Naval Officers Club
NEWSLETTER Number 113, 12 June 2018
ISSN 1445-6206
HMAS Barcoo ‘Beached’ in Force 10 Gale By Paul Shiels Lieutenant Commander RAN Retired In the early morning hours of Sunday, 11 April 1948, Adelaide experienced the worst storm in its history. Large portions of metropolitan jetties were washed away and along the Port River, two ships were forced aground; another was severely damaged. Winds up to 130 kph (70 kts) were reported in the metropolitan area and numerous small craft were either sunk or damaged beyond repair. The seafront along Gulf St. Vincent suffered the worst damage with the survey ship HMAS Barcoo dragging its anchor and being grounded at West Beach, just 1.3 NM north of the Adelaide’s main suburban beach, Glenelg. As the Barcoo bumped violently on the sand the gale swung from west to south bringing the ship closer inshore. Four sailors from Barcoo had a narrow escape when one of the ship’s 10.5 metre surveying motor -boats, Seamew, which was running a ‘boat routine’ between Glenelg Jetty and Barcoo broke loose from the jetty during the gale. One sailor, F. Wells, was swept overboard and another sailor, S. Meyers, (ranks not known) swam with a lifeline through rough seas and saved him. The remaining two sailors on the boat also jumped overboard and swam ashore before the boat foundered. Throughout the afternoon of 11 April, the grounded Barcoo was buffeted by Force 10 winds and faced high waves with overhanging crests. The sea took on a white appearance with foam being blown in very dense streaks; visibility was significantly reduced and the ship rolled heavily. A breeches buoy was rigged from the ship’s stem to the shore in case it became necessary to land any of the ship’s company. This operation was accomplished under extreme difficulty due to the heavy seas, fierce winds and strong undertow. The Resident Naval Officer, SA, (Commander N. Read RAN) came onboard Barcoo at 00.30 on Monday 12 April and discussed arrangements for refloating the ship. At daylight, preparations were
HMAS Barcoo on the ‘beach’ with curious onlookers made to lay out a kedge anchor to steady and secure the ship before refloating commenced. The South Australian Harbours Board agreed to supply the two-ton anchor but it arrived too late to secure the stranded vessel before dark. The tugs, Woonda, Foremost and Tandany, reached Glenelg, late on the Monday afternoon, before the kedge anchor arrived, and attempted to pull Barcoo off the beach. Although they dragged her 32 metres, the ship became stuck on a sandbar. The next day, the two-ton kedge anchor was laid out on the starboard quarter. On the Wednesday, Mr O’Malley, a dredge engineer on the Harbours Board staff, came on-board Continued Page 6
Naval Officers Club Newsletter is published by
Naval Officers Club Newsletter ISSN 1445-6206 Number 112, 20 March 2018 Editors:
Email:
Stephen Jeisman Doug Stevens Rick Bayley Paul Shiels John Thornton newsletter@navalofficer.com.au
Naval Officers Club PO Box 648 Pennant Hills NSW 1715 Www.navalofficer.com.au Email: honsec@navalofficer.com.au Electronic Funds Transfer: Westpac Naval Officers Club account: BSB 032-087 Account No. 17-4666
The Naval Officers Club of Australia Incorporated State and Territory Divisional contacts on this page. Details of forthcoming social events around the country will be found on the Page 4 Notice Board in this issue.
Contents HMAS Barcoo ‘Beached’ in Force 10 Gale!
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List of Committee and Divisional Chairpersons
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President: Captain Rick Bayley RAN Ret president@navalofficer.com.au
Members’ page
3
Notice Board
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Vice President: RADM Simon Cullen AM CSC RAN Ret
Australia’s Highest Decorated Naval Officer
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Patron: Vice Admiral T Barrett AO CSC RAN
Committee Members: David Blazey (Membership Sec.) membership@navalofficer.com.au Geoff Cole (Webmaster) webmaster@navalofficer.com.au John Ellis (Hon. Treasurer) treasurer@navalofficer.com.au Kingsley Perry (Hon Secretary) honsec@navalofficer.com.au Jim Warren (Social functions) John Hazell (Social functions) John Hodges John Vandyke
HMAS Barcoo ’Beached’ in Force 10 Gale! (Continued) 6 Salvo Fired at RAN to Operate the F-35B
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World Naval Developments
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Yangste Incident—The Unexpected Hero
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Storm Continues to Brew for Navy F-35B Capability
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‘Sea Hunter’ - Unmanned Ship of Future
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Flying the Tiger Moth
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A Theory on Port Visits
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Your Say
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Divisional Chairmen: Andy Craig (QLD) Stephen Jeisman (SA) Bob Mummery (WA) Warwick Gately (VIC) Mike Taylor (ACT) Chairman…*@navalofficer.com.au * Insert state/territory abbreviation
‘The Cursed Ship’
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Creswell Oration 2018 (Victoria)
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Coral Sea Commemoration (New South Wales)
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Encounter Dinner (South Australia)
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Obituary 1: Captain Graham Wright RAN Rtd
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Hon. Auditor: Nick Horspool
Obituary 2: Captain Peter Duncan MVO RAN Rtd
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Book Review 1 ‘On Her Majesty’s Nuclear Service’
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Book Review 2 ‘Hostage on the Yangtze ’
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Patrol Boat Reunion (Queensland)
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Membership: Total: 608 NSW: 248, VIC: 107, ACT: 114, QLD: 60, SA: 24, WA: 38, TAS: 7 NT: 1, UK: 2, USA: 2, France: 1 Canada: 1, New Zealand: 2, Malaysia: 1 NOC Newsletter Number 113, 12 June 2018
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NEW MEMBERS LCDR I. AMBROSE USNR Ret LCDR K. CARTWRIGHT OAM RFD RD RAN Ret MR R. FERRARI OAM LCDR M.F. STURGEON RANR CMDR L. WALTON RAN Ret
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LAST POSTS CMDR B.R. BAMBRICK RAN Ret *LCDR G. BESSELl-BROWN RAN Ret CMDR I.J. CARMICHAEL-BEAR MBE RAN Ret CAPT P.G. DUNCAN LVO RAN Ret *LCDR A HOPMAN MBE RAN RET LEUT P.B. McDONALD RANVR Ret LEUT D.J. McFALL RNR LCDR D MORRISON RD RANR Ret CAPT W.G. WRIGHT KM RAN Ret *LCDR F.V.R. WOLFE RAN Ret *MRS PATRICIA HOLDEN *MRS PAM READ * = Not a NOC member
WAGSTAFFE, NSW EAST GIPPSLAND, VIC FERN TREE, TAS BELLEVUE HILL, NSW ACT MCLAREN VALE, SA MONA VALE, NSW NORTHCOTE, VIC YARRALUMLA, ACT HOLLAND BUDERIM, QLD ANNANDALE, NSW
CHANGE OF ADDRESS SURG CMDR D.J.D. ANDREW RFD RANR LCDR J.H. HAZELL RAN Ret LCDR F.T. LANE RAN Ret RADM R.T. LOVE CB OBE LEUT P.J. MASON RANR LCDR C.R. WEST RAN Ret CAPT S.C. WILLIAMS RANR
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EMAIL CHANGES Deliberately blank in Public version of Newsletter
CHAP C.R. BAXTER RAN Ret CAPT R.J. BAYLEY RAN Ret LCDR P.A. JONES RAN Ret LCDR F.T. LANE RAN Ret LEUT P.J. MASON RANR CMDR T.M. MURPHY RAN Ret CAPT S.C. WILLIAMS RANR
PROMOTIONS AND AWARDS CMDR P.L. ORCHARD AM RAN Ret
ARDROSS, WA. .
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Notice Board This page carries club announcements, details of forthcoming social events, and other information.
Division Social Functions NSW
SOUTH AUSTRALIA
Contacts details at end of each notice: John Hazell 0410 447 189 (JH) johnhazell@navalofficer.com.au (JH); Kingsley Perry 0422 169 860 (KP); kingperry@navalofficer.com.au Jim Warren 0409 227 869 (JW) jimwarren@navalofficer.com.au
Stephen Jeisman 0408787384 Quarterly Lunches Details TBA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA Bob Mummery, O8 9528 2779 Meeting & Bistro Dinner Fremantle Sailing Club Thursday 14 June - 17.45 for 18.00 Guest Speaker Prof William Hart
Casual Lunch Lord Nelson Brewery Hotel Thursday 14 June (KP) Cost $50 - pay on the day.
Luncheon Fremantle Sailing Club Thursday 12 July - 11.45 for 12.15
Midwinter Lunch Mosman Club Sunday 29 July (JH) Dress - Smart Casual Cost - TBA
Meeting & Bistro Dinner Fremantle Sailing Club Thursday 9 August - 17.45 for 18.00 Guest Speaker LCDR Michael Hills RANR Rtd
* Important Notice—New bank Account for SYDNEY Functions: * EFT for NSW Functions to be sent to new Bank Account “NOC Sydney Functions BSB 032-087; Account No. 37-8079
Luncheon Fremantle Sailing Club Thursday 13 September - 11.45 for 12.15
ACT
Battle Honours Cruise - MV Southern Cross Monday 2 July Details TBA
VICTORIA
Warwick Gately 0409 372 489 Casual Catch-up The Cricketers’ Bar, Hotel Windsor Last Wednesday of Month at 17.00
Lunch - Orion Room, Southern Cross Club Monday 6 August - 12.00 for 12.30 Cost - $25 Dress - Smart Casual
Quarterly Lunch Toorak Services Club Wednesday 20 June & 19 September Details TBA
Lunch - Royal Canberra Golf Club Monday 3 September - 12.00 for 12.30 Details TBA
Notices for all Club members Changes of contact details: Please tell the Hon Secretary in writing or email the moment you change your address, phone number, email address etc.
Remittance of funds to the Club: Money for dues, functions or merchandise can be sent to the club by either cheque or EFT. Make the cheque out to “Naval Officers Club” and accompany it with written advice of both the sender and what the funds are for. If using EFT, the account details are on page 2; also advise the Hon Treasurer by email (treasurer@navalofficer.com.au) the same day.
Payment of Club dues: Members who are not Life Members and pay their dues annually are reminded that dues are payable on or before 1 March each year. Prompt payment supports your Club. NOC Newsletter Number 113, 12 June 2018
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Australia’s Most Highly Decorated Naval Officer LCDR Leon Goldsworthy GC, DSC, GM, RANVR Lieutenant Commander Leon Goldsworthy GC, DSC, GM, RANVR was born at Broken Hill on 19 January 1909. He became Australia's most highly decorated Naval Officer and remains so. As a youth he was a successful amateur wrestler and gymnast. Educated at Kapunda High School, South Australia, and later at the Adelaide School of Mines, Goldsworthy went on to Adelaide University where he worked as a technician in the Physics Department. In the years before the war, Goldsworthy moved to Western Australia and was engaged in the electrical sign business. Initially rejected by the Navy because of his small stature, he made a second attempt to enlist in March 1941 and was accepted as a Probationary Sub-Lieutenant RANVR. Shortly afterwards he was sent to England to complete his officer training. In England, Goldsworthy volunteered for the Rendering Mines Safe Section and joined RMS at the Admiralty in London. Later, he transferred to HMS Vernon. Promoted to Lieutenant on 24 June 1941, he quickly proved himself a skilled officer who was able to use his pre-war training in electricity and physics to good effect. His work often required him to defuse mines underwater wearing a bulky diving suit that made the slow, steady movements required in this work very difficult. On 13 August 1943 Goldsworthy defused a German mine in the water off Sheerness using a special diving suit which he and a colleague had helped to develop. In September and October 1943, he defused two mines, one of which had rested at a Southampton wharf for two years and the other in the River Thames. For this he was awarded the George Medal on 15 April 1944. Then, in same month, he disarmed an acoustic mine that had lain in the water off Milford Haven for two and a half years. On 15 August 1944 he was Mentioned in Dispatches, shortly afterwards in September 1944 he received the George Cross for his work in recovering and defusing mines between June 1943 and September 1944. This award was given to civilians or military personnel for actions not normally covered by purely military decorations. On 39 September 1944 he was promoted to Acting Lieutenant Commander. Before the Allied invasion of France, Goldsworthy was involved in the selection and
Lieutenant Commander Leon Goldsworthy GC, DSC, GM, RANVR training of men for port clearance and he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross on 16 January 1945 for his bravery and leadership in clearing Cherbourg Harbour, which was needed urgently to supply Allied troops advancing across France. On one occasion he disarmed a new German 'K' type mine in 15 metres of water under shellfire. After his work in France, Goldsworthy served with the United States Navy in the South Pacific Theatre, helping to defuse Japanese mines in the Philippines and in the Borneo area. He was among the first to enter and search the caves in Corregidor. Goldsworthy was discharged on 24 May 1946 and was Australia's most highly decorated naval officer, having rendered more than 300 mines safe. After the war he returned to Perth and became manager of the Rainbow Neon Light Company. In 1991 he became vice-chairman (overseas) of the Victoria Cross and George Cross Association. He died in Perth on 7 August 1994. (Content reproduced with approval of Australian War Memorial) 5
‘Barcoo’ Aground at West Beach. . . . .Continued from Page 1 with the RNO SA to discuss the practicability of dredging a channel astern of the ship. This appeared essential if the ship was to be refloated before the next spring tides due later in the month. Arrangements were then made to embark a 6” centrifugal pump to provide circulating water for the condensers. Later that day, Woonda and Foremost again attempted to refloat Barcoo but were unsuccessful. The following day, Australia's leading salvage expert at the time, Captain J. R. Williams, a merchant seaman, arrived in Adelaide and conferred with the HMAS Barcoo on beach with sightseers RNO SA and the Commanding Officer (Lieutenant Commander Remove most fuel oil, naval stores and amD. T. Gale DSC RAN). A salvage plan was devel- b. oped along the following lines: munition by lighters and jettison remaining fresh water. a. Dredge a channel from deep water to c. Lay out two kedge anchors astern and the around ship’s stern. ship’s starboard bow anchor – the latter to steady the ship’s head when the haul into deep water began. By Friday, the refloated but badly damaged, Seamew, had been towed back to the Barcoo and a dredge had arrived which was scheduled to begin dredging on the Saturday morning. Furthermore, arrangements were made to tow the two surveying motor-boats, Seamew and Moresby, and the motor skiff back to Port Adelaide on the same morning. The channel which was dredged, although silted up, can still be seen on the right-hand side of an aircraft taking off on the South-West Runway (RWY 23) from Adelaide Airport. Weather condition between 13-20 April were favourable for the salvage operations but on the morning of 20 April, a moderate north-west wind sprang up, accompanied by rain squalls. It was therefore decided to send the dredge back to harbour. HMAS Warrego arrived later that morning and anchored off, by which time the wind had backed to a west-south-west and increased to a Force 6 (25-31 kts). In mid-afternoon, both kedge anchors were hauled in slowly and steadily, and the ship began moving astern. At 16.20 HMAS Barcoo was afloat, and shortly after, was taken in tow by HMAS Warrego. When about eight cables (1500 metres/1600 yards) offshore, Warrego’s tow parted and Barcoo anchored until a line could be passed by
HMAS Barcoo and Harbours Board Dredge at West Beach NOC Newsletter Number 113, 12 June 2018
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HMAS Barcoo and HMAS Warrego under tow by Tug Woonda in the Port River
the tug Foremost that had been standing by. the grounding but exonerated. No doubt the tranForemost then towed her six miles to the Sema- scripts of the trial would reflect the decisions made phore Anchorage with HMAS Warrego anchoring with respect to the forecast and actual weather. nearby. The operation was carried out in the rough- Why couldn’t the ship get underway with the est seas experienced along the coast since the storm weather coming in? The grounding of the Barcoo created significant which drove Barcoo ashore, with winds reaching public interest in Adelaide. On one afternoon alone, 65 kph (36 kts). The next day, Barcoo proceeded to Outer Har- nearly 30,000 people visited the beach causing disbour at seven knots and secured alongside with ruption to refloating operations as bulldozers tried Warrego securing outboard of her. Three days were to shift sand. Back roads to the scene were jammed spent at Outer Harbour before both ships were with sightseers and cars, while a stream of people towed on Saturday 24 April, side by side up the Port walked along the beach to Barcoo. River, through the Birkenhead Bridge to berth at the Sugar Wharf, adjacent to the Jervois Bridge. There must have been questions regarding the overall preparedness, bearing in mind the forecast weather. Barcoo was anchored in open waters less than 10NM from the sheltered confines of Outer Harbour. Of course, other ships within Outer Harbour and the Port River were damaged and it’s not to say Barcoo wouldn't have experienced the same, but surely it would have been worth considering. HMAS Barcoo and HMAS Warrego passing through the Lieutenant Commander Gale Birkenhead Bridge towed by Tug Woonda was later court-martialled for 7
Salvo Fired at RAN to Operate the F-35B - An RN Engineer’s View By Commander Steve George RN Retired
F-35B Landing Aboard USS Wasp
(Extract from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute ‘The Strategist’ dated 20 June 2014 and republished in this Newsletter with approval of the writer)
As a military aircraft engineer, I’ve been associated with STOVL aircraft operations for around 30 years, and have worked on the F-35 program. So I’ve followed the current discussions around potential use of F-35B from the Canberra-class LHDs with interest. In my view, it’s remarkable how much the debate focuses on the problems that the aircraft would face in operating from those ships rather than the potential benefits to be gained. Assertions abound about the ‘limited’ nature of F-35B operations from an LHD, and the ‘severe challenges’ involved in generating a militarily ‘decisive impact’ from ‘small’ platforms. And yet for 30 years or more the UK and US (using AV-8Bs and Sea Harriers) have NOC Newsletter Number 113, 12 June 2018
delivered significant operational effect from similar platforms. Clearly, STOVL at sea can work. So I’d like to offer a few observations that might assist and inform the debate. For STOVL aircraft, the Canberra class isn’t a ‘small’ ship. They’re actually much larger than the RAN’s last carrier, HMAS Melbourne, and significantly bigger than the UK’s highly effective Invincible class. Their flight decks are nearly as big as Wasp class LHDs decks, for which the F-35B was designed. Indeed, the Canberra class actually have more suitable decks for F-35B operations; their ski jumps would deliver significantly improved launch payloads and safer launches. The point here is that STOVL is a truly disruptive tech8
nology. It allows LHD-sized vessels to deliver a level of maritime aviation capability previously limited to large conventional carriers. There are understandable concerns about the F-35B’s jet blast. STOVL operations require nothing like the complex blast deflectors fitted to CVNs, but jet-blast issues have been considered, researched and tested throughout the F-35 programme. In my view, the F-35B’s impact on flight decks is understood and manageable. New and highly effective flightdeck coatings have been tested and trialled. It’s possible that minor ship modifications may be required, including protection for deck equipment, or possibly even deck reinforcement, but measures like those are normal for STOVL operations on ships. Staying with the engineering aspects, there have been statements about the ‘inability’ to maintain the F-35 on board the LHDs. In fact, the aircraft has been specifically designed to be maintained at sea, and to have a small logistics footprint. It’s true that embarking F-35s would require some changes to existing spaces and facilities—but the RN put Sea Harriers (an aircraft not remotely optimised for maritime operations) on board with minimal ship changes. Lack of space doesn’t mean lack of engineering expertise, nor does it inhibit ingenuity.
HMAS Adelaide underway on Sydney Harbour ation, and it’s this: putting aircraft, stores, fuel, weapons, support facilities and personnel into close proximity on a ship allows for high operational tempos. That has been demonstrated for many years, from the South Atlantic to the Bay of Sirte, and from Korea to Suez. The amount of air capability an LHD deck could generate from five to 10 F-35Bs, and the length of time that could be sustained, would startle anyone who hasn’t done ‘STOVL at sea’. Coupling high-sortie rates with the ship’s ability to minimise distance to the target is the essence of naval aviation: proximity equals capability. In my experience, the key challenge in delivering a viable maritime aviation capability wouldn’t be the equipment, but in re-generating the required naval-aviation expertise. Fortunately, Australia has a strong naval-aviation heritage, and a number of ex-RAN aviators who were (not that long ago) involved in the UK’s Sea Harrier operations. In my view, the Australian Government should assemble some of that priceless experience and put it to work assessing the F-35B/ LHD option. Regenerating a fixed-wing navalaviation capability would be the key to exploiting the F-35B at sea—and I have no doubt the RAN would be equal to the challenge.
Capabilities of F-35B Turning to flight-deck operations, it’s been argued that F-35Bs would ‘displace’ other aircraft on the flight deck leading to a ‘loss of capability’. True, some specific capabilities would be constrained. But a different set of capabilities would be gained. We shouldn’t ignore the significant capability the F-35B would bring to the fight, nor overlook the value of being able to tailor the LHD’s ‘air wing’ to meet the (often unexpected) task. Concerns have also been expressed over safely operating both fixed and rotary wing aircraft on a single deck. So let me reassure readers that operating different types of aircraft simultaneously from small spaces is, like handling jet blast, a routine and well-understood aspect of naval aviation. Any integration of the F-35B with the Canberra LHDs would have to deliver operational impact in an efficient manner. There’s a key point here, not well understood by those unfamiliar with naval avi-
Steve George was an air engineer officer in the Royal Navy for 28 years, and served in HMS Invincible during the 1982 Falklands operation. During his career, he was closely involved with the Sea Harrier, and also with joint RN/RAF Harrier operations. Retiring from the RN as a Commander, he joined the JSF programme to work on F-35B ship suitability.
Storm Continues to Brew for Navy F-35B Capability…… Page 16 9
World Naval Developments At the beginning of March, Russian President Vladimir Putin devoted his speech on the state of Russia to what he considered a series of five spectacular new strategic weapons. One was a very long range Sarmat ballistic missile, presumably a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), capable of reaching targets anywhere on earth, reaching them by flying over either pole. It would be armed with Avangard hypersonic maneuvering re-entry vehicles, which could evade ballistic missile defenses because such defenses depend on the predictability of the path of the incoming weapon. Putin also announced a Kinzhal air-launched hypersonic cruise missile, a nuclear-powered underwater strike weapon (Status-6/Kanyon), and a nuclearpowered cruise missile. Of the five new weapons (if Avangard is counted apart from Sarmat), the only one not previously discussed was the nuclear-powered cruise missile. All of these weapons have Cold War antecedents, and one might ask just how much is new. FOBS was a Russian Cold War project, abandoned at that time because it was not particularly accurate. Whether whatever guidance is inside Avangard (if it actually exists) can overcome gross inaccuracies is anyone’s guess. Putin made much of the short boost phase of the Sarmat missile, presumably implying that it would be difficult to detect the launch of the missile from space (the United States has a network of satellites which look for the infra-red signature of launches). It
seems dubious that the boost phase can be short enough, given the sheer mass of the missile. The idea of a nuclear-powered extreme-range torpedo certainly dates back to the Cold War, and the first Soviet nuclear submarine was originally designed to fire a nuclear -armed super-torpedo into U.S. ports. The current nuclear torpedo project was originally disclosed in the form of graphics displayed at a Kremlin meeting and then shown in official photographs. Although the Cold War Soviet Union is not known to have worked on a nuclear-powered cruise missile, the Cold War United States did; ours was called the Super Low-Altitude Missile. It seems also to have been called Sledgehammer. Its most salient feature was that it spewed radioactive waste as it flew; that would have been so destructive that ultimately no warhead was envisaged. The project died partly because it became clear that it could never have been tested safely. The United States, and presumably also the Soviets, also pursued nuclear aircraft projects, which also died because they did not offer sufficient advantages. Putin claimed that his new nuclear cruise missile was no larger than conventional ones; that seems unlikely. It seems unlikely that the missile’s designers have paid much attention to limiting its environmental effects as it flies towards its target. The hypersonic air-launched missile recalls the late Cold War AS-16 (Kh-15) and, for that matter, the U.S. SRAM (AGM-69), although both had much shorter ranges (Putin claimed a range of 1200 miles
SARMAT Ballistic Missile Launch Silo NOC Newsletter Number 113, 12 June 2018
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It seems significant that Putin did not unveil some exotic means of defending Russia against Western strategic weapons. Effective large-scale missile defence is the only way that the nuclear balance of power can be tipped, and it is not, apparently, currently on the cards. Without it, Putin is merely threatening us with what he can already do, and what Russia has been able to do for decades. Putin’s nuclear show was part of a larger strategy to maintain Russian strength despite continuing economic weakness and a shrinking population. Nuclear weapons are a relatively inexpensive form of military power, made even cheaper if they never need be demonstrated (thanks to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty). Putin has also tried to convince Russians that these weapons are more than a deterrent: they are usable; a nuclear war is fightable and winnable. That is partly for internal consumption, but it is also a means of intimidation outside Russia. More generally, Putin clearly still believes what he was taught as a young KGB officer: that the West and its open societies are a deadly threat to Russia. This is nothing new in Russian history. A combination of fascination with the West and hatred of its openness goes back hundreds of years. The question for the Russians who wanted to resist the West and liberalism was always whether Russia could simply be sealed against contagion or whether it needed to take the initiative. This history, incidentally, confronts anyone who imagined that the Russians could be converted into friends at the end of the Cold War – which any Russian would have seen as a major strategic defeat. Putin has chosen to take the initiative even though his Russia remains much poorer than the West. That has meant adopting an unconventional form of warfare (often called ‘hybrid war’) employing deniable ‘volunteers’ or ‘contractors’ in wars from Ukraine to Syria. It has also meant sponsoring wide-scale cyberwarfare against the West. Putin has also used conventional diplomacy, for example in an attempt to detach Turkey from NATO, and to gain adherents in Central Europe. The Russians are no longer selling Communism, but Putin certainly is selling the idea of an authoritarian alliance, which must attract many national leaders or dictators. Putin’s weapons do not change the balance of nuclear power, because existing Russian strategic weapons are already enough to destroy the United States – just as existing U.S. nuclear weapons are enough to destroy Russia. The United States cannot buy enough strategic interceptors to beat off the mass of nuclear weapons Putin already has. It is conceivable that enough could be bought to defend
Avangard Hypersonic Re-entry Vehicle for Kinzhal). As an anti-ship missile, Kh-15 was intended to reach Mach 5 when coming out of a dive from high altitude. Putin credited Kinzhal with a speed of Mach 10. The Russians have already made much of their work on hypersonics, and a hypersonic anti-ship missile, which NATO has code-named Krypton, has been widely publicized. Putin claimed that all of the weapons were well along in development, and that Kinzhal was operational in the Southern Military District, but he illustrated his remarks with paintings on slides, not with photographs of actual hardware. A U.S. commentator said that there had been several unsuccessful tests of the nuclear-powered cruise missile. Putin emphasized that the new weapons could evade missile defenses and were thus ‘invincible;’ many commentators saw his announcement as an attempt to force the West to take him more seriously. Others pointed to the upcoming Russian Presidential election. Russians apparently generally resent the West, blaming it (not themselves) for the poor state of their economy and their country. Putin’s claim of overwhelming strength is doubtless very popular inside Russia. There, U.S. work on strategic missile defense has generally been taken as a direct attack on Russia, rather than what it is, a response to small numbers of ballistic missiles in the hands of rogue regimes, particularly those of Iran and North Korea.
Kinzhal Air Launched Hypersonic Cruise Missile 11
The question now, for both the West and for the Russians, is how deep the current friendship between the two countries goes. When the Russians first began selling the Chinese modern equipment in the 1990s, many Russians were uneasy. Now that trade is less and less vital to an evolving Chinese military industry. To a Russian, the looming reality is that the Russian army is thinly manned while the Chinese seem to have a bottomless pool of manpower and increasingly sophisticated weaponry. The Chinese have recently tested their first anti-ballistic missile. Whether or not the test was rigged (as some have suggested), Putin is likely to have seen it as an indicator that his main remaining military asset is being devalued. Is Putin’s message actually directed more at China than at the West? At some point in the near future, China will have a national strategic defence system. Like the United States, China cannot beat off a mass nuclear attack. On the other hand, unlike the United States, China may be willing to sacrifice a great deal if it can preserve its national leadership in Beijing. The Chinese may imagine that they really can buy enough interceptors to achieve that. Thus Putin may see his futuristic offensive weapons as a message not so much to Washington as to Beijing. He may see his nuclear cruise missile as the only way to attack the Chinese population over a wide area by cruising overhead, spewing radiation. Existing treaties have reduced the sheer size of the Russian strategic arsenal below what would be needed to attack the vast land mass of that country. Putin probably does not want to chance attacking China; he probably wants deterrence. It has to go well beyond the Mutual Assured Destruction which obtains between the United States and Russia. Putin needs to keep Chinese from doing anything to upset Russian control of Siberia. He cannot do that with a shrinking army. China does have its own strategic offensive weapons, but the numbers are limited. Putin already has a strategic defence system around Moscow. He may imagine that it would suffice to defeat a small-scale attack, while his much more massive nuclear force dealt with China. He may plausibly imagine that this would be a fightable, winnable, nuclear war.
Washington, but the Russians are probably aware of the firestorm in U.S. politics that would create. That leaves the question of whether Putin’s program is anything more than a gigantic election ploy for domestic consumption. He does face one potential problem other than the West: the East, in the form of China. For years the Chinese Communist Party has cultivated intense nationalism based on the sense that China has repeatedly been torn apart by foreign powers. Some of the results are quite visible: enmity towards Japan and the triumphant returns of Hong Kong and Macao. For years, however, Chinese maps showing the results of the ‘unequal treaties’ showed that the Russians seized large swathes of Chinese Siberia—into which many Chinese have moved. Any honest review of Soviet behavior before the Sino -Soviet split would show that when they were supporting the new People’s Republic the Soviets adopted the same humiliating practices the West had imposed on China before the Communists took power – practices the Chinese consider unacceptable. During the latter part of the Cold War, the Chinese were openly hostile to the Soviets. NOC Newsletter Number 113, 12 June 2018
Article courtesy of Norman Friedman, Author, published in the The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapon Systems, February 2018 12
Yangste Incident—The Unexpected Hero By Paul Shiels Lieutenant-Commander RAN Retired Posted to the Far East to a staff job in Nanking as Assistant Naval Attaché, LieutenantCommander John Kerans was given this ‘out-ofthe-way’ posting to save further embarrassment to Admirals and the Admiralty. But, to their humiliation, Kerans was soon to become a national hero! John Kerans joined the Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth at 13 in 1929. Early in his career as a Lieutenant whilst Officer-of-the-Watch in HMS Naiad, Kerans incurred the displeasure of an admiral and was reprimanded over an incident that at the end of the war showed he’d been unfairly treated. The Naiad was a Dido-class light cruiser and the flagship of a flotilla of RN ships. Kerans had altered course towards smoke on the horizon which he believed to be enemy warships and brought the crew to ‘action stations’. When no smoke was seen by the admiral, Kerans was admonished for his actions. Boom at Scapa Flow It was only after the war that Kerans’s actions were vindicated when German records showed the detection had indeed been the German battleships Gneisenau and Scharnhorst. On sighting the Royal Navy flotilla on radar, they had turned away. It was no wonder Kerans felt the way he did when this evidence was produced? Later, Kerans was given his first command HMS Blackmore a Type II Hunt Class destroyer. But, twice he got himself into trouble. Once caught in a boom at Scapa Flow and another time off the south east corner of England where a cable was caught in his propeller and he needed assistance to free it. At the time, Kerans was known to be a heavy drinker. It was not uncommon for him returning from ashore to need assistance to his cabin; an uncomfortable moment for all concerned let alone to instil confidence in the ship’s company. On 12 October 1945 HMS Blackmore ran aground. A Board of Inquiry convened a week later and Kerans incurred the Admiralty’s displeasure. In 1947 he was given command of a Bay-class anti-aircraft frigate, HMS Widemouth Bay. One night while berthed in Malta some crew urinated
Lieutenant-Commander (later Commander) John Kerans DSO RN over the ship’s side and then jumped naked into the water. All in full view and in front of the Admiral’s residence where a function was being held overlooking the ship. A Board of Inquiry was considered but, was not pursued. However, on 8 October 1947, Kerans was court-martialled for accepting a gift of six bottles of wine from the wardroom and for allowing his officers an extra day’s leave after the crew had already embarked. By this stage Kerans was making a name for himself. So, all the Admiralty wanted to do was get him away as far as possible. The Far East seemed to be the place and to China even better! It was while serving at the Embassy in Nanking that Kerans ended up taking command of HMS Amethyst at the direction of Captain (later RearAdmiral) V. Donaldson, the Naval Attaché at Nanking. Amethyst had been badly damaged with several killed and many wounded in action the pre13
Painting of HMS Amethyst arriving in Hongkong immediately after the action in the Yangste River vious day with the Chinese Communists. He took over from Lieutenant Weston, the Executive Officer HMS Amethyst who had been seriously injured. The appointment in-command was confirmed by the FO2FEF, Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Madden. Kerans joined and a day after the action, Lieutenant Commander Skinner, the original Captain died of wounds. Lieutenant Stewart Hett was the only Executive Branch officer left alive or uninjured until Lieutenant Commander Kerans joined. Two other officers were also aboard: Electrical Lieutenant-Commander Strain (promoted whilst in the Yangste) and FlightLieutenant Fearnley (replacement Doctor flown in by RAF Sunderland).
til Amethyst arrived in Hong Kong on 4 August Kerans did a superb job and deserves credit for it. During the time we were trapped in the Yangste, the Officers’ bar was certainly open, but I have no recollection of Kerans or any of us drinking to excess” Lieutenant-Commander H. S. Hett MBE RN Rtd (XO of Amethyst during Yangste Incident) said. A difficult and stubborn character, Kerans was resolute that an escape was possible. The First Sea Lord and British Ambassador were amazed Kerans had taken matters into his own hands. Discussions had been underway by the Foreign Office and the British Ambassador to China, Sir Ralph Stevenson for the safe passage of the ship to open waters. The Foreign Office was hoping that these talks with the Communist would bring the incident to a satisfactory conclusion. However, Kerans and apparently the C-in-C Far East Station were unaware of these negotiations. So, where the Royal Navy felt Kerans was an ineffectual officer, he suddenly became a ‘hero’ in the eyes on the British public and Commonwealth by escaping from the Yangste. So much so, that King George VI immediately awarded the DSO to Kerans after the escape before any Admiralty recommendation. Because of his ‘heroic’ status, the
Many Negotiations HMS Amethyst remained in the Yangste River for three months before Kerans made a brave escape. The Admiralty expected him to be unpredictable and careless throughout this incident. But, Kerans was far from that as shown in the many negotiations with the Peoples Liberation Army delegation. “My opinion of Kerans is that from the time he left the British Embassy in Nanking on 20 April unNOC Newsletter Number 113, 12 June 2018
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Admiralty were also encouraged under public pressure to promote him to Commander RN. As the ship cleared the Yangste and in support of Kerans performance, the King sent a telegram to C -in-C Far East Station: ‘Please convey to the Commanding Officer and Ship’s Company of HMS Amethyst my hearty congratulations to re-join the Fleet. The courage, skill and determination shown by all onboard have my highest commendation. Splice the Mainbrace’. Following his promotion to Commander, Kerans attended the RN Staff College (1950); Head of Far East Station Intelligence (1950-52); CO HMS Rinaldo (1953-54); British Naval Attaché, Bangkok (1954-55); Senior Officers Technical Course, Portsmouth (1957); and retired from RN (1958). ‘Mothball’ Fleet In 1956, Commander Kerans was Technical Adviser in the making of the film ‘Yangste Incident’ in which HMS Amethyst was taken out of the Reserve ‘Mothball’ Fleet and initially used until a massive explosion during filming (simulating shells being fired at the ship) holed and nearly sank her requiring all aboard to abandon ship. She listed heavily and couldn’t be righted, so was towed away. Prior to this unfortunate mishap, HMS Amethyst’s engines did not work until an ‘ex-Engineer Commander Forbes’ (later found to be an imposter) spent three days working to bring the engines back to life! Her replacement was HMS Magpie. Filming was done in the River Orwell near Ipswich UK starring Richard Todd as Lieutenant-Commander Kerans. As ever, Kerans didn’t inspire neutral feelings: people either loved him or hated him. The actionunit cameraman described him as ‘an arrogant, rude, self-opinionated bore who would listen to no one and to whom film-makers seemed to be a large gang of coolies dragging stones to erect a monument to him’. Kerans went on to become a Conservative MP for Hartlepools (1959-64) utilizing the film in his initial election campaign and then a Civil Servant on the Pensions Appeals Tribunal (1969-80). Commander John Kerans DSO RN died on 12 September 1985. Acknowledgements With permission to quote from ‘Last Action Hero of the British Empire’ by Nigel Farndale ‘Hostage of the Yangste’ by M. H. Murfett ‘http://www.naval-history.net/WXLGAmethyst1949.htm’ Email comments by Lieutenant-Commander H. S. Hett MBE RN Rtd to the writer. 15
RAN Involvement in Yangste Incident HMAS Shoalhaven had been tasked to replace HMS Consort at Nanking, but was exchanged with HMS Amethyst at the last moment. This was because the Australian Government were concerned at the escalating tensions between the Nationalists and the Communists. The ship’s ROP for April 1949 stated: “The Australian Ambassador had arranged to visit Shanghai and take passage onboard to Nanking but the political and military situation at Nanking prevented the visit. HMAS Shoalhaven was scheduled to proceed to Nanking on 11 April, but owing to the possibility of the Communist crossing the river about that time the programme was changed.” HMAS Shoalhaven moved alongside HMS Amethyst on 16 April at Shanghai transferring 137 tons of fuel for her trip up the Yangste River. On 20 April 1949, Shoalhaven was brought to one hours notice for steam in preparation to proceed up river to assist Amethyst who had signalled she was under heavy fire and aground in the Yangste River. However, it was decided HMS London and HMS Black Swan should proceed and for HMAS Shoalhaven to remain alongside in Shanghai as W/T guard for ANA Shanghai. The temporary transfer of Surgeon Lieutenant N. S. Chalk RANR to HMS Black Swan saw the RAN actively involved in the action. He then transferred to HMS London before its fighting in the Yangste River in which 17 were killed and 15 wounded on that ship alone. Surgeon Lieutenant Chalk returned to HMAS Shoalhaven on 22 April following the engagement. Two officers from HMAS Shoalhaven were landed to meet ratings from HMS Amethyst who had got ashore and were arriving in Shanghai by train. The RAN officers assisted to establish a liaison between local British residents and these ratings in order that they could be temporarily billeted ashore. The funeral of those killed in London and Consort was held on 23 April at Hung Jao Cemetery, Shanghai. HMAS Shoalhaven provided the firing party.
Storm Continues to Brew for Navy F-35 Capability Joint Strike Fighter Platform By Commander Steve George RN Retired (…..and the follow-up response to a submission in The Richard Williams Foundation ‘The Central Blue’ dated 9 January 2017, again approved by the author to be published in NOC Newsletter)
B
ack in November 2014, I wrote a piece for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute on potential F-35B operations from the new RAN LHDs (LHD and F-35B: The Debate Opens Up). It received a mention in a recent piece here on The Central Blue by Flight Lieutenant Jenna Higgins which set off a spirited discussion. As a result, I’ve been asked by The Central Blue team to provide a stand-alone piece to update my original article and touch on some of the main issues raised. My aim, however, hasn’t changed – to stimulate informed and objective debate on how the Australian Defence Force (ADF) could best deploy its F-35 force capability.
Support (HNS)? Would F-35Bs on LHDs provide a useful capability, and would it be cost effective? Any debate on the use of air power should recognise the iron laws of distance, time and speed that affect all air operations. Increasing the distance from base to objective reduces the amount of air power (time over the target) and the weight of ordnance that a force of aircraft can deliver in a given time frame. This isn’t a criticism of land-based air power, it’s a simple statement of physical fact. The further you have to fly, the longer the time spent in transit. Time spent in transit (both ways) is time you can’t spend delivering combat effect. If you want the same combat effect, you need more aircraft. This leads to my key conclusion. Proximity equals capability. Or, closer is better. This is why the US and the French have committed carriers to the current campaign in Syria and Iraq, located in the Eastern Mediterranean around 50 to 100 miles off the coast of Syria. It’s also why the Russians took the risk of basing their strike force on land in Syria. While I’m not arguing that Russian air strike tactics are a model for anyone in the West, their choice of a nearby land F-35B takes off from base has allowed them to deflight deck of USS Wasp liver concentrated and devastatingly effective aerial bombardments. Meanwhile, the ADF’s FLTLT Higgins referred to ‘a heated debate’ on HNS for Operation OKRA (Iraq and Syria) is locatthe F-35B/LHD question. It’s worth noting that dis- ed in the UAE, well over 1000 miles away. Surely, cussions about naval (or maritime) air power often no one could argue that this is the optimal location seem to get ‘heated’, particularly when the word for medium range aircraft such as the F/A-18. Proponents of land-based air power solutions ‘carrier’ appears, or when it appears to compete with land based air power. Sadly, it’s my experience will point to AAR technology and the ability of that much of the heat doesn’t shed any light, and the their aircrew to conduct very long-range missions as recent discussion thread on The Central Blue had the solution. It is, if your solution is simply to be some examples of the genre, which I’ll address. I’ll seen to contribute. But if you want to materially inalso update my assessment of the technical issues fluence events on the ground in a reasonable time frame, you need maximum time on task and weight surrounding F-35B/LHD integration. I believe that the core issues can be simply of effort. If you have to fly over 1000 miles to get to framed. How much air strike effect does the ADF the target, that’s millions of gallons of fuel burned want to be able to apply at long ranges from Aus- and hours of flying time spent not delivering weaptralia? Can it (and should it) rely on Host Nation ons. (ADF’s own figures from their website http:// NOC Newsletter Number 113, 12 June 2018
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supporting, or with whom we could come under common attack… it’s prudent to assume that the [RAAF] would have access to land bases … to make a contribution to a future coalition air campaign…” Two years on, we might conclude that while the ADF certainly has access to land bases, they certainly aren’t in the right place. Other arguments are deployed in an attempt to make the HNS issue go away. One recent post asked ‘how often (would) the Australian government … want to bomb countries that the neighbours of that country do not wish to be bombed’? With respect, that’s a Flight Deck crew prepare a F-35B for flight good example of ‘situating the appreciation’ – asking the question www.defence.gov.au/Operations/Okra/atg.asp) you want to answer. The question could be framed show average F/A-18 sortie durations of around 7.6 hours). They simply can’t deliver much ‘air power’ as: ‘why might countries deny us HNS?’ and time over the target at that range, as nearly all of there’s a long list of answers to that one. The first their flying hours are being spent getting there and is the obvious one – they don’t want us to bomb getting back. Nor can they deliver much weight of their next-door neighbour. (Or their co-religionist.) bombs. Their own figures show that less than one But history provides us with lots of examples why a weapon has been dropped per (long) sortie. country might want a neighbouring country to be bombed, but might still refuse HNS. Land Based Aircraft They might not want to be seen to be involved. This isn’t an isolated example, and history demonstrates that HNS is very often not available They might not want it bombed by you, because where you really want it. However, proponents of they disagree with you over something else. They land based air power solutions sometimes simply might have an election coming, and they might have deny that the problem exists. Back in 2014, the AS- an issue with a certain segment of their population that shares certain cultural values with the country PI argued that: “…the ADF would reasonably expect to be able you want to bomb. They might offer HNS, but with to operate land-based aircraft from the country strings, such as only for only for AAR sorties, not whose own defensive efforts Australia would be actual strike missions. Countries that you don’t even want HNS from may deny you overflight. In my view, any debate over the utility of carrier-based aviation should look at the evidence offered by history. The ability to forgo HNS issues and locate a meaningful force of aircraft at a time and place of a country’s own choosing is precious and useful. Maritime nations that possess such capabilities use them, all the time, all over the world. (Every enemy aircraft shot down in air combat by the UK since the end of WW2 has fallen to a carMany Amphibious ships these days rier-based aircraft.) I suggest that carry STOVL aircraft and are not disAustralia, by reason of basic geogsimilar to light fleet carriers raphy, is a ‘maritime nation’. Of course, others may differ. 17
power, parts and repairs. They will also be consuming the (fixed) service lives of the aircraft. Have these sums been done? A counter-argument recently advanced is that the ‘substantial’ additional cost to the RAAF of getting pilots trained to fly at sea (described as a ‘noncombat’ skill) could only be met by losing or degrading an existing RAAF aircrew ‘combat skill’. In the first place, carrier deck training isn’t a ‘noncombat skill’. Ships and their air groups HMAS Canberra at sea with a clear flight deck go into combat. Such training delivers a combat capability – delivery of high tempo operations from a mobile soverSo, what about the cost aspect? Nobody suggests eign base. Describing it as a ‘non-combat‘ skill that putting F-35Bs on to LHDs would be a cost- illustrates a profound misunderstanding of how free exercise. Various improbable figures have been maritime air power is generated. put forward, many resting on an assertion that this Changing Requirements would be a risky technical enterprise, with many But automatically assuming that learning to unanswered questions. The USMC’s recent successoperate from a ship would result in a ‘loss in comful trial of their ‘Lightning Carrier’ concept on board USS America, as noted by FLTLT Higgins, bat-related training across the RAAF’s air combat must surely lay many of these concerns to rest. The capability’ or a ‘decrease in proficiency’ is, in my Canberra-class LHD was designed to accommodate view, another example of ‘situating the apprecia12 F-35Bs. That ski jump is a valuable (and current- tion’. I’m sure that RAAF pilot training constantly ly unused) asset. Perhaps the costs of putting the gets adjusted to meet changing requirements and to field new equipment. If the Government decided to F-35B to sea should be re-examined. go for F-35B, the training would be part of the Strategy, Priorities and Politics cost. How big might that cost be? Some argue that any additional expenditure withIt would be substantial if the objective were a in the current national defence budget must by full ‘cat and trap’ or ‘STOBAR’ capability, where definition displace an existing capability. Not nec- getting aircraft back on board takes high-end pilot essarily. If you have a fixed budget and want to do skill levels, and executing a high tempo flying proso something additional, you can increase the budg- gramme from a small deck area requires a well et, or you can stop doing something that you’re trained and thoroughly worked up ship. However, F already doing. Or, you can do something you’re al- -35B has been specifically designed to provide low ready doing in a different way. Strategy, priorities workload launch and recovery to small flight and politics drive the choices. Of course, once a decks. F-35B operations will require a much (much) service (for example the RAAF) has its desired smaller training ‘delta’ for aircrew than either ‘cat equipment programme (a substantial F-35A buy), and trap’ or legacy STOVL aircraft. The LHDs will it’s easy to argue that anything else is unaffordable. already have to work up a core capability to operate But if we are to talk costs it might be interesting their current complement of aircraft – F-35B ops to get better visibility of the actual costs of the AD- would be another small ‘delta’. F’s current long-distance air support operations. Survivability of the ADF Fleet Spending around 10 hours in the air for each weapThere is also the issue of defending a deployed on dropped (from ADF figures) to ‘take out’ a pick up truck fitted with a cannon cannot, in my view, be ADF fleet. With China and India fielding capable an economically sustainable form of war. AAR ship-based combat aircraft, the issue of how to detankers deliver huge amounts of fuel – but they also fend the fleet against air attack must be considered. consume large amounts themselves, and frequently F-35B would offer a hugely capable air defence cahave to dump unused fuel to land back at base. pability in addition to its strike role, but the idea has Apart from the colossal fuel bill, these flying hours attracted some passionate opposition. One (somewhat novel) argument put forward are generating huge aircraft support costs in manNOC Newsletter Number 113, 12 June 2018
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against the F-35 in this role is that that putting a potent air defence capability on the LHDs would invite an air attack on the LHD that otherwise wouldn’t happen.
pily perform ski jump launches. It can be supported at sea, and can safely take off and land from small decks. The aircraft software works, although there’s still much to do. In a nutshell, there are now very few issues with the F-35B that aren’t shared by the F-35A and which aren’t being solved. The capability of the aircraft is clearly a huge step on from first-generation STOVL aircraft such as Harrier. In combat evaluation, the aircraft is showing what its massive situational awareness, and data collection and handling capability can bring to the fight. Imagine what such a platform could do when linked up with modern ship mounted radars and sensors to build a truly integrated intelligence, air defence and strike system. Conclusion
Air Power Terminology It’s further argued that it would be less risky to rely on missile defences to provide ‘air denial’ immediately around the fleet, relying on the new Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD). (Strangely, an AWD would apparently not attract attack in the same way that an F-35B equipped LHD would.) Actually, this is a hugely risky strategy. It’s been tried and it usually fails. In my view, this is wholly flawed thinking. What if the foe wants to shadow your fleet at or beyond your missile range? Or wants to attack a fleet asset other than the LHD? Or wants to attack the LHD because it’s already your capital ship, and the biggest (easiest) target? Or wants to attack you because you have no defences? I’m no expert on air power terminology, but aiming for basic air denial over the airspace immediately above your own fleet looks to be rather a long way down the capability scale – it’s only just above ‘air incapability’. I think you’d probably want at least air parity over the whole fleet, but I’m happy to be corrected. (I note that air power proponents have no difficulty in making the case for land-based air defence aircraft to provide air supremacy for land-based operations.) I’d be interested to know how the ADF plans to use land based F-35As to provide air defence for the surface fleet. Those iron laws of distance and time haven’t changed since the UK’s Royal Navy was supposed to be defended by RAF Phantoms in the 1970s. It didn’t work then and it’s unlikely to work now, unless the RAN is planning on staying very close to the mainland. Technical Issues
Countries’ defence plans are always changing in response to circumstances and external developments. In my view, the ADF’s intended area of operations, which is largely maritime in nature, will become a far less certain place in the years to come. Again, just my view, but previous assumptions on the availability of HNS will have to be reviewed along with existing plans for deployments of a purely land-based F-35A force. The F-35 will deliver a ‘game changing’ capability for the ADF. Surely, as F-35B equipped US LHAs and LHDs (and possibly the UK’s Queen Elizabeth-class carriers) become increasingly common visitors to the China/Pacific region, the ADF will have to look again at how it might develop an ability to more freely deploy its main striking force at long range. Or how it might protect its surface forces against developing air threats. When those reviews take place, it is to be hoped that objective and honest analysis prevails over single service interests. There’s too much at stake.
Two years on from my previous assessment, it’s clear to any impartial observer that the US has put a massive effort into getting the F-35B cleared and capable from decks and ships that are comparable in size and capability to the RAN’s LHDs. Along the way, many myths and misconceptions have been laid to rest. The flight decks don’t melt. The gear around the flight deck doesn’t fall apart under jet blast. People don’t get blown away by the jet blast. The aircraft can hap19
Sea Hunter - Unmanned Ship of Future
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he U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Research recently accepted delivery of a revolutionary uncrewed surface ship, one capable of traveling long distances and conducting missions, all without a human on board. The Sea Hunter Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel - or ACTUV for short - could someday lead to fleets of unmanned warSea Hunter at Speed ships plying the world’s oceans, doing everything from hunting submarines to acting as spy ships. The U.S. Navy through the DeThe ACTUV first went to sea in October 2016, fence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) ordered the ACTUV in 2012 as part of and spent 2017 undergoing a series of progressively the Pentagon’s broader push into unmanned air, sea, more difficult tests at sea. Along the way, DARPA and land systems. It was envisioned as a platform to realized the ship could be useful for launching the test the autonomous concept in surface ships, to ex- TALON elevated sensor mast. TALON is basically plore how to operate unmanned ships safely and a militarized parasail towed behind a ship, lifting a securely for months at a time over thousands of 70 kilogram payload up to about 500 metres above nautical miles, and create a vessel capable of track- sea level. Possible payloads for TALON include communications relays, in situations where satelliteing enemy diesel-electric submarines. Built at the Christensen Shipyards in Vancouver, based communications are unavailable, and Washington, the 40 metres long, 140 tonne vessel so-called “intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaisis the world’s largest un-crewed ship. The sance (ISR) sensor packages. Along the way, DARPA has expanded the pilothouse, necessary for a human crew to control the ship, can be unbolted and removed. The potential roles for the ACTUV. No longer just an ACTUV has a single hull with two outrigger floats anti-submarine warfare platform, in 2016 DARPA to enhance stability at sea and has a maximum was referring to the ship as a “payload truck” and reported speed of 27 knots. From above the ship the name was changed to Sea Hunter. TALON looks like a Klingon Warbird, its hull and two floats aside, the possibilities for an uncrewed surface ship are pretty much endless. Uncrewed ships could slicing through the water, leaving three wakes. shoot it out with swarms of Iranian An autonomous ship like the speedboats in the Straits of Hormuz, ACTUV would make an excellent lay in ambush for a Chinese Navy submarine hunter. Conventionallysurface task force, brimming with powered submarines, which make up anti-ship missiles hidden under a the bulk of the world’s submarine stealthy exterior, or sail up and down fleets, can stay underwater for up to the North Korean coastline, scooping two weeks at a time. That’s longer up radio signals with a spy package than a helicopter or fixed-wing airhovering above it on TALON, all craft can stay on station, and a without exposing a single friendly crewed surface ship puts the hunter at sailor to danger. Uncrewed ships risk of becoming the hunted. An uncould even conduct resupply runs in crewed ship, however, can track an dangerous waters, bring fresh misenemy submarine for as long as it siles, torpedoes, and other supplies to takes for the submarine to make a ships at sea while sending injured fatal mistake, then attack with a sailors back to the rear. lightweight homing torpedo. TALON undergoing trials NOC Newsletter Number 113, 12 June 2018
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section, or ship’s mess section, or anyone else whose role is to keep the ship and crew running. Sea Hunter’s autonomous nature means that a landbased crew need only man the ship’s sensors and weapons, when the ship is in action. A single crew could likely operate multiple Sea Hunters, only “crewing” them when the ship is in action. Sea Hunter will operate under the Navy’s Office of Naval Research, where it will “develop (Sea Hunter) technologies, including automating payload and sensor data processing, rapidly developing new mission-specific autonomous behaviours and exploring autonomous coordination among multiple (Unmanned Surface Vehicles)”. After that, likely some time in 2018, Sea Hunter will move on to become part of the broader U.S. Navy and could be assigned to actual real-world missions. Reproduced by permission of Kyle Mizokami, Defence Writer for ‘Popular Mechanics’
Lifting Sea Hunter into the Water
Ships like Sea Hunter are also the future because they have to be. The U.S. Navy has only a limited number of crewed hulls to handle missions at hand and the personnel costs involved in crewing those ships are a major part of the Navy’s budget. Small uncrewed ships offer a clever, cost-effective alternative. Sea Hunter doesn’t have an engineering
Flying the Tiger Moth By Lieutenant (A) Basil Nash RN Rtd The De Havilland Tiger Moth was an incredible aeroplane. About 28,000 were built worldwide when introduced in 1932. The last was built in the mid-1940’s. This aircraft operated in UK, Canada, South Africa, Australia and Rhodesia. It was a two-seater biplane made mostly of wood and fabric; fitted with a De Havilland Gipsy Moth engine. My introduction to it was in August 1945, when ‘stores officer’ in 1837 RN Corsair Sqn at RNAS Eglinton, Northern Ireland. I had been sent to RNAS Worthy Down, Winchester England, on a supply course. To my surprise there was a Tiger Moth located at the airfield. As a qualified pilot, I requested permission from CMDR (Air) to fly it. Once approved, I sought his knowledge and for him to show me the ‘Nobs’. The fuel tank was in the top wing and worked by gravity, The flaps in the top wings worked automatically to slow the stall. There were no conventional flaps in the lower wings. It was fitted with a tail skid at the back – but no brakes. It was easy to fly with concentration, but was quick to wander. Stalling speed was 45 kts, cruising speed 80 kts and up to 100 kts in a dive. To get the engine started, the propeller was swung manually by ground crew as there was no
Basil Nash and the Tiger Moth
self-starter. Its lack of power meant it was very difficult for aerobatics. If inverted too long the engine stopped! This was OK if at around 3000 feet or above, as a dive vertically would hopefully start the engine. If not, the pilot looked for a field somewhere below! In later years, various encounters were had with the Tiger Moth. In November 1945 whilst with Marshalls at Cambridge, the RAF Training Sqn provided an opportunity to fly it. Next at RNAS Dale in 1947, I sourced a Tiger Moth to act as a ‘tug’ for our gliding club. In April 1949 whilst a Maintenance Test Pilot at RNAS Stretton it provided my last chance in the RN to fly the Tiger Moth. Then in 2015 for my 90th birthday and for the last time, I had a ride as a passenger for 45 minutes in a modern Tiger Moth at Camden, Sydney. 21
(Printed by permission of Defence Force Journal. Article appeared in DFJ Sep/Oct 1977 Issue) rubble and tears of too many disastrous failures, smooth the path to success and allow him to look kindly on the supporting facilities which contributed to it. Preparation
O Captain! My Captain, our fearful trip is done, The ship has weathered every wrack, the prize we sought is won, The port is near, the bells I hear, the people all exulting!’
A port visit normally starts with a preparatory phase which is principally an information gathering process. The Fleet Port Guide will yield useful basic data, but is dry reading and not helpful in our particular field of endeavour. A ship should always send a liaison officer on ahead; the aim of every aspirant should be to be that officer. To gain the coveted post requires application. You must do your duty excellently well, train up a competent deputy, and curry favour with the Executive Officer. You must pretend a good knowledge of the area or the actual port. Create a fictitious aunt who runs a finishing school for young ladies of the nobility. Learn the language. Build up credit in the duty roster and then foreclose on your debtors. The Liaison Officer must be carefully briefed to look after the interests of the other aspirants as well as the routine matters of guest lists, bus tickets and football grounds. Imagination is important, for besides researching into tourist agencies for maps and brochures, obtaining local staff nominal lists of British-based companies (thereby locating Englishspeaking misses), visiting the teachers’ college and nunnery, he should, for example, consider the newspapers for the indigenous version of:
Walt Whitman
By Commander G. F. Liardet RN
A
VALID Theory of Port Visits will be a long time a coming because the data are diverse and anecdotal in nature. This paper aims to draw together a body of information on the conduct and practice of port visits in the expectation that others will take up the torch and carry it on to the point at which the young officer can be presented with coherent guidance in this important field; much in the manner that general, administrative, and operational orders cover the other areas of naval activity. As ultimate success in a port visit is a low probability event not susceptible to much statistical analysis, guidance such as this can do no more than reduce the odds against. The young aspirant today, having been seduced by the glamour of the naval calling and the prospect of foreign travel, soon discovers that he can only expect — if he is lucky — a short series of four day stands on a ‘group deployment’ once per ‘SL career option break-point’. There are many views on the optimum length for a port visit and some of these are discussed below, but it is certain that naval personnel now miss the lengthy foreign commissions of the past, the maintenance periods in foreign dockyards, graceful troopship voyages, and other such opportunities. The young officer must be efficient and well-organised in his approach if he is to achieve the aim in four days. The costs and difficulties of recruitment and retention are such that we must do all we can to assist his achievement; so may this advice, distilled as it is from the flames, NOC Newsletter Number 113, 12 June 2018
3rd gl sh flt £10 pw O1-123-4567 The information concealed here is that in the district shown by part of the telephone number there are two girls with a flat from which Mum can be presumed to be absent. There is a spare bed in this flat. lt is not an over-expensive scene. Given time and transport it should be possible to case ten or twelve such opportunities on behalf of your sister before the ship arrives — liberally deploying previously prepared gold-embossed invitation cards should things work out. Don’t forget to record information like addresses, names, availability of a 22
a future. She is here to tease Antonio, who is not on the British Naval Attaché’s cocktail party circuit. Antonio is nearly two metres tall, has dark curly hair, flies his own light aircraft, is first string at the local tennis club, and is currently behind the warehouse on the jetty grinding his perfect white teeth, looking at his slim gold Patek Phillipe watch, and drumming the nails of his other hand on the hood of his Alfa Romeo Giulietta Super Sprint. Margharita knows this and will make it up to him later in the evening. Strike One. Margharita is also very beautiful and very charming. Her engagements over the next few days include six hours voluntary old peoples’ homework, local flower festival beauty queen, three cocktail parties and a water-ski picnic to which you are not invited. Strike Two. The Executive Officer, urbane at the gangway, has noticed with the cynical bloodshot eye he keeps in the back of his head that you have made a flagrant dash to trap this dishy vision in defiance of his orders to chat up the oldies. He jams your leave for two days. Strike Three and Out! Now watch the Senior Engineer. He manoeuvres expertly under forced draught with one boiler banked and fixes Mum her favourite drink. He ascertains that she is a bridge player and asks to meet her friends. Soon there is a ring of gaiety and laughter as he deploys his slightly risqué jokes. By 2000 he is up homers. By Saturday morning he has been practically forced into bed with the handsome recently divorced cousin down from Bogota (‘it will do her good. . . ’) and on Sunday morning by the pool decides he is in love. Good luck to him, he was nice to them all. Notice how he skilfully enlarged his base of opportunity at an early stage. At such functions it is always worth taking some trouble with the conversation that you project, for people of sufficient eminence to be on the Ambassador’s list wouldn’t be there if they were unable to recognise a brash young man on the make, especially one who allows his eyes to wander about when you yourself are talking. But do not rely on decent treatment of Mum and Dad yielding the keys of the Cadillac and then the
car and so on in your little book. And so by care and skill the liaison officer can feather his nest as well as those of others. But do not overdo it — a Royal Marines officer was once landed from a Persian Gulf frigate to act as advance liaison officer at Mombasa while the ship went to the Seychelles hibiscus infested sailors’ paradise. He kicked and screamed, but his messmates were merciless, and themselves regretted nothing until the Kilindini Kboat brought off his limp and ashen form, a military man totally destroyed by excess. The full story of his detached duty will never be told, but the wary and speculative reserve with which all other mess members were treated during the subsequent Mombasa AMP indicated that here was a liaison officer who had over-reached his terms of reference. Execution The official cocktail party Look here upon this picture and on this. The ship’s Official Cocktail Party, gay with flags and bathed by the westering sun, is populated at this moment in time only by the ship’s officers — all smart and neatly brushed, self-administering the warmer broadside and listening to the Executive Officer wearily setting forth his rules for the conduct of officers at such functions. ‘Official cocktail parties are not for fun. . . ’ he begins. Some few moments later, following behind Mum and Dad, She appears in a white organdie dress, a flash of broderie anglaise, and white gloves. Her lambent eyes fortuitously meet yours, reason leaves you, and you are lost. Let us call her Margharita. What is not realised is that Margharita was not created for your benefit yesterday but has a past and 23
daughter. A randomised sample of thirty-two matrons at three official functions held at consecutive seaports on the East American seaboard showed that only ten had daughters, of which eight were already married. Only three daughters (married or unmarried) were in the same port. None of these were blonde. None had a Cadillac. All granddaughters (where held) were under age. The moral, therefore, is to be your usual bright, polite, self. Cast your bread upon the waters. Broaden your base. Eschew at least the six most attractive young ladies, maybe even a higher number.
free from official entertainment and obligatory selfdestructive runs ashore to throw a private party of an informal nature. Official Cocktail Party on the first night, private party on the fourth night. This gives enough time to build up the guest list and leaves one free evening to capitalise on developments. Fatigue makes its first appearance in the dog watches of the fifth day. Six Day Visit We are now entering Big Trouble Country. Some experts feel that in a six day visit the official entertainment should be spread over two days, with the Official Cocktail Party on day two. Certainly, this gives the DLC and the gangway staff something to do on two days and allows the organisation to salt the official guest list with the product of its own investigations. Remember however that the port was not built yesterday, like one of those stand-up cutouts in a children’s book, for your entertainment; and that to modify the guest list can sometimes cause the most terrible offence. Be guided by the local Flag Lieutenant and tune up the liaison officer’s sensory perception equipment. No one profits from a serious social mis-match under such circumstances and a heavy foot through the web of local customs and relationships can result in a visit memorable only for the sightseeing and the opportunities for sleep. Ashore, one begins to build relationships, share little jokes and experiences, repay hospitality, get involved. They remember your name. You recognise the car and can dial the telephone number without looking it up.
The Optimum Length The shape and texture of a port visit is determined by its duration. There is a readily apparent difference between a fuelling stop at Lyness in Orkney, and a four-week repair and maintenance period in Hong Kong; or between an exercise briefing at Den Helder and Kiel Week; but the gradations between these extremes are less well understood and therefore worthy of descriptions in a study of this nature. One Day Visit
Hardly worth the name of Visit. Only the Port Watch gets ashore. Useful for haircuts, telephone calls, buying picture post-cards towards the globetrotter image. Two Day Visit Starboard Watch gets ashore and makes the same errors as the Port Watch; daymen have time to buy rabbits and do a little sightseeing. Three Day Visit
Seven Day Visit
Begins to qualify as a Port Visit proper Unfair to the Starboard Watch.
A two-day journey up-country can be fitted in without detriment to the overall pattern of the visit. Those prone to alcoholic remorse will have had to pace themselves carefully by Day Seven. The physique begins to adjust to a daily routine which allows sleep between 4 p.m. and the hot bath at 6.45 p.m., boosted by cat-naps taken in the early morning on the Star Ferry, along the Bukit Timah, or in trains from Cape Town and Perth to Simonstown and Fremantle.
Four Day Visit Structured approaches to locals become worthwhile. Official cognisance of the visit as a Visit will probably be taken by shore authorities. The Aim may be achieved under coup de foudre circumstances. Fair to both watches. Qualifies as a visit within the meaning of the act and calls up the need for an advanced liaison officer and some detailed planning. Official calls and the official cocktail party must be compressed into the first day. Towards the end, people ashore recognise you when they see you again, and may even remember your name.
Eight Day Visit Eight days represents a watershed or climacteric in the nature of Port Visits. It is possible to do a Seven Day Visit in one powerful burst without suffering bankruptcy, nervous exhaustion, or protein deficiency. Anything longer requires a different pace, like the contrast between running one and
Five Day Visit Aspirants find themselves with enough evenings NOC Newsletter Number 113, 12 June 2018
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three miles. Retrospectively, many observers have said, after experiencing visits of eight days or more, that they should without doubt have sailed on the seventh. If all has gone well, either she, or you, or both, will be in love by the eighth day. Sail now Ulysses, or you are lost!
twigs in her beak. What shreds of common sense remain indicate that the ship should instantly sail, otherwise the Fatal Mistake will be made. Fourteen Day Visit This is the usual limit allowed by the wives and families of the Mobile FMG and thus probably terminates the AMP and the visit. About time too, because any extension beyond fourteen days almost guarantees the Fatal Mistake.
Nine Day Visit Human memory is short, and by the end of the nine day visit it seems to those ashore that the handsome, irrepressible, lovable crowd from HMS Nonesuch have always been around. The love becomes the tiniest bit possessive - ‘Why did you not ring me?’ ‘I was on duty’; ‘I had a previous engagement’; ‘I did not see you in the Mandarin as we arranged’.
The Fatal Mistake and Other Cautionary Tales
There are two types of Fatal Mistake, akin in nature and effect. The first is to induce the young lady to follow you to the next port. The potential for disaster and embarrassment following from such action is limitless. The Captain beetles his brow at the Official CTP (undignified manoeuvres have been necessary to get her asked) and says ‘Haven’t we met before somewhere?’ It is raining, she knows no -one, you find you do not love her, and being a gentleman, you are stuck with the airfare and the hotel bill. Sad, desperate, disaster. The second Fatal Mistake is to go one step further and propose marriage, or even get married. Again, being a gentleman, you have not said that you love her unless you actually do, but even if you do it is mandatory to control yourself and wait until the foreign tour is over before viewing the young lady in snowy Surbiton through the baleful eyes of Mum, and then making any promises. Remember that many foreign countries have rather stringent laws concerning breach of promise.
Ten Day Visit Somewhere towards the end of a visit lasting ten days the world starts to crack up on our young aspirant. He looks at another girl and gets his face slapped. The husband finds out. He runs suddenly and violently out of money. His Division take to fighting with the police, and his Head of Department notes that his sub-department functions neither before stand-easy nor after. It would be prudent to sail now. Eleven Day Visit A day of gloom and recuperation. A day of selfexamination and unanswered shore calls. Devotion to duty, remorse, exhaustion. Sail without regrets. Twelve Day Visit The scope of a Twelve Day Visit allows the career here to fore described to run its course and be replaced by the tickle of re-awakened curiosity and adventure. Perhaps it is pay- day, or a benevolent Deputy Supply Officer has (for a consideration) advanced a small loan. The lovers’ tiff is mended, and the affair is thus warmer and reinforced. Or perhaps another Belle Dame, who has been waiting in the wings, seizes herself a piece of the action. The pit is yawning at his feet, he must sail today.
The Casanova of International Repute
Thirteen Day Visit
Dwelling further on avoidable mistakes, another symptom of ill-mannered arrogance towards the Fair Sex is the Grimmies’ Trophy. Usually a grotesque Eastern African wooden idol of some sort, often with the characteristics of the Venus of Willendorf, this trophy is awarded to the officer popularly voted to have squired the least attractive
It is not a good idea to run a competition among your mates for the highest score under some such formula as this: (No. of young ladies) x (No. of ports followed to) x (Thousands of miles followed) as this breaks nearly every rule in the book, displays a degree of casual inhumanity hard to beat, and hopefully will bring you the worst of bad luck. The Grimmies’ Trophy
Nearly two weeks of hyperactivity of one sort or another have induced a rarified and elevated state of mind in our young man. He is not quite rational and becomes prone to making rash promises. His sunburn begins to peel. The lady is seriously beginning to look to the future, even perhaps flying round with 25
lady of the previous night. How such humour can misfire is illustrated by the following story: at an innocuous little thrash at some port of call the young lady looked up at the young man during a pause in the music and said ‘You are running a Grimmies’ Trophy, aren’t you?’ Much abashed and reddened with embarrassment, the young man admitted it. ‘Well, that’s fine’, she said, ‘so do we, and I’ve won’. Another tip; don’t award the Trophy to the Captain!
who has asked several officers (more than you would like) up homers would not recognise them in daylight the process of rapidly changing from uniform to baron-strangling rig can be important if you are to be first into the Cadillac and away. Lay out the suit and the tie before the party; if you are uncertain lay out the white shark-skin tux as well. Mess undress to tux can be achieved in nine seconds.
Transportation
There is no conclusion to all this. Information continues to be amassed, and in due course will be distilled into a series of conclusive maxims. Meanwhile get hold of a red-hotpoker and for your comfort, burn the following motto into the woodwork of your cabin:
Conclusion
The success or failure of a port visit is to a remarkable extent dependant on the availability of a motor car. The word bruited among the potted palms of the Marsa Club, and along the front from Pieta to Sliema, was always ‘All men are beasts, but some have transport’. You must have a motor car, and even one hired by a syndicate is better than none, lose friends how you may. But mind how you go, there is one Lothario who even now has a permanent hitch in his double clutching because she, unimpressed with his devil-may-care speed and skill, said ‘I hardly ever feel sexy when I’m terrified’. When abroad, always get a native to order your taxi for you - if you can persuade her - as this will often reduce the price. Always ask the price before the journey starts and know your way.
THE FIRST TURN OF THE SCREW CANCELS ALL DEBTS (The advent of an all gender crew may reflect a different tone to this theory? Sub-Ed.)
Some further do’s and don’ts for the aspirant On 12 March 1942 in HMAS Australia, at sea, Stoker John Riley was stabbed. Before he died the following day, he named fellow stokers Albert Gordon and Edward Elias who, he claimed, attacked him after he had threatened to report their homosexual activities. The men were charged with murder. It was the Commanding Officer’s (Captain Farncomb's) unwanted duty to prosecute at their court martial, convened on 15 April in Noumea. He studied available law books and, after a 'masterly' performance, secured convictions. Gordon and Elias were sentenced to death. Reverting to the role of Commanding Officer, Captain Farncomb then submitted an eloquent appeal for their lives; the sentences were subsequently commuted to imprisonment.
The White Ensign Club Never try and achieve the Aim under the White Ensign. Besides being illegal in a big way, it is a certainty that you will be rumbled by the Fresh Water Tanky, the HQI patrol, or the Bosun’s Mate. This is bad for your image and that of the other officers. Wives If wives are present in the port, comport yourself with decorum towards them even if you are a bachelor. A commission can last a long time, even these days. Disappointment Never show disappointment - it is a sign of weakness and is ungentlemanly. Outshifting Never be outshifted by your opponent. Quite often it is so dark in the wardroom that the nice family NOC Newsletter Number 113, 12 June 2018
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YOUR An Ambassador for the RAN and Australia
SAY I attended to represent the Naval Officers Club and can report that it was a well organised and impressive event and certainly a credit to the Project. Congratulations to them for their interest and their work.
Dear Editors, Congratulations on your last high-quality newsletter. I was particularly pleased to see the article on Captain J P Stevenson. Having worked for him and his predecessor Eric John Peel as a young twostriper during the 1960s DDG programme, JPS and his late wife Joanne were outstanding ambassadors for the RAN and our nation in Washington DC. His well-deserved, albeit overdue, national award is a fitting tribute to nature’s gentleman who was poorly treated by the naval hierarchy after the second MELBOURNE tragedy.
Kingsley Perry
Colour Between Stripes Dear Editors, I refer to the brief entry in ‘Did You Know’, p. 5 NOC Newsletter 112, with regards to distinguishing colours and distinction cloth for different branches. In the days when steam was supreme a common expression in the ME world was “The purple empire”. As an example in a ship the size of HMAS Melbourne the ME branch would have been a significant proportion of the Wardroom with about 15 officers. It was not uncommon in the lunch time or evening chit-chat to hear the expression “Royalty, Bishops and Engineers wear purple”. Many will recall that during deployment to the FE, it was quite common for cummerbunds to be ordered with one side exhibiting the branch colour. In the RN the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors (RCNC) wore a naval uniform with silver grey distinction cloth. In the 1980s I had the privilege of an exchange posting with the RN and worked within a ship building and ship repair organisation managed by the RCNC. The RCNC was the professional home of naval architects and constructors employed by the MOD. It was an extremely competent organisation and I was honoured to attend its 100th Anniversary Dinner in London in 1983. All RCNC members were very proud of the fact that in their early professional years they spent two years at sea in uniform. They held the equivalent rank of Lieutenant and wore the silver-grey distinction cloth. In appropriate situations throughout their career, they were entitled to wear uniform. Regrettably the RCNC was merged with the RN Engineering Service during budget driven restructuring in the 1990s and so lost its identity. In Australia analogous organisations never emerged. To my mind, this has had a detrimental effect. Here, the oversight of ship construction in commercial shipyards has suffered from lack of continuity, absence of corporate memory and a lack of esprit de corps amongst those doing this work”.
Bill Taylor Commodore RAN Rtd Photographs of NOC Luncheon in Victoria Dear Editors,
Just received my first copy of the First Team Effort and enjoyed a brief glance through same. Looks good, then came across an interesting photograph, or two. The coverage of the end of year luncheon of the Victoria Division was quite comprehensive, although John Redman might not be terribly happy about his name attached to a 92 year old member. The photograph of Peter Osborne and John Redman, should read Peter Osborne and John Bird and that of Jane Teasdale and John Redman should read Jane Teasdale and John Bird. Nevertheless a quick glance persuades me enjoy reading with care when time permits. John Bird Naval Graves Project Dear Editors, I was interested to read the article in the March newsletter about the Naval Graves Project and the good work they are doing to protect this part of the Navy’s heritage. As a follow up, on 10 February I had the privilege of attending a memorial service arranged by the Naval Graves Project for those who died in HMAS Voyager 54 years ago. It was held at the graveside of Lieutenant Harry Cook who was the navigating officer in Voyager. The grave is in the Anglican Naval Section of Rookwood Cemetery in Sydney. He was the only one to be buried ashore.
Tom de Voil 27
By Kit Bonner via Captain John Sketchley RAN Retired For a half century, the US Navy kept a lid on the details of the incident that prompted this salutation. A Miami news reporter made the first public disclosure in 1958 after he stumbled upon the truth while covering a reunion of the destroyer's crew. The Pentagon reluctantly and tersely confirmed his story, but only a smattering of newspapers took notice. In 1943, the Willie D as the Porter was nicknamed, accidently fired a live torpedo at the battleship Iowa during a practice exercise. As if this weren't bad enough, the Iowa was carrying President Franklin D.
carried 500-pound warheads. This destroyer was placed in commission on July 1943 under the command of Wilfred Walker, a man on the Navy's fast career track. In the months before she was detailed to accompany the Iowa across the Atlantic in November 1943, the Porter and her crew learned their trade, experiencing the normal problems that always beset a new ship and a novice crew. The mishaps grew more serious however, when she became an escort for the pride of the fleet, the new battleship Iowa. The night before they left Nor-
USS William D Porter—Fletcher Class Destroyer DD-579 folk, bound for North Africa, the Porter accidentally damaged a nearby sister ship when she backed down along the other ship's side and her anchor tore down the other ship's railings, life rafts, ship's boat and various other formerly valuable pieces of equipment. The Willie D merely had a scraped anchor, but her career of mayhem and mishaps had begun. Just 24 hours later, the four-ship convoy consisting of Iowa and her secret passengers, the Willie D, and two other destroyers, was under strict instructions to maintain complete radio silence. Since they were going through a known U-boat feeding ground, speed and silence were the best defence.
Roosevelt at the time, along with Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and all of the country's WWII military brass. They were headed for the Big Three Conference in Tehran, where Roosevelt was to meet Stalin and Churchill. Had the Porter's torpedo struck the Iowa at the aiming point, the last 60 years of world history might have been quite different. The USS William D Porter (DD-579) was one of hundreds of assembly line destroyers built during the war. They mounted several heavy and light guns, but their main armament consisted of 10 fast-running and accurate torpedoes that NOC Newsletter Number 113, 12 June 2018
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Suddenly, a tremendous explosion rocked the convoy. All of the ships commenced anti-submarine manoeuvers. This continued until the Porter sheepishly admitted that one of her depth charges had fallen off her stern and exploded. The 'safety' had not been set as instructed. Captain Walker was watching his fast track career become side-tracked. Shortly thereafter, a freak wave inundated the ship, stripping away everything that wasn't lashed down. A man washed overboard and was never found. Next, the fire room lost power in one of its boilers. Weather Balloons
sequence was interrupted by an unmistakable ‘whooooooshhhhing’ sound made by a successfully launched and armed torpedo. LEUT H. Steward Lewis, who witnessed the entire event, later described the next few minutes as what hell would look like if it ever broke loose. Just after he saw the torpedo hit the water on its way to the Iowa and some of the most prominent figures in world history, Lewis innocently asked the Captain, "Did you give permission to fire a torpedo?" Captain Walker's reply will not ring down through naval history, although words to the effect of Farragut's immortal "Damn the torpedoes" figured centrally within. Initially there was some reluctance to admit what had happened, or even warn the Iowa. As the awful reality sunk in, people began racing around, shouting conflicting instructions and attempting to warn the flagship of imminent danger First, there was a flashing light warning about the torpedo which unfortunately indicated the torpedo was headed in another direction. Next, the Porter signalled that the torpedo was going reverse at full speed!
The Captain, at this point, was making reports almost hourly to the Iowa about the Willie D's difficulties. It would have been merciful if the force commander had detached the hard luck ship and sent her back to Norfolk. But, no, she sailed on. The morning of 14 November 1943 dawned with a moderate sea and pleasant weather. The Iowa and her escorts were just east of Bermuda, and the President and his guests wanted to see how the big ship could defend herself against an air attack. So, the Iowa launched a number of weather balloons to use as antiaircraft targets. It was exciting to see more than 100 guns shooting at the balloons, and the President was proud of his Navy. Just as proud was Admiral Ernest J King, Chief of Naval Operations; large in size and by demeanour, a true monarch of the sea. Disagreeing with him meant the end of a naval career. Up to this time, no one knew what firing a torpedo at him would mean. Over on the Willie D, Captain Walker watched the fireworks display with admiration and envy. Thinking about career redemption and breaking the hard luck spell, the Captain sent his impatient crew to battle stations. They began to shoot down the balloons the Iowa had missed as they drifted into the Porter's vicinity. Armed Torpedo Down on the torpedo mounts, the crew watched, waiting to take some practice shots of their own on the big battleship, which, even though 6,000 yards away, seemed to blot out the horizon. Lawton Dawson and Tony Fazio were among those responsible for the torpedoes. Part of their job involved ensuring that the primers were installed during actual combat and removed during practice. Once a primer was installed, on a command to fire, it would explode shooting the torpedo out of its tube. Dawson, on this particular morning, unfortunately had forgotten to remove the primer from torpedo tube #3. Up on the bridge, a new torpedo officer, unaware of the danger, ordered a simulated firing. "Fire 1, Fire 2," and finally, "Fire 3." There was no Fire 4 as the
Secret Service Guard
Finally, they decided to break the strictly enforced radio silence. The radio operator on the destroyer transmitted " Lion (code for Iowa), Lion, come right". The Iowa operator, more concerned about radio procedure, requested that the offending station identify itself first. Finally, the message was received and the Iowa began turning to avoid the speeding torpedo. Meanwhile, on the Iowa's bridge, word of the torpedo firing had reached FDR, who asked that his wheelchair be moved to the railing so he could see better what was coming his way. His loyal Secret Service guard immediately drew his pistol as if he was going to shoot the torpedo. As the Iowa began evasive manoeuvers, all of her guns were trained on the William D Porter. There was now some thought that the Porter was part of an assassination plot. Within moments of the warning, there was a tremendous explosion just behind the battleship. The torpedo had been detonated by the wash kicked up by the battleship's increased speed. The crisis was over and so was Captain Walker's career. His final utterance to the Iowa, in response to a question about the origin of the torpedo, was a weak, "We did it". Shortly thereafter, the brand new destroyer, her Captain and the entire crew were placed under arrest and sent to Bermuda for trial, It was the first time that a complete ship's company had been arrested in the history of the US Navy.
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The ship was surrounded by Marines when it docked in Bermuda, and held there several days as the closed session inquiry attempted to determine what had happened. Torpedo man Dawson eventually confessed to having inadvertently left the primer in the torpedo tube, which caused the launching. Dawson had thrown the used primer over the side to conceal his mistake. The whole incident was chalked up to an unfortunate set of circumstances and placed under a cloak of secrecy. Someone had to be punished. Captain Walker and several other Porter officers and sailors eventually found themselves in obscure shore assignments. Dawson was sentenced to 14 years hard labour. President Roosevelt intervened, however, asking that no punishment be meted out for what was clearly an accident. The destroyer William D Porter was banished to the upper Aleutians. It was probably thought this was as safe a place as any for the ship and anyone who came near her. Accidently Fired
war, it was reported that she also shot down three American planes. This was a common event on ships, as many gunners, fearful of kamikazes, had nervous trigger fingers. In April, 1945, the destroyer Porter was assigned to support the invasion of Okinawa. By this time, the greeting "Don't Shoot, We're Republicans" was commonplace and the crew of the Willie D had become used to the ribbing. Japanese Bomber But the crew of her sister ship, the USS Luce, was not so polite in its salutations after the Porter accidentally riddled her side and superstructure with gunfire. On 10 June, 1945, the Porter's hard luck finally ran out. She was sunk by a plane which had (unintentionally) attacked it from underwater. A Japanese bomber made almost entirely of wood and canvas slipped through the Navy's defences. Having little in the way of metal surfaces, the plane didn't register on radar. It was a fully loaded kamikaze and was headed for a ship near the Porter, but just at the last moment veered away and crashed alongside the unlucky destroyer. There was a sigh of relief as the plane sank out of sight, but then it blew up underneath the Porter, opening her hull in the worst possible place. Three hours later, after the last man was off board, the Captain jumped to the safety of a rescue vessel and the ship that almost changed world history slipped astern into 2,400 feet of water. Not a single soul was lost in the sinking. After everything else that happened, it was almost as if the ship decided to let her crew off at the end.
She remained in the frozen north for almost a year, until late 1944, when she was re-assigned to the Western Pacific. However, before leaving the Aleutians, she accidentally left her calling card in the form of a five- inch shell fired into the front yard of the American Base commander, thus rearranging his flower garden rather suddenly. In December, 1944, the Porter joined the Philippine invasion forces and acquitted herself quite well. She distinguished herself by shooting down a number of attacking Japanese aircraft. Regrettably, after the
USS William D Porter sinking from secondary effects of a Kamikaze explosion—10th June 1945 NOC Newsletter Number 113, 12 June 2018
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Andy Mackinnon, RADM Jonathon Meade, Peter Osbourne, Peter Wickham
On 22 March the NOC Victoria joined with the Naval Association of Australia, Victoria, the Navy League of Australia, Vic – Tas, and the Naval Historical Society, Victoria Chapter to present the 2018 CRESWELL ORATION. About 60 members from all the associations heard from RADM Jonathan Mead AM, RAN, Commander Australia Fleet, as he provided a candid and entertaining insight into “The
State of the Fleet” and the challenges present in today’s maritime environment. This lunch gathering was all the more memorable with the presence of Mrs Rosemary Creswell who provided VADM Sir William Creswell’s medals, sword, cap and other memorabilia and Mrs Elizabeth Sevior, VADM Creswell’s granddaughter.
Ray Gill, Jim Dickson
Paul Willee Naval Officers Club Victoria State Chairman Warwick Gately introducing RADM Meade At Left. Simon Lee, John Bird, RADM Jonathon Meade
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NSW - Coral Sea Commemoration
Catafalque Party in foreground, RAN band at rear in front of ANMM Action Stations Pavilion. Wreaths have been laid on bow of Vampire.
On a sparkling Sydney autumn day, the 76th anniversary of the Battle of the Coral Sea was commemorated at the Australian National Maritime Museum on Saturday 5 May. The event was jointly hosted by the NOC and the Museum, with the RAN providing a band, catafalque party and other support functions. On this occasion the VIPs included the Japanese Ambassador and the US Charge d’Affaires. Well known author and journalist Mike Carlton gave an outstanding commemorative address at the luncheon which followed the formal ceremonial. His address was circulated to members by email.
Gareth Clayton with Andrew Robertson
VIP Line-up. CAPT Craig Powell (CO Watson), Mr James Carouso (US Charge d’Affaires), Mr Kevin Sumption (ANMM Director), Mr Sumio Kusaka (Japanese Ambassador), Rick Bayley (NOC President), CAPT Shinsuke Amano (JMSDF Attache), Mr Don Maynard (US Consulate General)
Mike Carlton commemorative address NOC Newsletter Number 113, 12 June 2018
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Origins of the Encounter Dinner By Stephen Jeisman Lieutenant Commander RAN Retired On 8 April, 1802, off the coast of South Australia, two warships encountered one another; one was the British ship, HMS Investigator, commanded by Matthew Flinders and the other was the French ship, Le Géographe, commanded by Nicolas Baudin. Although their two nations were no longer at war, due to the signing of the Peace of Amiens, neither captain knew of the truce. Recognising that the approaching ship was French, Le Géographe, Flinders cleared the decks for action, but also flew a white flag of truce. Both ships were engaged in exploration and scientific discovery and therefore were exempt from engaging each other in conflict. Baudin, however, believed the other vessel to be his sister ship, Le Naturaliste which he had separated from several weeks before but in addition to the French flag, he also hoisted an British flag as a precautionary measure. As the two ships drew close, Flinders boarded a row boat and proceeded to Le Géographe where the two captains exchanged details about their explorations. Both had been ordered to chart the 'unknown coast' of Terra Australis. The two ships then spent the night anchored side by side before departing on the following morning. This event is a significant part of South Australian history and the bay close to where Flinders and
Baudin met is known as Encounter Bay. The former naval base at Birkenhead in South Australia, HMAS Encounter, was also named after this famous meeting. Furthermore, the HMAS Encounter crest reflects the meeting between the French and the English ships with the flags of the two nations. Although HMAS Encounter was decommissioned in 1994, the South Australian naval community annually holds an Encounter Dinner to commemorate the meeting between Flinders and Baudin. This year, the dinner was held at the South Australian Naval, Military and Air Force Club on Saturday, 7 April. Several members of the Club attended the dinner which was hosted by Commander Andrew Burnett, the Commanding Officer, Naval Headquarters South Australia and the guest speaker was Mr Kevin Jones, the Director of the South Australian Maritime Museum, who was instrumental in producing the touring exhibition The Art of Science: Baudin’s Voyagers 1800-1804 which is now touring Australia.
Steve Pearson, Brian Gorringe, Tony Swain and Stephen Jeisman at the Encounter Dinner 33
OBITUARIES Captain Graham Wright RAN Rtd: “The Wright Stuff” Of Graham Wright’s three careers in his lifetime – as an RAN Officer, then as a senior Public Servant in Defence and lastly with Defence Chaplaincy – he observed of the first “…a career that promised so much but delivered very little.” Of the second, he had a profound, but silent pride in his deep involvement in the greatest change to the administration of the Department of Defence since Federation. Born in 1920, he had his Intermediate Certificate at the age of 13, before he was selected to join RANC in the 1934 Cook Year entry. For a number of years until his death he was the only survivor of his year group and, in an interview several years ago, he stated “I am in no hurry for the next Reunion of Cook Year 1934.” At RANC he was the Chief Cadet Captain and received the King’s Medal. There followed almost two years Midshipman’s seatime in both RAN and RN ships before being sent to UK in 1939 for a compressed program of Sub Lieutenant’s courses due to the war. He joined the new ship HMAS Norman in 1941 in Southampton as Navigating Officer and the ship was ordered to secretly take a British emissary to Russia for talks. Subsequently Norman operated and saw action in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean and the Far East. After posting off Norman in 1943 he spent time in a number of ships doing survey tasks before returning to UK in 1944 to undertake and top the Long N course. Once qualified he was posted in succession to the battleship HM Ships Anson, fleet carrier Venerable, light cruiser Argonaut and command ship Boxer. Returning to the RAN he joined the new Sydney as Fleet Navigator and from there NOC Newsletter Number 113, 12 June 2018
to command Culgoa, his only command. Following postings included Master Attendant, Training Commander and later Executive Officer at Cerberus, Navy Office in Melbourne, Leeuwin as NOCWA and, finally, Navy Office in Canberra from where he resigned his commission in 1962. Prior to leaving the Navy he had started studying for a degree. His post-navy career started in the Department of External Affairs with a two year stint as Head of Research with SEATO, based in Bangkok. From there he returned to join the Department of Defence in 1965 as a Clerk 3rd Grade. He rose quickly through the ranks and, in 1970, joined a special team reporting to the new Secretary of Defence, Sir Arthur Tange. The crowning achievement of his Public Service career was working on the preparation of the Tange Report on the “Amalgamation of the Defence Group of Departments with Department of Supply”. Part of his role after the Report was published was to sell the concepts within the Services and his papers formed his thesis for an Honours degree from ANU. Until he turned 90 years of age, when he could no longer be licensed, Graham was a Lay Reader at the Anglican Chapel, RMC Duntroon for 20 years. In the northern summer of 2011 he travelled to England with Marie, his wife of 40 years – and the I Zingari cricket team. At 91 he batted once. A glance behind point produced his only run for the innings. He smiled at his team mates as he entered the pavilion for the last time, ”At least I scored one more run than Don Bradman did in his last innings!”. 34
Captain Peter Duncan, MVO RAN Rtd Chief of Navy Signal 16 May It is with sadness that Navy has learned of the death on 9 May 2018 of Captain Peter George Duncan, MVO RAN Rtd. Born on 17 July 1929 he joined RAN College in 1943 and graduated in 1946. In 1954 returned to the RANC as a well respected Divisional Officer and role model for Jervis term. He served in the carrier Melbourne as Officer of the Watch and later commanded the frigate Diamantina and River Class DE Stuart. During his period in command, Stuart was royal escort and Captain Duncan was made a Member of the Royal Victorian Order for services to the Queen. His last appointment was as Executive Officer at Watson. Following his RAN career he transferred to the merchant navy and had a second career at sea with Burns Philp.
Anecdotes from Funeral Eulogy delivered by Peter Maxwell. (LEUT Duncan was a term officer at RANC when Peter and other notables were CMIDs.) “Grip of the Weed” Shortly before our final exams began, my term mate Glen L was having a lot of difficulty with mathematics and I was trying to help him along. Our usual routine was after lights out was to sneak into the boiler room in the main College building and go through a maths tutorial for an hour or so. Glen was also in the “grip of the weed” and he used to take that opportunity of my maths tutorial to drag on a few bumpers and one particular night, Peter Duncan, for some strange reason, wondered why the light was on in the boiler room. We were chastised for being up after lights out and we were punished by having to do jankers – which was running around the parade ground with a 303 rifle above your head for a couple of hours in the afternoon. But what remains in my mind is that he confiscated Glen’s packet of cigarettes, lit one, took a deep breath and blew smoke at me as he said, “Be wise young man, do not get in the grip of the weed”.
“Blackberry Wine” Another cherished memory of those days was the Photography Club. My term mate J5 was a mad photographer but he also had a good background in non-naval things because his father was a pharmacist in Ballarat. At the start of the year we would go through the outskirts of the College and pick blackberries - they were certainly the best blackberries in the world. However, J5 brought back a bottle of straight alcohol from his father’s chemist shop and we turned the blackberries into a magnificent drink. The alcohol was kept in the Photography Club as “hypo” and I recall one time Peter Duncan came to explore what we were doing in the Photography Club and J5 offered him a sip of the blackberry wine. PG (as we called him) made some comment about the quality of the blackberry juice and suggested that we might remove the bottle of hypo – we could have been in a lot of trouble except that he did like the blackberry wine.
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BOOK REVIEW
On Her Majesty’s Nuclear Service by Eric Thompson
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ric Thompson served in the Royal Navy for 37 years from 1961 to 1998 and has written a remarkable book about his career, which was, to say the least, unconventional. However it is more than that; it is a deeply personal reflection on a service career which started badly and finished brilliantly, and the personal values that supported it. His career spanned the darkest periods of the Cold War, where victory was by no means assured, through to the ‘peace dividends’ that flowed from victory in that struggle, with painful consequences for the Service he loved. This book is long overdue since it tackles issues that those of us who were there at the time, never felt comfortable discussing. Many operations of those times were highly classified and in some cases remain so. In particular it opens a previously firmly shut window on the unique challenges confronting nuclear submarine engineering departments. They faced not only considerable personal risks in operating a nuclear propulsion plant, but in the case of the Deterrent Force, the political consequences that would flow from failure. Having a foreword written by a former Chief of the UK Defence Staff may have helped open that window for Thompson. However this is more than the reminiscences of a cold warrior; rather it is a highly personal and often amusing account of the many aspects of Thompson’s life, giving tantalising glimpses of a complex personality who valued his family above all else, even to sacrificing his career by resigning rather be separated from them at a crucial time. What then transpired to allow him to withdraw his resignation is a classic example of the part that luck plays in most successful careers. However, his strategy in negotiating with the appointer (poster) particularly in his earlier career, is not one I would recommend that an ambitious junior officer follow! The book itself is a terrific read; his writing style carries you along at breakneck speed switch-
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ing seamlessly from highly technical subjects to the people skills that make for a complete naval officer. His views on the procurement process and the machinations of ‘The Ministry’ will be shared by many in navies other than just the Royal Navy. Reassuringly he has changed or omitted some names where appropriate, to protect the guilty, while lauding those who have helped him on his way, although at times this praise can be a tad OTT. The final pages, where he writes of his beloved wife’s last days, are restrained but achingly poignant. This is a recommended read for anyone with an interest in the naval, social and political history of the second half of the Twentieth Century. It also contains some clear warnings for those planning our defence in an increasingly uncertain world. Jock Thornton
BOOK REVIEW
Hostage on the Yangtze by Malcolm Murfett
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ostage on the Yangtze, by Malcom Murfett, tells the story of HMS Amethyst which was trapped on the Yangtze River and became caught in the middle of the conflict between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists in 1949. The author has a PhD from Oxford University and is a history professor at the National University of Singapore. He is a specialist in naval history and has contributed to several publications covering this field. These include In Jeopardy: The Royal Navy and British Far Eastern Defence Policy, 19451951 (1995), The First Sea Lords, (1999), and Two Oceans: A Military History of Singapore from First Settlement to Final British Withdrawal (2004). Professor Murfett is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society (1991), an associate editor of the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography and has taught or been a visiting fellow at numerous universities including the Australian Defence Force Academy. The book opens with a short survey of Western and particularly Britain’s intrusion into China in pursuit of trade, highlighting how Chinese hostility to foreign intervention erupted into a series of confrontations. These included the Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion during the nineteenth century, and the Boxer Uprising in 1900. During these years, Britain deployed the Royal Navy in what was known as gunboat diplomacy and established major naval bases at Hong Kong and Wei Hai, as part of the China Station, to protect British imperial interests in the region. In 1902, much to the aggravation of the Chinese, Britain signed the AngloJapanese Alliance and then following the outbreak of World War I, agreed to Japanese occupation of the former German territory in northern China. Having described the events which shaped the British–Chinese relationship during the early years of the Twentieth Century, Murfett moves to 1949 and what was occurring in Nanking as war between Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists reached its climax. To ensure the safety of British officials and residents, a RN guardship was stationed on a rotational basis. Towards the end of April, HMS Amethyst was ordered to replace HMS Concord (sic). The ship she, in fact replaced was HMS Consort. However, midway through her voyage, Amethyst was fired upon by a Communist Chinese shore battery and forced aground. Her commanding officer was mortally wounded, and several crew were also killed or wounded. Although Amethyst was able to float free, she was not allowed to proceed on her mission. Hence began a standoff which was to last three months.
Much of the book is devoted to the negotiations over releasing the Amethyst; these occurred at three levels. In London, the Atlee’s Labour Government endeavoured to find a diplomatic solution while in China, local diplomatic and naval authorities attempted to negotiate with the Chinese communists. At the same time, the assistant naval attaché in Nanking, Lieutenant Commander Kerans RN, was dispatched to the Amethyst to take charge of the situation and became involved in face to face negotiations with the communists to acquire provisions and medical aid for the crew. These negotiations dragged on for almost three months. Eventually, an exasperated Kerans made the decision to risk a daring, night-time escape. Running the gauntlet of communist shore batteries, Amethyst made a frantic dash down the Yangtze and upon reaching the open sea sent the following signal: HAVE REJOINED THE FLEET SOUTH OF WOOSUNG, NO DAMAGE OR CASUALTIES. GOD SAVE THE KING. The book is very readable and has a number of appendices which contain interesting background information relative to the events of 1949. Its only shortcoming is in regard to illustrations; the maps could have been larger and displayed more information and the diagrams of the Amethyst could also have been larger and more clearly detailed. Stephen Jeisman 37
Inaugural Patrol Boat Re-union a Success
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Several former Patrol Boat crew members line the deck of HMAS Gladstone (II) located on a hardstand at Gladstone Maritime Museum
n 9 March last year Gary Sproule and Mick Storrs attended a plaque unveiling in Gladstone to signify the completion of a project to restore the FCPB Gladstone & display her on a hard stand. clear of the water in the city’s East Shores precinct. On decommissioning 13 March 2007, the ship was donated to the Gladstone Maritime History Society which took the lead role in co-ordinating some 36 sponsors/donors in a project costing around $3.1 million. Gary & Mick both had a personal interest with Gary being the commissioning commanding officer 8 September 1984 in Cairns while Mick, was Commanding Officer Warrnambool, her consort during the post-commissioning shakedown & work-up. The visit “sowed the seed” that the site would provide a great place for former patrol boat personnel of Attack/Fremantle/Armidale classes to gather to remember their service be it in an operational or support role. The inaugural gathering was arranged for Anzac Day with the Navy providing HMAS Wollongong (LCDR Aaron Norley RAN) for the occasion which engendered much interest. Activities were a “meet & greet” at the Yacht Club first night, Anzac Day Dawn Service followed by a Gunfire Breakfast at the bowls club, home of the RSL & the march led by Wollongong’s ship’s company followed by the patrol boat contingent. The day concluded with a sausage sizzle at GladNOC Newsletter Number 113, 12 June 2018
stone & some availed themselves of a tour of Wollongong the following day. As an inaugural event, it was a great success appreciated by all who attended & it’s hoped it will provide the basis for future gatherings.
Mick Storrs and Bruce Eddes at the Anzac Service 38
Application for Membership of the Naval Officers’ Club To: Membership Secretary, Naval Officers’ Club PO Box 648, Pennant Hills, NSW 1715 I forward this application for membership of the Naval Officers’ Club of Australia. In the event of my being accepted, I hereby undertake to conform to the Constitution of the Club (see NOC website). My naval association is: ...…………………………………………..…………………………………………….in the …………………..………………..………………Navy Personal Details Last name ………………………………………………………. First name………….……………………………Initials…………………… Orders/decorations ……………………………................................... Rank……………………………………………………………. Naval Service. Year joined ……………………. Year left …………..……….Status Active/Retired….…………………………. Postal address ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...............................
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..Postcode………………………… Email ……………………………………………………………………………………………... Mobile…….……………………………………….. Home Phone…………………………………………………………….Work Phone……………………………………………………………... Occupation ……………………………………………………………….Partner’s name ………………………………………………………. Membership Annual Subscription expires end February each year. Newsletter printed and posted - $30 OR Newsletter digitally delivered (preferred) - $20 Merchandise Silk Club Tie $45 – Yes/No Payment Amount = $................................. Scan form and email to Hon Treasurer OR post. EFT. BSB 032-087, Account 174666, Naval Officers’ Club. Email Hon Treasurer at treasurer@navalofficer.com.au OR Cheque. To Hon Treasurer at PO Box 648, Pennant Hills, NSW 1715
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