Course: Date:
POL228: American Foreign Policy March 7, 2013
General Douglas MacArthur and the Korean War: Civil-‐Military Relations Mario Schulz
m s c h u 4 5 9 @ l i v e . k u t z t o w n . e d u
SPRING
13
2 GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR AND THE KOREAN WAR: CIVIL-‐MILITARY RELATIONS “War is the continuation of politics by other means” – this quote by Carl von Clausewitz introduces the issue of civil-military relations in a democracy. This paper examines questions surrounding U.S. civil-military relations during the Korean War, waged from 1950 until 1953. The relationship of President Truman and General Douglas MacArthur is one of the most prominent instances in the study of civil-military relations: Were civil-military relations in this era so strained that war in fact became the continuation of Douglas MacArthur’s politics? This paper analyzes events in the middle of the 20th century, but the issue’s implications remain relevant today. As Catherine E. McCoy states in 2010, “prudent politicians have a healthy fear of military power as a force that could turn against them. The study of civil-military relations examines how civilian institutions (e.g., democratic governments) can effectively exercise control over the military without undermining the latter” (McCoy, 2010, p. 672). There are four overarching concerns that the study of civil-military relations is concerned with: (1) that the military will seize political power, (2) that the military will absorb a disproportionate amount of scarce resources (i.e., the budget), (3) that the military will lead the country into unnecessary wars, and (4) that the military will fail to obey civilian leaders (Feaver, 1996, p. 149, as cited by McCoy 2010).1 The relationship between General MacArthur and President Truman is interesting even before the outbreak of war in Korea. As stated by Pearlman, Truman and MacArthur disagreed over policies towards Taiwan. The administration discontinued its military support for Chiang Kai-shek in January 1950. This can be attributed to Truman’s hope
1 Feaver (1996) provides a summary of Samuel Huntington’s influential work “The Soldier and the
State”. In addition, he summarizes developments in the theoretical study of civil-‐military relations that build on the work of Huntington and others.
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that a more neutral stance toward Taiwan would decrease hostility of Communist China
vis-á-vis the United States, which in turn might lead to more open disagreement between China and the Soviet Union. Pearlman cites MacArthur saying “Formosa in the hands of the Communists can be compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender located to accomplish Soviet offensive strategy” in communication with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a New York Times foreign affairs correspondent (Pearlman, 2003, p. 3). MacArthur was therefore opposing the administration’s more reluctant policy towards Chang Kai-Shek, whom he addressed as “my old comrade in arms” (ibid). Additionally, he was praising the “indomitable determination to resist Communist domination” of Cheng Kai-Shek (ibid), stating that “[Chiang Kai-Shek’s] determination parallels the common interests and purpose of Americans that all people in the Pacific area shall be free” (ibid). Pearlman further states that, in reaction to MacArthur’s endorsement of Chiang Kai-Shek, “Truman hit the ceiling,” as he had not approved of such a statement. MacArthur had informed the JCS of his position and articulation of it, but not the president (ibid). Truman sent William Harriman to convey to MacArthur to “leave Chiang Kai-shek alone” as he did not want Chiang Kai-Shek to be the reason for the United States to go to war with China (ibid). Truman asked Harriman to “find out what [MacArthur] wants, and if it’s at all possible to do it” he would be willing to give it to him (Pearlman, 2003, p. 4). MacArthur answered that he would, “as a soldier, obey any orders that he received from the president.” He also told Truman about Inchon, “which is what MacArthur wanted in return” (Pearlman, 2003, p. 5). The landing at Inchon proved to be a major military success as well as it was a necessity for progress in the Korea campaign. But the above exchange nevertheless is of
4 GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR AND THE KOREAN WAR: CIVIL-‐MILITARY RELATIONS importance, as it shows that a de facto political deal between Truman and MacArthur took place. It can be said to be an indicator of malfunctioning civil-military relations if such bargaining seems to occur. General MacArthur, assessing the strength of the North Korean forces, deemed early escalation of the conflict necessary not only for an effective and fast victory, but also for the avoidance of possibly utter defeat. He voiced this opinion in a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 30th, 1950 (MacArthur, 1950a). His military assessment of the situation is most likely justified, given the lack of knowledge about Chinese troops ready to enter the war, and the large gap in capacity between North Korean and South Korean militaries. After the debacle UN troops faced at the Pusan Perimeter, and following the amphibious landing at Inchon, MacArthur’s military skills were proven excellent once more. It can be argued that MacArthur’s image as an infallible military genius was partially formed by the successful campaign at Inchon. This image held by the public can be considered a factor weighing in on Truman’s decision-making. Even though this remains to be a counterfactual, it can be reasonably assumed that Truman’s reliance on MacArthur might have been less if it had not been for the War Hero image MacArthur held. But the success of Inchon, like MacArthur’s relationship to Chiang Kai-Shek, cannot be understood as an isolated issue or event. It has to be taken into account when examining two events of central importance: Reasons and incentives for crossing the 38th parallel, and the decision to attack targets on the Yalu River. President Truman, at a press conference on July 13th 1950, stated that he would make the decision to cross the 38th parallel “when it becomes necessary to do it” (Matray, 1979,
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p. 322). The Joint Chiefs of Staff warned about escalation north of the 38th parallel, as
was expressed in a policy paper submitted on July 21 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which warned against any “excessive commitment of United States military forces and resources in those areas of operation which would not be decisive” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1950a; Matray, 1979, p. 324). On September 27, Truman conveyed to MacArthur that operations north of the 38th parallel were only authorized when "at the time of such operation there was no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcements of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily” (Weintraub, 2001, pp. 157–158). On October 15th, Truman and MacArthur met on Wake Island. That event is of special interest, because it is often argued that President Truman handed almost complete control over Korean War matters to MacArthur. Pearlman suggests that Truman should have relied on CIA and State Department assessments rather than having asked MacArthur what the chances for Chinese or Soviet interference were (Pearlman, 2003, p. 5). MacArthur’s immediate responded that the chances were “very little”, while State Department officials, such as Dean Rusk, where less confident about Chinese nonintervention (ibid). There were statements by Chinese officials concerning Chinese interference, such as by Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-Lai on September 22nd: “The Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists". Another example is the message communicated through Indian and British diplomats in early October “that if United Nations troops entered North Korea, China would send in its forces from Manchuria.
6 GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR AND THE KOREAN WAR: CIVIL-‐MILITARY RELATIONS China would not interfere, however, if only South Koreans crossed the parallel” (Schnabel, 1972, p. 197). As Pearlman argues, “Truman’s deference to the theater commander, so reported in Beijing, confirmed the proposition of Communist hard-liners that the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) had no choice but to fight, if only for survival, because the MacArthur clique, allied with Chiang, embodied American Far East policy” (Pearlman, 2003, p. 5). The aspect of China’s perception of US policy-making channels is of great interest. It becomes clear that for an analysis of US-military relations in the context of the Korean War it is by no means sufficient to examine breaches of command or public statements of MacArthur vis-á-vis Truman. Rather, China’s perception of US civil-military relations plays a key role. It can be argued that China became much more likely to intervene as it perceived MacArthur to be in control of US foreign policy making. If that was the case, Truman’s goal of limiting conflict in Asia counted less in China’s assessment of the situation. It can be argued that US-military relations are shown to have failed during the Korean War for this reason alone. If a foreign power assesses the United States military to be de facto outside of the control of the country’s leadership, it shifts the calculation of international politics to a possibly enormous extent. In fact, MacArthur, following the guidance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ordered on September 27th that only South Korean troops would operate north of the 38th parallel (Schnabel, 1972, p. 216). However, he revoked this order on October 24th (Schnabel, 1972, p. 218). Schnabel summarizes the issues as follows: This order conflicted with the instructions the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sent MacArthur on 27 September wherein they had told him that "as a matter of policy no non-Korean ground forces will be used in the northeast province bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian
GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR AND THE KOREAN WAR: CIVIL-‐MILITARY 7 RELATIONS border." The Joint Chiefs, upon learning of MacArthur's new order, objected in the form of an inquiry. "While the Joint Chiefs of Staff realize," they told him, "that you undoubtedly had sound reasons for issuing these instructions they would like to be informed of them, as your action is a matter of some concern here." MacArthur defended his action with characteristic vigor. He held that his order had been prompted by military necessity since his ROK forces had neither sufficient strength nor enough skilled leadership to take and hold the border areas of North Korea. As to the legality of his decision, MacArthur pointed out that the Joint Chiefs had told him that the directive of 27 September was not final, that it might require modification in accordance with developments. For additional justification, General MacArthur emphasized that the Joint Chiefs had not actually banned the use of other than ROK forces but had merely stated that it should not be done as a matter of policy. Finally, in his mind, the instructions from the Secretary of Defense on 30 September, which had assured him, "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the parallel," had certainly modified any prior instructions from the Joint Chiefs and he had proceeded to issue his orders on that basis. He made no move to placate his superiors. While he assured them that he understood their concern, he also hinted of dire developments if he took any other course and clinched his argument by claiming that "This entire subject was covered in my conference at Wake Island." [10] Thereafter, the Joint Chiefs allowed General MacArthur's order to stand (Schnabel, 1972, p. 218). Of particular importance is MacArthur’s statement in regards to the Wake Island
Conference, as the available records of the meeting do not support MacArthur’s claim that his move to employ other than South Korean troops had been discussed with Truman (Schnabel, 1972, p. 218; The Truman Library and Museum, 1950). From a military point of view, advancing beyond the 38th parallel can be seen as fully reasonable. Even from a political point of view it can be argued that an aggressor, in this case North Korea, should be militarily punished for its behavior – the mere restoration of the status quo pre-aggression seems irrational. However, the aforementioned initial caution articulated by Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff reflected the political instability surrounding the early years of the Cold War. Even though it might have put the
8 GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR AND THE KOREAN WAR: CIVIL-‐MILITARY RELATIONS United Nations and the United States in a militarily precarious situation, the looming danger of triggering a great war can be deemed a justification for not crossing the 38th parallel while it was not highly necessary. Therefore, while it is a matter of military versus political standpoints whether MacArthur’s determination to cross the 38th parallel was justified, his statements regarding the conference at Wake Island is not. As the record suggests that he did not discuss with Truman the use of US ground forces north of the 38th parallel, this aspect represents an example of failed civil-military relations. If MacArthur willingly lied, it can be regarded treason. If the course of events and what has actually been said was less clear, it still shows a lack of clear orders and proper subordination of a military leader to the president. The other matter of central importance to this assessment is the use of force against targets on and north of the Yalu River. After the massive Chinese intervention, MacArthur decided to bomb the North Korean ends of international bridges across the Yalu River. He warned, however, that there must not be any border violations and targets likely to result in such violations must only be attacked under visual bombing conditions(Schnabel, 1972, p. 241). When Truman learned of the plan of attack on the bridges, he ordered to suspend any related actions and to withhold any strikes within five miles of the Chinese border (Schnabel, 1972, p. 243). MacArthur protested heavily, stating that “the only way to stop this reinforcement of the enemy is the destruction of these bridges and the subjection of all installations in the north area supporting the enemy advance to the maximum of our air destruction” (ibid). Therefore, Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave MacArthur a green light for bombing the bridges, as long as operations were conducted under extreme caution for not to violate Chinese airspace and
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territory (ibid). As American pilots were ordered not to violate Chinese airspace, the destruction of bridges across the Yalu proved extraordinarily difficult. Precise bombing
was obstructed by the necessity to fly in extreme heights to avoid being hit by air defense installations in Manchuria. Chinese pilots had a huge advantage, as they could retreat into Chinese airspace at any time (Schnabel, 1972, p. 247). In early December, when asked whether restrictions by the administration on bombing targets north of the Yalu River were “a handicap to effective military operations”, MacArthur replied: “An enormous handicap, without precedent in military history” (MacArthur, 1950b). Furthermore, he remarked “that selfish interests in Europe were causing support to be withheld from his forces” (Schnabel, 1972, p. 372). He also released his statements for instant distribution through the United Press (Pearlman, 2003, p. 6). By any measure, these public statements were obviously straining civil-military relations to a wide extent. It is difficult to assess whether the statements were a case of direct disobedience. However, those statements clearly were not in coherence with the tradition of an apolitical military. Beyond advancing MacArthur’s own political position relative to Truman, it can be argued that such statements were likely to have had other immediate effects: Such statements can affect the morale of troops, as they might develop a feeling of not being supported by the administration to the necessary extent. However, from a military point of view, MacArthur’s statements can be deemed reasonable. The military objective of destroying the bridges was made incredibly difficult to achieve, and the morale of his troops was certainly suffering from the disadvantage vis-à-vis Chinese fighter pilots.
1 GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR AND THE KOREAN WAR: CIVIL-‐MILITARY 0 RELATIONS Following above-mentioned statements criticizing the Truman administration, on December 5th Truman issued a memorandum to military, intelligence, and other executive agencies, to be forwarded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the regional commands on December 6th: In the light of the present critical international situation, and until further written notice from me, I wish that each one of you would take immediate steps to reduce the number of public speeches pertaining to foreign or military policy made by officials of the departments and agencies of the executive branch. This applies to all officials in the field as well as those in Washington. No speech, press release, or other public statement concerning foreign policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of State. No speech, press release, or other public statement concerning military policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of Defense. In addition to the copies submitted to the Departments of State or Defense for clearance, advance copies of speeches and press releases concerning foreign policy or military policy should be submitted to the White House for information. (Italics added). The purpose of this memorandum is not to curtail the flow of information to the American people, but rather to insure that the information made public is accurate and fully in accord with the policies of the United States Government (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1950b). Furthermore, the memorandum contained special provisions for the Departments of State and Defense: “In addition […] I wish the following steps to be taken: Officials overseas, including military commanders and diplomatic representatives, whould [sic] be ordered to exercise extreme caution in public statements, to clear all but routine statements with their departments, and to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines, or other publicity media in the United States (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1950b). Truman’s actions show how much he felt it was necessary to take a stance against MacArthur’s public statements. Although it seems clear that Truman’s actions were directed towards restoring proper civil-military relations, a number of things stand out:
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First, his actions take place relatively late in the ongoing conflict with MacArthur. This
perhaps shows that Truman was in fact intimidated by the military and political weight MacArthur had accumulated, fearing the political consequences of publicly breaking with the war hero. It can be argued that civil-military relations were broken for the reason that both the military and political branches allowed the emergence of an individual with political power so strong to make a president hesitant. In a situation of ideal civil-military relations, such open criticism would most likely have led to earlier relief; at least disciplinary measures intended to reify the hierarchical superiority of civilian leaders could have been expected Second, his decision to make the directive as general that it applied to basically all executive organs involved in the war effort can be regarded as weakness vis-à-vis MacArthur as well. It might have been less disruptive to replace MacArthur than to issue such a broad directive if in fact MacArthur would not have had such political weight. The position of the Truman administration on escalating the war to Manchuria was made clear by the extreme caution regarding bombing targets close to the Chinese border. Nevertheless, MacArthur conveyed to General Collins that an escalation of the war on Chinese territory was necessary (Schnabel, 1972, p. 373, quoting MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3539-40. (2) Ltr., Secy. Marshall to Hon. Richard B. Russell, 17 Aug. 51. (3) MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3665-66). The measures proposed by him included bombing and naval blockade. He stated his views to the press on February 13th, saying “that unless he was allowed to reduce materially the superiority of the Chinese, ostensibly through attacks upon their ‘sanctuary,’ he could not seriously consider conducting major operations north of the 38th Parallel”. On March 7th, in another such statement, he held
1 GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR AND THE KOREAN WAR: CIVIL-‐MILITARY 2 RELATIONS that vital decisions, yet to be made, must be provided on the highest international levels” (Schnabel, 1972, p. 373). His wording was very direct: “Unless authority is given to strike bases in Manchuria, our ground forces as presently constituted cannot with safety attempt major operations in North Korea.” With Manchuria left intact, the enemy “retains the potential to employ a force which will enable him to resume the offensive and force [another] retrograde movement upon us” (Pearlman, 2003, p. 8). Again, MacArthur’s assessment may be justified from a singular military point of view. However, as is was the case with crossing the 38th parallel and threatening the Chinese through close-border operations by American instead of ROK troops, the proposed actions stated above show his commitment to escalate the war which were in opposition to the Truman administration’s political goals. From a political point of view, attacking Manchuria was set to prompt a greater war in Asia – an argument that the UN mission required the bombing of Manchuria could hardly be justifiably made. A US attack on Manchuria at this point would have looked like the pursuit of expanded U.S. power rather than the forced retreat of the North Korean aggressor. Accordingly, the statements fulfill the criterion of leading the country in an unnecessary war. Following this argument, it can also be stated that MacArthur would have caused the military to consume a disproportionate amount of resources. Even though this argument is usually made in terms relative budgetary expenditures, it also applies to extending the war to China: The human and material cost of the word would most definitely have increased dramatically, making the military leader a cause for disproportionate cost imposed on the United States as a result of leading an unnecessary and very dangerous war. Apart from
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the points discussed, it is obvious that MacArthur’s statements are in violation of Truman’s directive regarding public statements. While Truman considered a political settlement when the two sides found themselves
in a military stalemate roughly along the 38th parallel, MacArthur, in the context of an offer to negotiate with the enemy, stated "The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse” (Schnabel, 1972, p. 374). This can clearly be regarded a threat against China. As the issue of challenging first Chinese intervention and then escalation by the Chinese was discussed before and equally applies here, other points can be focused on. First, MacArthur, as United Nations commander, challenged the UN policy of containing the War to the Korean peninsula. This challenge of UNSC/UNGA policy is perfectly inappropriate to be made by a US general. By criticizing not only the Truman administration but also the United Nations, MacArthur arguably produced an image of the United States military as being not under control of the civilian leadership; similar as it was the case in China’s perception of US foreign policy making. In sum it can be said that questions of civil-military relations during the Korean War remain disputed for good reasons. It is almost impossible to draw a line between necessary political restraints on military operations and seemingly equally necessary demands for military escalation by military leaders. The U.S. military embodied, like in modern times, a parochial interest to resolve conflicts through the employment of
1 GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR AND THE KOREAN WAR: CIVIL-‐MILITARY 4 RELATIONS overwhelming force. Therefore it remains a matter of disagreement in many instances whether MacArthur can be blamed for “violating” civil-military relations. However, MacArthur clearly disobeyed directives regarding public statements and appears to have falsely reported statements made by the president at the Wake Island meeting. Observed as isolated events these issues might appear to be minor violations of proper civil-military relations. But in the context of MacArthur contemplating to seek a publicly elected position in the United States it becomes obvious why well-functioning civil-military are of central importance to a democracy. Statements made by MacArthur can be argued to have undermined Truman’s authority as President of the United States – this is, particularly in times of war, undesirable for a democracy. Although instances such as the crossing of the 38th parallel and the bombing of the Yalu bridges are of central importance for this paper, they do not shed sufficient light on the much larger picture of the Cold War. General MacArthur’s stance towards Formosa, or Taiwan, had potentially strong implications for Sino-U.S. relations. MacArthur’s public articulation of support for Chiang Kai-Shek communicated U.S. hostility to communist China. Instances that are beyond the scope of this paper are important for a full understanding of the complex issue of Sino-U.S. relations, MacArthur’s suggestion to introduce nationalist Chinese forces into the conflict serves as an example. Overall, it can be argued that the events described above constitute major strains on civil-military relations, if not even a breakdown of them.
GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR AND THE KOREAN WAR: CIVIL-‐MILITARY 1 RELATIONS 5 Bibliography Feaver, P. D. (1996). The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control. Armed Forces & Society, 23(2), 149–178. doi:10.1177/0095327X9602300203 Joint Chiefs of Staff. (1950a). U.S. Courses of Action in the Event Soviet Forces Enter Korean Hostilities, NSC 76, July 21, 1950. Washington, D.C. Joint Chiefs of Staff. (1950b). JCS 98134, December 6, 1950 (p. 6). Washington, D.C. MacArthur, D. (1950a). Douglas MacArthur to Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 30, 1950; Korea - Messages, June 1950. Harry S. Truman Library. Retrieved March 10, 2013, from http://www.trumanlibrary.org/exhibit_documents/index.php?pagenumber=1&titleid =201&tldate=1950-06-30&collectionid=korea&PageID=-1&groupid=3432 MacArthur, D. (1950b, December 8). Statements. U.S. News and World Report. Matray, J. I. (1979). Truman’s Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea. The Journal of American History, 66(2), 314–333. McCoy, K. E. (2010). Beyond Civil--Military Relations: Reflections on Civilian Control of a Private, Multinational Workforce. Armed Forces & Society, 36(4), 671– 694. doi:10.1177/0095327X10361668 Pearlman, M. D. (2003). Korean War Anthology -Truman and MacArthur: The Winding Road to Dismissal. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Schnabel, J. F. (1972). Operation Chromite: The Concept and the Plan. United States Army in the Korean War. Policy and Direction: The First year (pp. 139–154). Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army. The Truman Library and Mus. (1950). Log of President Truman’s Trip to Wake Island, October 11-18, 1950, compiled by Lt. Comdr. William M. Rigdon, USN. Harry S. Truman Library and Museum. Retrieved March 5, 1BC, from http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/travel_log/key1947/wake1950_toc.htm Weintraub, S. (2001). MacArthur’s war: Korea and the undoing of an American hero (p. 385). Simon & Schuster.