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TSR Plans but
TSR: PLANS BUT PROBLEMS
Oleksandr Gavrylyuk highlights the recent Ever Given type incident on the TSR and identifi es future system capacity expansion plans
On 23 July 2021, high water resulting from days of heavy rains in Russia’s Far Eastern region of Chita (to the east of the Lake Baikal), severely damaged a rail bridge which forms part of the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) some 300km (190 miles) north of the border with China and Mongolia.
The collapse of the 33-metre-long old bridge (built in 1908 and upgraded in 1934) paralysed the operation of the world’s longest rail line (9289 km or 5772 mile) for about a week.
Despite all the efforts of Russian Railways (RZD), the country’s state-run railroad monopoly, to resume the suspended traffic in the shortest possible time, more than 500 trains heading in both directions found themselves in a jam.
The accident’s consequences can be compared with those of the Suez Canal congestion earlier this year, according to Maria Nikitina, a Russian independent transport and logistics expert.
“This situation demonstrates our fundamental transport vulnerability and the colossal risks associated with the lack of alternatives to the TSR,” she says.
Running from Russia’s European sector to its Pacific port of Vladivostok, the transcontinental transportation artery has been playing a vital role for the Russian economy since its inception.
Built during the Tsarist period, between 1891 and 1916, the Trans-Sib was intended to bind together Russia’s immense territory, stretching for thousands miles across the entire Eurasian continent. However, as time progressed, the line’s capacity proved to be inadequate.
As a result, in 1974, the Soviet government-initiated construction of the 4324 km (2687 mile) long Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) running about 610 to 770 km (380 to 480 miles) north of and parallel to the Trans-Sib. The project was declared complete in 1991 with the break-up of the USSR.
The turbulent decade after the Soviet Union’s dissolution saw the dramatic transformation of Russia’s political and economic system. It was only the arrival of the new millennium that marked a gradual revival of its economy, especially intensive exploration and the production of Russia’s vast mineral resources.
Under the circumstances, the two lines jointly designated as the Eastern Range (ER) of Russia’s railroads became instrumental in exporting its coal, ore, grain and other commodities to both European and Asian-Pacific markets. For instance, Kuzbass, the country’s principal coal producing region is situated in Central Siberia and it is only the Trans-Sib that connects it with Russia’s Baltic/Black Sea and Pacific harbours.
As the Kremlin kicked off a large-scale privatisation of the operation of domestic seaports, Russia’s vertically integrated industrial conglomerates picked the best bits. Determined to tap into the growing global demand for natural resources, they incorporated the newly acquired harbours into their rapidly developing supply chains.
Having, however, heavily invested in the expansion of the ports’ handling capacities, their new owners have found themselves restricted by the ER’s limited capacity. This has been especially the case with the Pacific harbours, with the European Union’s decarbonisation agenda effectively switching the focus of Russian coal exports to Asian markets.
Since hydrocarbons and other natural exports generate the bulk of Moscow’s incomes, it has prompted it to focus on the further development of the country’s transport infrastructure, including in the ER.
THEORY INTO PRACTICE?
Given the foregoing, Russia’s government has this year approved phase two of the two railroads’ upgrading, aiming to expand their aggregate capacity by a factor of 1.5 to 180 million tonnes by 2024.
While ambitious plans have been laid, a fundamental question is, will theory go into practice?
Unable to finance all the strategically important infrastructure projects on its own, Moscow has long been enlisting the support of privately held businesses through “public-private partnership” (PPP) agreements.
Accordingly, the government has welcomed an initiative of the Moscow-headquartered investment company A-Property to fund the building of a new 486 km-long rail line that would link the Elga coalfield in Yakutia (East Siberia) with the Pacific coast (Sea of Okhotsk).
Last year, A-Property acquired a 100% interest in the firms operating Elga, one of the world’s largest coking coal deposits with reserves reaching 2.2 billion tonnes, and has, since then, been increasingly interested in establishing its own export corridor.
To be constructed under the third stage of the ER’s development programme (2024-2030), the new line would facilitate the expansion of Russia’s annual coal exports by 30 million tonnes, according to Albert Avdolyan, A-Property’s Principal. Also requiring the construction of a new Pacific harbour, the project is estimated at to cost US$2.5–3 billion.
While the planned upgrading of the ER requires 15,000 workers today and up to 20,000 in the immediate future, the actual achievable figure, as calculated today, is around 11,000. To bridge the gap, Moscow has embarked on enrolling about 1000 conscripts and 1000 of convicts. This still does not solve the problem and thus according to Oleg Belozerov, Director General, RZD, there is a plan to invite guest workers from the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
It will be very interesting to see how the ER development programme progresses – will it overcome the raft of challenges it faces? The jury is still out on this.
8 The TSR is vital
