Page 1

APRIL, 2017

VOL. 1

Nouvelle Europe dossier

NATIONAL INDIFFERENCE

THIS ISSUE INCLUDES:

Foreword by Andreas Pacher

La banalisation de l'Europe engendre l'indifférence. Entretien avec Virginie van Ingelgom by Philippe Perchoc

No European to receive the EU’s cultural prizes by Andreas Pacher

Changer l'École pour sauver l'Europe? L'institution scolaire ou la fabrique des citoyens by Adrien Laurent

L'indifférence nationale en Roumanie, entretien avec l'historien Traian Sandu by Pauline Maufrais

How European can be a Post-Soviet Korean? by Svetlana Kim

Becoming Ukrainian. The context of national indifference in Ukraine by Yana Hryshko

From the Dolomites to Galicia – national indifference and “Habsburg patriotism” in the Austro-Hungarian empire’s literature by Balázs Gyimesi


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Nouvelle Europe is a think tank based in France, with members all around the world. Nouvelle Europe focuses on comparative research and publishing on modern tendencies in the EU and its neighbourhood, as well as conducting forums and simulation seminars in close partnership with institutions such as the European Commission, aimed at education and networking. Contacts: Balåzs Gyimesi, President - balazs.gyimesi@nouvelle-europe.eu Inga Chelyadina, Treasurer - inga.chelyadina@nouvelle-europe.eu Andreas Pacher, Editor-in-Chief - andreas.pacher@nouvelle-europe.eu Philippe Perchoc, Founder - philippe.perchoc@nouvelle-europe.eu The present dossier was organised by Nouvelle Europe’s Editor-in-Chief, Andreas Pacher.

Special acknowledgement to Patricia Gautier and Pierre Martin. Cover: the personification of peace by Ambrogio Lorenzetti, Allegory of Good Government Back cover: the personification of divisio by Ambrogio Lorenzetti, Allegory of Bad Government

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Contents Introduction: Nationalism and national indifference in contemporary Europe by Andreas Pacher ...............................................................................................................7

La banalisation de l’Europe engendre l’indifférence. Entretien avec Virginie Van Ingelgom by Philippe Perchoc ............................................................................................................ 13

No European to receive the EU’s cultural prizes by Andreas Pacher ............................................................................................................. 17

Changer l'école pour sauver l'Europe? L'institution scolaire ou la fabrique des citoyens by Adrien Laurent ............................................................................................................. 23

L'indifférence nationale en Roumanie, entretien avec l'historien Traian Sandu by Pauline Maufrais .......................................................................................................... 28

How European can be a Post-Soviet Korean? by Svetlana Kim ................................................................................................................ 35

Becoming Ukrainian. The context of national indifference in Ukraine by Yana Hryshko ................................................................................................................ 40

From the Dolomites to Galicia – national indifference and “Habsburg patriotism” in the Austro-Hungarian empire’s literature by Balázs Gyimesi ............................................................................................................. 50

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Introduction: Nationalism and national indifference in contemporary Europe By Andreas Pacher One of the oddest trends after the Brexitreferendum in 2016 saw hundreds of British Jews rushing to apply for Portuguese passports. Their hope was grounded on a Portuguese

law

which

enables

the

naturalization of those whose Sephardic ancestors were expelled from the Iberian peninsula in the 15th century. This episode vaguely echoes the Ottoman experience in which people were incentivized to change their millet, the system that divided people along religious lines. Religious affiliation determined whether one was subject to additional tax or to military conscription. Evidence shows that, for example, Christians Personification of ‘Divisio’ by Ambrogio Lorenzetti.

‘temporarily’ converted to Islam as a tactical means to optimize their livelihood.

The post-Brexit rush to Portugal, and the Ottoman millet-system can both be personified in the nationalism’s perennial companion with whom it eternally marches together: Indifference to nationalism. Whereas nationalism seeks to solidify an illusionary hierarchy of nations, national indifference circumvents it with a fluid relocation of identities. Within this dialectic, identifications matter – for it is precisely “on the basis of such socio-legal representations that rights are granted or denied” (Costas Constantinou). And who, in our contemporary “world of uncertain identities” (Paul Sharp), can opt out from ethnic or national categorizations? The hundreds of Sephardic Jews switching their citizenships epitomize a pattern of what Tara Zahra called “failed groupness” in a resistance against nationalist intrusions; individuals who had perceived themselves to be deeply attached to their community suddenly decide to withdraw. 7


With her works on national indifference, Tara Zahra has challenged conventional views of the socalled ‘age of nationalism’ in Central and Eastern Europe. She found that the era of nationalism can as well be labeled an age of indifference towards nationalism. Large shares of the populations responded to nationalism by not co-opting to these discourses. Their stance did not reflect mere passivity, but posed an outright political response. Zahra argues that making the limits of nationalism visible is valuable because it enables to highlight how nationalists respond to indifference by changing their strategies. In her view, therefore, it is the red arrow of the following diagram which poses the most important puzzle.

Why should we care about national indifference in contemporary Europe? In the words of James Der Derian, “[t]he ultimate reason to study the concept of identity in international relations is that ‘we’ fight against and make peace with ‘others’. These others might be newly encountered people from across an ocean or over a mountain range. They might be all-too-familiar people who once were fellow humans, reliable allies, friendly neighbours or even likable kin.” More radically, he alerts us that the formation of identities “can draw physical boundaries between peoples, as well as metaphysical boundaries between life and the most radical other of life, death.” Indeed, citizens within the EU today can find themselves to be outside tomorrow, only to witness their former partners greedily craving to inherit the preys left behind by the exit. It is for this reason that Italy’s deputy foreign minister, Mario Giro, warned from heading into an “economic cold war” between the leftover EU and the United Kingdom, while the waters off Gibraltar are getting filled with Spanish and British warships. What is all this a presentiment of? Our erstwhile friendly neighbor, our former amicable partner is suddenly an ‘Other’, perhaps a traitor to our 8


common peace project, at the brink of enmity. Can we respond with indifference to that discourse? And if we do, how can we make sense of that red arrow, how does our indifference affect nationalists – including ‘supranationalists’ who adhere to an unreflected EU enthusiasm? Our dossier at Nouvelle Europe collects various articles that pondered upon, thought further, and by times struggled with the concept of national indifference. While each text was inspired by national indifference, none is repetitive; the dossier instead reveals the richness of application that the term allows. A grand ouverture is presented by Philippe Perchoc’s intriguing interview with Virginie van Ingelgom, a professor in Louvain-La-Neuve who has published on citizens’ attitudes towards the EU. The interview highlights the complex relations between the politicized national member state levels and the rather aloof EU sphere that is so detached from all mass politics, giving rise to aphoristic conclusions such as “[l]es étudiants Erasmus rencontrent des Européens mais pas l’Europe” [“Erasmus students encounter Europeans, but not Europe”] and “l’indifférence à l’égard de l’intégration européenne peut être interprétée comme un signe de ‘normalisation’ de l’Union européenne” [“indifference towards the European integration can be interpreted as a sign of normalization by the EU”]. Andreas Pacher thematizes an obscure part of EU-led programs, namely the EU’s cultural prizes. His article highlights the institutional ambiguities that conceal that the fons honorum of the prizes is not really the EU, but rather private organizations that forcibly categorize winners along nationalities. The institutional conundrum – resulting from a struggle of mutual indifferences by the EU and its member states – makes it legally impossible to have ‘European’ instead of national awardees. Adrien Laurent contemplates on the absence of a genuinely European education, and links national indifference to sociological concepts by pondering how to “faire émerger un ‘habitus européen’”. He sees a need to add a dose of Europeanization to the national education systems “car l’être apolitique est un être national”. In the interview conducted by Pauline Maufrais, the Sorbonne-Nouvelle historian Traian Sandu highlights how national indifference has been shaping Romanian thinkers and politicians in the past century. The richness of ideas and options that loomed around 1918 – ranging from Germanophilia to national-communism – is striking. Their threads have continued to evolve even 9


up to Romanian politics of today. Traian Sandu predicts that Romania, disappointed by Occidentalisation, will seek to “se légitimer de nouveau” while “il n'y a pas de projet européen suffisamment crédible qui pourrait remplacer le nationalism” [“there is not European project that is sufficiently credible so as to replace nationalism”]. In the next article, Svetlana Kim narrates her experience as someone with a “truly strange” national background – a Russian-speaking ethnic Korean from Uzbekistan (‘Koryo-saram’) now living in the EU. Her article links national indifference to concepts of diaspora studies, including by putting forth how failed groupness can still be regarded as a ‘dormant diaspora’. Moreover, she asks not only what the red arrow in our diagram means, but also, and not less importantly, why and under what circumstances people opt to be nationalist or indifferent. Yana Hryshko’s article reflects upon a periodization of independent Ukraine’s history along three waves of large-scale nationalism dialectically followed by large-scale national indifference. She (sometimes passionately) demonstrates how these two antagonist forces have been mutually opposing each other since the collapse of the Soviet Union until today. While most other texts apply national indifference on a micro- or meso-level unit of analysis, hers interestingly utilizes it within a macro-level framework. Balázs Gyimesi’s article captures the nostalgic mood of the Austrian writers Joseph Roth, Ödön von Horváth, Robert Musil and Stefan Zweig. Literary passages are evoked that emotionally underline how national indifference was a deliberate reaction to nationalism. Many fictitious protagonists exhibit what William D. Godsey called ‘Habsburg patriotism’. Balázs Gyimesi’s thoughts extend even further by transforming the latter into a European patriotism. All these articles were inspired by one and the same concept – national indifference – and yet vary so much in their domain and scope of application. Some link it to sociology and diaspora studies, some apply them to biographical experiences or literary works, while others find the new locus of national indifference in the EU. The latter can be questioned, for some suggest that “European identity [is] constructed in the absence of an Other” (Marco Antonsich) in light of the Kantian theorem that patriotism and cosmopolitanism arise out of the same source of solidarity. Nevertheless, one can convincingly imply that the Others of the EU are, at least institutionally, the Member States who fear "the end of national cultures" (Lluís Bonet and Emmanuel Négrier).

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As Svetlana Kim suggested en passant, it is also urgent to ask why people become either nationalist or nationally indifferent. In the context of Brexit, such a view prompts us to take seriously the underlying real-world problems deeply felt, suffered, and often unarticulated by contemporary followers of populism. In the end one may ask: Is it possible for a worldly polity to claim the counterintuitive, often difficult and yet noble goal of inclusive universality – is it possible to develop a collective identity without creating an excluded Other? The dossier is based on the readings: CONSTANTINOU, Costas M., “Aporias of Identity. Bicommunalism, Hybridity and the ‘Cyprus Problem’”, Cooperation and Conflict, pp. 247-270, 2007. GODSEY, William D., “A Noblewoman’s Changing Perspective on the World: The Habsburg Patriotism of Rosa Neipperg-Lobkowicz (1832–1905)”, Austrian History Yearbook, pp. 37-60, 2016. SHILS, Edward, “Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties: Some Particular Observations on theRelationships of Sociological Research and Theory”, The British Journal of Sociology, pp. 130145, 1957. ZAHRA, Tara, “Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis”, Slavic Review, pp. 93-119, 2010. Further references : ANTONSICH, Marco, “The Narration of Europe in ‘National’ and ‘Post-national’ Terms. Gauging the Gap between Normative Discourses and People’s Views”, European Journal of Social Theory, pp. 505-522, 2008. BONET, Lluís & NÉGRIER, Emmanuel, “The end(s) of national cultures? Cultural policy in the face of diversity”, International Journal of Cultural Policy, pp. 574-589, 2011. DER DERIAN, James, Critical Practices in International Theory, Routledge, 2009. SHARP, Paul, “For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations”, International Studies Review, pp. 33-57, 1999. VAN INGELGOM, Virginie, Integrating Indifference. A comparative, qualitative and quantitative approach to the legitimacy of European integration, ECPR Press, 2014.

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“Brexit vote sparks rush of British Jews seeking Portuguese passports”, The Guardian, 31 December 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/31/brexit-vote-rush-britishjews-portuguese-passports. “UK and EU heading for economic cold war, says Italian minister”, The Guardian, 30 January 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/30/uk-eu-economic-cold-war-italianminister-mario-giro.

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La banalisation de l’Europe engendre l’indifférence. Entretien avec Virginie Van Ingelgom By Philippe Perchoc

Si

l’on

parle

de

la

montée

de

l’euroscepticisme dans les médias, un phénomène estimé,

semble

l’indifférence

largement

sous-

croissante

des

Européens envers l’Europe. Virginie Van Ingelgom est chercheuse qualifiée F.R.S.FNRS à l’Institut de sciences politiques Louvain-Europe, professeure en sciences politiques à l’Université catholique de Louvain, et chercheuse associée au Centre d’études européennes de Sciences Po Paris, revient pour Nouvelle Europe

Virginie van Ingelgom

sur ce phénomène. Merci d’avoir accepté cet entretien. Le sujet de l’indifférence européenne ne fait pas tellement la une des médias européens qui s’attardent plutôt sur la montée de l’euroscepticisme. Au même moment, Brice Teinturier publie un livre sur les « PRAF », les « plus rien à foutre », peut-on comparer indifférence nationale et européenne ? VVI : Paradoxalement, on attend des citoyens européens qu’ils ressentent et agissent différement de ce qu’ils font au niveau national. La politisation européenne touche les citoyens qui sont déjà politisés au niveau national, et pas les autres. Ainsi, plus l’Europe devient visible et plus elle devient un objet politique comme un autre, qui, comme les autres peut susciter l’indifférence. Pourtant, on pourrait penser que quand les citoyens voient que l’Europe change quelque chose à leur vie, ils s’y intéressent plus.

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C’est possible, mais cela nécessite une « expérience de l’UE », or la part des Européens qui ont une telle expérience reste faible, parce que l’Europe reste un projet élitiste, en particulier dans ses réalisations les plus visibles, mais également très ciblé. Même le programme Erasmus tellement vanté par les institutions ne semble pas avoir d’impact évident sur le degré d’attachement au projet politique européen. Les étudiants Erasmus rencontrent des Européens mais pas l’Europe ? C’est un peu cela. Les études existantes s’accordent sur le faible impact dans le temps long de l’expérience d’Erasmus sur l’identification à l’Europe. Par ailleurs, pour beaucoup d’Européens, celle-ci paraît « extérieure ». C’est vrai pour les Britanniques avec qui nous avons organisé des « focus groups », entretiens collectifs de groupes sociaux spécifiques, mais aussi pour les Belges et les Français1. Par une question réinsérée dans les sondages nationaux en Belgique pour 2014, il apparaît que plus de 40% d’entre eux seraient indifférents à la disparition de l’UE2. Dans le pays qui abrite la majorité des fonctionnaires européens, c’est le comble. Mais, comme nous l’avons montré avec Claire Dupuy (maitresse de conférence à l’IEP de Grenoble), les gens ont un avis sur les émétteurs des politiques publiques qui les concernent3. Si la plupart des citoyens européens évaluent positivement la possibilité de voyager, ils ne le font pas ; celle d’étudier ailleurs en Europe, ils ne le font pas. Mais qu’en est-il des professions directement au contact de l’Europe comme les agriculteurs ou les douaniers, les pêcheurs ? Dans ce cas, c’est différent. La politique est visible, il y a politisation, avec accord ou désaccord. Mais les politiques publiques européennes ne sont pas des politiques de masse, et dans ce cas, elles

Duchesne, Sophie, Frazer, Elizabeth, Haegel, Florence, & Van Ingelgom, Virginie. (2013). Citizens' Reactions to European Integration Compared Overlooking Europe. Palgrave Macmillan ; Van Ingelgom, Virginie. (2014). Integrating Indifference. A comparative, qualitative and quantitative approach to the legitimacy of European integration. ECPR Press. 2 Il s’agit d’une question qui était présente dans le sondage Eurobaromètre entre 1973 et 2004 : « Si l’on annonçait demain que l’Union européenne est abandonnée, éprouveriez‑vous de grands regrets, de l’indifférence ou un vif soulagement ? ». Voir : Van Ingelgom, Virginie (2012). Mesurer l'indifférence. Intégration européenne et attitudes des citoyens. Sociologie, 3, 1-20 (2012). https://www.cairn.info/revuesociologie-2012-1.htm 3 Dupuy, Claire, Van Ingelgom, Virginie (2017), « Comment l’Union européenne fabrique (ou pas) sa propre légitimité. Les politiques européennes et leurs effets-retours sur les citoyens », Politique européenne, 54, 152-187. https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-europeenne-2016-4.htm 1

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créent de l’indifférence. Même dans le cas du Brexit, pour les citoyens britanniques, qu’est-ce que le départ de l’UE allait changer au quotidien ? Personne ne le savait. Ne peut-on pas dire que la paix est une politique publique européenne de masse ? En suivant vos découvertes, on pourrait conjecturer que dans les pays où elle paraît menacée, par la politique russe par exemple, les gens sont moins indifférents à l’Europe. En quelque sorte, il faudrait regarder dans ces pays. Néanmoins dans les cas que j’ai étudiés, trois mécanismes expliquent cette indifférence : la distance, l’ambivalence et le fatalisme. Le premier, c’est de dire que tout cela, c’est très loin. De plus en plus de citoyens s’éloignent de la politique nationale dans les Etats membres à l’ouest de l’UE, et ils s’éloignent aussi d’une UE qui revêt de plus en plus les habits d’un animal politique semblable. On pourrait dire alors que c’est un problème d’imagination ? Les Européens se sentent loin d’une Europe inimaginable ? Je n’avais pas formulé la chose de cette façon, mais oui. Les Européens imaginent que les Belges mangent des frites et les Eurocrates parlent anglais, mais ces deux espaces se superposent et les Eurocrates ne mangent pas de frites ? Probablement. La distance au politique, national comme européen, joue un rôle central. Un second mécanisme relève de l’ambivalence. Finalement, on reconnaît que l’UE appore des bénéfices mais comme on en profite pas, à quoi bon ? Si je peux voyager mais que je n’ai pas l’occasion, je peux percevoir l’UE positivement en général mais resté ambivalent car mon expérience personnelle en est très éloignée. Enfin le dernier mécanisme qu’on voit apparaître dans les groupes de citoyens interrogés, c’est le fatalisme. De toutes façons, l’UE et la mondialisation, qui sont souvent synonyme, existent, et donc il faut faire avec. On retrouve aussi ce fatalisme au niveau national, mais au niveau européen, il apparaît amplifié. Ainsi quand on questionne les Belges ou les Français sur leur auto-perception, on les trouve plutôt négatifs ou parfois indifférents, c’est ce qu’en France on appelle le « déclinisme ». Mais si on leur demande comment ils voient les autres, ils sont plus clivés, positivement ou pas 4 . Quand les Duchesne, Sophie, & Van Ingelgom, Virginie (2008). L’indifférence des Français et des Belges (francophones) pour leurs voisins Européens : une pièce de plus au dossier de l’absence de communauté 4

15


Européens questionnent leur identité nationale, comme les Belges ou les Espagnols, c’est qu’ils ont une identité de rechange, comme les Flamands ou les Catalans. Mais dans le cas européen, il n’y a pas de stratégie de sortie, sauf l’identité nationale. Au final, on pourrait dire que si l’Europe créée de l’indifférence, comme le niveau fédéral américain pour l’élection duquel seuls 50% des citoyens se présentent, c’est qu’elle a réussit paradoxalement à devenir un objet comme un autre qui suscite l’indifférence ? Oui, l’indifférence à l’égard de l’intégration européenne peut être interprétée comme un signe de ‘normalisation’ de l’Union européenne. Néanmoins, les trois mécanismes mis en évidence sont amplifiés en quelque sort au niveau européen qui apparait dès lors comme un miroir grossissant des problèmes rencontrés par nos démocraties occidentales. L’Europe n’a évidemment pas et malheureusement pas le monopole du désenchantement démocratique. Celui-ci s’ancre dans des tendances plus générales rencontrées par nos démocraties occidentales.

politique européenne ?. Politique européenne, 26, 143-164 (2008). https://www.cairn.info/revue-politiqueeuropeenne-2008-3.htm

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No European to receive the EU’s cultural prizes By Andreas Pacher

The EU’s cultural policy is characterized by a structural oxymoron: The EU pursues European identity-building via a national framework. While the locus of EU cultural policies is delegated onto co-opted national organizations, the main share of successful identity-building discourse is arrogated by the EU. It is the eternal dialectic between Member States and supranational interests that leads to this institutional conundrum. The EU Prize for Literature serves as an illustration.

No ‘European’ has ever received the EU Prize for Literature. Instead, the winners are always classified as specific nationals of Member States – as Slovenians, Portuguese, Finnish, Romanians. It manifests a typical “narration of Europe in national terms” (Antonsich, 2008). Moreover, the awardees are always picked by national juries of their own state rather than by supranational EU institutions. As with the other cultural prizes, the EU merely provides funding and an overarching framework, while the actual selection processes are delegated to private organizations. With its cultural policy, the EU explicitly pursues the aim of building a European identity. The innate complexity within the concept of identity is only surpassed by the confusing institutional structures behind the EU’s cultural prizes. In case of the EU Prize for Literature, the national juries who pick their own countries’ awardees are themselves selected by a consortium of three umbrella organizations – namely the European and International Booksellers Federation (EIBF), the European Writers' Council, and the

17


Federation of European Publishers. These three, in turn, consist of an array of national organizations from all the EU’s member states and beyond. There are 12 or 13 winners each year. Each participating country – which include states other than EU members, namely Iceland, Norway, as well as EU candidates such as Albania or Serbia – gets to be represented once over a three-year cycle. The three stakeholder organizations are not always completely distinct from each other. For example, both the Bulgarian and the Austrian Book Associations are members of two of the EU-wide umbrella organizations that are responsible for selecting the national juries. Moreover, the EIBF, one of the umbrella organizations, include groups from the US, Russia, China, South Africa and New Zealand.

Psychological Consequences There is one problem with this institutional setting. Scientists of evolutionary psychology have long demonstrated that human beings (and some animals) exhibit an innate craving for a distinct status which sets them apart from their co-species (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Zizzo, 2002). Honors and prizes satisfy this deeply ingrained desire (Frey, 2006). In grand solemnity, the laureates are propelled to the center of ceremonious attention, they shake hands with official representatives and hear praising words about their works. One psychological result is the emergence of the emotion of gratitude, which is directed towards the benefactor from whom the honor was received. And gratitude nurtures relationships (Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006), gives rise to a feeling of social attachment, to a will to enact reciprocity, and, finally, to loyalty. Now if the locus of selection procedures can be found not in supranational, but rather in national institutions, then the benefactor is not European, but a co-national. One can therefore assume that it is the national organization to which gratitude and loyalty is addressed. This is the irony of creating a European identity via national institutions.

The Clash of Antagonistic Indifferences The EU Prize for Literature perfectly embodies the EU’s official rhetoric of ‘United in Diversity’ which is as ambiguous as it gets (Lähdesmäki, 2012). As the scholar Jason Dittmer wrote, “European cultural policy is, even in the best of times, a struggle to reconcile tensions between national and European scales of identity, between universalist and particular formulations of Europe” (Dittmer, 2012, p. 123).

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It is the antagonism between supranational (or post-national) and national ambitions that creates such intricate settings into which nonparticipating organizations, including from the U.S., China or even South Africa, absurdly become sucked in. The friction is particularly fierce because of what is at stake: Cultural policies ultimately shape identities (Singh, 2010; Sassatelli, 2009; Minnaert, 2014).

Legal Conundrum The whole cultural policy of the EU operates in categories that are not covered by the legal basis enshrined in the EU treaties. For example, the cultural prizes are called ‘actions’. These ‘actions’ are subsumed under the Creative Europe ‘programme’ managed by an agency under the supervision of the European Commission. Not Member States are the parties to these ‘actions’, but rather ‘participating states’ for the institutional (and political) reasons stated above. Neither ‘actions’ nor ‘programme’ nor ‘participating states’ are legal categories. Moreover, while each cultural prize is labelled to be a EU one, they are in fact organized by private foundations which often do not illuminate how selection procedures take place. The way winners are selected, and by whom exactly other than ominous ‘expert panels’, is never really transparent. (As a contrast: the Sakharov Prize – which is not under the Creative Europe framework, but a prize of the European Parliament – exhibits a clear step-by-step diagram that explains how the winners are chosen.) The following table lists the prizes under the framework of Creative Europe in the chronological order of the year they were established, featuring the private organizations in charge, and the selection procedures. It demonstrates the EU’s incremental and somewhat unsystematic approach to cultural policy. Prize EU Prize for Contemporary Architecture

Est.

EU Prize Heritage

Cultural

2002

Europa Nostra

European Border Breaker Awards

2004

Eurosonic European Union

EU Prize for Literature

2009

EU Prix MEDIA

2012

European and International Booksellers Federation; European Writers' Council; Federation of European Publishers n.a.

for

1988

Organized by Fundació Mies van der Rohe; Architects Council of Europe

19

Noorderslag; Broadcasting

Selection procedure Independent expert juries* assessing proposals from the Fundació’s partner institutions. Independent expert juries*; one public choice award through online poll. Unknown regarding nine prizes (“on the basis of data” of various institutions); one prize via online poll. National juries selected* by the three organizations involved.

n.a.


* The way jury members are appointed is not public. The reason why the EU’s cultural and identity policies spawn such extra-legal complexities is based on the eternal dialectic inherent to the EU. It is the antagonistic clash between two mutual indifferences, namely the supranational institutions’ indifference toward the defensively nationalist sentiments of the Member States on the one hand, and the Member States’ fear of an “end of national cultures” (Bonet & Négrier, 2011) which makes them, in turn, indifferent towards the EU’s ‘post-nation-building efforts’.

A Typical Quota System for ‘European Added Value’ Ever since the EU acquired its first legal competence to coordinate cultural policies in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, it has always followed an incremental approach in cultural policies. That was so precisely as an active response to the ‘supranational indifference’ encountered from the side of Member States, who, naturally, demanded unanimity for all actions within this policy domain. The EU thus always had to accommodate the defensive stances of those seeking to safeguard their national interests. The result is that the EU follows the classification of artists along nationalities; the need to give each ‘participating state’ its ‘equal’ share; the optics that ‘European added value’ to each work of literature – the main criterion to assess artistic value within the EU’s cultural framework – is ‘equally’ distributed among all Member States. This ‘equality’, as often in the EU, is of course a numeric equality according to which each sovereign Member State obtains the same quantum of winners after the same interval of time. Just compare this political numerology with the yearlong quarrel about the composition of judges in the EU’s General Court (which was ‘solved’ in 2016 with much “useless spending”), or with the shrewdly calculated formula of “Number of Commissioners = Number of Member States”.

National institutions, but Europeanized discourses As stated above, the recipients’ emotional responses are likely to be channeled towards the private national organizations. Nevertheless, it is the EU which receives the largest share of identitybuilding success. For, despite the institutional and legal conundrum, it is the EU that is at the center of discourses. Each cultural prize gains its prestige by including the label ‘European’ into its name. The national institutions that are co-opted to actually organize the prize remain unknown to the public. This 20


“Europeanization of discourses” (Lähdesmäki, 2012) is the main success that the EU shrewdly acquires through its cultural policy. While the awardees may be aware of the decisive role of national organizations, the rest of the 500 million-big audience – the actual targets of the cultural policy’s identity-building efforts – is enticed to believe that it was the EU which was really able to honor European artists and writers.

Conclusion So far there is no genuine, supranational EU prize in the realm of culture – one which would award actual ‘European’ rather than a bunch of national winners each year to accommodate Member States’ desires to receive their quota of policy outputs. The current system devised to create a European identity relies on national institutional venues. Classifying an artist not as ‘European’, but rather as a specific national, seems natural because it is commonly accepted today that identity is constructed along nationalities. The EU, however, has a supranational, if not post-national tendency to transcend national sentiments. This motion that flows away from the Member States’ narrow interests is the contemporary locus of “national indifference” (Zahra, 2010). The Member States react to this indifference by clinging to their sovereign rights which are safeguarded in the Council. They, in turn, exhibit ‘supranational indifference’, to which the European Commission reacts with an incremental approach. In the cultural realm, this dialectic dynamic spawns absurd institutional arrangements that are legally questionable at best. Moreover, the institutional setting of the cultural prizes may ironically foster the awardees’ loyalty to national institutions. However, the EU is the one which gains prestige and which successfully Europeanizes the discourses in cultural policies. In the end, these shady outcomes do some honor to the official rhetoric of ‘United in Diversity’. While the EU stresses the ‘united’, the member states emphasize the ‘diversity’. The actual practices simply implement the slogan’s antagonistic ambiguity to its utmost limit.

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Literature Anon., n.d. Creative Europe. [Online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/ Anon., n.d. EU Prize for Literature. [Online] Available at: http://www.euprizeliterature.eu Antonsich, M., 2008. The Narration of Europe in ‘National' and ‘Post-national’ Terms. European Journal of Social Theory, pp. 505-522. Bartlett, M. Y. & DeSteno, D., 2006. Gratitude and Prosocial Behavior. Psychological Science, pp. 319-325. Bonet, L. & Négrier, E., 2011. The end(s) of national cultures? Cultural policy in the face of diversity. International Journal of Cultural Policy, pp. 574-589. Dittmer, J., 2012. Towards new (graphic) narratives of Europe. International Journal of Cultural Policy, pp. 119-138. Frey, B. S., 2006. Giving and Receiving Awards. Perspectives on Psychological Science, pp. 377388. Henrich, J. & Gil-White, F., 2001. The evolution of prestige: Freely conferred deference as a mechanism for enhancing the benefits of cultural transmission. Evolution and Human Behavior, pp. 165-196. Lähdesmäki, T., 2012. Rhetoric of unity and cultural diversity in the making of European cultural identity. International Journal of Cultural Policy, pp. 59-75. Minnaert, T., 2014. Footprint or fingerprint: international cultural policy as identity policy. International Journal of Cultural Policy, pp. 99-113. Patz, R., 2012. European Council decides: Number of Commissioners = number of EU member states. Ideas on Europe, 3 October. Sassatelli, M., 2007. The Arts, the State, and the EU. Cultural Policy in the Making of Europe. Social Analysis, pp. 28-41. Sassatelli, M., 2009. Becoming Europeans. Cultural Identity and Cultural Policies. s.l.:Palgrave Macmillan. Singh, J. P., 2010. International Cultural Policies and Power. s.l.:Palgrave Macmillan. Tefer, P., 2016. Court of Justice defends doubling number of judges. EU Observer, 6 April. Zahra, T., 2010. Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis. Slavic Review, 69(1), pp. 93-119. Zizzo, D. J., 2002. Between utility and cognition: The neurobiology of relative position. Journal of Economic Behavior, pp. 71-91. 22


Changer l'école pour sauver l'Europe ? L'institution scolaire ou la fabrique des citoyens By Adrien Laurent

Le nationalisme est souvent présenté comme un obstacle à l’émergence d’une identité européenne, voire comme une menace

à

l’intégration

européenne.

Pourtant, rares sont ceux qui perçoivent le

rôle

de

façonnement.

l’éducation En

cela,

dans le

son

manque

d’européanisation de l’éducation est une réelle menace pour la réalisation future du projet européen.

La citoyenneté européenne introuvable L’Europe politique a longtemps été réalisée dans l’indifférence des citoyens. Une indifférence qui permettait aux dirigeants, dans une période de « consensus permissif », de mener des négociations européennes technocratiques. Ce schéma s’est effondré avec le traité de Maastricht et la poursuite de transferts de compétences au niveau européen, qui suscita de plus en plus vives polémiques. La situation est aujourd’hui devenue difficilement tenable, tant l’Union européenne semble éloignée et inconnue de ses citoyens, pour qui le cadre national reste structurant. Certes les droits créés par l'Union européenne sont pour tous identiques. Mais une analyse menée en ces termes masque les fractures profondes entre européens. Tout comme la nation est un ensemble particulièrement hétéroclite, il est nécessaire d'avoir conscience des disparités factuelles entre européens. La citoyenneté européenne, créée officiellement par le traité de Maastricht, n’a pas pénétré la population européenne de manière égale. Elle n’est parfois qu’une chimère de papier, qui ne concerne que ceux qui en connaissent l’existence. La réalité est qu’une partie des « européens » vit encore pleinement, ou du moins le croit-elle, dans le cadre national transmis par son habitus et son éducation. Pour ces citoyens l’Union européenne n’est pas; ou n’est au mieux 23


qu’une puissance étrangère qui menace la communauté nationale. A l'heure des réveils nationalistes, poursuivre l'intégration européenne impose donc de place le citoyen en son cœur.

L’éducation ou la fabrique du nationalisme à l’école Bien sûr, il y a de multiples façons de recentrer le projet européen sur le citoyen, à commencer par en repenser les institutions et l'exercice démocratique. Attachons-nous toutefois au rôle que peut jouer l'éducation en ce sens. Plusieurs travaux, à commencer par L'imaginaire national de Benedict Anderson ou Le nationalisme ordinaire de Michael Billig, et plus récemment l'œuvre d'Anne-Marie Thiesse, ont marqué les sciences humaines par leur éclairage sur le processus de construction sociale du nationalisme. Ils montrent entre autres qu'une véritable « socialisation » à la nation s’opère dès la naissance. L'école est sans doute le vecteur principal de la formation d’une identité nationale si structurante. La prise en main des programmes scolaires au niveau national a permis aux Etats-nations de s'imposer, notamment par l’édification de « romans nationaux » promouvant un passé supposé glorieux et souvent basé, à tort, sur l’idée d’une origine ancestrale et quasi-naturelle de la nation. Cette socialisation est un vrai problème pour l’Union européenne, car l’être apolitique est un être national. Un nationalisme ordinaire (au sens de Billig) est à l'œuvre, et maintient l'européen moyen dans un cadre assez peu propice à l'européanisation. Or c'est dans ce ferment national que résident souvent les passions nationalistes et anti-européennes. Cette socialisation est, a contrario, un formidable message d'espoir. D'une part car elle signifie que le nationalisme, cet obstacle à l'intégration européenne, n'est pas une fatalité. Il est possible de repenser les déterminants culturels et sociaux du nationalisme, pour les adapter à un cadre de pensée plus européen. D'autre part car, si peu de choses contribuent pour le moment à faire émerger un « habitus européen », la perspective future d'un "européisme ordinaire" s'ouvre à nous.

De l’éducation à l’Europe à l’éducation européenne L’éducation aurait alors, tout comme elle le fait pour le patriotisme et le nationalisme, un rôle central à jouer dans l’émergence et le maintien d’une identité et d'une citoyenneté européennes. Cela passe d’abord par une éducation à l’Europe, à sa diversité, à ses cultures et à ses institutions. Les plus optimistes pensent qu’une telle éducation est facultative, qu’apprendre « en marchant » (par exemple en votant aux élections européennes) suffit. C’est sous-estimer le manque abyssal de 24


connaissance du système politique européen, et renoncer à l’importance de cette formation citoyenne. Si c'est en exerçant ses droits civils et politiques que l'on devient réellement citoyen, il faut avoir pris préalablement connaissance de leur existence. L’éducation à l’Europe s’est d'ores et déjà faite une place dans les programmes scolaires nationaux. Elle reste cependant bien trop marginale et tardive, et pourrait être considérablement développée. Cela passe ensuite par une éducation européenne, c’est-à-dire une éducation commune dans ses grandes lignes à tous les jeunes européens. Celle-ci se limite aujourd’hui souvent à des expériences de mobilité qui ne bénéficient qu’aux plus favorisés, l'éducation étant une compétence avant tout nationale. L'éducation européenne pour tous, et dès le plus jeune âge, est de plus très clivante. Ce clivage repose néanmoins sur une conception faussée de l’identité européenne, pensée comme une menace alors même qu’elle peut s’agréger sans mal aux autres identités des individus. Européaniser l’éducation revient en somme à fournir, en complément et non pas en remplacement, un cadre commun d’éducation et de connaissance aux européens. Dans un sens, il s’agit autant de « créer » des Européens en leur fournissant un habitus commun, que de les former et de leur transmettre des savoirs.

Fabriquer des citoyens européens ? Mais l’idée que l’école pourrait représenter une « fabrique de citoyens européens » soulève de bien nombreuses autres problématiques. Pour y répondre, les apports des sciences humaines et sociales seront déterminants, notamment pour mieux comprendre l’articulation entre éducation, identités et culture. La première considération qui s’impose est éthique. Est-il vraiment sage d'instaurer une éducation européenne inspirée des modèles nationaux d’éducation, qui ont pu produire tant nationalisme belliqueux que dérives compétitives ? Bien plus, à quoi bon s'attacher à construire une « nation européenne », quand l’Union européenne est déjà elle-même dépassée par des phénomènes qui appellent une conscience mondiale comme la globalisation, le numérique ou les problèmes climatiques ? La seconde considération est d'ordre pratique. Evidemment, l’enjeu d’une européanisation de l’éducation est d'abord celui de la sauvegarde de la diversité et de la richesse des cultures nationales. « Une Europe cosmopolite est, en premier lieu et avant tout, une Europe de la différence et de la reconnaissance des particularités nationales », affirmait ainsi le sociologue 25


allemand Ulrich Beck. Si assurément les identités nationales et européennes peuvent cohabiter, est-il bien possible, dans un contexte de pression budgétaire, d’européaniser l’éducation sans nécessairement puiser sur le temps dévoué à la culture nationale ? Où la richesse culturelle nationale s'arrête-t-elle pour laisser place au nationalisme pernicieux ?

Conclusion La voie vers l'européanisation de l'éducation est donc sinueuse. Pour qui veut poursuivre l'intégration européenne, il est pourtant indispensable d'avancer en ce sens. L’enjeu véritable derrière cette ambition doit être celui de la cohésion sociale. L’européanisation de l’éducation aura sans doute pour vertu principale de réduire la fracture entre élites éduquées pro-européennes et classes défavorisées eurosceptiques, fracture aujourd’hui dangereuse pour la cohésion de nos sociétés et pour la survie de l'Union européenne. En prise avec les inégalités, elle doit pouvoir créer du commun et contribuer à la politisation des européens, pour faire de la citoyenneté européenne une réalité.

Pour aller plus loin… Sur Nouvelle Europe Dossier « La rentrée des classes », coordonné par Philippe Perchoc, 23 août 2007, http://www.nouvelleeurope.eu/node/1185

Dossier « Quelle éducation à l'Europe ? », coordonné par Philippe Perchoc, 29 mars 2008, http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/dossier/quelle-education-l-europe François Dupré, "L’éducation : expérience personnelle d’accès à une culture de masse", 7 septembre 2012 http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/l-education-experience-personnelle-d-acces-une-culture-demasse Sur le net "L'Europe de l'éducation et de la formation", Toute l'Europe, 31 octobre 2014 http://www.touteleurope.eu/les-politiques-europeennes/education-et-formation/synthese/leurope-de-l-education-et-de-la-formation.html SHEHAJ Albana, "How is a European identity significant to the future of the European Union?", 31 mai 2015 26


https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/albana-shehaj/how-is-european-identitysignificant-to-future-of-european-union A lire ANDERSON Benedict, Imagined communities. Reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism, 1983 (ed. 2006), Verso, 256 p. BECK Ulrich, « Réinventer l’Europe. Une vision cosmopolite », Cultures & Conflits, n°68, hiver 2007, http://conflits.revues.org/5183 BILLIG Michael, Banal nationalism, Sage publications, 1995 THIESSE Anne-Marie et al., « La nation, une construction politique et culturelle », Savoir/Agir, 2007/2 n° 2, pp. 11-20 THROSSELL Katharine, « One thing leads to another : European and national identities in french school children », Politique européenne, 2010/1 n° 30, pp. 131-152

27


L'indifférence nationale en Roumanie, entretien avec l'historien Traian Sandu By Pauline Maufrais L'indifférence nationale, c'est-à-dire l'indifférence

d'une

certaine

communauté envers l’appartenance ethnoculturelle pour structurer sa pensée et son action politique, trouve un écho en Europe centrale et orientale. En effet, consécutivement aux déplacements des frontières entre le 19e et le 20e siècles,

Traian Sandu

certaines

populations

se

sont

retrouvées intégrées dans de nouveaux Etats, où elles n'avaient pas d'attaches particulières avec la nation dominante, parfois hostile. Dans le cas de la Roumanie, de nombreuses communautés peuplent son territoire, à l'instar des Magyars, des Ukrainiens, des Allemands ou encore de la communauté juive. A cet égard, la place de l'indifférence nationale au sein du pays, tout comme sa construction identitaire ont parcouru son histoire et imprègnent son actualité contemporaine. Dans le cadre d'un entretien pour l'association Nouvelle Europe, le directeur du département Etudes Européennes de l'Université Sorbonne-Nouvelle à Paris III, Traian Sandu a accepté de présenter le thème de l'indifférence nationale en Roumanie. Agrégé en histoire, Traian Sandu est d'origine roumaine et enfant de dissidents politiques. Il arrive en France en 1978, et il entame des études qui le mènent à être Professeur agrégé détaché du secondaire dans le supérieur. Par ailleurs, il est habilité à diriger des recherches. Il est spécialiste de la Roumanie, du nationalisme et de l'entre-deux-guerres, et travaille actuellement sur une bibliographie du dirigeant communiste Nicolae Ceaușescu.

28


De lui-même, il introduit le sujet de l'indifférence nationale : J'ai découvert assez tard que l'indifférence nationale était un sujet à la mode. Concernant le nationalisme en Europe centrale et orientale, les organisateurs du nationalisme depuis la fin du 18e et du 19e siècle se plaignent du manque de mobilisation de leurs troupes supposées. Cela suppose qu'il y a une certaine indifférence, et que si un tel travail d'organisation des populations, de définition de la nation, est effectué à la fin du 19e siècle, c'est que ce travail est nécessaire. En effet, la nation est tout sauf une donnée évidente, c'est une donnée construite, sur et à partir de fondements qui reposent sur des théories nationales comme celles de Herder (ndlr : philosophe allemand du 18e qui a théorisé l'appartenance nationale à partir de critères culturels) avec des données concrètes et objectives comme la langue, le fonds culturel, alors que l'on trouve dans le nationalisme de Renan à la française une conception fondée sur l'histoire commune et le libre choix individuel. La construction nationaliste de la fin du 18e et du 19e siècle repose sur un certain nombre de données concrètes. Il faut y donner un sens, dégager les sociétés des fidélités monarchiques du 18e siècle, et leurs donner une autre visée et un autre but, celui de la construction de la nation. On suppose qu'avant les populations n'étaient pas fidélisées dans un cadre national, mais dans un autre cadre : dynastique ou religieux. Il y avait d'autres tenants et fidélités. Le thème de l'indifférence nationale trouve-t-il un écho en Roumanie dans sa construction au 20e siècle, notamment suite à son union en 1918 ? La nation roumaine considérait-elle que les communautés allaient toutes adhérer au projet national ? Au tout début du 20e siècle, les roumanophones eux-mêmes n'étaient pas certains du projet qu'allait suivre leur propre construction nationale. Cela pour des raisons d'alliances politiques ou diplomatico-militaires européennes. L'espace roumanophone appartenait à des systèmes différents. La petite Roumanie, des principautés roumaines unies entre 1859 à 1918, avait deux possibilités : - la possibilité de revendiquer la Transylvanie, qui se trouvait dans l'Empire autrichien puis austrohongrois à partir de 1867, en alliance avec les Russes, les Français, les Anglais. La Transylvanie était la région la plus développée et avancée politiquement, par rapport au reste de l'ensemble roumanophone. C'était une première possibilité. Mais, ce qui freinait cette tendance tournée vers les Transylvains, c'était que la Roumanie appartenait au même système d'alliance que l'Autriche. 29


Elle avait une situation proche de l'Italie. Cela pouvait donc dire qu'elle devait retourner son système d'alliance contre les Centraux. - l'autre possibilité était de se tourner vers la Bessarabie, l'actuelle République Moldave, et finalement d'essayer de l'annexer au détriment de l'Empire russe. Cela, elle pouvait le faire en compagnie des Centraux, et donc en restant fidèle à l'alliance de 1883 passée avec Bismarck et l’Empereur François-Joseph. Donc, les Roumains n'avaient pas un projet unitaire eux-mêmes. Il n'y a pas seulement une question d'option diplomatico-militaire, mais aussi celle de l'option civilisationnelle. C'est-à-dire se mettre du côté des Centraux, considérés comme occupant des espaces plus développés, ou se mettre du côté de l'Empire russe orthodoxe et intégrer une sphère panorthodoxe (panslave ne fonctionnait pas, le roumain étant une langue latine.) C'était un choix à faire qui impliquait, sinon une indifférence, du moins une option parfois difficile à trancher. Concernant le début du XXe siècle et l'intégration et la Roumanie post-1918, avant de régler le sort des minoritaires, il aurait fallu que les Roumains eussent été d'accord sur leur propre orientation géo-civilisationnelle et sur le développement de leur nation. C'était une situation compliquée entre roumanophones, avant d'arriver à cette indifférence nationale supposée des minorités. Ainsi, il existe un ouvrage de Lucian Boia, un adepte de l'histoire culturelle, qui s'appelle Les Germanophiles. En Roumanie, les germanophiles ont été considérés comme des traîtres en 1918, car ils étaient favorables aux Empires centraux. Ils avaient choisi le système d’alliance des Centraux, plutôt que de s'allier aux Russes, aux Français et aux Anglais. La Russie était considérée comme moins développée et plus autoritaire. Ces germanophiles ne voulaient pas forcément annexer la Transylvanie, ou alors, ils voulaient être annexés par l'ensemble austro-hongrois, et arriver à se fédéraliser dans un grand ensemble contenant l’Autriche, la Hongrie, mais aussi, autonomes, la Tchéco-Slovaquie, la Pologne, les Slaves du sud (Yougo-Slaves) ou la Grande Roumanie. Cet ensemble fédéralisé était ce que voulait l'archiduc François-Ferdinand, assassiné à Sarajevo. Les germanophiles avaient ce projet-là. Ce n'était pas une indifférence nationale, mais leur projet n'était pas porté par la Roumanie petite et indépendante, mais par un grand ensemble centre-européen. Ils auraient voulu une fédération respectant l'identité culturelle des nations. Il n'y avait pas véritablement d'indifférence nationale, mais une indifférence à l'indépendance politique roumaine. Les germanophiles ne souhaitaient pas nécessairement la création d'un Etat de type westphalien. 30


Concernant l'attitude et l'indifférence des minorités vis-à-vis de la nation au 20e et actuellement, il faut regarder les phases historiques et l'attitude des directeurs et des faiseurs d'opinion. J'entends par faiseurs d'opinion les hommes politiques, les journalistes, les essayistes et les intellectuels. On assiste actuellement à une période intéressante, on est passé rapidement d'une phase à l'autre. Les Roumains, comme les autres pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale qui ont eu le projet d'adhérer à l'Union Européenne et à l'OTAN, ont dû mettre de l'eau dans leur vin nationaliste. Immédiatement après 1989 il y a eu une période nationaliste intense. Mais, à partir de 1993 et 1994 il a fallu s'occidentaliser et modérer les discours. Il y a eu une phase de refroidissement, d'européanisation de la société roumaine et de ses logiques politiques. Il y a eu aussi eu une phase de modération par rapport aux minorités hongroises, rom (tsigane), très décriées. Sous l'effet des politiques européennes, les discours ont été modérés. D'autres tendances sont apparues, une minorité valorisée que sont les Allemands a quitté massivement le territoire après 1989. Les Roumains avaient déjà connu le départ des Allemands dans les années 1970 et 1980, « vendus » à l'Allemagne de l'Ouest par Ceaușescu. Après 1989, les Roumains ont donc vu que leur pays n'était pas si attractif pour les minorités qu'ils pensaient intégrer. Il y avait une indifférence vis-à-vis de la roumanité de la part de ces minorités. Les Allemands ayant été une minorité valorisée, cela a dévalorisé l'image qu'avaient les Roumains de leur identité. Enfin, la pauvreté en Roumanie a incité de nombreux Roumains à émigrer pour le travail. Ils ont éprouvé eux-mêmes ce que c'est de vivre en minorités brimées dans d'autres pays occidentaux. Cela existe pour les tsiganes, les roms mais aussi pour les non-roms. Ils ont découvert une identité dévalorisée de leur roumanité. Les expériences après 1989 ont été traumatisantes pour l'identité roumaine et ont renforcé une modestie un peu ironique déjà présente lorsqu’ils considèrent leur retard par rapport à l’ouest (voyez les travaux de Catherine Durandin à ce propos). On pourrait retourner à leur propos la sentence de Villiers de l’Isle-Adam : « Je m'estime peu quand je m'examine ; beaucoup, quand je me compare », un conte parfois cruel, en effet, les concernant... Pendant la période socialiste, le phénomène nationaliste a été mis de côté par les autorités. Quelles ont été les conséquences des années 1990 et de la transition politique sur le phénomène d'indifférence nationale en Roumanie ? Des minorités ont-elles développé une indifférence nationale, parfois au profit de la construction européenne et d'un nationalisme européen plus général ?

31


D’abord, Ceaușescu a beaucoup utilisé le nationalisme pour asseoir sa légitimité (Catherine Durandin a pu parler à juste titre de national-communisme). Après 1989, tout dépend des orientations idéologiques à l'intérieur de ces minorités qui ne sont pas univoques. Dans un article publié par Dan Tăpălagă le 14 avril 2016, “La Roumanie en marche vers l'obscurité ? Les sources du nouveau nationalisme”, une question était posée à la communauté magyare. Ce sondage, interne à l'Union démocratique des Magyars de Roumanie, qui est le parti représentant les Hongrois en Roumanie, s'adressait aux départements à majorité magyare du coude des Carpates. A la question : “Laquelle de ces réponses caractériseraient le mieux la relation entre les Roumains et les Magyars ?” les réponses suivantes sont apparues : 

Relation de coopération : 34,5%

Je ne sais pas ou je ne réponds pas : 3,5%

Manque intérêt réciproque : 17,9%

Relations conflictuelles : 42,2%.

Le manque d'intérêt réciproque caractérise l'indifférence nationale, mais d'une façon négative, c'est-à-dire que les deux communautés se tournent le dos. Et les relations conflictuelles constituent presque la moitié des réponses. L'UDMR est un parti relativement modéré. On voit de la part de ces minorités une réaction nationaliste au retour d'un nationalisme roumain parfois agressif. Ces minorités sont aussi soulevées par d'autres ferments nationalistes, venant parfois de Hongrie. Viktor Orbán voyage dans ces régions, tout comme des représentants du Jobbik d'extrême-droite. De façon générale, nous sommes dans une atmosphère plutôt de retour au nationalisme. Dan Tăpălagă en liste plusieurs, le nationalisme alimenté politiquement, le nationalisme religieux avec l'Eglise orthodoxe, le nationalisme économique où les élites dénoncent toutes les entreprises occidentales sur le marché roumain, ou encore le nationalisme par les médias. Ce dernier nationalisme rentre dans une dynamique propre des médias avec les surenchères nationalistes, car cela vend bien et parce que ces médias sont parfois détenus par des responsables politiques. Enfin, il existe un nationalisme à tendance globalisante, issu des problèmes continentaux : les migrants/réfugiés, les attentats terroristes par exemple. L'Union européenne a-t-elle un rôle concret dans le développement de l'indifférence nationale, avec l'établissement d'un projet global européen et ainsi, supranational ? 32


L'Union Européenne est forte quand elle est active et si elle est populaire, ce qui n'est pas le cas maintenant. Elle traverse un moment de faiblesse avec une absence de politique étrangère. A chaque fois lorsqu'elle a fait pression en faveur du dépassement de l'identité nationale, et de sa coexistence avec l'identité européenne, c'était à des moments où l'intégration et l'adhésion étaient à vendre, donc avant 2004 ou 2007. Les élites locales essaient de vendre le projet européen, elles promettent aux sociétés l'intégration. L'Europe n'étant actuellement pas très dynamique, ni unie dans son projet, il y a un manque d'impact vis-à-vis des opinions une fois l'adhésion réalisée. Donc, une projection de l'identité européenne n'est pas envisageable actuellement, l'Europe a peu de charisme. Actuellement, existe-t-il une conscience dans la société roumaine de l'indifférence nationale ? Des travaux historiographiques, des politiques sont-ils menés autour de ce phénomène ? Tout dépend à qui vous vous adressez. Il n'y a pas de travail véritable car il y a un retour de la légitimation par le nationalisme face à la faiblesse de l'Union Européenne. Si vous parlez à des universitaires, à des catégories jeunes, gagnants de l'adhésion et de la transition, ils vous diront qu'ils sont désespérés des tendances actuelles nationalistes. Il existe des tentations d'orientation vers l'est au détriment de l'ouest. Il y a des relais du nationalisme d'Alexandre Douguine (ndlr : intellectuel et théoricien nationaliste/néo-fasciste russe) en Roumanie, des déçus de l'occidentalisation. Non, on ne va pas vers une étude de l'indifférence nationale. La nation a au contraire besoin de se légitimer de nouveau. Par ailleurs, il n'y a pas de projet européen suffisamment crédible qui pourrait remplacer le nationalisme, ou servir à l'indifférence nationale en Roumanie. L'Europe de l'est s'estime par ailleurs victime de la politique occidentale. Concernant les relais nationalistes d'Alexandre Douguine en Roumanie dont vous parliez, participent-ils aux fractures nationales en isolant des minorités qui, se sentant à l'écart, vont entrer dans une forme d'indifférence nationale ? Elles peuvent se replier ou cultiver leur propre identité. Elles participeront peut-être à un retour sur leur identité. Ce n'est pas une indifférence nationale en tant que telle, mais elles ne participeront pas à la nation roumaine. En tout cas, on ne va pas vers un apaisement des esprits. Entretien mené par Pauline Maufrais.

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Pour aller plus loin : SANDU Traian, Un fascisme roumain, Histoire de la Garde de fer, Paris, Editions Perrin, 2010. SANDU Traian, Histoire de la Roumanie, Paris, Editions Perrin, 2008. « L’“eurasisme” contre l’élargissement européen aux Balkans occidentaux ? L’activisme balkanique d’Alexandre Douguine », dans V. Mintchev, N. Nenovky et X. Richet, Western Balkans and the European Union. Lessons from past enlargements, challenges to future integrations, Sofia, University Publishing House “Stopanstvo”, 2015, 297pp, pp275-287

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How European can be a Post-Soviet Korean? By Svetlana Kim

Disinterest towards one’s own nationality may be regarded as indifference, but this indifference is nuanced. For example, most of the post-Soviet Koreans who increasingly settle in the EU today seem well-assimilated and unconcerned about their identities, but they still continue to live their deeply ingrained national traditions. National indifference can

A Koryo-saram child. Picture taken by Viktor An, himself a Koryo-saram.

therefore be dynamically combined with the concept of a ‘dormant diaspora’.

A typical ‘Koryo-saram’ is born and raised in Central Asia or Russia, feels comfortable celebrating both Muslim and Christian holidays, hears a bit of Korean at home while mostly speaking Russian, learns Uzbek or Kazakh at school, and never questions how this multicultural society had become established in their home countries. Now, however, hundreds of this obscure half-a-million minority strive to settle in Prague or Vienna or other popular EU destinations for higher education or professional life. In these places, they face one question about which Valery Khan* – himself a Koryo-saram – once wrote: “Identity is irrelevant – until you are asked about it.” When I came to Austria to pursue my higher education, a usual conversation started with “Where are you from?” and resulted in a puzzled “I did not know that Koreans in Uzbekistan speak Russian!” I had not been aware before that I had what seemed a ‘truly strange background’, for, as a contrast, the Koryo-saram are unquestionably ‘normal’ in the post-Soviet countries. Never had I had any discussions concerning my ethnic background when I lived in Uzbekistan and Russia. The fact of being a Koryo-saram was so self-explaining for everyone around me. But in the EU, most of us are constantly asked about the nationality and receive a startled reaction most of the times. It was through this that my awareness was gradually raised.

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Deportation under Stalin Identity itself is a complex concept, and in the case of the Koryo-saram, it becomes even more intricate. My grandmother Nyura or Anna Kim was born in the Russian Far East. When she reached the age of nine in 1937, she and her family’s whole neighborhood were part of the 180.000 Koreans to be deported to Central Asia. The political tensions in this Russian borderland of Japanese-led Korea, Manchukuo, and China made this ethnic minority suspicious. They were all commanded to enter trains without knowing why they had to abandon their homes. As Anna’s father had recently had a surgery, he was not able to supply the family of four children with food. Their wagon neighbors, luckily, were generous to share with them some nutrition. The whole trip to unknowingness took more than one month. They landed in an unsettled field along the river regions of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and were now supposed to cultivate the virgin lands. The next decades saw a turmoil of all kinds of migration and Russification policies that deeply impacted all spheres of life – language, culture, food and religion. With time, the Russianized Koryo-saram generally fared well, pursued higher education and came to be largely well positioned in the (post-)Soviet society. However complex their identity developed in Central Asia of the Soviet and post-Soviet periods – they still retained significant parts of customs that shape their daily routines, and which originally stemmed from the Northern Korean lands from generations ago. These preserved old customs comprise food, festivities, the appellations of relatives, and other facets of everyday life.

Discovering the Charm of Diasporas At university in Austria, the curricular program obliged me to enroll in a seminar about national minority’s literatures. Unexpectedly, each piece of work, including from Koryo-saram writers like Anatoli Kim and Vladimir Kim, captured me – the self-exploring motifs, the emotional depth attached to the national questioning, the quest for a Self that was to be located in a national group with which one is identified by unrelated others. Searching for oneself in what is either a monologue or dialogue – this is indistinguishable – with the national Thou which one supposedly carries within one’s own heart, blood and genes… I then discovered the life of diasporic entrepreneurs and thought that therein lies the ultimate response to the everlasting “Where are you from?”-question. I read how diasporas recently became politically popular, how they were empowered by their host and home governments, optimistic appraisals about their economic and cultural importance, and how they helped to nurture a sense 36


of belonging in our “new world of uncertain identities” (Paul Sharp). I wanted to gather the dozens of my Koryo-saram friends in Austria into a diasporic institution in order to share our knowledge and organize events and informational exhibitions. I saw much hope for this undertaking, for theories would tell us that in democratic societies such as the EU, diasporas emulate democratic behaviors, gain economic and social capital, and can organize themselves in much larger freedom.

A Failed Diasporization Amidst Living Traditions However, I became confronted with what Tara Zahra conceptualized as “national indifference”, namely the limits of nationalism, a “failed groupness”. I surprisingly found out that most of my Koryo-saram friends in the EU were indifferent to their ethnicity or belonging. Neither did they think of returning home nor were they interested in connections with other Koreans. None of them wanted to hear anything about alleged identity struggles. They had their daily tasks, lived busily within their host societies in Austria, Czech Republic, Germany or France, had their well-integrated family and children – there was no need to preoccupy oneself with those historical things irrelevant to one’s present well-being. I could not understand – I tried to convince and ‘activate’ them by stressing our common past, shared memories, the moving stories, and I knew that all of them had their grandparents forcibly deported like my dear Anna; but to no avail. During a research, I conducted interviews with ten Koryo-saram living in the EU. We remained close friends since then – and the more time we spent together, the more I noticed how each of these allegedly indifferent Koryo-saram in Europe lived significant parts of their Korean culture even in their new homes. From Prague to Vienna, from Berlin to Paris, their food cooked at home is decidedly Korean, family festivities with all their ceremonies and clothes as well as the appellation of close friends and relatives were identical to the ones my grandmother passed on to me, which she herself had learned when she was still in the Far East near the Northern Korean border. Despite their unwillingness to unify themselves with other Koryo-saram in a formal diasporic organization, and despite being well integrated into their host societies, their daily routine remained strongly attached to their ethnic and cultural background. They may label themselves to be so assertively detached from their ethnic belonging. But the actual practice of passing-on one’s traditions relativized their disinterest. There are nuances to national indifference. While some may label themselves as decidedly unconcerned, their family-internal 37


practices may still reveal that they, in fact, still undeliberately cling to their identity-shaping traditions in a daily manner.

Not ‘Failed’, but ‘Dormant’ Moreover, diasporas are never static, but dynamic concepts; what is a “failed grouping” today, a set of scattered persons without any interconnections, may suddenly, one day, through any kind of external catalyst, be prompted to rapidly group themselves due to a shared basis. This is what is understood as a “dormant” diaspora (Sheffer 2003). Even non-diasporas or “imagined noncommunities” (Zahra), ‘held together’ by national indifference, may once have to ‘diasporize’. Those who are nationally indifferent, therefore, bear within them the continuation of their shared identity – embodied in the traditions of daily life that is grounded in the shared past and common ancestry – which can be triggered in dynamic times to exert the potential of diasporization. This is the essence of Valery Khan’s aphorism. “As long as you are not asked, identity remains insignificant” – we are constantly being asked, and we may perhaps see this as friendly chitchats that happen during nice encounters. But once we face the same-worded question suddenly sharper than usual, it can serve as a catalyst that awakens the dormant diaspora within us.

Conclusion An increasing number of Koryo-saram, or ethnic Koreans from (mainly) Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russia, have recently migrated to EU countries without forming any organized diaspora institutions. On the contrary, a majority of these well-acculturated Koryo-saram decide to be indifferent towards their own nationality. A closer exploration, however, shows that they ‘live’ their identity in daily matters by passing on unique national traditions including food, family festivities, and the appellations of relatives. It suggests that shared traditions, common memories and a certain togetherness still persists through seeming national indifference. These “imagined non-communities” can be equal to “dormant diasporas”, which suggests that a catalyst can anytime awaken them to void their indifference.

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Literature Bhatia, S. & Ram, A., 2009. Theorizing identity in transnational and siaspora cultures: A critical approach to acculturation. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Issue 33, pp. 140-149. Brubaker, R., 2005. The 'diaspora' diaspora. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28(1), pp. 1-19. Chan, V., 1998. The Korean minority in Central Asia: National revival and problem of identity. In: International Journal of Central Asian Studies, 3; 66-77. Clifford, J., 1994. Diasporas. Cultural Antropology, 3(9), pp. 302-338. Gabriel, S., 2003. Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gowricharn, R., 2009. Changing forms of transnationalism. Ethnic and racial studies, 32(9), pp. 1619-1638. Hall, S., 1990. Cultural identity and diaspora. В: J. Rutherforf, ред. Identity: Community, culture, difference. London: Lawrence and Wishart, pp. 222-237. Purkayastha, B., 2005. Negotiating ethnicity: Second-generation South Asian Americans traverse a transnational world. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Safran, W., 1991. Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of homeland and return. Diaspora, 1(1), pp. 83-99. Sharp, P., 1999. For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations. International Studies Review 1(1), pp. 33-57. Tölöyan, 1996. Rethinking diaspor(s): Stateless power in the transnational mament. Diaspora, Issue 5, pp. 3-35. Zahra, T., 2010. Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis. Slavic Review, 69(1), pp. 93-119.

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Becoming Ukrainian. The context of national indifference in Ukraine By Yana Hryshko

In the history of independent Ukraine, we can distinguish three periods of rising nationalism

with

rising

national

indifference in response. The topic has always been strongly influenced by the ‘Russia factor’. Moreover, the occurrence of national indifference was highly politicized, raising both nationalism and national indifference to the rank of a problem, issue, Ukrainian flags waving during the revolution 2014. Picture by Yana Hryshko.

and even threat. In this article, I try to describe the origin of national indifference

in Ukraine, the specificity of Ukrainian nationalism and the evolution of these two opposite yet intertwined phenomena. I was born in 1994 in an independent state, in an independent Ukraine. For some periods of my life I did not realise why we celebrate the Independence Day every year, I only remember that it was an exciting holiday in summer when we went to Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) where blue-and-yellow colors appeared everywhere. From my early childhood, I was taught that these blue-and-yellow colors are the colors of the Ukrainian flag, I learned the Ukrainian anthem, the Ukrainian language, all of which are also considered to be national symbols of my country. For a while I did not even realise that a few years before there had been no Ukraine as an independent state, I did not know about the existence of the Soviet Union and about the fact that Ukraine had been a part of it, and of course I did not know about Ukraine’s history as a part of Russia or Poland. First I learnt it at school during the history lessons, from the Ukrainian literature where authors were describing these periods of Ukrainian history, from my parents who told me when I started asking them. My father, in fact, is Russian, but despite that, I had never doubted that I am Ukrainian. I clearly associated myself with this 40


nation without even knowing many details about Ukrainian history and Ukrainian society, and, of course, without any knowledge about definitions of a nation, nationalism, or national indifference. Later I realised that not all people living in Ukraine ask the same questions and think in the same way as I do, that actually some of them do not care about the issue of nationality, do not have strong feelings of patriotism or even do not identify themselves with Ukrainians as a nation or Ukraine as a state or motherland. It is important to understand why these people feel this way and how to deal with the fact that citizens of a nation-state which faces an external threat do not feel as members of this nation and how to react to that. As much as it is hard for me, born and raised in independent Ukraine, to accept that some people living in Ukraine do not feel Ukrainian, it is as hard for these people who were born and raised not in Ukraine but in the Soviet Union to feel Ukrainian and to accept that they might be Ukrainians.

Why they do not feel Ukrainian – a Soviet Legacy To begin with, it is important to understand the fact that not all people living in Ukraine were born and raised in Ukraine. They were born and raised in the Soviet Union, in the first place, which was claimed to be the motherland of all nations living on its territory and where political nationalism was perceived as a threat to the existence of the country. The main aim was to build a multinational society in which people identify themselves with the Soviet Union, not with the republics they live in. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine granted citizenship for all people living on its territory. But that did not mean that all people who happened to live on the territory of Ukraine were Ukrainians; moreover, according to the last census of Soviet Ukraine in 1989, 11.4 million Russians – 22% of the population of Ukraine – lived on its territory. Many of them did not care about the independence of Ukraine or the collapse of the Soviet Union, they did not feel proud for gaining national sovereignty, they just were waiting for how it will be solved and what they will eventually gain (Applebaum, 2014). There were a lot of people who just happened to live in Ukraine and happened to be there during all those events. They did not have any warm feelings or attachments to Ukraine, they lived here because their parents or grandparents had been sent here. And even if they were born in Ukraine it did not really mean that they wanted to be citizens of independent Ukraine or Ukrainians.

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Nationalism in Ukraine Discussing the cause of national indifference of those people is impossible without discussing the reasons of rising nationalism in the first few years of the independent Ukraine’s history. Nationalism should be understood properly in the particular circumstances of a nascent Ukrainian state that had to arise out of the collapsed Soviet legacy. We should distinguish nationalism from the category that implies the superiority and exclusiveness of one nation above the others, and nationalism as a category which inclusively aims to unite a nation divided along regional, historical, cultural, religious, and ethnical lines (Brubaker, 2004). However, nationalism is „both inclusive in creating a political community bound by common values, as well as exclusive separating the ‘We’ from the ‘Others’” (Kuzio, 1999). In this context, we cannot avoid mentioning patriotism which is usually perceived as a positive category that implies a love to your country. The Ukrainian case is delicate. As the following will show, Ukrainian identity politics has been oscillating between the two extremes of highly inclusive and highly exclusive nationalism. This was exacerbated by the fact that Ukrainian nationalism has repeatedly been under heavy attack ever since the country gained independence. However, I argue that Ukrainian nationalism has found an equilibrium that does not lead to hostility, an equilibrium that strives to be inclusive – including towards the Russian population in Ukraine – by not “creating the other within” (Snyder, 2017). Two very important documents for the history of Ukraine - III and IV Universals – exemplify this statement. The documents, adopted by the Ukrainian Central Counsel (Ukrainian parliament during that period) in 1917 and 1918 respectively, proclaimed the People’s Republic of Ukraine and its independence from Russia. These documents acknowledged that there are many representatives of other nations living on the territory of Ukraine and expressed the will of the government and the Ukrainian people to protect their rights to self-determination. It is stressed that the “Ukrainian people, having straggled for their national freedom and finally having archived it, will strongly protect the will of the people of other nationalities living in Ukraine.” It particularly noted the Russian, Jewish and Polish people (III Universal, IV Universal). Furthermore, a Committee on affairs of the autonomy of minorities was ordered to be established and representatives of these nations were included in the parliament as representatives of the interests of their people. That was precisely about letting people of other nationalities feel free to be of any nationality they assign themselves to be while living in independent Ukraine. The chairman of the 42


Ukrainian Central Counsel Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, who is considered to be the first president of Ukraine, emphasized in his publications that he and his followers have always been strongly against any kind of national chauvinism and stated that “protectors of Ukrainian nationality will not become nationalists”, thus, emphasizing that Ukrainian nationalism has nothing in common with radicalism and hostile attitude towards other nations (Hrushevskyi, 1917). To the Ukrainian people, nationalism is directly related to state building, as the state building has always been directly related to the independence. Without nationalist sentiments, the young state cannot properly develop. One of the OUN’s (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists) ideologists Yuriy Pundyk in his considerations about nationalism stressed that “nationalism is the driving force of cultural and political life” and that we should think “not about how to restrain this force, but how to aim and use it to unfold all its energy for the sake of further human progress”. (Pundyk, 1966) For centuries, the main aim of Ukrainian elites was gaining independence and building up functioning governmental institutions in order to rule by themselves. This is not meant to exclude any hostile elements or to assert the superiority of Ukrainians, but in the meaning of ‚not being told what to do‘ by outside forces, in a mere formal sense of finally achieving a sovereignty that is recognized, yes, recognized even by that one country which has the most difficulty of accepting it.

“Diversity” of Ukrainian population In post-soviet Ukraine with the previous policies of institutionalized multinationality and “centralized rule and state-wide economic integration which led to linguistic and demographic Russification” (Brubaker, 2011) and attempts to create a Homo Soveticus (Richardson, 2004) opposing national identification, it was quite expected that a nationalist movement would emerge that would try to express its uniqueness and the right to exist in an independent state (Zahra, 2010; Kuzio, 1999). Every former Soviet Union republic had minorities in their population, and Ukraine received one of the largest Russian minorities in relative numbers. Nationalizing discourses, policies, and practices have therefore been more central and more sensitive in countries with a large population of representatives of other nations as Ukraine or Kazakhstan than elsewhere (Brubaker, 2011). However, we cannot talk about a particular “diversity” of Ukrainian population because it remains a national state with more than 70% of Ukrainians and the “diversity” of approximately 30% being representatives of other nations is “pretty much the norm for all stable states everywhere” (Motyl, 2014). Ukrainians from Lviv in the west and Donetsk in the east may differ in views on the political 43


situation and chose different presidents and parties during the elections, but it is almost the same as the differences between Americans from Massachusetts and Mississippi. And it does not mean that they do not belong to the same country (Finin, 2013). Moreover, according to the surveys conducted in 2007 answering the question “Do you consider Ukraine as your motherland?” 92.6% answers “Yes”, only 4.8 percent answers “No”, and 2.6 % found it hard to answer. And divided by region, it is more than 90% in Western, Central and Eastern parts of Ukraine, Southern – 86% of “Yes”.

First Wave of Nationalism and National Indifference We can distinguish several periods of ups and downs of nationalism in Ukrainian national memory as an independent state. It is worth to mention that the the rise of Ukrainian nationalism occurred already in the Soviet Union in 1989 after the policy of «glasnost» ("open up“ policy) when political pressure on the republics was reduced and other parties than the communist party were allowed. An anticommunist movement called Narodnyi Rukh za Perebudovu (People's Movements for Perebudova) emerged which included different democratic groups, dissidents, intellectuals, politically active youth . Later in October 1990, two hundred students went on a hunger strike which was called «Revolution on the Granite» and among their demands there were the end of communism and independence of Ukraine. After the proclamation of independence of Ukraine 1991 amidst an elevating mood inspired by notions of freedom, the new government started to implement pro-Ukrainian politics. An important notice is that a referendum on the Act of Declaration of Independence was held in Ukraine on 1 December 1991.[1] An overwhelming majority of 92.3% of voters approved the declaration of independence made by the Verkhovna Rada on 24 August 1991 and thus confirmed the independence of Ukraine. That was a period of «establishing new order» and the quest for the symbols of a Ukrainian Nation (Yurchuk, 2014). And during this period, the main difficulty was «to separate Ukrainian identity from Russian or Soviet» (Kuzio, 1999). The population composition that Ukraine obtained as a heritage from the Soviet Union cannot be described as difficult, but it was the potential cause of concern as 11.4 million Russians comprised 22% of the population in 1989. In the Crimean peninsula, Russians formed 66% of the population; 44


in the strategically important industrial region of the Donbass, their share was 44% (Brubaker, 2011). However, a significant decline in Russian population by 3 million people occurred between 1989 and 2001 according to the two most recent census of population of Ukraine. Yet net emigration of Russians accounts for only about 5 to 10% of this decline. Therefore, we can come to the conclusion that Russians have not been just leaving the country, they have been reidentifying themselves as Ukrainians. That large numbers of people who previously identified their nationality as Russians appeared to have identified as Ukrainian in the most recent census; and children from mixednationality families were more likely to be identified as Ukrainians than were such children in previous censuses (Brubaker, 2011). After the rising nationalism which occurred in 1991 on a wave of gained independence and freedom from communist regime, new problems arose as building a state and building a nation are not exactly the same, and once people have nothing to eat, then it becomes secondary whether communists or national democrats rule the country. Basically, after few first years of euphoria, hard times started, and at that period people were not satisfied with the situation prevailing in the country, they did not care about the issue of nationality and national identity; they only cared about themselves and their families, strove for satisfactory conditions for their well-being, which, however, the Ukrainian government could hardly provide on the eve of the presidential elections in 1994. That year, the second president of independent Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, was elected, whose narrative during the elections can be estimated as relatively anti-nationalistic. He emphasized that now the most important for the young country is to focus on the development of the economy, not on the historical memory and other sentimental issues (Yurchuk, 2014). However, as a matter of fact, his policy was quite diversified. And even the period of his presidency is called ÂŤmulti-vectors policyÂť. And here we can witness the second wave of national indifference that people felt since 1991, which was caused by economical difficulties and which brought up the question whether independence was really worth in face of these economical difficulties (the first period should be considered the one right after the collapse of the Soviet Union).

Second Wave of Nationalism and National Indifference: 2004 Elections The next wave of nationalism can be distinguished during the presidential elections 2004 where we can see a precise example of how the issue of nationality and self-identification was politicized. During the presidential election campaign, Ukraine was divided by politicians into two parts: the 45


west and the east, while the Ukrainian people were divided into three sorts: first sort in Western Ukraine, second – Central part, and the third – Eastern part of Ukraine (Poster from presidential elections in Ukraine 2004). Both candidates were clearly identified with either pro-European, or pro-Russian policy (Yurchuk, 2014). Moreover, Yushchenko, who later won elections and became the third president of Ukraine, used nationalist narratives for the purposes of his campaign, while Yanukovich represented the "abandoned" people of Eastern Ukraine, people who were claimed to be of the "third sort". Yuschenko's presidency is described as an attempt to revive a pronounced Ukrainian history (Yurchuk, 2014). He rose sensitive questions of the status of veterans of OUN UPA (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, Ukrainian Povstanska (Rebelion) Army), recognized the Holodomor 1931-1933 as genocide of Ukrainian People, and granted the status of Hero of Ukraine to Stepan Bandera, who still remains a controversial figure in Ukrainian history. Furthermore, the presidency of Yushchenko was considered to be in favor of people from Western Ukraine, while people of Eastern Ukraine felt abandoned and did not easily agree with the nationalism that was promoted by Yuschenko. Another important matter is that for many people who expressed this national indifference, it was not only the case of identifying or not identifying themselves with Ukraine or Ukrainian nation, but also with the matter that to be associated with the "arm that feeds you" (Zahra, 2010). There was a widespread idea all over Ukraine that people in Russia live better than people in Ukraine, therefore Russians live better, so it is better to be Russian than Ukrainian. According to the results of the poll conducted in 2005, 54.8% of Ukrainians thought that the level of life would be better in Russia than in Ukraine, and the majority of positive answers were from Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine. To sum up, economical difficulties and the persisting perception that Russians live better caused the reduction of nationalism and the rise of national indifference, especially among people who felt and lived close to Russia. This became reflected during the next presidential elections when pro-Russian candidate Yanukovich came to power. The pro-Russian position of Yanukovich was doubtless: His ‘achievements’ include the famous Kharkiv Pact on prolongation of the presence of Russian fleet in Crimea, the adoption of the law about languages of minorities which was directed mainly to support Russian language, and the refusal to sign Treaty of Association with European Union. These three events were the most prominent during his presidency and the most obvious as in favor of Russia. A harsh reaction of nationalist-oriented people was prompted as they considered these events as a giving up of the 46


independence of Ukraine, a return to the era of the Soviet Union or Russian Empire, and a loss of their national identity. It was especially hard after all these years of independence, and with so many children born and raised in an independent state.

The Third and Latest Wave of Ukrainian Nationalism: Since Euromaidan The Revolution of Dignity that happened in Ukraine is the latest large-scale expression of nationalism in Ukraine. However, it remains a question to what kind of reaction this will incite from the side of the nationally indifferent people. And after the Maidan events and Russian aggression against Ukraine with the annexation of Crimea and the launch of an asymmetric war in the East of Ukraine, the most important question is: is it possible for Ukrainians to remain nationally indifferent towards Ukrainian nationalism when the state you live in faces an external threat? In the case of Ukraine it is even more difficult, because the nationally indifferent population has been associated with the aggressor-country. Concluding all the above mentioned, I would say that in Ukraine we can witness the phenomenon of national indifference especially as the response to rising nationalism. However, it should be noted that the issue of national indifference in Ukraine is highly politicised. Moreover, national indifference, not just a phenomenon that is represented in almost every country with a mixed population, but as a problem that can divide the state and the nation apart was invented by politicians and has been politicized to (mis-)guide people's opinions and choiŃ es. In independent Ukraine, the widespread version of nationalism is equal to patriotism and is not directed against anyone living on the territory of Ukraine (despite the marginal presence of more extreme nationalists). In the case of Ukraine nationalism was directed not against other nationalities, but against centuries of subjection to another state. Nationalism led to the emerging of national indifference among people who did not share the same feelings, which in case of Ukraine is characterised by not only indifference per se, but by the geopolitical situation and the traditionally strong influence of Russia. At the current stage of the conflict’s evolution we should notice that national indifference declined comparing to the earlier times in favor of Ukraine. According to the recent polls 86.5% considers themselves as Ukrainians, 8.9% - Russians, 2.8% – of other nationalities, and for only 2% it is difficult to answer. Which is the evidence of declining of national indifference. The next census of Ukrainian population is planed to be conducted in 2020, look forward to looking at the data it will display. 47


References: D’Anieri P. (ed.), 2010. Orange Revolution and Aftermath: Mobilization, Apathy, and the State in Ukraine. pp. 23-46, especially pp. 26-27. Applebaum A., 2014. Nationalism Is Exactly What Ukraine Needs Democracy fails when citizens don't believe their country is worth fighting for. New Republic. Available online: http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117505/ukraines-only-hope-nationalism Brubaker R., 2004. In the name of the nation: reflections on nationalism and patriotism. Citizenship Studies, pp. 115-127, p. 117. Brubaker R. 2011. Nationalizing states revisited: projects and processes of nationalization in postsoviet states. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 34(11), pp. 1785-1814. Census of population of Ukraine, 1989 Available at: http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua Census of population of Ukraine, 2001 Available at: http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/nationality_population/ Data of Razumkov center sociological service: Available online: “Do you consider Ukraine as you motherland?”: http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=775 “If you could choose your motherland, what country would you choose?”: http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=764 “Will you defend Ukraine in case of war?”: http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=308 “Do you consider yourself as a patriot of Ukraine?”: http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=282 “What is your nationality?”, 2015 http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=1138 Figes O. 2013. Is there One Ukraine? The Problem with Ukrainian Nationalism. Foreign Affairs. Finin R. 2013. Ukrainians. Expected-the-Unexpected Nation. CRASSH. Available online: http://www.crassh.cam.ac.uk/blog/post/ukrainians-expect-the-unexpected-nation 48


Hryshevsky, M. 1917. To the nations of Ukraine. Great Ukrainian, pp. 106-197 Kuzio T., 1999. Ukraine: State and Nation Building[M]. Minnaert T., 2014. Footprint or fingerprint: international cultural policy as identity policy. International Journal of Cultural Policy, pp. 99-113. Motyl A., 2014. Should There Be One Ukraine Available at: http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/alexander-j-motyl/should-there-be-one-ukraine Poster from presidential elections in Ukraine 2004. Available at: https://goo.gl/images/KOcrM9 Pundyk, Y., 1966. Ukrainian Nationalism. Richardson T at al., 2004. Disciplining the Past in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Memory and History in Schools and Families, in Politics, Religion and Memory: The Past Meets the Present in Contemporary Europe, pp.109-135. Rogers B., 2011. Nationalizing states revisited: projects and processes of nationalization in postsoviet states. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 34(11), pp. 1785-1814. Snyder T., 2017. The White House forgets the Holocaust (again). Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/11/sean-spicers-hitler-holocaustspeak-volumes Tucker J., 2011. Orange in a Shade of Grey: Electoral Fraud, Corruption, and Protest. Universal III. 1917 Available at: http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0005300-17 Universal IV. 1918 Available at: http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0001300-18 Yurchuk J., 2014. Reordering of meaningful worlds: memory of the organization of ukrainian nationalists and the Ukrainian insurgent army in post-soviet Ukraine. Zahra T., 2010. Imagined noncommunities: national indifference as a category of analysis. Slavic Review, 69(1), pp. 93-119.

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From the Dolomites to Galicia – national indifference and “Habsburg patriotism” in the Austro-Hungarian empire’s literature By Balázs Gyimesi “Mein stärkstes Erlebnis war der Krieg und der Untergang meines Vaterlandes, des einzigen, das ich je besessen: der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie.“ [„My strongest experience was the war and the downfall of my fatherland, the only one I have ever had: that of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.”] Joseph Roth to Otto Forst de Battaglia, 28 October 1932

The Habsburg empire’s literature offers an intriguing landscape of Habsburg patriotism, which can be seen

as

a

form

of

“national

indifference”, a response to specific societal and political changes which affected the empire in its last decades, such

as

secularisation

and

nationalisation. This form of multilayered D. H. Lange "Volksschul-Atlas", 300th Volume, George Westermann in Braunschweig, 1899, Wikimedia Commons.

belonging,

having

both

territorial and religious anchors, but ultimately being attached to the

institution of the Habsburg monarchy, was masterfully demonstrated in Roth’s chefd’oeuvre, “Radetzky March” (1932). Through an analysis of fiction and nonfiction works of authors born in the Austro-Hungarian empire, the article will explore the notions of Habsburg patriotism, national indifference and a possible contemporary manifestation of the latter phenomenon, a form of “European patriotism”.

The Austrian Empire, and its successor after 1867, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which are also commonly referred to as the Habsburg monarchy, occupied a central place in Europe’s history, 50


ruling over vast regions of Central and Eastern Europe and a population of about 52 million on the eve of the empire’s demise. At the end of the First World War, the Treaty of St-Germain-enLaye (1919) and the Treaty of Trianon (1920) led to the disintegration of the empire into several sovereign countries, which defined themselves as nation states as opposed to the multi-ethnic nature of the Habsburg Empire, focusing on a nation-building process through the means of politics but also that of culture, for which literature was of great importance. However, the question arises how the authors of the Habsburg monarchy viewed the empire and its multi-ethnic nature. Did their works hold elements of “national indifference” and a possible “Habsburg patriotism” as opposed to national allegiances? The article will attempt to answer these questions by analysing the works of authors who were connected to the Habsburg Empire’s capital, Vienna, in the first third of the 20th century, with a special focus on Roth’s “Radetzky March”5. This period covers the last decade of the Habsburg empire, its disintegration, and the birth of the new nation states, offering a fertile territory for the study of the possible existence of “national indifference” and a possible “Habsburg patriotism” in a time of solidifying national movements and consequent nation building. As it will be demonstrated in the present article, the notion of “Habsburg patriotism” is closely related to “national indifference”, a concept that was thoroughly analysed in Tara Zahra’s seminal paper “Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis”.

“Habsburg patriotism” – a form of “national indifference”? The term “national indifference” was defined by Zahra (2010) as a multidimensional notion, which encompasses national ambivalence and apathy, but goes beyond these phenomena. For Zahra, national indifference was “often a response to modern mass politics” (Zahra, 2010: 99). In the Habsburg empire, the political importance of the constituent nations has started to develop with the acknowledgement of their equal status by Emperor Franz Joseph in 1848. Later, their role acquired further strength as the empire devolved certain powers to the historic kingdoms and crownlands (Berger, 2008: 189). The Kingdom of Hungary profited greatly of this political move of the emperor, as the Compromise of 1867, or Ausgleich, re-established the internal sovereignty of the Kingdom of Hungary, resulting in a dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary (Frank, 2001). The results of the compromise left, however, the other constituent nations, e.g. the Czech and Polish, dissatisfied with their situation.

5

„Radetzkymarsch“ by Joseph Roth, 1932

51


Amidst an era marked by emerging national movements, was there room for “Habsburg patriotism”? If so, could it be defined as a response to the calls for national sovereignty in the Habsburg Empire? The phenomenon was closely analysed by William D. Godsey (2016) in his study of the correspondence of Countess Rosa Neipperg, born in 1832 and died in 1905 in Vienna. The aforementioned milestones of the national movements in the Habsburg empire took place during Rosa Neipperg’s lifetime, making her correspondence on these issues highly intriguing. “Habsburg patriotism” is “a diverse, interconnected kinds of commitment that ranged from territorially defined attachments to a confessionally charged form of belonging” (Godsey, 2016: 41), a multi-layered form of patriotism which is above all directed at the Habsburg monarchy instead of national allegiances. Godsey observes a “lack of a national commitment” in Rosa Neipperg’s letters; even though Neipperg had a strong Bohemian orientation, it “was firmly embedded in the broader Habsburg one” (Godsey, 2016: 47). Furthermore, Neipperg’s “Habsburg patriotism” is described by Godsey as a “response to specific historical conditions tied to larger processes of change such as secularization, democratization, and nationalization”. “Habsburg patriotism” can therefore be seen as a form of Zahra’s definition of “national indifference”.

The unorthodox modernity of the Habsburg empire’s literature Countess Neipperg’s private correspondence demonstrated the existence of “Habsburg patriotism” among the nobility, but was this idea represented in other segments of society? Authors have the power to convey ideas to their readership through their work; did prominent authors of the Habsburg empire promote the idea of “national indifference” and “Habsburg patriotism” in particular in their oeuvre? According to Christof Dejung and Martin Lengwiler (2015), the literature of the Habsburg monarchy had its own form of modernisation, which was characterised by a permeating national indifference and by a celebration of intercultural actions. However, this modernisation effort went against the current of the Western narrative of modernisation, which was closely linked to the formation of the national collective, and prevailed over the Habsburg literature’s vision of modernity. The Western modernisation focussed on the strengthening of the national narrative, for which the French culture and literature, among others, served as an important example, whereas the modernisation efforts of the literature of the Habsburg empire were to be found in the “anchorage of interculturality”6 (Dejung and Lengwiler, 2015: 178). In the following, the article

6

„Verankerung der Interkulturalität“

52


will discuss certain examples of both fiction and nonfiction works reflecting this form of modernisation, written by authors connected to Vienna in the first third of the 20 th century.

“Nationalism is the new religion” – “Habsburg patriotism” in Roth’s “Radetzky March” Vienna was the pulsing capital of the Habsburg empire, attracting artists and intellectuals coming from all across the empire. Among them was Joseph Roth, a Galician Jew, who was born in 1894 in the small town of Brody, close to the Russian border of the empire, and lived in several European cities, such as Paris and Berlin. Roth’s chef-d’oeuvre is “Radetzky March”, published in 1932, which is also the name of a famed military march by Johann Strauss Sr., a musical piece which serves as a major motive of the novel. Roth’s novel discusses the last decades of the Habsburg empire, the question of rising nationalism, as well as the allegiance to the empire. “Radetzky March” reflects the countercurrent modernization of literature on the territory of the (former) Habsburg empire, with national indifference playing an important role in the characters’ selfdefinition. The novel recites the saga of the fictional House of Trotta von Sipolje, a family of Slovenian origin which rises from peasantry to nobility following a heroic act of the main character’s grandfather, Hauptmann Trotta. The novel mainly focuses on the grandson Carl Joseph Trotta’s life and career as a lieutenant in the emperor’s army. The main character’s grandfather is explicitly of Slovenian origin, however, with his decoration and the family’s rise to higher ranks of society, the role of the Slovenian roots fades for the coming generations. Carl Joseph’s father, Joseph Trotta, is described as a person who already sees himself as an “Austrian, a servant and bureaucrat of the Habsburgs, his Heimat being the Imperial Palace in Vienna”7, and firmly opposes Carl Joseph’s passing idea of returning to Slovenia. This shifting identity of the Trottas recalls Zahra’s definition of national indifference. Furthermore, the Austrian orientation of Joseph Trotta is, similarly to Neipperg’s Bohemian orientation, explicitly embedded into a broader Habsburg one. One of the most explicit examples of Habsburg patriotism in Roth’s novel is introduced in a scene in which Carl Joseph and his father dine with Count Chojnicki in the latter’s home in the Galician town “B.” (probably an allusion to Roth’s hometown, Brody). Count Wojciech Chojnicki is

“Er war ein Österreicher, Diener und Beamter der Habsburger, und seine Heimat war die Kaiserliche Burg zu Wien“, Part II, Chapter 9, „Radetzkymarsch“ by Joseph Roth. 7

53


described as a worldly nobleman, who states in the discussion with the Trottas that the monarchy will indeed fall apart, as “the time does not want us anymore! These times want to create independent nation states! One does not believe in God anymore. Nationalism is the new religion. […] The monarchy, our monarchy is founded on devoutness: on the belief, that God has chosen the Habsburgs to reign over so and so many Christian peoples.”8 Chojnicki’s Habsburg patriotism fits into Godsey’s definition of “confessionally charged form of belonging”, as the Count refers to God and the Habsburgs’ divine mission to reign over the (Christian) peoples of the monarchy. This manifestation of Habsburg patriotism in “Radetzky March” is anchored in Roth’s own religiosity, and also reveals Roth’s sense of nostalgia, as the novel was published 13 years after the end of the Habsburg empire, which Roth described as his only homeland (Spencer, 2008: 233).

The question of “Heimat” and nationality Several authors of the Habsburg empire reflected on the question of nationality and “Heimat”, a German word expressing a multi-faceted idea of “homeland” and belonging, encompassing among others territorial and cultural aspects, and which is difficult to translate into English (see “Heimat: A Critical Theory of the German Idea of Homeland” by Peter Blickle, 2004). The question of “Heimat” was addressed by Ödön von Horváth, author of “Tales of the Vienna Woods”9, in an essay published in 1929: “You are asking about my Heimat, I answer: I was born in Fiume, grew up in Belgrade, Budapest, Preßburg (Bratislava), Vienna and Munich, and have a Hungarian passport – but “Heimat”? I don’t know that. I am a typical old Austro-Hungarian blend: Hungarian, Croatian, German, Czech […] I only write in German now, I belong to the German Kulturkreis, the German Volk. However: The word “Fatherland”, nationalistically falsified, is foreign to me.”10

“Die Zeit will uns nicht mehr! Diese Zeit will sich erst selbständige Nationalstaaten schaffen! Man glaubt nicht mehr an Gott. Die neue Religion ist der Nationalismus. (…) Die Monarchie, unsere Monarchie ist gegründet auf die Frömmigkeit: auf dem Glauben, daß Gott die Habsburger erwählt hat, über so und so viele christliche Völker zu regieren.“ Part II, Chapter 11 Radetzkymarsch by Joseph Roth 9 „Geschichten aus dem 10 „Sie fragen mich nach meiner Heimat, ich antworte: ich wurde in Fiume geboren, bin in Belgrad, Budapest, Preßburg, Wien und München aufgewachsen und habe einen ungarischen Paß – aber: »Heimat«? Kenn ich 8

54


Von Horváth’s essay demonstrates the complexity and multi-layered nature of his identity, which reveals a certain form of indifference towards the both territorially and politically defined “Fatherland”. However, von Horváth saw himself as part of the German Kulturkreis [culture group] and even Volk [people] due to his attachment to the German language. Nevertheless, he remained a self-described “old Austro-Hungarian blend” without a Heimat in post-Habsburg Central Europe. Robert Musil, author of “The Man without Qualities” (published between 1930-43), intensively studied the issue of nationalism. Musil demonstrated a complicated relationship with the empire; the fictional country of Kakanien, where the action of Musil’s unfinished chef-d’oeuvre takes place, is a satirical, rather pejorative take on the k. u. k. Monarchie (Kaiserlich und Königlich, Imperial and Royal). However, Musil’s main character, Ulrich, can be seen as nationally indifferent, as he lacks any quality, including the sense of national belonging. Musil discussed the issue of nation and nationalism in several essays, including “The Nation as Ideal and Reality”11 (1921), in which he expressed nuanced opinions on the tension between nationalism and supranationalism, and called for leaving the “dead end” of “nationalist-imperialism” behind.

A possible European patriotism? To conclude, let us briefly examine Stefan Zweig’s view on the matter. Zweig is one of the bestknown authors and intellectuals of the Habsburg monarchy and Austria. In his seminal book, “The World of Yesterday: Memories of a European”, posthumously published in 1942, Zweig writes about his Heimat: “I was born in 1881 in one of the large and mighty empires, in the monarchy of the Habsburgs, but you shall not look for it on the map: it has been washed away without a trace. […] Therefore, I do not belong to anywhere, everywhere I am an alien and in best case a guest; also, the Heimat that was chosen by my heart, Europe, is now lost to me (...).”12

nicht. Ich bin eine typisch alt-österreichisch-ungarische Mischung: magyarisch, kroatisch, deutsch […] schreibe nunmehr nur Deutsch, gehöre also dem deutschen Kulturkreis an, dem deutschen Volke. Allerdings: der Begriff »Vaterland«, nationalistisch gefälscht, ist mir fremd. Mein Vaterland ist das Volk.“ 11 „Die Nation als Ideal und als Wirklichkeit“, by Robert Musil, 1921 12 “Ich bin 1881 in einem großen und mächtigen Kaiserreiche geboren, in der Monarchie der Habsburger, aber man suche sie nicht auf der Karte: sie ist weggewaschen ohne Spur. […] So gehöre ich nirgends mehr

55


Today, the political map of Europe is indeed in stark contrast to the one at the time of Stefan Zweig’s birth. Several sovereign countries are now to be found in Central Europe, across which the cities once inhabited by authors such as Roth, Von Horváth, Musil, or Zweig, are scattered. As the works introduced above demonstrate, many of these brilliant minds of the Habsburg empire have lost their Heimat with the demise of the Habsburg monarchy. Zweig, however, shifted to a “European patriotism” in his preface to “The World of Yesterday”, which raises some intriguing questions; is there today, in the age of European integration in the form of the European Union, a new manifestation of national indifference, a “European patriotism”? Although the political representation of nations within the European Union differs greatly from their situation as “constituent nations” in the Habsburg empire, is there a European patriotism, similar to Habsburg patriotism, to be found in the works of contemporary intellectuals? This question could be discussed in further articles, focusing on present examples of national indifference in a united Europe.

Literature Berger, S. (2008), A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Europe, 1789 – 1914, John Wiley & Sons Blickle, P. (2004), Heimat: A Critical Theory of the German Idea of Homeland, Camden House Dejung, C., Lengwiler, M. (2015), Ränder der Moderne: Neue Perspektiven auf die Europäische Geschichte (1800–1930), Böhlau Verlag, Köln Weimar Godsey, W. D. (2016), A Noblewoman's Changing Perspective on the World: The Habsburg Patriotism of Rosa Neipperg-Lobkowicz (1832–1905), Austrian History Yearbook, 47, 37-60. doi: 10.1017/S0067237816000060 Jonsson, S. (2001), Subject Without Nation: Robert Musil and the History of Modern Identity, Duke University Press Mehigan, T. J. (2003), The Critical Response to Robert Musil's The Man Without Qualities, Camden House Musil,

R.

(1921),

Die

Nation

als

Ideal

und

als

Wirklichkeit,

http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/buch/essays-6938/1 Spencer, M. (2008), In the Shadow of Empire: Austrian Experiences of Modernity in the Writings of Musil, Roth, and Bachmann, Camden House

hin, überall Fremder und bestenfalls Gast; auch die eigentliche Heimat, die mein Herz sich erwählt, Europa, ist mir verloren (…).“

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Roth, J. (1932), Radetzkymarsch, Gustav Kiepenheuer Verlag, Berlin Von

Horváth,

Ö.

(1929),

Fiume,

Belgrad,

Budapest,

Preßburg,

Wien,

München,

http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/buch/autobiographisches-und-theoretisches-2886/4 Zahra, T. (2010), Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis, Slavic Review, 69(1), 93-119. doi:10.1017/S0037677900016715

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