Part four: other role-players. - Free Online Library

Part four: other role-players. - Free Online Library 1. INTRODUCTION Government policy and strategies (see Part 1) specifically place emphasis on the notion of integrated government, thereby involving other government departments, as well as on partnership involving key stakeholders--from the business community in particular. This section contains four contributions, two each concerning the public and the private sectors respectively.

Within the public domain, the active participation in the combating of crime by local authorities especially within urban areas, is emphasised. Hence the contribution by the Director of Communication: Office of the Chief of Police, Mel Vosloo, on the Tshwane Metropolitan Police that covers the roles, strategy, functions and key performance areas of this police department at the local tier of government. At the national level, within the broader context of the constitutional and JCPS Cluster framework, the secondary functions and role of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in co-operation with the SAPS in combating crime are dealt with by Senior Staff Officer: Operations Land Internal and Borderline Control of the Joint Operations Division of the SANDF, Col Barry Schoeman. Apart from covering the statutory mandate of the SANDF in this regard, as well as current levels of co-operation, the main thrust of this contribution deals with shifts in the SANDF force employment strategy as a result of which the 'support to the people' role of the SANDF is compromised by the imperative of the

'promote regional security' role. This in effect means that although the SANDF will always be available to be of assistance to the SAPS, its regular force deployments in support of the SAPS are scaled down in order to support the Government's regional peace initiatives in the form of peace support operations.

Within the domain of the private sector, the 2003 Executive Overview of Business Against Crime (BAC) provides an overview of the major initiatives and activities of BAG in partnership with Government.

Established in 1996 as a non-profit organisation, the private sector funded BAG played a major role in drafting the NCPS. Since then it has been extremely active as a private sector partner to combat crime and the causes of crime, mainly by operating at strategic and project implementation levels and by interacting with the Government on ministerial and departmental level within the JCPS Cluster. The Executive Overview covers the approach and funding of BAC, as well as the projects the organisation is involved in and its achievements in respect of each project. The article by the Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, Prof Mike Hough, provides an analysis of the private security sector in South Africa. Apart from an overview of the kinds of services this sector provides, it specifically looks at the official views on and statutory provisions regulating the private security sector, in the process also assessing whether private and public security in South Africa compete or co-operate with each other.

2. THE POSITION OF KEY ROLE-PLAYERS

TSHWANE METROPOLITAN POLICE

Mel Vosloo

Director Communication

Office of the Chief of Police

Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department

1. INTRODUCTION

The City of Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department was established on 24 January 2002 in accordance with a business plan approved by the Council on 4 October 2001 and a proclamation in the Gauteng Provincial Gazette by the Member of the Executive Council (MEC): Safety and Liaison. The business plan described the vision, mission, values and core business of the Department. The functions of the Department and the additional resources and financial implications also formed part of this business plan. The first phase made provision for the establishment of the Department and the second for its progressive expansion until the end of the 2002/2003 financial year. From this point normal Council budgetary procedure applies.

2. ROLE OF THE METROPOLITAN POLICE

The role of the Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department is determined by the needs and demands of its clients, the municipality and the community, and to some extent by political responsibility and strategies applied to meet the demands of the various role-players.

2.1 Client system needs The escalating demand for a safe and secure environment due to the high crime rate is the main reason for the existence of the Metro Police Department. It is wrongly perceived that the Metro Police duplicates the services rendered by the South African Police Services (SAPS). It has to be stressed that the Metropolitan Police Department's focus is on pro-active crime prevention in supporting the SAPS and on ensuring a safe and secure environment, rather than acting on events. Due to the high crime rate, all members of the community reserve the right to demand a safe and secure environment.

2.2 Municipality needs

The establishment of the Metropolitan Police is directly linked to the Municipality's mission to stimulate and nurture a safe environment in which growth and development can flourish so that everyone can experience quality of life. For this to happen it is essential to meet the whole community's need for safety and security; once this is in place the community can grow and flourish.

Notwithstanding this priority, financial constraints force the use of alternative ways to deliver services. It is furthermore expected of the

Municipality to render an equal service to all residents. This expectation has led to a shift in the priorities of the Metro Police Department as well as a move towards addressing services that were not rendered on an equal basis. As a result services have been decentralised, leading to decreased reaction times in response to complaints.

The Municipality expects clean administration from the policing service. To spend the ratepayer's money with caution, this entails tighter budget control and the strengthening of support services to assist the operational management with accountability and effective control over resources. Resource services supply valid up-to-date management information including treasury services, logistical services and personnel services.

2.3 Community needs

The needs of the community to live, work and play in a safe environment is recognised as a high priority. This item first emerged during the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) process. Tshwane prides itself on being the safest city in South Africa. The community, however, has limited resources to spend on safety and security and therefore demands value for money and to be kept informed of all functions.

Ratepayers at all levels also want equality of services and should pay for services rendered. Since policing is a basic service it should be equal for all residents.

2.4 Political needs and demands

The political will requires a safe and secure environment for the electorate: this promise was made by each and every councillor and should be adhered to. Democracy generated new and sometimes unrealistic demands. As a result the policing service finds itself at the centre of the political process and often finds it difficult to attain its goals due to political intervention. At the national level politicians are placing more pressure on services in general. The national government's policies force the policing service to consider alternative ways of rendering services in public/private partnerships.

2.5 Accommodation of needs and demands

With the necessary resources and funding the police service has the ability and dedication to render an affordable, professional and efficient service. There are, however, several factors that make the policing service unique and that require unique solutions. These factors are the following:

--Most services are rendered on a 24-hour basis.

--The services are labour intensive.

--The services demand the use of expensive technical equipment.

--The client is dealt with under abnormal circumstances, for example in an emergency situation or when guilty of an offence.

--The rendering of services requires a well-trained and dedicated force.

The Metropolitan Police Service's ability to render a law enforcement service resides in several strengths and opportunities, also considering that the prevailing climate in a democratic South Africa necessitates continuous changes. The foundations of the policing service in this changing environment are the following:

--Most services are rendered in accordance with statutory requirements.

--In some areas well-established infra-structure exists, which can be extended to all other areas.

--The personnel corps comprises well-trained and dedicated professionals.

--Operational control is well established.

--The principle of functioning on a decentralised basis has been anticipated.

--The metropolitan police concept is accepted nationally as well as internationally.

2.6 Limiting factors

The main obstacles to the desired state of affairs are to be found in the organisation itself. The first is to get rid of a culture of average performance by replacing it with a goal-driven, responsible culture. In this way existing resources can be utilised much more effectively. This should be supported by scientific research and technology, presently largely lacking. Secondly, specialised units with different functions should be replaced with multi-skilled task forces.

For example, by-law enforcement across the whole spectrum should be controlled by one section instead of by various sections scattered throughout the Municipality. The luxury of separate traffic, security, guard and crime prevention units cannot be afforded and these functions must be combined in and executed by a multi-skilled task force.

2.7 Contributing factors

The strategic direction of service rendering on which the policing service must embark, is supported by the fact that many services can be delivered at the same standard but at a much lower cost than by private organisations. This gives the policing service the ability to save on costs and also the freedom to redeploy resources where they are needed most. Another contributing factor is the fact that the improvement of

the level of services can be achieved internally by establishing multi-skilled task forces, adopting a goal-directed management approach and utilising research and technology. A final contributing factor is the existence of the political will to address the safety and security situation in Tshwane.

3. STRATEGY

In order to formulate a strategy, certain 'reality clusters' were considered. Firstly, if the trust and sustained co-operation of the community are to be gained and maintained, local government has to ensure a clean administration which is visible to the community. This Department has successfully maintained this vision, supported by intensive media coverage of all suspensions and dismissals of wayward staff. It has in fact given credibility to this process publicly and privately by assuming a policy of zero tolerance.

Secondly, the Department has made inroads to as many community forums as possible, including Community Policing Forums (CPF), in a bid to stop possible vigilantism--a threat, that if ignored or minimised, could be a serious mistake. It is the policy of this Department to address community concerns as soon as possible and to stay involved until the concerns are properly addressed. Failing this, vigilante organisations could develop into powerful forces that are organised and capable of transgressing the law. Problems are dealt with by producing reasonable and accurate statistics proving or disproving the

community's perceptions. An aggravating factor is that compared to most other societies, South Africa's crime-infected society requires above-average initiatives and sustained measures.

4. FUNCTIONS OF THE METROPOLITAN POLICE

The three main functions of the Metro Police Department are, inter alia:

--crime prevention;

--by-law enforcement; and

--road policing.

All other functions of the Department support these functions.

The principle guidelines to operationalise the strategy are as follows:

--decentralised command and control;

--crime prevention through community participation;

--reorganising patrol methods;

--community accountability and ownership; and

--increased service delivery.

The Metro Police Department is an inclusive service that functions throughout the entire Tshwane area on an equal basis.

The minimum national standards stipulated by the South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act No 68 of 1995), section 64L are adhered to. They deal mainly with:

--the carrying out of arrests and the incarceration of arrestees;

--the management of crime scenes;

--the standardisation of forms;

--occurrence books;

--pocket books; and

--search and seizure procedures.

4.1 Regionalisation Policing in the Tshwane area was regionalised for the following reasons:

--shorter reaction times;

--geographical obstacles;

--the fact that areas differ in crime patterns and statistics;

--infra-structural obstacles; and

--to coincide with SAPS precincts as far as possible.

Eight regions were eventually demarcated.

5. KEY PERFORMANCE AREAS

5.1 Office of the Chief of Police

The Office of the Chief of Police has to strategically manage the Metropolitan Police in the following areas:

--crime prevention;

--by-law enforcement;

--road safety;

--to contribute to corporate strategy, initiatives and budget

responsibility;

--to provide strategic leadership in the above-mentioned areas; and

--to allocate, manage and optimise the use of resources.

5.2 Crime prevention

5.2.1 Social crime prevention

--Manage and oversee crime prevention programmes; and

--design, implement and maintain new crime prevention programmes.

5.2.2 Specialised crime prevention

--Manage and oversee specialised crime prevention programmes; and

--design, implement and maintain new specialised crime prevention programmes.

5.2.3 Strategy development

--Manage and oversee strategies for crime prevention; and

--develop, test and implement new strategies for crime prevention.

5.2.4 Environmental design and re-design

Examine present environmental design and develop and implement a new design that is safety and security friendly.

5.3 Policing

Manage and oversee:

--centralised policing operations;

--decentralised policing operations (regions); and

--road policing operations.

5.4 Road policing operations

Manage and oversee operations of:

--speed control;

--highway patrol; and

--specialised road safety services.

5.5 By-law enforcement

Manage and oversee:

--the by-law section by applying general management principles;

--the compliance of by-laws in all eight regions;

--the co-ordination of all by-law operations; and

--participation in the introduction of new by-laws.

5.6 Research and technology

--Gather data on crime trends;

--process data and disseminate information on crime trends; and

--investigate and activate new data sources.

5.7 Academy

Manage and oversee:

--the presentation of accredited statutory courses/own courses;

--the presentation of in-service training; and

--develop and implement new courses.

5.8 Support services

--Manage and oversee all administrative support services provided to the Department; and

--develop, implement and maintain new support systems.

5.9 Administration Bureau

--Manage and oversee the administrative functions of the Bureau;

--develop and implement new strategies;

--monitor and control employee wellness;

--manage and oversee prosecution administration;

--maintain good relations with the Department of Justice;

--maintain and oversee the traffic court's functions; and

--maintain and oversee the tracing unit functions.

5.10 Licensing services

--Maintain and oversee the statutory licensing functions with regard to motor vehicle licenses and registration, drivers' licenses and inspectoral functions;

--manage trade licenses, NATIS system administration and archive services; and

--develop, implement and maintain new systems.

6. CONCLUSION

The practical situation thus far is that the Department has achieved most of its objectives. The only outstanding aspect, due to slow processes that have to be followed, is the finalisation of the appointment and placement of personnel in accordance with the structures prescribed by the laws and policies of both the Council and national government. The encouragement of personnel to comply with the vision and mission of the Department is an ongoing process that is also receiving attention.

THE SANDF AND THE COMBATING OF CRIME: MAKING A DIFFERENCE? *

1. INTRODUCTION

Before discussing the current or future level of co-operation between the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the South African Police Service (SAPS), it is important to draw attention to the statutory mandate of the SANDF and its current employment by the President. It is also important to gain an understanding of the current dilemmas of the SANDF and of the political vision of the Government that may impact on SANDF co-operation with the SAPS in the fight against crime in South Africa.

2. THE SANDF'S STATUTORY MANDATE

According to the South African Constitution, 1996 (Act No 108 of 1996) section 200(2), the SANDF's main or primary function is to "defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force". The interim 1993 Constitution (article 227) also made provision for the secondary functions of the SANDF. These functions, that were since reiterated by the White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, 1996 are:

--the fulfilment of the international obligations of the Republic

of South Africa;

--the preservation of life, health or property;

--the provision or maintenance of essential services;

--the upholding of law and order in the Republic in co-operation with the SAPS; and

--support of any department of state for the purpose of socioeconomic upliftment.

According to Section 201 (2) of the Constitution, the employment of the SANDF in the undertaking of these secondary functions requires presidential authorisation. The President has, in accordance with these powers vested in him, employed the SANDF in three of these functions:

--Fulfilment of the international obligations of the Republic (the deployments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea (all United Nations [UN]-mandated) and Burundi (UN-endorsed).

--The preservation of life, health or property (support to the Department of Provincial and Local Government for disaster management).

--The upholding of law and order in the Republic in co-operation with the SAPS (Presidential Minute 27 of 1996--18 June 1996--according

to the National Crime Prevention Strategy--NCPS).

This article focuses on the latter function. The intended 18-year lifespan of the NCPS is to last until 2014, thus it is taken for granted that the employment will remain valid until then. Based on the presidential authorisation, the Minister of Defence instructed that the employment be effected in the entire area of the Republic of South Africa.

3. THE CURRENT LEVEL OF CO-OPERATION PROVIDED BY THE SANDF TO THE SAPS

Since the authorisation of its employment by the President in 1996, the SANDF has mainly co-operated with the SAPS in three major fields:

--Borderline control.

--Rural protection.

--Combating of serious crime, namely:

--Urban terrorism (in the Cape Metropolis).

--Stabilising of areas where violence is endemic (in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands).

--The safeguarding of major events (for example, elections and events of international importance such as the Non-Aligned Movement Summit and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting).

The force levels deployed were compromises between the maximum force level possible within the SANDF's budget constraints and the requirements of the SAPS. In the recent past this has led to only the priority requirements being catered for, which can be summarised as follows:

--Borderline control. An average of 13 companies were deployed along the Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho borders.

--Rural protection. An average of 23 Territorial Reserve Force platoons were deployed.

--Combating of serious crime. An average of six companies were deployed.

--22 Aircraft (fixed and rotary wings) and ships (primarily harbour patrol boats) were used where and when required to support SANDF elements, and on request to support SAPS elements.

Due to both political and financial constraints, the SANDF has been withdrawn from all internal operations other than borderline and rural safeguarding. Should the need for SANDF crime fighting assistance arise

within the urban or peri-urban areas, special motivations will have to be provided and specific criteria met, before such assistance would now be forthcoming. The force levels for the border areas have also decreased from 13 to 11 companies. The excess forces are now used for foreign deployments.

Despite these force reductions, the SANDF was still able to achieve some notable operational results (see Tables 1 and 2).

It is clear that the SANDF plays a major role in combating crime in these focus areas. The reduction in force levels inevitably impacted on the results obtained and prevented the SANDF from providing anything resembling blanket coverage along the priority border areas. This meant in practice that the SANDF and SAPS local commanders were forced, more so than before, to plan deployments to achieve reasonable results. The results provide proof of the good co-operation between the forces, especially at tactical level. Along the South African borders SANDF patrols are not required to operate together with SAPS patrols, but in practice this often occurs.

4. THE WAY FORWARD

The SANDF has now reached that critical point where decisions are taken with consideration of the need to be active within the African context. This is a political imperative and it also ensures that the SANDF is ready to serve South Africa as required by the Constitution.

The current deployment of the SANDF within South Africa in co-operation with the SAPS must be seen against this background. The choice forced upon the SANDF is the product of budgetary constraints and the vision of the Government to stabilise the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region as a prerequisite for peace, progress and tranquility in South Africa.

To deal with this problem the Department of Defence has, for the first time in its history, developed a single comprehensive military strategy to provide guidelines for future development and structures.

Using the military strategy as a basis, the SANDF has developed a force employment strategy.

4.1 SANDF force employment strategy

The military strategy identified 37 missions derived from the Constitution, the Defence Act, 1957 (Act No 44 of 1957 as amended) and governmental directives, and also identified three military-strategic objectives. The 37 missions were divided into the three military-strategic objectives that are to be operationalised within the force employment strategy. These objectives are:

--Support to the people.

--Promote regional security.

--Defence against aggression.

The force employment strategy covers an 18-year period, divided into three phases of six years each. The strategy acknowledges the fact that the dividing lines between the phases are not clearly delineated, but are drafted for the purpose of presenting the strategy. According to the force employment strategy, the 'support to the people' objective is the most important objective for the first phase.

The 'promote regional security' objective is, however, also important and is expected to replace the 'support to the people' objective as a priority over time. Currently no immediate threat is identified, thus the low priority of 'defence against aggression'. If regional security can be promoted successfully all three objectives will merge over time (see Figure 1).

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

The strategy makes provision for a Stage 1 where the force levels allocated to co-operate with the SAPS will remain constant to a point in time, after which they will decrease progressively or decrease as a result of a growing requirement to promote regional security. The SANDF will utilise SANDF force design capabilities and commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) type of equipment to reduce the running costs of the support provided. As the internal situation becomes the SAPS sole responsibility, the SANDF role will change from intensive

deployments to a form of interactive missions utilising reaction forces to stabilise the situation and so prevent specific illegal cross-border movement and the plundering of economic resources. The strategy also states that a multi-national approach needs to be followed to deal with illegal border crossings. This means that as of now, and even more so in future, the SANDF must in co-operation with the SAPS involve the security forces of neighbouring countries to jointly combat illegal cross-border activities. The SANDF internal role changes will not affect its commitment to support other government departments, in particular the utilisation of the SANDF planning capability during crises. The level of involvement will be determined by the concept of selective engagement. It is therefore important that permanent co-ordinating mechanisms at all levels are maintained, staffed and improved to ensure good co-operation between government departments.

4.2 Military strategic end-state

The strategy also developed a new military strategic end-state for withdrawal from the internal situation that is summarised as follows:

--The internal situation is under control, which does not necessarily imply that the crime situation has reached the desired level, but rather that the SAPS can control it on their own.

--Appropriate technology and intelligence-driven operations to allow for effective utilisation of resources to prevent:

--illegal cross-border movement;

--trans-national crime; and

--the plundering of resources.

--The SANDF's inherent capabilities are utilised to assist other government departments at their request and cost.

4.3 Future SANDF co-operation with the SAPS in the future

The SANDF will scale down regular force deployments along the borderline over the next six years. The process of handing it over will be planned and step-by-step, as each party declares its ability to transfer and to take over an area. The SANDF will always be available to be of assistance to the SAPS or indeed other government departments under certain defined circumstances.

The SANDF will also progressively exit from the rural safeguarding environment. It will still continue to assist the SAPS when requested, but these deployments will be to stabilise volatile areas and will be high-density intelligence-driven operations of short duration.

The safeguarding of major events such as international conferences, visits of foreign dignatories, and international sporting events will, however, be managed at the cost of those who request it.

5. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the main driver of the SANDF's strategy to scale down internal deployments over the next six years is the need to support the Government's regional peace initiatives. The effect of this on the SAPS and other departments is recognised, but the SANDF does not have the resources to simultaneously operate both internally and externally at the level of commitment required by the Government. The SANDF will, however, remain involved in internal operations for as long as the SAPS is unable to operate without SANDF support or resources. The SANDF will indefinitely remain on standby to be of assistance to any department as is required by the Constitution, given that certain defined criteria have been met. The use of the naval and air resources of the SANDF by other government departments will, however, continue as long as necessary as an essential cost-saving measure.

BAC EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW OCTOBER 2003

Business Against Crime South Africa

PREFACE

The major initiatives and achievements of Business Against Crime (BAC) are described in some detail in this document ... (that also includes) a number of recent highlights ... extracted to serve as a quick reference.

Firstly, BAC has appointed a new Chief Executive Officer ... who will build on past achievements whilst looking towards a greater realignment with all stakeholders to ensure a future and continued relevance. It is important for BAC to maximise its impact within government beyond the current set of projects and to maintain the ongoing support of business, and especially to secure support from the black business sector.

The Partnership with government continues to grow in its acceptance, influence and international recognition as a unique and effective approach to addressing crime combating strategies.

The projects continue to achieve in excess of expectation, some however are long-term interventions that do not deliver immediately measurable results, nevertheless their achievements continue to be recognised. A few of the most recent highlights are listed below:

--The Criminal Justice Strengthening Programme has successfully completed its extended pilot on the restructuring of the manner in which courts are organised and managed and will be rolling out its Professional Court Management Model throughout KwaZuluNatal and Gauteng during the remainder of this year.

--The Organised Crime Programme, focusing on Vehicle Crime, has effectively brought the fraudulent re-registration of stolen vehicles under control, significantly improved the control of border posts and

has been instrumental in the establishment of a special anti-hijack task team by the South African Police Service (SAPS) that has significantly reduced hijackings in Gauteng over the past three months.

--A special unit has been established to accelerate the investigation, prosecution and conviction of bank and CIT robbers. In the past two months more than 50 cases have already been prepared for trial, many of which would most likely never have been tried. Through the co-ordinated participation of all parties a greater number of robbery attempts have also been foiled.

--The new Specialised Commercial Court Centre in Johannesburg hasl increased conviction rates three-fold and the number of cases completed by ten-fold, rapidly moving towards the improvements recorded by the Pretoria Pilot initiative. This is soon to be followed by establishments in Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town.

--The Case Row Management system of the IJS programme has effectively implemented its performance measurement systems, which has already been rolled out to over 40 major courts, and is now able to recognise and reward the achievement of top performing courts and also, and more importantly, to identify under-performers and devise corrective action.

--The Victim Support Programme through which victims of crime are counselled both for trauma and in judicial rights and processes has

expanded the number of counselling centres to 157 from which some 80 000 victims are assisted annually.

1. INTRODUCTION

This document provides an executive overview of the activities that Business Against Crime (BAC) is engaged in, and progress made in this business-driven initiative that is managing the implementation of measures, in partnership with government, to improve the effectiveness of the criminal justice and crime combating process.

It is appropriate to review the origin and objectives of BAC in order to place the activities and achievements in context.

2. BAC OVERVIEW

Business Against Crime was established as a non-profit organisation, initially funded by its Founding Sponsors, in response to President Mandela's request in 1996 "for the private sector to partner the government in combating crime and the causes of crime".

Subsequent to this BAC companies were registered in each major province, all of which focus on a common goal and provide implementation capacity for the provincial roll-out of national priority initiatives.

The role that BAC fulfils on behalf of South African Business is to:

--Influence crime combating strategy, policy and priorities.

--Transfer business skills to government without creating a dependency.

--Show that business is visibly committed by creating a channel for business involvement.

--Develop and maintain the public/private partnership, to shape a mutually agreed vision and to drive working solutions that achieve project goals.

BAC therefore supports the government as catalyst, facilitator, consultant, project manager and capacity builder.

BAC's activities, in the role it plays, are funded entirely by private sector sponsorships and donations whereas the capital and operational cost of the criminal justice service is funded by the government.

BAC is therefore not an alternative source of Government funding, nor is it a lobby group and will not act on behalf of the Government.

3. HOW BAC OPERATES

BAC operates at strategic and project implementation levels and

interacts with government on ministerial and departmental level within the 'justice cluster'. BAC does not take over the responsibilities of government but rather provides additional skill and focus to drive solutions successfully.

The BAC approach is therefore by means of clearly defined strategies and projects that provide solutions to high priority crime combating initiatives. The key projects, achievements to date and future activity objectives, are summarised in this document. It is worth noting that significant successes have been achieved in all areas of BAC supported activity.

4. THE BAC APPROACH

The priorities for improvement in the delivery of the criminal justice service have been set and are being addressed by the government with BAC's assistance as described below.

Diagram 1 describes the focus of BAC's activity:

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

There are six core project areas in which BAC is presently engaged, which are:

--An Integrated Justice System.

--Commercial Crime and Fraud.

--Organised Crime--syndicated crimes.

--CCTV--Surveillance Systems.

--Service Delivery Improvement at police stations.

--Tiisa Thuto--conflict resolution and crime prevention in schools.

5. FUNDING OF BAC ACTIVITY

BAC, originally funded by its founding sponsors, extended its source of funding to the broader based business sector to meet the funding requirements of the scope of the initiatives listed above. Not only do these contributions, which are in cash and in kind (business skills), provide the much needed funding that enables BAC to positively bring about change, but they are also an indicator of the commitment of business to support the change process.

Current contributors fall into four categories:

--Founding sponsors and patrons, who provide core funding of BAC activity in the range from R350 000 to R1 000 000 per annum over a three to five year period.

--Major sponsors, who have committed in excess of R150 000 as a single or an annual payment

--Sponsors and donors, who commit less than R150 000 as a single or an annual payment. Payments are often made as a monthly contribution

--Partners, who contribute an initial fee of R25 000 and ongoing maintenance support to BAC's SPPS Programme (Support Partnership Police Station).

Funds are designated, at the sponsor's request, towards a specific project or to the BAC initiative in general, where BAC directs the funds in terms of specific, strategic or project needs.

BAC is fiercely results-oriented and sharply focused on adding value, and is committed to providing regular progress reports in terms of general and project achievements.

Sponsorship benefits, over and above participation in BAC public activities include:

--Tax deductibility of contributions.

--Appropriate recognition and visibility in BAC's marketing and communications programme and various crime prevention and information-sharing initiatives.

--Presentations of analysed and evaluated current data.

6. OVERVIEW OF PROJECTS

6.1 Integrated Justice System (IJS)

The goal of the IJS is the transformation of the current Justice System into a modern, efficient, effective and integrated process to deliver swift justice through improved business processes supported by a modern technology infrastructure across all criminal justice programmes.

The Programme will ensure that criminals are effectively managed through the process of investigation, prosecution and incarceration and that state resources are optimised and effective.

Special Achievements

To date, pilot implementations have produced benefits such as:

--96 infrastructural/process improvements have already been implemented.

--IJS Court Centres--the implementation of court centres with reengineered procedures have brought about several performance improvements, including:

--the average time taken to prepare a case for trial has been

reduced by 40 per cent; and

--an improvement in cases disposed of by up to 124 per cent at one court, with the national average showing a steady increase at 58 per cent over the last 18 months.

--The Awaiting Trial Prisoner Project in Port Elizabeth--has reduced detention cycle times by 28 per cent from 122 to 87 days, thereby reducing costs by R8 million and relieving the overpopulation problem in our jails. Indirect annualised savings amount to R110 million.

--The disappearance of police dockets in Court Centres has reduced from an average of 27 per month to NIL.

--The Criminal Record System--the availability of criminal records improved in phase one from 97 to 35 day. Now with the AFIS (Automated Fingerprinting Information System) this has been further reduced to seven days.

Key future activities include the development and implementation of the technology infrastructure, the business information system, the integrated case management system and the further restructuring of courts to improve workflow efficiency.

6.2 0rganised Crime

The Organised Crime Portfolio focuses on large scale syndicated crimes with the major focus on vehicle theft and hijackings as well as copper cable and cellular telephone theft.

The approach is to remove the commercial benefit from trading in stolen vehicles and vehicle parts by preventing the illegal re-registration or export of whole vehicles and the trade in second hand parts originating from stolen vehicles.

This is being done by improving processes and information, by uplifting skills and management, by countering corruption, by closing down illegal operations and by ensuring that cases are properly investigated and perpetrators effectively punished.

Special Achievements

--The rooting out of fraud and corruption and improving service delivery at motor vehicle registration offices. Implemented at 30 registration offices in Gauteng, it is currently also operational in selected offices in Mpumalanga, North West and Eastern Cape. The so-called best practice model (BPM) is aimed at reducing the illegal registration of an estimated 55 000 stolen/hijacked vehicles per year.

--To date over 200 cases of suspected fraud have been reported, with several internal disciplinary actions brought about.

--Service levels have also improved, and at the main Loveday Street registration office queue times have been reduced from three hours to under a half hour.

--The various vehicle information data bases have been linked to facilitate information sharing.

--Several vehicle recovery operations have been initiated, co-ordinated and executed, involving various responsible departments, in which over 100 criminal cases have been opened and 80 stolen vehicles and 23 000 parts recovered in operations on vehicle 'chop shops'.

--The increased vehicle identity verification programme by Border Police had by the end of 2002, achieved successes in the seizure of approximately 2 800 stolen vehicles at border posts, with a value in excess of R220 million.

--A national roll-out programme will follow.

Key future activities include a Justice right-sizing initiative to improve service delivery of the Department of Justice, a project to reduce crime in the retail sector and a narcotics initiative.

6.3 Commercial Crime

The Commercial Crime project has created an environment for the successful, effective and efficient investigation, prosecution and adjudication of fraud and corruption which causes 30 per cent of all business failures, consumes 3-5 per cent of turnover, affects 86 per cent of South African business and costs the country upward of R40 billion per annum.

The project focuses on commercial specialisation, the principle of prosecution-led investigation, workflow and productivity management systems and controls and the development of professional skills through training and mentorship programmes.

Special Achievements

--The initiative has produced excellent results at the Commercial Crime Court in Pretoria.

--The number of convictions has increased from 15 per annum to 16 per month--a 1 200 per cent increase.

--A 92 per cent conviction rate.

--45 per cent of cases are finalised within one year compared with three to five years previously.

--Court utilisation has improved, exceeding the national average by

22 per cent, and backlogs are down.

--Appropriate sentences are being passed--with 33 per cent of the convicted being jailed without the option of a fine.

--Early achievements at the recently opened Johannesburg Commercial Crime Court show a 100 per cent conviction rate during their first quarter of operation.

--The major successes of the programme for prosecution by private counsel, both in respect of successful prosecution and the transfer of knowledge and capacity building of state advocates.

Key future activities include the continuance of the mentorship and skills development programme for prosecutors and investigators, the handover of the workflow and productivity management systems as well as the technology implementation for the management of documentary evidence.

Plans are already in place for the opening of Specialised Commercial Crime courts in Durban, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth by the end of 2003.

6.4 CCTV Surveillance

The Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Surveillance Project designs,

implements and manages international-standard surveillance systems in partnership with the SAPS, metropolitan councils and other law enforcement agencies in major urban centres where street crime is prevalent and law enforcement officers on the street have declined.

The core focus is the effective installation and operation of infrastructure, procedures, management and skills development.

Special Achievements

--Surveillance Units have been established in Cape Town and Johannesburg.

--ISO 9002 accreditation has been awarded for the documented procedures as validated against the Johannesburg installation.

--The results have seen a decline of 80 per cent in street crime in areas covered in the Cape Town CBD with an equivalent improvement being recorded in Johannesburg in the first year.

--Responses of SAPS reaction units to the crime scene are now less than one minute.

--Video footage of crimes has been accepted as prima facie evidence in court.

--The many successful sightings of criminal activity that have

resulted in the arrest and conviction of the perpetrators.

Key future activities include the extension of Surveillance Technology implementations to other major centres in Gauteng and other provinces.

6.5 Service Delivery Improvement in Police Stations

The objective of the Support Partnership for Police Station Programme (SPPS) is to support one of the SAPS' four strategic priorities of service delivery improvement by bringing business expertise and resources in a planned, measurable and sustainable way to a police station with the objective of capacitating its members thereby enabling them to render an improved service to the communities they serve.

The SPPS brings a business to partner with a police station for the benefit of the community represented in the partnership by the Community Police Forum, the process being initiated, facilitated, guided, monitored and evaluated by Business Against Crime.

Based on the model below (Figure 2) the programme focuses and evaluates the partnerships on addressing and achieving a set of criteria that would most impact on the service received in the areas of a police station most utilised by the community.

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

Special Achievements

--The programme has inducted 49 partnerships in Gauteng since 1998.

--The programme commenced in Mpumalanga during 2002 and to date 15 partnerships have been inducted in that province.

--Eight Community Service Centres (formerly Charge Office) have been renovated.

--Three training rooms have been equipped.

--10 Victim Support facilities have been equipped.

--13 stations have had training in telephone skills.

--A variety of other interventions such as computer literacy, Powerpoint presentation skills, driver training, absenteeism reduction, workshops with prosecutors, have taken place in different stations.

Key future activities include:

--Focussing all partnerships simultaneously on the same set of service delivery improvement criteria during 2003.

--The introduction of an evaluation process during 2003.

--Extending the programme to all 121 police stations in Gauteng.

6.6 Victim Support Programme

The Victim Support Programme run by the SAPS in conjunction with Business Against Crime has steadily expanded since its inception four years ago. Until recently victims of crime and violence had neither recognised rights nor adequate recourse to the criminal justice process.

Recognising this, government launched the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) Victim Empowerment Programme. This provided a link for the first time between the work of departments such as the SAPS, Social Development, Health, Justice and Correctional Services in partnership with non-governmental and community based organisations.

Victims of crime and violence suffer emotional trauma, which often results in psychological and physical symptoms. Volunteers are trained to provide support through the criminal justice process--from the time of the initial reporting of the crime at the station to the closing of the case, which includes:

--basic practical and emotional support;

--to recognise post-traumatic stress symptoms; and

--to refer traumatised victims (who may require professional counselling)

to appropriate services providers in the community.

Special Achievements

--The original Victim Support Programme has been improved, internationally benchmarked and reprinted. 2 500 Volunteers have been recruited and trained to work in 120 operating centres that today manage more than 5 000 cases of victimisation monthly.

--Over 1 000 participants have been exposed to the Partnership programme and experience gained is being used in the further development of the programme. A performance measurement system is in the progress.

Future Activities

The programmes currently running in Gauteng, Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape, will be rolled out nationally over the next 12 months.

6.7 Tiisa Thuto

Tiisa Thuto meaning, 'We Strengthen Education' has as its main objective the development of a positive morality, improved

interpersonal relationships and a reduction in the levels of crime at schools so that teaching and learning can take place more effectively.

This is achieved by working with learners, educators, parents and the local police towards nonviolent methods of conflict resolution and problem solving.

The project was introduced in 44 schools (four communities) in Soweto and has produced not only a significant improvement in individual educational achievements but also a reduction in crime, improvement in moral standards and the more effective operation of communities in general.

Special Achievements

The project has been independently audited and the following achieve highlights recorded:

--Pass rates are up in Thiisa Thuto schools by an average of 78 per cent on 1999, with 100 per cent being reported in some schools.

--There has been a 70 per cent increase in attendance at school initiated activity.

--Communication between teachers and parents has risen from 0 per cent to 28 per cent.

--Home discipline has improved.

--Teachers and School Governing Bodies have tackled as much as 87 per cent of crime-related issues.

--Acts of aggression and violence are down by 72 per cent.

As a result of these achievements the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has endorsed the programme by adopting the model as the standard to be rolled out nationwide.

Key future activities

The rollout phase is currently under way and has reached the following areas:

--Gauteng: 312 schools in Tshwane, Katlorus (East Rand), Alexandra and Orange Farm.

--Limpopo: 162 schools in all 30 districts.

--Free State: 12 schools in Villiers, Frankfort and Steynsrus.

--The Western Cape, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu Natal are to be implemented in 2003.

6.8 Criminal Justice Strengthening Programme (CJSP)

The Criminal Justice Strengthening Programme is a strategic partnership initiative, managed by BAC and funded by USAID, aimed at supporting and strengthening the capacities of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development's (DOJCD) core business function (that is Prosecution, Court Services and Adjudication) as well as their support services (for example financial operations, the Justice College) and the related strategic alliances (that is SAPS, DCS, DSD), in order to provide all South Africans more effective and accessible justice whilst maintaining citizen confidence in democratic governance.

The CJSP is made up of four sub-programmes.

Court Services

--The Decentralised Court Support Services Project focuses on the development and implementation of an organisational structure for the effective management of shared services and non-shared (core) functions to get cases to flow and be adjudicated timeously.

--The Integrated Case Flow Management System will develop a business process to streamline and integrate all relevant aspects of a case as it moves through the value chain.

SOCA (Sexual Offences and Community Affairs) Programme includes:

--Awareness Campaigns to make women and children aware of their basic human rights.

--Case Managers to fast track the case flow through the system.

--Victim Assistance Programme to help strengthen the capacities of victims.

--The development of a Sexual Offences Training Guide.

--The development of a Domestic Violence Training Guide.

--Management Development Programme to teach strategic management, leadership and project management in the SOCA environment.

Justice College

--Tutor Training Project aimed at providing basic skills and to broaden the perspectives and widen the horizons of the prosecutors and magistrates in previously disadvantaged areas.

Outsourcing of Trust Fund Management

--Outsourcing to organisations better geared to dealing with the receipt and payment of high volumes of cash.

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECURITY IN THE RSA: COMPETITION OR CO-OPERATION?*

Prof Mike Hough

Director: Institute for Strategic Studies

University of Pretoria

1. INTRODUCTION

Various factors have led to the phenomenal growth of the private security industry in South Africa. The increase in crime, as well as perceptions and realities regarding the efficient functioning of the South African Police Service (SAPS), and metro policing, are among the main factors in this regard. More recently, attention has been focused on improving the regulation of the private security industry, and increasingly appeals are made for closer co-operation between the SAPS and private security. It remains to be seen whether increased efficiency on the part of the SAPS or the introduction of metro policing in cities where this does not yet exist, will diminish the need for private security.

In this article, an overview of the private security sector in South Africa and the kinds of services rendered, is given; followed by selected official South African views on private security and current

initiatives to regulate the industry. This is followed by an assessment of the current as well as potential role that private security could play in combating crime.

2. INDIVIDUAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Increased emphasis on the concept of 'human security', and at times even equating it to national security, has meant that crime has been recognised as one of the obvious threats to human security.

However, it is often, from a human security and/or a national security point of view, not combated effectively.

The two basic components of human security are freedom from fear and freedom from want. Threats to human security are listed as being threats to the following areas (although they tend to overlap), namely economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security.

Each of these are seen to require certain conditions, such as a basic income, and physical and economic access to basic food. (1))

Part of the problem regarding an excessive focus on human security is its affordability to the state. Has the threat to individual security reached the stage where it has already, or may soon, become a threat to national security? To what extent does the state have a definite legal obligation to provide aspects of human security; and what is the distinction between the causes, potential causes or potential

manifestations of threats to national security and the actual manifestations of these threats? These are often confused.

Threats to human security, such as poverty, could therefore exist without this necessarily manifesting (or even potentially manifesting) as a threat to national security. It has been argued that only if a certain condition or situation leads to violence, unacceptable conflict or state instability, or has the clear potential to do so (including existing indications to this effect), could it possibly be viewed as a national security threat. In this regard, threats to law and order are not necessarily threats to national security, nor is normal national or international competition. The intensity, extent and consequences of for instance violent crime, will determine in a given situation whether it is a threat to individual security and law and order, or also a threat to national security. It has of course also been said that a threat is a threat to national security when a government says it is. This is, however, insufficient, as governments often list priorities for the sake of political expediency, or under- or over-emphasise certain threats.

Threats or potential threats from the same source, for example the environment, may pose a threat to individual security only, or to individual and national (and possibly also global) security.

In the Third World context specifically, it has been argued that threats to national security must ultimately have a political dimension.

(2)) Although the concept of "security software" is especially important in the Third World context, over-emphasis of this dimension

could lead to utopian thinking, particularly when divorced from national security.

Despite the difficulty of finding a universally acceptable definition of human security and its link with national security, the Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA--July 2002) stipulates that by 2005, a framework for codifying the concept of human security into national laws as contained in the CSSDCA Solemn Declaration, should be established.

(3))

As far as the latter is concerned, it is inter alia stated that: (4))

(b)The concept of security must embrace all aspects of society including economic, political and social and environmental dimensions of the individual, family, and community, local and national life. The security of a nation must be based on the security of the life of the individual citizens to live in peace and to satisfy basic needs while being able to participate fully in societal affairs and enjoying freedom and fundamental human rights.

The above does not specifically refer to the concept national security (although it refers to stability), and obviously takes a wide view of security with the emphasis on human security.

Definitions of 'human security' (although the concept has obvious merits), have been criticised for often being too vague and wide, and that virtually any type of threat or even discomfort, could constitute a threat to human security. It also does not help decision-makers in deciding on the allocation of scarce resources among competing goals if no hierarchy of security objectives is established.

"After all, not everything can be a matter of national security with all of the urgency that this term implies". (5))

An over-emphasis of human security can also create false priorities and a false sense of hope, as well as false assumptions, as the alleviation of human insecurity does not necessarily mean greater peace and security. (6)) Many 'human security' issues are in fact service delivery issues, some at local level.

Human insecurity is often at least partially the result of bad governance or an emphasis on regime security instead of national security. Buzan also pertinently states that national and international security cannot be reduced to individual security. The pursuit of individual security may also lead to conflict with the state, and individual security may be affected both positively and negatively by the state. (7))

Although all threats to human security are not automatically threats to national security, crime for instance is often not sufficiently viewed as a threat to human security, or in some instances

to both human and national security. In the case of South Africa, it could be argued that crime is a serious threat to both individual security and to national security. Recognising this as such is, however, only a first step, as an unacceptable gap often exists between policy and effective implementation.

It is therefore clear that while countering all threats to individual security lies beyond the capacity of the state, despite undertakings contained in the Bills of Human Rights, certain basic state functions and responsibilities do exist. One of the prime functions in this regard is to provide an acceptable level of national and individual security. Whether due to a lack of resources on the part of the state; a lack of political will; inefficient service provision; increasing crime levels; or a need for added security, those that can afford it have increasingly been making use of private security, also in South Africa.

3. THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA: EXTENT AND ROLE

Private security has been described as "those efforts by individuals and organisations to protect their assets from loss, harm or reduction in value, due to criminality". (8)) In this regard, the protection of assets in the business, commerce and industry environment is the basic function of private security. These assets may include people, fixed and immovable property, business rights, information, contracts, etc. Private security though, also plays a role in the protection of private individuals and their property on a client basis.

The above functions are performed by managing the potential or actual losses incurred by, or resulting from crime. Crime prevention, also in the form of deterrence, as well as investigations, may constitute part of the function.

The Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 2001 (Act No 56 of 2001) provides an extensive list of services qualifying as security services. The Act defines security services as meaning one or more of the following services or activities:

(a) Protecting or safeguarding a person or property in any manner;

(b) giving advice on the protection or safeguarding of a person or property, or on any other type of security service as defined in this section, or on the use of security equipment;

(c) providing a reactive or response service in connection with the safeguarding of a person or property in any manner;

(d) providing a service aimed at ensuring order and safety on the premises used for sporting, recreational, entertainment or similar purposes;

(e) manufacturing, importing, distributing or advertising of monitoring devices contemplated in section 1 of the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act, 1992 (Act No. 127 of 1992);

(f) performing the functions of a private investigator;

(g) providing security training or instruction to a security service provider or prospective security service provider;

(h) installing, servicing or repairing security equipment;

(i) monitoring signals or transmissions from electronic security equipment;

(j) performing the functions of a locksmith;

(k) making a person or the services of a person available, whether directly or indirectly, for the rendering of any service referred to in paragraphs (a) to (j) and (l), to another person;

(l) managing, controlling or supervising the rendering of any of the services referred to in paragraphs (a) to (l);

(m) creating the impression, in any manner, that one or more of the services referred to in paragraphs (a) to (l) are rendered. (9))

A security service provider is defined as "a person who renders a security service to another for a remuneration, reward, fee or benefit and includes such a person who is not registered as required in terms of this Act". It has to be noted that in terms of the Act,

all in-house security officers are also obliged to register as well as, for example, private investigators. (10))

A broad distinction can be made between contract security and in-house security as far as the private security industry in South Africa is concerned. Three types of services are basically provided, namely a guarding service, an armed response service, and cash-in-transit operations. (11))

Larger organisations may have in-house security, which refers to a security department, protection department or risk management structure within the organisation itself. Contract security may be combined with inhouse security, with each performing specific functions. Some mining houses, local authorities and financial institutions, for instance, make use of in-house security. The trend, however, is to outsource guarding services specifically to contract security. (12))

In addition to being providers of certain services, the private security industry also provides a range of electronic and other security equipment such as intrusion detection equipment, vehicle security systems and access control systems. Finally, private investigations and industrial espionage and counter-espionage are also functions provided by certain individuals or companies in the private security sector.

(13))

By August 2003, the private security industry had 250 852 active

security officers, and 4 271 registered security businesses. The industry has been growing at a rate of 12,5 per cent per annum over the last five years, and was estimated to have an annual turnover of R13 billion by 2003. Foreign investment in the industry is estimated to be more than R3 billion. (14)) A wide variety of services are rendered, and the categories of services registered with the Regulatory Authority are indicated in the table below. A security business may render any number of these services.

The ratio of active private security personnel to uniformed police officers in South Africa is approximately 2,5:1. (15)) This is based on a total number of uniformed police of 101 022 by October 2002. (16))

4. SELECTED OFFICIAL SOUTH AFRICAN VIEWS REGARDING THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY

Before discussing the contribution of South Africa's private security industry to the prevention and combating of crime, and the possibility of closer co-operation with the SAPS, some official views on the private security industry first need to be considered. It is clear that the South African authorities have, for various reasons since 1994, tended to harbour some reservations about private security.

During 1995, although crediting private security with the role played at for instance a number of public buildings and airports following the privatisation of security, the then Deputy Minister of

Intelligence Services, Joe Nhlanhla, stated the following: (17))

Concern, however, is expressed over allegations against a number of private companies, particularly in strife-torn areas, suspected of being involved in criminal and unconstitutional activities.

Government is also concerned about the training of units, hit squads and private armies that are involved in the massacre of people.

It is the legitimate right of companies to train bodyguards and installation guards.... But, there is the perception that third force elements see the private security industry as a haven from where to continue their third force activities of destabilisation.

It does seem that some private security firms are being used as cover for arms trade, rhino-horn smuggling, drug trafficking and illicit diamond dealings both in South Africa and beyond international borders. Industrial espionage seems to be a new area of interest.

Some reservations regarding the role of certain "private security and intelligence companies" were also expressed by the South African Coordinator for Intelligence, Linda Mti, during 1997. He stated that: (18))

Some of the greatest concerns that exist in respect of private security and intelligence companies revolve around the following issues:

--the weaponry they have in their possession;

--their historical links with the previous regime's security services;

--the involvement of anti-government elements who are using the infrastructure of the industry to train, equip, channel and manage anti-constitutional and criminal activities;

--the connections some of the actors in the private security companies have with foreign intelligence services and the similarity of objectives informed by their past co-operation in the Cold War era, ... which makes them free agents to be exploited for espionage activities; and

--their mercenary-type role in foreign affairs.

From an intelligence perspective, which is not driven by profit or commercial interest, these activities bring the entire private security industry into disrepute. While that is the case, it is known that many of the companies and individuals involved in the industry are patriots.

They can be relied upon when it comes to the defence of South Africa's national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thus they are intent on cleaning up the industry. In co-operation with private companies, including private security companies, these patriots form a crucial building block in the campaign of waging war against crime.

Mti made some distinction between what he called private security companies and private intelligence companies, and pointed out that no legal provision is made for the latter, although the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act, 1992 (Act No 127 of 1992) is relevant in this regard. His concern over private intelligence was expressed as follows: (19))

In order to remain competitive, most successful business ventures have established and operate their own intelligence capabilities to identify opportunities and to protect their production processes and technologies. Their existence is understood, not condoned.

What is objectionable is the development of covert collection capabilities by private intelligence companies, and their use of these capabilities in total disregard of the Constitution and other legislation. This is cause for concern.

The General Intelligence Law Amendment Act, 2000 (Act No 66 of 2000) also places restrictions on the employment of members of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) or the South African Secret Service (SASS) in the private security industry for a period of three years after leaving the Agency or the Service unless a clearance certificate is provided by the Director-General. (20))

During 2000, official concern over the role of some private security companies was again expressed. The Director-General of NIA stated that quite a few of these companies are "intelligence

companies", parading as research or investigation institutions. The Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) was investigating ways to exercise some or other form of control over these companies. (21))

In a subsequent development the Chairperson of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Safety and Security spoke out strongly against foreign involvement in the private security industry in South Africa. It was reported that during 2000 alone, foreign companies had invested more than R1,7 billion in buying security companies in South Africa. The 11 September 2001 terror attacks in the United States (US) seemed to have played a major role in the South African government's view on foreign ownership of private security in South Africa. (22)) In the Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 2001, the requirements for registration subsequently included that only citizens or permanent residents of South Africa may apply for registration as security service providers. (23)) The same applies to a security business. Foreign investment in such a company remains admissible.

5. REGULATING THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA

The Security Officers" Act, 1987 (Act No 92 of 1987) created a now defunct statutory body, the Security Officers' Board, to exercise control over the occupation of security officers, and also provided for the compulsory registration of all contract security officers with the Board. The Board could take such steps as were necessary to maintain standards and regulate practices for security

officers. It also took measures deemed expedient or necessary in connection with the training of security officers, the determination of the standards of such training, and the promotion of the maintenance of those standards. (24))

Regulations were promulgated in 1992 relating to the training of security officers, the levels of training and content of courses being determined by the Board. Following training, security officers are graded from A (highest) to E (lowest). A security service may not be rendered by an employee of a private security firm unless the employee is in possession of a training certificate issued by the Board. (25))

The Security Officers' Amendment Act, 1997 (Act No 104 of 1997) replaced the Security Officers' Board with a Security Officers' Interim Board, which continued the functions of the previous Board. In addition, it advised the Minister of Safety and Security on the establishment of a restructured permanent board. (26))

During 2001, the Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 2001 was adopted by Parliament, and signed by the President in January 2002, replacing most of the provisions of the Security Officers" Act, 1987. The aims of the Security Industry Regulatory Authority established in terms of the new legislation, are as follows: (27))

3. The primary objects of the Authority are to regulate the security industry and to exercise effective control over the practice of

the occupation of security service provider in the public and national interest and the interest of the security industry itself, and for that purpose, subject to this Act, to--

(a) promote a legitimate security industry which acts in terms of the principles contained in the Constitution and other applicable law;

(b) ensure that all security service providers act in the public and national interest in the rendering of security services;

(c) promote a security industry which is characterised by professionalism, transparency, accountability, equity and accessibility;

(d) promote stability of the private security industry;

(e) promote and encourage trustworthiness of security service providers;

(f) determine and enforce minimum standards of occupational conduct in respect of security service providers;

(g) encourage and promote efficiency in and responsibility with regard to the rendering of security services;

(h) promote, maintain and protect the status and interests of the occupation of security service provider;

(i) ensure that the process of registration of security service providers is transparent, fair, objective and concluded timeously;

(j) promote high standards in the training of security service providers and prospective security service providers;

(k) encourage ownership and control of security businesses by persons historically disadvantaged through unfair discrimination;

(l) encourage equal opportunity employment practices in the security industry;

(m) promote the protection and enforcement of the rights of security officers and other employees in the private security industry;

(n) ensure that compliance with existing legislation by security service providers is being promoted and controlled through a process of active monitoring and investigation of the affairs of security service providers;

(o) protect the interests of the users of security services;

(p) promote the development of security services which are responsive to the needs of users of such services and of the community;

(q) promote the empowerment and advancement of persons who were

historically disadvantaged through unfair discrimination in the private security industry.

Furthermore, Section 28 of the Act provides for a legally binding code of conduct for security service providers. (28)) It should also be noted that under the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No 51 of 1977), security officers enjoy the same powers of arrest as ordinary citizens (29)) (unless they are contracted to perform duties at national key points).

6. THE CURRENT AND POTENTIAL ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY IN COMBATING CRIME

6.1 Current role

The current role of the private security industry in South Africa as far as the combating of crime is concerned, is linked to the reasons for the growth of the industry and the advantages of private security compared with official policing. It should, however, be borne in mind that private security is not intended to replace official policing.

(30))

--While the police service has to operate under public service regulations, private security is more flexible as it can be more readily adjusted to changing consumer demands.

--Public perceptions of police inefficiency and slow response times have translated into an increased demand for private security.

--Private security has become more visible than the police currently, and in this sense a pro-active deterrent role regarding the combating of crime is fulfilled. It is also specifically focused on protecting a specific victim. Official policing has increasingly tended to become reactive.

--The huge market for industrial, commercial and residential security in South Africa, means that the police cannot meet the demands due to its limited resources, and are for instance incapable of producing visible security on a 24-hour basis in most instances.

--Access control and the development of mass private property such as large shopping centres, have generated an increased need for security which the police mostly cannot provide.

--The private security industry is a provider of security systems such as burglar alarms and closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV), with the latter being seen as increasingly important in combating crime.

--Increasingly, insurance companies are insisting on private security measures such as links with armed response.

Some private security companies claim that in their areas of

operation, crime has been reduced to between 75 per cent and 90 per cent. (31))

6.2 Potential role

It has been stated that the distinction between public and private policing has already become blurred since armed response services rendered by private security companies already imply performing some traditional police duties. The same applies to the patrolling of certain streets by private security officers. Functions such as eviction and the policing of illegal strikes have also involved private security. (32))

Although the extension of the powers of private security has received considerable attention, it is stressed that the primary role of private security is to serve a specific client for profit. Assisting more actively in combating crime in general would therefore be a secondary role, The Security Officers' Board nevertheless submitted a policy paper to Government inter alia requesting peace officer status for certain categories of private security guards. This would include full powers of arrest, search and seizure. (33))

Although no formal co-operation agreement exists between the SAPS and the private security industry, it has been reported that the SAPS views the provision of crime intelligence and information, as well as a visible presence by private security, as important factors in combating crime. On local level, some informal co-operation does exist, for

example in various Cape Town suburbs. (34)) An indication has been given that the SAPS Commissioner would meet with representatives of the Regulatory Authority to discuss formal co-operation, but this does not seem to have materialised yet.

A number of other potential roles have also been suggested by academics and analysts. These include the following: (35))

--Forensic investigations, such as the photographing of crime scenes on behalf of the SAPS.

--Criminal investigations which are already being carried out by private security (for example regarding commercial crime) could be expanded to include crimes where specialised detection skills are required and where this is available in the private sector.

--Transporting prisoners.

--Guards for state-owned premises and for individual state officials still guarded by the SAPS.

--Increased responsibility for security at private functions such as sport events.

--Aspects of police officer training.

--Court-orderly duties.

Some other potential functions have also been suggested such as certain justice and prison-related activities, but the point is that where some of these functions are out-sourced, these need not necessarily be to private security companies.

7. PROBLEMATIC ISSUES

A number of problematic issues, however, surround the idea of an expanded role for private security, Firstly, the issue of cost.

Taxpayers may well argue that they are entitled to better policing.

Forcing the public (and only some can afford it) to rely increasingly on private security, could be viewed as a dereliction of government responsibilities. In this regard the following has been remarked: "Meanwhile, at the beginning of the year most monitoring and armed reaction companies raised their fees quite steeply--in some cases as much as 25 per cent. This is way ahead of the inflation rate and is quite alarming.... Far from being a boon, security is becoming a problem in that its cost is constantly increasing". (36)) Recent mergers in the security industry could strengthen the trend towards monopolies and higher costs. It is estimated that the number of major operators could decrease from 12 in 2001 to about five in 2005. (37))

Secondly, it has been stated that "private security companies police for profit and are accountable to their clients. Extending the

power of private security guards will effectively give those who employ these guards, powers and rights the general public will not have".

(38))

Thirdly, while the police are accountable to various levels of government and the electorate, private security companies are primarily accountable to their clients and shareholders. (39))

Fourthly, the fact that the deterrence of crime is enhanced by the arrest and punishment of criminals, in which the police play a major role, is contrasted with the fact that although visible private security also has a deterrent effect, the main objective of the latter is reduction of the risk of crime and loss. Furthermore the increased establishment of "enclaves" protected by private security could merely lead to crime relocating to other areas that are not protected in this manner. (40))

Other issues that are mentioned (also in the context of the current role of private security) include the following: (41))

--Overburdening of the police who respond to false alarms that are not linked to reaction and do not always meet acceptable security equipment standards.

--Training standards which, although regulated by the security industry, are sometimes viewed as inadequate. This especially applies to

firearm training and the training of grade D and E guards.

--Criminal behaviour by security officers, such as involvement in cash-in-transit robbery, housebreaking, etc, as well as other improper conduct (for example, between 1995 and 2000, 1 835 improper conduct enquiries were instituted).

--Underpayment of guards which led to a major strike during 2001.

--The use of unregistered security officers.

--The ability of the private security industry to cope with increasingly violent, more sophisticated and large-scale attacks, such as cash-in-transit robberies.

--Unfavourable ratios of 800 to 1 400 customers per single armed reaction vehicle in some cases.

It should of course be taken into account that many police officers are not well-trained either, with approximately one third of the SAPS currently illiterate. Significant numbers of police officers are also facing criminal charges or disciplinary hearings. (42)) The absence of a permanent solution to crime in South Africa also results in a situation where there is a shift in crime from targets protected by private security to softer targets. (43))

A number of issues were also raised in reaction to the publication of the first draft of the Security Industry Regulation Bill. The South African Police Union (SAPU) objected to the prohibition on inter alia members of the police and the military to register as security officers.

The long delays in the registering of new security officers with the former Security Officers' Board was also mentioned. (44)) Subsequently, dissatisfaction with the functioning of the Security Industry Regulatory Authority has been expressed on a number of occasions. (45))

8. CONCLUSION

In the policy paper submitted to the Minister of Safety and Security by the Security Officers' Interim Board during 2000, it was stated that "(t)he Board proceeds from the premise that the strategic crime prevention and crime fighting roles of private security will continue to expand in the foreseeable future". (46)) An appeal was also made for a "working partnership" between public police and private security, and it was stated that the strategic importance of the security industry is self-evident from a safety and security perspective. (47))

Undoubtedly private security does contribute to the prevention of crime, and in fact may, if the service had not existed, also have led to an increase in vigilante actions. It is nevertheless clear that private security cannot replace public policing and also that a formal

co-operation agreement between the police and the private security industry on national level is not imminent. The increased and more efficient regulation of the private security industry as envisaged in the Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 2001 will hopefully also lead to higher standards of service and professionalism in the industry, and contribute to its ability to play an important role in the combating of crime. A realisation that crime in South Africa is not only a threat to human security but more specifically that the extent of serious crime has implications for national security, is required as a first step in the more effective combating of crime, also by the official policing agencies.

Table 1:

Operational Results: Rural Safeguarding

Financial Year

Focus Area 2001/2002 2002/2003

Stolen vehicles recovered 167 698 Illegal immigrants apprehended 11 129 10 185 Narcotics in tablet form confiscated 320 7 973 Narcotics--dagga confiscated 11 851 kg 93 922 kg Illegal and unlicensed firearms confiscated 520 2 071

Stolen stock recovered 919 2 008 Suspects arrested 2 500 10 169

Table 2:

Operational Results: Borderline Control

Financial Year

Focus Area 2001/2002 2002/2003

Stolen vehicles recovered 138 196 Illegal immigrants apprehended 63 186 47 323 Narcotics in tablet form confiscated 20 586 2 Narcotics--dagga confiscated 40 342 kg 18 788 kg Illegal and unlicensed firearms confiscated 214 133 Stolen stock recovered 661 229 Suspects arrested 822 523

REGISTERED CATEGORIES OF PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICES IN SOUTH AFRICA

Security services Number of security businesses

Guarding and/or patrolling: Commercial, industrial or 3 014 residential Safeguarding assets in transit, providing security 685 transport Providing close personal protection / body guarding 946 Providing advice on the protection of persons or property, 335 any other security service or the use of security equipment Providing reaction or response services 339 Ensuring safety and order on premises (sporting, 984 recreational and entertainment) Manufacturing, importing, distributing or advertising of 141 monitoring devices Functioning as private investigators 855 Providing security training or instruction 951 Installing, servicing or repairing security equipment 428 Providing services of a locksmith 260 Monitoring signals from electronic security equipment 1 111 (security control room) Making persons or their services available for rendering a 994 security service Providing security at special events 676 Car watch or related activities 223

Source: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority, Research Enquiry, 28 August 2003.

* This article is an updated version of ISSUP Bulletin 4/2002, originally written by Col Barry Schoeman, Senior Staff Officer, Operations Land Internal and Borderline Control, Joint Operations Division, SA National Defence Force.

# Updated version of an article first published in the Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol XXIV, No 2, November 2002.

REFERENCES

(1.) United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp 24-25.

(2.) Ayoob, M, The Third World security predicatment: State making, regional conflict and the international system, Lynne Rienner, London, 1995, p 19.

(3.) Organisation of African Unity, Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), July 2002.

(4.) Organisation of African Unity, CSSDCA, Solemn Declaration, AHF/Decl.4 (XXXVI), July 2000.

(5.) Paris, R, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?", International Security, Vol 26, No 2, 2001, pp 89 and 92.

(6.) Khong, Y F "Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?, Global Governance, Vol 7, No 3, 2001, pp 231-234.

(7.) Buzan, B, People, States and Fear, Second Edition, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hampstead, 1991, pp 112-116.

(8.) Bosch, J G S, "The role and structure of the private security industry in South Africa", ISSUP Bulletin 3/99, 1999, p 4.

(9.) Republic of South Africa, Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 2001 (Act No 56 of 2001), section 1.

(10.) Ibid, sections 1 and 20.

(11.) Bosch, J G S, op cit, p 5.

(12.) Ibid, pp 5-6.

(13.) Ibid, pp 6-7.

(14.) Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority, Research Enquiry, 19 September 2002 and 28 August 2003; and Security Focus, May 2003, p 4.

(15.) Security Focus, January 2003, p 4.

(16.) SAPS Profile, http://www.saps.gov.za/profile.

(17.) Nhlanhla, J, "Challenges facing the Intelligence Community in South Africa", ISSUP Bulletin, 6/95, 1995, p 3.

(18.) Mti, L M, "The role of the Intelligence Services and private security companies in crime prevention and crime combating in South Africa", ISSUP Bulletin, 5/97, 1997, pp 12-13.

(19.) Ibid, pp 10-11.

(20.) Republic of South Africa, General Intelligence Law Amendment Ac> 2000 (Act No 66 of 2000), section 22E.

(21.) Beeld (Johannesburg), 20 April 2000.

(22.) Business Day (Johannesburg), 27 September 2001.

(23.) Republic of South Africa, Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 2001, op cit, section 23.

(24.) Republic of South Africa, Security Officers Ac> 1987 (Act No 92 of 1987), section 3.

(25.) Republic of South Africa, Government Gazette, No 14178, 31 July 1992.

(26.) Republic of South Africa, Security Officers Amendment Act 1997 (Act No 104 of 1997), section 12.

(27.) Republic of South Africa, Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 2001, op cit, section 3.

(28.) Ibid, section 28.

(29.) Republic of South Africa, Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No 51 of 1977).

(30.) Schonteich, M, "Fighting crime with private muscle: The private sector and crime prevention", African Security Review, Vol 8, No 5, 1999, p 67.

(31.) Business Report (Johannesburg), 6 December 2001.

(32.) Irish, J, "Policing for profit", ISS Monograph Series, No 39, August 1999, p 29; and The Star (Johannesburg), 9 March 2001.

(33.) Security Officers' Board, Policy Paper, 21 May 2000, p 220.

(34.) Schonteich, M, op cit, p 68; and Security Focus, January 2003, p 44.

(35.) Minnaar, A, "Partnership policing", African Security Review, Vol 8, No 2, 1999, pp 45-46.

(36.) Security Focus, April, Vol 18, No 4, 2000, p 4.

(37.) Business Report (Johannesburg), 6 December 2001.

(38.) Irish, J, op cit, p 30.

(39.) Ibid, p 9.

(40.) Ibid, pp 9-11.

(41.) Minnaar, A, op cit, pp 46-49; Beeld (Johannesburg), 7 March 2001; Beeld (Johannesburg), 6 March 2001; The Star (Johannesburg), 4 January 2001; Security Officers' Interim Board, Statistics for 2000, March 2001; and Business Report (Johannesburg), 6 December 2001.

(42.) Rapport (Johannesburg), 25 February 2001.

(43.) Business Report (Johannesburg), 6 December 2001.

(44.) Sake Beeld (Johannesburg), 29 August 2000.

(45.) See for instance Security Focus, May 2003, p 4.

(46.) Security Officers' Board, Policy Paper, op cit, p 4.

(47.) Ibid, p 39.

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