statistics. As they were no longer counting
particular, both groups see acquiring and
there are still some very nasty ones indeed
casualties in the same way, simple
holding territory as a primary objective, and
— and that some of the worst involve
comparisons between the pre- and post-9/11
this shapes what they do with their violent
Islamist terrorist groups such as ISIL and
world became impossible with US
capabilities. Indeed, ISIL functions in many
al-Shabaab.
government data. (Cynics suggested that
ways as a state with an army rather than as a
this was the purpose of the change.) So if we
terrorist group which happens to control
look at the GTD as a surrogate dataset, we
some land. Without wishing to confer any kind
find that terrorists in 2014 can kill over a
of political or legal legitimacy to its
thousand each month — whereas from 1995
aspirations, it would be absurd to categorise
to 2003 only 2001 showed more than a
an organisation that is well equipped with
thousand killed. Nor is the GTD the only
heavy weapons, that controls territory in
study that shows a very large increase:
which perhaps 8 million or more are living,
similar conclusion emerges from a BBC
and which raises and spends millions of
Monitoring/ICSR study of Islamist violence in
dollars in a month as being considered in
November 2014 which showed that around
same category as left-wing Greek terrorists or
5,000 were killed.
animal rights extremists (both of who are
How can this be? How can Stephen Pinker, using robust data, produce one conclusion,
considered terrorist organizations in some jurisdictions).
What might seem an arid discussion of statistics and terminology points, therefore, to a significant change in what we understand by terrorism, and perhaps to a change in the problem itself. Groups still try to put bombs on planes and assassinate their enemies but the transition to extremist state-building, signalled as early as the 1990s by the Algerian GIA but carried out most extensively by al-Shabaab and ISIL (with groups in South East Asia, Yemen and North Africa also attempting it), is an historically significant development. The wars that accompany state-building by
while statistics drawn from the same database
The point is a lack of clarity about what
groups espousing Islamist ideologies are
indicate the opposite? The obvious answer is
constitutes a ‘terrorist.’ This is not only the
linked to but qualitatively different from the
that they are actually talking about different
well-worn cliché of one man’s freedom fighter
Islamist terrorism that is exemplified by
things. Pinker excludes attacks on Coalition
being another man’s terrorist, but more
al-Qa’ida’s major transnational attacks. But
forces in Afghanistan after 2001 and Iraq after
fundamentally, the point that the group of
conflating these varying groups under the
2003. The State Department in the 1990s
actors that is increasingly grouped together as
same banner causes further analytical
defined terrorism pretty narrowly as politically
‘terrorist’ is one that is becoming so broad as
issues.
motivated violence outside a state of war. The
to lose all useful coherence.
BBC/ICSR study narrows the scope in one
This problem of conflation or aggregation
This is important for researchers but for
has been well recognised by academics
practitioners, policy-makers, and the public
such as Peter Neumann who has described
too. When politicians say — as many do — that
the tendency “to lump together groups and
the terrorist threat has never been higher, we
individuals in vastly different situations of
are entitled to know whether there is evidence
violent conflict just because they use similar
that supports their claims. Statistics can be
tactics” as “the cardinal sin of ‘terrorism
manipulated but even in most areas of
studies’”3. The dominance of Islamist
controversial policy there is someone, perhaps
violence in our concerns about terrorism
in a university, who is able to say definitively
may be leading to a different kind of
what the data shows. More urgently,
conflation — of lumping together groups
practitioners and policy-makers need to know
using different tactics just because they
what works in both countering terrorism and
express themselves using a similar ideology.
its more recent near-synonym, ‘violent
This problem matters beyond academic
extremism’. If terrorism is getting worse, what
debate because it may be one explanation
does this tell us about the billions of dollars,
for the lack of consensus in so many
pounds and euros that have been expended
questions we need to answer about political
on dealing with it since 9/11? Our difficulty
violence in today’s world, including the most
with defining not just terrorism but forms of
fundamental questions of causality. Does, for
violence more generally is a significant part of
example, poverty lead to terrorism? Absolute
the problem here. It seems clear, for example,
or relative deprivation was once widely
That is not to say that the GTI is wrong to
that transnational terrorism targeting the West
assumed to be a major factor, until post-9/11
include these types of violence. In fact, it
is rare (even if, on occasions, it can account
econometric studies appeared to show that
would be perverse to exclude the ‘Islamic
for horrendous levels of casualties) and that
it wasn’t. Economists who turned to the
State’ (ISIL/Daesh) or al-Shabaab from a report
while it has not gone away it has not got
study of terrorism demonstrated from robust
on the frequency and severity of terrorist
statistically worse. The threat from domestic
data that transnational terrorism seemed to
violence. Both of those entities would
terrorist movements in Europe has declined
be perpetrated by people in countries with
unquestionably meet most people’s definitions
dramatically from its highpoint in the 1970s,
low levels of civil liberties against people
of terrorist organisations. (For instance, they
when extreme left-wing groups terrorised the
living in rich countries — but wealth and
are both proscribed in the UK under terrorism
Continent and Irish republican and loyalist
inequality in the source countries appear to
legislation.) But the point is that some forms of
groups carried out almost daily attacks. And it
be irrelevant. These findings are important
their violence are qualitatively different from
is clear that, while wars are less destructive
but they do not tell the whole story. If we
terrorism as it was understood in the 1990s. In
now than they were in the twentieth century,
look at a movement like Boko Haram, for
dimension (Islamist violence only) but is extremely wide in another dimension (the form the violence takes and the context in which it occurs.) Given the nature of early twenty-first-century conflicts which, for various historical and geopolitical reasons are predominantly taking place in Muslim-majority countries, a lot of violence can readily be labelled as ‘Islamist’. The GTD is wider still than the BBC/ICSR study as it includes violence not involving Islamists, but includes violence taking place in many of the same conflicts in South Asia, the Middle East, and East, North and West Africa that feature so heavily in that other study. When the State Department was counting, therefore, it excluded civil wars, insurgencies, and even some kinds of guerrilla movements from its attention. Now, those tend to be included.
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