International Relations
The Future of the Liberal International Order written by Nader di Michele and Josephine Muench Photo: American Flag in Raleigh, USA, Andretti Brown, 2019.
C
ovid-19 is the latest blow to the Liberal International Order (LIO) and could be the proverbial straw that breaks the camel’s back by exposing the inherent instabilities and weaknesses of this system.
To accurately assess the impact of Covid-19 on the current LIO and understand what it entails, we must be able to define it. The order is characterised by the establishment of international institutions and rules to collectively regulate, manage and govern various aspects of international politics, from economics to security. The Liberal International Order is defined by the spread of globalisation along with capitalist modes of production, which are organised according to neo-liberal beliefs of limited government intervention in the economy and the free movement of people. Thirdly, it, in principle, aids and legitimises the global spread of liberal institutions and values, such as democratic regimes. What drives many of these practices are ideas, values and interests stemming, although not exclusively, from Western powers. Even before the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic this world system constructed and led by the USA had for long shown signs of decline. The global alliances, institutions and rules that govern international relations have been consistently challenged by assertive autocratic regimes with Russia, China and more recently with the USA, as well as right-wing populist governments across Europe. Moreover, the liberal international order has been largely abandoned by its leader. A clear example of this
trend is US President Donald Trump’s “America First” agenda which remains sceptical of international institutions such as the World Health Organisation, the UN and NATO and rejects to abide by international agreements such as the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement and the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal. Even though the dismissal of globalisation and the international liberal order were evident before the pandemic, the failures of the WHO and the UN to effectively address the health care crisis further contributed to this trend. This included the UN security council “completely missing from action” by showing no methods to fighting the pandemic. What is worse, the World Health Organization (WHO) failed to warn the world in time of the outbreak in order for effective policies to be put in place. However, the extent of the impact of Covid-19 is not only to be blamed on the international institutions of neoliberalism. The slashing of social security and healthcare systems brought about by the neo-liberal age of privatisation and austerity have undoubtedly hindered the capabilities of societies to react to a crisis of this nature. This explains the failure of liberal democracies to provide basic health protections such as PPE (personal protective equipment) to medics or even grant full medical attention to those in need. This, combined with the inequalities prompted by our digitalised economy, rendering the distribution of capital and labour income more unequal and shifting income from labour to capital, have put on full display not only the weakness of the social safety net in countries like the USA and the UK, where marginalised groups were hit the hardest by the virus but also the scale of structural
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Dialogue • Autumn 2020
