shaping-joint-capabilities/ (accessed 15 August 2024).
65 Greg Fry, Tarcisius Kabutaulaka and Terence Wesley-Smith “‘Partners in the Blue Pacific’ initiative rides roughshod over established regional processes” Dev Policy Blog (5 July 2022) www.devpolicy.org/pbpinitiative-rides-roughshod-over-regional-processes-20220705/ (accessed 15 August 2024).
to have now subsided with the appointment of the former president of Nauru, Baron Waqa, as Secretary-General, among other measures.66 Rumours have circulated that China influenced the initial withdrawal by one of the states in question, Kiribati;67 whether or not that is true, China’s growing presence in Kiribati and the Solomon Islands, including through the provision of security services, has clearly unsettled relationships in the region.68
Fully alert to the global geopolitical context, Pacific countries are conscious of China’s strategic ambition to displace the US as “a regional and global hegemon”.69 Many might prefer dealing with “traditional partners” such as Australia and New Zealand, but see engagement with China as a pragmatic necessity. More positively, others view China as offering access to more markets, finance and technology, without the perceived politically-
66 Sadhana Sen and Stephen Howes “To the (Micronesian) victors go the spoils” Dev Policy Blog (3 March, 2023) www.devpolicy.org/to-the-micronesian-victors-go-the-spoils-20230303/ (accessed 15 August 2024).
67 Rimon Rimon “China influenced Kiribati exit from Pacific Islands Forum, MP claims” The Guardian (online ed, London, 12 July 2022) www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/12/china-influenced-kiribati-exit-frompacific-islands-forum-mp-claims (accessed 15 August 2024).
68 David Brunnstrom and Kirsty Needham “US Cautions after Hawaii neighbour Kiribati gets Chinese police” RNZ (27 February 2024) www.rnz.co.nz/news/world/510310/us-cautions-after-hawaii-neighbour-kiribatigets-chinese-police (accessed 15 August 2024).
69 Dame Meg Taylor DBE “Pacific-led Regionalism Undermined” Asia Society Policy Institute (September 25, 2023) www.asiasociety.org/policy-institute/pacific-led-regionalism-undermined (accessed 15 August 2024).
motivated development imposed by Western states.
Indeed, it is inevitable that existing relationships between particular Pacific countries and external actors will result in the formation of bilateral alliances. As territories of France, for instance, New Caledonia and French Polynesia serve as crucial bases for that country’s naval forces.70 Three states — the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau — are parties to a Compact of Free Association that enables the US to operate armed forces on their territories in return for funding grants and social services.71 Papua New Guinea receives significant development aid, as well as security support, from Australia. Such alliances may be inevitable in such a diverse region; nor are they necessarily inimical to collective identity and action. However, they do have the potential to create gaps and inequalities, making the high-minded goal of “friends to all” difficult to achieve in practice. To give a couple of related examples, the Australian Federal Police’s Pacific Policing Initiative was launched without clarity on where it sits with the PIF regional architecture, and has the potential to cut across several existing mechanisms such as the Pacific Transnational Crime Network; and the policing training offered by China might not be interoperable with that provided by Australia and New Zealand.
Security-development nexus
Pacific countries are faced with a number of other, more specific dilemmas when deciding what kinds of engagement they seek from external actors, particularly in the security-development nexus. Choices must be made whether to continue to focus on building infrastructure or to spend more on “human development”, such as health and education programmes. Investments in infrastructure, including those with significant climate components such as hydropower projects, are often financed through debt to multilateral development banks,72 adding to the high risk of debt distress experienced by a majority of Pacific countries and raising doubts whether the current “building spree” is sustainable.73 Labour migration has long provided a significant source of income for Pacific countries, with remittances far outweighing foreign direct investment in many countries. However, the formalisation of seasonal labour schemes and creation of new pathways to residence in Australia and New Zealand in recent years have led to dramatic and devastating shortages of skilled labour in Pacific countries.74 And while bilateral free trade agreements offer increased opportunities for exports from Pacific countries, regional agreements such as The Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus or the EU’s proposed Pacific States Economic Partnership
70 Denise Fisher “The Crowded and Complex Pacific: Lessons from France’s Pacific Experience” Security Challenges (16:1, 2020).
71 “US delivers ‘crucial’ compact deal for Freely Associated States” RNZ (11 March 2024) www.rnz.co.nz/ international/pacific-news/511389/us-delivers-crucial-compact-deal-for-freely-associated-states (accessed 15 August 2024).
72 For example, the Tina River Hydropower Development Project in the Solomon Islands is financed by the World Bank and the ADB: “Tina River Hydropower Development Project” World Bank Group http:// projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P161319 (accessed 15 August 2024); “Solomon Islands: Tina River Hydropower Project” Asian Development Bank www.adb.org/projects/50240-001/main (accessed 15 August 2024).
73 Dayant and others, above n 11, at 8; “Debt Dynamics in Fiji: Impacts, Challenges and Strategies for Sustainable Economic Development” Pacific Network on Globalisation and Third World Network (2024) http://static1.squarespace.com/static/63571f8389595e7a5ec0dd07/t/65d9b1f6347ff0 3a52281361/1708765732658/LOW+RES+Fiji+Debt+PANG+2202+Edit.pdf (accessed 15 August 2024).
74 Catherine Wilson “Pacific Islands fear brain drain from Australia job scheme” Al Jazeera (online ed, Qatar, 17 January 2023) www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/1/17/pacific-islands-fear-brain-drain-as-australialures-workers (accessed 15 August 2024); Christine Rovoi “Experts warn of Pacific economic challenges if seasonal work schemes not carefully managed” Pacific Media Network (22 May 2024) www.pmn.co.nz/ read/pacific-region/experts-warn-of-brain-drain-issues-if-pacific-seasonal-work-schemes-not-carefullymanaged (accessed 15 August 2024).
Agreement tend to be less effective and can be viewed by Pacific countries as attempting to “squeeze the region into existing frameworks and priorities, rather than to focus clearly on Pacific needs and interests”.75
Finally, an emerging issue that threatens to divide the region is the possibility of deepsea mining. While some Pacific leaders view this as an opportunity to raise the money needed to build climate resilience,76 others have called for a moratorium or outright ban.77 Lying at the intersection of two priorities in the 2050 Strategy — the drive for economic
development and the desire to protect the Pacific Ocean and environment — deep-sea mining is often framed as providing critical minerals for the transition to “green” energy,78 and will also potentially attract geopolitical competition over securing minerals for military purposes. A Talanoa Dialogue on this topic is scheduled to be held in 2024, facilitated by the PIF Secretariat.79 The next part of this paper offers some ways in which New Zealand could contribute to identifying positive solutions to this and other challenges facing Pacific countries.
75 Doidge, above n 63; see generally Wadan Narsey “Rethinking PACER Plus” Dev Policy Blog (22 July 2022) www.devpolicy.org/rethinking-pacer-plus-20220722/ (accessed 15 August 2024); Wesley Morgan “Much Lost, Little Gained? Contemporary Trade Agreements in the Pacific Islands” The Journal of Pacific History (53:3, 2018) 268.
76 Lydia Lewis “‘Building resilience takes money’: Deep sea mining an opportunity, Cook Islands PM says” RNZ (3 November 2023) www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/501629/building-resilience-takes-moneydeep-sea-mining-an-opportunity-cook-islands-pm-says (accessed 15 August 2024).
77 Jon Letman “Cook Islands PM ‘proceeds with caution’ on deep-sea mining as critics warn over risks” The Guardian (online ed, London, 7 July 2023) www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/07/cook-islandsdeep-sea-mining (accessed 15 August 2024); Daniel Hurst “Here be nodules: will deep-sea mineral riches divide the Pacific family?” The Guardian (online ed, London, 10 November 2023) www.theguardian.com/ environment/2023/nov/10/pacific-islands-forum-deep-sea-mining-harm-risks (accessed 15 August 2024).
78 “The False Promise: Deep-Sea Mining and the Energy Transition” Environmental Justice Foundation (July 17, 2024) http://ejfoundation.org/news-media/the-false-promise-deep-sea-mining-and-the-energytransition (accessed 15 August 2024).
79 “Fifty-Second Pacific Islands Forum: Suva, Fiji,” Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (Forum Communiqué) (610 November 2023) at [68].
4 How can Aotearoa New Zealand better engage with the Pacific?
Strengths
Before identifying ways in which Aotearoa New Zealand can better engage with the Pacific, it is useful to begin with a clear-eyed view of the existing strengths and weaknesses in its existing relationships with the region. Indeed, New Zealand’s greatest strengths lie in the close associations and trust it has already established with Pacific countries, at both intergovernmental and personal levels. New Zealand has long described itself as a Pacific nation, in part because of its geographical position as an island state in the Pacific Ocean and colonial history, but more importantly due to the genealogical and historical links between tangata whenua and tangata Pasifika, both in New Zealand and in the wider region. 80 Whether by immigration or birthrate, New Zealand is “becoming more Pacific by the hour”. 81 New Zealand diplomats and military personnel have accrued considerable goodwill in Pacific countries, having made positive contributions to resolving conflicts in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands. 82 New Zealand’s anti-nuclear stance also aligns well with Pacific countries’ aspirations for a peaceful and nuclear-free Pacific. Even if the perceptions are not universally positive, many
Pacific governments view New Zealand as a partner of choice, as well as an active member of the PIF “family”.
Building on these strengths, recent New Zealand Governments have responded to strategic competition in the Pacific by adopting three broad strategies. 83 First, new foreign policy frameworks, beginning with the “Pacific Reset” in 2018, emphasised New Zealand’s Pacific identity, significantly boosted the government’s Pacific budget, and saw a corresponding expansion of diplomatic and development activities in the region. The “Pacific Resilience” framework, adopted in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic in late 2021, advocated an approach grounded in Te Tiriti o Waitangi / the Treaty of Waitangi and a Māori world view, including the principles of “Tātai Hono (The recognition of deep and enduring whakapapa connections)” and “Tātou Tātou (All of us together)”. 84 The second broad strategy has been to uphold and promote the Pacific regional order, committed to the 2050 Strategy and channelling security concerns through the PIF and related mechanisms. Third, New Zealand has sought to shape the behaviour of external actors or partners to act through those same regional mechanisms.
80 Anna Powles “How Aotearoa New Zealand is Responding to Strategic Competition in the Pacific Islands Region” Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs (9, 2023) 32-33.
81 Damon Salesa Island Time: New Zealand’s Pacific Futures (1st ed, Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 2017) 1.
82 Jim Rolfe “Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville,” International Peacekeeping, (8:4, 2001) 38; Jon Fraenkel, Joni Madraiwiwi and Henry Okole “The RAMSI Decade: A Review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, 2003-2013” Dev Policy Blog (14 July 2014) www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/ default/files/filemanager/pidp/pdf/Independent%20RAMSI%20Review%20Report%20Final.pdf (accessed 15 August 2024).
83 This paragraph summarises the arguments in Anna Powles “How Aotearoa New Zealand is Responding to Strategic Competition in the Pacific Islands Region” Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs (9, 2023) 32.
84 Nanaia Mahuta “Aotearoa New Zealand’s Pacific Engagement: Partnering for Resilience” The Beehive, (Speech, 3 November 2021) www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/aotearoa-new%C2%A0zealand%E2%80%99spacific-engagement-partnering-resilience (accessed 15 August 2024); “New Zealand’s Pacific Engagement: From Reset to Resilience, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, (Cabinet Paper 11 November 2021, CAB-21-MIN-0401) www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Cabinet-papers/Cab-Paper-NZ-Pacific-EngagementFrom-Reset-to-Resilience.pdf (accessed 15 August 2024); Nanaia Mahuta “Aotearoa New Zealand’s Pacific Engagement: Partnering for Resilience” The Beehive, (Speech, Wellington, 3 November 2021) www. beehive.govt.nz/speech/aotearoa-new%C2%A0zealand%E2%80%99s-pacific-engagement-partneringresilience (accessed 15 August 2024).
These strategies all align well with the expressed interests of Pacific countries, and have the potential to enhance New Zealand’s reputation and mana in the region.
Risks and Weaknesses
The main risk associated with these strengths is that New Zealand comes to believe it is doing better than it actually is. There is a danger that New Zealand diplomats and government officials misread or misunderstand the messages they receive from Pacific countries. Such misunderstandings may be especially likely if Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) officials view the Pacific as a less attractive place to be posted than other regions; if MFAT sends its junior diplomats to “cut their teeth” in Pacific postings; or is distrustful of sending Pasifika diplomats to Pacific postings, as has been the case in the past. More fundamentally, such behaviours reflect paternalistic attitudes towards Pacific countries that are more difficult to displace and pose a continuing challenge to the success of New Zealand’s engagements in the region. The “Pacific Reset” and “Pacific Resilience” offered crucial opportunities to recalibrate relations between New Zealand and its Pacific neighbours, which will be important to consolidate. To the extent that the current government has signalled a return to the “Pacific Reset”, 85 it is to be hoped that the positive and attractive aspects of “Pacific Resilience” are also retained.
One particular area of potential weakness in New Zealand’s engagements in the Pacific arises where a mismatch is perceived between its rhetoric and its actions in relation to climate change, the biggest existential threat identified by Pacific countries. Diplomatically, New Zealand tends to position itself as a middle power, seeking common solutions. From the perspective of Pacific countries, however, New Zealand
is often seen as siding with major powers on climate issues, for instance negotiating in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process as part of the Umbrella Group (together with the US, Australia, Japan, and others), whereas many Pacific countries belong to and work through the developing-country Group of 77, the Least-Developed Country (LDC) group, or the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). 86 This means that New Zealand often adopts positions on climate financing that are not aligned with those of Pacific countries. To the extent that the new coalition government may be perceived as less environment-friendly than its predecessors — for example, in fast-tracking the consent process that would allow deep seabed mining and restarting offshore drilling for fossil fuels — this may risk further damage to New Zealand’s reputation among Pacific countries.
87
Another area of some sensitivity that will require careful navigation concerns the evolving relationships between Pacific countries and China. New Zealand’s latest National Security Strategy characterises China’s development cooperation as “a key lever to achieve its long-term ambitions in the Pacific”, and refers to China’s involvement in developing ports and airports as raising the possibility that they “become dual-use facilities (serving both civilian and military purposes) or fully fledged military bases in the future, which would fundamentally alter the strategic balance in the region”.
88 Whatever the truth of such analysis, these statements minimise the legitimate interests and agency of Pacific countries in seeking to upgrade crucial aspects of their development infrastructure. To take one example, Kiribati has long sought to develop a World War II-era airstrip on Kanton Island for trade and tourism purposes, and was unable to attract investment from “traditional” partners in the region before turning to China for assistance. 89
85 Rt. Hon Winston Peters “Pacific Futures” The Beehive, (Speech, Wellington, 19 July 2024) www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/pacificfutures (accessed 15 August 2024).
86 “Party Groupings” and “Regional groups and negotiating blocks”United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change https://unfccc.int/cop6/parties/87.html (accessed 15 August 2024).
87 Robin Martin “Fast-tracking consent bill backed by seabed mining company eyeing Taranaki” RNZ (15 February 2024) www. rnz.co.nz/news/national/509299/fast-tracking-consent-bill-backed-by-seabed-mining-company-eyeing-taranaki (accessed 15 August 2024); Marc Daalder “It’s drilling or climate ambition — it can’t be both” Newsroom (11 June 2024) www.newsroom. co.nz/2024/06/11/its-drilling-or-climate-ambition-it-cant-be-both/ (accessed 15 August 2024).
88 “Secure Together Tō Tātou Korowai Manaaki New Zealand’s National Security Strategy 2023-2028” Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (4 August 2023) www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-11/national-security-strategy-aug2023.pdf at [40] (accessed 15 August 2024).
89 Jonathan Barrett “Kiribati says China-backed Pacific airstrip project for civilian use” Reuters (May 13, 2021) www.reuters.com/ world/asia-pacific/kiribati-says-china-backed-pacific-airstrip-project-civilian-use-2021-05-13/ (accessed 15 August 2024).
To characterise such projects as simply the result of “China’s ambition to link economic and security cooperation… and expand its influence with Pacific Island countries” may be viewed by Pacific countries as insensitive to their development needs and sovereign autonomy.90
Suggested approaches
The above analysis gives rise to a specific set of suggested approaches. These are primarily targeted at decision-makers within the New Zealand Government, civil society, businesses and NGOs active in the Pacific, but a number of the recommendations could equally apply to state and non-state actors elsewhere.
Suggestion 1 – use current turbulence to recast relationships, providing greater agency to the Pacific Island Forum and Pacific countries
As outlined above, geostrategic competition is disrupting and destabilising the Pacific region in many ways, which is not necessarily benefitting Pacific countries and their peoples. While challenging, such activity also provides opportunities for New Zealand to differentiate itself by acting in ways that eschew competitive frameworks and build on New Zealand’s existing strengths. This includes the many connections between its people and those of Pacific countries, its history of positive engagement in the region, and its reputation as an honest broker. Humility will be required, however, to recognise that gaining a deeper understanding of the Pacific requires developing further intellectual, expert and cultural capacities at home. In this connection, existing social networks and traditional knowledge in the tangata Pasifika diaspora offer vital keys that can be leveraged to build stronger relationships with Pacific countries.
Additionally, the New Zealand Government and other institutions and individuals can proactively communicate the significant positive contributions that Pacific peoples have made to New Zealand in the fields of government, culture, business and society and more. This will engender goodwill and better
social cohesion in New Zealand, enhance links to the broader region, and add to the New Zealand public’s support for its government taking a proactive and constructive role in the Pacific, as well as prioritising the region in its foreign and security policies.
Suggestion 2 – Recognise the different needs and interests among Pacific countries and better tailor engagement
Recasting these relationships with the region requires recognising that not all Pacific countries have the same needs and interests, and better tailoring engagement accordingly. For example, Pacific countries are affected by climate change in different ways and to different extents. Other potential points of disagreement might arise in relation to deepsea mining, logging, or illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. This will also require open acknowledgement that New Zealand also has its own national interests, which will not always coincide with those of Pacific countries. A more honest and open conversation about the difficulties New Zealand faces in managing its own relationships with other external actors — including Australia, the US, and China — will go a long way towards establishing greater trust with Pacific countries in the long term.
Suggestion 3 – Make a balanced contribution to regional security as defined by Pacific countries and the Pacific Island Forum, with a particular focus on climate and health
New Zealand should continue making positive contributions to regional security, as defined and requested by Pacific countries in the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent and other key documents. This contribution needs to be balanced across the different types of security, with a particular focus on climate and health. It will also include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, transnational crime, and maritime security operations, as well as more traditional areas of defence and policing. Fully conscious of the conceptual and practical sliding scale between securitisation and militarisation, New Zealand should
90 “Secure Together Tō Tātou Korowai Manaaki New Zealand’s National Security Strategy 2023-2028” Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (4 August 2023) www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/ files/2023-11/national-security-strategy-aug2023.pdf at [40] (accessed 15 August 2024).
nevertheless seek opportunities to meet the expectations of Pacific countries that external actors will cooperate in responding to their primary security challenge, climate change.
Suggestion 4 – Build better expertise, peopleto-people, and civil society links using both government and non-government channels
New Zealand should foster collaboration between academic institutions, think tanks and other civil society organisations in New Zealand and the wider region. It can do so, for example, by developing shared academic and research programmes with educational institutions such as the University of the South Pacific; by proposing the addition of Track II platforms to existing regional mechanisms, such as the South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting; by creating partnerships to train defence, security and diplomatic personnel in Pacific countries; and by developing a cadre of tangata Pasifika experts in New Zealand who can be called upon by Pacific countries to advise on security issues, broadly understood. A longer-term goal might include working towards a regular, multi-track dialogue that includes diplomats, academics, security experts, think tanks and business leaders from a range of Pacific countries and external actors.
New Zealand has a number of organisations providing such links with Asia and elsewhere; however New Zealand-based organisations delivering Track II dialogues in the Pacific are fewer in number and activity. As an independent, non-governmental organisation, NZIIA has the ability to convene academics, NGOs, business and government officials for dialogues in a neutral space. In doing so, it would seek to complement and collaborate with other organisations in this field, including the centres and institutes housed within New Zealand universities, Pacific Cooperation Foundation, the Council for International Development and others.
Suggestion 5 – Support the review of the Pacific Island Forum’s mechanisms for external engagement
New Zealand should continue to support the review of the PIF’s mechanisms for engaging with external actors, while carefully calibrating its own attitudes to such actors. For example, instead of confronting any and all Chinese influence in the region, New Zealand
could acknowledge that Pacific countries have reasonable interests in entering into arrangements with China to address development and security concerns. Doing so would not mean ignoring the potentially disruptive effects of heightened geopolitical competition in the region; nor would it entail any weakening of commitment to the “Blue Pacific Principles for Dialogue and Engagement”. Rather, it would mean greater selectivity when deciding when to oppose, when to disagree and when to cooperate with China. Adopting such an approach might serve to persuade Pacific countries that New Zealand places a high priority on aligning with their national interests and is not driven by a knee-jerk assumption that China’s motives are malign.
Suggestion 6 – Proactively encourage Pacific-led solutions and strategic solidarity
Finally, New Zealand should seek opportunities to proactively engage with issues of strategic salience to Pacific countries. This might involve offering or encouraging mediation between the French Government and the Kanaky independence movement in New Caledonia, even if this might be unpopular with “traditional” partners in the Pacific. More prosaically, it could include taking steps to review trade and labour agreements for the benefit of Pacific countries. Other possibilities include tangible demonstrations of support for “homegrown” Pacific initiatives, such as the creation of the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law (COSIS); the requests for advisory opinions on climate change issues from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the International Court of Justice; and the effort to fix baselines under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
5 Selected background reading
‘2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent’, Pacific Islands Forum, 2022, https://forumsec. org/sites/default/files/2023-11/PIFS-2050Strategy-Blue-Pacific-Continent-WEB5Aug2022-1.pdf
Azizian, R., & Johanson, T., ‘Finding the democratic balance: Australian and New Zealand national security coordination’, Routledge Handbook of Democracy and Security, Routledge, 2020.
Dayant, A., & Keen, M., ‘Drivers of change in the Pacific’, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 24 January 2024, www.lowyinstitute.org/theinterpreter/drivers-change-pacific
Dayant, A., Duke, R., De Gorostiza, G., & Rajah, R., ‘Pacific Aid Map 2023 – Key Findings Report’, Lowy Institute, 31 October 2023, www. lowyinstitute.org/publications/pacific-aidmap-2023-key-findings-report
Doidge, M., ‘EU-Pacific Development Relations and the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent’, DIPLO, 2022, http://ir.canterbury. ac.nz/items/e1c76602-ddbc-4aa7-a34d5139e42db981
Fawcett, D., ‘Speaking Softly & Carrying a Big Stethoscope: Universal Health Care for Pacific Island Nations’, Periscope, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, September 2023, https:// periscopekasaustralia.com.au/briefs/speakingsoftly-carrying-a-big-stethoscope-universalhealth-care-for-pacific-island-nations/
Iati I., ‘Navigating geopolitical competition in the Pacific’, New Zealand International Review, May/June 2024, www.nziia.org.nz/ articles/navigating-geopolitial-competition-inthe-pacific/
Iati, I., ‘Chapter 9. China and Samoa’, in Wesley-Smith T., and Porter, E.E., (eds.), China in Oceania: Reshaping the Pacific?, Berghahn Books, 2010, https://doi. org/10.1515/9780857453808-013
Iati, I., ‘China’s Impact on New Zealand Foreign Policy in the Pacific: The Pacific Reset’, in Smith, G., and Wesley-Smith, T., (eds.), The China Alternative: Changing Regional Order in the Pacific Islands, ANU Press, 2021, https:// doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1h45mkn.8
Keen, M., ‘Australians watching Pacific with concern and care’, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 3 June 2024, www.lowyinstitute.org/ the-interpreter/australians-watching-pacificconcern-care
Keen, M., & Tidwell, A., ‘The bigger political game in the Pacific’, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 23 February 2024, www. lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/biggerpolitical-game-pacific
Keen, M., ‘Infrastructure for Influence: Pacific islands building spree’, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 31 October 2023, www.lowyinstitute. org/the-interpreter/infrastructure-influencepacific-islands-building-spree
Kelly, S., & Doidge, M., ‘EU-Pacific engagement post Covid-19 and post-Brexit: What impact on the SDGs?’, PIMA Bulletin, 31:21, 2020, https:// cradall.org/sites/default/files/pima_bulletin_ no._31_0.pdf
Movono, A., Scheyvens, R., & Ratuva, S., ‘Beyond bouncing back: A framework for tourism resilience building in the Pacific’, Journal of Interdisciplinary Research, Vol 76 (1) 2023, http://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/server/api/ core/bitstreams/20ad16db-4bde-4adb-87f2d90528df6d13/content
‘New Zealanders’ Perceptions of the Pacific’, Pacific Cooperation Foundation, 2022, https://static1.squarespace.com/ static/621421c4d99baa795bd3f6df/t/6391983a0 2377f72a3b2821b/1670486099531/FINAL+PCF+ New+Zealanders+Perceptions+of+the+Pacific+ Report+-+Embargoed+5.00pm+Friday+9+Dece mber+2022+%281%29.pdf
Penjueli, M., ‘Mended region sails into IndoPacific headwinds’, Samoa Observer, 8 April 2023, www.samoaobserver.ws/category/ columns/102921
Powles, A., ‘How Aotearoa New Zealand is Responding to Strategic Competition in the Pacific Islands Region’, Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs, September 2023, https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/ handle/10822/1084984
Powles, A., & Szadziewski, H., ‘The Question from the Pacific Islands: Will the United States Be a Credible and Consistent Indo-Pacific Partner?’, Asia Policy, 18(3), 2003, 56-68, https://www.nbr.org/publication/one-regionmultiple-strategies-how-countries-areapproaching-the-indo-pacific/
Powles, A., & Noakes, S., ‘What we Have (and Have not) Learned from Early Research on China’s Engagement in the Pacific’, Ekistics and the New Habitat, 81(3), 2020, https:// ekisticsjournal.org/index.php/journal/article/ view/561
Powles, A., & Wallis, J., ‘Burden-sharing: the US, Australia and New Zealand alliances in the Pacific islands’, International Affairs, 97(4), 2021, https://academic.oup.com/ia/ article/97/4/1045/6299308
Powles, A., & Wallis, J., ‘Smooth sailing? Australia, New Zealand and the United States partnering in–and with–the Pacific islands’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2023, www.aspi.org.au/report/smooth-sailing
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