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Can Europe and China shape a new world order?
North Korea. From the Chinese point of view, all these multiple dialogues can be an annoyance, taking up the valuable time of senior officials and vice ministers. We do not argue that the big three should downgrade their bilateral relationships with China. Given the importance of the country, it would be unrealistic to expect them or other EU governments to hand over their relations with China to a series of BrusselsBeijing dialogues. In any case, the Chinese value personal contacts with particular leaders from European countries. Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative, has decided that China should not be his top priority; he has probably been right to focus on the Balkans, the Middle East and Africa, given his limited resources and the difference that he can make in those regions. Commission President Barroso does not have much of a role to play on the noneconomic aspects of foreign policy. So visits to China by senior politicians from the memberstates can be good for the EU as a whole. 13
Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu call this ‘principled bilateralism’, in the context of EURussia relations. See their ‘A power audit of EU Russia relations’, European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2007.
We do argue that the memberstates’ bilateral contacts should reinforce rather than undermine EU objectives.13 When they are pursuing similar interests in China, they would often achieve more by working together, or with EU institutions. Take the EU’s reaction to the conflict in Tibet and the consequent demonstrations in Britain and France against the passage of the Olympic flame. Bernard Kouchner, France’s foreign minister, urged the EU to aim for a common position. But Sarkozy unilaterally announced that he was thinking of boycotting the Olympic games opening ceremony. Britain’s prime minister, Gordon Brown, unilaterally said that he would attend the closing, but not the opening ceremony. Merkel unilaterally stated that she would not attend the games.
We doubt that such pronouncements will make much impact on Chinese policy. But if Britain, France and Germany – or, better still,
A partnership that is not strategic
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all 27 – had given the same message to China, it might, perhaps, have had some effect. In our view, they should have all said: “We want the Olympic games to be a success and we believe in engagement with China, so we will attend the games; but we also urge the Chinese authorities to enter into dialogue with the Dalai Lama, and to remove restrictions on journalists in Tibet.” That was more or less the message of President Barroso when he visited Beijing in April 2008, and soon afterwards the Chinese government did resume a dialogue with some of the Dalai Lama’s officials.
Unreadable China The Chinese find the EU, with its complex institutions, hard to deal with. The feeling is mutual. In some ways, the Chinese government is even harder to read than the Brussels bureaucracy. In the EU – despite its baroque institutional machinery – a keen observer can work out who is responsible for which decision. The Chinese system is much less transparent. European decisionmakers often do not know who on the Chinese side is taking decisions. China’s political structures are highly centralised, which means that the more sensitive issues are often referred up the hierarchy to near the top. This may lead to delays and frustration. For example, in the summer of 2007, the Chinese government would not agree to a date for the annual EUChina summit, which is held every autumn. In the end, a date was fixed just two months before the event, whereas the EU’s other interlocutors are generally willing to commit to dates much longer in advance. On a whole range of protocol issues, the Chinese are difficult, according to EU officials. For example, who will represent the Chinese side in a meeting, and what will be the format? The Chinese may not answer such questions until just before the event. European officials believe that the Chinese use these kinds of procedural issue to frustrate and sap the energies of their counterparts. EU representatives sometimes find it hard to work out to whom they should be talking, and to get access to the right people. They