DANGEROUS WATERS
robust military with a willingness to assert territorial claims in the East China and South China Sea have given Abe a further rationale for Japan becoming a normal nation and getting rid of the shackles that people like him feel have been imposed by the US ever since the end of World War Two." But it appears as if Japan is overstepping the mark in its efforts to reassert its dominance on the international scene and making unnecessary moves that cause further tension within the region. It is hard to rationalize any visit to a shrine memorializing war criminals, and it is even more confusing when one realizes that in doing so at the end of 2013 Abe angered Japan's biggest ally, the U.S. It is understood that the American government had strongly urged Abe not to make such a visit via diplomatic back-channels. After all, some of those memorialized by the Yasukuni shrine took part in the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Despite America's best efforts, Abe continued with his decision to make the visit, much to America's, South Korea's and China's chagrin. Yul Sohn, Professor of International and Japanese Political Economy at Yonsei University in Seoul told CRI that by visiting Yasukuni, Abe hit virtually all of his targets for his first year term. "(It) started with the economic policy, the socalled Abenomics to stimulate the economy. He (ran) a successful campaign for the upper house election in the summer (of 2013), followed by the military expansion plan approved domestically and internationally, with the US. And he also introduced a consumption tax increase. All these are major decisions. And finally, Yasukuni; it is a culmination point of the first year of major decisions he's made. In that sense, the visit was planned and politically calculated." Yet there appears to be another aspect to the apparent rightward
slide which suggests that it could have been prevented if China and South Korea had pushed harder to achieve high-level meetings. Zhang Weiwei, Assistant Research Fellow of the Department for AsiaPacific Security and Cooperation Studies at the China Institute of International Studies believes that Abe's shift to the right is as much a result of frustration as it is political belief. Zhang explains, "Japan's relations with both China and South Korea have been stuck for one or two years, or even three years. So, even though Shinzo Abe has this strong, personal, political belief, he didn't visit the Yasukuni shrine earlier. He said he would like to open talks and meet personally with the high leaders of China and South Korea. However, there is no sign that this kind of summit meeting would ever (be) realized." In explaining Abe's choice to visit the shrine, Zhang believes that Abe is "impatient with the scenario of improvement with China and South Korea. He thinks that the visit will cost him very little in terms of diplomatic relations because the two bilateral relations have already (come to a complete stop). So, I think that is another political calculation, because he thinks it can't get worse." Meanwhile, Zhang Baohui posits another theory, suggesting that the visit reflects Abe's nationalist identity in that "he wants to take off the shackles imposed on him by the US ever since 1945." In the context of the US urging Abe not to visit the shrine behind the scenes, Zhang Baohui notes, "I think (the visit was) actually directed against the US rather than China or South Korea. It's not a historical related behavior, it's a foreign policy behavior and the target is actually America." Whether Abe is pursuing normal nation status, hitting political
targets, opposing the US, or simply working under the assumption that things can't get any worse, the net result is that the general public in both China and South Korea is becoming angrier with Japan's actions and rhetoric. But while visits to the Yasukuni Shrine always prompt public outrage from Japan's neighbors, it is the Liberal Democratic Party's efforts to change the country's post-war pacifist constitution that are truly worrying. Regardless of public sentiment in China, or how the media portrays the words of Japan's politicians, the notion of constitutional amendment is not a popular one among the Japanese general public. As Zhang Weiwei notes, "the Japanese populace are still very supportive of the constitution of Japan, as they think the constitution has brought Japan all these years of peace and prosperity." Furthermore, Abe was not elected as a result of his foreign policy beliefs, but rather because of his liberal economic policies. His credibility therefore, relies on the success of traditional liberal economics. Should the economy stagnate, and as the tax hike takes effect at the start of April, Abe may begin to lose credibility. An urge to fall back on foreign policy in order to bolster his legitimacy could lead to dangerous political maneuvering given the fact that Abe traditionally speaks for a highly conservative element within the country. In attempting to redefine the post-war constitution and outline Japan's so-called right for collective defense, Abe would give Japan the power to engage in military scenarios far beyond its own borders. Such a thought truly worries China and South Korea, especially given the fact that leading figures within Japan still openly deny the country's aggressive past. 21