Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
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in all probability dug in at least until after the Viet na...mese elections. After that, we could take another look, but I still doubt that any serious change will be indicated. If it is, some e,pproach like the He Win one seems to me by far the most promising. "A key question is of course how 'He handle the Soviets . My own hunch is that Kosygin burned his finger s somewhat
in February, but that they have built their position in Hanoi at least back to its former level . In the process, they "lvill have almost certainly undertaken some additional a,id. Kno'i'ring as they do all our peace moves , they may have a strong feeling that we are in a hurry and perhaps suscept i ble to change . This would argue against pressing them hard in the near future, as we did in early April in any event . liOn the other hand, we certainly could impress upon them our belief that their own int erest lies in getting the situation resolved, and that they should be exerting r eal influence to this end. But this should be coupled with a calm firmne ss in our olm determination to go ahead and not to be throlm off by anything additional they may be doing or threaten to do. I n the last analysis, they can judge whether they really have any leverage and how to exert it. "At any rate, the next major contacts w'ith the Soviets -Dobrynin ' s return and Bro"\-m 's visit to Mosco\'i in late May -should in my jud ~lent be played in this measured but essentially low key unless they come up with something . Brovm is not himself inclined to try something new at the moment , and we should do nothing to encourage him. (He has a full plate anyway of other issues. ) ~ Bundy ' s basically optimistic estimate (50-50 was in the context of the time optimistic) "\-Tas partially supported by the r eports of ground action coming out of South Vietnam, although the increasing enemy threat. in I CTZ remained an ominous and somevThat puzzling development . '5.
Developments in the Ground Har:
Strategy Takes Shape
Ground operations in the period February into early May followed essentially the pattern predicted by COMUSlv!..A.CV in his earlier assessments and statements of strategy . The PRAIl{[E series of operations conduct ed by the Marines to counter i nfiltration through the DMZ had received permission during the month to employ artillery fire against military targets
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