Page 75

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

EVA23Water Intrusion

3.5.10 Post-flight Evaluation Planning With the isolation of the failure condition to the FPS assembly, plans were formulated to package and return the FPS and the associated contamination samples and wipes to the ground for detailed evaluation. The evaluation plan consisted of four parts: a. NDE X-ray CT scanning of the FPS without the Item 127 filter and 128 check valve, and scanning of those items separately. b. Teardown and examination of the FPS itself. c. Separate N-ray CT scanning of the water separator drum and pitot independently. d. Examination and analysis of all contamination and wipes, including any material found during the disassembly. A pathfinder exercise using a correctly configured FPS was outfitted with some representative contamination, and both X-ray and N-ray Computer Tomography were used to determine sensitivity and best orientations for scanning. Results were positive, and these techniques were planned for use on the discrepant flight article, which was returned from the ISS in mid-November.

3.5.11 Post-flight Evaluation of the FPS and ALCLR Filters


ISS EVA Suit Water Intrusion Mishap Investigation Report  

Report of the NASA Mishap Investigation Board examining the high visibility close call event of July 16, 2013 when ESA astronaut Luca Parmit...