Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
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Continuing , he reviewed various programs (MARKET TIME, G~ME WARDEN, DANIEL BOONE, SK~ DRA_GON) and the detailed plans to broaden them , but once more the Pacific commander returned to the subject of the sanctuaries: "The problem of sanctuaries has b een ment ioned severa l times. Those in NVN and Laos are limited sanc tuari es since they are subject to air attacks, alb eit , with certain restrictions. The sanctuary in Cambodia, however , is compl ete . It would appear appropriate to undertake actions at an early date aimed at per suading the Cambodian l eadership to adopt a mor e neutral position. Pur suant to a request by DOD it is understood that a Joint State, Defense , and CIA c o~~ittee is cons idering this probl em . It i s hoped that recomraendations from thi s group "Till be forthcoming at an early date which will indicate positive measures which may be t aken . The importance of Cambodia as sanctuary and as a source of supplies , particularly rice, cannot be overemphasized . Consequently, we must get on vTith a strong progra..rn to inhibit thi s use of Ca,mbodia, preferably by non- belligerent politica l and diplomati c means . If vTe do not achieve the required degree. of success by these means then we must be prepared i n a ll re spects to use the necessary degree of force to attain our obj ectives. "In summary, the problem of countering infiltrat i on of enemy fo rces into SVN is just one aspect of the total military problem in SEASIA . While infiltration cannot be absol utel y stopped by direct military action , it can b e made costly and its effectiveness blunted. The enemy ' s prodigious efforts to provide air defense and to repair damaged LOC 's are strong evidence of the effectiveness of our air campaigns i n NVN , Laos and SVN. Increasing interdiction of his supply system , especially by cl.osing his port s , would be the most effective measure l'le could take against his capability to infiltrate . Additionally, shifting Rolling Thunder emphasis to atta~k selective target systems should have a significant impact upon his I'Till to continue support to the ins1..1.rgency in SVN. 'I'he more successr'"'ul our ope~ations become in NVN and l aos , the more use the enemy I,Till seek to rr.ake of his supply sources and channels in Cambodia . To achieve our objectives in SEASIA our current strategy ) a combination of carefu_lly balanced military programs must be pursued in close coordination with politica l, economic, and sociological programs ." ]}:j
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