THE VIEW FROM THE CIVIL TRIAL BENCH
Judge Judy Holzer Hersher, Sacramento County Superior Court
The Demise of “Camping Rights” (Unlimited Jury Time) in Civil Trials by Judge Judy Holzer Hersher
This article represents the thoughts and opinions of the author and should not be considered court policy or the opinion of other trial judges. Comments should be addressed to HersherJ@saccourt.ca.gov.
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redicting the length of a jury trial and getting it done within that time can be challenging. Generally it is not an issue for those who have prepared witnesses, organized exhibits, and carefully crafted, non-repetitive questions. For others, the outcome is less certain. With the dwindling availability of civil courtrooms statewide, there is increasing pressure on trial judges to get trials done more efficiently, in less time. Thus it should come as no surprise that a recent appellate court has waded into the issues surrounding time limitations that a trial judge can impose on attorneys. (California Crane School, Inc. v. National Commission for Certification of Crane Operators et al. (2014) 226 Cal. App.4th 12, hereinafter “Crane”.) Notably, Crane spends no time discussing the facts or law litigated in the case (Cartwright Antitrust Act, Bus. & Prof. Code §16700 et seq., unfair competition, and other business torts). Rather, it focuses on a trial court’s power and duty to work with counsel in setting appropriate time limits when a particular case, court schedule, or experience with counsel warrants. In no way do the justices hold that time limitations should be given in all or even most cases. Rather, they explain what needs to go into the decision-making if time limitations will be applied.
“Efficiency is not necessarily measured by comparing the actual length of a trial with the parties’ original time estimate because parties often overestimate or underestimate a trial’s length.” (Crane at p. 20.) There are a variety of statutes and ethical canons in play and which have granted judges the tools to balance fairness with time limitations. (See Evid. Code § 352, empowering trial judges to limit the presentation of relevant and probative evidence in the face of undue consumption of time; Evid. Code § 765(a), mandating that a trial court shall exercise control over the mode of interrogation of witnesses “so as to make interrogation as rapid, as distinct and as effective for the ascertainment of truth…;” Gov. Code § 68600 et seq., mandating the prompt disposition of all matters; Standard 2.1(a) of the California Standards of Judicial Administration (“…from the commencement of litigation to its resolution, whether by trial or settlement, any elapsed time other than reasonably required for … court events is unacceptable and should be eliminated”); Canon 3B(8) of the California Code of Judicial Ethics, providing that “[a] judge shall dispose of all judicial matters fairly, promptly and efficiently… in a manner that provides all litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly adjudicated in accordance with
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the law.”) (Crane, supra, 226 Cal. App.4th at pp. 19-20 & fn. 3.) “Some litigants are of the mistaken opinion that when they are assigned to a court for trial they have camping rights.” (Crane at p. 19.) So how long is long enough for any given trial to satisfy the rights of civil litigants to have their fair day in court? As Crane explains, it is not whatever time it may actually take a lawyer or party to put on their case. Rather, it is the considered experience of a judge and unique circumstances of a case that control. The Crane court put it this way: “Some litigants are of the mistaken opinion that when they are assigned to a court for trial they have camping rights. This view presumes that the trial judge must defer to the lawyers’ time estimates for the conduct of the trial such that, for example, when examining witnesses, unless a valid objection is made by one’s opponent, a party is entitled to take whatever time it believes necessary to question each witness. This view is not only contrary to law but undermines a trial judge’s obligation to be protective of the court’s time and resources as well as the time and interests of trial witnesses, jurors and other litigants waiting in line to have their cases assigned to a courtroom.” (Id. at p. 19.) At the appellate level, the appellant (plaintiff) argued that the trial judge impermissibly limited the presentation of his rebuttal evidence. Appellant estimated a four to