Banana by daud jimale

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Somalia

BANANA SECTOR STUDY FOR SOMALIA STRATEGY FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND DIVERSIFICATION IN LOWER SHABELLE 2002/34474 Version 1

Revised Final Report

November 2003

EURATA European Union Rural&Agriculture Temporary Association

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Somalia

BANANA SECTOR STUDY FOR SOMALIA STRATEGY FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND DIVERSIFICATION IN LOWER SHABELLE

2002/34474 Version 1

EURATA Experts: Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko This report was prepared with financial assistance from the Commission of the European Communities. The views expressed are those of the consultant and do not necessarily represent any official view of the Commission.

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Table of Contents 0

Executive summary ............................................ Error! Bookmark not defined.

Introduction ........................................................................................................ 5

2 Irrigation System Rehabilitation and Agriculture Improvement Project ......................................................................................................................... 7

2.1Project Area

2.2Crop-Diversification versus Recovery of Banana industry

2.3Overall Objective and Purpose of the Project

The Parameters of the Strategy....................................................................10 3.1 Socio-Economic Environment

3.2Problems

3.3Opportunities

3.4Principles of Implementation

3.5Implementation under public authority?

The Elements of the Project...........................................................................16 4.1The project area

4.2Rehabilitation and Maintenance of the Irrigation systems in Former Banana Growing Areas 17 4.3Agricultural Development and Diversification in the Former Banana Growing Areas 21 4.4Marketing of agricultural produce in the Former Banana Growing Areas 23 4.5 Capacity building and training of water-user institutions, communities and farmers 25

Economic and financial considerations .......................................................27 5.1Project costs

5.2Project returns

5.3Sustainability of the project results

5.4Viability of the project results

Implementation of the Project......................................................................31 6.1Methodology of Implementation

6.2Implementing Partners

6.3Project Assistance, Capacity Building and Supervision Unit (PACSU) 33 6.4Monitoring and Evaluation

7 Logical Framework – Development of a Diversified Agriculture in Lower Shabelle ........................................................................................................35

EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

ANNEXES: Annex 1 Preliminary Assessment and Strategic Options Report

Annex 2 Rehabilitation and Management of the Irrigation System on Lower Shabelle

Annex 3 Agricultural Development and Diversification Strategy in Lower Shabelle

104

Annex 4 Marketing Study in the Lower Shabelle Region

141

Annex 5 Persons Met and Documents Used

EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

157

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Chapter 0 Executive summary Somalia, as an ACP member, receives support under the Special Framework of Assistance for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Banana (SFA Banana)1 special Assistance for ACP Banana suppliers. During the period February to June 2003, a Banana Sector Study was carried out in two phases, examining the possibilities of Somalia’s banana industry to return successfully to the international market. If this does seem not feasible, the study should then examine what alternative development strategy would be recommendable for the former main banana growing areas. The prospects for the revival of an internationally competitive banana sector are extremely limited at present. The main reason therefore is the prevailing uncertainty regarding the future development of political stability, safety, socio-economic environment, infrastructure, etc. in Somalia The rehabilitation of the banana sector requires a more sophisticated market environment, with reliable market chains for the domestic and international markets. Therefore the study team recommends to focus - for the short- and medium term – on diversification and to adopt a wider and more general policy for the irrigable banana areas. The aim will be the rehabilitation of the progressively declining irrigation system combined with the intensification of the traditional food and cash crop production, including perennial crops for domestic consumption and extension of the national food supply basis. During Phase II of the study, the experts carefully examined the conditions under which rehabilitation could be realized in the former main banana growing areas. The field assessments by the study-team were confined to the area of Lower Shabelle, which represents about 90 % of the former banana growing areas of Somalia, since the security situation and the absence of adequate logistic facilities did not allow field investigations in Middle Shabelle and Lower Juba as well. The present report describes the rationale and the elements of the proposed Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle. However, Lower Shabelle has been found representative for all Somali banana growing areas in economic, technical and social aspects relevant to future rehabilitation and development strategies. Investigations in the field and information gathered in Somalia and Nairobi did not indicate any particular fact or element that would invalidate the application of the proposed methodology in Middle Shabelle and Lower Juba areas. The overall objective of the intervention is to increase household incomes for farming families through improved agricultural production. The benefit of the project is to provide equitable access to the use of irrigation opportunities for all farmers in the project area and enable user organisations to operate and maintain the system appropriately. In the context of aid policy, the project intends to initiate the transition from mainly relieforiented activities to more consistent and effective development oriented operations, resulting in sustainable and viable improvements for the rural population. After a decade of extreme centralisation during the 1980’s, there was a void of law and order. This led to an increase in conflicts and insecurity perpetuated an attitude of “wait and see” and dependency. 1

Council Regulation (EC) No 856/1999

EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

The main opportunity of the project consists in the high natural potential of the irrigation system, although in disrepair and progressing degradation. It is the major tool for the improvement of livelihood and growth of welfare for a great number of farming households in the region. The rehabilitation of the system aims to restore the (lowest acceptable) level of functionality, allowing the extension of irrigated crop production and to prevent further degradation. In principle there are two basic scenarios under which the project could be implemented. The first Scenario would be to assume the prevalence of the actual Status Quo. The second one could be characterised by assuming the gradual implementation of an operational national authority with a stepwise establishing of the regional and local administration. Experiences from other countries proof that the establishing of a functional national administration and the subsequent set up of regional and local authorities might most certainly not be finished during the lifetime of the proposed project. Therefore the project approach is formulated in a way allowing for the flexible incorporation of any emerging local or regional authority and the objectives and operations of the proposed strategy are limited to those which are firmly believed to be achievable in the given social, physical and economic environment. The results, although moderate, should directly benefit the largest number of stakeholders and those stakeholders have to show firm commitment and active cooperation in the operation and maintenance of the restored structures. The implementation of the project is conceived as an essentially stakeholder- driven process, largely independent of the assistance/ participation of public authorities, but in need of massive external support in finance and technical assistance in the field. The three core elements of the project are: rehabilitation of the irrigation structures, development of agricultural production and the enablement of stake-holder organisations to operate and maintain the restored system appropriately. The project would be carried out during the 5-year period 2004-2009. The overall project coordination would be with the EC–Somali Unit. The technical assistance component is provided at two levels: (a) by selected international Consulting Companies for the operation of (PACSU), the special unit for project assistance, coordination, supervision and capacity building and (b) by international NGOs or UN agencies for project-implementation on the ground in collaboration with local partners and contractors. The basic rehabilitation works comprise repair and excavations on four main barrages, the excavation and reshaping of 349 km of canals, the repair of 112 cross regulators and 1546 tertiary and direct intakes. The cost of contractual works is at USD 3.9 million. The agricultural components of the development of the project are, in combination with the increased acreage under irrigation, to introduce better maize varieties, control of the stalk borer and the continuation of crop trials. The projected results of the agricultural improvements are: •

As a result of rehabilitating the irrigation system the area of irrigated maize could increase from the present 11,200 ha to 32,091 ha, and the area of irrigated sesame could increase from 5,280 ha to 15,128 ha.

•

EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

•

Sesame production could increase from 8,844 m/t to 13,276 m/t as a result of irrigation rehabilitation.

Based on the above production figures, the value of production after implementing the project is estimated to rise from USD 8.5 million at current levels, to USD 12.8 million after rehabilitation of the irrigation system and to USD 14.0 million with the additional benefits of maize stalk borer control. The potential financial benefits from all interventions would therefore be USD 5.5 million per annum. The third pillar of the project is capacity building and training for water-users organisations and farmers. The successful completion of this component is considered the largest guarantee for the sustainability. The economic and financial evaluation of the project effects must be kept at the level of very high aggregation. Estimates and plausibility-assessment suggest high positive margins at the level of farm households and farming communities, reflecting viability and promising sustainability of the achievements. In this particular human and political environment in the project zone, the methodology of implementation is a crucial factor of success. The used approach relies on previous experiences in Somalia and the application of confirmed development tools used in self-help type of interventions (PRA) in development, adequate for essentially stakeholder–driven activities. This implementation strategy harbours however a dilemma, since the effective execution of physical rehabilitation works claims for a more operations-driven procedure. To find the right balance of both principles presents a major challenge for the implementing partners. The size of the project requires the participation of more than one implementing partner. The selected agencies would work side by side in distinctive geographical zones, but operating independently with the same set of terms and tasks. Given the prevailing conditions, the project may appear ambitious and its execution challenging for all partners involved. There must be an enforced ability and capacity to cope with unpredictable incidents and a great flexibility in eventual adjustments during the entire project cycle. In order to establish this coping capability for the present, but also for future agricultural projects in Somalia, it is recommended to establish a small but efficient Project Assistance, Capacity Building and Supervision Unit (PACSU), located in Nairobi but prepared to be moved to Somalia, once a formal government will be in place. PACSU would be active and responsible towards the EC Somalia Unit Nairobi in the following main areas: 1. PACSU translates development concepts and strategies into action. It evaluates project initiatives and organises the required procedures for the launch of new or the extension of existing (development) interventions in agriculture and rural areas, funded by EC. 2. PACSU will act as partner unit for the provision of advisory support and technical assistance to emerging Somali public and private institutions in the agricultural sector, once a new government is in place and takes over regulatory functions. 3. PACSU carries out all tasks of project supervision including control of progress of work and field performance of implementing partners and EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

develops adequate indicators and procedures. PACSU analyses and follows–up major deviations in the execution of operations and prepares adequate solutions to the problems encountered; it identifies need for conceptual amendments and assists in fine-tuning of the procedures. PACSU comments on quarterly reports and carries out checks in the field. 4. PACSU will act as moderator in conflicting situations in the field in order to minimise the exposure of the individuals or the agencies engaged in project execution. 5. PACSU will facilitate capacity building, particularly in the case of the emergence of a functional administration / counterpart institution. The project should be subject to the normal monitoring and evaluation procedures, carried out by independent institutions or individuals. A mid-term review, including the evaluation of PACSU and the implementing partners should preferably take place in the course of year 3 of the project, prior to the dates or contract renewals.

EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Chapter 1 Introduction Country Background Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world: most Somalis live way below the poverty line and the country has the lowest adult literacy rate and the highest infant mortality rate in the region. Somalia does not possess significant mineral resources (although oil prospecting in the 80s gave some encouraging results), and the aquatic wealth, considered of high potential, is not exploited to benefit the population. The vast majority of the Somali people depend on livestock, farming or a combination of both and have very limited access to social services including health and education. The natural ingenuity of Somalis has produced a thriving service sector that provides some degree of income and jobs for part of the urban population. Remittances from abroad, estimated at US$ 400-600 million per year, also provide vital funds for the fragile economy. Since the outbreak of civil war in the early 1990s, Somalia’s productive assets have suffered massive losses and economic infrastructures have generally collapsed. Today, most of the country is plagued with structural food insecurity, internal displacement is widespread, and development has virtually ground to a halt. Somalia has been without an internationally recognised government since the fall of Siad Barre's regime in 1991 and the subsequent disintegration of the country into clan centred fiefs. With the exception of Somaliland (former British Somaliland) which, after years of civil war against Siad Barre's Somalia, declared unilaterally its independence in 1991 and gained relative stability, the Somali political situation is characterised by regular armed clashes. Islamic “Sharia” law has been introduced in certain areas to promote law and order alongside traditional systems of jurisdiction which do not prevent illegal trafficking and similar activities from flourishing. Furthermore, given the progressive involvement of Ethiopia and the Arab countries in the conflict through local allies, Somali anarchy now has a regional destabilising effect. DG- Development assesses that without continuous international pressure, the Somali factions and their established interests will not easily come to a consolidated peace agreement.2 Setting and purpose of the study Somalia, as an ACP member country and (former) supplier of banana to the EU is eligible to receive support, especially for the banana sector, under the Special Framework of Assistance for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Banana (SFA Banana); Council Regulation (EC) 856/1999.,. While in 1999 and 2000 Somalia did not apply for funding under SFA Banana, the respective allocations for 2001 to 2004 will be used for development-oriented rehabilitation operations in Somalia’s former banana growing areas in the Shabelle and Juba floodplains. SFA Banana funded operations in Somalia are integrated in the EU-Special Aid to Somalia 2002-2007 and will be implemented under the responsibility of the EU-Headquarter. During the period February to June 2003, a Banana Sector Study was carried out in two phases in the Lower Shabelle region, Somalia’s former main banana growing area. Phase I 2

Compare: European Commission - Directorate Development: EU Relations with Somalia http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/country/country_home_en.cfm?cid=so&lng=en&sta tus=new EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko â&#x20AC;&#x201C; November 2003

dealt with the assessment of the potential of the Somali banana industry to return to an internationally competitive level, but realistic chances and a sustainable feasibility of such a policy could not be established under prevailing domestic and international circumstances. (See Annex 1). Alternatively and for a medium term period, the study team recommended adopting a wider and more general development approach, aiming at the development and improvement of a diversified farming system in the irrigable areas of Shabelle and Juba. During phase II of the Banana Sector Study, a comprehensive strategy for developmentoriented activities in the former banana growing area was developed, aiming at the rehabilitation of the irrigation system combined with the improvement of the traditional food and cash crop production, including perennial crops, in the Lower Shabelle. It appears opportune to confine the project to the two districts Merca and Qoryoley in the initial phase of 3 years of the project. However, favourable developments of the political environment allowing, interventions of the proposed type could be extended or replicated with minor modifications in the largely comparable context of the Juba River. The present report describes the elements of the proposed strategy, composed of three core operations and a genuine mode of implementation, which was elaborated, endeavouring to take carefully into account the specific political and social circumstances in the project area. In the positive expectation of growing security and the emergence of a minimum of public institutions and legal framework, it is hoped that the strategy will be useful for the gradually replacement of rehabilitation-operations by consistent and effective actions of a more sustainable and viable character. The proposed strategy is also intending to create and consolidate awareness and confidence of self-help and responsibility in the rural society in Somalia.

EURATA â&#x20AC;&#x201C; European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association â&#x20AC;&#x201C; November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Chapter 2 Irrigation System Rehabilitation and Agriculture Improvement Project 2.1

Project Area

In Somalia bananas were grown in the Lower Shabelle, Lower Juba and Middle Shabelle region. For accessibility reasons, the field investigations of the study were limited to the former main banana growing area in the central part of Lower Shabelle, from Jenaale in the north to Bolo Mareta in the south, covering about 40 km of the river and around 30,000 ha of potentially irrigable land. In the past this area was producing over 90% of the bananas in the Shabelle region and 50% of all Somali bananas. Following civil unrest and by the El Nino floods in 1997/98, the industry collapsed and exportations stopped almost totally. No other crop or industry has yet replaced the banana industry as foreign exchange earner and employer for the rural population in the affected regions. Food crops, oilseed, fruit and vegetables for subsistence and irregular local market outlets replaced banana production progressively. The progressing deterioration of the canal network forced the farmers to reduce the part of irrigated crops and larger areas are returned to rain fed cultivation or fallow, on small and large holdings alike. The farming communities in the area attach the highest priority to the improvement of the irrigation system and access to water for human and agricultural use and expressed their commitment to active cooperation and responsible use of the re-established physical and non-physical means. Practices concerning land rights varied from rural to urban areas. In pre-colonial times, traditional claims and inter-clan bargaining were used to establish land rights. A small market for land, especially in the plantation areas of the south, developed in the colonial period and into the first decade of independence. The socialist regime sought to block land sales and tried to lease all privately-owned land to cooperatives as concessions. Despite the government's efforts, a de facto land market developed in urban areas; in the bush, the traditional rights of clans were maintained. In 1977 it was reported that 80% of families owned their own farms and more than 10% of those regularly rented extra land. Rental of extra irrigated land by farmers on rainfed areas is still common and the mission was also told that landless former banana workers are often given small plots, a quarter ha or so, rent-free, on former banana farms, in preference to leaving the land idle and being allowed to go back to bush. Before 1991 all banana producers of the three regions were associated into the “Shikadda Beereleida Moshka (SBM)” member of Somalfruit together with the Somali Government and the De Nadai Group. From the registers of the SBM it will be possible to recompose the register of the legal owners before the occupation.

EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

At the beginning of the war in 1991 many banana producers were forced to abandon their farms by armed groups that occupied the land replacing the landowners. Occupation mostly affected foreign farmers (Italian, Libyan and Yemeni) as well as Somali producers belonging to the Darot group. All Awaya producers could remain on their lands and after 1991 decided to associate into the co-operative “Shirkadda Beereleida Somalied (SBS)”. Some farms, especially the state farms and larger commercial farms that were taken over during the civil war, are still occupied illegally, while others have been given back to their owners. Other farms are occupied by relatives of the owners or by former employees acting as caretakers for absentee owners, several of whom are still living outside the country. Unsolved land ownership disputes essentially concerning former commercial estates, are not considered as an obstacle to start rehabilitation interventions, beneficial to the large majority of the rural population in the traditional farming sector. This area is recommended as intervention area for the proposed Irrigation system rehabilitation and agriculture improvement project. (For further socio-economic details refer to Annex 3: Agricultural Development and Diversification Strategy)

2.2

Crop-Diversification versus Recovery of Banana industry

The situation of the international Banana market since the late 90s is marked by a structural oversupply. Long-term analysis reveals that the terms of trade for bananas have experienced a steady deterioration over the last 20 years. Fundamental changes took place in the international marketing chains, where the multinationals move away from direct growing to marketing and distribution activities, avoiding production risks. Preferential entries for ACP banana producers into the European market will be reduced according to WTO regulations in the near future and thus expose all ACP producers to a sharp international competition. The prospects for Somalis return into the international banana market are extremely limited. Somalia’s position is that of a late newcomer, starting under severe material, institutional and financial handicaps into an oversupplied and extremely competitive market. However, a substantial fraction of banana production will find an outlet in still expandable domestic and regional markets, so that banana production will continue to the extent of that demand. Somalia has a structural food deficit and depends on commercial imports and food aid. Therefore there is a strong case for the agricultural potential in the former banana areas to be developed for food crops and maximizing food production throughout the irrigable areas. A diversified cropping pattern will allow for a better choice of crops and intensified cropping patterns in line with improved water availability. This will substantially increase the rural population’s livelihood and cash-income opportunities through farming and farm-related activities.

2.3

Overall Objectives and Purpose of the Project

Considering the needs and expressed priorities of the rural population and the best achievable impact, the project aims to diversify and strengthen the agricultural production system in the former main Lower Shabelle. EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

The overall objective of interventions implemented under the project will contribute to:

“Household incomes are increased for farming families through improved agricultural production” Diversification in agriculture, introducing an expanded and intensified pattern of food crops, oil seed, vegetables and perennial crops for subsistence and supply of the domestic markets will be directly beneficial to a larger number of farmers and provide a greater spread of increased household income among the rural population. A diversified range of products also reduces the farmers’ exposure to adverse climate and market conditions. The projected benefit of the project is:

“The farmers in the project area have access to and use irrigation opportunities in a productive way and are enabled to operate and maintain the system at village level appropriately” The project, although funded under “development” budgets, essentially intends to initiate the transition from mainly relief-oriented activities towards a more consistent and effective development-oriented set of activities aiming at sustainable and viable improvements for the rural population.

EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Chapter 3 The Parameters of the Strategy Background As mentioned above, in principle there are two basic scenarios under which the project could be implemented. The first Scenario would be to assume the prevalence of the actual Status Quo. The second one could be characterised by assuming the gradual implementation of an operational national authority with a stepwise establishing of the regional and local administration. Experiences from other countries prove that the establishment of a functional national administration and the subsequent set up of regional and local authorities may not be finished during the lifetime of the proposed project. Therefore the project approach is formulated to allow for the flexible incorporation of any emerging local or regional authority. As well, the objectives and operations of the proposed strategy are limited to those, which are firmly believed to be achievable in the given social, physical and economic environment. The results, although moderate, should directly benefit the largest number of stakeholders and those stakeholders have to show firm commitment and active cooperation in the operation and maintenance of the restored structures. In order to quantify the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed approach, a SWOT (Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats) analysis for the implementation of operational national authority is presented below: SWOT-Implementation of Strategies Strengths: • • • • •

Somalia presents a growing need for inter-sectoral coordination and common principles. Capacity building and training for water-users organisations and farmers could be a large step towards sustainability. As a result of rehabilitating the irrigation system the area of irrigated maize and irrigated sesame could nearly triple. The production of maize and sesame could increase by over 66% as a result of irrigation rehabilitation. The potential financial benefits from all interventions would therefore be USD 5.5 million per annum.

Weaknesses: • • • •

Establishment of a functional national administration and the subsequent set up of regional and local authorities may not be finished during the lifetime of the proposed project. Objectives and operations of the proposed strategy are limited to those, which are firmly believed to be achievable in the given social, physical and economic environment. Political tension, lack of stability in Government will cause many challenges to project implementation. The poor condition of barrages, canals and control and the latent hydrological mutation of the river require long-term rehabilitation and adaptation.

EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

•

The lack of formal market information system makes it difficult for the farmers to determine supply and prices at various moments and locations.

Opportunities: •

• •

Great urgency for intervention is dictated by the progressive deterioration of the irrigation system, which is the most important regional asset for viable and sustainable improvement of agriculture within the project region. High natural potential in the irrigation system, (although in severe disrepair). This asset must be protected and further degradation prevented or at least slowed down. The system is the major tool to improve the basis of livelihood of a great number of farm households in the region, provide national food selfsufficiency, and also to produce food-crop surpluses for the national market. The irrigable areas also present a basis for future cash crops production exportable to regional markets. Private sector has a remarkable vitality and capability to continue business, despite the disintegration of economic infrastructure and regulatory mechanism in the Somali economy.

Threats: • • •

3.1

Agricultural infrastructure, including essential irrigation infrastructure, was destroyed and lack of maintenance led to further deterioration and malfunctioning, reducing the production of food and cash crops. The threat of flooding and natural disasters The security situation remains rather difficult. Numerous warlords and factions are still fighting for control of Mogadishu and the other southern regions. Suspicion of Somali links with global terrorism further complicates the picture.

Socio-Economic Environment

After nearly twelve years from the outbreak of the civil war, today Somalia is a country without a National Government and all related institutions. Only within the Northern portions of the country, the autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland, have local administrations and enjoy a certain degree of security. In Southern Somalia, where banana production was traditionally carried out, the area is divided into a countless number of territories guarded by ethnic groups whose leaders are often engaged in armed clashes. In Mogadishu presently sits a Provisional Government established as a result of internationally sponsored peaces conferences (Djibouti and Addis Abeba) which enjoys Arab League backing, but which does not extend its control much beyond the City limits. In the Lower Shabelle and Juba regions, the dominating presence of commercial farming followed by a decade of extreme centralisation during the 1980s, encouraged a general attitude of dependency and prevented the development of a sense of ownership and responsibility among the rural population.

EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

In sharp contrast followed the still unfinished period of the void of public authority and resurging inter-clanic conflicts in the project region, leading to a total collapse of physical and economic infrastructure. Since 1995 multiple aid programmes of essentially humanitarian character, although necessary to secure the livelihood of a great number of people, also perpetuated dependency and wait and see attitudes. Presently (and accompanying some progress in regional normalisation in Somalia), the international donor community intends to shift relief programmes gradually towards rehabilitation including some basic development-elements. In principle, relief programmes initiated by the executing NGOs or UN agencies themselves, are of a very diverse nature in content and implementation. The more these activities are geared into a rehabilitation and development context, the more there is a growing need for inter-sectoral coordination and common principles. The SACB Agricultural Working Group has been aware of the need to improve effectiveness of aid-interventions in the agricultural sector, therefore developed a sector strategy in 2002. This provided members with a set of principles and options for agricultural interventions in Somalia of which following are guiding parameters for the development strategy in the project area: • Follow a sustainable livelihood approach by pursuing economically viable options • Follow the principle of subsidiary by locating the intervention at most appropriate/lowest level, • Utilize participatory approaches • Expect substantial stakeholders’ contribution and cost sharing • Promote ownership through development of stakeholders’ skill and management capabilities As the political unrest has apparently come to a halt in the Lower Shabelle region, it appears opportune to concentrate future support interventions in agriculture under a coordinated and common strategy in order to: • Increase the effectiveness of interventions through better targeting, methodology and coordination, • Improve the efficiency of agricultural practice in irrigated land use • Prepare the different target groups for active participation and ownership in a broad based and sustainable development process. Although a reasonable state of security is not yet reached, a great urgency for intervention is dictated by the progressive deterioration of the irrigation system, which is the most important regional asset for viable and sustainable improvement of agriculture within the project region.

3.2

Problems

The outbreak of the civil war also affected the Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba regions. Agricultural infrastructure, including essential irrigation infrastructure, was destroyed and lack of maintenance led to further deterioration and malfunctioning, reducing the production of food and cash crops. The security situation remains rather difficult. Numerous warlords and factions are still fighting for control of Mogadishu and the other southern regions. Suspicion of Somali links with global terrorism further complicates the picture. EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Incidents such as armed banditry and road assaults still occur on a regular basis. With the exception of Somaliland, crime is an extension of the general state of insecurity. Serious and violent crimes are very common. Kidnapping and robbery are a particular problem in Mogadishu and other areas of the south. In Lower Shabelle, (the core zone of irrigated agriculture in south Somalia), large-scale commercial farming has drastically declined and the production today is predominantly subsistence oriented, with maize as the main food crop. The operations necessary to reach a (lowest acceptable) stage of preservation, as well as functionality and effective use of the irrigation system must be carried out in an environment presenting several key-obstacles:

3.3

•

The entire agricultural infrastructure, essentially the irrigation system and road network in the Shabelle region is in an extremely poor state, due to destruction or lack of maintenance, which for the irrigation system means continuing and accelerated degradation.

•

Lack of agricultural skills and the general low level of farming practices and inadequacies for irrigated agriculture. Along with the pre-war dominance of sophisticated commercial farming techniques, in the noncommercial and subsistence sector, no strong farming tradition has developed.

•

Poor cropping patterns and little variety and diversity offer only a very narrow basis for the farmers to cope with volatile climatic conditions and other risks of crop failures or losses.

•

Agricultural services and inputs are scarce, difficult to accede and expensive. The situation is aggravated by the total disruption of agricultural education and training since more than 10 years. Insecurity also continues to hamper individual investment efforts and development of private service providers

•

Poor transport conditions limit the farmers’ access to regional and local markets and low prices result from adequate market opportunities after good harvests. Timing of food aid interventions is not always most appropriate as deliveries sometimes continue to be delivered after good national harvests.

Opportunities

The main opportunity of the project is the inherent high natural potential and the physical asset in form of the irrigation system, although in severe disrepair and progressing degradation. This asset must be protected and further degradation prevented or at least slowed down. The system is the major tool to improve the basis of livelihood of a great number of farm households in the region and also to produce food-crop surpluses for the national market. Besides the contribution to the national food self-sufficiency, the irrigable areas also present a (now dormant) basis for future cash crops production (revival of bananas, fruit, vegetables, EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

etc.) exportable to regional markets, to which Somalia have strong traditional relations through the traditional livestock trade. The last decade (without government and any public authority whatsoever), has demonstrated that the private sector has a remarkable vitality and capability to continue business, despite the disintegration of economic infrastructure and regulatory mechanism in the Somali economy. Although it is necessary to harness some anarchic phenomena in the sector, the inherent business-mindedness and entrepreneurship of the private sector is an extremely valuable element for sustainable development and economic growth.

3.4

Principles of Implementation

In summary the project environment leads to the following strategy for the achievement of viable and sustainable results: • • • • •

3.5

The objectives and operations of the strategy are limited to those which are firmly believed to be achievable in the given social, natural and economic environment, The intended results, although moderate should benefit (directly) the largest possible number of stakeholders, The operations should only be carried out if the stakeholders show firm commitment, cooperation and responsibility in implementation and management and meeting the set conditions, The rehabilitation of the irrigation system aims to restore the (lowest acceptable) level of functionality allowing the improvement of irrigated crop production and the prevention of further rapid degradation, After appropriate training, the selected interventions must be efficiently manageable by the available local staff and users-communities.

Implementation under public authority?

When the present study was carried out, talks about national reconciliation had reached a stage where the establishment of a new national Government becomes more likely to come in place within the coming years. Since the strategy proposed for the project is conceived as an essentially stakeholder-driven autonomous process, independent of interference of any public/national authority, it may be asked if there would be a difference once a government is in place. Having in mind the urgency of the rehabilitation works and assuming that a new government, even when installed in the next future, will need considerable time until the administrative structures are built–up and adequately staffed and equipped, little direct impact on the actual implementation can be expected from new authorities. The best positive effect to be expected from a government in place would be the return of law and order. Theoretically, in the case of eventual public tendering of contractual works on the canals through a public authority, the delay of execution could be shortened. It remains to be seen if this approach, apart from its purely technical merit, would be conducive to the development of ownership and responsibility of the user community. Regarding the sustainability of development, it is the general perspective that different institutions must play different roles. If it becomes feasible, then (governmental) institutions should be supported to effectively fulfil their functional role. However, as previously EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

mentioned, it is not expected that a significant amount of governmental institutions will emerge during the lifetime of the project. If that should be the case, the project must assure their gradual involvement and benefiting from its activities. In that regard the project can contribute to a sustainable development of Governmental institutions. Apart from the medium term rehabilitation of the irrigation system, there is also a problem of long-term adjustment of the hydraulic system of the Shabelle River. Should this be solved, it would require the existence of a competent national public organisation with power of regulatory enforcement. Whenever undertaken, such a programme would not negatively interfere with the proposed mid-term measures under the project. In summary, the eventual coming into force of a new government during the projected livespan 2004 2009, for the time being, does not require a principal change in the project strategy.

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Chapter 4 The Elements of the Project The totality of activities, measures and investments planned for the rehabilitation of the irrigation system and the improvement and diversification of agriculture in Lower Shabelle is called the project.

4.1

The project area

The immediate project area as defined within this study is the main irrigable area in the central part of Lower Shabelle river valley within the districts Merca and Qoryoley, from Sigaale village, north of the Jenaale barrage to Bulo Marerta village in the South. The project area covers a gross area of around 67.000 ha with about 30-40 000 ha of potentially irrigable land. Although no exact figures are available, it can be concluded from evidence in the field and reports from CEFA that due to the poor state of canals and gates, only half of the irrigable area is receiving irrigation water at all, mostly only once per season. The accurate figure of the village population in the project area is unknown. In 1978 the recorded figure was 112 000, made up of 24 000 families for the two districts. An update survey carried out during Phase II of the present study gave a total of 30 000 families for both districts. On this basis, using the same average family size (4.65 in 1978) the total population in 2003 would be around 140 000. However, application of an arbitrary 2.5% annual growth figure to the 1978 population of 112 000 gives a current estimate of 200 000 habitants.3 Consequently at that stage, the number of families or households likely to benefit from any development intervention of the project can be estimated at some 35-40 000 families. In 1978 the average farm size was about 1.93 ha (range 0.5 –13.0) for around 20.000 smallholders growing mainly annual crops. The smallholders association, SOMALTA’AB give 15 ha as the maximum farm size to qualify for membership. Farmers questioned during the current study gave a range of 1-5 ha per family as a norm. Some fragmentation into smaller units would appear likely as the population has grown during the past 25 years. Also rental of extra irrigated land by farmers on rain-fed areas is still common and former landless banana workers are often given small plots rent free on former banana farms in preference to leave the land idle. In order to achieve the project purpose the project interventions in the project area are focussed around the limited number of three core operations of high priority and close interdependence: • Rehabilitation and improved operation efficiency of the irrigation system • Increase of irrigated crop production and improvement of agricultural practice.

This estimate is close to the 1999 FSAU estimate of 193,000 people at risk in the Lower Shabelle region. However, the FSAU estimate includes only those who are affected by the food crisis, not the total population in the region, or those in displaced communities. See source: “UN Administrative Committee on Coordination/Sub-Committee on Nutrition (ACC/SCN)” Date: 1 Sept 1999. EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

•

Qualification of users and stakeholder organisations to assume ownership and responsibility for operation and maintenance of the rehabilitated system.

The project rationale is the following: (a)

Rehabilitation of the irrigation system is the key and basic condition for the improvement of traditional crop production by the large farming community.

(b)

Qualification of the users/farmers enables them to operate and maintain the irrigation system in good condition and to make better use of the irrigation water.

It appears opportune to confine the project to the two districts Merca and Qoryoley in the initial phase of 3 years of the project. However, favourable developments of the political environment allowing, interventions of the proposed type could be extended or replicated with minor modifications in the largely comparable context of the Juba River.

4.2

Rehabilitation and Maintenance of the Irrigation systems in Former Banana Growing Areas

A detailed description of the Irrigation system and the proposed measures of rehabilitation is given in ANNEX 2. The irrigation system in the project area (see Figure 2.3 Annex 2) is based on four barrages on the Shabelle for water level regulation in the river enabling gravity irrigation in the command areas of four respective canal systems. The total length of primary and secondary canals amount to 1915 km of which 136.5 km are silted at present, meaning that 57% of the system is totally dry or only functioning at much reduced capacity. The basic design principle of the present irrigation system was to provide the necessary irrigation water especially for the cash crops on commercial farms, but also to traditional food-crops as maize and sesame, supplementing the scarce and unreliable rains. Due to difficult topographic conditions and the high seasonal fluctuations and silt-loads of the Shabelle River, the system required very careful and expensive maintenance operations on the total system from the very beginning, which until about 1995 were directly or indirectly secured by the commercial agriculture sector and/or state-organisations. The Jowhar off-stream storage facility requires extensive rehabilitation, and apart from the high cost involved, the rehabilitation of this reservoir would have a very limited effect on the silting-up of the river (none on the core issue: lack of outlet for both the river and the drainage system). The opportunity of rehabilitating this reservoir needs to be carefully evaluated in the framework of the whole hydrology of the river basin and in connection with comprehensive long-term river training interventions. With the cessation of regular commercial banana exports, the most important source of finance and the technical O&M-organisation for the irrigation system had vanished. After the breakdown of public authority around 1996 and during the last decade of civil unrest, the farmers, commercial and traditional, have fought for and used anarchic methods to secure their part of irrigation water, but invested very little in common activities or systematic

EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

maintenance procedures. At present the whole irrigation system is in an advanced state of disrepair and progressive degradation. There are two orders of problems affecting the deterioration of the Shabelle irrigation system. From the most apparent and technical view, the poor condition of barrages, canals and control structures is the result of years of hazardous and faulty operation and inadequate maintenance. The second and less visible process is the latent hydrological mutation of the river, which also requires long-term adaptation essentially on the river banks and main intake-structures on the Shabelle River itself. Flooding is caused in the area by either (i) river bank overtopping (canal bank overtopping never occurs) or (ii) water wastage at the tail of the irrigation canals. Flood risk and drainage problems have the same origin and should be dealt with at river basin level. All barrages, bridges, intakes and structures need to be raised in the process of river embankment, so that the re-construction financial requirements would exceed any amount the international community may mobilise at the present stage. However, immediate relief and risk reduction on flooding will result from rehabilitation and proper operation of the irrigation system as foreseen by the project. It is obvious that under prevailing conditions no action can be undertaken on the long-term adaptation to fundamental hydrological changes in the Shabelle Riverine regime. Operations in that area usually need long preparation periods and could only be implemented by strong public/governmental authorities and the availability of public funding. None of these conditions are met at present. The intended and urgently needed interventions under the proposed strategy are of short and medium term nature. The activities and investments are designed to meet a twofold objective: (a) restore the existing system at the lowest acceptable level, allowing the equitable access to irrigation water for a maximum of users (traditional and commercial) and securing the water requirements for an improved and diversified crop production pattern, (b) enable the farming community to operate the canal system efficiently with own competence and responsibility. The realisation of the extensive works under the rehabilitation programme and the achievement of early and broadly spread tangible effects are expected to have a massive mobilisation effect on village level and stimulate the stakeholders’ readiness for cooperation and coordination of interests on inter-communal and regional level.

EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Basic Rehabilitation The basic rehabilitation of the irrigation system in the project area comprises the following works as shown in Table 1. (Please refer to Table 2.8 in Annex 2 for a breakdown of cost estimates.) Table 1. Cost Estimates for Basic Rehabilitation Item Main barrages, repair and excavation Canals, excavation and reshaping Cross regulators, installation or repair Tertiary & direct intakes, installation or repair

Quantity

Cost estimate. (USD)

4 units 349 km 112 units 1546 units

Total for basic rehabilitation

358 1 508 259 1 794

000 750 000 750

3 875 750

In respect of the critical state of the system, the works should, as far as possible, be started simultaneously on the four canal systems (Jenaale, Mashally Qorioly, and Abdi Ali) and at the earliest possible time. In reality however, eventual bottlenecks in technical assistance personnel, manpower and shortfalls of contractors may lead to some differentiated start-ups. For preparation, planning and supervision of the works and the connected training of user groups and operators, technical assistance support will be provided under the Special Aid Program for Somalia. Required mechanical earth moving, construction and metal works will be carried out by local contractors, formally hired by the respective communities of canal users but paid and supervised by the technical assistance personnel of the implementing agencies. According to information obtained from different sources, it may be anticipated that the total volume of contractual work is attractive to local entrepreneurs and the required capacities in machinery and qualified manpower will be available. There are no valid reference data for cost calculations for equipment and construction. Contracts are so far negotiated on a case-bycase basis. In the detailed irrigation report, two scenarios for the implementation of the rehabilitation program have been developed and discussed. These are: a 3-year implementation period under the assumption of a government respectively competent public authority in place, or a 5-year implementation span without government and depending essentially on a user–driven implementation process. A decision in favour of the 3-year scenario would only be realistic with a national government in place by 2004. This would eventually allow for a regular, national or international, open tendering of the entire workload by a public authority, calling for specialised (expatriate) consultants and contractors, as well as specialised international consultant’s input. The advantage of this option would be essentially to speed up the execution of work, and as positive side effect, enhance the establishment of specialised national or regional river and irrigation authorities. Apart from the ongoing uncertainty about the early establishment and function of a new government in Somalia, the main disadvantage of this option, in terms of sustainable development, would be that it largely excludes or diminishes the active participation and EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

responsibilities of the local communities. Hence, it would contribute little to the peoples’ confrontation with direct responsibilities and the development of a sense of ownership in their common goods and affairs. The implementation under the 5-year scenario requires some stability in security, but no competent public institution at regional level is anticipated. The planned program will be essentially user-driven and realized with the help of a substantial external human resources/ technical assistance input, able to cope effectively with the ambitious program. (For details, see Chapter 6) In conclusion the study team suggests that the basic rehabilitation program shall be started as soon as possible and carried out during an estimated 5-year period, which is also the proposed lifetime of the project (2004-2009). Annual Maintenance Distinct from the basic rehabilitation works, the regular annual maintenance operations are of paramount importance for the preservation of the system-efficiency and securing the technical life span over the years. By category of work the annual maintenance cost (entire project area) are estimated as below in Table 2: (Please refer to Tables 5.1 and 5.2 in Annex 2 for a breakdown of cost estimates.) Table 2. Estimated Annual Maintenance Costs Item Main barrages, annual maintenance Canals, excavation, reshaping, bank form. Cross regulators, maintenance & repair Tertiary & direct intakes, Maintenance & repair

Cost estimate (USD) 53 500 194 300 12 900 68 300

Total for annual maintenance

329 000

In relation to the total of irrigable area of 30 to 40 000 ha, the annual maintenance cost would range between 8.3 to 11.0 USD/ha A vital precondition for sound management and regular maintenance is the existence of canal committees and skilled operators. It can be assumed, that with the impetus of the rehabilitation operations, all or most of the former traditional canal committees can be revitalised and reinforced with new qualified members. The canal committees and the selected operating personnel for canal will receive adequate training, skill development and extension support, enabling them to assume their tasks and responsibilities and to cooperate on system and regional levels. Under the guidance of the respective canal committees, the stakeholders are expected to organise and carry out the regular maintenance operations by their own initiative without substantial external financial support at the end of the project. Funding of the Project The study team suggests that the basic rehabilitation and the technical assistance components, financed from SFA Banana funds as grant, be considered as a one time EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

investment into the preservation of a valuable regional production asset. The preservation of the irrigation system forms the most important tool for the improvement of livelihood for a large regional population in the former banana growing zones. It is further recommended that the beneficiaries (communities) should contribute with a token (5-10%) of the cost of canal excavations and tertiary intakes in order to raise and test the sense of ownership and responsibility, while the bulk of the rehabilitation cost of canals, regulators and main-intakes ad barrages would be borne by the funding agency (grant). The suggested contribution to the rehabilitation works is approximately equal to the estimated amount required for the consecutive annual maintenance. It appears essential to insist strictly on a stakeholders' contribution to the cost and material input for annual maintenance operations by the users. These contributions, as far as attributable to user groups and system owners, should be kept commensurate with the positive returns from better water availability and improved agricultural production

4.3

Agricultural Development and Diversification in the Former Banana Growing Areas

For the detailed report on the subject see ANNEX 3. The Mission’s approach to this “Banana Sector Study” was to establish whether or not there was a possibility of Somalia reviving its international banana export trade and if not, what could replace it to utilise the irrigation water and soil resources in the former banana growing areas, for the maximum benefit of the people living there. The benefits of the former banana export trade were: • • •

Foreign exchange earning for the national economy Employment opportunities for local people High standard of living for a minority (±150 out of ±30,000 families)

With the demise of the banana export trade (see ANNEX 1), the potential for increasing agricultural production lies with the smallholder sector and the improvement of annual crops: • • •

Increase food production for better food security and nutrition Increase cash crop production for better living standards Increase production of import substitution crops to lower cost of living.

Somalia is a food deficit country and increased food production would not only benefit the smallholder families living in the irrigation farming areas, but could provide surpluses to improve food security in the country as a whole, as well as reducing import requirements. Many of the workers previously employed by the banana plantations are now dependent on smallholdings for their survival and would benefit from interventions to increase crop yields/production and improve living standards. Replacement of foreign exchange previously earned by exporting bananas might be achieved, at least partially, by growing crops to replace imported foods, which would be more affordable for the majority of the people.

EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Although the original reason for the development of the irrigation system was to produce commercial crops of cotton and bananas, it also (potentially) serves an estimated 40-50,000 smallholder families who subsist mainly on annual crops. Since there would appear to be little prospect of reviving the banana export trade to its former scale, the interventions proposed to replace it have concentrated on the smallholder sector and annual crop production, with the main objective being to increase food production. Maize and sesame are the principal food crops grown in the irrigated areas, and the traditional cropping pattern is to plant 100% of the land with maize in the first rainy season (Gu-Apr/May/June), followed by a second crop of maize on plus sesame on the same land, with the second rainy season (Der-Oct/Nov/Dec). However, with an annual rainfall of 500 mm or less, spread over the two seasons, irrigation is vital for successful cropping in the area. Yields of irrigated crops are currently more than double that of rainfed ones. Components of the proposed Agricultural Strategy are therefore as follows: (a) (b) (c)

Introduction of better maize varieties Control of the maize stalk borer Continuation of trials on crops for import substitution.

Rehabilitation of the irrigation system is obviously a top priority for increasing production, but other constraints which need to be addressed include the low yield potential of the local maize varieties and the major losses caused by maize stalk borer. Activities to deal with these three constraints constitute the main components of the proposed Agricultural Strategy. A fourth component is also considered worthwhile, that of continuing the trials and seed multiplication on alternative crops which could replace imported foods and thereby lower living costs. The oilseeds are of particular interest and trial work on upland rice and wheat should also continue, although some doubts about their chances of success as smallholder crops preclude recommending any major extension efforts at this stage. The main components of the proposed Agricultural Strategy are limited to three. Under the social and political context it seems to be a sound principle to start any effective development intervention with a limited number of the objectives which are firmly believed to be achievable and which have clearly identifiable benefits. The selected interventions can then be more adequately and efficiently managed by the available staff, with more chance of success than if their efforts had to be spread over a large number of activities. This is particularly important in Somalia at present, when there are no government institutions and no national extension staff. At present the NGOs – ADRA, CEFA, CARE and CONCERN are working on improvements to irrigation and agriculture in the area and, in the absence of a government agricultural extension service, it appears that (for the foreseeable future), only NGOs can provide the supervision and extension services to implement the proposed developments. As far as possible they are working through traditional village committees, some of which deal with irrigation scheduling and others look after agricultural matters. The latter would be important, for example, in promoting the adoption of new maize varieties and stalk borer control methods. The benefits of the proposed strategy are estimated as follows: 1. As a result of rehabilitating the irrigation system, the area of irrigated maize could increase from the present 11,200 ha to 32,091 ha, and the area of irrigated sesame could increase from 5,280 ha to 15,128 ha.

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

2. 3.

Maize production could increase from the present level of 28,000 m/t, to 42,775 m/t per annum, as a result of irrigation rehabilitation, and up to 53,113 m/t with the addition of efficient maize stalk borer control. Sesame production could increase from 8,844 m/t to 13,276 m/t as a result of irrigation rehabilitation.

Based on the above production figures, the value of production after implementing the project is estimated to rise from US$ 8.5 million at current levels, to US$ 12.8 million after rehabilitation of the irrigation system and to US$ 14.0 million with the additional benefits of maize stalk borer control. The potential financial benefits from all interventions would therefore be US$ 5.5 million per annum. Further explanation can be found in Annex 3. As mentioned above it is recommended to confine the project to the two districts Merca and Qoryoley in the initial 3 years of the project. However, favourable developments of the political environment allowing, interventions of the proposed type could be extended or replicated with minor modifications in the largely comparable context of the Juba River.

2.2

Marketing of agricultural produce in the Former Banana Growing Areas

The project’s development activities to be launched in Lower Shabelle are expected to result in larger production volumes, foremost in maize and sesame, but also in various fruits and vegetables to a lesser extend. Since the area is not a food deficit area in normal years, the increased quantities of the production will be sold in order to generate cash incomes for the rural households. A market survey has been conducted during Phase II in order to get information on the actual condition and structure of the local and regional market for agricultural produce from Lower Shabelle and to evaluate the existing marketing channels and other options that may help to increase farm production and profitability. (See ANNEX 3). Maize and Sesame, being the staple food crops, are grown by almost all farmers and form key marketed commodities in the region. Between 25% to 100% of harvested maize is retained by farmers for own consumption and the balance sold to help finance essential home needs depending on the quantity harvested and the family size. As for sesame, about 20% is retained for home use and 80% sold. All fruits and vegetables are predominantly passed through the marketing chain although some small quantities are utilized at home. The major market outlet is Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia, which in 1998 was estimated to have a population of about 1.0 million habitants. Present population is unknown but it is still the urban centre that consumes the most commodities, (either local sources or imported). It also serves as an exchange centre for most produce from the North and South of Somalia and imports due to its location and availability of a seaport. Other markets which can be served through Mogadishu include Bosaso, Hargeysa, Galkacyo, Belet-Weyne and Jowhar, all to the North. The towns that can be served direct from the lower Shabelle region include Kismayo, Baar Dheere, Baydhaba and Huddur which are regional capitals. The populations of the different regional capitals are difficult to estimate but are assumed to be inhabited by substantial number of consumers, being large urban centres. Distinctive seasonal price variations are common and a trend of marked peaks and dips are evident in all production from the area. Some seasonal variations can be predicted, for EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

example, supply is normally affected for most vegetables and bananas during the cool, dry and windy periods of May to July, while it is also expected to have reduced levels of water during dry periods leading to shortages and high prices, seasonal, cropping patterns also have a direct bearing on supply as most farmers plant and harvest at the same time. Such productions depress prices due to seasonable over supply. Another serious source of price depressions is the considerable quantities from food aid donations finding their way frequently to the regular food markets. Average prices for some produce at wholesale market in Mogadishu and demand trends are shown in Table 3: Table 3. Demand Trends for Wholesale Produce Prices* at High Prices* at Low demand Demand Period Periods Maize (80kg) 180,000 March – July 50,000 August - October Sosame (1.0kg) 15,000 March – May 5,500 June – Sept Tomato (120kg) 300,000 May – July 25,000 Aug – Oct Water melon (50kg) 120,000 Jan – April 20,000 June – Sept Banana (100kg)** 120,000 May – July 60,000 *Wholesale prices at Mogadishu in Somali shillings. 1 USD = 17,000 SS ** On local markets, banana is traded in bunches and price is per 1 quintal. Boxes of 12,5 kg are only used for expert purposes at prices “offered” of 1,2-1,5 US$/box. Produce

There is no standard packaging for most products except cereals. The packaging for some products are as follows:• • •

Bags: - Maize (80kg), sesame (50kg), Pumpkin (50kg) Drums (steel) cut into half - tomato (120kg) Cartons - Banana (12.5kg) for specific markets and export

Bananas and watermelons are not packed but loaded direct onto trucks. Other products are packed into any available material including bags, baskets, crates etc. The quality of cereals is good except for maize which has been stored underground. Such maize loses 25% to 50% of value when marketed. Fruits and vegetables are characterized by poor quality at the farm and market ends. Harvesting techniques are poor and produce is rarely sorted or graded before packing and transportation. The handling and transportation also accelerate deterioration as they are kept in the open under direct sun heat, heaped and transported on open trucks. The resulting damage and bruising can lease to losses of up to 50% at the market level. These have a bearing on the price at the wholesale market and the retail and consumer end. The produce reaches the wholesale market through brokers. The main difference for the different market channels is the number of intermediaries (broker and transporters between farm and wholesale market. The transaction costs from farm to wholesale market are high and composed of grading/loading, transport, checkpoint and off-loading. The costs are not uniform for all products but vary depending on value /volumes of transactions and who is involved. Table 4 shows the estimated handling costs from farm to market. EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Table 4. Estimated Handling Costs from Farm to Market Produce

Grading/Loading Offloading per lorry

Maize (80kg) Sesame (50kg) Tomato (120kg) Water-melon (10MT) Banana (10MT)

Transport

Checkpoint

Broker

100,000

20,000

700,000 – 1m

4,000 (per lorry)

100,000

25,000

700,000 – 1m

150,000

25,000

700,000 – 1m

4,000 – 50,000 (per 120kg)

150,000

3,500,000

700,000 – 1m

100,000

150,000

3,000,000

700,000 – 1m

100,000

Normally, the single farmer hands over his product to the broker or transporter. The brokers/transporters recover their cost after selling and bring back the proceeds to the farmer. Farmers also never negotiate prices or shares left with the broker. The most efficient and less costly are the channels where there are few players between farmer and outlet. It is noteworthy that most producers cannot or will not bypass brokers for fear of retaliation by parties left out of the trade. There is no formal market information system and it is difficult for the farmer to determine supply and prices at various moments and locations. However, the farmers and traders receive informal information gathering network communicating mainly by phone (for those having access to telecommunication). Conclusion: The study shows plainly that even in a food deficit country, the local producer of food has a very weak position in the food supply chain. The market study mentions a number of possible measures to improve that position, but the study-team does not recommend any specific action by the project TA teams, intervening directly into the complexity of vested interests of the actual market structure.

4.5

Capacity building and training of water-user institutions, communities and farmers

Project Beneficiaries: The third pillar of the proposed development strategy for the Shabelle region is capacity building and training for farmers, water-users organisations and local extension personnel. The successful implementation of the capacity building component could be considered as the most important component to guarantee sustainability, which is in fact the only real longterm indicator for the achievement of development. Issues to be addressed: Development means efforts for change for the better and in Somalia today, there is no better authority except the populations themselves to promote or push the process of their development.

EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Capacity building is intending to equip the targeted communities or social sections with the necessary attitudes, skills and knowledge to empower them to own, manage and sustain their own development. It also aims at building an effective institutional framework within and between communities capable of sustaining the momentum of change and sustainability. In the context of the project it has to be recognised that Somalia’s political and economic environment of the past 20 years has held very little encouragement for common and sustainable development initiatives. As well, it has been a great barrier of scepticism and mistrust and has still to be overcome with the concerned rural population in the communities, in spite of the many aid activities of various organisations and relief programmes. The most important task to be achieved at the initial stage of the project is gaining the confidence and mobilising the active cooperation of the rural population. As recent experiences indicate, the approach of PRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal) seems to be a suitable instrument to create problem awareness and to mobilise self-help consciousness in the villages. It will be crucial for the project results to link this mental awareness of the population in the project area with the expected momentum from the physical execution of the rehabilitation works and the demonstration of early and tangible results achievable in agriculture. This early demonstration aspect is the main reason for keeping the number of project elements to a manageable minimum and to focus intervention efforts on essential key factors. In respect to the capacity building and training component, only the members of (reactivated or new) canal committees, the group of technical operators of the irrigation system and the farmers using irrigation would be the target group receiving intensified attention. Considering the importance of the capacity building component for the sustainability of project results, it appears highly advisable to conduct a special survey on the most effective methodology of knowledge transfer and training for the identified target group, prior to project implementation. The effectiveness of the transfer of knowledge and management capability will also have a direct bearing on the structure and number of a subsequent extension system in the area. (It may be mentioned here, that the project strategy leaves the responsibility for operation and maintenance of the canal systems largely to the users themselves. It is however understood, that in the medium term, the problem of responsibility and rules for the operation of the barrages and main intakes on the Shabelle must be solved on a higher geographical level and should finally lay with river authority or similar national public body.)

EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Chapter 5 Economic and financial considerations At the level of the project strategy, the evaluation of the expected economic effects can realistically only be applied to the probability of (a) sustainability and (b) viability of the projected operations and results. In Somalia, since there exists very little coherent information on the national economic context and there is a total lack of reliable socio-economical reference data on the project area, this exercise (even at the very general level), is quite arbitrary. All figures reproduced in this report are therefore plausible estimates deducted form very different sources of which consistency and accuracy could not be verified conclusively. This is in principle also valid for total population and area figures used by the FSAU and other international institutions. The team is aware that there are different figures on population and acreage which result from different sources and different bases used in the different parts in the report. The team abstained from arbitrarily unifying these figures, thus highlighting one basic difficulty of the study.

5.1

Project costs

At the present stage of project conception, the estimated amounts of expenditures for project implementation fall under 3 main categories as shown in Table 5 below. Table 5. Estimated Project Expenditures Basic rehabilitation of irrigation system Human resources for implementation Project Assistance & supervision Total (gross estimate)

Contracted works & services Implementing Agencies Local staff Training & extension PACSU (Nairobi) External Monitoring & Evaluation 2004-2009

+/- 3,9 million USD

+/- 2.5 million USD

+/- 1,2 million USD

+/- 7.6 million USD

Put in relation to the 35-40 000 ha of irrigable land in use at the end of the project, the investment costs are: • Contracted works & services only: 112 – 96 USD/ha • Contracted works & services & • human resources: 222 – 195 USD/ha

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In addition, the combined estimate of the Human resources and Technical assistance associated to the project is almost equal the physical investments/ contractual works. This magnitude is explained by the high intensity of technical assistance and local technical staff required for the successful preparation (social and technical), launch and conduct of the operations under the (anticipated) total absence of any public service or authority. Financial and human resources input should be handled with extreme flexibility throughout the project lifetime and the flow of expenditures is not predictable at this stage. Apart from security and political stability, the flow is dependent on the intensity at which the implementation will effectively start und run during the projected project period. The project is supposed to be financed from the SFA Banana funds, and funding regulations will be following the guidelines of the EC Commission Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia (2002-2007) on a grant basis. It is assumed that the disbursements of the annual implementation budgets will be subject to a set of conditions, which both the beneficiaries and the implementing partner agencies have to meet. These conditions are yet to be specified in detail; however the most crucial one is the beneficiaries’ direct and material contribution. The implementing agencies in spite all recognized hardships, should strictly be held responsible for provision of qualified personnel in sufficient numbers. The beneficiaries should contribute from the earliest stage of rehabilitation with a token (510%) of the respective cost of canal excavations and tertiary intakes, in order to incite their sense of ownership and responsibility while the bulk of the rehabilitation cost of canals, regulators and main-intakes ad barrages would be borne by the funding agency (grant). Clearly distinguished from the one time rehabilitation of the canal system are the annual maintenance operations. After full rehabilitation, the cash expenditures for contractual maintenance works of the entire system are estimated at about 339,000 USD, or approximately 10% of the rehabilitation cost. Thus, the suggested contribution to the rehabilitation works represents approximately the estimated amount required for the consecutive annual maintenance of the system. It appears essential to insist strictly on a substantial contribution to the cost and material input for annual maintenance operations by the users. These cost, as far as attributable to user groups and system owners, are considered to be commensurate with the positive returns from better water availability and improved agricultural production Put in relation to the 35-40,000 ha of irrigable land at the end of the project •

The annual maintenance cost are:

9.7 – 8.5 USD/ha

•

Maintenance cost in kg maize:

82 – 80 kg/ha

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

5.2

Project returns

The potential economic effects of the project are: • Direct and quantifiable in terms of increased volumes and values of agricultural production due to better access and use of irrigation water. • Indirect returns as induced effects, mainly through the large amount of cash injection for contractual works and services and also increased expenditures following improved household incomes in the area. The potential for increased production of maize and sesame after implementation is summarized as: • The area of irrigated maize could increase from the present 11,200 ha to 22,922 ha, as a result of rehabilitating the irrigation system. • The area of irrigated sesame could increase from the present 5,280 ha to 15,128 ha, as a result of rehabilitating the irrigation system. • Maize production could increase from 28,000 m/t to 42,775 m/t per annum as a result of irrigation rehabilitation, and up to 53,113 m/t with the addition of efficient maize stalk borer control. • Sesame production could increase from 8,844 m/t to 13,276 m/t as a result of irrigation rehabilitation. Based on the above production figures, the value of production after implementing the project is estimated to rise from US$ 8.5 million at current levels, to US$ 12.8 million after rehabilitation of the irrigation system and to US$ 14.0 million with the additional benefits of maize stalk borer control. The potential financial benefits from all interventions would therefore be US$ 5.5 million per annum. Table 6 below shows the calculation, based on current local market prices of Shs 2000/kg for maize and Shs 10,000/kg for sesame, using an exchange rate of Shs 17,000 : US$ 1.00. Table 6. Potential Value of Increased Maize and Sesame Production Crop

Maize

Value of Production Current Situation

Value of Production Value of Production w ith Irrigation System w ith Irrigation Rehabilitated Rehabilitated Plus Maize Borer Control Production Value Total Value Production Value Total Value Production Value Total Value (tonnes) (US$/tonne) (US$) (tonnes) (US$/tonne) (US$) (tonnes) (US$/tonne) (US$) 28,000

118.00

3,304,000

42,775

118.00

5,047,450

53,113

118.00

6,267,334

Sesame

8,844

588.00

5,200,272

13,276

588.00

7,806,288

13,276

588.00

7,806,288

Both Crops

36,844

8,504,272

56,051

12,853,738

66,389

14,073,622

The quantification of induced economic effects is not feasible in the context of Somalia’s economy because there is no way to retrace linkages and flow of income and expenditures. However, the induced effects can safely be assumed positive for the direct players (contractors and suppliers) and intermediaries.

5.3

Sustainability of the project results

In a general way, when the question of sustainability is put as, “does the project provide an acceptable level of benefits over a period of a number of years?” it can be answered positively for the project.

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The project provides access to potential benefits for the farming community. The realisation of the benefits is at the reach of the majority of farming households and the threshold for access in terms of skills and financial input is low. Furthermore, during a long transitional period of 5 years, the potential beneficiaries are massively supported in the development of skills and structures for a sustainable operation of the irrigation system. The cost of maintenance is modest for the beneficiaries in relation to their potential benefits. However, in spite of the fundamentally positive conditions, sustainability of the project effects may be threatened from project external factors: • In the short term and unless a functioning government is in place, perpetuated or resurging civil unrest and insecurity may prevent or interrupt the undisturbed implementation of the project and the peaceful use of the progressively improved agricultural potential by the present populations • In the medium term the risk lies with the continuous absence of a competent public authority to deal with the establishment and enforcement of rules for regional irrigation matters and the control of the hydrological system of the Shabelle River itself.

5.4

Viability of the project results

The assessment of the economic/ financial viability of the project, put as: “does the project produce more wealth than it costs?” leads to an overall positive result. In economic terms, the gross estimates of returns and cost indicate a large positive margin, due to the fact that the projected costs/investments, although considerable in absolute figures, are moderate when put in relation to the number of ha of irrigated area and the incremental production potential of proper irrigation. A normal progress provided, the incremental annual production achieved in the project area is exceeding the total cost of the project before the end of the project implementation-phase (approx. in year 3). Statements on the financial viability at user level would be totally speculative beyond the general assumption, that incremental agricultural production will be reachable and beneficial to the majority of farming households. To quantify these effects and to gain insight in income distribution and use at household level is not feasible at present. In absence of any reliable statistical data on the project area, it is essential for the assessment of project impact, project control and supervision, to create a proper reference system for the project. In the early stage of project inception, a benchmark survey has to be made on a restricted but significant number of controllable data for the three project components and the measurement of economic effects on farm level and household level. These data will form the central source for the determination of indicators the assessment of project progress and the establishment of work plans and annual budgets.

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Chapter 6 Implementation of the Project 6.1

Methodology of Implementation

Since 1994, consecutive EC financed interventions in the agricultural sector have taken place in the Shabelle valley. These started in 1998 in the Middle Shabelle and extended to the Lower Shabelle, a Crop Improvement and Diversification Project. The aim was at the introduction of paddy rice production, and geared during its last period into a more comprehensive intervention called SHARP - Shabelle Agricultural Rehabilitation Project (20022004) and carried out by a coalition of four international NGOs (Cefa, CARE, Concern Worldwide and ADRA). It was conducted for parallel and similar project activities in neighbouring geographical intervention areas. In the course of implementation of SHARP, at request by the EU Somalia Unit Nairobi, considerable improvements have been introduced in project design, choice and harmonisation of approaches, planning of interventions, use of same development tools and training methods, etc. The new approach draws extensively from previous field experiences in the area, combined with confirmed new practices and development tools especially in use in self-help type development activities. The reshaping of the project took place during 2002 and the project is now conducted under the new methodology. The earliest moment to evaluate the new approach effectively will be towards the end of 2003/ beginning of 2004. The opportunity of a thorough evaluation of the SHARP performance will by no means be overlooked. SHARP contains activities similar to the three core elements of the proposed project: rehabilitation of irrigation canals, improvement of crop production and qualifying of user institutions and stakeholders on a smaller scale, and as such it is in fact the field test of the methodology proposed for the larger Lower Shabelle project. Although the new approach, especially the application of participatory tools (PRA) appears to be a promising tool for the basic mobilisation of the target population, final conclusions on the effectiveness of the new comprehensive approach on a larger scale can not be drawn yet. The execution of the Lower Shabelle Project contains a methodological dilemma: while the socio-political environment in the project area favours stakeholder/community–driven intervention and the use of self-help and grass-root development approaches, the effective execution of the rehabilitation works on canal systems claims for technical and operationsdriven procedures. To find the right balance between both principles represents a major challenge for the implementing partners and project operators.

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

6.2

Implementing Partners

Unless there is a formal Government in place, eligible partner organisations for the provision of technical assistance and field support in Somalia are non-government organisations (NGO) or UN agencies. Many of them have gained an extensive experience in Somalia’s difficult social and political environment and shown a great ability to carry out (relief) projects under severe hardship conditions. Past projects in the rural areas were in principle initiated by NGOs or help agencies who in turn sought funding from the donor organisations for “their” help projects. In the execution of the projects, the agencies followed their “own” specific approach (philosophy) in implementation. In contrast to these activities, the implementation of the Lower Shabelle project, due to the technical contents, the size of intervention and the necessary time-span for completion requires a different understanding of the respective roles as players engaged in the execution of the project: •

•

The implementing NGO-partners, used to “do the right things their way”, have now to comply with a tight set of conditions interfering on the agency proper mode of operation and the qualification of fielded personnel. Furthermore the implementing partners have to accept external steering and control mechanisms during the course of the project. The EC-Somali Unit, who was receiving requests for finance for projects initiated and “built” by NGOs and accorded funds if the project fitted, will now select implementing partners through procedures having strong traits of competitive calls for proposal and contract award.

The size of the project needs the intervention of more than one implementing partner, working alongside in distinctive geographical areas (lots) but operating the same basic set of terms and tasks. At the present stage of project definition the study team proposes the involvement of up to three implementing partners, each solely responsible for the implementation of all project activities in one zone of fielding teams composed of expatriate and local experts and technical staff. Implementing partners already engaged in the ongoing SHARP project should be given preference in order to benefit from their country knowledge and field experience, their existing infrastructure for expatriate and local staff and - non the least - their familiarity with the new project approach. To incorporate such qualifications, the following “tender procedure” is suggested: • EC-Somali Unit (through PACSU, see below) prepares a general project document /concept describing the objectives and the elements of the planned programme. • Based on this project document, the four IPs and other interested candidates are invited to submit individual proposals for implementation. • PACSU evaluates the proposals, selects the most qualified candidates and elaborates a uniform set of TOR and indicators in close cooperation with the retained intervention partners

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All implementing partners on the project shall work under one common project framework, with identical terms of references, but independent and solely responsible in respective zones of operation. The first contractual period for the IPs should cover the period of 3 years. This period would allow for the coverage of the full cycle of rehabilitation, operation and first maintenance on the first completed systems. Considering the numbers and qualifications of personnel to be provided and the length of the planned interventions, the selected partners have to make proof of a substantial and experienced home organisation, capable to meet multi-annual contractual obligations.

6.3 Project Assistance, Capacity Building and Supervision Unit (PACSU) By commissioning a project of the Lower Shabelle type, the interventions under the EC Somali Aid Programme mark an ambitious change in the nature of activities. On the scale of the continuum from Linking-Relief-Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), the project is definitely located in the zone of transition between rehabilitation and development. The project is meant to provoke a change of attitude in the farming community of the project area. Under the prevailing socio-political environment, the project may appear rather ambitious and its execution challenging for all operators engaged in project implementation and project supervision. The ability and capacities to cope with unpredictable incidents and still strive for best effectiveness must be enforced in the project cycle management set-up. In order to improve this coping capability for (also future) projects in the agricultural sector, it is strongly recommended to create a Special Unit for Project Assistance and Supervision (PACSU). PACSU should be established as a small and efficient unit, at present located in Nairobi but be prepared to move to Somalia as soon security is safely restored. For the preparation and supervision of the Lower Shabelle project, the unit would best be in place and achieve some degree of operational status at the very beginning of 2004. The core expert staff for start-up of the unit could be restricted to two permanent and one visiting experts of the qualification of economist/irrigation engineer/ agronomist. One of the two permanent experts should have confirmed experience in project planning and supervision. Because of the seasonality of work, the agronomist or engineer could be visiting expert. PACSU would be active and responsible towards the EC Somalia Unit Nairobi in the following main areas: 1.

PACSU translates development concepts and strategies into action. It evaluates project initiatives and organises the required procedures for the launch of new or the extension of existing (development-) interventions in agriculture and rural areas, funded by EC. PACSU will act as partner unit for the provision of advisory support and technical assistance to emerging Somali public and private institutions in the agricultural sector, once a new government is in place and takes over regulatory functions.

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4. 5.

6.4

PACSU carries out all tasks of project supervision including control of progress of work and field performance of implementing partners and develops adequate indicators and procedures. PACSU analyses and follows–up major deviations in the execution of operations and prepares adequate solutions to the problems encountered; it identifies need for conceptual amendments and assists in fine-tuning of the procedures. PACSU comments on quarterly reports and carries out checks in the field. PACSU will act as moderator in conflicting situations in the field in order to minimise the exposure of the individuals or the agencies engaged in project execution. In the process of the expected re-establishment of a Somali government, PACSU will facilitate and support capacity building of regional and national authorities in the field of agriculture and irrigation.

Monitoring and Evaluation

The project should be subject to the normal monitoring and evaluation procedures, carried out by independent institutions or individuals. It is worth rementioning that besides the general political and social uncertainties, the chosen approach for the project implementation will only be successful if the application of (new) development tools (PRA) and the interaction of the implementing partners (NGOS) and project supervision (PACSU) is smooth and effective. It is therefore important to recall that the study team strongly recommends to thoroughly evaluate the present SHARP programme with special focus on the responsiveness of the rural population to PRA and the achievements of the initiated rehabilitation operations (canal clearing). It is equally important for the effective monitoring and supervision of further project operations to carry out a baseline survey and to establish a reference system for the project activities (i.e. an adequate set of economic and social data) as early as possible. These two elements in hand, a mid-term review, including the evaluation of PACSU and the implementing partners should preferably take place in the course of year 3 of the 5-year project. The obtained results of the mid-term review will immediately by useful for eventual modifications in project approach or adjustments of expected results. Furthermore, at the moment of contract renewal with implementing partners, the selection of eventual new implementing partners will be allowed, as well the option to proceed to a more substantial project re-planning (e.g. new intervention areas, additional elements like infrastructure, involvement of new institutions, etc.) as the then prevailing situation may allow.

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Chapter 7 Logical Framework – Development of a Diversified Agriculture in Lower Shabelle Indicators of Achievement

Project Objectives

Sources of Information

Assumptions and Risks

Overall Objective of the project o

Household incomes for farming families are increased through improved agricultural production

No severe climatic hazard Security is restored and stable No inter-clanic rivalries or fighting and armed gangs are under control

Project Purpose o

Farmers in the project have equitable access to and use irrigation opportunities in a productive way and are enabled to operate and maintain the irrigation systems appropriately

Increased crop production per farm household Increased cash incomes from sales of agricultural produce Canal committees in rehabilitation zones are revitalized/created and member elected by user communities, and gate operators nominated, Statutes for committees on different level are elaborated and recognized as guideline for cooperation. Members of committees and operators have been trained and are qualified to assume their respective tasks.

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Data from reference households identified during bench-mark survey and further regular observation Reports from UNDP,FAO Data from progress and supervision reports Project monitoring and evaluation

No negative interference from other humanitarian actions Food aid takes into consideration domestic supply situation Commercial farmers cooperate constructively in the rehabilitation process of the entire system Common statutes have been adopted and are respected Inter-group/committee cooperation takes place Conflicts are settled in a peaceful way

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003 Results o

Result 1 Irrigation systems are rehabilitated and functional

Sources of Information

Indicators of Achievement -

Length of canals restored to full capacity Number of gates installed or repaired Progress on barrage – rehabilitation works

Annual work plans Regular observation of relevant project indicators Progress- and supervision reports and special field checks Contracts and disbursements for works and services Project monitoring and evaluation FAO Water and Land Information System

No hostile intervention or blocking policies conducted by interest groups inside or outside the project zone No pressure group is monopolising the provision for works and services

See above

Irrigation water is provided according to pre-established and agreed schedules among the water user communities Maintenance works are carried out by the water-user communities timely and up to standard Bench –mark survey on relevant socio-economic, agricultural and physical indicators has been executed A project-proper grid of reference units (households, farms, fields, canals, etc) for the systematic control of project effects is in place. SHARP evaluation report is available.

See above

Result 2 Improved agriculture production using Irrigation and diversified cropping is practiced on 35.000 ha of traditional farm land

Result 3 Water users organisations are enabled to maintain and operate the irrigation systems efficiently.

Result 4 Tools for project planning and monitoring and evaluation are in place.

Assumptions and Risks

Increase of acreage under efficient irrigation Changes in seasonal croppingpatterns and increased acreage per crop

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Project Inputs

Activities o

Activity 1.1 Rehabilitation of the irrigation systems in the districts of Jenaale and Qoorioley during 2004-2009

Implementing agencies and local staff for project implementation, training and extension (€ 2,5 million)

Activity 2.1 Improvement of farmers skills in irrigated farming and pest control for food and cashcrop production

Activity 2.2 Diversification of agricultural cropping pattern at farm level -

Formal and informal training activities for individuals, farmer-groups, conduct of practical field demonstrations, Conduct a survey on the knowledge deficits and best way of knowledge transfer and skill development with the specific target group Organise mobilisation campaigns explaining project and role of stakeholders Conduct of trials of new crops and new varieties crops; tests of irrigation schedules and soil preparation. Variety trials and seed multiplication on alternative food crops, oil seeds and pest control and irrigation practice. Plant seed multiplication plots and select farmers for seed multiplication for confirmed varieties or crops

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Assumptions and Risks

Sources of Information

Political situation allows a full Project documents deployment of personnel and Contracts with Implementing partners and project infrastructure contractors for works and services Independent Evaluation and monitoring Reports Quarterly project reports Special audits See above

See above

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Activities (continued) o

Activity 3.1 Organisation and training of Canal Committees and canal operators to operate and maintain the canal systems effectively and sustainable.

Project Inputs -

Activity 4.1 Bench –mark survey on relevant socioeconomic, agricultural and physical indicators. Activity 4.2 Establishment of a project-proper grid of reference units (households, farms, fields, canals, etc) for the systematic control of project effects.

Implementing agencies and local staff for project implementation, training and extension (€ 2,5 million) Formal and informal training activities for individuals, farmer-groups, conduct of practical field demonstrations, Organise formal and informal training programmes at levels of village, canal systems and project area level Assure close extension support to key personnel of the organisations Evaluation studies SHARP evaluation Bench mark survey Evaluation studies SHARP evaluation Bench mark survey

Assumptions and Risks

Sources of Information

See above

Planning documents and Special subject report

See above

Planning documents and Special subject report

See above

* PACSU is not included in the logframe as the existence of this unit is a precondition to carry out the project which is necessary under the given circumstances in Somalia.

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

ANNEX 1

Preliminary Assessment and Strategic Options Report

This Report was prepared by the Eurata Experts: Mr. Hans Hack Mr. Hector McKilligan

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Table of Contents 0

Executive Summary ...............................................................................................42

Introduction ...........................................................................................................44

1.1Purpose of the study

1.2Objective of the Study

1.3Implementation of the Study

Analysis and Assessment.......................................................................................46 2.1Area of Intervention

2.2Socio-economic Environment – Brief Overview

46 47 47 47

2.2.1 Population and Land Tenure 2.2.2 Authorities and Governance 2.2.3 Stakeholders

2.3Agricultural Production Potential 2.3.1 Land Use 2.3.2 Farm Sizes

2.4Crops and Cropping Patterns 2.4.1 Banana Production in Somalia 2.4.2 Other Perennial Crops 2.4.3 Annual Crops

48 48 50 51

2.5Yields & Production Potential

51 53 52

2.6Irrigation System

2.7Infrastructure and Equipment

2.5.1 Bananas 2.5.2 Annual Crops

48 48 48

The international Banana Market ..........................................................................55 3.1Evolution of international Banana Markets and Market-Regulations

3.2EU Regulations concerning ACP Banana Suppliers

3.3Implication for the Banana Sector in Somalia

Conclusions and Recommendations ......................................................................59 4.1Choice of the Strategic Option for the Implementation of SFA Operations in the former Banana Sector 59 4.2Key elements of Implementation 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3 4.2.4

Rehabilitation of the Irrigation System Institution Building Agricultural Activities Support to implementation

4.3Implementing Phase II of the Study

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60 60 61 61 62 62

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Annexes .................................................................................................................63 5.1Annex I: Time-Schedule and Activities

5.2Annex II: Persons Met

5.3Annex III: Documents Consulted

5.4Annex IV: Web-Sources on Banana Prices, Costs and Trade

List of Acronyms ACP CEFA CMO EU FAO NGO SFA SHEFA TNG UNCTAD USA

= = = = = = = = = = =

African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries Comitato Europea per la Formazione e agricoltura Common Market Organisation European Union Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations Non Governmental Organisation Special Framework of Assistance Shebelle Fruit Association Transitional National Government United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United States of America

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

0 Executive Summary The objective of the Banana Sector Study for Somalia as defined in the ToR is “to assess the banana industry in the context of irrigated crop production. Based on the assessment a strategy to improve banana production to an internationally competitive level will be developed. In case this is not sustainable, a strategy for diversification of irrigated crop production will be developed.” The study is carried out in two phases. Phase I was implemented between February 13th and March 03rd, 2003 by H. Hack, and H. McKilligan. The result of Phase I is presented in the Preliminary Assessment and Strategic Options Report, providing the baseline for the decision on the focus of the support programme under the Special Framework of Assistance for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Banana in the Lower Shabelle region. Phase II is scheduled for May/June 2003. The assessment and analysis of information collected from a field mission to the area of intervention, interviews with a great number of experts and stakeholders and consultation of relevant documents, the consultants came to the following conclusions presented in the report hereafter: 1.

Prospects for the re-entry of the Somali banana industry in the international market are not encouraging and the single crop oriented recovery programme would bear a high risk. There is, however, a reasonable and expandable local/domestic market and some possibility of limited exports to regional markets, so that banana production will be able to continue to the extent of that demand.

Somalia is a food deficit country, depending on commercial imports and food aid. Therefore, there is a strong case for the agricultural production potential of the former banana areas to be used to grow food crops and food production to be maximised throughout the irrigable area, where successful cropping is not dependent on rainfall. A diversified cropping pattern will allow a better choice of crops and cropping intensities to the availability of water over the year and within the area.

The diversification option, introducing an expanded and intensified cropping pattern of food crops, oil seed, vegetables and fruit (including banana) for subsistence and supply of the domestic markets will be directly beneficial to a larger number of farmers and provide a greater spread of increased household incomes among the rural population. A diversified range of products will reduce the farmers exposure to price fluctuations in the still highly volatile domestic markets for all commodities.

The proposed option of a recovery strategy represents the first steps from mainly relief–oriented activities towards a more systematic development approach. The operations of the proposed recovery programme will be successful only if largely autonomous socio-economic structures are emerging gradually in the region and when communities and stakeholders assume ownership and responsibilities, so far unknown to them. In that respect, the activities will, to some extend, have trial or pilot–phase

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

character where progress depends essentially on the response and absorption capacity of the target-groups. The recovery programmes in the former banana growing areas should be oriented towards the development and improvement of a diversified agricultural productive system, rather than on a single crop approach. The objective of such an approach is to maximise the area of annual food crops grown under irrigation to reduce dependence on commercially imported food grain and/or food aid and to allow bananas and other perennial crops to be grown for the supply of local markets. Rehabilitation of the irrigation system is given the highest priority by the farmers of the community.

EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Purpose of the study Somalia, as an ACP member country and (former) traditional supplier of banana to the EU, is eligible to receive support, especially for the Banana sector, under the Special framework of Assistance for traditional ACP Suppliers of Banana (SFA) set up in 1999. In 1999 and 2000 Somalia did not apply for SFA funding. The present Banana Sector Study is financed under SFA allocation 2001 and the findings of the study will form the guidelines for design and implementation of subsequent SFA-funded support programmes, aiming at the “rehabilitation of productive agricultural systems in the traditional banana growing areas of southern Somalia”. Banana production in Somalia dominated the agricultural sector since the 70’s, and with periodic lows during the civil war, until 1997. In its prime periods, the banana sector has been Somalia’s second most important foreign exchange earner after livestock. It provided between 8 000-10 000 jobs in the production zones and guaranteed a steady cash-influx of up to 1 million USD per month. Civil unrest and floods in 1997 devastated the industry. No other crop or rural based industry has yet replaced the essential economic role of the banana sector, putting large sections of the population in the affected zones at risk to food insecurity and poverty. Until 1997, up to 10,000 ha of land in the three areas Middle Shabelle, Lower and Lower Juba, of which Lower Shabelle had banana plantations. (This represents about 60 % of the total growing area.) Apart from banana growing, the three irrigable areas form the largest potential for agricultural production and most valuable national asset, however are in desperate need for actions to stop further decay. The Terms of Reference suggest that the study should initially focus on the Lower Shebelle Region, because of its accessibility. This is roughly the area between Afgoi in the north to Haaway in the south, a distance of some 200 km along the course of the River Shebelle. Due to the absence of a central government, so far none of the international or EU support facilities could be mobilized for consistent recovery programmes in the former Banana areas, (with the exception of food aid and disaster relief operations, carried out by several NGOs). Since 2001, the activities of four NGOs that have been working in EU financed relief programmes in the Middle and Lower Shabelle, have been coordinated into a modest but more consistent approach.

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

1.2

Objective of the Study

The Terms of Reference of the Study Objective are as follows: “The objective of this consultancy is to assess the banana industry in the context of irrigated crop production. Based on the assessment a strategy to improve banana production to an internationally competitive level will be developed. In case this is not sustainable, a strategy for diversification of irrigated crop production will be developed.”

1.3

Implementation of the Study

The study is carried out in two distinctive phases: Phase I and Phase II. Phase I was carried out between 13th February and 28th of March. This included an assessment mission to the area of intervention in Somalia and a desk study, carried out in Nairobi and Europe, (see Annex I - Timetable). The result of Phase I of the Study is the present Preliminary Assessment and Strategic Options Report. The Assessment Study will provide a sound baseline for the decision-making of EU Somali Unit on the focus of the future recovery strategy in former banana growing areas. In Phase II, the study team will elaborate the technical and operational outlines of the chosen option in detail. This is upon endorsement by the EU Somali Unit of the strategy to be followed, with the team paying special attention to participation and commitment of stakeholders during implementation and their capability of later operation and maintenance of the rehabilitated elements. Field missions for Phase II are scheduled during May/June and the final report is to be submitted before end of August 2003.

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Chapter 2 Analysis and Assessment 2.1 Area of Intervention The Terms of Reference suggest that the study should focus initially on the Lower Shebelle Region, because of its accessibility. This is roughly the area between Afgoi in the north to Haaway in the south, a distance of some 200 km along the course of the River Shebelle. The field visit for the preliminary assessment was carried out in the main banana growing areas in the central part of Lower Shebelle, from Janaale in the north to Bulo Mareta in the south, covering abut 40 km of the river and around 30,000 ha of potentially irrigable land. In the past, this area was responsible for over 90% of banana production in the Lower Shebelle Region and over 50% of all Somali bananas. The consultants will refer to this central part of Lower Shabelle as “area of intervention”.

2.2

Socio-economic Environment – Brief Overview 2.2.1 Population and Land Tenure

The total population of the grand Lower Shabelle region was estimated in 19955 at 616.000 inhabitants, (urban 17%, rural 60%, nomadic 23%). In 1989 the rural population lived in 715 villages and the number of farms was about 70.000, of an average size of 2,7 ha. Out of about 200,000 ha of arable land, 40,000 ha were irrigable and 112,000 under rain fed cultivation.4 Compared to the total of 40,000 ha of irrigable land, the area under banana production, even at its peak around 1990, occupied annually about 8-9,000 ha shared by 1415 banana growers. The size of individual banana plantations was between 40 and 300 ha. In the Janaale-Bulo area, the current population is unknown due to the absence of civil authorities and census data. A report in 1978 by Sir M. Macdonald & Partners approximated the population of the Janaale – Bulo area at 112,310, comprising some 18,940 families in 128 villages, but there may have been considerable internal movement since the start of the civil war in 1990. It was reported by several observers that the sedentary population in the Shabelle region has largely remained stable after the years of turmoil and disaster. Due to clan-oriented control, there was no heavy permanent influx of immigrants from other regions. But many of the workers’ villages that were sited on the commercial farms have been abandoned, partly because of the lack of work and also because the collapse of the canal system has prevented drinking water reaching them. Most of these people are said to have moved into small

4 5

UNDOS, Nairobi, Lower Shabelle Region, Study on Governance, 1997 Nur A. Weheliye, The present role of the Banana sub sector…,1996

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

towns like Janaale, Shelembot, Qorooley and Golweyn as well as Merca, the district capital. However, major changes have taken place in land ownership. “Widespread expropriation and unlawful occupation of properties became common in Somalia after 1991.The result of a long and chaotic process can be summarized as follows. In 1997, there were very few farms belonging to individuals that are still occupied by newcomers. The real owners or their caretakers have now regained control of the property. The only exceptions are the farms owned by Siad Barre’s family. Most state farms or plantations owned by foreigners are still occupied. Newcomers, if successful, started cultivating state land because they knew that sooner or later, the issue of ownership would be raised and they shifted progressively from private farms to “State” land.”6 Changes in land use, cropping pattern and employment are direct consequences of the break-down of the banana industry, leaving the large banana-work force without employment. The progressing deterioration of the canal network forced the farmers to reduce their irrigated crops and larger areas are returned to rain fed cultivation, on smaller and large holdings alike. Banana production was reduced and replaced by food crops (self subsistence) oil seed, fruit and vegetables for small and irregular outlets on the local market at highly volatile prices. Although the final and legal settlement of land ownership may not be achieved in the near future, today, ownership disputes are not considered to form a crucial obstacle to start any rehabilitation measures in the area, that would be beneficial to the great majority of legal owners and farmers. The farming community attaches the highest priority to the improvement of the irrigation system and expresses willingness of active cooperation and commitment.

2.2.2 Authorities and Governance There is no central government with overall control in Somalia and security is a problem in many areas, including the capital, Mogadishu, with vehicle hijacking and kidnapping cited as major concerns. However, Merca town and the study area are relatively safe at present, although most vehicles travel with several armed guards. The TNG (Transitional National Government) does appear to have some influence in the area, with soldiers manning some checkpoints. Traditional councils of elders, as well as religious Sharia courts, are also said to have a role in the maintaining some order. Otherwise, the nearest approach to institutional organisation in the area, are the farmers committees, ranging from small village irrigation committees to the two main farmers’ associations, one representing small-scale farmers (Somalta’ab) and the other for the larger-scale banana farmers (SHEFA – Shebelle Fruit Association).

2.2.3 Stakeholders In addition transporters area include intervention 6

to the farmers themselves and a limited number of traders, and contractors, stakeholders concerned with development in the the EU and the NGOs working on irrigation and agriculture in the area – ADRA, CEFA, CARE and CONCERN. The Italian NGO, CEFA

UNDOS, Nairobi, Lower Shabelle Region, Study on Governance, 1997

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

(Comitato Europea per la Formazione e Agricultura) also provides back-stopping technical support to the other NGOs in the utilisation of EU funds.

2.3

Agricultural Production Potential 2.3.1

Land Use

The MacDonald study of 1978 gave the following summary of land use in the Janaale-Bulo area: Gross Area (ha) Uncultivated land: Annual crops (rainfed/part irrigated): Annual crops (irrigated): Bananas: Other perennial crops: Total:

17,450 15,565 27,010 6,870 515 67,410

NetArea (ha) 5,078 11,512 4,067 305 20,962

In 1978, most of the cropping was dependent on irrigation and since the deterioration of the canal system following the civil war, it can be assumed that the cropping pattern may have changed considerably. Rainfed sorghum areas most probably will have expanded, at the expense of irrigated maize, and banana production is now confined to areas near the river, or to the first 2-3 km of the main canals and on farms with pumped irrigation from groundwater. 2.3.2

Farm Sizes

The MacDonald study of 1978 gives the average farm size for around 20,000 smallholders growing mainly annual crops, as 1.95 ha (range 0.5 – 13.0 ha), with an average net cropped area of 0.90 ha per farm. The smallholders association, Somalta’ab gives 15 ha as the maximum size of farm to qualify for membership. The number of commercial banana farms is not given in that report, but the 1996 report by Weheliye states that in 1994-95 there were 140 banana growers in the Shebelle Region, with 3003 ha of land under bananas. The individual plantation sizes ranged from 50-300+ ha. In Phase II of the study, it should be possible to establish the current number of banana farmers.

2.4

Crops and Cropping Patterns 2.4.1

Banana Production in Somalia

Historic Development: Banana production in Somalia started in the ‘30s in the Lower Shabelle where irrigated agriculture was developed and the main canals Primo Primario, Primo Secundario and Asyle ere constructed under Italian colonial administration. The major development of banana production took place between mid ‘50s and end of ‘60s when banana production was extended to Middle Shabelle and Lower Juba. Most banana producers were Italian as well as the traders and, most important, the traditional market for Somali Bananas has always been Italy, except small quantities exported to Saudi Arabia. Nationalisation policy at the end of the ‘60s led to a steady decline of the banana industry until the end of the EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

‘70s. In 1983 the National Banana Board (Somalfruit), a joint venture between producers, the Somali government and DeNadai was established. The almost complete destruction of the Somali Banana industry (due to civil unrest and the civil war of 1991) was followed by a short period of massive rehabilitation efforts when DeNadai and Dole, major players in the international banana market, returned to Somalia. In 1998 however, the two foreign investors decided to interrupt any activity in the country. The main reason for this decision was the damages caused by El Niño related floods to the plantations and agricultural infrastructure. Nevertheless, the prospective cancellation of individual quotas for ACP countries under the new EU regulation on banana has also been accounted for. In fact, it was mainly the 60.000 MT exclusive quota for Somalia under the 1993 Regulation that made it attractive to operators and importers to invest in the rehabilitation of the banana industry during the period 1994-1998. Somali Banana production reached its peak in 1973, when about 150,000MT of banana were produced on 9,500 ha (about 60% in Lower Shabelle), yielding 2530MT per ha. Civil war in 1991 led to the almost complete destruction of the banana industry. During the recovery efforts of 1993-1997, in the Lower Shabelle region, the banana output reached again about 80,000MT. Approximately 65% of the total banana production in Somalia was exported and 35% went to domestic markets. The banana sector was not only the second export crop before war, it was also the major employer of the local population in the cropping areas. Production in the plantations absorbed a labour force of up to a total of about 10,000 and induced the development of related activities in up-and downstream sectors to the banana industry. Present Situation: After almost ten years without government and public institutions, very little of the industries infrastructure is left and there are no reliable figures available after 1996 on banana output, cropping areas etc. During the field mission in February 2003, it was observed that in spite of the poor state of the irrigation system, bananas do show some signs of recovery. The mission saw mature plantations and new fields being planted. Bananas were harvested for the local urban markets, and representatives of a Middle Eastern company, Shebelle Agro Products Ltd, have told the mission that they have identified 1600 ha from which they intend to purchase the crop for export over the next 12 months, for export to Middle East markets. If this is correct, it could represent some 15,000 Mt, compared with Somalia’s exports in 1996 (24,188 Mt), prior to the destruction of some 80% of the banana plantations by the floods of 1997/98, which were attributed to the “El Nino” weather effect. Although it was not mentioned by the representatives of Shebelle Agro Products Ltd., farmers told the mission that two trial shipments of bananas were exported last year --50,000 boxes (of 18.5 kg each) in April 2002 and 50,000 boxes in September 2002. Payment was on the basis of a Letter of Credit from the Dahabshil Bank, which has branches in Mogadishu and Nairobi. The price of US $ 1.50 per box of 18.5 kg was very low compared with the price paid in 1996 for a

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

12.5 kg box, although there are conflicting reports on that 1996 price, ranging from $2.00 to $2.70 per box. However, in spite of this apparent revival, there are many factors militating against future success for Somali bananas in the international market, apart from the irrigation. Some of these are mentioned below: •

Because they have to be irrigated, Somali bananas are more expensive to produce than the rainfed crops. Moreover yields are low, about half that of the main producing countries. Limited areas of ideal soils, strong winds, high evapo-transpiration rates and flooding are some of the factors responsible.

•

At the present time the DeNadai group is buying bananas in Ecuador at half the price they were paying for Somali bananas in 1996.

•

As soon as export earnings become significant, there is a real danger that criminal elements would be attracted to the area and disrupt the trade with theft and kidnappings etc.

•

The lack of any of support services for business – insurance, mechanical services, suppliers of spare parts, crop inputs and packing materials etc.

The local/regional market for bananas is potentially substantial and has been estimated at 30-40% of pre-war production levels, when it was possible to transport them as far as Hargeisha and Djibouti. However, at present these markets are not accessible due to poor roads and the security situation. Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and other Middle Eastern markets are also limited, with competition from the Philippines and Yemen. The latter is reported to be sending 100,000 Mt per annum into Saudi Arabia by road, although Somali farmers discount this, saying the Yemeni climate is often too cold and leads to unreliability of supply. It has been suggested that there might be export possibilities for organic bananas and certainly the conditions in Somalia would favour this type of production. The dry climate means that there are few problems with fungus diseases and even Sigatoka is unknown, which is a problem in most other banana producing countries. Nematode control by sun-fallowing is also said to be effective, and there are possibilities for banana weevil control using neem tree leaves or extracts, thereby minimising the need for proprietary chemicals.

2.4.2

Other Perennial Crops

The other perennial crops grown in the area are mainly: limes, mangoes, grapefruit, papaya and coconuts. Minor fruits like cherimoya and local fruits are also found. Most of these crops are for home consumption and for sale within Somalia in the urban markets. There have been some exports in the past, mainly to the Gulf and Middle Eastern countries; of limes, mangoes, grapefruit, watermelons and sesame (watermelons and grapefruits were also shipped to Italy with bananas). However, the volume of exports for all products was never very significant. The Consultants did see limes being dried for export on one farm EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

but they were also seen rotting away on another farm, having failed to find a market.

2.4.3

Annual Crops

Annual crops include maize, sorghum, sesame, rice, cowpeas, mung beans and ground nuts, as well as watermelons and vegetables like tomatoes, onions, garlic, lettuce and carrots. Cotton was important in the past but is no longer grown. Tobacco has also been important in the past but its current status is not known. Maize and sesame are the principal food crops grown in the irrigated areas, with sorghum in the rainfed areas and at the “tail” end of the irrigation system, which receives very little water. Around 300-500 ha of upland rice used to be grown on a mechanised state farm, but only minor areas of paddy rice are now found. Maize and sesame are the main crops in the irrigated areas and the traditional cropping pattern is to plant 100% of the land with maize with the main rains (Gu season – Apr/May/Jun), followed by a second crop of maize (60%) plus sesame (40%), with the second rains (Der season – Oct/Nov/Dec). The average rainfall for the whole year is less than 500 mm, so irrigation is essential for most crops. Minor crops like cowpeas are intercropped with maize and high value cash crops like watermelons and vegetables are grown all year round with irrigation, in pure stands. In the irrigated areas maize and sesame are also cash crops, with sesame in particular regularly fetching a good price. Somalia has structural food -grain deficits and is importing maize, thus local market outlets should be good, although complaints were heard about prices being depressed by the availability of food aid maize from WFP in the markets. Research plots were also visited where CEFA agronomists were conducting variety trials on sunflower, safflower, upland rice, paddy rice and groundnuts, as well as sesame (alternative irrigation system) and maize (stem borer control using Neem tree extract).

2.5

Yields & Production Potential 2.5.1

Bananas

Prior to the civil war, banana yields were reported to be around 25-30 Mt/ha/yr (gross), compared with yields in excess of 40 Mt/ha/yr, which are achieved in other banana producing countries. The exportable yield per hectare has also been rather low, as can be seen from the following figures extracted from the 1978 MacDonald report, based on data from aerial photography and the records of the National Banana Board. The average exportable yield would appear to have been less than 10 Mt/ha:

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Banana Production from Lower Shabelle

2.5.2

Year

Banana Area (ha)

1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977

3,400 3,917 4,700 4,694 4,209 3,897 3,895

Exported Yield (Mt)

36,710 60,650 46,270 41,470 34,990 33,870 28,810

Exportable Yield per ha (Mt)

10.8 15.5 9.8 8.8 8.3 8.7 7.4

Annual Crops

The MacDonald report gives the following yield estimates for the major annual crops grown in the irrigated area: Maize Maize Sesame

1.0 Mt/ha (on the better soils with irrigation) 0.6 Mt/ha (on the poorer soils with limited irrigation) 0.3 – 0.4 Mt/ha (0.5-0.8 Mt/ha in good years)

No figures are given for sorghum - the report only deals with the irrigated area.

2.6

Irrigation System

The source of irrigation water is the River Shebelle, which is silting-up and raising the height of the riverbed, forcing canal off-takes to be higher than their original level before they will work. The period over which the river flows at the higher levels is short and therefore less time and less water is available for irrigation. Silting of the river also contributes to flooding, damaging canals, roads and crops and hindering transport. The flat gradient of the river’s course will naturally result in flooding if the river is not regularly managed by dredging and bank reinforcement. Silting in the river also slows the flow of water, resulting in a faster rate of silt deposit, exacerbating the problem. Lower river levels than in previous years have been also been observed, and are believed to be the result of greater abstraction of water upstream in Ethiopia. Most of the irrigation canals are so badly silted up and choked with vegetation that they only operate when the river is at its highest, greatly reducing the irrigated area of crops. Another result of the non-functioning canal system is the breaching of riverbanks by farmers, to obtain irrigation water, which is resulting in uncontrolled flooding and wastage of water. Crops irrigated in this way are unlikely to get a second water application. Shortage of water also leads to conflict when farmers block the canals and breach the banks for irrigation, thus depriving farmers further downstream of water.

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Considerable work on rehabilitation and maintenance of canals, diversion structures and off-takes has been carried out by the NGOs and the farming communities, but much of their work has been rendered ineffective because of the rapid rate of silt deposit and build-up. There would appear to be several reasons for this. One is insufficient maintenance by de-silting after the initial canal rehabilitation. Another is the difficulty of reshaping canals to their original design and depth, because the banks of the canals have become too high for excavators to be able to reach the bottom. This seems to be result of inefficient cleaning in the past, with silt removed being deposited too near to the canals. A third reason for rapid silting is partial rehabilitation, with primary canals being cleaned but not the secondary canals or drainage channels at the same time. The result is a reduced or restricted flow out of the main canals. Tertiary canals are said to be well maintained by the farmers. They are small enough to be cleaned by hand and clans/families in the vicinity of such canals, and tend to be related and cooperation is easier with less likelihood of disputes. Village committees that control the allocation of water are said to be working well. Maintenance of the larger secondary and primary canals is more problematic. They are expensive to work on, requiring heavy machinery and because of their greater length (up to 36 km) they may also need cooperation between a number of different clans. When bananas were being exported the larger farmers could afford to maintain the main canals, to the benefit of the smaller farms downstream. However canal committees are functioning, and agreements for cost sharing with the NGOs have been reached and implemented, although farmers using water direct from the river are not keen to share costs of maintaining canals. Some pumping of irrigation water from boreholes was observed, where there was no water in the canals. This is obviously expensive and possibly entails some danger of a salinity build-up over time, due to the poor quality of ground water in some areas. Within the Janaale-Bulo Marerta irrigation system there are three main canals with a total command area of 32,000 ha, taking water from the River Shebelle. These are the Primo Secondario, Aseyle and Cesera Maria canals and they all start from the Janaale barrage. Specifications are as follows, but it should be noted that the Consultants cannot vouch for the accuracy of figures at this stage, since there has been some variation between sources of information: Primo Secondario Canal Length: 35 - 36 km Discharge drain: 8 km into the coastal dunes Design capacity: 2.65 cumecs Command area: 12,000 – 15,000 ha Feeds one secondary canal: Kel Shekaal (6.9 km) Aseyle Canal Length: 16 km Discharge: back into the River Shebelle Design capacity: 1.6 cumecs Command area: 6,500 ha No secondary canals

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Cesera Maria Canal Length: 17 km Discharge drain: via Kel Shekaal (6.9 km) into the coastal dunes Design capacity: 1.9 cumecs Command area: 12,000 ha Feeds 3 secondary canals: 7.3 km, 4.5 km and 4.0 km, in addition to Kel Shekaal In addition to the secondary canals, all three main canals also have direct offtakes to farms from their main channels, as does the river itself.

2.7

Infrastructure and Equipment

The port of Mogadishu is closed and Merca port is said to be accessible for only 8 months of the year due to rough seas (September to April). The tugs and pontoons previously used in Merca for loading bananas have all gone – stolen or destroyed. Large boats have to anchor offshore, beyond the reef and have to be loaded from smaller vessels. The roads are in very poor shape and during the wet season it could well be impossible to transport the crop to the port. The company proposing to export bananas has said that they intend improving the main roads to get the bananas out. Contracts for canal de-silting are with local owners of earth moving machinery, mainly the larger banana farmers and most of the machines are old and maintained by cannibalising parts from others, which is obviously not a sustainable situation.

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Chapter 3 The international Banana Market 3.1

Evolution of international Banana Markets and Market-Regulations

The situation of the international banana market since the late nineties is marked by a structural oversupply of bananas. The main cause of overproduction may be found in the producers/suppliers expectations generated by the liberalization in the European Market and in the increasing demand from the emerging markets in Eastern Europe, Russia, and China, which finally did not develop to projected levels. These circumstances, together with the sluggish growth of consumption in major developed markets (EU, USA) led to the actual situation resulting in declining real prices for bananas. Long term market analysis carried out by FAO7 and UNCTAD8 reveal that the terms of trade for bananas have experienced a steady deterioration in real terms already over the last 20 years, with few periodic exceptions due to national or regional market regulations or natural disaster. In the developed countries, which still account for 85 to 90 % of the total banana imports, the annual imports per capita have settled in the range of 9.5 to 10.5 kg since 1995 and the increasing stagnation has resulted in a significant decline in import (c.i.f.) prices. This long-term progressive stagnation of demand and increasing oversupply is confirmed by Projections for Supply and Demand of Bananas to 2005, FAO 1999, predicting an underlying world market growth rate for demand of 1.5% p.a. against an increase of world net exports of 2.2% p.a. The projected volume of international banana trade is of 13.7 million tonnes in 2005. However, “this balance would be attained only by a decline in real prices as a result of sharp decrease in import demand growth rates and the lag in production adjustment in face of decreasing prices”9. The projected overall price decline is 18 per cent, including a decline of some 25 per cent in North America and a smaller decline of about 6 per cent within the European market. Strategies to escape the squeeze of margins by focussing on “Niche” markets such as organic production or fair-trade production offers only limited prospects for the time being. Although progressing at annual rates of 15-20 percent, the share of internationally traded “organic” bananas is estimated at less than 90.000 MT actually, against a total volume of about 12 million MT . The main EUmarkets for organic bananas are Germany, United Kingdom at an estimated volume of 15-20.000 tonnes annually. The production of organic Bananas, according to the standards set by the major consumer countries, requires very specific and cost intensive agricultural practices in soil fertility management and pest control. Major problems however are encountered in logistics. As the traded volumes are low, market entry costs 7

FAO, Projections for Supply and Demand of Bananas to 2005 (May 1999) UNCTAD, InfoComm, Market Information,Commodities, 2002 9 FAO, Le Marché de la Banane biologique et de la Banane du Commerce èquitable, (May 1999) 8

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

are comparably very high and transports, as a rule, have to be associated to normal banana shipments. Countries without regular Banana shipments will face prohibitive costs of market access for organic or fait-trade productions.3 Fundamental changes are also taking place in the international marketing chain for Bananas. In the last 20 years there has been a move away of multinationals from direct growing in order to focus on more specific marketing and distribution activities. Following this strategy, multinationals avoid production risks, such as those related to natural disaster, as well as environmental and social costs of production. It is the local producer who has to face these costs.2

3.2

EU Regulations concerning ACP Banana Suppliers

The current EU regulation on banana, (CMO) – Common Market Organisation on Bananas, came into existence in 1993, in response to the EU single market and will remain in force until December 31st 2005. From January 1st 2006, further steps towards liberalisation of the market will be implemented under WTO agreements, precise details have yet to be agreed upon. An increased competitive pressure on all suppliers, ACP and non-ACP, is to be expected. The main features of these EU-regulations for ACP banana producers are the following: • •

The overall import quota for ACP countries is 750.000 MT, with a preferential tax-exemption (zero tariff) No sub-quota is given to individual ACP countries

Above these protected quantities, third country bananas and non-traditional ACP bananas are allowed into the EU up to a level of 2 million tonnes, with only a duty of 75 €. Above these 2 million tonnes, import duties of 680 € / tonne for non-ACP countries and 380 €/tonne for ACP countries are applicable. The main objective of these regulations was to allow harmonization of the banana market, guarantee free movement of bananas within the community. The accorded transitory preferences would ensure adequate incomes and promote improvement of efficiency in banana production for traditional suppliers of bananas to the EU. While the abolishment of individual quotas has been a big chance for established and competitive ACP suppliers to increase their individual share, it presents for Somalia, a major setback. The “loss” of the former 60.000 MT country-quota minimizes the attractiveness of the Somali banana sector to potential external investors, to try a turn-around, similar to the ‘90s. In compensation of the loss of entry privileges to the European market, a number of financial and economic instruments such as structural adjustment, STABEX and support to production have been available during the past years.

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

The lack of a National Government prohibited Somalia’s access to these facilities since 1991. At present The Special Framework of assistance for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas (SFA) of the EU, started in 1999, offers another opportunity of assistance to either improve the national banana industry to international competition or to convert the agricultural potentials into a more sustainable and viable structure

3.3

Implication for the Banana Sector in Somalia

Prospects for the return of the Somali banana industry in the international market are not encouraging. In fact, Somalia’s actual position is that of a newcomer, starting under severe material, institutional and financial handicaps into an oversupplied and extremely competitive market. It has to be recognized that all crucial elements of a well functioning banana sector, including irrigation, roads and ports, intermediaries, trade organisation, financial and institutional system, would have to be fundamentally rehabilitated and /or rebuilt, requiring a massive and rapid injection of capital, to be engaged under considerable financial and economic risks. The high risk of such a strategy would persist, even under the assumption of full security, freedom of movement and gradually emerging administrations and public institutions in the area of intervention and in the Country. It might be reminded that the (once successful) recovery operation during 1993 to 1997 took place under a more stable political and economic environment, was essentially driven by multinational capital and know how, and was favoured by highly preferential market conditions. The financial commitment of the DeNadai/Dole group was crucial for the rehabilitation, both in terms of providing the growers with essential farm input and financial resources, technical management as well as handling the totality of export operations10. None of these factors are given in the prevailing situation. However, even under extremely difficult conditions, banana production in Somalia has survived and is supplying local outlets on a very limited scale, without major investments into farms and irrigation system and using-up the remaining production assets. The domestic market, which has been one important outlet in the past (est. of up to 30,000T p.a.), will be the most reliable basis of survival and for further development of the Somali banana production. However, instead one can rather speak of “local markets”, due to bad transport conditions, insecurity and restrictions in free movement of goods and persons. In addition to the potential of domestic banana consumption, (probably limited) exports to Libya and or Middle East markets are providing additional opportunities. Some of these exports are reported during the past 2 years. In 2003 further exports to regional markets are planned. Bananas for the domestic market are traded at farm gate for 5-6$/quintal, which is considered insufficient to cover even the production costs. It is reported that for exports the new traders offer 1,5 to 2USD /box of 12,5 kg; modalities of payment to the producers are not known. Prices in these limited markets are extremely volatile.

Nur A. Weheliye, EU, The present Role of the Banana Subsector in the Somali Economy..., 1996

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

It can be concluded that in the short and middle term, the most realistic path of future development for the banana Sector of Somalia would be follow the steady demand of the domestic market(s) and gradually extend to neighbouring countries and additional regional outlets/exports in the Middle East region, as the opportunities develop. The continuity of banana production rather than the recovery of the banana industry in Somalia would be imbedded into a comprehensive rehabilitation strategy of the agricultural production potential in Lower Shabelle, ability to respond flexibly to real demand and to provide improved income opportunities for the largest possible number of farmers, large and small.

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Chapter 4 Conclusions and Recommendations 4.1

Choice of the Strategic Option for the Implementation of SFA Operations in the former Banana Sector

After the assessments of the present status of Somali Banana production and it’s chances to achieve a sustainable recovery, including a successful re-entry into the international banana export markets, the consultants conclusion at the end of Phase I of the Banana Sector study are as follows: Prospects for the re-entry of the Somali banana industry in the international market are not encouraging and the single crop oriented recovery programme would bear a high risk. There is, however, a reasonable and expandable local/domestic market and some possibility of limited exports to regional markets, so that banana production will be able to continue to the extent of that demand. Somalia is a food deficit country, depending on commercial imports and food aid. Therefore, there is a strong case for the agricultural production potential of the former banana areas to be used to grow food crops and food production to be maximised throughout the irrigable area, where successful cropping is not dependent on rainfall. A diversified cropping pattern will allow a better choice of crops and cropping intensities to the availability of water over the year and within the area. The diversification option, introducing an expanded and intensified cropping pattern of food crops, oil seed, vegetables and fruit (including banana) for subsistence and supply of the domestic markets will be directly beneficial to a larger number of farmers and provide a greater spread of increased household incomes among the rural population. A diversified range of products will reduce the farmers exposure to price fluctuations in the still highly volatile domestic markets for all commodities. The recovery programmes in the former banana growing areas should be oriented towards the development and improvement of a diversified agricultural productive system, rather than on a single crop approach. The objective of such an approach is to maximise the area of annual food crops grown under irrigation to reduce dependence on commercially imported food grain and/or food aid and to allow bananas and other perennial crops to be grown for the supply of local markets. Rehabilitation of the irrigation system is given the highest priority by the farmers of the community. The proposed option of a recovery strategy represents the first steps from mainly relief– oriented activities towards a more systematic development approach. The operations of the proposed recovery programme will be successful only if largely autonomous socio-economic structures are emerging gradually in the region and when communities and stakeholders assume ownership and responsibilities, so far unknown to them. In that respect, the activities will, to some extend, have trial or pilot–phase character where progress depends essentially on the response and absorption capacity of the target-groups.

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

After the assessment of the present status of Somali Banana production and its chances to achieve a sustainable recovery, including a successful re-entry into the international

4.2

Key elements of Implementation 4.2.1

Rehabilitation of the Irrigation System

The key element of any recovery operation in the Lower Shabelle region is the rehabilitation of the irrigation network aiming at (a) prevention of further deterioration, (b) improvement of access to irrigation-water for farmers and (c) increasing distribution efficiency of the canal system. There are several different approaches that can be considered for rehabilitation of the irrigation system. The choice of which would affect the scope of the study. These are given below, in three scenarios: 1st Scenario: -

Rehabilitation of all of Lower Shebelle, from Afgoi in the north to Bulo Marerta in the south, some 50,000 to 60,000 ha irrigable land.

Rehabilitation of the main banana area between Janaale and Bulo Marerta, which amounts to about 30,000 ha of irrigable land (Merka District).

2nd Scenario: Full rehabilitation to the original design capacity. This will be the slowest and most expensive option, but will ensure maximisation of the irrigable area and achievement of its full crop production potential. or Partial rehabilitation and repair. This option will be faster and cheaper, but will not achieve maximum irrigation or full crop production potential. or Partial rehabilitation as an emergency approach, followed by full rehabilitation at a later date. This would give some results quickly as well as providing for eventual development to full irrigation potential. 3rd Scenario: Rehabilitation of all three main canal systems, along with the associated secondary and tertiary canals, in one operation. or Rehabilitation of each main canal system in turn, which would have the advantage of the first one acting as a pilot scheme for the others.

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

During Phase II of the Strategy Study, the amount of work to be done and the best method of doing it will be assessed, paying particular attention to the need for redesign of the canal system, where necessary, to enable low cost maintenance by the communities and to make water available to the entire command area. The rehabilitation-plan would ensure coordination of effort between the implementing agencies and NGOs, a logical approach to the rehabilitation work, as well as a programme for future maintenance and training of farmers. Proposed actions should be achievable, within a reasonable time scale, sustainable in terms of community maintenance and should aim to maximise the use of water resources. In view of the specific expertise required in the field of irrigation engineering, it is proposed to include an additional irrigation engineer into the study team for Phase II.

4.2.2

Institution Building

To ensure sustainability of the implemented measures, it is essential that the stakeholders are involved at all stages of programme design, execution and operation. Therefore, the second key element is appropriate support activities aiming at the enforcement of local institutions and stakeholder organisations to enable these to operate and maintain the (rehabilitated) system. There are no government institutions, so Phase II of the study would involve discussions with the farmers associations, particularly the small scale farmers association - Somalta’ab, and SHEFA – the Shebelle Fruit Association for the larger banana farmers, to determine their strengths and weaknesses, assess training and organisational needs, as well as requirements for buildings, storage, equipment, communication and transport.

4.2.3

Agricultural Activities

To ensure economic viability of the recovery programme, it is essential to maximise the return per unit of irrigation water. The third key element of the recovery strategy is support to the farmer community for the improvement of agricultural practice, farming systems and crop varieties to achieve higher production levels. Also market access and marketing techniques must be improved, eventually strengthened through consistent purchase operations by food-aid and relief programmes. During Phase II of the study, the current situation regarding land use and crop areas in terms of farmer numbers, land tenure, farming systems and crop production levels will be assessed. The estimated effects and benefits of rehabilitating the irrigation system on future crop production, both in terms of farm incomes and increased food security will form one of the crucial parameters for the assessment of the economic viability of the different rehabilitation scenarios. The results of the current crop trials would be studied and recommendations made as to their importance and relevance for improving crop production. Factors to be looked at would include: irrigation methods to make more efficient use of water, integrated pest management to minimise the need for purchased chemicals, higher yielding varieties – especially for maize and new crops for diversification of the farming system. Methods of increasing banana productivity, such as high density planting, would also receive attention.

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

The success of the 2003 export effort on bananas will be examined, as well as the problems and bottlenecks the banana growers are facing. Availability of labour, crop inputs and machinery would be included in the assessment. Similarly, the crop production and marketing problems of the small farmers will be evaluated with a view to recommending a strategy for increasing crop yields and productivity.

4.2.4

Support to implementation

The interventions will follow the principles of participatory planning and implementation. The communities of beneficiaries must show cooperative commitment to the operations and are requested to provide material contribution to investment and maintenance amounts. The operations will essentially be stakeholder driven, assisted by implementing partners providing technical assistance and playing the role of facilitators. External implementing partners in the field would be the group of NGO, already present in the area since several years. These organisations have developed an excellent understanding of the social context and demonstrated their ability to maintain external and local field-staff operating under hardship conditions in the area of intervention. During the last year, under the (EU financed) coordinated action programme, valuable technical documents for intensified coaching activities in institution building and irrigation network rehabilitation have been elaborated by CEFA staff. In respect to the increased volume and complexity of the rehabilitation works on the irrigation system and the collateral activities, the set-up of a special operation unit may however be justified. This Unit would (a) coordinate the interventions of the NGO and eventual other organisations in the project area, (b) provide special expert input and backstopping to the field staff, (c) assure close monitoring and quality control of project operations. As long as security problems are not settled permanently, this Unit would preferably be bases in Nairobi.

4.3

Implementing Phase II of the Study

The field-missions during phase II of the Study are planned to take place during the months of May and June, when the water levels are high in river and canals and the crops in the fields can best be observed. Given the crucial importance of irrigation in the recovery strategy, it appears necessary to complete the team by an additional irrigation engineer during Phase II. The experts’ inputs will be the evaluation of the different implementation scenarios (extent, location, timing, mode of execution) and to contribute to selection of the most preferable option to be implemented. However, under the option of diversification, it is justified to reduce the marketing experts intervention and concentrate on the survey of the local/ domestic markets for agricultural products of the project area.

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Chapter 5 Annexes Team Phase I:

5.1

Hans Hack, Agro economist/Team leader Hector McKilligan, Agronomist

Annex I: Time-Schedule and Activities

The execution of the Study was commissioned to EURATA under a framework contract on 20th Nov. 02. 13th Feb. 03: arrival of start-up team for the study, H. Hack, agro economist/ team leader and H. McKilligan, agronomist arrived in Nairobi 13th to16th Feb: discussions/data collection Nairobi, interviews with (EC Somali Unit, CEFA, FSAU, former Somali Banana growers, representative of de Nadai-Group) 17th to 22nd Feb: field visit to Somalia/Merca; field trips within Janaale-Bulo Mareta area; discussions with Staff of CEFA, CARE, individual Banana Farmers, Small Farmer’s Association (Somalta’ab), Banana Farmers Association (SHEFA), study of technical documentation prepared by CEFA. 23rd Feb to 03rd March: further data collection and meetings with stakeholders. Special meeting with Agriculture Working Group of SACB. 03rd March Wrap-up meeting with EC Somali Unit. During all stages of their presence in Nairobi and Somalia, the Consultants work was effectively facilitated by excellent support, practical assistance and frank cooperation received, especially from EC-Somali Unit and CEFA staff in Merca. The Consultants did not encounter any security problem while in Somalia.

5.2

Annex II: Persons Met

Christoph Langenkamp, Rural Development TA, EU Somalia Uniut, Nairobi. Eric Beaume, First Secretary, EU Somalia Unit, Nairobi. Alberto Fait, Coordinator (outgoing), CEFA – Somalia, Nairobi. Francesco Baldo, Coordinator, CEFA – Somalia, Nairobi. Guenter Wessel, Project Manager, CEFA – Somalia. Buzz Sharp, FSAU – Food Security Assessment Unit, FAO, Nairobi. Abdi Salat Dahir, Consultant & former Somali banana farmer, Nairobi. EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Mohamed Oday Omar, Agronomist & former Somali banana farmer, Nairobi. Mohamed Ahamed Sheikh, Snr. Agronomist, CEFA, Somalia. Mahmoud Mohamed Nur, Irrigation Engineer/Surveyor, CEFA, Somalia. Osman Ali Asayir, Chairman Somalta’ab (small scale farmers association), Shelembot, Somalia. Colonel Abdu Hakim Abdullahi Sultan, Deputy Chairman, SHEFA –Shebelli Fruit Association (banana farmers association), Merca District, Somalia. Farm staff of Dr Osman Adan Abdulla, banana farmer, Merca District, Somalia. Farm staff of Osman Abdu Giile & Osman Ulusow, banana farmers, Merca District, Somalia. Adan Mohammed Heyle, banana farmer, Merca District, Somalia. Lex Kassenberg, Coordinator, CARE - Somalia, Nairobi. Hans Nagel, Project Coordinator, SHARP (Shebelle Agricultural Rehabilitation Project), CARE, Merca, Somalia. Gobinda Rajbhandari, Community Irrigation Management Specialist, SHARP (Shebelle Agricultural Rehabilitation Project), CARE, Merca, Somalia. Karanja J. Gikonyo, Project Manager, CONCERN, Merca, Somalia. Abdirizak A. Shakur Warsame, Personnel & Inventory Manager, Shebelle Agro Products Ltd., (banana exporters), Merca, Somalia. Amin Sh. Elmi, Deputy Manager, Shebelle Agro Products Ltd., (banana exporters), Merca, Somalia. Johan du Toit, Agronomist, CEFA, Somalia. Edward Baars, Agronomist/Community Mobilisation Specialist, CEFA, Somalia. Vittorio Travaglini, De Nadai Group (former Somali banana exporters), Nairobi. Peter Muthigani, Irrigation Engineer, CEFA, Somalia. Dr. Manfred van Eckert,, Regional Director, GTZ, Nairobi Arsfod Ngenoa, Programme Officer, GTZ, Nairobi

5.3

Annex III: Documents Consulted

“Homboy Area and Smallholder Banana Cultivation in the Lower Juba Valley and Assessment of Agricultural Benefits”, Main Report, Sir M. Macdonald & Partners Ltd., July 1987.

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

“Genale-Bulo Marerta Project”, Annex IV, Existing Agriculture, Sir M. Macdonald & Partners Ltd., July 1978. “Genale-Bulo Marerta Project”, Annex VI, Potential for Agricultural Development, Sir M. Macdonald & Partners Ltd., July 1978. “The Field Atlas of Settlements in Somalia”, 2000 Edition, UNDP/DIMU, Nairobi. “Agriculture in the Regions along the Shabelle”, Insituto Agronomico per L’Oltremare – Firenze, by M.Khalif & H. Ismail, 1989. “The Agroclimatology of Somalia”, Technical Report No. 12, Ministry of Agriculture, Somali Democratic Republic, FEWS project, 1988. “Making Ends Meet, An Introduction to Rural Livelihoods in Somalia”, Alexandra France & Buzz Sharp, FSAU (Food Security Assessment Unit), FAO, Nairobi, August 2002. “FOCUS - 2002 Gu Season and Food Security Implications for Somalia in the coming year”, FSAU, FAO, Nairobi, November 2002. “Food Economy baseline Profiles, Shebelle Riverine: Irrigated maize”, FSAU, FAO, Nairobi, 2000. “Monthly Food Security Report, Somalia”, FSAU, FAO, Nairobi, February 2003. Weheliye, Nur A., The present role of the banana sub sector in the Somali economy and its political and social ramifications. European Commission-Somali Unit, Nairobi, 1996 France, Alexandra, , Making ends meet. An introduction to rural livelihood in Somalia. FSAU Nairob i2002. Marchal, Roland, Survey of Mogadishu’s economy. EC Somali Unit, Nairobi, 2002 UNDOS, United Nations Office for Somalia,1997, Lower Shabelle region Study on governance, Nairobi European Commission Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia 2002 – 2007, February 2002 UNCTAD, Market information on Banana: Economic Policies, Market ,Market Chain, 2002 FAO, Intergovernmental Group on Bananas and Tropical Fruits: -

Projections for Supply and Demand of Bananas to 2005, Australia 1999

Le Marché de la Banane Biologique et de la Banane du Commerce equitable, 1999

Assessment of the New (April 2001) Banana Import Regime in the European Community (EC), 2001 Banana Statistics, 1999

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

5.4

Annex IV: Web-Sources on Banana Prices, Costs and Trade

Banana prices: http://www.nass.usda.gov/hi/fruit/annban.htm http://www.bananalink.org.uk/ http://www.citinv.it/associazioni/CNMS/archivio/strategie/confebana.html Social costs of bananas: http://www.eya.ca/mainresources/TWC_PDFs/TWC7.pdf Table of imports, exports etc..: http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/X7470E/x7470e03.htm#P2691_34545

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

ANNEX 2

Rehabilitation and Management of the Irrigation System on Lower Shabelle

This Report was prepared by the Eurata Expert: Domenico Fino

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Table of Contents 1

Background............................................................................................................70 1.1Origins, physical features, limitations and past operational criteria for the irrigation infrastructures 71

1.2Present situation and guiding principles under both a short-term immediate rehabilitation and a long-term development strategy 72

Immediate rehabilitation strategy .........................................................................74 2.1Present irrigation facilities and rehabilitation requirements 74

2.2Tentative estimate of the works’ quantities and cost 82

Implementation of programme .............................................................................87 3.13-year Implementation Scenario 88

3.25-year implementation scenario 90

Technical assistance required ...............................................................................92 4.1Design and implementation standards; after-rehabilitation management 92

4.2Development of long-term strategies within a river basin Authority framework 93

Maintenance requirements ....................................................................................96

Operation of the irrigation systems .....................................................................102

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List of Tables and Figures Tables Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 5.1 5.2

Main and secondary canals – Command areas by river intake Rehabilitation requirements: canals and control structures assessment Jenale barrage rehabilitation cost (US$) Mashally barrage rehabilitation cost (US$) Koriolay barrage rehabilitation cost (US$) Abdi Ali barrage rehabilitation cost (US$) Canals and control structures rehabilitation cost (US$) Summary of the cost estimate by system (US$) Summary of the cost estimate by category of work (US$) Maintenance annual cost by system (US$) Maintenance annual cost by category of work (US$)

Figures Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure

2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2

Jenale-Bulo Marerta Irrigation Project Jenale-Bulo Marerta Irrigation Project Infrastructure Layout Tentative work Plan (3-year scenario) Tentative work Plan (5-year scenario)

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Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

List of Acronyms

CT = DER = EU = FAO = GU = NGO = PASU = PRA = O & M= ST =

Counterpart Team The second rainy season (Oct/Nov/Dec) European Union Food and Agriculture Organisation The first rainy season (Apr/May/June) Non governmental Organisation Project Assistance and Supervision Unit Participatory Rural Appraisal Organisation and Methodology System Team

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Chapter 1 Background 1.1

Origins, physical features, limitations and past operational criteria for the irrigation infrastructures

Following the collapse of the banana market linked to the effects of the civil war in Somalia, the Jenale-Bulo Marerta area underwent a major economic setback. The area had largely benefited in the past from a well-established network of canals and drains, allowing for a consistent supplement to the scarce and unreliable rains with the abundant surface and underground waters from the Shabelle River. For many years, conducive soil and climate had sustained good performances of both cash and food crops under irrigated conditions, while extra water was used for leaching practices that kept salinity build-up under control. However, the drainage system began to rapidly silt up due to lack of a terminal outlet, because the flat topography does not allow for drainage water to be returned into the river by gravity, and the river itself had spread into large swamps, never reaching its end. Rainfed agriculture has always been marginal, though it continued steadily in association with traditional nomadic livestock herding. The irrigation system was originally based on a limited number of gated gravityfed river intakes feeding main canals. The main canals were designed in such a way as to have enough head to command the fields through secondary canals and further down, smaller tertiary canals to the individual farms’ intakes. Within these systems, each canal provided enough water to meet the irrigation requirements of its command area, by rotating a given water module among the farmers according to the irrigation intervals. Due to the flat morphology described above, increasing difficulties have been experienced with the drainage system as all possible depressions, and shallow old dried river beds were silting up while being utilised to dispose of drainage waters. Since the river seasonal fluctuation only allows for short high-level flow, cross regulators were provided on the Shabelle river in order to keep the hydraulic head at the main canals’ intakes at their design level as long as possible. However, all-year-round irrigation is required in the area for perennial crops. These perennial crops include not only banana but also citrus fruits. In particular, there was a local pink grapefruit that looked promising enough to raise the expectations of the banana farmers as they saw the market crisis looming in the early eighties. Unfortunately, the banana market crisis did occur as projected, and the grapefruit export first attempts proved that it was not competitive enough at the production level it had reached before the civil unrest erupted. However, at the time the irrigation system was conceived and put in place, banana exports provided very high revenues on average, allowing for comfortable pay-back of the conspicuous investment costs. Good shares of those EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

revenues were also used in properly applying technically sound operation procedures and regular maintenance practices, as taxes were levied to the benefit of the Government Departments managing the irrigation facilities. At that time, the farmers practised proper management, which is essential for large investments to bring about benefits, especially in sensitive physical and social environments such as this. Under specific environmental constraints, operating the canals and the relevant control structures according to the design criteria may become even more important than maintenance itself. Ordinary maintenance is implicitly secured by correct operational procedures, as no system would properly work without it. At the same time, operational difficulties would signal any need for extraordinary maintenance. While the area was prosperous, expensive management and time-consuming duties such as profit taxes from banana exports, and a government in place to defend everyone’s rights while providing irrigation support at public level was regularly being carried out. The study conducted by MacDonald in 1978 on the same Jenale-Bulo Marerta project area, reported a permanent staff of 45 at the Jenale and Korioley Government Offices in charge of O&Mof the irrigation network, including 18 gate operators. The study further proposed that the staff be reduced to 36, but the gate operator’s number be increased to 20. The concurrence of such favourable circumstances brought about economic growth through employment opportunities and most importantly, through irrigation support to sesame and traditional food crops. These crops could not have solely repaid the irrigation system, but yet the farmers could regularly benefit from it. When the river was at its highest, they received enough water at the beginning of both GU and DER season, where the scarce rains complemented with at least one application and the traditional flood-recession maize cultivation succeeded. After the river floods, irrigation was used to continue for months as long as water kept flowing, but for the perennial crops only. It was crucial at this time that river weirs’ gates could properly operate, so as to hold the water level high at the main canals’ intakes. As the river flow subsided and for the entire low-flow season afterwards, banana (and citrus) irrigation requirements were met by private bore-holes.

1.2

Present situation and guiding principles under both a shortterm immediate rehabilitation and a long-term development strategy

Sustained commercial production has allowed for the preservation of the irrigation system for decades of relative prosperity. In spite of the increasing shortage of adequate resources (caused by the severe deterioration of the social and economic conditions since the mid seventies), part of the irrigation facilities still operate at present in the area, though at an increasingly lower level of efficiency. The area remains one of the most productive in the country, hence significant income is still secured at least on the national and local market. Farmers have undertaken doing their utmost to take over from the dissolved government agencies with the management of the irrigation system. Donors are clearly having an important role in sensitising rural communities on the social EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

and economic reach of the issues at stake, as well as technical assistance through the various NGOs active However, as the entire irrigation system is slowly and under the present circumstances, much more should be delays.

providing advice and in the project area. steadily deteriorating done to avoid further

When introducing the rehabilitation measures that the Jenale-Bulo Marerta irrigation system may require, it must be pointed out that there are two orders of problems affecting the present poor and worrying conditions of the system. From the sheer technical point of view, the poor state of the barrages, canals and control structures is the result of years of extempore operation and inadequate maintenance. This however, should not be confused with an inevitable process of hydrological mutation that the river would have undergone anyway and to which the irrigation system would have had to adapt. The first order of problems deals therefore with short term strategies, while the second with long term. The two approaches outlined in the next section imply different political scenarios, as long-term strategies require the context of a widely recognised government, whilst immediate measures of rehabilitation and operational improvement do not require such a government and are being implemented (to some extent) without that context. Two short-term scenarios are dealt with separately in the next paragraph, based on the assessment of the shortcomings made in the field and hereby presented. The on-going negotiations may produce significant changes in the near future that would provide new options for the short-term rehabilitation strategy. Note that the level at which the assessment has been made, due also to the specific conditions in the area and the time made available for it, does not allow for detailed appraisal and hence conclusions and estimates are intended for preliminary orientation only.

EURATA â&#x20AC;&#x201C; European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association â&#x20AC;&#x201C; November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Chapter 2 Immediate rehabilitation strategy 2.1

Present irrigation facilities and rehabilitation requirements

The area investigated by the team of experts coincides with the extended Lower Shabelle cultivated area shown in Figure 2.1. This includes the Jenale – Golwen banana farms, as well as the surrounding interacting irrigated and non-irrigated traditional cultivations. Figure 2.2 shows the approximate late 1970’s limits of the land commanded by the main canals and the direct river intakes, the latter to be regarded as uncontrolled. The underlying distribution layout, which has not significantly changed in the course of the years, basically corresponds to the sketch provided, not to scale, in Figure 2.3. The system is based on four barrages meant to hold the river water level, so as to enable canals in their descending order from river intake down to each field to operate by gravity. Jenale’s barrage was built first in 1925, then Korioley’s and Falkeyrow’s (now called Abdi Ali barrage) in 1955. Later in 1968, a fourth barrage was built just downstream the Gaiverow road, which is now called Mashally or Gaiverow barrage. This was intended to boost the discharge of the Primo Secondario main canal from that point, in view of meeting the requirements of new downstream irrigation development projects. According to the information received, the link canal to Primo Secondario never received any water from the river because the barrage’s retention level proved too low in respect of the intake level. Most of the technicians consulted maintain the barrage was mistakenly constructed at the wrong level, compared to the bottom of the Primo Secondario canal at the link canal’s inlet, which now would clearly rule out any rehabilitation of the barrage. It is the opinion of the mission that these circumstances need to be verified by an accurate survey. In fact, the barrage itself looks quite high above the river banks’ level, which could also be a reason for the extensive flooding observed on both river banks of the at the site. Subject to such verification, it has been assumed that the rehabilitation of Mashally barrage would include raising the river bank upstream in order to allow water into the link canal. Design drawings were found to have not done the check on paper, yet the importance of the works suggests that such a gross oversight is unlikely to have occurred. Hence, the water level must permit the intended purpose once banks are raised to the gates retention level. (Otherwise, this barrage only requires limited rehabilitation, apart from gates blocked by rust and vandalism.) In contrast, major repairs and replacement are required for both Jenale and Korioley barrages, where conditions are aggravated by the excessive silting up of the river that hampers operating the gates. At these barrages also exists an evident flooding hazard, particularly because of the populated centres they are located at. Therefore, from raising the riverbanks, enough bed excavation has been provided in order to reach for the gate’s bottom, to re-establish their EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

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operation and facilitate the river flow across the barrages. Clearly, this is not an orthodox measure because the river will soon silt up again. However, under the adopted approach of delivering river water throughout the network as an immediate necessary objective, the proposed works are all justified, though not fully consistent with long-term rehabilitation. A number of canals were also provided as described above, and fed by main-river intakes normally located upstream the above four barrages. A proper network of secondary canals was never completed, except in part for Cesare Maria and Bokorow main canals. The breakdown of the command area by irrigation canal over the investigated area is given in the Table 2.1.

Figure 2.1 Jenale-Bulo Marerta Irrigation Project, Sir M MacDonald & Partners, 1978.

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Figure 2.2 Jenale-Bulo Marerta Irrigation Project, Sir M MacDonald & Partners, 1978, command areas

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Table 2.1 Main and secondary canals – Command areas by river intake Canal names

Command area

Jenale barrage Sigale East main canal – Left bank

250 ha

Sigale West main canal – Right bank

300 ha

Raydabley-Busley main canal – Right bank

450 ha

Degwariri main canal – Right bank

500 ha

Jiidow main canal – Right bank

600 ha

Cesare Maria main canal – Left bank 9 600 ha 2nd Secondario (Buffow) secondary canal 3rd Secondario secondary canal 4th Secondario secondary canal 5th Secondario (Shikal) secondary canal (to be fed by Cesare Maria according to the design, actually fed by its extension into Primo Secondario main canal) 6th Secondario secondary canal Primo Secondario main canal – Left bank

13 700 h

Asayle main canal – Right bank

7 550 ha

Mashally-Gaiverow barrage (not operational) Link to Primo Secondario main canal (not operational) – Left bank Korioley barrage Fornari main canal – Left bank

2 900 ha

Liban main canal – Right bank

1 250 ha

Abdi Ali barrage Bokorow main canal – Left bank

5 750 ha

1st East secondary canal 2nd East secondary canal 1st West secondary canal 2nd West secondary canal Falkeyrow main canal – Left bank

1 200 ha

Total for main canals

44 050 ha

Direct river intakes (some 400 minor canals)

10 150 ha

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Total command area

54 200 ha

The above data on the command area, listed by individual canal has been based on existing documents, mainly the 1978 study by Sir M MacDonald & Partners, with the adjustments that came from the field investigation carried out from 22 May to 5 June by the mission team. Though these data need to be re-confirmed, they might be useful in appreciating the scale of the existing irrigation facilities in need of rehabilitation. The table also shows that almost a third of the area under controlled irrigation would be served by the Primo Secondario main canal, which the majority of the largest and long-established banana farms lie along. The Primo Secondario is 35 km long with narrow strips of land it serves on both sides, illustrating a general trait of the system, which is the lack of secondary canals. Only the Cesare Maria and the Bokorow main canals include secondary level canals. This lack of secondary canals clearly re-confirms the severe drainage limitations caused by the flat topography. It can also be seen that the Jenale barrage has a particular importance, as the three main canals it feeds account in all for 75% of the potential controlled irrigation. The area under uncontrolled irrigation is quite large, exceeding 10 000 ha. This is made up by minor canals that are fed directly from the river, through breaches cut by a small group of farmers or even an individual farmer into the river bank. This is an illegal and highly dangerous practice, intended to anarchically escape from contributing to the maintenance of works benefiting the whole community that hence has to equally share the relevant cost. Moreover, an increased number of small canals implies higher silting rates and clearance requirements. Although some of these intakes have been provided with gates and somehow included in the irrigation system, such a high number of intakes (probably as many as 400) makes it virtually impossible for regular control of their conditions. Therefore, the river bank is exposed to high hazard, given the river has silted up and little or no freeboard exists during the floods. Large extensions of village and agricultural land become at flood risk in these circumstances. Unfortunately, most of these intakes do not have any gates, and bank erosion heavily occurs as water falls from river top bank to field level. It is hence imperative for gates to be provided everywhere and kept operational. Out of the total command area, a limited portion is deemed to be presently irrigated. No data are available on this land use efficiency indicator, but evidence in the field suggests that far less than half the irrigable area might have been under irrigation at the time the team was visiting the area. One of the reasons for that is the poor state of the canals. They all present some degree of silting sediments and vegetation, which reduces the hydraulic sections and thereby, only fractions of the design discharge can actually be delivered. They all have a terminal section that has remained dry throughout the irrigation season of the last years, the length of which is normally impressive, as indicated in Table 1.2 as “silted”. All control structures, the number of which is summarised in the table too, require major rehabilitation or complete re-construction. In many cases the needed gated structures were either never provided, or have totally collapsed.

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In order to restore operation, cleaning and excavation of the canals to the approximate original section is urgently required immediately, though inefficient it may be. In fact, re-designing the system according to the present water requirements would not be feasible for the time being. Until all control devices remain non-operational, large wastage will continue at the canals’ tail as water levels sufficient for gravity irrigation require that large supplies continuously pass down the canals. At night in particular, when little or no irrigation is done, large areas are flooded because the main intake does not allow for stopping the flow. This would put the riverbank at risk because the gates at the barrages cannot be operated on a daily basis to accordingly augment the river flow. Even if this was possible, the river itself would hardly receive the increased flow because of the severe silting. A serious consequence of this general state of disrepair is waterlogging and salt build-up in the soils over most of the area. A proper drainage system is neither in place nor possible until a major reclamation is engineered and performed for the river system allowing for an outlet through its terminal swamps. Pumping drainage water back into the canals has been also observed in the area, which is a totally reprehensible and ineffective practice. The required long-term, comprehensive approach would only be possible if a stable institutional framework is in place, and would exceed the mandate of the mission anyway. However, in the short-term, a minimum operating condition needs to be reestablished through the first-priority immediate measures. Indeed, if the canals are excavated for their full length and equipped with the necessary control devices, more land will be irrigated in their lower reaches and most of the wastage, water logging and salinity build-up avoided. In the following paragraphs, a possible programme for short-term immediate rehabilitation measures implemented is outlined, complete with tentative estimates of the required resources and implementation timing. Under this objective, it is envisaged that the concurrent contributions of different NGOs working under the same PRA approach in different sub-areas would be the only possible way ahead, provided that the expatriate and national staff in each organisation and/or the number of sub-areas are adequately increased, which also implies consistent budget allocation. In principle, each NGO should have full responsibility on all project components within the sub-area it has been assigned.

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Table 2.2. Rehabilitation requirements: canals and control structures assessment

Canal Dwnstr barrage

Length in km Name

Total

Silted

Number of structures Cross regulators

Tertiary intakes

Jenale

Sigale East Sigale West Busley Degwariri Jiidow Cesare M. 2nd sec./Buffow 3rd sec. 4th sec. 5th sec./Shikal 6th sec. Primo Secondario Asayle

3.50 10.00 5.00 6.00 11.00 15.50 7.30 4.20 4.50 6.00 5.00 35.00 16.50

3.00 6.50 4.00 3.50 8.00 13.50 4.30 4.20 4.50 4.00 3.00 19.00 13.50

1 2 1 1 2 4 5 3 4 4 1 11 7

10 24 12 14 25 41 20 15 12 18 12 158 80

Mashally

Link to Primo Sec.

3.00

Korioley

Fornari Liban

12.80 12.20

10.50 10.00

2 4

20 20

Abdi Ali

Bokorow 1st East sec. 2nd East sec. 1st West sec. 2nd West sec. Falkeyrow

16.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 4.50 2.50

9.00 2.00 3.50 1.50 4.50 1.50

2 0 0 0 0 1

48 8 11 7 10 8

0.00

400

Direct river intakes TOTAL

191.50

136.50

973

Note: Canals exceeding 8-10 km in length have larger cross sections, bridges, and regulators.

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2.2

Tentative estimate of the works’ quantities and cost

Cost estimates refer to the assumption that the works are executed by local contractors, except for the direct river intakes. In this case, the masonry works with the relevant gates and these figures are included in the estimates. However, rehabilitation costs are given only for main and secondary canals only in Table 2.7 and the canals that have not been included, fall into the tertiary level. These canals remain as the responsibility of the water users, i.e the farmers. For any cost components other than tertiary canals, estimates provide the overall cost including possible farmers’ contribution. Using these assumptions, please see Tables 2.2 to 2.9 for a representation of the tentative cost of the immediate rehabilitation works required to re-establish an acceptable level of operation with the irrigation system in the Jenale – Bulo Marerta area. According to the preliminary assessment made, a total cost of about 3,9 million US$ is required to achieve the short-term immediate objective of restoring the basic operational conditions of the systems. More than 50% of this amount would go for water control structures of the canals (30%) and direct river intakes (20%). The latter should not be rehabilitated, as this would inappropriately support practices that are neither legal nor technically orthodox. In the present circumstances however, where the river hydrological equilibrium is so risky, decision makers might have no choice but to fix all those intakes as per a minimum safety standard. Earth moving works (required for re-establishing the canals’ carrying capacity) account for an additional 40% of the total cost, while rehabilitation works at the four river barrages only represent 10% of it. As previously mentioned, the rehabilitation of the barrages is limited to the very immediate needs and major interventions should be properly conceived under an overall review of the floodplain hydrology. In terms of single systems, Jenale’s would absorb more than 50% of the total cost, Koriolay’s and Abdi Ali’s just over 10% each, and Mashally requires 5%, provided that the topographical survey prove it can be made operational by raising the river banks upstream. The remaining 20%balance would be used for uncontrolled direct intakes from the river, which clearly cannot be associated to any barrage. Table 2.3 Jenale barrage rehabilitation cost (US$) Cost component

Unit

River bed excavation Maintenance of scour sluice gates River bank formation Replacement of sluice gates Repair of sluice gates Civil works

m3 nb m3 nb nb ls

Quantity 40 000 6 20 000 5 6

Price

Component cost

0,75 1 250,00 0,50 4 500,00 2 500,00

Total cost

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30 000 7 500 10 000 22 500 15 000 3 500 88 500

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Table 2. 4 Mashally barrage rehabilitation cost (US$) Cost component

Unit

River bed excavation River bank formation Replacement of sluice gates Repair of sluice gates Civil works

m3 m3 nb nb ls

(SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION)

Quantity 20 000 160 000 3 5

Price

Component cost

0,75 0,50 4 500,00 2 500,00

15 000 80 000 13 500 12 500 2 000

Total cost

123 000

Table 2. 5 Koriolay barrage rehabilitation cost (US$) Cost component

Unit

River bed excavation River bank formation Replacement of sluice gates Repair of sluice gates Civil works

m3 m3 nb nb ls

Quantity 40 000 40 000 3 6

Price

Component cost

0,75 0,50 4 500,00 2 500,00

30 000 20 000 13 500 15 000 8 000

Total cost

86 500

Table 2.6 Abdi Ali barrage rehabilitation cost (US$) Cost component

Unit

River bed excavation River bank formation Replacement of sluice gates Repair of sluice gates Civil works

m3 m3 nb nb ls

Quantity 20 000 30 000 2 7

Price

Component cost

0.75 0.50 4 500.00 2 500.00

Total cost

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15 000 15 000 9 000 17 500 3 500 60 000

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Table 2.7 Canals and control structures rehabilitation cost (US$) Canal

Length

Excavation

Bank cut,

Name

(km)

& re-shap

fill, level

Sigale East Sigale West Busley Degwariri Jiidow Cesare M 2nd sec./Buffow 3rd sec. 4th sec. 5th sec./Shikal 6th sec. Primo Secondario Asayle

Cross regulators

Tertiary intakes

cost

3.50 10.00 5.00 6.00 11.00 15.50 7.30 4.20 4.50 6.00 5.00 35.00 16.50

10 500 75 000 15 000 18 000 82 500 116 250 21 900 12 600 13 500 18 000 15 000 262 500 123 750

1 750 25 000 2 500 3 000 27 500 38 750 3 650 2 100 2 250 3 000 2 500 87 500 41 250

1 2 1 1 2 4 5 3 4 4 1 11 7

2 500 12 000 2 500 2 500 12 000 24 000 12 500 7 500 10 000 10 000 2 500 66 000 42 000

10 24 12 14 25 41 20 15 12 18 12 158 80

7 500 48 000 9 000 10 500 50 000 82 000 15 000 11 250 9 000 13 500 9 000 316 000 160 000

129.50

784 500

240 750

206 000

441

740 750

Link to Primo Sec.

3.00

9 000

1 500

2 500

Mashally System

3.00

9 000

1 500

2 500

Fornari Liban

12.80 12.20

96 000 91 500

32 000 30 500

2 4

12 000 24 000

20 20

40 000 40 000

Koriolay System

25.00

187 500

62 500

36 000

80 000

Bokorow 1st East sec. 2nd East sec. 1st West sec. 2nd West sec. Falkeyrow

16.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 4.50 2.50

120 000 9 000 15 000 9 000 13 500 7 500

40 000 1 500 2 500 1 500 2 250 1 250

2 0 0 0 0 1

12 000 0 0 0 0 2 500

48 8 11 7 10 8

96 000 6 000 8 250 5 250 7 500 6 000

Abdi Ali System

34.00

174 000

49 000

14 500

129 000

400

800 000

Jenale System

Direct river intakes

TOTAL

191.50

1 155 000

353 750

259 000

973

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1 749 750

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Table 2.8 Summary of the cost estimate by system (US$) Jenale system's rehabilitation

2 060 500 Barrage

88 500

Canal excavation, re-shaping

784 500

Canal bank formation

240 750

Cross regulators

206 000

Tertiary intakes

740 750

Mashally system's rehabilitation (subject to confirmation)

136 000 Barrage

123 000

Canal excavation, re-shaping

9 000

Canal bank formation

1 500

Cross regulators

2 500

Tertiary intakes

Koriolay system's rehabilitation

452 500 Barrage

86 500

Canal excavation, re-shaping

187 500

Canal bank formation

62 500

Cross regulators

36 000

Tertiary intakes

80 000

Abdi Ali system's rehabilitation

426 500 Barrage

60 000

Canal excavation, re-shaping

174 000

Canal bank formation

49 000

Cross regulators

14 500

Tertiary intakes

129 000

Direct river intakes

800 000

Total rehabilitation cost in US$

3 875 500

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Table 2.9 Summary of the cost estimate by category of work (US$)

Jenale barrage rehabilitation

88 500

Mashally barrage rehabilitation (subject to confirmation)

123 000

Koriolay barrage rehabilitation

86 500

Abdi Ali barrage rehabilitation

60 000

Canal excavation and re-shaping

1 155 000

Canal bank formation

353 750

Cross regulators

259 000

Tertiary and direct river intakes

Total rehabilitation cost in US$

1 749 750

3 875 500

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Chapter 3 Implementation of programme In the short-term, this report deals more specifically with an immediate rehabilitation strategy, proposing the required organisation including staffing and timeframe. According to the possible developments in the economic and political set up, two different scenarios have been assumed. The two adopted scenarios contemplate different options on expatriate and local technical staff deployed, either a) the concurrence of co-ordinated NGOs or b) a combination of NGOs and private international firms. These correspond to two different durations and for the identified field activities, the time required to complete the rehabilitation programme is likely to depend on the resources mobilised. Basically, only the duration of an implementation programme depends on the nature and number of partners involved in the implementation programme. Otherwise, as far as technical results are concerned, whether they are NGOs or private companies does not make any significant difference. Equally, the number of partners would not affect the expected output provided that each partner is able to field one or more System or sub-system Team(s), fully autonomous and not overlapping, and that sufficient budget is timely allocated. It is also understood that the near-future political environment might dictate decisions on which kind of and how many partners need to be involved. It has been assumed that local contractors for earth works, masonry and hydromechanical devices will not be a limiting factor. This assumption sounds quite justified within the present context of the economic situation in Somalia, amazingly efficient though unofficial it may be. Nevertheless, should the outcome of the dialogue among the conflicting parties revive commercial activities, the number and capacities of the contractors available in Lower Shabelle will require new verification. Special concern exists on whether sufficient earth moving machinery would be available in the area under that scenario. Works have been divided in lots, each of them assigned to a System Team (ST), a self-contained technical unit responsible for surveys, design, contracting and supervision of works and duties, and operation and maintenance of the infrastructures both before and after rehabilitation. These management duties need to be gradually handed over to local Communities and future Government Authorities, and therefore the STs will also secure on-the-job training for the technical Counterpart Team (CT). This will consist of representatives elected by the communities, or Farmers Associations or Water Users Associations from the area served by the works the ST deals with. It is also expected that soon local Government’s Officials are appointed and join the CT as its driving force, to assist taking over from the ST. Understandably, ST and CT are meant to have the same composition in terms of functions. Training will also be given at the level of the tertiary canals, the rehabilitation of which remains at the users’ responsibility. This training will mostly consist of onfarm water management and field irrigation methods, in view of improved EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

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operational procedures. Farmers are accustomed to cleaning their canals and handling the irrigation schedules at the tertiary level. They are also used to doing this at their own cost, by contributing labour. It is very important however that their representative in charge of the water distribution at the tertiary level and their homologue in the ST have permanent interaction with their colleagues in charge of the secondary and main canals. The communication must be not only on management, but also on rehabilitation aspects. Based on the standard amount of works included in the average single lot, the relevant ST will include the following full-time staff: •

One Irrigation Engineer or Agronomist: This staff member will be either expatriate or Somali, and will have the task of assisting the farmers in selecting the most appropriate irrigation methods and improve on-farm application practices while co-ordinating the rehabilitation and management activities carried out by the farmers’ community at tertiary level and formulating demands for water allocations and schedules.

•

One expatriate Irrigation Engineer, to act as Team Leader, assisted by one Somali Engineer and two Somali Surveyors, all experienced in irrigation infrastructures. These staff will be in charge of the surveys, design and contracts/ supervision of the rehabilitation earth works along the canals, as well as the technical assistance and training on the operation and maintenance of the canals during and after the rehabilitation works. River-dredging and bank-raising will also be their responsibility.

•

Two Somali Civil Engineers, co-ordinated by the expatriate Team Leader, in charge of the surveys, design and contracts/supervision for the rehabilitation of the control structures along the canals and across the Shabelle river, as well as the technical assistance for the maintenance works during and after rehabilitation. These experts will in particular see that the best local technical standards are adopted for the repair/replacement of the gates, especially across the river, and relevant maintenance.

As for the co-ordination with the overlapping, on-going rehabilitation programme, it is actually planned that by the time the present programme enters into effect, the Cesare Maria main canal and its secondary canals 2nd to 6th will already be rehabilitated and only require maintenance and proper operation. Because delays can be expected with the progress of the on-going rehabilitation, (especially with control structures), the reporting team has opted for the inclusion, (though only weighted 50% since works have already started under SHARP in 2003), of the Cesare Maria sub-system in the rehabilitation programme.

3.1

3-year Implementation Scenario

A basic assumption that has been made to allow for the completion of the rehabilitation works within the limited 3-year indicated period, is the early involvement of private international partners, either consulting firms or main contractors. Stimulating the private initiative is thought to be the only effective EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003 88

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measure to accelerate the lengthy process of the all-level participatory approach dictated by the present lack of legal public administration. However the mission recognises that the reduced pace at which works are conducted at present is the only possible way under the present circumstances.! The PRA approach appears to be an inherent limiting factor for the speed of implementation. Also there appears to be some lack of coordination among the active implementing agencies. Having recognised agriculture as essential for the development of the lower Shabelle economy, and irrigation for the agricultural economy, immediate efforts should be directed towards rehabilitating the irrigation facilities in the shortest possible time and according to technical standards securing regular operation. In many ways, the inseparable economic and social recovery require a legitimate government in place. This first scenario is therefore based on the assumption that in the next few months, there is a reconciliation that enables Somolia to establishment a widely recognised Government. For major works such as river barrages, main and secondary canals, “the State” traditionally assumes the responsibility and the interaction would then be with the empowered Authorities. This would (i) expedite the technical and administrative steps and speed-up the implementation process, (ii) make it possible to involve private partners besides NGOs, which in turn provides for further thrust towards physical deliveries. On such assumption, the following lots have been identified together with the suggested type of organisation to be contracted and its envisaged staffing: •

Lot 1 (one ST, implemented by NGO, estimated value 417,250 $) Sigale East, Sigale West, Busley, Degwariri and Jiidow canals

•

Lot 2 (three STs, implemented by private Partner, estimated value 1,367,500+136,000* $) Jenale barrage, Primo Secondario, Asayle and Fornari main canals (two STs) Mashally barrage*, Link canal*, (*SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION)

•

Lot 3 (one ST, implemented by NGO, estimated value 50% of 455,750=227,875 $) Cesare Maria main canal’s sub-system (assumed as partly rehabilitated)

•

Lot 4 (two STs, implemented by private Partner, estimated value 699,000 $) Korioley and Abdi Ali barrages, Liban, Bokorow and Falkeyrow main canals’ sub-systems

•

Lot 5 (two STs, implemented by NGO, estimated value 800,000 $) Direct river intakes

Figure 3.1 shows the proposed time schedule for the implementation of the rehabilitation works under the specific political scenario illustrated above and allowing for the anticipated 3-year implementation objective. Works have been grouped as per the assumed sub-division into five separate lots. At the tendering stage, bidders might be allowed to submit for two or more lots, in attempt to limit the number of contracted partners. This however, would not EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

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change the work plan in the opinion of the mission team. Implementation of the first contracts is planned to start in July 2004, and all works will be fully in progress by early 2005. Works are scheduled to be completed by June 2007. It is generally arranged that the rehabilitation of control structures along the canals precede the excavation and bank formation. This minimises the maintenance workload because the lack of proper devices (which enable the system to function according to design criteria) is the first cause for canals to silt up, for embankment erosion, for water delivery failures and for soil salinity build up. Having the control structures in place however, is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition: gates need to be operated daily according to the project criteria, if the infrastructure is to be preserved. As discussed, carrying out regular maintenance and correct operation programmes on the rehabilitated works will be included in the task of each ST. On-the-job training will also be given to counterparts in those aspects, as well as rehabilitation techniques. Weather and river hydrology statistics have also been considered while drafting the work plan. Earth works at the river barrages are scheduled to be preferably executed during the low-flow period, and any earth works should stop in case of rain. Bank raising requires careful surveys and control with elevations and soil compacting, materials need to come from inside the river/canal bed first and then from far away from the embankment, never from the land strip adjacent to the embankment itself. This strip of land needs to be left untouched and cultivation on it strictly banned. These activities have been distributed through the fixed period in such a way as to avoid the inevitable peaks resulting from overlapping of different components that often reach beyond operational capacities.

3.2

5-year implementation scenario

This second scenario refers to the possibility that the peace conference does not bring the expected output at once. In this case the conditions enabling the forthcoming Government to involve private partners in the rehabilitation programme would not be there for some more time, and yet political opportunity suggests that the rehabilitation should however go ahead. As said, the only way ahead under this scenario would consist of contracting NGOs and carrying on with the present community-participation approach they make possible. Whatever the number of involved NGOs, the process would prove lengthy because of the approach itself. The minimum time required for the complete rehabilitation is estimated at not less than five years. That is why it is suggested to have three lots only, and three implementing NGOs: •

Lot 1 (two STs, implemented by NGO, estimated value 1,217,250 $) Sigale East, Sigale West, Busley, Degwariri and Jiidow canals, direct river intakes

•

Lot 2 (two STs, implemented by NGO, estimated value 1,415,375 $) Jenale barrage, Primo Secondario, Asayle and Cesare Maria (50%) main canals

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•

Lot 3 (two STs, implemented by NGO, estimated value 879,000+136,000* $) Korioley and Abdi Ali barrages, Fornari, Liban, Bokorow and Falkeyrow main canals Mashally barrage*, Link canal* (one ST) (*SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION)

It is important to note the staffing requirements for the eligible NGO: comparatively, two full-time STs as detailed above make a dramatic increase in the average technical resources deployed at present by any NGO active in the area. Figure 3.2 shows the proposed July 2004 to June 2009 work plan. As for the rehabilitation and management of the systems throughout the envisaged five years, the general criteria introduced in the last two paragraphs of the previous point 3.1 apply unchanged to the present scenario. If anything, the enlarged representation of the users and the stretched timeframe can make the project management slightly more demanding. SEE WORK PLAN, FIGURES 3.1 AND 3.2

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Chapter 4 Technical assistance required From the technical point of view, the envisaged STs are intended for full autonomy in respect to the assigned tasks. All the required capacities have been included to enable the field staff undertaking the rehabilitation programme; this is including operation and maintenance throughout, while at the same time providing on-the-job training to their counterpart. The only condition is that the implementing partners comply with staffing assumptions in number, qualification and permanence in the field. Nevertheless, co-ordinating the rehabilitation, maintenance and operation activities on such a large number of irrigation facilities is clearly a major challenge requiring continuous guidance and co-ordination at adequate technical and administrative level. In order for these activities to deliver sustainable results with a strong and effective training component, the staff of the implementing organisations will have to secure permanent commitment in the field and concentrate on the assigned components. The demanding context of the area cannot be overemphasized, particularly for expatriate professionals. The adverse conditions created over the years in Somalia by the long, persisting political instability and economic constraints are challenges that need to be tackled through appropriate logistic measures. When the STs are concentrating on their field activities, the co-ordination of an external steering unit from either Nairobi or Mogadishu is considered essential if the tight rehabilitation schedules dealt with in the previous paragraphs need to be respected. These schedules need to be respected if irreversible degrees of deterioration are to be averted in time.

4.1

Design and implementation standards; after-rehabilitation management

The main task of the proposed external monitoring and steering unit will be coordinating and harmonising the activities of the different partners involved by providing common orientation guidelines and technical backstopping. Except for the possible difference of method, which may be dictated by the nature of the single partner itself (e.g. NGO or private company), equal standards need to be complied with in implementing the agreed work plans and the same deadlines need to be met. As well, adequate maintenance programmes and strict operation procedures must be introduced as soon as the irrigation facilities are rehabilitated. It is proposed that technical support be provided through the Project Assistance and Supervision Unit (PASU) and be set up at an early stage to assist with the bid preparation and evaluation. PASU would be based in Nairobi or preferably in Mogadishu, and will include a full-time resident Engineer with strong experience in large, multi-sector irrigation development projects including EURATA â&#x20AC;&#x201C; European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association â&#x20AC;&#x201C; November 2003

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the implementation projects of significant civil works. In addition to this full-time expert, PASU would be availed with an adequate number of man-months for specialist expertise. This would enable the recruitment of short-term consultants to respond to specific needs of PASU, whenever not covered by the EU Somalia Unit. PASU will provide all concerned partners with rehabilitation technical criteria and design standard, and approve the detailed drawings, the local contracts and the payment certificates submitted accordingly. The rehabilitation design will have to take into account possible changes in the land tenure by adapting the irrigation schemes to the expected new number and size of farms, as well as to the diversified cropping patterns likely to be introduced. This will require effective interaction of PASU with the field STs and CTs, particularly between the respective Team Leaders and the Irrigation Agronomists in charge of assessing the water requirements of the farms. As soon as earthworks and control structures along the canals are completed to the point of re-establishing the function they are conceived for, it is imperative that they are operated according to that function and maintained in such proper conditions. Based on design criteria, expected local conditions and observed trends, PASU will dictate the best O&M practices to be adhered to by all implementing partners. Regular meetings will be held to discuss all technical aspects and external expertise will be brought in. This expertise may be necessary in order for the different lots and components to proceed according to the common standards and the time schedules agreed upon. It must be recognised that inadequate technical rehabilitation standards, delays in the works implementation, lack of maintenance, improper management or insufficient transfer of capacities to the counterpart may cause additional damage to the local/national community. Therefore, PASU is also meant to provide advice on whether a poor-performing partner’s contract should be annulled.

4.2

Development of long-term strategies within a river basin Authority framework

Should the initiated national reconciliation process re-confirm the positive perspectives that have recently prevailed in most stakeholders’ opinion, donors would become involved in the country with comprehensive, far-seeing programmes allowing for the long-waited move from relief towards development. With the EU likely being the most active donor at present, its on-going programme of revival of the agricultural sector would receive further attention and thrust. In the past, the two permanent rivers’ that flow through the irrigation facilities have provided vital support for the agricultural sector in Somalia. Therefore, the responsible approach by any legitimate government would be to carefully analyse the long-term consequences of the present deterioration trends. The present report makes reference to the traditional banana-growing Lower Shabelle area, which has been the object of the study carried out by the mission. EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

The main physical constraint to efficient irrigation in this area comes however from the river hydrological features and concerns the river basin as a whole. Since the river has no outlet besides the swamps, it dries up downstream from the Lower Shabelle irrigation systems, and these circumstances have caused a massive silting up of the river bed that heavily affects the barrages and the intakes. All irrigation canals similarly lack natural outlets, which makes the sediment deposit prohibitively rapid and the salinity build-up in the soils a serious hazard to agricultural productivity. Apart from re-establishing the original conveyance capacity of the systems through dredging and their correct operation through providing proper control devices and discouraging illegal practices, a long-term strategy needs to be adopted. This long-term strategy is by definition the role of the State, throughout its Government or successive Governments, to undertake comprehensive investigation and studies leading to the identification of effective and lasting solutions. In the specific case of the Lower Shabelle, Jenale-Bulo Marerta area, the solution might be the gradual embankment of the river starting far upstream around Johar or approximately where the flood-prone river section extends to, and proceeding downstream. This would imply the complete reconstruction, at higher elevation, of the barrages and the intakes along the river. The same bank raising would be necessary along the canals to dig proper drainage canals, and all control structures would then need to be reconstructed. The importance of the investment involved is so high that only a full fledged and firmly established Government would reasonably embark in anything similar. Please note that the above option is just a possible scenario among several possible solutions. Comprehensive, multi-sector studies will be required in order to re-design the overall river system, and certainly conclusions cannot be given beforehand. However, it is possible that the river flow is so firmly kept in place by its banks that it acquires a self-cleaning action due to the increased speed. In this scenario, the river would eventually find a stable way through the sandy swamps, provided that the banks are high enough. Whatever the outcome of the studies, technical solutions to the present trend need to be urgently identified by the forthcoming authorities. The river Shabelle continues silting up and most of the barrages, bridges and intakes will be submerged in few years. Even in other areas including the river Juba, long-term solutions to the rapid deterioration of the irrigation infrastructure need to be found before the systems deteriorate beyond control. The short-term strategy always remains the same, immediate re-establishment of operation as outlined in the previous paragraphs. The development, long-term strategy instead requires adequate studies to base far-reaching decisions on. A recipient Government would be the condition for any Donor to consider funding these studies. Also, given the complexity of the subject, these studies would need to analyse all the interacting factors within the river basin. It is likely that the entire Shabelle-Juba hydrological system will be considered, since the two rivers form an inseparable basin. The establishment of a River Basin Authority provided with the necessary resources and technical competences is important for the recipient too, if informed decisions are to be made. Should all this happen in the near future, PASU could be entrusted with the tasks of assisting the new-born Authority in EURATA â&#x20AC;&#x201C; European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association â&#x20AC;&#x201C; November 2003

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adequately structuring itself, conducting the necessary studies and making the right decisions on behalf of the Government. Sufficient provision of expertise should therefore be allowed particularly in the hydrology and river training sectors, as well as effective collaboration with parallel hydrological studies such as those compiled by the FAO. While investigating and preparing for long-term solutions, the anticipated River Basin Authority must engineer and put into effect appropriate management organisation and procedures including the beneficiary communities’ participation. The programme of immediate measures of rehabilitation outlined in this report together with the associated recommendations for strict operation and maintenance procedures will provide a unique opportunity for building the new authority on consolidated know-how.

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Chapter 5 Maintenance requirements Considering the huge investment required, the viability of any irrigation development highly depends on the accuracy with which preventive maintenance is planned and executed. If the canals and control gates are operated as planned, regular maintenance allows for preserving the infrastructure and extending its life span over the years. Although the economic life depends on the quality of the original works, (which is quite good in Lower Shabelle), in general a properly operated and maintained irrigation system can boost agricultural productivity for many decades in order to pay back the initial investment and generate additional benefits. Sometimes however, the irrigation systems need to be completely re-designed even before the end of their economic life in order to adapt to the changed physical or social environment. For instance, the development of urban and transport infrastructure had forced authorities in Europe to convert all irrigation canals into pipes by the end of the last century. In the process, European systems were modified to adapt to changed land tenure, cropping patterns, irrigation methods. This will likely be the case again with the Lower Shabelle’s hydrological trend, where the recurrent flood events might force the river into finding a new bed. This has happened in the past and may reoccur again in the future if adequate measures are not taken. These measures must be analysed carefully in the framework of a long-term strategy, which is time-consuming, especially given the present conditions of the country. In the mean time, it is necessary to reestablish operational conditions. The proposed immediate rehabilitation is meant to avoid the collapse of the system and keep the agricultural sector alive until a long-term comprehensive strategy comes into effect. Without proper maintenance however, the rehabilitated infrastructure may rapidly deteriorate: this risk should be realistically taken into account given the persisting confusion of mandates and rules of procedures in respect of the systems’ management. Lack of regular maintenance could expose the infrastructure to this risk even before the rehabilitation programme is completed. The implementing organisations have been hence provided with adequate field staff (STs) to plan for and supervise the required maintenance activities. As the rehabilitation proceeds, it is also proposed that counterpart staff from either local communities or Government Authorities be trained and organised in such a way to become responsible for preserving the works (CTs). In addition, external guidance and expertise will be available whenever required through PASU. Sufficient technical input will be provided so that regular maintenance would only require the financial resources (and not technical support) when entering local contracts. Maintenance activities will include the following duties: a)

Clear the vegetation and re-establish the river and canals’ banks (1-year frequency) EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

Banana Sector Study for Somalia Strategy for Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Final Report by Mr H.Hack, Mr McKilligan, Mr D.Fino and Mr Ouko – November 2003

Dredge the canals and de-silt the area around river and canals gated structures (1 year)

Masonry repairs on all structures (1 year)

Ground, check, weld, sand brush, re-paint, grease, re-install gates at river barrages (1 year)

Ground, check, weld, sand brush, re-paint, grease, re-install canals’ gates (6 months)

Grease lifting mechanism and check operation of all gates (1 month)

Table 5.1 Maintenance annual cost by system (US$) Jenale system

192 000 Barrage

16 000

Canal excavation, re-shaping

120 000

Canal bank formation

24 000

Cross regulators

10 000

Tertiary intakes

22 000

Mashally system (subject to confirmation)

16 000 Barrage

14 000

Canal excavation, re-shaping

1 500

Canal bank formation

300

Cross regulators

200

Tertiary intakes

Koriolay system

44 000 Barrage

12 000

Canal excavation, re-shaping

22 500

Canal bank formation

5 000

Cross regulators

2 000

Tertiary intakes

2 500

Abdi Ali system

37 000 Barrage

11 500

Canal excavation, re-shaping

17 500

Canal bank formation

3 500

Cross regulators

700

Tertiary intakes

3 800

Direct river intakes

40 000

Total annual cost in US$

329 000

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Activities (a) through (e) will need to be carried out by local contractors, on the basis of technical specifications issued by the field staff, who are also in charge of supervising the works and preparing payments certificates. The gate operators will be responsible for point (f), a portion of them already in the field, to be integrated into the CTs. The Tables 5.1 and 5.2 examine the work to be contracted and provide an estimate of the annual cost on the basis of the quantities of works to be expected at the indicated frequencies: Table 5.2 Maintenance annual cost by category of work (US$)

Jenale barrage

16 000

Mashally barrage (subject to confirmation)

14 000

Koriolay barrage

12 000

Abdi Ali barrage

11 500

Canal excavation and re-shaping

161 500

Canal bank formation

32 800

Cross regulators

12 900

Tertiary and direct river intakes

68 300

Total annual cost in US$

329 000

The maintenance annual cost shown in Table 5.2 above represents the total financial requirement including all contributions of cash or labour expected from the beneficiaries or their representative organisations including the intervention of the forthcoming new Government. In this respect, it is important to note that maintenance of tertiary canals and relevant private intakes existing along them are not included. This important task has been left with the beneficiaries the same way the rehabilitation of the tertiary level’s infrastructure has been left with the users. The technical representatives elected by the beneficiaries in the envisaged CTs will receive training while joining the STs in directing the rehabilitation and maintenance works. Therefore, they will acquire the capacity to assist the communities in taking care of the tertiary canals that need to gradually become their own canals. Also, quite a number of gates and structures on tertiary canals have remained the responsibility of the overall programme funding and are thereby included in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. These gates and structures are the direct intakes from the river, which presents a major inconsistency in the present situation. Direct river intakes cannot be left with the farmers at this stage EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003 98

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because of the sensitivity of the issue of the river bank safety. This aspect will have to be carefully studied and sorted out in the long-term strategy that will likely be a high priority for the future Government. Although the circumstances are favourable for the beneficiaries, (who will be maintaining the tertiary canals and contributing in technical staff) it appears to be quite demanding for the farmers in the present economic conditions of Somalia. Hence as shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, it is the opinion of the mission, that the entire cost for maintaining the rest of the infrastructure should be digressively taken in charge by the EU aid programme.

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Chapter 6 Operation of the irrigation systems Most of the management shortcomings affecting the irrigation infrastructure and deterioration of the systems have much to do with the current operation of the irrigation systems. The primary reason for the dramatic deterioration observed is the lack of maintenance, which is clearly linked to the economic setback of the agricultural sector in the Lower Shabelle. Nevertheless, the impact of incorrect operational practices induced by absence of authority, lack of technical advice and poor status of the flow-control devices in the network should not be underestimated in that respect. The anarchic practice of drawing water off the canals whenever and wherever desired, meanwhile ignoring and disrupting any scheduled distribution of fair water allocations, greatly disturbs the hydraulic working conditions of the system. This is often done through breaching into the bank of the canals and even from the river, which should be regarded as illegal and prosecuted for putting the public safety at serious hazard. Earth breaches can easily trigger major leakages further aggravating the already upset hydraulic functioning, to the point of washing entire sections of the embankment away. As well, breaching into the bank can be dictated by the extremely poor conditions of the water control equipment along the canals, and this is how the practice is usually justified. It should be considered of the utmost importance therefore, that all control structures are rehabilitated in advance and properly operate by the time the design canals carrying capacities are re-established. That is why works are planned in such sequence (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). Another consequence of not having had any control of the water flow in the canals for too many years is the gradual loss of good soils and aggravated silting up of the canals. The head regulator gates remain normally opened at night because they are not/cannot be operated, and since the gates along the canal also remain open at night for the same reason, huge wastage occurs at the canal tail until irrigation resumes in the morning. Additional leakage is caused by the bank breaches. Apart from the valuable water lost, this produces water logging on large areas with consequent salinity build-up and silt accumulation. The result is that more land is abandoned because of the salt and the increasingly problematic canal’s outlet accelerates the silting up. One might rightly argue that drainage difficulties are part of a wider problem, which can only be solved if the hydrological changes that the Shabelle River are going through are studied with the many aspects involved and tackled at the comprehensive basin level. Nevertheless, accelerating the clear process of deterioration of a fragile system that is already on the brink of the collapse would be irresponsible. Instead, all flow control devices must be made operational, and new ones installed if non-existent, wherever the original project made provision for. It is also understood that some minor changes may be required to adapt to the new conditions, also involving minor modification in the EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

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canal’s capacity (in many cases this proves excessive when compared to water requirements). Once rehabilitated, the canals need to be operated according to strict rules, which include opening the head, tail and intermediate gates in such a way that the canal is kept full and the same discharge distributed to the fields enters the canal at the same time. Opening should be adjusted to this objective, and head gates should be closed at night so that the canal will be almost full when opened the following day. Special attention needs to be paid to the operation of the direct river intakes because of the serious flood risk involved. If the system is regularly maintained, these procedures basically require adequate, trained and motivated staff, rather than expensive equipment and excessive running costs. The task is quite absorbing, but considering that the same staff must have daily interactions with the farmers along the assigned canals in order to plan irrigation schedules, the daily presence is likely to help with properly mastering the operational procedures in a short time. As long as the EU partners are involved in the field with implementing the rehabilitation programme and the prescribed maintenance activities, they will also apply the correct operational criteria as summarised above. In doing so, the STs will assist in the rapid establishment of the CTs and provide them with regular on-the-job training throughout. Major local stakeholders (representatives elected by the Communities, Canal Committees, Farmers Associations, Water Users Associations, possibly Government’s Officials in the near future) will be involved in the CTs, where they will become trained in and familiar with the operational procedures. This will allow for the management duties to be gradually handed over to local Communities and future Government Authorities. The absorbing operational tasks, combined with the parallel rehabilitation and maintenance work of planning and supervising, requires the continuous commitment of all ST and CT’s members. It is therefore important that CTs become operative at an early stage and are provided with adequate tools and transport means (intended for official use along the canals only). A crucial role will be played by the gate operators, as a lot of civic pride and wisdom is requested for this function besides technical skill. Motivation through decent salaries is important for the CT staff, who also need to be dissuaded from accepting any bribes users may offer. However, it is the planning, dedication and communication between all teams and beneficiaries that will ultimately help in rehabilitation of the irrigation system to eventually better all parties involved.

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ANNEX 3

Agricultural Development and Diversification Strategy in Lower Shabelle

This Report was prepared by the Eurata Expert: Hector McKilligan

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Table of Contents 0

Executive Summary ............................................................................................... 105

Location of the Study Area ..................................................................................... 108

Background to the Agricultural Situation ................................................................. 109

Soils, Climate and Water Resources ........................................................................ 109 3.2Climate

110

3.3Water Resources

111

Land Use .............................................................................................................. 112

Farming Population................................................................................................ 114

Land Tenure ......................................................................................................... 116

Farming Systems ................................................................................................... 117 7.1History of Commercial Farming 117

7.2Banana Farming 7.2.1 Land Preparation and Planting 7.2.2 Irrigation 7.2.3 Pests and Diseases 7.2.4 Fertiliser Use 7.2.5 Labour Requirements 7.2.6 Banana Yields 7.2.7 Marketing of Bananas 7.2.8 Costs and Returns for banana production

117

7.3Smallholder Farming 7.3.1 Land Preparation 7.3.2 Maize 7.3.3 Sesame 7.3.4 Other Annual Crops

120

7.4Livestock

126

117 118 118 118 119 119 119 120 122 123 125 126

The Potential for Improving Agricultural Production ................................................. 127 8.1The Approach

127

8.2The Potential for Bananas 128

8.2.1.

Gross Margin Estimate for Banana production

8.3The Potential for Other Export Crops

118 129

8.4The Potential for Improving Annual Crop Production 129

8.5Interventions to Increase Production of Maize and Sesame 130

8.5.1 Irrigation Rehabilitation 8.5.2 Improved Maize Varieties 8.5.3 Control of Maize Stalk Borer

130 130 130

8.6The Potential for Increasing Production of Maize and Sesame 131

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8.7

The Potential Value of Increased Maize and Sesame Production

8.8

Gross Margin Estimate for Principal Annual Crops

132

8.8.1 Gross Margin for Smallholder Maize 8.8.2 Gross Margin for Smallholder Sesame 8.8.3 Gross Margin for Smallholder Tomatoes 9

122

122 123 124

Agricultural Development Strategy 136

9.1 9.1.1 9.1.2 9.1.3 9.1.4 9.2

Components of the Proposed Programme 136

Rehabilitation of the Irrigation System Increasing the Use of Higher Yielding Maize Varieties Control of Maize Stalk Borer Crop Trials and Seed Multiplication of Alternative Crops

136 136 137 137

Implementation

137

9.3Project Monitoring 137

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List of Tables and Figures Tables Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Estimated Land Use in the Study Area, 1978 & 2003 (ha) Number of Families in Qoreooley & Merca Districts, 2003 Lower Shabelle Banana Production in the 1970’s Costs & Returns for Banana Production (US $/ha/annum) Cropping Calendar Operations for Maize & Sesame Crop Area Estimates – 1977 & 2003 (ha) Maize Production and Sale Value. Sesame Production and Sale Value. Estimated Gross margin/ha for Bananas Potential Increase in Production of Maize and Sesame Potential Value of Increased Maize and Sesame Production Estimated Gross margin/ha for Smallholder Maize Estimated Gross margin/ha for Smallholder Sesame Estimated Gross margin/ha for Tomatoes

Figures Figure 1.

Banana Sector Study Area – Monthly Rainfall Means

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Chapter 0 Executive Summary The study area in the Lower Shebelle Region covers 67,000 ha, of which 30-40,000 ha is potentially irrigable. The River Shebelle is the main source of irrigation water and 16,000 ha was being irrigated before the civil war. Currently, no more than 10,000 ha are being irrigated, mainly because the canal system has largely silted up. It is estimated that the total cultivated area is now around 30,000 ha, of which 20,000 ha is rainfed. The Mission’s approach to this study was to establish whether or not there was a possibility of Somalia reviving its international banana export trade, without the former benefits of preferential trading terms in the EU. If it is not a possibility, the objective was to consider what could replace the banana industry to utilise the irrigation water and soil resources for the maximum benefit of the people living there. The Lower Shebelle Region used to be responsible for over 90% of the banana production in Somalia, but the civil war in 1990 caused the collapse of the banana export trade and subsequent neglect of the irrigation system has also led to a reduction in the area under bananas, which at present are only grown for the domestic market. SHEFA, the banana growers association, estimates that today, only 1,600 ha is in production in Lower Shebelle, compared with almost 5,000 ha in former times. There are, unfortunately, many factors militating against success for Somali bananas in the international market. Because they have to be irrigated, Somali bananas are more expensive to produce than the rainfed crops of their main competitors in the Americas and South East Asia. Historically, yields have been low, about half that of other banana producing countries and with no government in power, there is also a real security risk to any lucrative business. At present therefore, it is not believed that the potential for bananas justifies any specific intervention or investment to increase production. Grapefruits and watermelons were also exported in the past but the quantities were small and only justified on the back of the banana trade, filling up space on the banana boats and benefiting from preferential trade tariffs etc. Similar reservations apply to those regarding bananas, i.e. high production costs and lack of security. The future for these crops is also limited to the local market and also does not justify any development intervention to increase production. Although the original reason for the development of the irrigation system was to produce commercial crops of cotton and bananas, it also (potentially) serves an estimated 40-50,000 smallholder families who subsist mainly on annual crops. Since there would appear to be little prospect of reviving the banana export trade to its former scale, the interventions proposed to replace it have concentrated on the smallholder sector and annual crop production, with the main objective being to increase food production. Maize and sesame are the principal food crops grown in the irrigated areas, and the traditional cropping pattern is to plant 100% of the land with maize in the first rainy season (Gu-Apr/May/June), followed by a second crop of maize on plus sesame on the same land, EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

106

with the second rainy season (Der-Oct/Nov/Dec). However, with an annual rainfall of 500 mm or less, spread over the two seasons, irrigation is vital for successful cropping in the area. Yields of irrigated crops are currently more than double that of rainfed ones Rehabilitation of the irrigation system is obviously a top priority for increasing production, but other constraints which need to be addressed include the low yield potential of the local maize varieties and the major losses caused by maize stalk borer. Activities to deal with these three constraints constitute the main components of the proposed Agricultural Strategy. A fourth component is also considered worthwhile, that of continuing the trials and seed multiplication on alternative crops which could replace imported foods and thereby lower living costs. The oilseeds are of particular interest and trial work on upland rice and wheat should also continue, although some doubts about their chances of success as smallholder crops preclude recommending any major extension efforts at this stage. Components of the proposed Agricultural Strategy are therefore as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Rehabilitation of irrigation Introduction of better maize varieties Control of the maize stalk borer Continuation of trials on crops for import substitution.

The benefits of the proposed strategy are estimated as follows: 1. As a result of rehabilitating the irrigation system the area of irrigated maize could increase from the present 11,200 ha to 32,091 ha, and the area of irrigated sesame could increase from 5,280 ha to 15,128 ha. 2. Maize production could increase from the present level of 28,000 m/t, to 42,775 m/t per annum, as a result of irrigation rehabilitation, and up to 53,113 m/t with the addition of efficient maize stalk borer control. 3. Sesame production could increase from 8,844 m/t to 13,276 m/t as a result of irrigation rehabilitation. Based on the above production figures, the value of production after implementing the project is estimated to rise from US$ 8.5 million at current levels, to US$ 12.8 million after rehabilitation of the irrigation system and to US$ 14.0 million with the additional benefits of maize stalk borer control. The potential financial benefits from all interventions would therefore be US$ 5.5 million per annum.

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Chapter 1 Location of the Study Area The field study was focussed on the main irrigable areas in the central part of Lower Shebelle river valley, within the districts of Merca and Qoreooley, from Sigaale village, north of the Genaale barrage to Bulo Marerta village in the south. This covers a gross area of around 67,000 ha with 30-40,000 ha of potentially irrigable land, which used to be responsible for over 90% of the banana production in the Lower Shebelle Region and over 50% of all Somali bananas. This is also the area covered by detailed studies in 1977/78 by Sir M. MacDonald & Partners for the “Genale-Bulo Marerta Project” which, in the absence of more recent studies, has been the main source of basic data on the area.

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Chapter 2 Background to the Agricultural Situation Banana production in Lower Shebelle started in 1927, reaching 4,500 ha by 1939, with 32,000 tonnes exported. It was restarted after the war, peaking in 1965 when the area of the crop reached about 5,000 ha and 60,670 tonnes were exported. The subsequent decline was mainly due to economic reasons; removal of preferential import duties to Italy in 1969, post independence emigration of Italian farmers, partial nationalisation, etc. Exports ceased at the end of 1990 with the start of the civil war, when many farms were abandoned or taken over by force, and only local sales were possible until 1994 when exports restarted and continued until 1997. Approximately 3,400 ha were in production at that time with exports reaching 26,983 tonnes in 1996. In 1994-95 there were 140 banana growers in the Shebelle Region. Towards the end of 1997, strong winds and flooding attributed to the El Nino weather phenomenon destroyed most of the banana plantations and exports ceased again until 2002, when a Libyan company purchased two trial shipments of 50,000 and 70,000 boxes, totalling 1,500 tonnes. At present there are 98 farmers registered as members of the banana growers association SHEFA (Shebelle Fruit Association), with 1,600 ha of bananas under cultivation and they were hoping to be able to export again in 2003 but a shortage of irrigation water has so far made it impossible to achieve the required quality. Maintenance of the irrigation system by the banana farmers and exporting companies has been neglected since 1997, when the banana export market collapsed. However, some repairs have been undertaken recently to diversion structures and de-silting of canals, organised by NGOs and funded by the EC. Maintenance of the main canals by the banana sector was also essential for small-holder irrigation downstream, and now, as a result of the system silting up, very little water reaches the tertiary canals, resulting in a reduction in irrigated cropping and a corresponding increase in the rainfed area.

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Chapter 3 Soils, Climate and Water Resources 3.1

Soils

The soils over most of the area are of alluvial origin, fine textured and moderately fertile, with nutrients replenished annually by silt from the river carried in the irrigation canals and flood water. Small-holder crops are universally grown without any fertiliser, but it was very interesting to note during the field visits, that maize crops throughout the area, both irrigated and rain-fed, showed no signs of any nutrient deficiency. The fact that most farmers cannot cultivate all their land, coupled with low rainfall probably allows organic nitrogen to accumulate between crops. Topography is generally level except for occasional small hills and depressions in old river beds. Soil profiles are deep, enabling quite long periods between irrigations and making it possible to grow sesame to maturity, largely on residual moisture after the main “Gu” season rains. The fine textured soils are slow-draining and liable to waterlogging. This characteristic might also explain why ox-cultivation is not practiced, because such soils can be very hard when dry and very sticky when wet. Poor drainage has also been reported to result in shallow rooting of bananas, making them vulnerable to wind damage.

3.2

Climate

The climate is semi-arid, and generally hot and humid with an average annual rainfall of between 400 and 600 mm. There are two rainy seasons, with the main rains in the “Gu” season (Apr/May/Jun), followed by the second rains in the Figure 1. Banana Sector Study Area - Monthly Rainfall Means “Der” season 90 (Oct/Nov/Dec). From July to September, during the 80 “Hagai” season, there are 70 intermittent rains and January to March is the dry 60 season “Jilal”. The graph 50 in Figure No. 1 shows monthly rainfall means, 40 compiled from historical 30 meteorological data given in the MacDonald report. 20 Given that even local 10 varieties of maize, the 0 staple crop, will take 100 or Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec more days to mature and Monthly Mean (mm) require at least 500 mm of water over the growing Source "Genale - Bulo Marerta Project" report by Sir M. MacDonald & Partners, 1978. period to produce

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reasonable yields, it is obvious that irrigation is vital for successful cropping in the area. Farmers quote yields for rain-fed maize in the region of 0.6 – 0.7 t/ha, and 1.0 - 2.0 t/ha for irrigated maize. With such a marginal rainfall situation, serious drought periods are to be expected, with crop failure a constant risk in non irrigated areas. Flooding is also common, either by the river overflowing, or from rainwater accumulating in low lying areas. Strong winds are a further feature of the climate, necessitating the use of windbreaks to prevent damage to banana plants in particular, while increasing evaporation rates and exacerbating the effects of dry periods.

3.3

Water Resources

The River Shebelle is the main source of irrigation water, supplemented by some use of groundwater from boreholes, when river levels are low. Prior to construction of the Genaale barrage across the river in 1925, rainfed cropping of food crops was the norm for most of the area and irrigated agriculture was limited to areas near the river. The Genaale barrage feeds three main canals and together with three more barrages and associated canals subsequently constructed further down stream, the total (theoretically) irrigable area amounts to 40,000 ha. In practice less than half of that area is likely to be under irrigated cropping in any one year. MacDonald’s report estimates that 16,000 ha were being irrigated in 1977/78, with an additional 678 ha under preparation (see Table 1 – Estimated Land Use). It is thought that today, no more than 10,000 ha is irrigated, as result of siltation, collapse of the banana market, illegal occupation of farms etc.. High water levels in the River Shebelle correspond to the Gu & Der rainy seasons, with the Der flow during August–December being larger and more reliable than the earlier Gu flow of MayJune. The river has been known to dry up completely during the dry “Jilal” season. Water quality can be poor at the start of the Gu season, with high salinity levels from the first rains in the Ethiopian highlands and, because of this, it is usual to delay the start of irrigation by two weeks. The Gu maize crop is normally not irrigated until after it has germinated with the first rains.

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Chapter 4 Land Use Table 1 shows the land use situation in 1978 when more of the cropping was irrigated as well as a “rough” estimate of the current situation. This strategy study has not had the resources to update the map or figures on land use with any degree of accuracy, but some indication of the major changes were obtained from local farmers and NGO workers. Table 1. Estimated Land Use in the Study Area, 1978 & 2003 (ha) 1978 LAND USE (ha)

Gross

Non

2003

Planted Planted

Land Cultivated Area

Area

Planted

Non

Land Cultivated

Area

Irrigated Rainfed

Planted

17,450

Non-irrigable crop area

15,565

10,487

5,078

15,565

10,487

5,078

Irrigable annual crop area 27,010

15,498

11,512

31,380

8,458

8,000

14,922

22,922

Bananas - irrigated

6,870

2,803

4,067

2,500

900

1,600

515

210

305

515

315

200

67,410

46,448

15,884

5,078

20,962

67,410

37,610

9,800

20,000

29,800

Sources:

Area

Total

Uncultivable land

Note:

Area

Planted Planted

Area

TOTAL

Area

Gross

Area

Other fruits - irrigated

Irrigated Rainfed

Total

Area

1978 figures - “Genale - Bulo Marerta Project” report by Sir M. MacDonald & Partner. 2003 figures – Mission estimate - see notes on the land use table below Banana area in 1978 includes 647 ha under development at that time.

Notes on the land use table: 1. It is assumed that the area of uncultivable land remains unchanged at 17,450 ha. This is made up mainly (75%) of wooded scrub land, often sandy with rough topography, as well as areas of old river beds, permanently flooded land and riverside vegetation. 2. Less than 40 % of rain-fed and irrigable areas was actually used for cropping in 1978, the remainder being either left fallow or occupied by tracks, irrigation canals, bunds, windbreaks etc.. However it is believed that the population could have doubled since then, and it is reasonable to assume that more use of the fallow land has been necessary to feed the extra people. The total area estimated for annual cropping in 2003 has therefore been increased by approximately 70% over the 1978 figure (see also Section 5 on population estimates).

3. The collapse of the banana export trade, plus the shortage of irrigation water, has led to a reduction in the area under bananas, and SHEFA, the banana growers association, estimates that only 1,600 ha is in production during 2003. Much of the unused former banana area is now being utilised for irrigated

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annual copping, by the owner, or rented out to smallholders or farmers from rain-fed areas. In this estimate the balance of the former banana area has therefore been added to the land available for annual cropping. 4. Deterioration of the irrigation system has meant that a greater proportion of the “irrigable” land area is now mainly rain-fed. CEFA’s Senior Somali Agronomist, estimates that only 30-40% of the previously irrigated area is irrigated today, compared with the time before silting up of canals, and that even much of that area will only be irrigated once, when the river is at its highest. Accordingly, estimates for irrigated annual cropping in 2003 have been reduced by a third and the balance added to the rain-fed area estimate. 5. Areas of other perennial fruit trees, principally mangoes, coconuts, grapefruit and limes, are also assumed to have declined, as result of lack of export opportunities and water shortages. There are many reports of trees being cut for firewood, plantations being neglected and little replanting. A reduction of one-third of the area has been assumed for the purpose of this land use estimate.

Although these figures for current land use are necessarily only rough estimates, it is felt that some attempt had to be made to indicate the probable baseline situation, so that indicators can be identified, for the evaluation of future development activities.

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Chapter 5 Farming Population There does not seem to have been a significant movement of people out of the area since the civil war in 1990. Some smaller villages have been abandoned as their inhabitants have moved into larger settlements for added security and there are some reports of adult men moving out of the area to look for work, leaving the families behind to carry on with the farming. Many of the banana labourers' villages which were sited on the commercial farms have been abandoned, partly because of the lack of work and also because the collapse of the canal system has prevented drinking water reaching Table 2. Number of Families in Qoreooley & Merca Districts, 20 them. Most of these people are also said to Qoreooley District Merca District have moved into small Village No.of Village No.of towns like Genaale, Fam ilies Fam ilies Shelembot, Qoreooley, Qoreooley 6,000 Genaale 4,259 Bulo Marerta and Gaiw erow 700 Segaale West 600 Golweyn as well as Farhane 1,150 Segaale East 192 Merca, the district Cardi Cali 700 Maduulow n/a capital. In 1978 the village population of the two districts making up the study area was 112,316, made up of 23,905 families, excluding the town of Merca and most of the villagers can be assumed to be farming families. An accurate figure for the current population is unknown, but during Phase 11 of this study, the field staff of CEFA assisted by carrying out a survey to roughly update these figures, the results of which are presented in Table 2 (next page).

Furuqley Bandar Jeerow Maduulow Garas Guul Tugaarey Bulo-Koy Jasiira Haduman Bulo Sheikh Manya Murug Farkeerov

Total

550 480 800 520 500 300 100 350 570 470 465 250

Waagade Degw ariri Khamisow Majabto Buulo Muuse Golw eyn Bulo Marerta Mushaani Uguunji Shalambood Bufow Bulo Arundo Bulo Jameo Malabele Busley Da'ud

13,905

567 1,000 770 215 57 2,000 3,000 976 1872* 1017 * 275 180 77 850 1200

16,218

Source: Village elders, farmers and CEFA field staff – June 2003 * 1977 figures from MMP report. 2003 figures not available

This suggests that the total number of families in the two districts in 2003 is 30,123. On this basis, using the same average family size as the Macdonald report (4.65), the total population in 2003 would be 140,071.

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However, application of an arbitrary 2.5% annual growth figure to the 1977 population figure of 112,316 over the last 25 years, gives a current estimate of 200,000. Obviously, at this stage, the population as an indicator of the likely number of beneficiaries from any development intervention can only be approximate and for the purpose of this study it is assumed that the population has increased by 70% since 1977, with at least 40,000 families. Temporary migrants into the area include nomadic or semi-nomadic livestock owners who bring their animals in for dry season grazing near the river and seasonal labourers from Bay and Upper Juba looking for casual work. The numbers of seasonal migrants was estimated to be 94,000 in 1977, but it seems likely that this would have declined in more recent years, with the collapse of the banana export trade, although there is still work to be had on tomatoes and other vegetables.

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Chapter 6 Land Tenure In 1977 it was reported that 80% of families owned their own farms and more than 10% of those regularly rented extra land. Rental of extra irrigated land by farmers on rainfed areas is still common and the mission was also told that landless former banana workers are often given small plots, a quarter ha or so, rent-free, on former banana farms, in preference to leaving the land idle and being allowed to go back to bush. Some farms, especially the state farms and larger commercial farms, which were taken over during the civil war, are still occupied illegally, while others have been given back to their owners. Other farms are occupied by relatives of the owners or by former employees acting as caretakers for absentee owners, several of whom are still living outside the country. The banana growers association, SHEFA, has 98 members with a wide range of farm sizes up to 300 ha or so, but the average is said to be 30-40 ha.

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Chapter 7 Farming Systems

7.1

History of Commercial Farming

After construction of the first barrage across the River Shebelle, in 1925, it was possible to undertake large scale irrigated farming for the first time, with the first commercial crop being cotton, grown mainly by Italian settler farmers, which reached 3,000 ha by 1929. Production declined in subsequent years due to pest and disease problems and although reintroduced in 1950, there is no longer any cotton grown in the area. Groundnuts and castor were encouraged during war-time but areas had declined to 500 ha of each crop by the 1950’s. Only limited areas of groundnuts are now found, on the lighter soils, and no castor. Most of the Lower Shebelle area has close-textured soils which are unsuitable for groundnuts. The Lower Shebelle Region used to grow more than 2,000 ha of rice, producing more than 50% of Somalia’s total production, but this was mostly on State farms and no rice is growing at present, although the Italian NGO - CEFA (Comitato Europea per la Formazione e Agricultura) is now promoting upland rice through smallholder Rice Growers Associations (RGAs). The only commercial crop of importance since then has been the banana, production of which started in 1929/30. Small areas of other perennial crops, mainly found on the banana farms, include limes, mangoes, grapefruit, papaya and coconuts. There have been some exports in the past, to Italy and Middle Eastern countries, of limes, mangoes and grapefruit but the volumes were never very significant and at present they are only grown for the local markets. On several farms, tomatoes, onions and watermelons are important cash crops for the local markets.

7.2

Banana Farming

In spite of the poor state of the irrigation system the Mission saw a number of mature plantations still being cared for, and a few new fields being planted. However there were also many fields of abandoned bananas, which had died off for lack of water.

7.2.1

Land Preparation and Planting

Land for bananas is ploughed by tractor and banana suckers are planted in the bottom of furrows for ease of irrigation, at a planting density of around 2,000 plants per hectare. The first bunches are harvested 9-11 months after planting and the plant continues to produce successive stems for a period of 3-4 years or so before it has to be replaced. Land preparation and planting is the main expense for a banana farmer and 3-4 years is a relatively short lifetime. Six years would be normally regarded as an economic minimum. Poor drainage which results in development of a surface root system, and nematode infestation, are said to be two

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of the things limiting the lifetime of the plant, both factors making plants liable to uprooting by the strong winds which are a feature of the area. The Cavendish type of banana called “Poyo” is the main variety grown for export, with plantains planted round the edges as windbreaks. Casuarina and other trees are also used as windbreaks. 7.2.2

Irrigation

The planting/irrigation furrows silt up very quickly and basin irrigation is practised thereafter. When river levels are low, farmers may use boreholes, pumping groundwater for irrigation but the water quality is poor and salinity build-up is always a danger. Drainage is a major problem on most farms, contributing to salinity, which is another factor said to limit the lifetime of the plant. The current poor state of the irrigation canals is a major constraint on production and farmers were unable to meet a potential export order for April 2003 because the bananas did not mature properly due to water stress.

7.2.3

Pests and Diseases

Major pests are the root burrowing nematodes Radophilus similes, and the banana weevil Cosmopolites sordidus. The MacDonald report states that the level of nematode infestation was higher than had been seen in any other banana growing countries. Carbofuran has been the principal chemical used to control soil pests. The generally dry climate however, means that there are few problems with fungus diseases and even Sigatoka is unknown, which is a major problem in other banana producing countries.

7.2.4

Fertiliser Use

In spite of the nutrient value of the silt carried in the irrigation water, fertiliser to supply N,P & K is regarded as essential for maximum production, particularly potassium and nitrogen, but at present these are generally not widely available. For optimum production, around 900 kg of fertiliser per hectare each year would be required. The Libyan company which has contracted to purchase bananas for export in 2003 is reported to have imported fertiliser for the banana farmers, both urea and potassium sulphate, to be supplied on credit.

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7.2.5

Labour Requirements

Labour requirements are estimated to be 220 man-days/ha for the first year, the year of crop establishment, and around 450 man-days/ha per year thereafter. In addition to planting, hand labour is needed for weeding, pruning, trash burning, chemical and fertiliser applications, irrigation, harvesting and packing/loading. At its peak the banana industry is said to have employed 10,000 permanent workers and over 100,000 seasonally.

7.2.6

Banana Yields

The pruning system is aimed at producing 1.5 bunches per year from each plant. The best farms were reported to be yielding 25 t/ha, of exportable quality, but the average exportable yield was much lower, as little as 7.4 t/ha in 1977. MacDonald (1978) gives the following information for production and yield in the 1970’s: Table 3. Lower Shabelle Banana Production in the 1970’s

Year

Banana Area (ha)

Exported Yield (mt)

Exportable Yield per ha (mt)

1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977

3,400 3,917 4,700 4,694 4,209 3,897 3,895

36,710 60,650 46,270 41,470 34,990 33,870 28,810

10.8 15.5 9.8 8.8 8.3 8.7 7.4

Some of the reasons for low yields could perhaps be addressed, like poor irrigation, nematode infestation etc., but the adverse effects of other factors, which include excessively strong winds and high rates of evaporation, susceptibility to flooding and difficult drainage due to the topography, are not easy to mitigate. Areas of really suitable soils are also limited and bananas are not always grown in ideal conditions.

7.2.7

Marketing of Bananas

Somalia’s last full year of banana exports was in 1996 (24,188 mt), prior to the destruction of about 80% of the banana plantations by the floods and high winds of 1997/98. Since that time only local markets have been available and the chairman of SHEFA estimates that 6-8 truckloads, of 110 quintals each, are being sent daily to the Mogadishu markets. Traders also collect from as far away as Hargeisha, Galcaio and Bossaso in the north, as well as Kismayo in the south. Bananas are loaded loose in bunches, and not in cartons as they would be for export. According to SHEFA the average price received is 70-80,000 Somali Shillings per quintal (approx. US$ 4.4), from which has to be deducted the cost of transport and the illegal militia check point levies. Transport costs Shs 2.8 million per truck (US$ 1.5 per q.) and militia levies Shs 440,000 per truck (US$ 0.24 per q.).

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7.2.8

Costs and Returns for banana production

Banana production at the present time is largely based on existing plantations, with very little new planting. Chemicals and fertilisers are generally unavailable or considered too expensive in view of poor returns from the local market. Most of the production can be assumed as saleable, since there is no export market and, in view of the lack of fertiliser, pest control, irrigation problems and aging plants, it would seem unlikely that there would be more than 10 tonnes produced per ha (gross yield), about half that of previous years. On this basis the economics of producing bananas at present might be as follows: Table 4. Costs & Returns for Banana Production (US $/ha/annum) Sales/(US$) Costs/ha (US$) Labour Transport & leviers Miscellaneous at 10%

100 q. @ $ 4.40/q 100 man-days/ha @ $ 1.00/day 100 q. @ $ 1.74/q

440.00 100.00 174.00 27.00

Total Cost (US$)

301.00

Net income per ha (US$)

139.00

This cost estimate is necessarily tentative, in view of the general lack of verifiable data and the widely varying figures given by different farmers. The costs of initial land preparation and planting are not included, on the assumption that establishment of new plantations is unlikely to be very common without an export market, in view of the high costs.

7.3

Smallholder Farming

The original reason for the development of the irrigation system was to produce commercial crops of cotton initially and bananas in more recent times. However it also (potentially) serves an estimated 50,000 smallholders who subsist mainly on annual crops. The MacDonald study of 1978 gives the average farm size for around 20,000 smallholders growing mainly annual crops, as 1.93 ha (range 0.5 – 13.0 ha), with a maximum cultivable area of 1.6 ha and an average net area cropped each year of 0.90 ha per farm. The smallholders association, Somalta’ab gives 15 ha as the maximum size of farm to qualify for membership. Farmers questioned during the current study gave a range of 1-5 ha per family as the norm. Some fragmentation into smaller units would be appear likely as the population has increased over the intervening 25 years, so it would seem reasonable to assume that the land area per family has probably declined since 1978. Maize and sesame are the principal food crops grown in the irrigated areas, with sorghum in the rainfed areas at the “tail” end of the irrigation system which receives very little water. The traditional cropping pattern over most of the area is to plant 100% of the land with maize with

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the main rains (Gu season – Apr/May/Jun), followed by a second crop of maize (40%) plus sesame (60%), with the second rains (Der season – Oct/Nov/Dec). The Cropping Calendar in Table 4 shows typical seasonal operations for maize and sesame. Table 5. Cropping Calendar Operations for Maize & Sesame Month

Maize

Sesame

GU SEASON April

planting

May

planting, irrigation, weeding threshing

June HAGAI SEASON

irrigation, weeding

July

irrigation, weeding

August

harvest

September DER SEASON

harvest

October

irrigation, planting

land preparation, irrigation

November

irrigation

irrigation, planting

December JILAL SEASON

irrigation

weeding

January

harvest

weeding

February

harvest

harvest, stooking

March

land preparation

harvest, stooking, threshing

Sources:

threshing

1978 figures - “Genale - Bulo Marerta Project” report by Sir M. MacDonald & Partners. 2003 figures – Mission estimate - see notes below.

The areas can vary considerably from year to year; depending on the rainfall, particularly for the second maize crop and no planting is carried out after October as river levels fall. Some sesame is planted as a catch crop in Hagai – inter-planted in maturing maize (triple-cropping). Tomatoes are generally planted in May/June when the risk of heavy rains is past. The 2003 cropping pattern in the study area (for the main crops only) is estimated in Table 5 and compared with the situation in 1977. The cultivated area estimate has been increased by 70% from the 1977 figure, to reflect the assumptions on population increase (see Sections 4 & 5). The proportions of the different crops have been maintained and the main difference in the farming system would be a reduction in the irrigated area and a corresponding increase in rainfed cropping, as result of the irrigation difficulties.

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Table 6. Crop Area Estimates – 1977 & 2003 (ha) Crop Maize Maize Sesame Sesame Tomatoes

Season Gu Der Hagai Der Hagai

1977 16,590 6,636 1,000 9,954 350

2003 28,000 11,200 1,680 16,800 560

% 100 40 6 60 2

Other annual crops include cowpeas, mung beans and ground nuts, as well as watermelons and vegetables like tomatoes, onions, garlic, lettuce and carrots. Tobacco has also been important in the past but very little is now grown. Cowpeas are probably the next most popular crop, usually inter-planted with maize. Upland rice used to be grown on a mechanised state farm and commercial farms, and CEFA is trying to create interest in it again for smallholders, by multiplying seed and supplying milling equipment to RGAs (Rice Growers Associations). Paddy rice was recently tried with the RGAs but was unsuccessful, mainly due to irrigation difficulties.

7.3.1

Land Preparation

Generally only the larger farmers with more than 30-50 ha have their own tractor and smaller farmers would hire from them for ploughing. Current tractor hire charges are actually quite low, at Shs 120 per hour (US $ 6-8), probably unsustainable and certainly uneconomic for new equipment. Most farmers, except those with the very smallest holdings would prefer to hire tractors if they could afford them. The soil in the irrigated areas tends to be very hard when dry, as result of the fine silt content, and difficult to dig by hand. This is also said to be one of the reasons for the lack of ox cultivation. The end result is that land preparation by hand is usually very shallow, which might be expected to restrict root development, thereby exacerbating moisture stress, as well as causing waterlogging. The traditional hoe is small and light, more suited to weeding than digging and it might be worth trying something more substantial like the jembe used in other African countries. After ploughing, land for irrigation is divided into square basins and levelled using a small scraper blade (kawawa), which is operated by two men, one pushing and the other pulling on a rope. A typical basin is 1 jibal (0.06 ha), subdivided in to 4 smaller basins.

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7.3.2

Maize

Planting: Maize is typically planted by dropping 5 or more seeds in one hole at a spacing of about a metre apart in each direction. Farmers in many African countries plant maize like this to insure against the risks of poor germination, pest damage etc., but undoubtedly competition between plants limits the yield potential. The wide spacing between planting holes gives a low plant population, about one quarter of optimum for maximum yields, but is necessary to minimise competition for moisture under rainfed or partially irrigated conditions. Row planting is more common in irrigated and commercial crops. Maize planting usually starts with the first rains and dry planting before the rains is said to be common. The first irrigation, if available, is given after germination. A local 105 day variety predominates and seed of better varieties is not available. As much as 50% of the maize is said to be inter-planted with other crops, more than half of that with either cowpeas or green grams. Pumpkins, lablab beans, lima beans, g/nuts, sweet potatoes and melons (Der season only) can all be found inter-planted with maize. Irrigation: Where irrigation is still possible, maize would usually receive a maximum of three irrigations, with long periods between irrigations, as much as 60 days. One of the reasons, apart from water availability, is said to be the fear of excessive weed growth as a result of seeds from the canal banks being carried in the water. Another is the danger of waterlogging, if rain should come soon after irrigating. Because of insufficient water and irrigation scheduling problems, some farmers get very little water, especially near the tail-ends of canals. Water use efficiency is also generally low due to poor land levelling, wastage and spillage. Pests & Diseases: Maize stalk borer, Chilo partellus, is the main pest of the crop, with losses of 30% or more being experienced and even total crop destruction is not unheard of. It is worst in the Der season, populations of insects having built-up during the first, Gu season crop. Chemical control used to be common but is now rare and cultural control by stover removal/burning is unusual, although many farmers do remove infested plants when they see them. The virtual monoculture of maize without rotation or fallowing also favours this pest. Trials by NGOs, with insecticidal extract from the Neem tree, which grows locally, have had some success. Armyworm damage has also been reported in some years and can necessitate replanting if the crop is attacked early. Bush pigs & warthogs are plentiful, since they are not hunted for food for religious reasons, and can do a lot of damage to maize. Farmers put “scarecrows” of pieces of plastic etc., in the fields to try and scare them off. Fertiliser: As mentioned above in the Soils section, small-holder crops are grown without any fertiliser, but in spite of that maize crops throughout the area showed no signs of any nutrient deficiency, during the time of the Mission in May/June, when most maize was 4-6 weeks old. Previous soils studies indicate that potassium is not limiting except for bananas, but attributes small cob sizes to phosphorus deficiency. With such a heavy silt load in the irrigation and flood water, it is likely that most nutrients are being be replenished annually, to some extent, but it is still likely that maize would respond positively to nitrogen fertiliser. However with the currently low prices for maize (± Shs. 2,000 per kg) it is unlikely that farmers would purchase fertiliser even if it was available. Animal manure is not used on crops, even where available. Cattle dung is mainly used in house building and also burned for smoke to discourage flies. Yields: The MacDonald report quotes the following maize yield survey results: 1. Fertiliser, pest control, 3 irrigations

2.0 t/ha

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2. 3. 4. 5.

Fertiliser, pest control, 2 irrigations No fertiliser, pest control, 2 irrigations No fertiliser, no pest control, 2 irrigations No fertiliser, no pest control, 1 irrigation

1.5 t/ha 1.2 t/ha 1.0 t/ha 0.5 t/ha

The current situation is almost universally one where no fertiliser is applied, no pest control measures are used and irrigation is limited to one application in most cases, i.e. situation No.5 in the above table, with a yield of 0.5 t/ha. The above yields are generally in line with the information given to the Mission by farmers, although they were inclined to be a bit more optimistic, usually putting rainfed yields at 0.6-0.7 t/ha and maize irrigated once at 1.0-2.0 t/ha. Harvest: The local variety of maize takes 105 days to mature and is then cut and stacked in the fields until time for shelling. The stover is mainly used for animal feed and the traditional storage method of storing grain is in underground pits, about a metre deep, lined and covered with maize stover and topped with soil. Maize stored in this way rapidly gets discoloured but the flavour is said to improve. One wonders about the possible dangers of Aflatoxins as moulds develop. The selling price of maize has been very low recently, around Shs 2,000 per kg, even to the extent that some farmers have cut down the area planted in the Der season and replaced with extra sesame, which continues to command good prices. One of the reasons given for low maize prices is the presence of food aid maize in the markets, from Ethiopia as well as Somalia. Economics: Maize is the staple food crop and only the surplus to a family’s food requirements will be sold for cash. The following Table 6 gives a simple economic analysis of the crop’s value: Table 7. Maize Production and Sale Value Rainfed Maize Average maize area per family in Gu -100% (ha) Average maize area per family in Der -40% (ha) Total maize area per family for a year -140% (ha) Yield per ha (kg) Total maize production for the year (kg) Annual maize consumption per family of 6 (kg) Surplus for sale (kg) Value of surplus at Shs 2,000/kg = US$ 0.118 ($)

0.90 0.36 1.26 600 756 840 -84 0

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Irrigated Maize 0.90 0.36 1.26 1,000 1,260 840 420 50

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756 kg of rainfed maize production is obviously below the theoretical subsistence level, whereas an irrigated maize production of 1,260 kg, provides a surplus worth about US$ 50, somewhat less than a dollar a day return to labour. One ha of maize requires 60+ days of labour, depending on the yield. Both these examples are based on the assumption that no fertiliser is used and there is no effective pest control and that 1-2 irrigations are possible in the irrigated version.

7.3.3

Sesame

Planting: Sesame is planted similarly to maize, with a pinch of seeds per hole, spaced at 0.50.7 metres, after irrigation, or on residual moisture at the end of the Gu season (as a catch crop during the Hagai), or with the rains of the Der season, which is the main growing period. A mixture of white & brown seeded types is sown together and planting times are chosen to ensure sunny conditions for growth, to get good pod set and minimise disease losses. Irrigation: Basin irrigation is also the norm for sesame, and planting is done after the soil has been allowed to dry out after a single irrigation. No further irrigations are given and this probably restricts yield potential. If ridge and furrow irrigation were to be used, instead of flooded basins, it would be possible to irrigate more than once without creating the waterlogged conditions, which would damage the crop. It can take several weeks for the soil to dry out enough for planting and this delay could also affect yield potential. Pests and Diseases: The webworm (Antigastra) is regarded as the most damaging pest of sesame, with the capacity to cause yield reductions of 25-50% losses. Leaf spot (Cercospora) is mentioned as an important fungal disease, which is worse under wet overcast conditions. Yields: Rainfed sesame yields average 3–4 q/ha (5-8 in good years). Irrigated sesame can produce 0.8 t/ha. No fertiliser is used. Harvest: Sesame takes 90 days to harvest and is cut green, before the pods have started to split, then tied in bundles and stacked in the field or homestead yard to mature for about 15 days. The seed are then shaken out onto cloths. If the crop is processed at home to extract the oil, this is done by simple, wooden mortar & pestle type equipment, usually driven by a camel. Economics: Sesame is used for oil and as a food, but recently the selling price has been so attractive, at Shs 10,000/kg or more, that many farmers have opted to sell most if not all of their production and to buy imported cooking oil, particularly palm oil, which is relatively cheap. The following Table 7 gives a simple economic analysis of the crop’s value:

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Table 8. Sesame Production and Sale Value Rainfed Sesame Average sesame area per family in Der -60% (ha) Yield per ha (kg) Total sesame production for the year (kg) Value of sales at Shs 10,000/kg = US$ 0.588 ($)

0.54 350 189 111

Irrigated Sesame 0.54 800 432 254

The labour required to produce sesame is about 80 man-days per hectare, which would be worth about US$ 80, if there were any opportunities for paid employment.

7.3.4

Other Annual Crops

On smallholdings, other annual crops like cowpeas, mung beans, groundnuts, watermelons, pumpkins and tomatoes, are inter-planted with maize. On larger commercial farms watermelons, onions, tomatoes and other vegetables are planted on their own.

7.4

Livestock

Livestock do not feature largely in the farming systems. Most farmers have a few sheep and goats and some do have small herds of cattle. In the dry season the area attracts large herds from more arid areas, seeking the grazing provided by the river and flooded lowlands. Local farmers may rent out land for grazing to these seasonal immigrants. Oxen and donkeys are used for transport but not for cultivation. The silty nature of the irrigated soils makes them extremely hard when dry and very sticky when wet, which are difficult conditions for animal draft.

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Chapter 8 The Potential for Improving Agricultural Production 8.1

The Approach

The Mission’s approach to this “Banana Sector Study” was to establish whether or not there was a possibility of Somalia reviving its international banana export trade and if not, what could replace it to utilise the irrigation water and soil resources in the former banana growing areas, for the maximum benefit of the people living there. The benefits of the former banana export trade were: • • •

foreign exchange earning for the national economy employment opportunities for local people a high standard of living for a minority (±150 out of ±30,000 families)

Should there be no prospects for reviving the banana export trade, to its former scale, interventions to replace it could have the following objectives: • • •

Increase food production for better food security and nutrition increase cash crop production for better living standards increase production of import substitution crops to lower cost of living

Somalia is a food deficit country and increased food production would not only benefit the smallholder families living in the irrigation farming areas but could provide surpluses to improve food security in the country as a whole, as well as reducing import requirements. Many of the workers previously employed by the banana plantations are now dependent on smallholdings for their survival and would benefit from interventions to increase crop yields/production and improve living standards. Replacement of foreign exchange previously earned by exporting bananas might be achieved, at least partially, by growing crops to replace imported foods, which would be more affordable for the majority of the people.

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8.2

The Potential for Bananas

There are, unfortunately, many factors militating against success for Somali bananas in the international market. Because they have to be irrigated, Somali bananas are more expensive to produce than the rainfed crops of their main competitors in the Americas and South East Asia. Yields have also been low, about half that of other banana producing countries, which generally achieve in excess of 40 t/ha. At the present time, with no government in power, there is also a real security risk to developing any lucrative business, with the danger of theft, illegal taxes and land occupation. The local market for bananas is substantial however, and seems to be adequately supplied by the existing plantations. Apart from rehabilitation of the irrigation system, which in any case is necessary for smallholder agriculture, the potential for bananas does not justify any other specific intervention or investment to increase production.

8.2.1

Gross Margin Estimate for Banana Production

Given the following assumptions: 1. that implementation of the proposed development strategy makes it possible to produce banana yields Table 9. Estimated Gross Margin/ha for Bananas (following Project Implementation) equivalent to pre-civil war levels, VARIABLE COSTS 2. that the security situation improves, and Description Frequency Number Unit Unit Annual 3. that some exports to the Quantity Cost Cost/ha Middle East are possible; Land Preparation

The potential Gross Margin for banana production is estimated at US $255 per hectare.

Irrigation maintenance Pest Control Fertilisers Labour

Notes on Table 9:

every 3rd year annually

210

(contracted machinery & labour) *

17.5

tractor hours

100

every 3rd year

Litres/Kg

130

annually

quintals

240

annual average

350

man/days

350

Packing for export

annually

man/days

Transport (local market)

annually

130

quintals

1.74

226

Sub-total

Contingencies (10%) annually Historically the yield of Total Variable Costs (US $) exportable bananas has been in the region of 7-8 INCOME t/ha, out of an average total Banana Frequency Quantity Unit yield of 20-25 t/ha, with the Sales balance being disposed of in the local markets. For this Export (7.5 tonnes) annually 600 boxes (12.5 kg) calculation a total yield of Local sale (15 tonnes) annually 150 quintals 22.5 t/ha has been Total Income (US $) assumed, with an exportable yield of 7.5 t/a. GROSS MARGIN PER HECTARE FOR BANANAS (US $) 2. Labour requirements in the post project situation will be much higher than at present (Table 4), in order to deal with more intensive management and increased

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1,407

Unit

Annual

Value

Value/ha

1.67

1,002

4.40

660 1,662 255

128

production. The figure of 350 man/days/ha is based on the MacDonald report of 1978. 3. Export bananas will be purchased at the farm packing station, with boxes supplied by buyer, so there is no allowance for transport costs or packing material in the farmers costs. 4. The export price of $1.67 per box of 12.5 kg is the average of the prices agreed for a six year contract with the Middle Eastern export company for 2003-2009. These are: $ 1.50 (years 1 & 2), $ 1.70 (years 3 & 4), $ 1.80 (years 5 & 6).

8.3

The Potential for Other Export Crops

The quantities of grapefruits and watermelons exported in the past were very small and only justified on the back of the banana trade, filling up space on the banana boats and benefiting from preferential trade tariffs etc. Similar reservations apply to those regarding bananas, i.e. high production costs and lack of security. The future for these crops is also limited to the local market and also does not justify any development intervention to increase production.

8.4

The Potential for Improving Annual Crop Production

With the demise of the banana export trade, the potential for increasing agricultural production lies with the smallholder sector and the improvement of annual crops. The principal annual crops of the irrigated areas, maize and sesame, both have potential for increasing yields substantially, with improved irrigation and agronomic practices. They can contribute to the objectives suggested earlier in Section 8.1,that of achieving better food security, increasing incomes from the sale of surpluses and lowering prices by reducing the quantities of imported maize and cooking oil. Cooking oil, rice and wheat flour are currently imported in considerable quantities and trials of sunflower, safflower, groundnuts, upland rice and wheat are being carried out in the area under the direction of the CEFA agronomists. These crops have to potential to reduce import requirements and improve farmer incomes, but it is still too early to judge how successful they will be. Problems which might prove difficult to overcome are discussed briefly below. Upland rice and wheat present a number of potential problems for smallholder production. The lack of tractors or oxen for seedbed preparation may pose problems. In countries where these crops are traditional, several operations to cultivate, harrow and level are usually necessary before a suitable seedbed is achieved. Weed control without chemicals is very labour intensive in broadcast crops and bird damage is also a major constraint, particularly when relatively small areas are grown and the bird pressure is therefore concentrated. Considered in relation to these difficulties the yield potential of upland rice is not particularly high, with only 1.5-1.7 t/ha having been achieved in the past when it was grown on large commercial farms, even with 5-7 irrigations. Smallholder yields can be expected to be substantially lower, especially if adequate fertiliser application is not possible. Wheat has the added disadvantage that the yield potential of heat tolerant varieties is also limited, probably less than 2 t/ha, and may be sub-economic in terms of the return to labour expended. Extensive on-farm trials are recommended before promoting these crops.

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Other oilseeds, groundnuts, sunflower and safflower are attractive in their potential to boost local production of cooking oils. However areas of light soils suitable for groundnuts are limited, bird damage is a threat to sunflower production and safflower yields tend to be rather low. Here again, extensive on-farm trials are recommended before promoting these crops. The problem of bird damage in sorghum is a major factor militating against more use of this drought tolerant crop and is the main reason why there has not been a shift to from maize to sorghum, in spite of the shortage of irrigation water. Instead, farmers are planting maize at lower densities to match the expected rainfall. The potential for increasing yields is good but the bird problem tends to be even more serious with improved varieties. In view of this and the fact that it is only grown at the fringes of the irrigable area, it is not recommended for any development intervention at this stage. In conclusion therefore, it is recommended that development activities should concentrate on increasing production of maize and sesame, the main food crops grown in the area.

8.5

Interventions to Increase Production of Maize and Sesame 8.5.1

Irrigation Rehabilitation

The deficiencies of the irrigation system are on the top of every farmer’s list of constraints, in view of the marginal rainfall which is the norm for the area. The adverse effects of not having an efficient irrigation system include; limited crop areas, necessity for drought tolerant low yielding crop varieties, non-ideal planting times, low crop yields, risk of crop failure, and the need to cultivate larger areas to supply minimum food requirements. Rehabilitation of the irrigation canals and control structures is therefore a priority, together with farmer organisation and training in orderly water scheduling and efficient water use to minimise waste.

8.5.2

Improved Maize Varieties

In order to maximise the benefits of a more extensive and efficient irrigation system there should be an increase in the area planted with improved maize varieties with a higher yield potential than the local one. At present there is little known about the potential for improved sesame varieties in the area. Seed multiplication of improved maize varieties and their promotion through demonstrations and extension is therefore the second of the main intervention recommendations.

8.5.3

Control of Maize Stalk Borer

Maize stalk borer is a major pest in the area, reducing crop yields by at least 20%. Effective control measures by smallholders are believed to be possible and economic, and their introduction is recommended, as the third major intervention activity.

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8.6

The Potential for Increasing Production of Maize and Sesame

Table 10 presents an estimate of the potential for increasing production of maize and sesame by implementation of the three main development interventions discussed above; rehabilitation of irrigation, introduction of better maize varieties and control of the maize stalk borer. Table 10. Potential Increase in Production of Maize and Sesame Crop

Season & % of Area

Production Current Situation

Production w ith Irrigation System

Planted

Rehabilitated Area (ha)

Yield (t/ha)

Production (tonnes)

Area (ha)

Yield (t/ha)

Irrigated Maize

Gu (100%) 8,000 Der (40%) 3,200 Sub-total 11,200

1.00 1.00

8,000 22,922 3,200 9,169 11,200 32,091

1.20 1.20

Rainfed Maize

Gu (100%) 20,000 Der (40%) 8,000 Sub-total 28,000

0.60 0.60

12,000 4,800 16,800

5,078 2,031 7,109

0.60 0.60

All Maize

Total

28,000

39,200

Irrigated Sesame

Hagai (6%) Der (60%) Sub-total

480 4,800 5,280

0.80 0.80

384 1,375 3,840 13,753 4,224 15,128

0.80 0.80

Rainfed Sesame

Hagai (6%) 1,200 Der (60%) 12,000 Sub-total 13,200

0.35 0.35

420 4,200 4,620

305 3,047 3,352

0.35 0.35

8,844

18,480

All Sesam e Total

39,200

18,480

Production (tonnes)

Production w ith Irrigation Rehabilitated Plus Maize Borer Control Area (ha)

27,506 22,922 11,003 9,169 38,509 32,091 3,047 1,219 4,265

5,078 2,031 7,109

Yield (t/ha)

Production (tonnes)

1.50 1.50

34,383 13,754 48,137

0.70 0.70

3,555 1,422 4,976

42,775 39,200

1,100 1,375 11,002 13,753 12,102 15,128 107 1,066 1,173

305 3,047 3,352

53,113

0.80 0.80

1,100 11,002 12,102

0.35 0.35

107 1,066 1,173

13,276 18,480

13,276

It has been assumed that the irrigated area could more than double as a result of rehabilitation and that maize yields will increase by 20% from more efficient watering and a greater proportion of land being planted with improved varieties. The additional benefit of efficiently controlling maize stalk borer is assumed to be worth a further 20% increase in overall production. The assumed yields are taken to be averages since some farmers will achieve better results as a result of the interventions and many will not. In summary: •

The area of irrigated maize could increase from the present 11,200 ha to 32,091 ha, as a result of rehabilitating the irrigation system.

•

The area of irrigated sesame could increase from the present 5,280 ha to 15,128 ha, as a result of rehabilitating the irrigation system.

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•

Maize production could increase from 28,000 m/t to 42,775 m/t per annum as a result of irrigation rehabilitation, and up to 53,113 m/t with the addition of efficient maize stalk borer control.

•

Sesame production could increase from 8,844 m/t to 13,276 m/t as a result of irrigation rehabilitation.

8.7

Potential Value of Increased Maize and Sesame Production

Based on the above production figures, the value of production after implementing the project is estimated to rise from US$ 8.5 million at current levels, to US$ 12.8 million after rehabilitation of the irrigation system and to US$ 14.0 million with the additional benefits of maize stalk borer control. The potential financial benefits from all interventions would therefore be US$ 5.5 million per annum. Table 9 below shows the calculation, based on current local market prices of Shs 2000/kg for maize and Shs 10,000/kg for sesame, using an exchange rate of Shs 17,000 : US$ 1.00. Table 11. Potential Value of Increased Maize and Sesame Production Crop

Maize

Value of Production Current Situation

118.00

3,304,000

42,775

118.00

5,047,450

53,113

118.00

6,267,334

Sesame

8,844

588.00

5,200,272

13,276

588.00

7,806,288

13,276

588.00

7,806,288

Both Crops

36,844

8,504,272

56,051

12,853,738

66,389

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8.8

Gross Margin Estimates for Principal Annual Crops 8.8.1

Gross Margin for Smallholder Maize

The Gross Margin for irrigated maize after project implementation, is estimated at US $ 159.00 per hectare. This assumes the ability to irrigate up to three times if necessary, following rehabilitation of the irrigation system, as well as the use of improved varieties and the control of Maize Stalk Borer. Table 12. Estimated Gross Margin/ha for Smallholder Maize, following Project Implementation VARIABLE COSTS Description

Frequency

Number

Unit

Annual

Cost

Cost/ha

Seed (improved)

0.500

10.00

Stalk Borer Chemical

2.00

8.00

Land Preparation

man/hours

n/a

0.00

Planting

n/a

0.00

Irrigation

n/a

0.00

Weeding

168

n/a

0.00

Harvesting

n/a

0.00

Shelling

n/a

0.00

Transport (local market)

n/a

0.00

368

(90 man/days)

Labour (farmer's own):

Total Variable Costs (US $)

18.00

INCOME Maize

Frequency

Quantity

Unit

Sales Local sale

1500

Unit

Annual

Value

Value/ha

0.118

177.00

Total Income (US $)

177.00

GROSS MARGIN PER HECTARE FOR MAIZE (US $)

159.00

Note on Table 12: 1. Labour inputs are based on the Macdonald Study of 1978. No cost has been assumed for family labour, because the opportunity for alternative employment will be almost negligible without a major revival of the banana production for export trade.

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8.8.2

Gross Margin for Smallholder Sesame

The Gross Margin for irrigated sesame after project implementation is estimated at US $ 464.00 per hectare. No increase in yield is expected, compared with currently irrigated sesame, but, following rehabilitation of the irrigation system it is expected that a larger proportion of the crop area will be irrigated. Table 13.

Estimated Gross Margin/ha for Smallholder Sesame, following Project Implementation VARIABLE COSTS

Description

Frequency

Number

Unit

Annual

Cost

Cost/ha

0.588

5.88

Land Preparation

man/hours

n/a

0.00

Planting

n/a

0.00

Irrigation

n/a

0.00

Weeding

n/a

0.00

Harvesting

n/a

0.00

Threshing

n/a

0.00

Transport & selling

n/a

0.00

329

(80 man/days)

Seed (farmer's own) Labour (farmer's own):

Total Variable Costs (US $)

5.88

INCOME Sesame

Frequency

Quantity

Unit

Sales Local sale

800

Unit

Annual

Value

Value/ha

0.588

470.40

Total Income (US $)

470.40

GROSS MARGIN PER HECTARE FOR SESAME (US $)

464.52

Note on Table 13: 1. Labour inputs are based on the Macdonald Study of 1978. As with maize, no cost has been assumed for family labour.

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8.8.3

Gross Margin for Smallholder Tomatoes

Tomatoes are the only other annual crop which might be a significant cash and food crop. The MacDonald Study of 1978 estimates that 2% of the area was under tomatoes, but at that time much of the crop was grown by commercial farmers with the produce going to the canning plant at Afgoi, which no longer exists, so it is unlikely that more that say 1% of the irrigated area would be under tomatoes today. Tomatoes are still important for smallholders with access to irrigation, so it could be argued that rehabilitation of the irrigation system could lead to an increase in overall production with a corresponding increase in the surplus available for cash sales. Although smallholder yields can be expected to be relatively low, estimated at 5 t/ha, the Gross Margin for tomatoes is estimated at US $ 9,684 per hectare, due to the assumption that family labour will be used at no cash cost. On this basis, the farmer with 0.02 ha of under tomatoes, would enjoy a gross margin of $ 194. Table 14. Estimated Gross Margin/ha for Smallholder Tomatoes VARIABLE COSTS Description

Frequency

Number -

Unit

Quantity

Unit

Annual

Cost

Cost/ha

Pest Control

annually

Litres/Kg

Fertilisers

annually

quintals

150

Labour

annually

500

man/hours

Transport (local market)

annually

quintals

1.74

Sub-total Contingencies (10%)

287 annually

Total Variable Costs

316 INCOME

Tomato

Frequency

Quantity

Unit

Sales

Local sale (5 tonnes)

annually

5000

Unit

Annual

Value

Value/ha

2.00

Total Income GROSS MARGIN PER HECTARE FOR TOMATOES (US $)

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10,000 10,000 9,684

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Chapter 9 Agricultural Development Strategy 9.1

Components of the Proposed Programme

A good principle for any effective development intervention is to limit the objectives to those which are firmly believed to be achievable and which have clearly identifiable benefits. The selected interventions can then be more adequately and efficiently managed by the available staff, with more chance of success than if their efforts had to be spread over a large number of activities. This is particularly important in Somalia, when there are presently no government extension staff. The main components of the proposed Agricultural Strategy are therefore limited to three: rehabilitation of irrigation, introduction of better maize varieties and control of the maize stalk borer. A fourth component is also considered worthwhile, that of continuing the trials and seed multiplication on alternative crops, already being carried out by CEFA.

9.1.1

Rehabilitation of the Irrigation System

The rehabilitation of the irrigation system is being dealt with in detail in the Irrigation Engineering Annex, but the high cost of irrigation requires that water be used efficiently, and extension activities should include farmer training in water scheduling and management as well as demonstrations of improved irrigation systems.

9.1.2

Increasing the Use of Higher Yielding Maize Varieties

As far as agronomy is concerned the high cost of irrigation also requires that crop yields be increased to maximise the return per litre of water. This can be achieved by using improved varieties, longer duration with higher yield potential for the areas with good irrigation, and shorter duration where irrigation is less reliable. Even after rehabilitation of the irrigation system there will always be farms, particularly near the “tail end” of the canal systems, where water shortages will occur. The use of short duration maize varieties could reduce the risk of crop failure and also enable more timely planting of the second Der season crops. Seed multiplication of improved maize varieties can probably be done in the area, under the supervision of the NGOs. It will take time for a significant number of farmers to adopt new varieties and local seed multiplication should be able to keep up with demand. There is no question of using hybrid maize and the production of open pollinated varieties is fairly straightforward.

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9.1.3

Control of Maize Stalk Borer

Maize stalk borer, Chilo partellus, was mentioned by all farmers as the main pest of the crop and a yield reduction of 30% or more is normal. There are number of methods of control which can be used, in addition to the traditional hand removal of infested plants, including: stover removal & burning, removal of volunteer maize plants, crop rotation, insecticidal extract from the Neem tree, biological predators and proprietary chemicals. The UNA Integrated Pest Management Project in Somalia has provided information that the Bayer product, Bulldock is being used by some farmers in the Lower and Middle Shabeelle for stemborer control. At recommended application rates of 4 kg per hectare, one application per season, and wholesale costs in Nairobi of as little as US$ 1.50 per kg, effective insecticidal control of stemborers can be achieved at very little cost.

9.1.4

Crop Trials and Seed Multiplication of Alternative Crops

CEFA agronomists are conducting variety trials and seed multiplication on sunflower, safflower, upland rice, short duration maize, heat tolerant wheat and also groundnuts, as well as an alternative irrigation system for sesame and maize stem borer control using Neem tree extracts. As discussed above in Section 8.4, it is still too soon to recommend large scale adoption of new crops, but it certainly worthwhile continuing these activities, especially in respect of the oil crops.

9.2

Implementation

At present the NGOs – ADRA, CEFA, CARE and CONCERN are working on improvements to irrigation and agriculture in the area and, in the absence of a government agricultural extension service, it would appear, for the foreseeable future at least, that only NGOs can provide the supervision and extension services to implement the proposed developments. As far as possible they are working through traditional village committees, some of which deal with irrigation scheduling and others look after agricultural matters. The latter would be important, for example, in promoting the adoption of new maize varieties and stalk borer control methods.

9.3

Project Monitoring

Indicators for baseline establishment and monitoring of project progress in the improvement of maize and sesame production might include the following: -

Number of farmers able to irrigate their crops Proportion of cropped area irrigated Number of irrigations possible 1, 2 or 3 Yields obtained Number of farmers using improved varieties Number of farmers controlling maize stalk borer efficiently Number & type of crop trials, demonstrations and farmer field days held.

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- Number & type of training sessions and number of participants - Amount & type of improved seed produced & distributed

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ANNEX 4

Marketing Study in the Lower Shabelle Region

This Report was prepared by the Eurata Expert: Jotham O. Ouko

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Table of Contents 0

List of Tables and Figures ...................................................................................... 141

Introduction .......................................................................................................... 145

The Products and Markets...................................................................................... 144

The Marketing Process........................................................................................... 145 3.1

Marketing Channels

145

3.2

Direct Marketing Costs

147

3.3

Produce Prices

148

3.4

Market Information

149

3.5

Packaging and Produce Quality

150

Institutional Framework ......................................................................................... 151

Constraints............................................................................................................ 152

Recommendations ................................................................................................. 153

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Chapter 0 List of Tables and Figures Tables Table 1. List of crops grown and marketed in Lower Shabelle Region Table 2. Produce handling costs in Somali shillings at farm and market Table 3. Wholesale prices at Mogadishu in Somali shillings

Figures Figure 1. Basic produce flow through the marketing chain

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Chapter 1 Introduction The success and sustainability of any agricultural production depends on economic and financial gains by farmers participating in the activity and can be measured by proceeds accruing after marketing the produce. These gains serve as incentives to farmers as they are able to meet their basic social and economic needs of their households including the ability to finance the next crop. There is therefore a need to link crop production with marketing preferably by working backwards from the consumer and market demands to help determine what to plant, when to plant and quantities to produce. The purpose of this market study was therefore to survey and evaluate the existing marketing channels with a view to recommending suitable marketing processes and other related options that may help enhance agricultural production and profitability in the former Banana growing zones particularly lower Shabelle region. It involved visits and discussions with producers and traders in order to determine the flow of different products from production to end markets, costs involved in produce preparation, loading, transportation and delivery to the markets for sale. Attempts have been made to assess produce quality at both ends: produce supply and demand, prices and other related factors which influence the marketing process. Since there is no regulatory framework in Somalia, roles of established institutions with emphasis being placed on farmers groups and associations on their involvement in marketing support activities in the region were assessed.

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Chapter 2 The Products and Markets Visits to farms and markets within the lower Shabelle Region identified a wide range of crops being grown or are available at the markets. The dominating crops are shown in Table 1. Table 1.

List of crops grown and marketed in Lower Shabelle Region

Cereals/Legumes/Oil Crops Vegetables Maize Tomato Sesame Onion Peanut Pumpkin Cowpea Carrots Sorghum Spinach Rice Dudhi Cucumber Lettuce Capsicums Brassica spp Turnips

Fruits/Nuts Water melon Mango Lime Grape fruit Coconut Banana Guava Papaya Annona spp

Maize and Sesame, being staple food crops are grown by almost all farmers and form key marketed commodities in the region. Between 25% to 100% of harvested maize is retained by farmer for own consumption and the balance sold to help finance essential home needs depending on the quantity harvested and the family size. As for sesame, about 20% is retained for home use and 80% sold. All fruits and vegetables are predominantly passed through the marketing chain although some small quantities are utilized at home. The major market outlet is Mogadishu, the capital city of The markets: Somalia which in 1998 was estimated to have a population of about 1.0 million habitants. Present population is known but it however is still the urban centre which consumes most commodities, locally sources or imported. It also seems as an exchange centre for most produce from the North and South of Somalia and imports due to its location and availability of a sea port. Other markets which can be served through Mogadishu include Bosaso, Hargeysa, Galkacyo, Belet-Weyne and Jowhar, all to the North. The towns which can be served direct from the lower Shabelle region include Kismayo, Baar Dheere, Baydhaba and Baakol which are regional capitals. The populations of the different regional capitals are difficult to estimate but are assumed to be inhabited by substantial number of consumers, being large urban centres.

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Chapter 3 The Marketing Process An attempt has been made to present the way produce flows through different channels from production to the markets considering the different functions that are carried out in getting the product to the primary market. The primary market is a wholesale outlet where produce can be retailed or sold wholesale for distribution to other secondary markets.

3.1

Marketing Channels

The main functions in the marketing chain involve production, packaging, collection, purchasing, transportation and delivery to the retail or wholesale market. Six channels can be distinguished as presented in Figure 1 below. The common factor is that all deliveries to the wholesale markets are through brokers. Figure 1. Basic produce flow through the marketing chain Consumer

Consumer

Retailer

Consumer/Retailer

Exporter Wholesaler

Wholesaler

Broker

Transporter JACBUR

Transporter

Producer

Channel 1

Channel 2

Channel 3

Wholesaler

Agent

Producer

Channel 4

Channel 5

Producer Channel 6

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transports to the wholesale market through another broker. The farmer is paid very low prices in cash. The farmer hands over produce to broker at the local market. The broker (1) then transports produce to a wholesale market where it is sold to wholesaler through broker (2). Small holders utilize this channel and about 10% of vegetable/fruits and 40% of cereals are marketed through this channel. Channel 2 In this channel, producers hand over produce to an organized transporter (JACBUR) and produce is charged per load transported. The transporter takes charge of produce pays levies at checkpoints, sells produce through a broker and recovers transport and other incidental costs from each farmer also had given produce. Farmers with small to medium quantities of produce use this system. Farmer hands over produce to transporter. About 30% of produce pass through this channel. Farmer is paid by transporter after sales. JACBUR: A business person who transports produce to the market at a fee. Farmers within a production area hand over their produce for transportation and sale at a market and the transporter (Jacbur) recovers his costs after selling. The transporter then brings back proceeds to the farmer less transport and other incidental costs. There is little transparency and accountability but a lot depends on trust. Channel 3 This channel involves a producer or group of producers hiring a lorry to deliver produce to the market. The transporter is paid an agreed amount and takes care of all incidental expenses. The producer or an agent accompanies produce. The channel can also cover producers with own lorries. But in most cases producers with own lorries prefer hiring due to risks on the road especially encounters with war lords and wear and tear of the vehicle. 40% of farmers use this channel for all marketed produce. Farmer is paid directly at the market. Channel 4 On some occasions, traders contact producers directly, buy produce from them and organize transport to markets. This is more common in markets near production areas e.g. Merka, Kismayo etc About 5% of sold produce use this channel. Channel 5 Some producers have been able to sell direct to retailers and consumers thus by passing brokers and wholesalers. The consumers are mostly hotels and institutions.

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There are minimal transactions through this channel. Channel 6 Export banana and sesame have been transacted through this channel where agents based in Somalia buy for delivery to various destinations. N/B: It is worth noting that most producers cannot bypass brokers for fear of retaliation/revenge. Farmers also never negotiate prices—this is left to the broker/auctioneer. Almost every Somali citizen is armed and retaliation refers to probability of fights from the aggrieved party who is being left out of the trade. The most efficient and less costly channel is where there are few players between farmer and market outlet i.e. channels 4 – 6. Channels 1 – 3 tend to exploit farmers as there are many players who consume part of the proceeds.

3.2

Direct Marketing Costs

The major cost items in the marketing process are market preparation (sorting, grading, loading) transportation, levies at checkpoints and market and off loading. The costs are not uniform for all products but vary depending on value/volumes of transactions and who is involved. Table 2 shows estimated produce handling costs at the farm and market. Table 2: Produce handling costs in Somali shillings at farm and market. (1 USD = 17,000 SS)

Produce

Grading/Loading Offloading per lorry

Transport

Checkpoint

Maize (80kg)

100,000

20,000

700,000 – 1m

100,000

25,000

700,000 – 1m

150,000

25,000

700,000 – 1m

4,000 – 50,000 (per 120kg)

150,000

3,500,000

700,000 – 1m

100,000

150,000

3,000,000

700,000 – 1m

100,000

Sesame (50kg) Tomato (120kg) Water-melon (10MT) Banana (10MT)

Broker 4,000 (per lorry)

Transport costs Lorry is hired or produce loaded and charged per container

Check point charges There are normally 5 security checkpoints to Mogadishu one managed by Transitional National Government (TNG) and the others by war loads. TNG charges SS20,000 per lorry while the rest is taken by the war loads who

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don’t have fixed charges. One can also come across illegal checkpoints where up to SS1,000,000 can be demanded. Costs paid by transporter.

Loading/Off loading costs These include sorting, putting into containers and loading at the farm and off loading at market when lorry is hired. Costs paid by farmer.

Brokers fees Brokers are involved in produce auctioning at the wholesale market and normally charge per bag or packaging. However, tomatoes are charged by value which can reach SS50,000 per 120kg container when prices are high. Costs recovered from produce sales.

Market charges Charges are only available for Merka which was visited during the study. There were observed numerous variation depending on ownership of stalls or shops where traders operate. Banana wholesaler TNG Levy Rent per month Night guard weekly

SS20,000 per lorry load SS200,000 SS5,000

SS2,000 to 3,000 per bag SS2,000 (no charges if owner occupier) SS120,000}Where no space for store SS2,000 } SS5,000 SS1,000

SS2,000 - 3,000 per bag SS200,000 SS5,000

Vegetable Fruit Retailers TNG Levy Daily Rent Store Rent Porter per Day Night guards weekly Daily Security Cereal Stores TNG Levy Rent per month Night guards weekly

Market Facilities and Services There are no other services provided except for security by TNG and those paid for directly by traders. There is no water, electricity and traders take care of sanitation. Some traders display produce on mats on the ground while most have tables (wooden or galvanized sheets)

3.3

Produce Prices

Farm gate prices can be estimated by deducting direct marketing costs (which tend to be consistent) from market prices as shown in Tables 2 and 3.

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Local market Distinctive seasonal price variations are common and a trend of marked peaks and dips are evident in all production from the area. Some seasonal variations can be predicted, for example, supply is normally affected for most vegetables and bananas during the cool, dry and windy periods of May to July while it’s also expected to have reduced levels of water during dry periods leading to shortages and high prices, seasonal, cropping patterns also have a direct bearing on supply as most farmers plant and harvest at the same time. Such productions depress prices due to over supply. Average prices for some produce at wholesale market in Mogadishu and demand trends are shown in table 3 below: Table 3:

Wholesale prices at Mogadishu in Somali shillings. 1 USD = 17,000 SS Prices at High Prices at Low demand Produce Demand Period Periods Maize (80kg) 180,000 March – July 50,000 August - October Sosame (1.0kg) 15,000 March – May 5,500 June – Sept Tomato (120kg) 300,000 May – July 25,000 Aug – Oct Water melon (50kg) 120,000 Jan – April 20,000 June – Sept Banana (100kg) 120,000 May – July 60,000

Export market Only banana and sesame have been exported in the recent past. Agents of a Libyan based company have signed a 6 year contract with Shabelle Fruit Association (SHEFA) to purchase up to 150,000 cartons of 12.5kg per month at a price of USD 1.5 per carton for the first 2 years and increasing to USD1.85 during the last 2 years of the contract. The exports are to start from September 2003. Destination will be Libya or Middle East. For sesame, the last export season was in 1998 and produce was purchased at US$4.0 per kg through an agent for export to the Middle East.

3.4

Market Information

There is no formal market information system in place and it is difficult to determine supply, demand and prices at various production areas and markets. The farmers and traders have however their information gathering network including:

Fellow farmers who have been to the market Communication by phone between traders and farmers

Farmers make decisions based on such information sources

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3.5

Packaging and Produce Quality

There are no standards packaging for most products except cereals. packaging specifications for some products are as follows:-

The

Bags: - Maize(80kg), sesame (50kg), Pumpkin (50kg) Drums (steel) cut into half - tomato (120kg) Cartons – banana (12.5kg) for specific markets and export Bananas and water melons are not packed but loaded direct onto trucks. Other products are packed into any available material including bags, baskets, crates etc. The quality of cereals is good except for maize which has been stored underground. Such maize lose 25% to 50% of value when marketed. Fruits and vegetables are characterized by poor quality at the farm and market ends. Harvesting techniques are poor and produce is rarely sorted or graded before packing and transportation. The handling and transportation also accelerate deterioration as they are kept in the open under direct sun heat, heaped and transported on open trucks. The resulting damage and bruising can lease to losses of up to 50% at the market level. These have a bearing on the price at the wholesale market and the retail and consumer end. Some banana producers have collection sheds with manual equipment and pits for processing bananas.

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Chapter 4 Institutional Framework With no functional government in Somalia, most farmers’ operations are independent but are curtailed by lack of regulations. A part irrigation canal management groups under a manager (YERSAN) there are few functional institutions which support agricultural activities are in existence. In addition to international NGO’s the following have agriculture related activities. Somali Small Scale Growers Association (SOMALITACAB) Formed 2 years ago and based at Shalanhood village, their objectives are

Assist improve crop production, sharing knowledge and arbitrate over members disputes Mobilize farmers to maintain irrigation canals Serve as a lobby group and link members with collaborators including donors

It has a membership of 3,500 farmers who are active and own up to 20ha of land. They have no funds and rely on donations to run an office and implement its functions. They have no market support roles. SHABELLE FRUIT ASSOCIATION (SHEFA) This association has been operating since 1998 with a membership of 100 owning an average of 30ha each, all fruit growers. The associations’ objectives include:

Uniting fruit growers Undertaking marketing (export) activities Training of members to improve productivity

It has managed to sign a contract with Shabelle Agro products Ltd to supply bananas for export of between 100,000 to 150,000 cartons of 12.5kg per month after 6 months. Deliveries start in September, 2003. HIRTA SHEIKH HASHI COMMUNITY This is a religious community based at Buloo - Mareer composed of 500 farm families. They undertake joint production and marketing of their produce and have heavy equipment normally used for canal clearing. At times, they receive external support.

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Chapter 5 Constraints The following summarises the major constraints related to marketing:

Unplanned production in relation to produce demand in the local market Lack of market information (demand, supply, prices) Uncoordinated marketing approaches High transport costs, levies and poor roads Poor produce quality/post harvest handling procedures Hostile export environment Inability to diversify into new products and also explore alternative market outlets and channels Insufficient availability of improved crop production technologies Lack of market facilities and services Competition from imports Inability to commercialize farm operation

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Chapter 6 Recommendations The following are highlights of areas for possible interventions:

Enhancing local market linkages and improving efficiency

Channel players. earnings products

produce through a system that reduces the number of This will bring marketing costs down and improve farmers’ and at the same time lower consumer prices thus making more affordable.

Set up a market information system through NGOs and farmers institutions linking major outlet markets and the production areas. Information on prices, produce demand and supply, market accessibility etc can then be relayed between the two important ends. Market Information System: Somalia has a good network of telecommunication through landlines, mobile phones and radio phones. Radiophones are relatively cheap to use and can be used in this case to link major markets and production areas. NGO's operating in Somalia have offices in both production areas and major towns and can therefore provide the rudimentary linkage by visiting the wholesale markets, determining prices, supply, demand of produce and access to markets by road and informing regional offices.

Improving produce quality and production capacity

Facilitate access to improved planting materials/seeds, farm inputs, improved water use and irrigation to enhance production techniques. This will assist improve production capacity and reduce production costs.

Create awareness on produce quality requirements in relation to produce standards, harvesting and post harvest procedures including packaging, transportation and storage. Export market entry will be easier at an appropriate stage when high quality produce is available.

Consumers are aware of product quality and can pay higher prices especially those with better incomes. Higher consumer prices will definitely trickle back to the farmer in terms of better income. This can encourage improvements on handling and hence quality. Poor quality is enhanced by poor post-harvest handling procedures including being left in the sun for hours after harvesting, packaging mode of transportation and storage (for cereals). The harvested produce is fair to good quality at the farm.

Supporting development of farmers’ institutions

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Establish reliable out grower groups which can organize production and marketing for themselves. This will lead to reliability and consistency in produce delivery and produce quality.

Support will be required in training on group management, farm management, record keeping and market dynamics.

The farmer-based institutions can be linked to other established NGOs and any other rudimentary agencies like TNG

Adding value through small scale agro processing

Fruits and vegetables can be preserved through drying, making jams, marmalade, pastes or juices to extend shelf life and make them available over longer period of time. This can be substitutes to imports. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Examples of small Scale processing products include: Solar drying and processing of fruits and vegetables. Juice making is already popular for grapefruit, lime and mango although there is room to make it more efficient, hygienic and to extend shelf life of products. Jams, jellies and marmalade can be made from citrus and mangoes. Solar drying of fruits and vegetables. Tomato paste/sauce Pickles and chutneys with acid, salt and sugar Canned/bottled products.

Individuals or groups can operate these operations which need very simple equipments which can be fabricated locally. General Comments The greatest positive short term impact can be through diversification and improving productivity and quality. Regional and external markets can be targets with the right quality products if available in enough volumes and reliability in supply is assured. I however, noted that most Somalis are very pessimistic about change in their way of doing things as there is very little hope of peace. They have been too used to instability and have accepted it as a way of living. It will require much effort to convince them that there is need to change.

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ANNEX 5

Persons Met and Documents Used

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PERSONS MET (Phase 11) Christoph Langenkamp, Rural Development TA, EU Somalia Unit, Nairobi. Abdulahi Ahmed Ga’al, Somali Liaison Officer, EC Somalia Unit, Mogadishu. Francesco Baldo, Coordinator, CEFA – Somalia, Nairobi. Tony Gikonyo, Project Manager, CEFA – Somalia. Mohamed Ahamed Sheikh, Snr. Agronomist, CEFA, Somalia. Mohamed Alio Ibrow, i/c CEFA office, Qoreooley District. Mohamed Salah Yusuf, CEFA Agricultural Extension Agent, Qoreooley. Edward Baars, Agronomist/Community Mobilisation Specialist, CEFA, Somalia. Osman Haile Arush, Chairman of SHEFA (Shebelle Fruit Growers Association). Abdi Salat Dahir, former Somali banana farmer, now resident in Nairobi. Osman Ali Asayir, farmer & Chairman of Somalta’ab, Shelembot, Somalia. Sheikh Hashi Ali Baare, farmer, Bulo Marerta. Adan Mohammed Heyle, farmer, Bulo Marerta. Haji Ali Mohammed Aden, farmer, Golweyn. Ahmed Yusuf Farah, farmer, Golweyn. Hassan Mohammed Aden, farmer, Golweyn. Abdulkadir Muse Omar, farmer, Busely. Ali Sheikh Muhudin, farmer, Busley. Village elders in group meetings at Bulo Marerta, Golweyn, Busely, Segalle, Bulo Rundo, Malable, Bulo Jamao and Dagwiri. Lex Kassenberg, Coordinator, CARE - Somalia, Nairobi. John Miskell, Team Leader, CARE, Somalia. Lesley Adams, FSAU – Food Security Assessment Unit, FAO, Nairobi. Mohammed Y. Aw. Dahir, Somalia Desk, FEWS NET, Nairobi. DOCUMENTS CONSULTED “Homboy Area and Smallholder Banana Cultivation in the Lower Juba Valley and Assessment of Agricultural Benefits”, Main Report, Sir M. Macdonald & Partners Ltd., July 1987. “Genale-Bulo Marerta Project”, Annexes IV, Existing Agriculture, Sir M. Macdonald & Partners Ltd., July 1978. “Genale-Bulo Marerta Project”, Annex VI, Potential for Agricultural Development, Sir M. Macdonald & Partners Ltd., July 1978. “Genale-Bulo Marerta Project”, Annex VII, Engineering, Sir M. Macdonald & Partners Ltd., July 1978. “Genale-Bulo Marerta Project”, Annex VIII, Economic and Financial Analyses, Sir M. Macdonald & Partners Ltd., July 1978. EURATA – European Union Rural & Agricultural Temporary Association – November 2003

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“Genale-Bulo Marerta Project”, Annex X, Management and Implementation, Sir M. Macdonald & Partners Ltd., July 1978. “Genale-Bulo Marerta Project”, Annex X, Survey Data, Sir M. Macdonald & Partners Ltd., July 1978. “Genale-Bulo Marerta Project”, Annex XI, Inception Report, Sir M. Macdonald & Partners Ltd., July 1978. “The Field Atlas of Settlements in Somalia”, 2000 Edition, UNDP/DIMU, Nairobi. “Agriculture in the Regions along the Shabelle”, Insituto Agronomico per L’Oltremare – Firenze, by M.Khalif & H. Ismail, 1989. “The Agroclimatology of Somalia”, Technical Report No. 12, Ministry of Agriculture, Somali Democratic Republic, FEWS project, 1988. “Making Ends Meet, An Introduction to Rural Livelihoods in Somalia”, Alexandra France & Buzz Sharp, FSAU (Food Security Assessment Unit), FAO, Nairobi, August 2002. “FOCUS – Bleak Perspectives for the Banana Industry in the Shabelle Valley and its Impact on Food Security”, FSAU, FAO, Nairobi, April 9 1998. “FOCUS - 2002 Gu Season and Food Security Implications for Somalia in the coming year”, FSAU, FAO, Nairobi, November 2002. “Food Economy baseline Profiles, Shebelle Riverine: Irrigated maize”, FSAU, FAO, Nairobi, 2000. “Monthly Food Security Reports, Somalia”, FSAU, FAO, Nairobi, January 2002 to June 2003. Technical Report No. 11, Food Early Warning System Department, Ministry of Agriculture, Somali Democratic Republic, Dec. 1988.

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