Robert Ladrech
we were to ask how integrated the decisions of government ministers in Brussels and the general activities of MEPs are into internal party mechanisms of accountability, then we would see a different picture emerging. First of all, not all government ministers are party politicians (there is widespread use of experts or technocrats). Second, not all government ministers are accountable to a national parliamentary party, i.e. they do not sit in the parliament and in cabinet government, as in the UK. Third, and significant for my argument, national executives in general are autonomous from their parliaments—and by extension, from their national parliamentary parties (here the literature on the so-called democratic deficit points to national parliaments as ‘losers’ in European integration; see inter alia Maurer and Wessels, 2000). Finally, national parties—the extra-parliamentary wing—do not have the mechanisms to hold their members in government accountable in any meaningful way, as this would require vast organisational resources and expertise. Thus, parties in government delegate to their members in executive government positions the freedom to act on EU matters (the exception being issues of a more historic nature or ones that achieve a high political profile and come into conflict with core ideological positions). As for MEPs, their integration into their national parties varies considerably, from the link-MEP system of the British Labour Party to what is more the norm, the situation where the delegation leader has ex officio membership on a mid-level leadership committee. Voting rights for MEPs at party congresses are normally those of a party’s elected officials; again this varies from party to party. However, the distance of MEPs collectively from their national parties’ consciousness in terms of knowledge of activities and appreciation for those matters where MEPs may make a difference in EP decision-making has narrowed only marginally over the past decade or so.
Finally, how do national parties organise themselves such that they become aware of and can take positions on EU policy? If the EU now looms so large in domestic policy-making, and if indeed there has been institutional and policy adaptation due to the influence of the EU (i.e. Europeanization), then might we not expect to see some organisational adaptation on the part of national parties? In fact, a recent research project (The Europeanization of National Political Parties) has shown that the actual organisational changes in major centre-left and centre-right parties in the 15 Member States before the 2004 enlargement were extremely modest. Put differently, there has not been much in the way of new positions or changes in decision-making rules to suggest that EU matters are now processed more systematically or in a more visible manner than before the late 1980s. For example, in terms of the party central office (the extra-parliamentary party organisation), it remains the International Secretariat that maintains relations both with foreign parties internationally as well as strictly within Europe and with the party delegation in the EP. In some parties, a distinct European Secretary position has been created, but this is more the exception than the rule. Resources to monitor EU issues and to liaise with EU party actors such as MEPs have not grown substantially. In other words, in an environment of limited resources, national parties choose to continue to devote the vast bulk of their resources and capability to the domestic scene, even though intellectually many party actors will acknowledge the greater influence of EU issues on domestic policy development. As for the relationship between national parties and their respective Euro-party, the overwhelming number of national representatives to a Euro-party bureau or executive committee are International secretaries; the responsibility is one added to others in their portfolio. The election of delegates to Euro-party congresses is extremely limited, with the vast bulk of delegates either ex officio, such as MEPs, or else appointed. In most cases, Euro-party working groups are
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