·cBl':ded out by Vie"tns!:E:se b~' the end 0:';' 1955. It should be pos~;5.ble to witl:d.l'a·.: the bulk vl' U.S. J:"::l'sonr,~l 'by t::f.lt t:ir.e. C.
In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to take over reil~tary fu...YJct ions, 'the Defense Department, should announce in' the near future presr:ntly prepared :plans to ",..UhdraH 1000 U.S. nilHarJ' personnel 'by the end of 1963: Tilis action should be explained in Iml key as all initial step in a long-term pro~r(::':l to re:ploc€; U. S. pel'S o~nel uitil trained Viet- . namese Hithou.t :iJ;.pairment of the var effort.
Gerr.~anc
to the above recornendat Ions, bcvever, it vas stated elsewhere in the report, "No further reductions should be made until the requfrement.s 01' the 1964 caInpaign becceie firm. II 4 0 1 ' . Folloi:Ting the I;SC !:lceting or 2 October, the ''I':lite House issued a fOl'l!.i.sl public announcenerrt of the major polic;:,' aspect.s of the gc!;=u::araTaylor l-1is~ion Rellort. Th~ Uhite House stater.:er:t is reproduced belo".·l.
u.s, POLICY 0:: VIE:T-I:Pl·;: \'ffiITE HOUSE STNI£.:EI:T, OCTOBBR 2, 1963
';Q/
Secretary LOr Derense.Ro~el~ s·7 11cr8~sra and General /ir:a~~ell n.? Taylc~ reported to the Presid.ent thj.6 morn:.ng and to the l:atim-~al Security Council this efte-rLoo~. Their report included a nurcber of cla~sifjed fin5ir.S5 and ricc~~c~dations which will be the subject of further revi~~ a~1 action. Their basic preser.tstion was endorsed by all nezbers or t·r.e Sec~iJcy COU:1C:!.l ar.,i 'tne follo-.:ing state.::~nt of United stEltt.s Folicy vas approved b;:,- tl:3 President on the 1:;a;:;i~ . .. ....., .... ~, .:l t;; of reC~iOenc.a'tl.On5 r eceavec, lrCl -t:.nelrl ana.. .ro::J. Joi""0csss""or I.p:cnT"j Caboy Lodge.
1. The security of South Viet-l:~n is a !·.ajor 11lterest of th-e United states as other free nat fons , He \;ill adhere to our Jlolic~r of ,,:or}~i.l'lg llitb the people and Goverr~ent of South Viet-l;~::n to deny this count:ry to cC:":.-:~is~ end to suppress t1-,-= exterr.elly 5til~u.l.sted and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as pro::lptly as possfb.le , Effective perfo-""":'~~nce in this U:l~erta}~ing is the central objective of our policy in So~th Viet-I:an.. 2. The militar;y· program in South Viet-!~a!'!l has made progress and is sound in principle, though improvements are being e:l.ergetically sought.
3. Major U.S. assistance i.l'l support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security- ·forces of the Gover.ament of South 'Viet-I\am are capable of sUpp-""essing it. Secretary l,!cNamara land General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a cont.inufng requirement for a limited number of U.S~ training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training' Vietnamese should .~..:. ... .