Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka by Nicholas Morris

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

POL 3017

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka Did the institutional choices made by the Sinhalese political elites during the post independence period contribute to the growing ethnic polarisation and civil war?

UCard Number: 040163130 Word Count: 11,744 Supervised by: Dr. K. Adeney The University of Sheffield Department of Politics Elmfield

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

Contents Introduction...............................................................................................................................3 Methodology.............................................................................................................................6 What is institutional decay? And why I am using it?.............................................................8 Mobilisation and Institutional decay.................................................................................... 10 How the centralisation of state power contributes to institutional decay .......................... 11 Roots of the problem............................................................................................................. 12 Post-independence Sri Lanka ............................................................................................... 16 Denial of citizenship to Estate Tamils ................................................................................. 17 Sinhala Only Act ................................................................................................................... 18 Dialogue between the Sinhalese and the Tamils: Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam and the Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pacts ...................................................................................... 21 Colonisation of the ‘Dry Zone’ ............................................................................................ 22 Policy of Standardisation (Universities Act, 1971)............................................................. 24 The rise of Tamil separatism: ............................................................................................... 25 The ‘Ethnocratic’ Constitution of 1972 ............................................................................... 28 The ‘Presidential’ Constitution of 1978............................................................................... 31 Analysis and Conclusions..................................................................................................... 36 Appendix One: map showing the ‘colonisation’ of the north-eastern provinces of Sri Lanka...................................................................................................................................... 41 Appendix Two: Map showing the proposed ‘Tamil Eelam’ .............................................. 42 Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 43

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

Introduction This paper will analyse the impact the institutional choices made during the postcolonial period have had on the relationship between the Sinhalese1 and the Tamil communities in Sri Lanka. It will argue that these choices set in motion a framework, which would ultimately give rise not only to Tamil mobilisation but also to the civil war, which threatens the political unity of Sri Lanka. The choices made by the Sinhala political elites of Sri Lanka to address the over representation of the Tamil community in both higher education and senior levels of the civil service (in addition to the economic advantage the community has developed) have not only been a major source of contention in the on going conflict between the two communities but have been instrumental in changing the democratic character of Sri Lanka. The institutional choices adopted by the political elites have changed Sri Lanka from what would have been a plural, liberal democracy to a ‘democracy’ characterised by illiberal tendencies2. The paper will argue that Sri Lanka is witnessing a process of institutional decay characterised by an ethnicised institutional structure. Focus will be drawn to four key political decisions made by the Sinhalese elites, these being the ‘denial of Indian Tamil citizenship’, the ‘Sinhala Only Act, 1956’, the policy of standardisation in education and finally the policy of ‘colonisation’ of the Dry Zone. This paper draws upon the theoretical perspectives of ‘historical institutionalism’ and will argue that past decisions have influenced future events and outcomes. Historical institutionalism looks at how choices made the design of governmental systems can influence the outcome of future decision-making processes of individuals. In his classic seminal piece on historical institutionalism, Krasner has shown that historical institutionalism explains how institutions become embedded, producing what is known as ‘path dependent policies’.3 In relation to Sri Lanka, the historical institutional framework is the most appropriate model to use since when analysing the causes to the ethnic

In the paper the phrase Sinhalese refers to the ethnic group and Sinhala refers to the spoken language N. DeVotta (2002) ‘Illiberalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1, p.85 3 S. Krasner ‘Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics’, Comparative Politics, Vol.16 pp.223-46 cited in V. Lowndes, ‘Institutionalism’ in Theory and Methods in Political Science, ed. D. Marsh & G. Stoker (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p.101 2

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

outbidding between the two political parties this theoretical perspective will be able to show how extreme, anti-Tamil rhetoric has become embedded and fused into the political system and how, as a consequence, these views have given rise to Tamil mobilisation. Historical Institutionalism is able to provide to a critical understanding of the causes of the problem as it analyses previous decisions, which impact on the political structure of the state. This idea of there being an element of ‘decay’ within the political structure of Sri Lanka has been advocated by DeVotta4 as being one of the main reasons for the acceleration of ethnic conflict as the state is no longer able to seek accommodation with minority groups. The concept of institutional decay as a theoretical framework as a means of understanding the current political situation in Sri Lanka was developed by Moore, who analysed the political decay in the 1980s5. According to Moore the political decay within Sri Lanka is multidimensional and occupies a multitude of levels. At its simplest, the ‘decay’ can be seen in the following areas: an increase in the centralisation of state power and the use the legal framework for political objectives, the repression of political opposition and finally the decay can be observed in the raising tensions between the Sinhalese and the Tamil community6. DeVotta7, in his research into the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka has used the political decay model, created by Moore to provide a theoretical framework to the idea that Sri Lanka is not just experiencing political decay but is also going through a period of profound institutional decay as well. In addition to drawing on the works on Moore, DeVotta also utilises the conceptual framework Ganguly uses in his study on Kashmiri separatism.8 The choices made during the post-independence period have given rise to centrifugal politics, which 4

N. DeVotta (2000) ‘Control Democracy, Institutional Decay and the Quest for Eelam: Explaining Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No.1 p.56 5 M. Moore (1990) ‘Liberalisation versus Political Pluralism in Sri Lanka?’ Journal of Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp.341-383 6 Ibid. p.346 7 N. DeVotta (2000) ‘Control Democracy, Institutional Decay and the Quest for Eelam, N. DeVotta (2005) ‘From ethnic outbidding to ethnic conflict: the institutional bases for Sri Lanka’s separatist war’, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 11, No. 1, N. DeVotta, ‘Illiberalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’, Journal of Democracy, (2000), Vol. 13, No. 1 8 N. DeVotta (2000) ‘Control Democracy, Institutional Decay and the Quest for Eelam, N. DeVotta (2005) ‘From ethnic outbidding to ethnic conflict: the institutional bases for Sri Lanka’s separatist war’, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 11, No. 1

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

has resulted in the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP) competing for support from the same ethnic community, the Sinhalese. This in turn has contributed to a growing illiberalism within the Sri Lanka state and has consequently developed into what has been referred to as a c‘ ontrol democracy’, characterised by an ethnically exclusive political structure. DeVotta drawing on the works of Chandra (who examined the nature of Indian democracy) has defined control democracy to be a democracy in which “…the majority group eschews ethnic compromise with the state’s minorities and instead solely controls the levels of power.”  The illiberalism that has permeated Sri Lanka’s democracy has resulted in the marginalisation of Sri Lanka’s minority population and has been caused by the practice of ‘ethnic outbidding’ made by the country’s two main Sinhalese political parties. Ethnic outbidding is the process whereby the political elites of a poly-ethnic state attempts to create a multitude of programmes in order to ‘outbid’ their opponents (who are from the same ethnic group) on the anti-minority stance adopted for political gain. Despite some areas of the state increasing in strength, as a result of the 1978 Constitution, institutional weakness and decay has occurred, as the Tamils would increasingly become disenfranchised from the Sri Lankan state, due to the fact their concerns and grievances are not being addressed by the political elite.

What the

Sinhalese failed realise however was that the illiberal and ethnocratic practices they initiated could not be curtailed. Consequently, this meant that the outbidding would spill over into over other parts of the political arena and in doing so would lay the foundation for political decay to develop and take root in the political structure of Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka this outbidding can be seen quite clearly between the two dominant Sinhalese political parties, the UNP and the SLFP.

According to Sartori, cited in

DeVotta, once ethnic outbidding becomes embedded into the political process to beings to result in the “…negation of competitive politics.”10 An example of ethnic outbidding can be seen in the actions of President Chandrika Kumaranunga, who has tried to accommodate Tamil demands when in power but “…sings a different tune when her



DeVotta (2000) ‘Control Democracy’, p.57 DeVotta, ‘From ethnic outbidding to ethnic conflict’, p.141

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

opponents control parliament.”11 The unprincipled nature of Sri Lanka’s political elites in the words of DeVotta “…merely contributes to the political decay in the island”12 and thus shows that a lasting peace between the two communities is unlikely to occur unless appropriate institutions are developed that ensure a dispassionate treatment for all of Sri Lanka’s citizens. For this to be achieved, the Sinhalese political elites must cease the practice of ethnic outbidding. Over time, this ‘ethnic outbidding’ would place enormous strain on the country’s democratic institutions; a strain that would ultimately give rise to what DeVotta refers to as an ‘…ethnocracy’ in all but name.’13 By the late 1960s it became apparent that Sri Lanka was moving further away from the plural utopia envisioned in the pre-independence days. This realisation amongst the Tamil people would provide the necessary catalyst for mobilisation against the centre. Mobilisation in a political context “…refers to the process by which individuals enter as actors into the political arena. It involves growing demands for political participation”14. In Sri Lanka, Tamil mobilisation initially took the form of a Satyagraha in order to put pressure on the centre. As a result of the constant ignoring of Tamil demands, Tamil mobilisation had by the late 1970s moved towards the use of military force in order to apply pressure on the state. Initially the mobilisation of the Tamil community took the form of peaceful demonstration, however, as a result of the ‘centre’ constantly ignoring their concerns. Eventually, Tamil mobilisation would develop in the late 1970s into an armed struggle against the state.

Methodology Since the main emphasis of this paper is primarily focused on the link between past institutional choices and ethnic conflict within a state, a case study approach was one of the most appropriate methods to use. Yin notes in his paper on case studies “…the case study is the method of choice when the phenomenon under study is not readily

Ibid. p.156 Ibid 13 Ibid. p.84 14 S. Ganguly, ‘Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilisation and Institutional Decay’, International Security, Vol.21, No.2 (1996), p.92 12

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

distinguishable from its context”.15 This is especially useful in trying to understand the causality between previous choices and an observable phenomenon, which in the case of this paper is intra-state conflict. In addition to this, case studies are good at addressing fundamental questions, which are vital in determining the research strategy which is to be used. Case studies are one of many methods that are used within the social science spectrum. Although other research methods are also available, such as experiments, surveys and archival information, cases studies posses a particular advantage. As Yin notes in his classic paper, case studies are useful in answering “how” and “why” questions.16 As opposed to archival analyses, which tends to be predictive in nature, case studies are especially useful when the objective is explanation and, ultimately, understanding. As a result of case studies being essentially an empirical investigation17 they invariably examine situations in which there are a multiple set of variables.18

In light of this, the case study approach helps to provide a framework in

which a particular theoretical model can operate. This was especially useful for this paper, which draws heavily on the theoretical perspectives of ‘historical institutionalism’ as the case study approach provided a structure to which the theoretical perspective could work within and in doing so enabled the research to be focused in a particular fashion. In addition, since the Sri Lankan conflict is often categorised as an ethnic issue and can, therefore, initiate different opinions and valuations depending on who portrays the conflict. As a result of this potential bias, the literature used in this paper (where possible) has been carefully collected in order to give a relatively objective picture of the Sri Lankan conflict. Any pro or anti resources about Sinhalese or Tamils without critical approach are avoided since they do not have any credibility in academic writings. In order for this case study to achieve the desired objectives, it is important that the theoretical framework is clearly laid out. The following three sections aim to provide a clear and robust theoretical structure, which will enable the paper to have a degree conceptual clarity. 15

R. K. Yin, Application of Case Study Research 2nd ed. (Applied Social Science Research Methods Series Vol. 34 Sage Publications: USA, 2003), p. 4 16 R. K. Yin, Case Study Research: design and methods, 3 rd ed. (Applied Social Research Methods Series Vol. 5 Sage Publications: USA, 2003), p.22 17 Ibid. p.3 18 P. Lynn Kennedy; E. Jane Luzar ‘Toward Methodological Inclusivism: The Case for Case Studies’, Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (1999), p.584

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

What is institutional decay? And why I am using it? The breakdown in the political structure in Sri Lanka has given rise to decay in the institutions of state. Institutional decay is the situation, which sees institutions of state operate in a corrupt and arbitrary manner, which results in the foundation of the state’s liberal democratic framework being completely sidelined. As noted by DeVotta, institutional decay develops when the “…state’s rule-making, -enforcing, -applying…”19 etc are incapable of acting impartially and constitutionally. While in theory, according to DeVotta, Sri Lanka can be viewed as a partial consolidated democracy20 due to the state fulfilling at least one of the five perquisite laid out by Linz and Stephan, that being that the state must have at least two successive elections.21 As Oberst has noted that in the first thirty years after independence Sri Lanka did experience an “…impressive parliamentary record.”22 However with regard to the other areas that are required for a state to be deemed ‘consolidated’ they are either none existent or have been severely corrupted in Sri Lanka. The other key areas are civil society, political society, an economy free from overt state interference and finally a bureaucracy that reflects the demographic composition of the state. Civil society within Sri Lanka has all but collapsed due to the threat posed by the insurgency. In addition the institutional framework of the state has failed to protect the minority community and there is no credible legal framework to ensure the protection of minority rights. The political structure while it is contested democratically has developed along ethnic lines to such an extent that Tamil representation has become marginalised thus preventing the Tamils from being able to exercise any political power. Finally, despite attempts to liberalise certain areas of Sri Lanka’s economy, the state still retains control of key the economic apparatus. The failure of the state to address these points prevents the state from fully being a consolidated democracy. One of the reasons the state has 19

DeVotta, ‘From ethnic outbidding’, p.152 DeVotta, ‘Illiberalism and ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka’ p.84 21 A. C. Stepan, A. C & J. J Linz, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: southern Europe, South America and Post Communist Europe, (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) 22 R. C. Oberst, ‘Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’, Journal of Federalism, Vol. 18, (1988), p.176 20

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

failed to achieve full democratic consolidation is due in part to the practice of ethnic outbidding by the two main political parties. The utilisation of ethnicity for short term political goals has weakened both the institutional and democratic framework of the state, allowing decay to set in which has corrupted that state’s democratic norms. In Sri Lanka, the implementation of the Sinhala Only Act, 1956 can be seen to be the start of the state’s institutional decay as it showed the inability of the Sinhalese political elites to treat the Tamils dispassionately. This inability to treat the Tamils dispassionately can be argued to be one of the root causes in Sri Lanka’s institutional decay as Tamils began to lose confidence in the state’s apparatus. As DeVotta notes “…each successive policy that was implemented to legitimise the Sinhala Only Act merely re-emphasised Tamils’ marginalisation and deepened the institutional decay…”.23 Consequently, this institutional weakness and decay would prevent the state from accommodating the demands of the Tamil insurgents. In light of the insurgency movement in the north eastern provinces, institutional decay can also seen in the state’s inability to articulate itself throughout the country, as vast tracks of this region are controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This in some ways has led to ht e creation of a de facto Tamil homeland,24 which challenges the premise of the Sri Lanka unitary existence. Institutional decay helps to explain why ethnic outbidding occurred and how this resulted in both the political and militarily mobilisation of the Tamils. This is because this framework looks solely at the institutions as being the main catalyst of the conflict. As DeVotta argues, by “…understanding the correlation between institutional decay and Tamil mobilisation”25 we then in turn develop an understanding of the reasons behind Sri Lanka’s ‘bloody and protracted’ conflict.

Ibid. p.155 S. Nadarajah & D. Sriskandarajan‚ ‘Liberation struggle or terrorism? The politics of naming the LTTE’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1, p.93 25 DeVotta, ‘From ethnic outbidding’, p.143 24

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

Mobilisation and Institutional decay

The mobilisation of the Tamil community can be seen as a direct consequence of the actions of the Sinhalese political elite. The choice made by these elites, which affectively gave a special position for their community at the expense of the minority, and the subsequent marginalisation that this would result in for the Tamil community has not only given rise to institutional decay of Sri Lanka’s political structure but has been instrumental in the mobilisation of the Tamils. One of the main consequences of the Sinhalese elites constantly ignoring the demands of the Tamils has been the gradual increase in the political consciousness of the Tamil community. The mobilisation of the Tamil community, whether through peaceful demonstrations or through armed insurrection campaign against the centre, has so far been the only mechanism available to the Tamil community to voice their demands.

It has to be stressed that political

mobilisation is not necessarily the product of institutional decay and may arise through the process of economic modernisation.26 However, when the state implements policies that weaken the democratic fabric of the state through marginalising minority groups (as has been the case in Sri Lanka) institutional decay can cause the mobilisation of minority groups to occur. The institutional decay of Sri Lanka has been the driving force behind Tamil mobilisation. Had the choices made by the elites not resulted in the marginalisation of minority groups, institutional decay may not have occurred and in doing so the Tamil mobilisation may not have developed on such a scale. This inability of the state to accommodate Tamil demands and grievances has given rise to a political mobilisation, which in its extreme form can be seen in the insurgency campaign of the LTTE. This political situation with regard to the insurgency threat closely resembles the problems India faces in Kashmir, which like Sri Lanka, has failed to accommodate the rising political demands and in so doing has given rise to institutional decay.27 As Ganguly argues the development of insurgency movements occurs when the state in

S. P. Huntingdon, ‘Political Development and Political Decay’, World Politics, Vol.17, No.3 (1965), p.386 27 Ganguly ‘Explaining the Kashmir’, p.103

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

question faces “…political mobilisation against a backdrop of institutional decay.”28 In the years that followed, Sri Lanka would become the setting of a bloody and protracted insurgency movement that at present sees no sign of ending. How the centralisation of state power contributes to institutional decay

As mentioned in the introduction, the centralisation of political power can be instrumental in the development of institutional decay. The centralisation of the Sri Lankan State occurred in 1978 the when new constitution created an executive presidency, thus moving Sri Lanka away from the Westminster system it had inherited from British colonial rule to a system that resembles the political structure of France. However, in practice, the Sri Lankan presidency was much more powerful than the President of France. French presidents traditionally deal only with defence and foreign policy, leaving domestic affairs to the Prime Minister.29 Sri Lankan presidents on the other hand are involved with every aspect of the government and are able to hold cabinet posts, or can bypass the cabinet posts by delegating decisions to the Presidential Secretariat.30 As a consequence of this political centralisation, the constitution gave the president “…near dictatorial powers”,31 allowing the government under Jayewardene to enact a number of controversial laws, in particular the passing of the draconian, Prevention of Terrorism Act. This further developed the level of institutional decay within the country as no checks and balances were incorporated into the constitution, which would have placed legal constraints on the ability of the president to enact such discriminatory policies. The 1978, constitution due to its illiberal framework, especially with regard to the human rights abuses carried out under the Prevention of Terrorism

Ibid p.77 Présidence De La République [English Version] ‘the 1958 Constitution and its amendments’ [accessed from http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/anglais/the_institutions/founding_texts/the_1958_constitution/the_19 58_constitution.20245.html on 9th January] 30 The Official Website of the Government of Sri Lanka: ‘Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka – Chapter VII, The Executive; the President of Republic’ [accessed from http://www.priu.gov.lk/Cons/1978Constitution/Chapter_07_Amd.html on 9th January] 31 DeVotta, ‘Iliberalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’, p.91 29

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

Act32 would “…shatter whatever remaining confidence Tamil youth had in the institutions of public order, and would lead more young Tamils to join the fight for separatism.”33

Roots of the problem

The roots of the ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka can be traced back to the period of British imperial rule (1796-1948). Under British administration Sri Lanka, formerly known as Ceylon, was governed under the maxim of ‘divide and rule’. This meant that minority groups (which in the case of Sri Lanka refer to the Tamils) were given preferential treatment over the majority.34 Another major relic of British rule in Sri Lanka was the development of what has been referred as a ‘dual economy.’ One sector of the country’s economy was highly sophisticated and was geared up primarily for export. The other was centred on traditional economic methods, such as subsistence farming. This economic dichotomy would provide an economic rationale to the policies the extremist elements within the Sinhalese community would advocate as it was the Sinhalese who overwhelming worked in the least economical sector. The Tamils’ willingness in accepting ‘Western ideals’ and practices, for example converting to Christianity and embracing English as the ‘medium of instruction’ would give them an enormous advantage over the Sinhalese. The dividend paid off and after a couple of years of colonial administration, Tamils would affectively ‘dominate’ both the civil service and the education profession.35 By the time of independence in 1948 Tamils disproportionately dominated both the political structure and the education sector (especially in higher education). According to DeVotta in th e last years of British imperial rule, the Tamil community account for one third of the senior levels of the civil service as well as making up nearly 40 per cent of the judiciary, despite only comprising

Ibid. p.90 Ibid. 34 BBC News, South Asia, Quick Guide: Sri Lanka http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6065646.stm (13 th April 2007) 35 R. C. Oberst, ‘Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’ Journal of Federalism, Vol.18, No. 3, (1998) p.190 33

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

11 per cent of the population.36 In addition to this, nearly a third of university students were drawn from the Tamil community. As a consequence of this ‘over representation’ of the minority in key areas of state, many Sihalese despite their numerical advantage began to feel economically marginalised and thus found it difficult to empower themselves both economically and politically. The feeling of economic disempowerment is a direct consequence of the British Imperial edict of ‘divide and rule’, which as mentioned previously conferred a privileged status onto the minority community. The marginalisation within the Sinhalese community gradually developed in what is known as a ‘minority complex’37 seeing themselves as ‘defenders of the Thereveda Buddhist Tradition.’38

This meant that although the Sinhalese were numerically

dominant, the community feared the economic and political power of the real minority, the Tamils, who account for eighteen per cent of the population. The Tamil population is broken down into two distinct groups, Indian Tamils, who make up approximately six per cent and Tamils who are indigenous to the country who in turn from the remaining twelve per cent. This anxiety amongst the Tamils was made worse by the newly created Indian state of Tamil Nadu in 1953. To the Sinhalese, this seemed as if Sri Lanka was in danger of being surrounded by Tamils.39 Indeed Senanayake was fearful that the creation of Tamil Nadu with over 40 million Tamils could affectively reduce the Sinhalese to the status of a minority.40 The concern the Sinhalese had that their culture could become endangered as a result of being precariously positioned towards “…the Dravidian people of south India” 41 would be instrumental in developing hostility towards the idea of a federal political structure, as it was felt that such a political structure would enable the possibility of a union between the Tamils of south India and Sri Lanka to occur. Despite Sinhalese fears that a possible

DeVotta, ‘Control Democracy’ p.60 A. J. Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: its origins and development in the nineteenth and twentieth century (C. Hurst & Co., Publishers, 2000), p.5 38 A. Bullion, ‘Civil Society and the Peace Process’ in Civil Wars Vol. 7 No.2 SPECIAL ISSUE, ed., A. Bullion, Routledge: London (2005), p.117 39 A. J. Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism, p.5 40 DeVotta, ‘Illiberalism and Ethnic Conflict’, p.88 41 R. C. Oberst ‘Federalism in Sri Lanka’ p.190 37

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

union would take place, the general consensus within the Sri Lankan Tamil community was against the idea of unification.42 This Sinhalese insecurity over its minority community closely resembles the ‘minority complex’ felt in Malaysia and Indonesia in relation to their respective Chinese communities.43

Malaysia stands as a good regional comparison for evaluating the

success of the Sri Lankan government’s strategy of the ethnic accommodation of minorities. Malaysia in the late 1950s shared much in common with Sri Lanka with regard to its political, social and economic composition. In addition, Malaysia also experienced tension between the indigenous population (the Malays) and the Chinese community. The Malaysian government enacted a number of policies, which were similar to those of the Sri Lankan government that aimed to address the economic disparities between the Malayan and the Chinese communities. Yet despite the perceived similarities, Malaysia was able to avoid a full scale political confrontation with it’s Chinese minority, something which Sri Lanka failed to achieve with the Tamils as result of choosing policies that did not alienate the Chinese community or polarise the minority group from political participation. Malaysia handled the problem of minority protection “…through genuine consultation, bargaining and compromise”44 in a broad coalition up till the communal riots of 1969. The ability of the Malaysian elites to engaging in consultation with the country’s minority groups was perhaps easier to achieve than in Sri Lanka due to the fact that minority groups were not territorially based as in Sri Lanka. In addition to Malaysia adopting a consociational structure two additional but related points have been suggested as to why Malaysia has been able to navigate away from intra-state violence, which Sri Lanka has witnessed is due in part to two things Sri Lanka lacks. First, Malaysia is highly resource rich, this has enabled the country to leap ahead economically. Whereas in Sri Lanka, which is not well endowed in terms of resources, has had almost stagnant economic growth. This has meant that the elites in Malaysia have more to loose if the 42

B. Pfaffenberger, ‘The Cultural Dimension of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka’, p.1147 E. K. B Tan, ‘From sojourners to citizens: managing the ethnic Chinese minority in Indonesia and Malaysia’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 24, No. 6 (2001) 44 D. Mauzy, ‘Malay political hegemony and ‘coercive consociationalism’ in The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts, ed., J. McGarry & B. O’Leary, Routledge: London & New York (1997), p.107 43

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

ethnic cleavages are manipulated for short-term political gain. The second point is that as long as there is political stability and the discriminatory practices have not been increased too much, non-Malays will accept the current status quo in order to reap the rewards of economic growth. In light of this, the non-Malayan population would be reluctant to do anything that may result in political instability. Malaysia’s ability to steer away from ‘ethnic outbidding’ and to move towards a form of consociational democracy (which although is not entirely perfect) has allowed the country to experience unprecedented economic growth whereas Sri Lanka has instead witnessed the gradual deterioration of the state, characterised by intra-state conflict between the two ethnic communities.45 The Tamils too were concerned that come independence the Sinhalese would utilise their numerical superiority for political advantage, this they felt would potentially result in their community losing the privileged position they had obtained during the colonial period.

This fear of minority

marginalisation had gradually developed alongside the extension of universal suffrage in 1931. Tamils argued that the move towards universal franchise would give rise to majority rule by the Sinhalese. Wang has argued that the collective insecurity shared by the Sinhalese community would give rise to a number of policies by the state that would overwhelmingly favour of the Sinhalese community.46 To counteract this potential problem, the minority groups in Sri Lanka petitioned the British colonial administration to hold a commission that would safeguard minority rights. The Soulbury Report published in 1944, “…ensured that the governor-general would exercise his discretion on any bill that evoked serious opposition by any racial or religious community…or serious injustice to any such community.”47 In additional to this, the report established the provision against religious discrimination and enshrined the protection of minority rights by making any changes to the constitution require a twothirds majority in the legislature.48

S. Aberyratne, ‘Economic Roots of Political Conflict: The Case of Sri Lanka’, The World Economy, Vol. 27 No. 8, (2004), p.1298 46 Bee-Lan C. Wang, ‘Positive Discrimination: A comparative investigation of its bases forms and outcomes’ Comparative Education Review, Vol.27, No.2 (1988), p.191 47 N. Wickramasignhe Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History of Contested Identities, (C. Hurst & Co., 2006), p.169 48 Ibid

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

Post-independence Sri Lanka On gaining independence the protection of minority rights, enshrined in the Soulbery Report, would begin to whither away as the Sinhalese political elite realised that they held the numerical advantage which gave them a unique opportunity to initiate a range of policies that would be to their community’s political and economic advantage.49 These policies, which the Sinhalese would enact, would attempt to address what they perceived to the ‘over representation of the Tamil people’. These measures would appeal to the ‘primordial’ beliefs of the extreme elements of the Sinhalese community (especially the Buddhist monks) who used the idea of ‘myths of a common descent’ to justify the belief that ‘Sinhala’ was in danger and thus required the state’s protection. Since independence, Buddhist monks “…have engaged actively in the political process and have attempted to influence the political elite by virtue of their moral prestige”50 and have been highly instrumental in the implementation of policies that place special attention on the historical roots of the Sinhalese community. Eventually, the Tamil community would begin to mobilise against what they perceived as discriminatory practices from the ‘centre’. At first Tamil demands were verging on the placid, seeking just linguistic recognition, however, as a result of successive Sri Lankan governments ignoring the concerns of the Tamil community these demands would later respond to the “…growing Sinhalese self assertion and discriminatory legislation through a violent subnationalist movement in favour of a Tamil homeland.”51

C. Manogaran, Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka, (University of Hawaii Press, 1987), p.11 50 N. Wickramasignghe, Sri Lanka in the Modern Age, p.182 51 S. K. Mitra, ‘The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism: Subnational Movements of South Asia in a Comparative Perspective’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol.25, No. 1, (1995) p.68

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

Denial of citizenship to Estate Tamils

One of the first policies the Sinhalese elites, under the government of D.S. Senanayake, would initiate once obtaining political power would be to address the question of Indian Tamil citizenship. Indian Tamils are descendants of the plantation labourers from India during the period of British colonial rule in the nineteenth century.52 Although they speak the same al nguage, they are usually considered a separate community from the Sri Lankan Tamils of the North and East. It is interesting to note that unlike the Sri Lankan Tamils, the Tamils of Indian descendent did not join in the demands for a separate state. Indeed, in some cases the two Tamil communities often lead opposite political paths.53 The ‘Citizenship Act 1948 and the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act’, 1949 would be the first piece of legislation that would undermine the rights of minority groups within a few months of independence. Under this legislation (ironically it was given its full support by the Sri Lankan Tamils),54 Indian Tamils were to be disqualified from the Sri Lankan state.55 The effect of this citizenship act was to tilt the island's political balance away from the Tamils. In 1948, at the time of independence, the Tamils had 33 per cent of the voting power in Parliament.56

Upon the disenfranchisement of the Estate Tamils, however, this

proportion dropped to 20 per cent. The Sinhalese could and did obtain more than a 2/3 majority in Parliament, making it impossible for Tamils to exercise an effective opposition to Sinhalese policies affecting them.57 Not content with stripping their citizenship, successive governments tried to remove the estate Tamils from the country entirely. In 1962, Prime Minister Sirimavo

J. Spencer, ‘Introduction: The Power of the Past’ in Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict, ed. J. Spencer (Routledge, 1990), p.14 53 Kearney, ‘The Territorial Elements of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka’, p.566 54 V. Nithiyanandam, ‘From News to Stale News: an analysis of the global projection of Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict, in Conflict and Community in Contemporary Sri Lanka; ‘Pearl of the East’ or the ‘island of tears’, eds. S. Gamage & I.Watson, (London: Sage, 1993), p.52 55 Tamil Nation: Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Amendment Bill http://www.tamilnation.org/nadesan/electionsbill.htm (3rd March 2007) 56 Tamil Nation: Indictment Against Sri Lanka, Plantation Tamils Deprived of Vote and Citizenship 1948/50, http://www.tamilnation.org/indictment/indict001.htm (3rd March 2007) 57 Tamil Nation: Truth & President Kumaratunga, http://www.tamilnation.org/conflictresolution/tamileelam/cbkproposals/01chandrika.htm (6 th March 2007)

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

Bandaranaike signed an agreement with Indian Prime Minister L.B. Shastri,58 which would allow for the sizeable population transfer of the Tamil community to India.

Sinhala Only Act

By the mid 1950s a number of Sinhalese community leaders had realised that a “…better life for their community”59 could not be achieved through political emancipation alone. identity…”

What was required was the “…exploitation of their ethnic

to achieve the level of satisfaction that was desired. Bandaranaike, a key

figure within the Sinhalese community, advocated that the complete “…overhaul of the administration, educational and political structures…that had bestowed “undue” privileges on the Tamils”61 had to be carried out in order to maximise the political will of the Sinhalese majority and in doing so address Sinhalase grievances over ‘Tamil over representation’ in the Sri Lankan state. Despite the fact that there was an agreement between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities that both languages would be made official once independence was granted, momentum had developed within the Sinhalese community to such an extent, due in part to the activities of Buddhist monks, that would result in the agreement being discarded. In the Sinhalese dominated parliament, the government of Bandaranaike put forward legislation that would replace English as the official language of Sri Lanka (which prior to independence had been the main medium of communication of government) with Sinhala, a language spoken by 74 per cent of the population. The legislation had the double-pronged effect both of increasing Sinhalese representation within government service and at the same time de facto disenfranchising the Tamil community from working within the state bureaucracy. Supporters of the law saw it as an attempt by a community that had just gained independence to distance themselves from their colonial masters, while its opponents viewed it as an attempt by the linguistic majority to impose its will on minorities. Tamil politicians under the leadership 58

The official website of the Government of Sri Lanka, Former Prime Ministers http://www.priu.gov.lk/PrimeMinister/formerprimeministers.html (4 th January 2007) 59 Manogaran, Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka, p.11 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid.

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

of Suntharalingham began to show their disproval of the legislation by threatening to “…solicit the support of Tamils in South India”62 in order to create an independent state that would protect the Tamil language and customs. However, the vast majority of Tamils did not support such measures and instead gave their support to the Tamil Federal Party, which campaigned to have Tamil on par with Sinhala without splitting the country. The ‘Sinhala Only Act’ (SOA) “…was the catalyst for heightened tensions between the Tamil and Sinhalese communities that eventually resulted in ethnic riots that year and more serious riots two years later”63. The Federal Party influenced by the approach Gandhi carried out against British rule in India, sought to apply pressure on the government’s linguistic stance by organising and participating in nation wide Satyagraha (peaceful protests). These peaceful demonstrations would enflame Sinhalese passions and ignite Sri Lanka in an orgy of violence, the first being in 1956 and the second in 1958. The violence that occurred in 1958 would not be seen on such a scale until the 1983 pogroms,64 as DeVotta notes:

“…the Sinhala-Only Act exemplified a radical change in policy implemented by the Sinhalese for the benefit of the Sinhalese. There is no disputing that the policy was dictated by using the majoritarian principle. But it is also indisputable that the Act's sponsors had cavalierly demanded that the majority's will be the will of all. Rules and laws rarely get enacted with complete consensus, and this is especially true for rules dealing with ethnic issues in a polyethnic society.”65

These tensions over language can arguably been seen as part of a deep-rooted clash which is not only based on linguistic affiliation but on religious, ancestral heritage as well.66 Imposing Sinhala on the minority automatically placed a severe disadvantage on the Tamils who found it difficult to succeed in the labour market, a market that reorientated itself around the language of the majority. The SOA was one of the first 62

Manogaran, Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka, p.11 Peace in Sri Lanka, The Official Website of the Sri Lankan Government’s Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP), K.M de Silva, To Restore Peace to Sri Lanka’s Fractured Polity, http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/peace2005/Insidepage/Background/Background.asp (17 th February, 2007) 64 S.J. Tambiah, Sri Lanka: ethnic fratricide and the dismantling of democracy, (University of Chicago Press, 1986), p.13 65 DeVotta ‘From ethnic outbidding to ethnic conflict’ p.149 66 Kearney, ‘Language and the rise of Tamil Separatism’, Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 5 (1978), p.521 63

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

indicators that Sri Lanka was moving in the direction of a control democracy, which the governing elites would find difficult to maintain as the outbidding would soon get out of control.67 The subsequent polarisation the SOA caused, propelled Sri Lanka into its first major communal disturbance since independence. The riots of 1956 would affectively force the government to negotiate with the Tamils over the issue of language and would give rise to the first of two pacts between the political elites of the Tamil and the Sinhalese communities.

The ‘Sinhala Only Act’ was the beginning of the ethnic

outbidding in Sri Lanka and the policies that would occur as a result of this would further contribute to the growing political decay within the state institutions, a decay that would eventually give rise to institutional decay. DeVotta has argued that there is similarity between the policies carried out by the Sinhalese over the issue of language and actions of the Bengalis.68 The Bengalis utilised the religio-linguistic identities for political gain in the same way as their Sri Lankan counterparts.

By laying emphasise on religion as a primary identity marker, the

Sinhalese were able to galvanise enough support to push for independence. Likewise, the utilisation of religion by the Bengalis provided the necessary legitimacy for Jinnah’s concept of ‘Two Nations’, which ultimately provided the rationale for Pakistan’s formation.69 However, the decision to adopt the secondary marker of identity (that being language) in Sri Lanka would result in Tamil marginalisation. In Bengal, the adaptation of language as the embodiment of identity would split up Pakistan and lead to the formation of Bangladesh.

DeVotta, ‘Control democracy, institutional decay’, pp.56 - 59 DeVotta, ‘The Utilisation of Religio-Linguistic Identities by the Sinhalese and Bengalis: Toward a General Explanation’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 39, No.1 pp.66-95 69 Ibid. 68

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

Dialogue between the Sinhalese and the Tamils: Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam and the Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pacts

Following from the language riots an agreement was reached between the two ethnic communities in order try and address the issue of minority accommodation. The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam (B-C) Pact stipulated that the Tamil language would be used for all administrative purposes in the Northern and Eastern Provinces while Regional Councils would be created to deal with education, agriculture and colonisation. Tamils in return would cease their demands for linguistic parity and in addition would call off the Satyagraha.70 However, the agreement failed to last and was promptly dropped due to pressure from the extreme elements within the Sinhalese community. The dropping of the agreement would provide an impetus for a second communal riot. Despite the violence the riots created, one arguably positive outcome was the passing of the ‘1958 Tamil Language Act’. The passing of the 1958 Language Act aimed to address the concerns of the Tamils and to secure unity of the state, which had been severely threatened by the violence.71 The act provided for the use of Tamil as the medium of government in the North and East provinces of Sri Lanka. However, with no implementing regulations the act remained in legal limbo and would thus become one of many examples the Tamil community will cite as examples of the many empty promises the Sinhalese had made to the their community but were never realised (or if they were realised they were often implemented far too late for the policies to have any real impact on the political structure of Sri Lanka). It would not be until 1961 that the necessary legal promulgations would be carried which would make the Act affective.72 Following from the 1956 riots, a second attempt at ethnic accommodation and devolution was made possible when UNP and Federal Party (FP) leaders agreed to the socalled Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact after the UNP returned to power. The SLFP, however, traduced the agreement by claiming that the UNP and FP had conspired to undo 70

DeVotta, ‘From ethnic outbidding to ethnic conflict’, p.150 R. I. Rotberg Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: civil war and reconciliation, (Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p.7 72 R. N. Kearney, ‘Sinhalese Nationalism and Social Conflict in Ceylon’ Pacific Affairs Vol. 37 No. 2 (1964), p.133 71

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

the 'Sinhala-only' policy and dismember the country. Besides the standard support from the Buddhist clergy and nationalist organisations, to this the Muslims and Marxists, who had previously agreed to linguistic parity, also joined them.73 However, this pact too, like the previous one, was unsuccessful. Faced with mounting internal pressure from his own party in addition to the uncooperative stance of the UNP, Prime Minister Senanayake was forced to abrogate on the deal with Tamils. The collapse of these two deals (both the BC and S-C pacts) would eventually enflame the Tamil community to such an extent, giving rise to more extreme demands.

Colonisation of the ‘Dry Zone’

In addition to wanting to change the medium of instruction, Sinhalese community leaders ever since independence, have implemented a range of policies that have helped to enforce the Sinhalese Buddhist identity.74 Peebles has argued that the process of strengthening the position of Sinhalese confirms that ethnic communities are created and transformed by particular elites.75 Following from the SOA, the Sinhalese initiated a policy, which would open up the ‘dry zone’ in the North Eastern region (an area known for its Tamil majority) for economic development although seen from the perspectives of the Sri Lanka Tamils such a policy amounted to a blatant colonisation of their cultural homeland.76 This is arguably one of most controversial enactments during the post-independence era, as it would result in the systematic phasing out of the Tamil majority in these areas in favour of the Sinhalese.77 The policy of all governments in Sri Lanka has been to alter the demographics of the Trincomalee District in favour of the Sinhalese. With the granting of independence in 1948, the government began the Kanthalai colonisation scheme where Sinhalese from outside the district were settled. This was followed by the Allai scheme in the early 73

DeVotta, ‘From ethnic outbidding to ethnic conflict’, p.151 Ibid. 75 P. Peebles, ‘Colonisation and Ethnic Conflict in the Dry Zone of Sri Lanka’, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 49, No. 1. (Feb., 1990), pp. 30-55 76 See map; ‘colonisation of the north eastern provinces’ 77 Tamil Nation, Sinhalese Settlements and Forced Evictions of Tamils in the North-East Province, http://www.tamilnation.org/forum/manogaran/000601settlements.htm (27th December 2006) 74

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

1950s and the Morawewa scheme in the 1960s. Sri Lankan state sponsored colonisation schemes of Sinhalese in the northern or eastern parts of the island, traditionally considered to be minority Sri Lanka Tamil regions, has been perhaps the most immediate cause of inter-communal violence as it evoked not only Sinhalese ‘primordial attachments’ which not only idealise the prosperity of the ancient Sinhalese but also the memory of the Tamils who claim historical and cultural attachment to the region.78 From the position of the Tamils, the areas considered for state sponsored ‘colonisation schemes’ (Vavuniya and Trincomalee) are considered part of their homeland and thus any attempt by the centre to ‘colonise’ these regions has been viewed by Tamils as an attempt to breakdown the areas of Tamil power. In addition, the internal migration by the Sinhalese in the ‘Dry Zone’ has also been “…viewed by Tamil political leaders as a threat to the survival of their community.”79 However, from the perspectives of the Sinhalese the utilisation of this peripheral wasteland has been a much needed government initiative to spearhead economic growth80 and address the perceived inequalities between the two communities.81

The

government’s policy of opening up the ‘Dry Zone’ for economic development resulted in an increase of 86 per cent of the harvested area, as well as this, the investment increased the number of workers by 152 per cent.82 Shastri has argued that it was the rise in the economic potential and not the threat of Sinhalese ‘colonisation’, which is what Peebles argues that spearheaded the drive towards Eelam. In addition, the process of colonisation also had the benefit of taking pressure off the crowded, urban south. The policy of colonisation of the northeastern provinces had developed into a major issue for the Tamil Federal Party, who would now use this as a mechanism to advocate a separate state for the Tamil people.

The policy of

‘colonisation’ would “…dramatically changed the population ratio among the Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims, thereby deepening the ethnic divide.”83 Consequently, the internal migration by the Sinhalese to Tamil areas has increased the pressure for land within Sri 78

Peebles, ‘Colonisation and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’, p.32 Kearney, ‘Territorial Elements of Tamil Separatism’, p.571 80 Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and Dismantling of Democracy, p.12 81 Peebles ‘Colonisation and Ethnic Conflict on Sri Lanka’, p.32 82 A. Shastri, ‘The Material Basis for Separatism: The Rural Eelam Movement in Sri Lanka’, Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.49, No.1 (1990) p.63 83 S. J. Tambiah, ‘Introduction’, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 49, No. 1. (1990), p.28 79

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

Lanka and in so doing has been a contributing factor in the violence in the North Eastern provinces, as it provided the impetus for the Tamil community’s mobilisation. Running parallel to the government’s programme of economic reconstruction of the ‘dry zone’, the state also initiated policies that would alter the ethnic demographic composition of higher education in favour of the Sinhalese majority.

Policy of Standardisation (Universities Act, 1971)

The Sri Lankan government’s policy of standardising the education system was the last major attempt to address what ht e Sinhalese perceived as Tamil ‘overrepresentation’. After 1970, the government sought to increase access for Sinhala students by introducing an entrance system under which the number admitted in each language group was proportionate to the number who had sat the exam. The effect of this policy was that Tamil speaking students had to get higher marks for university entrance than their Sinhala-speaking counterparts, and many who would have gained entrance under the previous system were denied university education altogether. The government’s programme of 'standardisation' was soon to change however and would be replaced in 1972 by a three tier admission policy “…based on a national merit of 30 per cent, a regional merit quota of 55 per cent and a special allocation to ‘backward districts’ of 13 per cent”84 to what was referred to as a ‘district quota system’.85 The aim of the ‘district quota’ scheme was “…to compensate for the fact that within each language constituency, certain groups had access to considerably better educational facilities.”86 The district quota system was to benefit disadvantaged students in rural areas, particularly, whatever their ethnic group. According Nissan87 the policy of educational standardisation would mainly benefit the rural Sinhalese, the Muslim community and the ‘east-coast Tamil’ students. However, Jaffna Tamils on the other 84

B. Matthews, ‘University Education in Sri Lanka in Context: Consequences of deteriorating standards’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 68, No.1 (1995) p.80 85 Concilation Resources, E. Nissan ‘Sri Lanka: Historical Context’, http://www.c-r.org/ourwork/accord/sri-lanka/historical-context.php (13 th March 2007) 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid.

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

hand would still have to perform better than others because of their higher overall educational attainment. As can be imagined, the government’s policy of standardising higher education would cause resentment in the northern territories, leading in some cases to anti-state protests. These in turn were strongly resisted by the state. The ‘policy of standardisation’ in higher education, as consequence of it favouring the Sinhalese community over the Tamils, would heighten the level of disillusionment and disenfranchisement felt by the Tamils. The policy of standardisation provided the impetus for the ‘radicalisation’ of Tamil politics,88 which with the formation if the Tamil New Tigers (later to become the LTTE) now took on a highly militant edge in order to force political change from the ‘centre’. In 1976, under the aegis of the newly formed Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), along with the LTTE, Tamil demands changed and were now in favour for a separate state. It can be argued that 1971 ‘University Act’ was the ‘straw on the camels’ back’ due to it providing the necessary ideological catalyst for the Tamil struggle.

The rise of Tamil separatism:

The change in the demands of the Tamil community and the subsequent move towards secessionist politics can be seen to be a response to nearly a quarter of a century of the government pursuing policies that aimed to marginalise the Tamil community and result in the collapse of negotiations between the two communities. The demand for regional autonomy would form the basis for Eelam89 (homeland) and the gradual rise in separatism amongst the youth would provide the backdrop for further ethnic polarisation, which would culminate in all out civil war in 1983. Initially the concept of “…‘Eelam’ amongst the Tamils was of empowerment and justice; not a territorial entity and an implacable commitment to secession.”90 The Tamil community’s demand for regional autonomy rests on the idea that the Tamils of Sri 88

A. K. David, [Book Review] ‘Conflict and Violence in South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka’, K.M de Silva [accessed from http://www.ices.lk/publications/esr/articles_jul00/ESR_2_Review.pdf p.251 on 12th March 2007) 89 Please see appendix two; map two for full details on the proposed Eelam 90 B. Shawm, ‘Peace: Sri Lanka’s Impossible Dream?’ in Conflict and Community in Contemporary Sri Lank: ‘Pearl of the East’ or ‘the Island of Tears?’, ed. S. Gamage & I.B Watson (London: Sage, 1999), p.11

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

Lanka comprise “…a separate and distinct nation, delimited by a common history, language and traditional homeland”.91 However, Tamil “…aspirations for independence or autonomy would collide with the tenacious stand of the Sinhalese”92 who felt that such a move would jeopardise the political stability of the country. This association the Tamils have towards a particular territory and the collective belief in a homeland for all Tamils distin guishes the Tamil community from other minority groups in Sri Lanka.93 Stokke and Ryntveit have argued that despite both Tamil and Sinhalese political elites using the concept of nationhood as if it were a “…natural phenomenon”, evidenced based research leads however to contrary conclusions.94 Drawing on the research of Hellmann-Rajanayagam,95 Stokke and Ryntveit have put forward the idea that such beliefs are relatively recent constructions. This can clearly be seen in the development of the Tamil collective consciousness, which developed in the later half of the ninetieth century, as a means of developing support against the British rule. The desire amongst Tamil leaders to create a homeland can be seen a consequence of the institutional decay within the state which in turn provided the catalyst for mobilisation of the minority. Between 1956 and 1972, the Tamil community under leadership of the Federal Party sought to achieve a federal structure that would accommodate their concerns while at the same time hoped to maintain cooperation with the Sinhalese.96 However the ethnic outbidding between the two main Sinhalese parties, the SLFP and the UNP over the issue of language during the post independence period effectively set in motion the entrenching of extreme, anti-Tamil views into the political system. As a result of the ethnic outbidding becoming entrenched in the political institutions of Sri Lanka, such an accommodative approach may amount to nothing and

Kearney ‘Territorial elements of Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka’, p.568 Ibid. 93 Kearney ‘Territorial elements of Tamil separatism’, p.576 94 K. Stokke and A. K. Ryntveit, ‘The Struggle for Tamil Eelam’, Growth and Change, Vol. 31 No. 2 (2000) p.290 95 D. Hellmann-Rajanayagam ‘The Politics of the Tamil Past’ in Sri Lanka: History and the roots of the conflict, (ed.) J. Spencer, London: Routledge, (1990) 96 Concilation Resources, E. Nissan ‘Sri Lanka: Historical Context’, http://www.c-r.org/ourwork/accord/sri-lanka/historical-context.php (13 th March 2007) 92

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

may quickly be dropped for political advantage. This u-turn of policy can be seen in the two major Tamil and Sinhalese pacts; the B-C and the S-C when as soon as it seemed that a institutional solution had been reached between the two communities, extreme Sinhalese politicians with the support of the Buddhist monks would claim that ‘Sri Lanka is in danger’93 thus ending Tamil engagement with the political process. The inability of the state to accommodate their demands would further enhance Tamil resentment towards the centre.

After successive rejection by the centre of these demands, the Tamils

attempted to push for a negotiated secession from the state. It was when these last negotiations failed that the method of achieving separatism changed. The various policies aimed at addressing ‘minority over-representation’ would indicate that the state was unable to treat the Tamils dispassionately. This lack of dispassion, along with the frequent attempts at ethnic outbidding, would weaken the institutional framework of the Sri Lankan polity to such an extent that institutional decay has set into the political structure. The two constitutions of the 1970s (the 1972 and 1978 constitutions) differed widely from the Soulbury Constitution. These constitutions were implemented without any prior discussion with the Tamil community; again, this highlighted amongst the Tamil youth in particular the ‘centre’s’ inability to seek political compromise and accommodation. The alienation felt by the Tamils would accelerate the level of institutional decay within the Sri Lankan polity. This institutional decay was exacerbated by the fact the Tamils were not consulted on the formation of the constitution, would rise what Chandra describes as a ‘control democracy,’94 which results in the institutions of state reflecting the concerns of the majority rather than the whole populous. One of the reasons why it was possible for the Sihalese elites to construct a ‘control democracy’ is the fact that the Sinhalese determine 80 per cent of parliamentary seats.95

The

overwhelming electoral dominance of this community would mean the UNP and the SLFP had no choice but to capitulate to their community’s demands at the expense of the Tamils if they wished to continue serving in government. 93

H. L. Senevirante, ‘Buddhist monks and ethnic politics: a war zone in a island paradise’, Anthropology Today, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2001) p.15 94 Chandra ? or DEVOTTA 95 Tamil Nation, Sinhalese Settlements and Forced Evictions of Tamils in the North-East Province http://www.tamilnation.org/forum/sachisrikantha/amirthalingam.htm (13th March 2007)

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

The ‘Ethnocratic’ Constitution of 1972

The first constitution enacted in the 1970s, was the 1972 ‘Republican Constitution’. This was enacted largely as a response to the uprising carried out by the Sinhalese Maoist Youth, the JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna).96 In 1971, the JVP launched a massive insurgency against Bandaranaike’s government seizing a number of areas in southern and central Sri Lanka, only to be defeated after successfully counterinsurgency campaign by the government. The JVP insurgency was largely in response to the government failing to provide enough employment opportunities, despite the fact that the centre has actively engaged in promoting the Sinhalese above the rest of the population. The JVP led insurgency against the ‘centre’ forced the government to reevaluate the state’s security needs, providing the political impetus for constitutional change. Under the new constitution, which Wickramasigne has argued was born out the ideological framework of the 1950s,97 the unitary state was affirmed as the only legitimate method of organising the state. This made it increasingly difficult for the regional councils to operate effectively, as the constitution still enabled the executive presidency and the parliament to dominate the political structure.

This gave the

impression that the councils were never intended to have any real political clout and as result the majority of Tamils began to see them as yet another example of broken promises, which initially stemmed from in the mid 1950s. As well as this the 1972 constitution removed the last remaining elements of the Soulbury Constitution when it abolished the clause that guaranteed minority groups protection.98 In additional, the constitution placed a special emphasis on the Buddhism within the Sri Lankan state. Despite the constitution reaffirming the position of the

See M. Moore, ‘Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka’ Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 27 No. 3 (1993) pp.593-642 and W.A. Warnapala, ‘The Marxist Parties of Sri Lanka and the 1971 insurrection’, Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No. 9 (1975) pp.745-757 for more information on the Sinhalese insurgency. 97 Wickramasinge, Sri Lanka in the Modern Age, p.183 98 B. Shawn, ‘Peace: Sri Lanka’s Impossible Dream?’ in Conflict and Community in Contemporary in Sri Lanka: ‘Pearl of the East’ or ‘Island of Tears’ ed. S. Gamage & I.B Watson (London: Sage, 1993), p.15

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

Sinhalese culture, the Tamil language was finally recognised as a national language and was to be giving the same legal protection Sinhala had. However, despite the moves to address language issue, the new constitution was effectively to the advantage of the Sinhalese as it cemented their position within society. The special place conferred on Buddhism at the expense of the country’s other religions, especially Hinduism, would provide another symbolic blow to the Tamil community. The remove of minority protection and illiberal framework that this constitution created would develop into what DeVotta refers to as an ‘ethnocracy’99 and would highlight the vulnerabilities of the Tamils. Pfaffenberger, has argued that the 1972 constitution aimed at making a ‘masterslave’ relationship between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, where the Tamil community would effectively become subservient to the wishes of the majority.100 This was to be achieved by denying the Tamils access to vital resources that would enable their culture and their hopes of a homeland to develop. As well as this, the constitution also renamed the country from ‘Ceylon’ to Sri Lanka symbolising the severing of links with Britain. In addition the constitution also “…created a weak president appointed by the prime minister.”101 In addition to the host of political reforms carried out by the government of Bandaraike, which would restrict the emancipation of the Tamils pushing them further towards the idea of ‘Eelam’, the government also implemented a number of economic measures that aimed to transform the country’s economic structure. Under Bandaraike, the government also embarked on a radical programme of nationalisation, that would be see whole tea and rubber plantations and other private industries under state control.102 The economic programme as with most of the policies carried out by the Sinhalese benefited the ethnic majority at the expense of the minority. In addition to the constitutional changes of the early 1970s, a massive programme of nationalisation was carried out by the government of Bandaraike. This economic reconstruction aimed at providing a basis for which the poor Sinhalese could 99

DeVotta ‘ethnocracy’ Pfaffenberger, ‘The Cultural Dimensions of Tamil Separatism’, p.1147 101 United States Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm (18th January 2007). 102 Ibid. 100

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

prosper. However, this structural change to Sri Lanka’s economy would economically disenfranchise the Tamils who were already bearing the brunt of political marginalisation from the centre. Six years later however, Sri Lanka would move away from its socialist orientation and open up its economy to foreign investment.103 Aberyratne has suggested that the trade liberalisation programmes initiate under the UNP were implemented too late to “…neutralise the fertile ground of political conflict.” 104 Aberyratne has gone further in suggesting that had the marketisation of the economy occurred in the early 1970s, during the period he refers to as the “transition from the import substitution regime”105 Sri Lanka may have avoided the ethnic conflict although as it would have enabled the possibility of greater social mobility, especially amongst the Sinhalese. The UNP, under J.R. Jayewardene, returned to power in 1977. The Jayewardene government opened the economy and, in 1978, introduced a new constitution based on the French model, a key element of which was the creation of a strong executive presidency. As well as change the political structure at the apex of the Sri Lankan polity, the UNP also implemented a number of electoral reforms, which aimed to encourage both ethnic moderation and integration. The amendments of the electoral system also sought to address the ethnic outbidding that had plagued the country since the mid 1950s. However, the electoral reforms would take nearly a decade for any affect to be noticed.

103

Ibid. S. Abeyratne, ‘Economic Roots of Political Conflict: The Case of Sri Lanka’, World Economy, Vol. 27, No. 8 (2004), p.1311 pp 1295-1314 105 Ibid. 104

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

The ‘Presidential’ Constitution of 1978

The communal riots of 1977 showed that the ‘republican constitution’ was unable to provide the necessary political structure to guarantee political stability. This created the need for political reform under the UNP. Equally, the increase in the presence of the TULF (Tamil Unified Liberation Front) meant that ‘centre’ faced not an ideological opposition but an ‘ethnic opposition’. Kearney has suggested the Tamil community’s political endorsement of the TULF in this election can be viewed as an acceptance to the organisation’s mandate to seek a separate state for the Tamils, which as Kearney points out was strongest in the north-east, where the Tamils are in a majority.106 Although, there had previously been a sizable Tamil bloc within the legislature in the post independence settlement this would be one of the few times that the Tamils were incorporated into government (although the cabinet roles which were assigned would be fairly insignificant). This political development was highly significant within the Tamil community, as the emergence of TULF would replace the Tamil Federal party as the main voice of the Tamils. The electoral success of the TULF meant that for the first time the Tamils had a strong voice in the legislature and would enable them to apply pressure on the government to accommodate their concerns. At first the 1978 ‘presidential’ constitution appeared to offer substantial concessions to the Tamil community.

Under this

constitution, language and citizenship went through a process of “…liberalisation”107 in order to try and ease the communal tension that had been growing since independence in the vain hope that a negotiated settlement could be reached. The acceptance of Tamil as a ‘national language’ of Sri Lanka provided the constitutional framework to allow Tamils to be taught and educated in their native language. Despite the move to make Tamil a national language alongside Sinhala, Oberst has argued that no specific criteria concerning the rights of the Tamil language were

106

Kearney, ‘The Territorial Elements of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka’, p.571 W.A. Wiswa Warnapala, ‘Sri Lanka 1978: Reversal of policies and strategies’, Asian Survey: a survey of Asia in 1978: Part 11, Vol. 19, No.2, (1979), p.180. 107

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

established.108 In addition the incorporation of Tamil as a national language would not challenge the dominance of the majority language. However, the growing insurgency in the northeastern region of Sri Lanka suggested that Tamil grievances had now gone beyond that of language. Equally, the ignoring of this insurgency meant that the centre had failed to accommodate the growing demands of political power. Extremists within the Sinhalese community, supported by Buddhist monks had argued that any move away from the unitary structure of the state could bring about the total dismemberment of Sri Lanka as a political unit. The fear that any from of decentralisation would weaken the stability of the country hindered the government’s attempts to pacify the north and east, thus fuelling the insurgents’ demands. In addition to these accommodative measures the constitution radically altered the political structure of the state. The ‘presidential’ constitution, so called as it moved the Sri Lankan state from a parliamentary model to an ‘executive presidency’ was modelled on France’s Gaullist constitution. The political structure was widely regarded as the panacea that would ensure stability through executive strength and political centralisation. The idea that stability can only occur with a strong political executive follows the traditions of the ancient Sinhalese monarchy.109 The constitution also gave way for an informal political centralisation of the state within the ruling UNP. One of the effects the change of the constitution has had on Sri Lanka has been the concentration of political power in the hands of small, plutocratic elite of cabinet ministers who have built up an extensive network of patronage.110 This in turn has resulted in members of the government pursuing and encouraging policies of ‘rational self-interest’ in order to maintain their own political and economic position within the state at the expense of minority groups. This rational preservation of self-interest enabled the institutional decay to develop further into the Sri Lankan state, as the apparatus of state was being subverted for individualistic purposes. The new constitution also changed the electoral system, moving it from a majoritarian democracy that allowed it to be dominated by one particular ethnic group to an electoral system that offered greater proportional representation for minority groups. 108

Oberst, ‘Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’, p.183 Warnapala, ‘Sri Lanka: 1978’, p.179. 110 Moore, p.358 109

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

The change to the law also removed the possibility of “…landslide victories by the two major parties and eradicated disparities between the percentage of votes a party polled and the number of parliamentary seats won.”111 However, despite the structural changes the new constitution was create (especially with regard to minority representation), these changes according to DeVotta would ensure that the United National Party (UNP) (headed by Jayewardene) would become the dominant party within the state.112 Equally, despite the supposedly accommodative nature of the new constitution towards the minority, Tamil leaders were not consulted in the drafting or implementation of the constitution. This was despite the fact that there was an almost total collapse of the state in the north eastern provinces due in part to the growing insurgency. While the Tamils were given regional councils, which went some way to address the demands made by moderate Tamils, the general feeling within the Tamil community was for greater autonomy than what was being offered by the ‘centre’. Consequently, this aversion by the political elites to devolution would galvanise Tamil hostility and mobilisation against the centre. DeVotta has suggested that the aversion to fully accommodating Tamil demands stems from the fact that policies initiated by the UNP were initiated “…to satisfy [Jawewardene’s] megalomaniac ambitions”113 and thus any change to the institutional structure of the state, while perhaps having the effect of bolstering the position of the minority groups were in fact carried out to “decimate”114 political opposition to the UNP. Faced with a growing rebellion in the north, which, despite the measures the government had taken, showed no sign of abating, the government in 1979 enacted the ‘Prevention of Terrorism Act’ (PTA). This legislation allowed the police and security forces to arrest and detain anyone (without trial) they considered to be a threat to national security.

The suspension of habeas corpus and the arbitrary nature of the act would

propel the Tamil youth further into political periphery of the state, as well as this the PTA “…formalised the language of terrorism and…conflated terrorism with the Tamil 111

DeVotta, ‘Control Democracy’, pp.67-68 DeVotta, ‘From ethnic outbidding to ethnic conflict’, p.153 113 Ibid. p.153 114 Ibid. 112

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

political project in Sri Lankan political discourse.”115 While the PTA was initially aimed at all anti-state disturbances, regardless of ethnicity, it was however actively used against the Tamil community. The increased use of the PTA throughout the early 1980s and the alienation that this would cause to the Tamil community would give rise to one of the worst acts of communal violence since the anti-Tamil riots of the 1950s. Frustrated by the lack of political opportunities and broken promises by the government, the LTTE initiated a massive attack in the Northern part of the country in attempt to lay the foundations for their ‘quest for Eelam’. This attack resulted in the killing of thirteen military personal and would finally push the Sri Lankan polity into civil war. The anti-Tamil riots of 1983 showed that not a single institution of state was able or willing to treat the Tamils equally and dispassionately. This further deepened the level of ‘institutional decay’ within the state as the country was incapable of living up it obligations to protect its minority citizenry. The institutional breakdown and decay of the Sri Lankan state was visibly seen in the actions of the state’s security forces during the 1983 riots. The conduct of the security personnel during these riots (or pogrom from the Tamil perspective) was in stark contrast to the impartiality and professionalism the forces had shown during the first communal riots of the 1950s. During the riots that occurred in the 1970s the security forces either aided or abetted the riots or were slow to respond to the plight of the Tamils.116 In the riots of 1983 the security forces were either observers or willing participants to the violence. The 1983 riots would finally make clear to the Tamil community that the state was unable or willing to accommodate their grievances. The 1983 riots would provide even more support the to LTTE insurgency campaign. The event of July 1983 commonly referred to amongst the Tamil community, as ‘Black July’117 would push Sri Lanka into a bloody, protracted civil war between the two main indigenous groups, that at present sees no sign of ending.

The Sri Lankan civil war has gone through three distinct phrases

115

S. Nadarajah & D. Sriskandarajan‚ ‘Liberation struggle or terrorism? The politics of naming the LTTE’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1, p.89 116 117

Ilankai Tamail Sangam: Association of Tamils of Sri Lanka in the USA, Black July 1983 http://sangam.org/taraki/articles/2006/07-10_Black_July.php?uid=1829 (5 th February 2007)

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

since its conception in 1983. The civil war has been a major facet in the developing and spread of ‘ethnic outbidding’ as it encourages the parties in power to offer away out of the quagmire only to eventually make a u-turn over the policy when the opposition cries ‘Sinhala in danger’. Since 1987, with the signing of the Indo-Lanka accord there have been a number of attempts to end the conflict, yet all negotiations to date have collapsed. One of the difficulties in making the peace-process last in Sri Lanka has been addressing the concerns the Sinhalese community has that any negotiated settlement with the LTTE would be regarded as a ‘betrayal of the motherland’.113 Schneckener and Wolff114 have suggested that there is an element of ‘bounded rationality’ between the government and the LTTE, as both groups have come to depend upon the conflict as a means of political survival. Consequently, the “…failure to end the war therefore refle cts the perverse rationality of immediate gains”115 which explains why the war has become highly intractable seeing no sign of ending.

113

C. Orjuela, ‘Civil Society in Civil War: The Case of Sri Lanka’, in Civil Wars (special issue) Vol. No. 2, ed. A. Bullion (Routledge, 2005), p.122 114 U. Schneckner & S. Wolff, (eds) Managing and settling ethnic conflicts: perspectives on successes and failures in Europe, Africa and Asia, London: Hurst & Company, 2004, pp.109 - 110 115 Ibid.

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

Analysis and Conclusions Sri Lanka’s post-colonial politics have, according to Stokke,116 been characterised by three different kinds of political alliances, ethnic class alliances, political-patron client networks and finally by strategic governmental alliances. In the early period of Sri Lanka’s history the different alliances helped to create a certain level of political participation. However, “…the neglect of the material and discursive politics of the ethnic class alliance…”117 would undermine the structure of the Sri Lankan polity leading to the radicalisation of the Tamil demands. The ethnic outbidding between the two Sinhalese political parties (UNP and SLFP) have resulted in a protracted conflict, which has over the past twenty-five years weakened the fabric of democracy to such an extent that it has been reduced to a ‘hollow shell.’121 In the mid 1950s, Sri Lanka’s political elites resorted to ethnic outbidding as a means of achieving political power and in so doing the island’s Tamils have been systematically marginalised and disfranchised from the political process. Over the years that would follow, Tamil resentment at their exclusion from the country’s political process would give rise to a mobilisation that would ultimately develop in the mid 1970s into a full scale insurgency movement which would challenge the essence of Sri Lanka’s unitary existence. It can be argued that the path towards ‘ethnic outbidding’ was already sown in the country’s pre-independence constitution, which although provided a liberal framework it did not explicitly guarantee the protection of minority groups.

Had the Soulbery

Constitution enshrined the protection of minority groups into law it would have provided a potential barrier to the emergence both of linguistic natio nalism and the ethnic outbidding that would develop alongside it. Synder cited in DeVotta has noted that the rise of ethnic nationalism occurs when the institutions of state fail to meet either the basic

116

K. Stokke ‘Sinhalese and Tamil Nationalism as Post Colonial Political Projects from ‘Above’: 1948 – 1983, Political Geography, Vol. 17, No. 1, (1998), p.83 117 Ibid. 121 DeVotta, ‘Illiberalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 11 No. 1 (2002), p.84

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

needs of the people or when there ceases to be any alternative structures which can counteract the growing use of ethnicity for political gain.122 In addition to the constitution, the electoral system has also lent itself to the practice of outbidding as it “…encouraged inter party competition by combining proportional and party list voting.”123 Consequently, this meant that the issue of ethnicity became highly politicised by the majority ethnic group. Shastri has argued, however, that the various electoral changes, which were implementing following the enactment of the 1978 Constitution, have resulted in a greater inclusion of ethnic minorities and interethnic cooperation124. In addition to this Shastri has suggested that since the 1990s, there has been a gradual increase in the number of ethnic minorities represented in government. However, Shastri makes the points out while the electoral reforms have granted at least a nominal increase in the number of ethnic minorities, the reforms have at the same level “…increased both the potential instability in the political system and the political fragmentation of ethnic minorities.”125

Instability in the political system has developed

even further due to the reforms creating a “…more fluid, and unpredictable…system which has augmented short term calculations.”126 The outbidding, which initially was targeted at the island’s Tamil community, has now become so entrenched that it has affected the development of a strong political and civil culture from developing. The decisions made by the elites both at the preindependence stage and during the post-colonial period have contributed to the state’s institutional decay as result of the elites failing to treat the minority community dispassionately. This institutional decay has been the consequence of the “…dialectic position between ethnic outbidding and majority rule.”127 Sri Lanka’s post-colonial development has shown that while democracy offers the requisite structural mechanism to promote ethnic accommodation, electoral politics can create a situation which “…encourages opportunistic elites to exploit”128 particular 122

DeVotta, ‘From ethnic outbidding to ethnic conflict’, p.142 DeVotta ‘Illiberalism and ethnic conflict in sri lanka’ 124 A. Shastri ‘Channelling ethnicity through electoral reform in Sri Lanka’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2005) p.34 125 Shastri ‘Channelling ethnicity through electoral reform in Sri Lanka’, p.57 126 Ibid. 127 DeVotta, ‘From ethnic outbidding’, p.141 128 DeVotta, ‘Illiberalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’ p.97 123

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

cleavages. The story of Sri Lanka is thus a warning over the use of ethnicity by political elites for short-sighted political gain. The various methods the Sinhalese implemented in order to counteract their ‘minority fears’ has provided the institutional framework which has seen not only seen the Tamils marginalised from the ‘centre’ but has provided the insurgency movements with a rationale for succession. In short, the very methods which sought to ‘protect’ the territorial and religious integrity of Sri Lanka have been the very catalyst for Tamil mobilisation; a mobilisation which has sought to disentangle the Tamil community from Columbo. In addition, the experience of Sri Lanka has also shown that the practice of “…outbidding and ethnocentrism can become both embedded”129 into the political culture of the state and path dependent making it practically impossible to address the fundamental grievances of the Tamil community without a complete overhaul of the state’s existing political infrastructure. As Wood eloquently puts it “…the future success of democracy in Sri Lanka will depend on the ability of the government to create and ensure a new institutional structure that will devolve significant powers to the Tamil communities.”130 Sri Lanka’s inability to treat and accommodate its minority community dispassionately especially with regard to linguistic plurality was the opposite to the integrative stance of Nehru. Under Nehru, India which is more linguistically and religiously fragmented than Sri Lanka, was able to craft regional minorities into two ways. First, the states were reorganised along linguistic lines. This would ensure that minority languages were granted protection. It is interesting to note that the linguistic reorganisation of India occurred during the same time Sri Lankan elites attempt to unify Sri Lanka around a single language. Had the Sinhalese shown the same level of foresight as their Indian counterparts future ethnic rivalry could have been prevented in Sri Lanka. The second initiative the Indian elites implemented was changing the political structure of India to that of federalism. The federal structure enabled power to be essentially diffused throughout the state thus limiting the power of the state to the benefit of the state regions. This in turn

129 130

DeVotta, ‘From ethnic outbidding to ethnic conflict’, p.154 A. T. Wood, Asian Democracy, p.101

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

strengthened the previous commitment to the recognition of minority languages as it gave minority groups greater control over their respective states. Sri Lanka in contrast would maintain its commitment to the principle of a unitary state. This rise in Tamil mobilisation can thus been seen as a direct consequence of the state’s institutional decay. This mobilisation has developed along side the majority community’s desire to see Sinhala and Buddhism take a prominent role in the civic life of Sri Lanka. The desire by the Sinhalese political elite to rekindle the hegemonic status of their culture through enacting various pieces of legislation that enabled Sinhala to become the dominant and official of Sri Lanka gave rise to a ethnic polarisation of the two communities. Consequently, the move by the Sinhalese community to enact such laws provided an outlet which would challenge the very fabric of Sri Lanka’s unitary existence, thus the institutional choices made during the post-independence period have been instrumental in setting in motion Sri Lanka’s path towards intra-state violence. The experience of Sri Lanka has shown that a political structure that encourages polyethnic coalitions is most likely to elicit ethnic coexistence, while one that encourages centrifugal competition between ethnic parties of the same community would likely engender ethnic outbidding. The case of Sri Lanka also shows that past decisions matter and that a particular path once chosen (although not impossible) is difficult to adjust. This can readily been seen in the attempts by the SLFP and the UNP to try and accommodate the Tamils and promote a degree of harmony but due to the pressures exerted from the institutions and from their own communities such measures were unable to bear fruit. Consequently, the inability of both Sinhalese parties to adjust the institutional framework so that it would be more accommodating to the Tamils shows that “…institutions can lack malleability once their policies become embedded in the state.”131 Every successive policy made by the Sinhalese that bolstered their own community’s position has merely re-emphasised both Tamil marginalisation and exacerbated the institutional decay of that state132 and in doing so has polarised the two

131 132

DeVotta, ‘From ethnic outbidding’, p.147 Ibid. p.155

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

communities further apart to such an extent that reconciliation between the two ethnic groups appears at present to be a distant dream. This paper has shown that institutional design of a country, and choices which are made to achieve the design, are highly important for the stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s political development. This is especially the case in multinational states where different ethnic groups seek to position themselves in such away so as to gain greater political and o economic influence. While the primary focus of this paper has been on the institutional choices made by political elites of Sri Lanka much of what has been research can be applied to a wide selection of countries.

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

Appendix One: map showing the ‘colonisation’ of the north-eastern provinces of Sri Lanka133

133

Map reproduced from: Tamil Nation ‘Tamil National Forum’ [accessed from http://www.tamilnation.org/images/forum/manogaran1.jpg 13 th April, 2007]

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

Appendix Two: Map showing the proposed ‘Tamil Eelam’134 Shaded areas denote the area of Sri Lanka which as been proposed as a homeland for the Tamils

134

Map reproduced from R.C. Oberst, ‘Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka’, Journal of Federalism p.185

Institutional Choices and Ethnic Conflict: a case study of Sri Lanka

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