Jus Humanis Issue 4 by jus humanis

Jus Humanis Journal of International Human Rights Law

MIGRATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 4 ISSUE // MARCH 2021

WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE DO JUS HUMANIS IS A POLITICALLY INDEPENDENT ORGANISATION AND THE OPINIONS EXPRESSED IN THE JOURNAL BELONG TO THE AUTHORS ONLY.

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EDITORS: ENRIQUE ALONSO-CALO SOTO CRISTINA SNEGUR

EDITORIAL TEAM

Cristina Snegur is the Secretary of Jus Humanis and editor of Jus Humanis Journal. Cristina is a Moldovan lawyer who has received her Master of Arts in International Law and Human Rights from the University of Tartu, Estonia. In the meanwhile, she participated in a traineeship programme at the "Sorainen" Law Firm, where she carried out legal analyses of issues related to: Human Rights, EU law, privacy law, property law and ethics. She decided to deepen her knowledge of Human Rights and is currently doing her LLM In International Human Rights Law at Lund University, Sweden. Her main interest is focused on rights of women and children.

Enrique Alonso-Calo Soto is a member of the Jus Humanis Board and editor of Jus Humanis Journal. Enrique is a Spanish lawyer currently attending the International Human Rights Law Master's program at Lund University, Sweden. He has worked at a Spanish law firm and as a member of the Jean Monet Research Group in International Human Rights law before beginning his studies in Lund. His main interests include public international law, migrations and refugee law and the implications of technological developments in the human rights field.

IN THIS ISSUE

Editorial piece by Huan Nguyen .......................................................p.5 States' responsibility in ptrotecting refugees' Human Rights by Delphine Saint-Martin......................................pp.7-12 The deprived fate of foreign domestic workers - How intermediary institutions produce and reproduce segregation by Yi-Chia Chen ................................................pp.13-19 Some people cannot even afford to be legal: The precarity of Thai undocumented migrant workers in South Korea by Wichuta Teeratanabodee ..............................pp.20-24 The Arendtian paradox of statelessness: Human Rights, Citizenship, and "the Right to have Rights" by Quah Say Jye ...............................................pp.25-32 Nomads of Dolpa Po of Nepal and the obscure realities of children on the move by Aastha Kc....................................................pp.33-37 The influence of the migrant crisis on terrorism in Europe by Romana Crgol ..............................................pp.38-42 Refugees welcome? Viewing refugees coming to Greece as a security concern by Emmanouil Anagnostou ................................pp.43-49 Structural challenges of the Central American region that incentivize the displacement and vulnerability of the population by Roberto Ogg Fábrega.....................................pp.51-53 "Next time there is violence, it won't be for the refugees" - What remedies do humanitarian volunteers in Europe have for harassment by the Police? by Alena Kahle..................................................pp.55-60 The Branco-Shatz submission suspicions: does the European Union respect Human Rights? by Marco Dal Monte ..........................................pp.62-67 How does climate change induced salinity force the coastal people of Bangladesh to migrate and how does the migration process violate Human Rights? by Dilafroze Khanam, Golam Rabbani & Shahana Afrin Dina.................................................................pp.68-75

Jacob Lawrence "Migration Series", Panel 18 Source: www.moma.org

Sometimes tears are words for me [us]. Migration and disenchatment of Indonesian gay men in Paris by Wisnu Adihartono.........................................pp. 76-80 Out of tyranny ambition: migration crisis caused by “Europe’s last dictator” by Kseniya Gladenkaya......................................pp.81-87 Gastarbeiter Underclass by Daria Tarkhova.............................................pp.88-91 No paper - no man: How armed conflict in Ukraine paves new roads to statelessness by Anastasiia Vorobiova ...................................pp.93-99 People without rights: undocumented migrants in Spain by Mireia Sierra Arnau....................................pp.100-105 The land that forgot its past - the issue of migration in the Canary Islands by Ainoa Prieto García...................................pp.106-108 The reality of the refugee crisis in the city of Patras, Greece by Anastasia Lazaridi....................................pp.109-112 The European New Pact on Migration and Asylum: Solidarity but for whom? by Silvia Mugnaini.........................................pp.112-119

EDITORIAL PIECE BY HUAN NGUYEN Migrants' situation is seated deeply in vulnerability, exposing them to the threats of xenophobia, violence, exploitation and human rights violations. This is being exacerbated by the pandemic which is expected to still generate its harmful impacts for at least a few years ahead. The situation calls for special attention on rights protection in the migration field more than ever.

Dear readers,

I am delighted to introduce the new issue of Jus Humanis Journal of International Human Rights Law as our attempt to create a space for disseminating human rights opinions and relating interdisciplinary ideas of young researchers. Amid the turbulences caused by the unprecedented pandemic of Covid-19 of which the end is still unpredictable, we would like to dedicate this issue to the topic of “Migration and Human Rights”. Over the world, bustling migration movements, especially the tragedies referred to as ”migration crisis” are driven by globalization, resource-scarcity, economic inequality and armed conflicts. Migrant in such movements travel around for many reasons, ranging from refugees, trafficked victims to economic workers and their families.

It is undoable that human rights perspectives and human rights-based approaches are needed to prevent both immediate and long-term harms on migrants as well as other involved stakeholders. Hence, this issue focuses on various aspects and nuances of migration across the globe, to which, we believe, the talent authors of interesting articles hereof dedicated their hard-work and excellence for our clearer vision on the issue of migration and human rights. I want to express our gratitude to them for their contributions. Upon Jus Humanis’s best efforts, especially from our editorial team, this issue was made with our hope that you can find it inspirational.

Stay safe and enjoy reading!

Sincerely, Huan Nguyen Vice-President of Jus Humanis

Jus Humanis Journal of International Human Rights Law // March 2021

STATES' RESPONSIBILITY IN PROTECTING REFUGEES' HUMAN RIGHTS Article by Delphine Saint-Martin Throughout their flee, refugees have different human rights (HR) protected by various States, traditionally responsible for the protection of HR. There are multiple differences between refugees and migrants. Refugees are defined in the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees as people having « a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 1 opinion ». Refugees have their HR threatened in their home State, which are unable or unwilling to protect them. Whereas as noted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, migrants « [may] leave [their] country for many reasons that are not related to persecution, such as for the purposes of employment, family reunification or study. [They] continue to enjoy the protection of [their] own government ».2 The definition of refugee is narrow and does not encompass all reasons why people might flee and have their HR threatened. 3 International Refugees law is not adapted to the current realities. The 1951 Convention was adopted as a response to WWII, as a temporary regime for a specific time and region. Even if the 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees broadens its protection, there have not been fundamental changes to the original text. However, the interpretation of the 1951 Convention can change, as it is a living instrument, and such change is crucial because, in addition to the current refugees and migrants, there could be more than 60 million people forced to flee because of a one-meter sea-level rise in the years to come.4

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11951 Convention on Status of Refugee, Introductory Note

2 A Personal appeal from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 3 Jaya Ramji-Nogales, November 14, 2016. Migration Emergencies.

Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 68, 2017, p. 613

4 C. Schofield and A. Arsana, 2012. “Climate change and the limits of

maritime jurisdiction”, in R Warner, C Schofield (eds.) Climate Change and the Oceans: Gauging the Legal and Policy Currents in the Asia Pacific and Beyond, (Edward Elgar Publishing), p. 127.

Photo: www.ied.eu

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I. Home State A. Right to life The home State responsibility to protect HR is determinant for the refugee status. States must protect HR, especially the right to life, which is protected at both the international 5and regional 6 level. In this regard, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) highlighted that the right to life must not be interpreted narrowly,7 but as including the positive obligation to provide a certain standard of life, life with dignity. Therefore, the right to life includes the right to live with dignity and a potential right to a 8 clean environment. However, given that the latter is not included in the current interpretation of the 1951 Convention, said interpretation needs to be extended to provide protection for those migrating as a consequence of climate change, as well as for holding home States responsible when 9 disregarding their environmental obligations. In the Teitiota case,10the Committee reiterated that climate change is one of: « the most pressing and serious threats to the ability of present and future 11 generations to enjoy the right to life ». This same 12 concern has been raised by international and 13 regional organisations. The right to life is the cornerstone of HR protection so that it is fundamental to set a high threshold for its compliance, as allowing a low threshold would deprive it of its importance. However, this high threshold disadvantages complainants, and discourages changes by jurisprudence. The two dissenting opinions on the above-mentioned case noted that access to the HRC should be easier and that the burden of proof should be shared with the State.14 ______________________________ 5 ICCPR, Article 6 6 ECHR, Article 2 7

Rights under article 17 ICCPR in CCPR, Portillo Cáceres v Paraguay 8 HRC General Comment N°36, 2018, para. 3 9 A Personal appeal from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 10 CCPR, New Zealand v Karabati (Teitiota case) 11 CCPR Teitiota case and HRC General Comment N°36 of the HRC, 2018, para. 3 12 HRC, Concluding observations on the initial report of Cabo Verde; CEDAW, Concluding observations (2019) 13 Resolution 2307 (2019) of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly on a legal status for “climate refugees” 14 Teitota case Dissenting opinion of Vasilka Sancin, para 5.

It was noted that it would be: « counter-intuitive to the protection of life to wait for deaths to be very frequent and considerable in number to consider the 15 threshold of risk as met ». The aim is to protect the right to life and not to place a further burden on the victim. This decision can be interpreted as a warning to the States in granting asylum to climate refugees. Thus, a new broader definition of the right to life and 16 refugee status could emerge. B. Right to seek and enjoy asylum Under International Law, there is no general right to seek and enjoy asylum. However, it has been recognized as an international customary right, under article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which provides that: « Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution ». Regardless of the nonbinding nature of the UDHR, the 1951 Refugee Convention is binding for member parties, and refers to article 14, giving it a binding effect. There are rights in the UDHR for people to enjoy the right to seek asylum in case of persecution, but not in case of sea-level rise. Article 14 (2) of the UDHR provides: « This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and 17 principles of the United Nations ». However, a new interpretation could arise. States have an obligation to protect HR and guarantee the UN purposes and principles. The threat to the right to life, the breach of States responsibility to protect HR, and a situation of instability and insecurity, could be interpreted as so great it would be contrary to international peace and security not to allow the right to seek and enjoy asylum.

______________________________ 15 Teitota case Dissenting opinion of Duncan Laki Muhumuza, para. 5 16 Draft European Rules of the Council of Europe (Rule B1) 17 UDHR, Article 14(2)

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In the Teitiota case, the HR Committee recognised that climate change poses a threat to the right to life, which is a first step in recognising the right to seek and enjoy asylum on climate change grounds. This is crucial, as according to The Economist, 17 per cent of Bangladesh’s landmass would be 18 flooded by a one-meter rise, Bangladeshis would be forced to migrate by the millions. There is a responsibility of the home State to protect HR but also to not keep the citizens from leaving its territory, allowing the freedom of movement. States have an obligation, under international human rights law, to allow individuals to seek the protection of another State. II. Home State A. Duty to research On the duty to render assistance, Article 98 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) provides that coastal States « shall promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an adequate and 19 effective search and rescue service ».

Under the 1974 International Convention for the 20 Protection of Human Life and Sea (SOLAS) and 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search 21 and Rescue (SAR), there is an obligation for Coastal State, in direct proximity, to search for embarkations, particularly people in danger. This involves two stages. A passive stage, which is to have and operate the appropriate equipment; and an active stage, which is to look for and communicate with vessels. However, this duty to search is not always fulfilled by coastal States, and 22 some have argued against it. Thus, other actors have been faced with migration at sea, such as NGOs, who have taken it upon themselves to search and rescue. Nevertheless, they lack resources and are limited by coastal States. The latter justifying their non-respect of their duty to search and rescue on HR protection and respect of 23 International Conventions. Commercial ships have also been faced with this situation. With the MV Tampa incident, the 2004 Amendments to the 1974 SOLAS and 1979 SAR, lessened the burden of shipmasters and place it on the States.24

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18 Those in Peril by the Sea, The Economist 6, 8 (Sept. 9, 2006)

20 SOLAS, Chapter V Resolution 15 LOSC, Article 98 21 SAR, Annex, Chapter 3, para. 3.19

19 LOSC, Article 98

22 Question in the UK House of Lords, Wednesday 15 October 2014: on

the contribution the UK would make to rescues of migrants at sea in the Mediterranean 23 Italian Ministero dell’interno (Ministry of Internal Affairs), Code of Conduct for non-governmental organisation involved in migrant’s rescue operations at sea (2017) 24 Felicity G. Attard Richard L. Kilpatrick, Jr., October 12, 2020. Reflections on the Maersk Etienne Standoof and its Ramifications for the Duty to Render Assistance at Sea. EJIL: Talk! Photo: Christa SaysWhat, flickr.

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Commercial vessels and crews are not equipped to rescue refugees, and the financial cost of changing route and stopping is important. Besides, shipmasters have the discretion to render assistance at sea. This poses the question of how human life is seen compared to financial gain, when humans risk drowning, dehydration, and malnourishment, on overcrowded embarkations. Arguably, States are the only ones equipped with vessels adapted for such a task; with enough resources and time; with the knowledge to search, to care for refugees, and to ensure their legal rights. Therefore, the States have a responsibility of search and rescue in coordination and cooperation. Vessels are no longer primarily responsible for ensuring that such coordination and cooperation occur. There is a responsibility of the home State to protect HR but also to not keep the citizens from leaving its territory, allowing the freedom of movement. States have an obligation, under international human rights law, to allow individuals to seek the protection of another State. B. Duty to rescue On the duty to rescue, Article 98 of the LOSC imposes the duty to render assistance, including the duty to rescue on individual seafarers: « Migrants travelling on the high seas are not within the jurisdiction of any state. But the duty of rescue grants them (limited) opportunities to invoke the responsibilities of other travellers (and thus of the 25 state where their boats are registered) ». As 26 pointed out by the Italian Court of Cassation, the key HR to be protected in the context to rescue operations are the right to ask for asylum, the 27 28 principle of non-refoulement, right to life and prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. 29 The duty to disembark includes the duty to disembark to the closest place of safety, as provided for in, SAR and SOLAS and the 2004 Amendments, and as recognised by international ______________________________ 25Itamar Mann, August 2, 2017. Book Discussion: Itamar Mann Introduces

« Humanity at Sea ». EJIL: Talk! 26Italian Court of Cassation, Criminal Section III, sentence n. 6626/20 1951 27Refugee Convention, Article 33 28ECHR, Article 2 29ECHR, Article 3

customary law. Rescue involves preserving lives, not putting them in a further dangerous situation, so the rescuing operation is not over until the rescues’ HR are no longer threatened. The requirement of the place of safety is a double edge sword in protecting HR, as it can be used as an argument by coastal states to deny vessels the right to disembark, such as Italy and Greece. There are two schools of thought on the interpretation of the ‘primary responsibility’ of SAR States found in the 2004 Amendments. One imposes an obligation on the SAR State to also allow disembarkation when efforts to find a place of safety have failed. The other one imposes the closest safe port the duty to allow disembarkation. A solution adopted during the Indochinese crisis was that the disembarkation on the coastal State was permitted, provided the flag States accepted to welcome the refugees later. This solution could be adopted nowadays, to increase the protection of HR. III. Destination State A. Obligation of non-refoulement The international customary obligation of nonrefoulement placed on the destination State is defined in the 1951 Convention Article 33(1): « No Contracting State shall expel or return […] a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened », serving as a protection mechanism for those meeting the criteria for being granted the refugee status. This ensures that the destination State will not endanger refugees under its jurisdiction and that it will be responsible for their HR protection.30 The question of these « territories » has been analysed above. ______________________________ 30

See also 1983 UNCAT, Article 3

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The Teitiota case recognised: « 9.3 […] The obligation not to extradite, deport or otherwise transfer, pursuant to article 6 of the Covenant, may be broader than the scope of the principle of nonrefoulement under international refugee law, since it may also require the protection of aliens not entitled to refugee status ».31Arguably the obligation of non-refoulement under the 1951 Convention is too narrow to encompass the situation of people who are not under the scope of the refugee status, as it would be the case of those fleeing their homes because of climate change, and especially sea-level rise. However, even if it is narrow, it may imply great responsibility for certain States. Thus, these States are unlikely to accept an absolute nonrefoulement obligation.32 At the regional level, the ECtHR has recognized an absolute principle of non-refoulement under Article 3 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)33and its extra-territorial applicability.34A nonbinding resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly further extended the non-refoulement principle by including a responsibility for States to allow climate refugee to seek asylum.35Regional organisations can apply stricter obligations, as consensus may be found more easily thanks to a greater homogeneity and fewer State parties within them. B. Protection of Human Rights Destination States have an international customary obligation to protect the HR of individuals under 36 their jurisdiction, including refugees. As analysed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees: « States are already committed to protecting the [HR] of refugees through their [HR] obligations, not least the right to live in security and with dignity ».37

It can be argued that the mere fact that these refugees are placed in centres is a violation of their right to liberty and security, and even of articles 6 and 7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). However, the counterargument is that based on the security principle, under Article 5 ECHR, States can detain and deprive a person of his liberty « to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country ». This is the question of balance between liberty and security. In any case, States have a responsibility to protect the HR of individuals under their jurisdiction, and it can be argued that the detention of refugees is not in keeping with the fulfilment of this obligation. The question in HR protection is the balance between rights and their different interpretations. The main arguments against the obligation of nonrefoulement are that it encourages people to risk their lives. It helps smugglers not having to rescue refugees. It slows States in rescuing and searching for refugees on the high seas, in fear of placing an economic and administrative burden upon them when being obliged under international law to protect the refugees’ HR. However, the non-refoulement obligation helps to ensure refugees’ HR in placing responsibility on destination States, since their home State cannot protect their HR. This is of great importance since there will be an increase in refugees and asylum seekers due to climate change, among other reasons, even if it is not an easy decision for people 33 to leave their home. Placing responsibility on States ensures that International HR Law is respected and that HR are not simply a theory but a reality.

It is a long-established HR that no-one shall be detained without trial. 38 ______________________________ 31 See also HRC General Comments No36 (2018) provision 30; 55 and 57

32 ILC Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity, Article 5 33 ECtHR cases: Soering v UK; Vilvarajah v UK or Chahal v UK 34 ECtHR Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy 35 Resolution 2307 (2019) of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly

on A legal status for “climate refugees”, provision 5.4

36 HRC General Comments No36 (2018)

37 A Personal appeal from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees

38 Habeas Corpus Act 1679

______________________________

UNU-EHS, Institute for Environment and Human Security, Climate Change and Migration in the Pacific: Links, attitudes, and future scenarios in Nauru, Tuvalu, and Kiribati (2015) (source: https://i.unu.edu/media/ehs.unu.edu/news/11747/RZ_Pacific_EHS_ES CAP_151201.pdf)

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IV. Conclusion In conclusion, States have a responsibility to protect HR, when the individuals are under its jurisdiction. This is based on international customary law and the conventions that States are party to. It can be argued that the more States have the obligation to protect HR, the better the protection will be, and the more effective International HR Law will be. Especially concerning the new threat that climate change pauses to HR and the right to life in particular. It is a longestablished HR that no-one shall be detained without trial.

HR are not granted to individuals but are theirs because they are humans. However, individuals alone cannot protect their HR, and thus States are responsible for their protection. This entails the right to life, the right to dignity, the prohibition of torture and degrading treatment, but also potentially the right to a clean environment and the right to seek and enjoy asylum. For the protection of these rights, there must be obligations on the part of States, which are the obligation to ensure these HR, the duty to search and rescue, and the obligation of non-refoulement.

Delphine Saint-Martin is a Master of Law in International Law and Human Rights candidate at the University of Tartu. She holds a Bachelor's degree in French Law and Common Law, from the Paris Nanterre University. She is a Red Cross volunteer and is interested in climate change and migration.

Photo: Bastian Greshake Tzovaras, flickr.

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THE DEPRIVED FATE OF FOREIGN DOMESTIC WORKERS-HOW INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTIONS PRODUCE AND REPRODUCE SEGREGATION Article by Yi - Chia Chen There are various ways to recruit foreign workers, and one prominent tool is through intermediary institutions. In Arab Gulf countries, the employment contract is issued by a sponsor, kafeel, under kafala, an official sponsorship system initiated by governments. A foreign worker cannot enter and work in any Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) country without a local kafeel. The kafeel can be a placement agency, a company, an institution, or any individual under the condition that he or she 1 is a citizen of the given GCC country. Since the 1930s, when the first floods of foreign workers arrived in the region, and the formalisation in the 1950s, the kafala sponsorship system has not only become the legal basis for all foreigners’ residency and employment in the Gulf countries but also holds a structural role in sustaining the segregated 2 structure characterising the Gulf population. Meanwhile, there is a maze of agencies in South and Southeast Asia serving as non-official institution to recruit migrant workers to Gulf countries as well as East Asian countries. Considering the disparity of the official status between these two systems, their operations might also vary between each other. Nevertheless, no matter official or non-official institution, both the kafala sponsorship system and private recruitment agencies systematically create segregation and construct hierarchical practices, in particular for domestic workers, in Gulf countries as well as migrant-receiving countries in Asia. The Kafala Sponsorship System Since the 1930s, when the first groups of foreign workers came to the region, the institution of kafala is rooted in the construction of state-society links. ______________________________ 1 Fargues, Philippe, and Françoise De Bel-Air. “Migration to the Gulf

States: The Political Economy of Exceptionalism.” Global Migration: Old Assumptions, New Dynamics, Praeger, 2015, p. 155. 2 Ibid.

Photo: ILO Asia-Pacific, flickr.

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Either the process of national-building in the region’s independent states or the shift from protectorates of Western powers to independent political entities granting oil concessions spurred the need to define who would be entitled to a share of the oil rent, and shaped the nationals as 3 opposed to the foreigners. In the 1950s, the kafala became further formalised, and it determined the superiority of kafeel. This means that the fate of a foreign worker is entirely dependent upon the goodwill of a sponsor, who, at any time, can threaten his or her deportation if unsatisfied. Foreign workers are not allowed to change jobs or employers without the agreement of the kafeel. However, the kafeel has the power to transfer the sponsorship to another employer without the worker’s consent, because the kafala sponsorship system is designed to ensure that visas are only issued to migrant workers to meet the specific labour needs of employers.4 Workers also lose their mobility. Since, without obtaining explicit written permission from the kafeel, they are not able to enter or leave the country for any reason. The imbalance of power under the kafala system can be particularly seen in the case of domestic workers. Although both the employers and domestic workers are able to break contracts within a three-month probationary period, this ostensible equality is merely a ruse. On the one hand, if the worker breaks her contract, she must pay the cost of her return ticket--a charge that would have otherwise been paid by the sponsor. On the other hand, she may also be fined or forced to pay debts to the recruitment agency. Conversely, sponsors do not need to pay any cost within the probationary period.5

does not flow freely across or within the labour market.6 In the case of domestic workers, since most of them are confined to their sponsors’ homes, they have to rely on their sponsors to receive information. Under administrative regulations of the Ministry of Interior (MOI), domestic workers who have completed their contracts have the right to stay for one month before departing back home, which gives them an opportunity to settle any financial dues or look for employment.7 However, many of them are not aware of this immigration rule, because they do not receive the information from their sponsors; therefore, they often do not report to the embassy or police authorities to verify their immigration status and miss the opportunity to legally look for their next employment.8 The lack of legal knowledge further leads these domestic workers to stay illegally and leaves them in a vulnerable position in the destination market. Because of other illegal immigration, many domestic workers struggle to bargain for higher wages with employers and often have to suffer from long hours, unequal status and little food. The loss of income and labour abuse demonstrate that asymmetric information can lead to both legal and economic risks for migrant workers as well as additional complications for government officials.9 Visa trading is another problem for domestic workers created by the kafala system which benefits GCC nationals. Since GCC nationals with business licenses are given permission for work visas for a given number of immigrants, they may sell these visas to others. It is a multimillion-dollar industry. There are high fees for the initial sponsorship, followed by two-year renewal fees.10 ______________________________ 6 Katz, Eliakim, and Oded Stark. “International Migration Under

The kafala system also creates information asymetries. These occur when market information ______________________________

3 Fargues, Philippe, and Françoise De Bel-Air. “Migration to the Gulf

States: The Political Economy of Exceptionalism.” Global Migration: Old Assumptions, New Dynamics, Praeger, 2015, p. 155. 4 Awad, Ibrahim, and Nourhan Abdel Aziz. “Egyptian Irregular Migration in the GCC Countries.” Skilful Survivals: Irregular Migration to the Gulf, Gulf Research Centre Cambridge, 2017, p. 229. 5 Halabi, Romina. “Contract Enslavement of Female Migrant Domestic Workers in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.” Human Rights & Human Welfare, 2008, p. 43

Asymmetric Information.” The Economic Journal, vol. 97, no. 387, 1987, pp. 718–26. Crossref, doi:10.2307/2232932. 7 Malit, Froilan T., and George Naufal. “Asymmetric Information under the Kafala Sponsorship System: Impacts on Foreign Domestic Workers’ Income and Employment Status in the GCC Countries.” International Migration, vol. 54, no. 5, 2016, p. 14. Crossref, doi:10.1111/imig.12269. 8 Ibid., p.15 9 Ibid 10 “Responding to emerging and critical issues 1 Policy Brief No. 2: REFORM OF THE KAFALA ( SPONSORSHIP ) SYSTEM.” Migrant Forum Asia.

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Because of information asymmetries, some of the low-skilled workers even pay exorbitant amounts to buy a worker visa for a Gulf job that in reality may 11 not exist. This money is often borrowed from friends, relatives, or money lenders. The debt bondage compels and prolongs irregular residence in the Gulf, which continually makes them vulnerable in society. Private recruitment agencies On the other side of the globe, there is a maze of agencies in South and Southeast Asia serving as a non-official institution to recruit migrant workers for Gulf countries as well as for East Asian countries. Although some countries are starting to adopt a system of state-to-state recruitment for a certain field of migrant workers, excluding the involvement of commercial brokers, private recruitment agencies are still key stakeholders in temporary labour migration in Asia, mediating between aspiring migrant workers and employers in the regional and international labour market.12 The private recruitment industry is highly fragmented. There are both licensed and unlicensed recruitment agencies located in the capital or major cities of most Asian origin countries. While some agencies have registered subagents or staff operating at the local level, it is far more common for a migrant’s first point of contact to be an independent, individual agent -usually, villagers who worked overseas before or who are familiar with local politics. The individual agent finds prospective workers in the village, prepares their documents, and brings them over to the agency in the city.13In this way, an agency is able to reach the kind of workers they prefer at low costs. The migrant family also places more trust in a local agent than in some strangers from the city and feels more comfortable sending their children with a fellow villager to explore the unknown outside world.14 ______________________________

11 Shah, Nasra M. “Introduction: Skilful Survivals - Irregular Migration to

the Gulf.” Skillful Survivals: Irregular Migration to the Gulf, Gulf Research Centre Cambridge, 2017, p. 8. 12 Lan, Pei-Chia. “Deferential Surrogates and Professional Others: Recruitment and Training of Migrant Care Workers in Taiwan and Japan.” Positions, vol. 24, no. 1, 2016, p. 266. 13 Ibid., p.260 14 Ibid., p.261

Once a worker is connected with a recruitment agency in a country of origin, the agency then facilitates a relationship between the worker and a third party abroad. That third party is generally another recruitment agency in the destination country, which is responsible for placing the worker with an employer. Nevertheless, if the private recruitment agency is a transnational corporation, there is no need to link with a third party abroad. Instead, the private recruitment agency can not only do recruitment and work placement but also have the facility to train the worker in its country of origin. This allows them to minimise transaction costs and to maximise control in the recruitment and training process.15 The imbalance of power begins to be created from the training program provided by private recruitment agencies. This can be observed in a training centre in Indonesia, which is mainly for prospective domestic workers migrating to Taiwan. According to the owner, the most crucial aspect of the training is the Confucian principle of morality-aims to discipline villagers into productive and obedient labours by cultivating an attitude of subservience toward employers.16 The framework of the private recruitment agencies also causes information asymmetries, which result in workers migrating for employment without previously giving their voluntary informed consent. Subagent routinely misinforms workers about salary, working conditions, and living conditions associated with prospective employment.17 Yet, misrepresentations of this sort are the basis upon which recruiters justify their inflated fees. Based on what they are told, workers believe that the promised financial reward will outweigh the upfront financial investment, debt, and profound social costs of the decision to migrate.

______________________________ 15 Ibid., p.260

16 Ibid., p.262 17

Farbenblum, Bassina, and Justine Nolan. “The Business of Migrant Worker Recruitment: Who Has the Responsibility and Leverage to Protect Rights?” Texas International Law Journal, vol. 52, no. 1, 2017, p. 9,

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Moreover, terms are often not explained to workers and contracts are not provided prior to payment of significant fees, nor at a time when the worker is still able to refuse the position offered.18 Information asymmetry is also deliberately created by private recruitment agencies, causing conditions that render workers more vulnerable to abuse and less able to access protection and remedies 19 abroad. Following the previous example of the Indonesian training centre, instead of telling prospective domestic workers how to exercise their rights to protect themselves, trainers only preach to them: “Work hard, appreciate the opportunity to make money, and don’t fight with 20 your employers.” In other words, if something unfortunate happens, workers would not know how and where to seek assistance. Although private recruitment agencies only serve as a non-official institution, there can be a shift of governance from a state to the private sector, giving more power to the latter. In Taiwan, the government makes employers responsible for sending foreign workers home on time. Employers can only recruit a new foreign worker if the working permit of the previous one has expired and after he or she has returned to the country of origin. _____________________________

18 Ibid., 19 20

Ibid., p.10 Lan, Pei-Chia. Op. cit., p. 262

Photo: ILO Asia-Pacific, flickr.

This policy also puts immediate pressure on private recruitment agencies, since their profits come from brokerage fees that are earned by helping employers continue to hire new workers from overseas. In addition, the quota to hire workers is fixed, and one missing migrant worker means the reduction of profit from another migrant worker. Monitoring workers thus becomes the job of 21 private recruitment agencies. Therefore, private recruitment agencies intentionally control workers’ mobility. Combined with information asymmetry, workers may easily give away their passports to brokers, allowing them to limit their mobility. Segregation In the Gulf countries, decades of intense but temporary migration have resulted in nationals and non-nationals growing into two separate entities without a new, mixed population emerging as a result of their coexistence.22On the other side of the globe, although it is not as strict as in the Gulf countries, many migrant-receiving countries in Asia also promote ethnic homogeneity and prevent migrant workers from becoming citizens or permanent residents.

______________________________

21 Tseng, Yen-fen, and Hong-zen Wang. “Governing Migrant Workers at a

Distance: Managing the Temporary Status of Guestworkers in Taiwan.” International Migration, vol. 51, no. 4, 2011, p. 12. 22 Fargues, Philippe, and Françoise De Bel-Air. Op. cit., p. 147.

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To prevent foreigners from integrating with the rest of the society, through the kafala system and the practices of recruitment agencies, segregation is reproduced in three aspects-spatial, socioeconomic, and sociopolitical, which can also be observed in the case of domestic workers.

nationals in society. Furthermore, due to the information asymmetries created by the kafala system and private recruitment agencies, many domestic workers do not know that it is illegal for their employers to confine them in their homes, which further reinforces spatial segregation.

Spatial Segregation. To ensure control over foreign labourers' movements and prevent their intermingling with local populations, spatial 22 containment is often the rule of practice. As extreme as it may sound, in Qatar, where foreigners made up to 86 percent of the total population in 2010, the census conducted that year revealed that more than half of the residents were living in labour camps.24Yet, the situation of domestic workers is even worse, as nearly all domestic workers live in their employers’ homes.

Socioeconomic Segregation. From the distribution of employed populations by activity sector and occupations, the dual labour market is clearly shown and proves the existence of socioeconomic segregation. According to the GCC National Statistical Organisations, the data from 2017 to 2018 shows that out of all employed populations, not a single national of GCC countries works as a domestic worker in their own country. In Qatar, once, an advertisement in an Arabic newspaper by a recruitment agency looking for Qatari women to work as maids created massive anger around Qatari citizens, who considered that as an insult 26 and a humiliation towards Qatari society. These show that domestic workers are viewed as a job only for foreigners in GCC countries.

No matter in Gulf countries or migrant-receiving countries in Asia, in many cases, domestic workers are even confined in their employers’ homes without any opportunity to interact with society. According to a study from the International Labour Organization and UN Women, there is 6 per cent of employers of migrant domestic workers in Asian migrant-receiving countries claimed they had no 25 interaction with migrant workers. Therefore, when they are only allowed to stay in their employers’ homes, and not be able to step out of the houses, they also may not have a single chance to interact with anyone, not even with their employers. This can be explained by the imbalance of power and information asymmetry between domestic workers and employers, which are constructed by the kafala system and private recruitment agencies, making spatial segregation even more severe. Given the status hierarchy, there is a spatial distance between domestic workers and nationals, and none of them would like to communicate with each other. Once the spatial distance is practised, it not only prevents domestic workers from integrating into the local community but also continuously separates domestic workers from _____________________________ 23 Ibid., p.152 24 Ibid., p.153

25 International Labour Organization and UN Women. Public Attitudes

towards Migrant Workers in Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. International Labour Organization, 2019, p. 54.

The formation of dual labour markets can be explained by the kafala system. Because of the existence of kafala and the impossibility of switching kafeel, foreign workers are barred from professional competition and upscale mobility. In the case of domestic workers, they are evicted from a real labour market in Gulf countries. Even if they acquire other skills, because of the information asymmetry, they are still unable to find other employment. Therefore, it is the kafala system that creates this imbalance of power, and further leads to the socioeconomic segregation of domestic workers. In Asian migrant-receiving countries, domestic work is not necessarily a job only for foreigners, but livein domestic workers are mostly done by foreigners. As a result of attitudes and beliefs associated with the perception of domestic workers as criminals, socioeconomic segregation can also be observed. ______________________________ 26 Diop, Abdoulaye, et al. “Attitudes Towards Migrant Workers in the GCC:

Evidence from Qatar.” Journal of Arabian Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, 2012, p. 178. Crossref, doi:10.1080/21534764.2012.735453.

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Sociopolitical segregation. After the Iranian revolution took place, Arab migrants became subjects of political concerns in Gulf countries. On the one hand, due to the common-shared language and culture, Arab migrants’ exerting ideological influence, voicing political and labour demands, and likely settling in host Gulf countries became increasingly feared. On the other hand, since Asians were seen as a more flexible workforce and less prone to political expression, employers and governments in GCC states gradually started to favour the recruitment of Asian 31 over Arab workers. Sociopolitical segregation thus began in the Gulf region. According to an interview conducted in Thailand, people believe that foreign domestic workers could be associated with crimes due to the low income they earn, therefore, there can be a possibility for 27 them to bring in someone to rob employers. In Taiwan, a study also shows that the media’s reports about domestic workers often depict them as untrustworthy, uneducated, and incapable of maintaining a safe environment. These descriptions demonstrate that domestic workers in Taiwan are constructed as threats and are seen as driven by a lack of self-discipline.28

As it is assumed that foreign nationals would bring a working-class and its potential to protest and threaten the social stability, regimes and citizenries in GCC countries persistently oppose the naturalisation of foreign nations.32 To prevent integration, the kafala system endows local sponsors with a political agency as well.33This not only allows keeping migrant workers in check but also makes the kafeel a middleman between the foreign worker, the receiving country’s society and the state, which further strengthen the imbalance of power as well as sociopolitical segregation.

The negative label on domestic workers can be traced back to private recruitment agencies. From the curriculum conducted in the training centre, private recruitment agencies have already perceived that domestic workers have inadequate 29 morality in the first place. Since private recruitment agencies are the first contact for people getting to know domestic workers in migrant-receiving countries, how private recruitment agencies comment on domestic workers can determine people’s impression of foreign domestic workers. When domestic workers are often pictured as 30 lacking morality and desperate for money, through negative connotations, the gap of socioeconomic segregation between domestic workers and nationals can become wider, which leads to the result that most nationals are not willing to take up the domestic job. _____________________________

Although private recruitment agencies are nonofficial institutions, they also serve as a political agency in migrant-receiving countries in Asia. Since involuntary repatriation is undesirable in democratic societies, governments cannot do much in sending foreign domestic workers away when their time is up.34 In the case of Taiwan, by turning employers and private recruitment agencies into mediators to govern the temporary status of foreign domestic workers, persons and activities are governed through private channels supporting the state. No matter sending foreign domestic workers home on time or monitoring their activities, the Taiwanese government uses a quota system to transfer the monitoring role to 35 private recruitment agencies.

27 International Labour Organization and UN Women. Op. cit, p. 25. 28 Cheng, Hsin-I. “On Migrant Workers’ Social Status in Taiwan: A 29 Critical Analysis of Mainstream News Discourse.” International

Journal of Communication, vol. 10, 2016, p. 2521 Lan,Pei-Chia. Op. cit., p. 262. 30 Ibid.

_____________________________

31 Fargues, Philippe, and Françoise De Bel-Air. Op. cit., p. 143. 32 Ibid., p. 154. 33

Ibid., p. 157.

34 Tseng, Yen-fen, and Hong-zen Wang. Op. cit., p. 12. 35 Ibid.

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Conclusion While segregation is produced by inequalities of gender, class, ethnicity, occupation and citizenship, as intermediary institutions in societies, the kafala system and the private recruitment agencies also produce and reproduce the segregation for domestic workers in Gulf countries as well as migrant-receiving countries in Asia.

Domestic workers are marginalised through the intermediary recruiting system, and the operational mechanisms of these intermediary institutions further reinforce the separation between foreign domestic workers and nationals.

Yi Chia-Chen is from Taiwan and is studying for a Master Programme in Human Rights Studies at Lund University. She has done an exchange study in Egypt, where she further develops her interest in refugees and migration studies.

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SOME PEOPLE CANNOT EVEN AFFORD TO BE LEGAL: THE PRECARITY OF THAI UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANT WORKERS IN SOUTH KOREA Article by Wichuta Teeratanabodee In December 2020, the Thomson Reuters Foundation uncovered at least 522 Thais that had been reported dead in South Korea, most of whom 1 were undocumented migrant workers. The issue was declared as an alarming human rights case by the United Nations International Labor 2 Organization (ILO). This breaking news has also brought attention to the subject of undocumented, or illegal, Thai migrant workers in South Korea, the number of which has been increasing throughout the past years. This article looks at the situations of Thai migrant workers in South Korea and posits the issue is highly complicated as it involves extended problems on the systematic level, including the socio-economic conditions of the workers that pushed them out of Thailand and the unaccommodating migration processes. Furthermore, the issue requires a deeper understanding of other related circumstances the workers are facing, including their working and living conditions, motives, and other restrictions. _____________________________

In this case, while the undocumented migrant workers want to follow the procedures and laws, they face financial challenges. In other words, some of them cannot even afford to be legal. Through this paper, I hope to fulfil three aims. First of all, I want to shed light on the topic of the Thai undocumented migrant workers in South Korea and echo it to a larger pool of audiences. Second, I want to explore various dimensions of the issue by focusing on their precarity in addition to the mere fact that the workers live and work illegally. Finally, I hope to encourage the readers to view this issue from a different viewpoint and critically question the system those workers are facing. Through this approach, while we might find ourselves in a dilemma, we would also understand the issue more deeply, which might perhaps lead us to some solutions.

1 The Straits Times. 2020. UN calls for inquiry after hundreds of Thai

workers die in S. Korea. Accessed 31 January 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/un-calls-for-inquiry-afterhundreds-of-thai-workers-die-in-s-korea. 2 The Straits Times. 2020. UN calls for inquiry after hundreds of Thai workers die in S. Korea. Accessed 31 January 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/un-calls-for-inquiry-afterhundreds-of-thai-workers-die-in-s-korea.

Photo: Arielle Lewis, flickr.

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Background Seeking employment in a foreign country is not a new phenomenon. People who wish to embark on this path need to undergo several administrative steps. In South Korea, specifically, one of the first and most important steps required by the Korean Ministry of Manpower is to study the Korean language, because English is not widely used as a means of communication in the industries commonly joined by foreign migrant workers. The language skills are tested via a few rounds of standardized exams, which the applicant must pass before being eligible to register and apply for a job through the Korean Minister of Manpower.

Most undocumented migrant workers take on the so-called 3 Ds works.5 It is a kind of dirty, dangerous, and difficult works that is less attractive among the locals, such as construction, factory, and farming. Apart from the lack of domestic labour forces, employers themselves also prefer to hire foreign migrant workers from less economically developed countries for these roles, as they can set lower 6 wages to save costs of production. Furthermore, the wages from 3Ds works are still much higher than similar kind of works in Thailand. As a result, despite being dirty, dangerous, or difficult, undocumented migrant workers tend to aim for the 3Ds works in South Korea. The Precarity and Exploitation

The Thai government provides some support to people who wish to seek employment in South Korea, such as language and technical training courses. However, it is not a popular means since most of the workers, who seek financial improvement, cannot afford to go through such time- and resource-consuming procedures. As a result, the majority of Thai migrant workers in South Korea are undocumented; in other words, they enter South Korea to live and work there illegally. While it is difficult to indicate the exact number, the Thai Embassy in Seoul estimated over 150,000 undocumented Thai migrant workers as of March 2020, compared to approximately 25,000 Thais who attained works in South Korea through a legal process.3 Landing in South Korea Most of the Thai workers entered Korea as travellers by taking advantages of the bilateral FreeVisa Agreement.4 The agreement allows each country’s citizens to visit and stay up to 90 days in the other country. Therefore, several Thais used this pass to enter Korea, seek employment, and overstay to work. This method is undoubtedly illegal and consequently leaves them in precarious and unprotected situations. _____________________________

3 PPTVHD 36. 2020. ผีน้อย คือ เปดคํานิยามกลุ่มแรงงานไทยจากเกาหลีใต้

หลังเผชิญปญหาโควิด-19 (translated: ‘Little Ghosts- Thai Migrant Workers in South Korea Facing the Covid-19 Problem’). 4 TTR Weekly. 2020. Seoul cuts visa-free for Thai travellers. Accessed 31 January 2021, https://www.ttrweekly.com/site/2020/04/seoulcuts-visa-free-for-thai-travellers/#:~:text=The%20 Thai%20and%20South%20Korean,Last%20month.

Due to the lack of legal protection, this group of migrant workers often face challenging and harsh working conditions. They are more prone to exploitation and violation of human rights, such as overwork and lack of access to healthcare and supporting systems. Not so uncommonly, some have been refused to be paid up to the agreed amount of money.7Nevertheless, these workers have to remain quiet, as if they decided to speak up and seek help, they would face the risk of being deported. Even if they wanted to seek help, the language barriers remain a huge obstacle. As a result, most undocumented migrant workers tend to endure their living and working situations regardless of how severe the conditions are. The case of Nid, an employee of a hotel in South Korea, is a great example. _____________________________ 5 Bangchan-ad, B. (2020). เจาะอาชีพ 'ผีน้อย' ในเกาหลี ค่าแรงวันละ 2,000 ต้อง

อะไรบ้าง? (translated: The ‘Little Ghosts’ Career in South Korea- what do they do for the daily wage of 2000 (TBH)). Bangkok Business. Accessed 31 January 2021, ttps://www.bangkokbiznews.com/news/detail/869301 6 Ibid. 7 BBC Thai. (2018). สนทนากับ "ผีน้อย": ประสบการณ์คนงานไทยผิดกฎหมายใน เกาหลีใต้ (translated: Conversing with ‘Little Ghosts’: Their experiences working illegally in South Korea). Accessed 31 January 2021, https://www.bbc.com/thai/thailand-45369383.

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Nid is a 32-year-old undocumented migrant worker in Thailand who overstayed after the 90 days of visiting Korea. She worked in a small hotel 15 hours 8 a day, with one day off per month, Without any doubt, the working hours, as well as the number of holidays she received, is illegal according to the Korean laws, which allows up to 52 hours a week 9 (40 hours with additional 12 hours of overtime). However, Nid decided not to reach out for any help as she was living and working there illegally. After a few years of working there, she fell sick and decided to report herself to the Thai Embassy in Seoul. Through this process, Nid’s name was put on the waitlist along with other 10,000 undocumented Thai migrant workers to be 10 deported to Thailand. While waiting to go back to Thailand, Nid still had to work and could not really seek help or ensure that her labour’s rights were protected. “They have judged us. We chose to come here illegally by ourselves, so we have to face and put up with any 11 situations that happened to us” remarked Nid The situation is even more worrying during the COVID-19 pandemic as the undocumented migrant workers were put into a more precarious position. In early 2020, South Korea was one of the most affected countries. At its peak, at the end of February, there were 800-1400 daily cases.12Without healthcare and proper legal protection, many of those workers decided to report themselves to the Thai Embassy to be on the deportation waitlist. This indeed triggered a controversy in Thailand as many Thais were afraid that the migrant workers would bring the virus into the country. _____________________________

8 BBC Thai. (2018). สนทนากับ "ผีน้อย": ประสบการณ์คนงานไทยผิดกฎหมายใน

เกาหลีใต้ (translated: Conversing with ‘Little Ghosts’: Their experiences working illegally in South Korea). 9 Khaosod Online. (2020). มูลนิธร ิ อยเตอร์ตีแผ่ “ผีน้อยไทย” เสียชีวต ิ เยอะสุดใน เกาหลีใต้-ไร้สาเหตุอือ UN จีตรวจสอบ (translated: The Reuters Foundation Found ‘Thai Little Ghosts’ highest death rate in South Korea- no reasons; UN urges for an investigation). 10 The Straits Times. (2018). South Korea officially drops its maximum workweek to 52 hours to promote work-life balance. ิ อยเตอร์ตีแผ่ “ผีน้อยไทย” เสียชีวต ิ เยอะสุดใน 11 Khaosod Online. (2020). มูลนิธร เกาหลีใต้-ไร้สาเหตุอือ UN จีตรวจสอบ (translated: The Reuters Foundation Found ‘Thai Little Ghosts’ highest death rate in South Korea- no reasons; UN urges for an investigation). ิ อยเตอร์ตีแผ่ “ผีน้อยไทย” เสียชีวต ิ เยอะสุดใน 12 Khaosod Online. (2020). มูลนิธร เกาหลีใต้-ไร้สาเหตุอือ UN จีตรวจสอบ (translated: The Reuters Foundation Found ‘Thai Little Ghosts’ highest death rate in South Korea- no reasons; UN urges for an investigation).

Discussions One of the most straightforward perspectives is to perhaps criticize by focusing on the illegal part. On the other hand, however, it is important also to question, “what are the rationales that would make someone risk their health and life by living in a foreign country without any legal protection?” And the most common answer is financial conditions. “I would definitely love to [secure the work permit and legally seek employment in South Korea]. I want to go further to Dubai or Europe, but I don’t have the money to even start with documents and other processes. That’s why I am saving up [in South Korea]” remarked an undocumented Thai migrant worker in South 13 Korea. As the motivation is to get a higher salary (working in Korea would promise them at least 4-5 times 14 higher wages than Thailand), it is not surprising that many people with fewer economic opportunities would aspire to go abroad and seek a better quality of life, which, in the case of many undocumented migrant workers, is defined by the financial status. Most of them hope to work for a couple of years, save up, and return to Thailand with a higher position on the socioeconomic ladder. In the past decade, especially, Thailand has also been going through waves of economic stagnation and political upheaval. These factors play a significant role in “pushing” many outside to explore better opportunities. ______________________________ 13 BBC Thai. (2018). สนทนากับ "ผีน้อย": ประสบการณ์คนงานไทยผิดกฎหมาย

ในเกาหลีใต้ (translated: Conversing with ‘Little Ghosts’: Their experiences working illegally in South Korea). Accessed 31 January 2021, https://www.bbc.com/thai/thailand-45369383. 14 Khaosod Online. (2017). ตีแผ่ "ผีน้อย" คนไทยในเกาหลีไปทํางานอะไร ไป ยังไง อยูแ ่ บบไหน รายได้ดีแค่ไหน!? (translated: Reveal ‘Little Ghosts’ Thai Migrant Workers in South Korea- the works, working conditions, living conditions, and salary). Accessed 31 January 2021, https://www.khaosod.co.th/special-stories/news_355829.

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Conclusion This article indeed does not argue that violating the laws or seeking employment without documents is justified. Instead, it hopes to reveal the living conditions and motives behind undocumented migrant workers in South Korea.

It has also pointed out that while working abroad is seen as a way to earn a higher salary, some cannot even afford to take this path legally. The paper cannot provide any ultimate solutions apart from encouraging the readers to see it from a different angle, including the workers’ motives and push effects from the origin country.

Wichuta Teeratanabodee is pursuing a master’s degree in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies – NTU, Singapore. Wichuta’s research interests include development issues and politics in East Asia. She plans to pursue a career in academia to contribute her passion for research to addressing social issues.

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THE ARENDTIAN PARADOX OF STATELESSNESS: HUMAN RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP, AND "THE RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS" Article by Quah Say Jye This essay works at the intersection of politics, philosophy, and history, and surrounds three overlapping subjects. Firstly, statelessness, or the condition of being without citizenship or ties to any nation-state, one of “the most destabilising 1 developments of modern politics”. A large proportion of the 12 million stateless people today are refugees or forced migrants, making the issue of migrant rights of urgent importance. 2 Thus, failure to elucidate and address the problem of statelessness has major repercussions on the fate of migrants around the world.

Second, it concerns Hannah Arendt, “without question…the most widely studied figure in the history of political thought to reflect on the meaning of statelessness.” 3Arendt is taken to argue that the mass statelessness that precipitated from the wars of the 20th century reveals the limitations of human rights, as when individuals were found outside of a social context from which human rights could be recognised and enforced, these rights were pointless exactly when they were needed most.

_____________________________

3 Siegelberg, Statelessness, 10.

_____________________________ 1 Mira L. Siegelberg, Statelessness: A Modern History (Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 2020), 2.

2 United Nations, “'12 Million' Stateless People Globally, Warns

UNHCR Chief in Call to States for Decisive Action | UN News,” November 2018, https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/11/1025561.

23 5

Photo: rvjak, flickr.

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It is from this, as elaborated later, that scholars have primarily taken Arendt to argue that mass statelessness reveals that citizenship confers our third subject – “the right to have rights”, the basic, foundational right from which all other rights follow. As Abrahamian writes, Arendt’s “pithy summary of the problem—that political inclusion constitutes the right to have rights—is cited endlessly”. 4 This essay argues that instead of citizenship conferring the “right to have rights”, the main insight of Arendt’s phrase, taken in the context of her book, is to raise a general argument against ‘natural’ rights through revealing a paradox of human and citizenship rights. The phrase “right to have rights” shows us that to imagine a right, we need to imagine a prior right from which we may claim the former right, and so forth. In the context of the entire chapter, Arendt suggests this by raising a paradox surrounding the idea of rights that statelessness reveals, namely that human rights presuppose citizenship rights, and citizenship presupposes human rights. To propose this reading, a rebalancing of the emphasis given to the different points raised by Arendt is necessary. Specifically, without taking away anything from her pointed critique of human rights, the paradox naturally forms itself when we draw more attention to her comments on citizenship, as membership within the nation-state. While scholars are certainly correct in highlighting Arendt as a critic of human rights, they have underplayed the condemnation of citizenship that runs parallel to her scepticism of human rights. By taking these criticisms as secondary and focusing on the more philosophically interesting critique of human rights, an incomplete and misleading picture is painted. By accounting for the remarks about the nation-state and citizenship, we can see how the problem of statelessness reveals that ‘natural’ rights rest on a paradox. _____________________________ 4 Atossa Araxia Abrahamian, “The Right to Belong,” The New York

Review of Books, review of Mira L. Siegelberg, Stateless: A Modern History, and Dimitry Kochenov, Citizenship, December 17, 2020. https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2020/12/17/statelessness-rightto-belong/. Italics added.

This paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 establishes the background context of chapter 9 of Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism which contains the phrase ‘the rights to have rights'. It also offers a brief sample of the scholarship that takes Arendt to hold that citizenship confers the “right to have rights”. Section 3 details Arendt’s critique of human rights. Section 4 moves on to Arendt’s critique of citizenship. This dual critique sets the foundation for Section 5, which concludes the paper by restating and clarifying the general thesis that Arendt’s phrase should be read as an attack against the idea of ‘natural’ rights in general, as it puts itself forward as a circular paradox - that human rights presuppose citizenship rights, and citizenship presupposes human rights. Two caveats regarding the scope of this essay are first introduced. Firstly, the main ‘debate’ that this essay wants to base itself on is over interpretations of Arendt, and not normative prescriptions that arise from Arendt’s views or general ideas of citizenship. In other words, it challenges scholarly interpretations of Arendt and offers little beyond (though implications might arise). Secondly, this essay takes on an internalist reading of the relevant text and does not interact with the secondary literature that situates Arendt in relevant debates 5 of the period. Background Arendt, a Jew, fled Nazi Germany in 1933. She spent 13 years stateless, before being granted citizenship in the United States. This experience of being stateless, together with her reflections on global currents, underpins chapter 9 of her 1951 book Origins, which contains her analysis of statelessness and its implications for human rights and citizenship.

______________________________ 5 Siegelberg, Statelessness: A Modern History, 190-191.

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Arendt presents how as a result of the disintegration of empires in World War I and the mass expulsion and denationalisation of minorities before and during World War II, millions worldwide lost their citizenship and were de facto or de jure 6 stateless. For Arendt, the condition of statelessness was one of precariousness and invisibility, without protection or recognition. This, as explained later, reflects the failure of human rights, which were supposed to exist independent of any context and simply virtue of one’s humanity. It is also within this chapter that the pregnant phrase “the right to have rights” appears twice, firstly and more importantly in, “We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one's actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new 7 global political situation.” Scholarship on Arendt’s views on statelessness has primarily focused on the critique of human rights, and taken Arendt to take citizenship to confer the “right to have rights”. Taylor’s claim that “Arendt’s insight here is that the one right that is really needed, and missing, is the right to be a citizen of a nation-state” represents the conventional 8 understanding of the phrase and chapter. As the next section shows, it is Arendt’s sharp critique of human rights that leads to these conclusions. This is not a totally inaccurate view and seems to be confirmed by how Arendt follows her use of the term with “and a right to belong to some kind of organized community”. Yet, when we read Arendt in the context of her chapter, we can see how this view is incomplete and moves too close to a reading that takes citizenship as a solution to statelessness.

_____________________________ 6 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego, NY,

London: Harcourt Brace, [1951] 1985), 76, 279. Arendt does not elaborate on what constitutes de facto and de jure statelessness. 7 Ibid., pp. 296-297. 8 ibid., p.9.

A considerable proportion of the literature underplays Arendt’s reservations of citizenship. A rebalancing of the reading of Arendt that accounts adequately for her criticisms of citizenship will instead reveal a paradox that functions as a criticism of ‘natural’ rights. Arendt's critique of human rights Before moving to Arendt’s critique of citizenship, it is important to present her well-noted critique of human rights. The release of Origins coincided with the post-war phase, where international organisations, specifically the United Nations, held great promise in being able to prevent the horrors of the world wars from repeating. Relatedly, international declarations like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had spurred optimism over the potential of human rights to play a bigger role on the international stage. Human rights were theoretically embodied in the individual simply by virtue of their humanity. That way, even if an individual human being were stateless or without membership in a political community, they would still have rights and be protected from the various arbitrary oppressions by international organisations. Yet, for Arendt, statelessness revealed both political and philosophical shortcomings of human rights. This section explains them both in turn. The political critique of human rights straightforwardly parallels the school of realism within international relations theory. Arendt points out that the international system is not an autonomous organisation on its own, and only functions through the operation of individual states. As such, there is no ‘world government’ that can enforce international human rights law. This led Arendt to be greatly sceptical of ideas of human 9 rights ever being reliably enforced. Arendt’s philosophical critique ‘naturalness’ of human rights. ______________________________

targets

the

9 Arendt’s pessimism goes further still, noting that while such “a world

government is indeed within the realm of possibility, but one may suspect that in reality, it might differ considerably from the version promoted by idealistic-minded organizations.” See Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 298.

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Photo: rvjak, flickr.

Jus Humanis Journal of International Human Rights Law // March 2021

As Arendt notes, the “stateless people were as convinced as the minorities that loss of national rights was identical with loss of human rights, that 12 the former inevitably entailed the latter.” Combined, the political and philosophical critique represents Arendt’s thoughts on how statelessness reveals the limitations of human rights. For Arendt, to continue to insist on human rights as the key to solving the issue of statelessness is a dead-end, as

Photo: skizo39, flickr.

She traces the idea of human rights back to Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man, written about the French Revolution, where human rights were taken to be ‘naturally’ embodied by an abstract individual simply by virtue of their humanity.10In other words, all human beings are inalienably right-bearers, regardless of characteristics or political status. This contrasted with ideas of the right that preceded the French Revolution, which took it that rights were instead won and maintained through 11 struggle. Yet, Arendt points out that statelessness reveals that rights taken to be naturally held by individuals are actually meaningless if not recognised in a social context. By taking as the ontological subject an atomised individual abstracted from all social context, human rights theorists makes a crucial philosophical mistake. Individuals, without a social context from which they and their ‘natural’ rights can be recognised, particularly nation-states, become exactly as human rights theory takes them to be - abstract entities, and therefore effectively invisible. When they are invisible, the stateless completely lose the ability for political participation, and cannot press for any of the natural rights they supposedly hold. In other words, as individuals lose their citizenship, or membership in a political community, their human rights are no longer recognised and in effect completely lost. _____________________________

10 Ibid., pp. 268-25. 11 Arendt notes the departure from history that human rights

entailed by stating that “This new situation, in which "humanity" has in effect assumed the role formerly ascribed to nature or history, would mean in this context that the right to have rights, or the right of every individual to belong to humanity, should be guaranteed by humanity itself.” See Ibid., 298.

“No paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant irony than the discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist on regarding as "inalienable" those human rights, which are enjoyed only by citizens of the most prosperous and civilized countries, and the situation of 13 the rightless themselves.” What these critiques of human rights, revealed by statelessness, entail is that individuals require a guarantee of a social context from which rights can be recognised and enforced, lest these rights are pointless. It is not far to go from this criticism of human rights to the position that Arendt takes citizenship to act as the aforementioned guarantee, and therefore confers the “right to have rights”. As mentioned, however, to stop at this point is to paint an incomplete picture as it does not adequately account for Arendt’s critique of citizenship. Doing so would reveal a paradox that acts as an attack on the idea of ‘natural’ rights in general. Arendt's critique of citizenship Arendt’s critique of citizenship is not entirely systematic but is not without logical coherence and further implications. This section seeks to reconstruct this critique so that it can be used to put forward the paradox that, this essay suggests, embodies the main insight of her chapter.

_____________________________ 12 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 293. 13 Ibid., p.279.

Photo: Bùi Linh Ngân, flickr.

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Importantly, what is presented here is an incomplete reconstruction of her critique of citizenship and does not cover her critique of how taking nation-states as the unit of international politics gives rise to statelessness. It focuses on the logic of exclusion inherent in nation-states that causes expulsion and the irreversibility of statelessness, which should suffice to find the general thesis of the essay. To appreciate Arendt’s critiques of citizenship, we must observe two important historical contexts. Firstly, it is the context where the nation-state is the hegemonic form of political organisation. Throughout Origins, Arendt equates citizenship with its formal definition, or as legal membership within a nation-state. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that in Arendt’s context, the nation-state retains privileged status as the hegemonic or common-sense form of political organisation. This is especially prescient in the post-WWII moment that Arendt wrote in, an era of decolonisation and post-colonial struggle. Many of these struggles centred around the goal of obtaining their own nation-state, and were moved by the forces of nationalism which had been growing since the 14 French Revolution. Since Arendt draws such a tight link between citizenship and the nation-state and does not explicitly offer us any alternative conception of citizenship, we can reasonably read any critique of the nation-state also as a critique of citizenship. The other important historical context is the French Revolution, which Arendt references numerous times in her chapter. Arendt’s understanding of human rights is explicitly linked to the French Revolution’s conception, and she understands the initial purpose of human rights by 15 looking back to that period. During the French Revolution, human rights were conceived as a way to protect individuals from arbitrary state power.

_____________________________

14 See, for example, Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the 15

Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse (London: Zed Books, 1993). Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 293.

Arendt understands the purpose of human rights as a last resort onto which individuals could fall back on when under state oppression. For Arendt, at the root of statelessness is a logic of exclusion inherent within nation-states, and therefore citizenship. As she states, “the danger of this development”, referring to statelessness, “had been inherent in the structure of the nation-state 16 since the beginning”. This is especially the case in an age of rising nationalism, given nationalism’s inherent insistence on homogeneity within its society. At the root of statelessness was this overwhelming sense of nationalism, the logic of which had overwhelmed state institutions. She states, "with the rise of stateless people…the transformation of the state from an instrument of the law into an instrument of the nation had been completed; the nation had conquered the state, 17 national interest had priority over law”. Anyone that does not fit into the overarching homogeneity, most poignantly the Jews in Nazi Germany, are seen as ‘aliens’. The nation-state and its insistence on homogeneity cultivate a fear of the alien, which it sees as “a frightening symbol of the fact of difference” which the state “has a distinct 18 tendency to destroy”. From exclusion, we are one step to expulsion or denationalisation, which directly causes statelessness. Mass expulsions of minorities from the nation-state are a perfect example of arbitrary state power, as the state uses force or the threat of force to strip individuals of citizenship, removing individuals from their social and territorial jurisdiction. As mentioned, human rights were designed to protect individuals from such state power, allowing us to see how Arendt is raising a paradox, as elaborated in the next section. Furthermore, exclusion more sharply contributes to statelessness by ensuring that the two solutions, repatriation and naturalisation, are rendered 19 ineffective. ______________________________

16 Ibid., 275. 17 Ibid., 275. See also 230. 18 Ibid., 301. 19 Ibid., 281-285.

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Repatriation fails as nation-states, operating under the logic of exclusion and the fear of aliens, “did not worry too much about committing a few illegal acts in order to diminish the country's burden of undesirables [sic]” and therefore rejected those it had originally expelled. 20 Naturalisation failed primarily for logistical reasons, as mass statelessness overwhelmed bureaucratic structures. From this, with extra pressure from the domestic population driven by the fear of the alien, nation-states decided that instead of naturalising some of the stateless, it would cancel earlier naturalisations, therefore restarting the cycle of statelessness. By rendering these solutions ineffective, Arendt points out that citizenship not only sits at the root of mass statelessness through 21 expulsion but ossifies it by making it irreversible. [Nation-states causes statelessness by expulsion, then fail to remedy the issue, and therefore make statelessness permanent. From the logic of exclusion inherent in nationstates, to which the idea of citizenship is closely tied, statelessness arises and becomes irreversible. Arendt can therefore be seen to deliver a strong critique of citizenship. By factoring in this critique, we can begin to see that the idea that Arendt took citizenship to confer the “right to have rights” is an incomplete picture and that the phrase embodies something deeper. _____________________________

Recapping the paradox With Arendt’s critique of both human rights and citizenship stated, we may now revisit the general thesis of this paper - that Arendt’s phrase, when read in context, represents an attack against the idea of ‘natural’ rights in general, putting itself forward in the form of paradox - that human rights presuppose citizenship rights, and citizenship presupposes human rights. It is by appreciating this paradox that Arendt’s critique of natural rights clarifies itself in its fullest force. With her critique of both human rights and citizenship, Arendt shows firstly that without membership in a socio-political context which citizenship provides, the stateless have no recognition of their human rights and no institutions to enforce them. This socio-political context in Arendt’s time undoubtedly refers to the nation-state. Yet, concurrently, individuals depend on human rights, or some form of naturallygrounded guarantee from which masses of individuals might be protected from state oppression, as without it there is nothing to stop them from being expelled from the nation-state.

20 Ibid., p.283 21 Ibiid., p.293

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This circular relationship on which rights presuppose each other and subsequently themselves shows that there is no natural or apriori foundation on which rights can be grounded, as they always rely on a prior form of rights. Therefore, the phrase “the right to have rights” reveals a circular understanding of rights, as to posit a right is always to presuppose a different one. Consequently, as statelessness reveals, strip away one of the human rights or citizenship rights, and both crumble. From the logic of exclusion inherent in nation-states, to which the idea of citizenship is closely tied, statelessness arises and becomes irreversible. Arendt can therefore be seen to deliver a strong critique of citizenship. By factoring in this critique, we can begin to see that the idea that Arendt took citizenship to confer the “right to have rights” is an incomplete picture and that the phrase embodies something deeper. This essay has thus re-presented Arendt’s attack on ‘natural’ rights.

For Arendt, the idea that rights are pre-political, naturally guaranteed, inalienable, and therefore do not have to be earned but instead possessed by abstract individuals as a given, is too complacent. By showing that natural rights, like human rights, are instead always predicated on other rights, Arendt shows that no natural foundation exists. Allowing ourselves to think that our rights will always be there regardless of the political situation lets our guard down and allows these rights to be stripped away, as statelessness shows. However, if rights are not naturally-ordained, it also means that we can struggle and fight to secure more rights than we 22 currently have. This struggle for rights is what 23 constitutes Arendt’s idea of political struggle. With 24 the prospect of 150 million climate refugees, if Arendt were alive, she might suggest that this is not a struggle we can afford to give up. _____________________________ 22 Ibid., 310. 23 Ingram, “What Is a ‘Right to Have Rights’?”, 408-413.

24 John Vidal, “Global Warming Could Create 150 Million 'Climate

Refugees' by 2050.” The Guardian, November 3, 2009. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/nov/03/globalwarming-climate-refugees.

Quah Say Jye is an MSc (Asian Studies) student at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. His research interests lie at the intersection of politics, philosophy, and history.

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NOMADS OF DOLPA PO OF NEPAL AND THE OBSCURE REALITIES OF CHILDREN ON THE MOVE Article by Aastha Kc “Perhaps home is not a place but simply an irrevocable condition”. James Baldwin

Humans are known to have migrated extensively throughout prehistory and human history. However, migration continues to remain a vehemently discussed but poorly understood issue. More often than not, it has been formulated as a metaphor within contemporary debates for movement and dislocation and the crossing of borders and boundaries. In this sense, migration is often also generalised and subsequently invents an implicit narrative that prerequisites home as a place of fixity. The quotation from Baldwin, therefore, is intended to only illustrate the often overlooked. Dolpa, the largest but the least developed and remote district, lies in the mid-western region of Nepal. Most of its hills are naked, open and dry due to low rainfall. The district in itself ranges from as low as sub-tropical 1575m to as high as nival zone 6883m and provides a unique trans-Himalayan ecosystem.[1] The “hidden” valleys of Dolpa are therefore an adventurous traveller’s dreams realized. Discarded camping gear, energy food packaging, plastic bottles bobbing around the once pristine waters are testimony that the paths are graced by many. The date, place of manufacture and languages on some of these discarded items is telling that Dolpa is truly adored and adorned by everyone alike around the globe. One cannot help but also notice severe anthropogenic interference caused by forest fires, over-grazing, deforestation, etc. in its surroundings. Traces of political slogans left behind by the cadres of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) from the time of insurgency during Nepal’s Maoist movement (1996-2008) remain on the walls of rocks near the district’s headquarters in Dunai. _____________________________

1 Kunwar, Ripu & Adhikari, Nirmal. (2005). Ethnomedicine of Dolpa

district, Nepal: The plants, their vernacular names and uses. Lyonia. 8.

Murals of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao and Che (an icon for the new Maoist age) can be frequently sighted, next to the slogans that promise “One toilet per house in the next five years” and another that asserts the beginning of the “new era of the socialist republic”. The “Battle of Dunai” that claimed the lives of 14 policemen in a crossfire between the Maoist guerilla and local police in late September 2000 marks the first armed attack led by the Maoist group which happens to be the 2 district’s headquarters. It later manifested as the decade long insurgency that resulted in the deaths of over 17,000 people, including civilians, insurgents and police personnel and the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, mostly throughout rural Nepal. However, it is important to note that this data is an approximation made by the state and the individual-level data on the victims of war is inconsistent and thus, contested by human rights organisations and researchers. Lest we forget, the valley, therefore, is not all that “hidden” as the state’s tourism industry likes to advertise after all. Dolpo is the upper part of the Dolpa district bordered in the north by China. The sparse, agropastoral population known as Dolpa Po in standard Tibetian and Dhol-wa in the local dialect is connected to the rest of the Dolpa district via Jufal airport, which can be reached in approximately three days by horse. Whilst the precise population numbers for the region is unavailable, some research estimates it to be between 5,000 and 3 18,000. The Dolpa Po are generally adherents of Bon, a Tibetan religion whose origins predate Buddhism. _____________________________

2 Maoist insurgency - Battle of Dunai - Dolpa, September (2000)

Available at: https://www.raonline.ch/pages/story/np/npstory02.html

3 Deepak Adhikari “Nepal: 13 years after civil war ends, victims await

justice” (13.07.2019), Available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asiapacific/nepal-13-years-after-civil-war-ends-victims-awaitjustice/1530499

Photo: Aastha KC

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Although it is hard to find an acceptable number of historical accounts on Bon, some written works can be found that help make some broad inferences about their genealogy. “The Bon landscape of Dolpo: Pilgrimage, Monasteries, Biographies and the Emergence of Bon.” written by Marietta Kind or Kenneth Bauer’s “High frontiers: Dolpa and the changing world of Himalayan pastoralists” amongst others provide some historical evidence about the Dolpa Po and provide an account for how and when they settled in the region after fleeing religious persecution by the kingdoms of western Tibet. Nepal is not a signatory to 1951 Refugees Convention or its 1967 Protocol, nor does it have any domestic legislation relating to the protection 4 of refugees. According to the last World Refugee Survey conducted by the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) in 2008, Nepal hosted 130,000 refugees amongst whom 20, 000 were Tibetians who fled the Chinese invasion in 1959. The remaining were the Nepali-speaking Lhotsampas from Bhutan who fled ethnic cleansing in 1991 and 1992 from a nation whose government is guided by the principle of Gross Domestic Happiness. The exact data on how many refugees might have settled in the trans-Himalayan areas of Nepal like Dolpo from this time is unknown. Despite Dolpa Po’s ancestors crossed borders initially to avoid religious persecutions, Dolpo was a region where the writ of Nepalese government barely ran at all and was left politically autonomous internally allegedly before the 1960s.

The Agro-pastoralists or the nomadic population were of course severely impacted by the closing of the Tibetan border. Impermanence, which happens to be the cornerstone of the Buddhist teachings and practice, which the people here sincerely follow, continues to be the number one inescapable, and essentially painful, fact of life in Dolpo. The locals recall when the Nepalese government introduced the new system called Village Development Committees (VDC) in the late ’70s in the name of Nepal’s nation-building campaign, the four valleys of Dolpa were remapped into 6 VDCs. The officials came in groups, mounted their makeshift camps and issued national identities among the people by distributing citizenship cards. It is unknown how many people were handed citizenship cards amidst this said ‘nation-building’ chaos. The citizenship card is, however, a legal and a valid document that recognises the people of Dolpo as Nepalese citizens. Well, at least those who happened to get hold of one when the officials were there, the rest neither carry official identity cards nor are registered in the state’s census.

The region and its people for this reason, amongst others, claim to have benefitted from this very limited political interference from the state, leaving the right of self-governance to the villagers and its eastern neighbour then known as the Kingdom of Lo for quite some time. The region continues to maintain close cultural and economic ties with Lhasa and other ethnically Tibetan border communities despite the closing of the Tibet border today. _____________________________

4 United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, World

Refugee Survey 2009 - Nepal, 17 June 2009, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/4a40d2aec.html.

Photo: Aastha KC

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Besides, culture and people who bear no linkage to the Hindu caste system today carry random castes in their surnames from that time government officials handed out citizenship cards and put whatever surnames they pleased in the official documents. An entire history omitted by a strike of a pen. To conduct a thorough genealogical account of the people of Dolpa Po is thus, an arduous task and beyond the scope of this article but to provide some contextual account deemed imperative, nonetheless. Slipping through the cracks of the tumultuous history, politics, religion and culture of the region are the children of Dolpo. With their homes rolled up in bundles and lashed to the backs of yaks and horses, they are required to periodically move with the herds. At a glance, moving across the grasslands of the unforgiving terrain of the Himalayas exposed yet resilient to the harsh elements of the environment in which they are destined to labour, nomads evoke freedom. However, one must argue that perhaps freedom comes in different variations. Freedom is also a privilege. Freedom is amnesty. Freedom is emancipation, it is after all also a prerogative. In the case of the children of Dolpa Po, they belong amongst the most marginalised groups of Nepal and are widely excluded from the educational provision. The present development policies of Nepal are insensitive to the needs of nonsedentary communities like the Dolpa Po, and therefore, the future of these children continues to loom with uncertainty. However, a more inclusive policy, I must argue, cannot be developed without detailed research studies that are employed to specifically identify issues to which policy needs to respond. Perhaps a good place to start would be to genuinely start mending the antagonistic relationship the people of the region have with the state. And rightly so. Aggressive promotion of sedentarisation, where nomad children are introduced to a sedentary lifestyle by bringing them to boarding schools in the capital of the country, inculcating in school-going children the world-views of sedentary society are reasons why education provisions are destined to fail.

The shift to sedentism amongst the Dolpa Po population is believed to have increased dramatically in the late 20th century as a result of sharp economic, political and demographic changes. Some are believed to have settled in response to the political turmoil and civil war, as during which as the locals recalled, many young men and women were involuntarily recruited to fight the infamous ‘people’s war’ by the Moaists. The majority of whom never returned and remain missing. Today, some Dolpa Po have settled in agricultural or urban communities like the state’s capital to escape impoverishment and land loss as well as to obtain social services including health care and formal education. As there is no reliable research or study done around the issue one can only make inferences from studies conducted elsewhere in similar settings, that the contemporary pastoral sedentarization occurs as families shift away from pastoral lifestyle for urban occupations. The only thing that remains unchanged in this scenario is the realities of children that are somehow permanently confined in an absurdly non-identical but analogous state of perpetual motion. The Convention on the Rights of the Child –an international agreement on childhood– has become the most widely ratified human rights treaty in history and has helped transform children’s lives around the world. Yet, not every child gets to enjoy a full childhood. Still, too many childhoods are cut short. When our children are growing up hungry and unhealthy, we've failed to deliver on the promise of childhood. Deep economic crises, the horrors, and the aftermath of the decade long internal armed conflict along with decades of underdevelopment have not spared a single girl or boy in rural parts of Nepal. Nomads, whether ancient or modern, are also conspicuously put outside of the popular discourse of migration. They are also often left out of the development process. Despite possessing a great body of indigenous knowledge about the environment, their husbandry skills are often not well recognised, let alone attempted to be preserved by the state or development planners. An issue that ought to be given serious attention in its own entirety.

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At the end of November 2018 up until July 2019, I was affiliated with a local NGO in Nepal working for 5 their Educate Dolpa Project which focuses on facilitating the existing but fragile primary level education in the Dolpa district. It would not be an exaggeration to say I was frightfully beaten by its terrain and profoundly affected by the people I had an opportunity to converse with during my time there. _____________________________

I must therefore reiterate, that Dolpo is extremely vast and complex, beyond my meagre comprehension at least. The geographical adversity of the place is at once mesmerising and terrifying whilst the enchanting landscapes continue to overshadow the memories of hardships of the people of Dolpo. I was, however, able to capture a speck of this perilous land, most incomparably the children of Dolpo.

5 Educate Dolpa – Snow Yak Foundation. Available:

https://snowyak.org/educate-dolpa/

Aastha Kc was born and raised in Kathmandu, Nepal. She studied Human Rights Studies at Malmo University and is currently pursuing a Master’s of Science in Sociology of Law at Lund University.

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THE INFLUENCE OF THE MIGRANT CRISIS ON TERRORISM IN EUROPE Article by Romana Crgol "It´s only terrorism if they do it to us. When we do much worse to them, it´s not terrorism." Noam Chomsky, Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda At the very beginning, it is important to note that the study of migration and the study of terrorism are two separate fields. It is undeniable that there is a huge amount of available literature and research on both topics, but not much intersectional studies have been conducted on the influence of migrations on terrorism. Therefore, there is a scarcity of migration literature related 1 directly to terrorism. In order to relate both terms, first, we need to define and contextualize them. As well, we must not forget to ask ourselves why is that so – are we actually afraid to relate the abovementioned terms even though they could be even more than relatable? What is migration? We tend to think of migration only in terms of people crossing international borders, but if we look at intra-state migration as well, the sheer extent of contemporary human mobility – free and forced, regular and irregular - becomes evident. Migrations are nothing new, they have been always 2 present among people. People have always moved and sought better living conditions. Nevertheless, the focus of this article is forced migration as a form of displacement, defined as the forced movement of people from their locality or environment and occupational activities. It is a form of social change caused by a number of factors, the most common being armed conflict. Of course, we 3 must not disregard other factors as natural disasters, developmental, economic, political changes, etc. _____________________________

1 Simsek, Y., Terrorism and Migration in Turkey Between 1992 and

1995”, In: S. Ozeren, I. Dincer and D. M. AlBadayney, Understanding the Terrorism: Analysis of Sociological and others?, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2007, p. 146 2 Schmid, A.P., Links Between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, Hague, 2016, p. 6. 3 Displaced Person / Displacement | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (archive-it.org) (Available at: https://wayback.archiveit.org/10611/20171126022420/http:/www.une sco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/internationalmigration/glossary/displaced-person-displacement/ (updated: 2017, accessed: January 27th, 2021)

Forced migration is a rapidly growing phenomenon4 – since the so-called “refugee crisis” began in 2011 and reached its peak in 2015, millions of displaced people entered the territory of the European Union. What is terrorism? The roots of the word terrorism originate from the Latin noun terror which can be translated as fear, violence, dreadfulness. Later on, various forms of 5 word terror were co-opted in different languages of the world which ultimately led to the word terrorism as we know it today. The notion of 6 terrorism is, obviously, related to that of 'terror'. In the most general sense, that term denotes an extreme fear, usually stemming from a vaguely perceived, relatively unknown, and largely unforeseeable threat. In this sense, terror can be caused by human action but also by natural disasters such as volcanic eruptions or earthquakes. Even though we can trace back the 7 origins of the word terrorism, it is important to note that there is still no consensus on the definition of terrorism today. It is internationally recognized that the legal term of terrorism entails the following three key instruments: (i) the perpetration of a criminal act (such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson, and so on), or threatening such an act; (ii) the intent to spread fear among the population (which would generally entail the creation of public danger) or directly or indirectly coerce a national or international authority to take some action, or to refrain from _____________________________

4 For more information on statistics:

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managedmigration/data/database (updated: 2021, accessed: January 27th, 2021) 5 Bekavac Basić, I. et all., Latinsko-hrvatski i hrvatsko-latinski rječnik s kratkom gramatikom, Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 2008., p. 239. 6 For more information on origins, philosophy and politics of the word terror: Fine, J., Political and Philological Origins of the Term „Terrorism“ from the Ancient Near East to Our Times, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2, Taylor & Francis Ltd., 2010., pp. 271-288 7 Guillaume, G., Terrorism and International Law, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 3, Cambridge University Press on behalf of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2004, p. 537

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Photo: rvjak, flickr.

Jus Humanis Journal of International Human Rights Law // March 2021

taking it; (iii) when the act involves a transnational 8 element. Causality - migrant crisis and terrorism Based on the previous two definitions, questions arise: how can we relate migrant crisis and terrorism as we know it today? First of all, we need to dig a bit deeper into the present refugee crisis, whose root causes we can find in armed conflicts that occur in the Middle 9 East. The ongoing crisis entails many risks and problems which are reflected in human, financial and legal crises. For example, demographic and labour market destabilization is happening within the Member States territory, with direct consequences to human security. Today, human security is focusing more sharply on the downside risks that can threaten the wellbeing of all people, both affluent and poor. Furthermore, it focuses on the well-being and dignity of people rather than on 10 the protection of national borders. On that notion, it is certain that terrorism does represent a threat to human security, but other factors like e.g., labour destabilization must not be disregarded and perceived only as threats to socioeconomic wellbeing. Socioeconomic well-being should entail the human security concept as well. 11

On the other hand, according to Europol´s latest report on terrorism in 2019, the number of terrorist attacks and victims of terror continued to decrease. Namely, when it comes to religiously motivated terrorism, which is most often put in relation with the refugee crisis, and whose peak point was reached in 2015 when 150 people died while 379 were injured in 17 terrorist attacks that happened on the Member States territory – the number of victims is in a constant decrease. _____________________________

8 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy,

Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, STL-11-01/1, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, February 16th, 2011, para. 85. 9 It is questionable what are actually the root causes of the present migrant crisis. Read more in: Ališić, E., Letschert, R. M., Fresh Eyes on European refugee crisis, European Journal of Psychotraumatology, 7:1, 31847, Taylor & Francis Ltd., 2016. 10 Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko, New Threats to Human Security in the Era of Globalization, Journal of Human Development Vol. 4, No. 2, July 2003, p. 1 11 Europol is the European Union´s law enforcement agency. Read more on Europol´s engagement on terrorism at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/tesat-report

Notwithstanding, Europol´s report points out several important issues – since the refugee crisis began, there has been, inevitably, more religiously motivated attacks than ever before. Yet, Europol in their last report reiterates that, as in previous years, there are no signs of systematic use of irregular migration by terrorist organizations. In fact, in more than 70% of the arrests related to Islamist extremism and terrorism, for which citizenship was reported to Europol, the individuals 12 were nationals of the EU country in question. Statistically, migrants very rarely decide on extremist moves upon their arrival in the destination country, and almost never when they 13 are in transit. The radicalization of the “newcomers” begins after they settle in their new surroundings. Studies on immigrant communities have shown that restrictions of individual liberties and rights, deprivation of access to social life and experiences of social exclusion can foster grievances towards the state/system and encourage retreat from society. These experiences can trigger the search for alternative opportunity structures and ingroups, with radical violent organizations possibly 14 providing such alternatives. On the other hand, according to Schmid, if the migrants are not fully integrated into host societies, they might develop resentment and with some that anger might become so strong that they – or more likely, their children – turn against the host society. That has been one of the reasons why so many of the foreign fighters from Europe were the sons of 15 immigrants. Accordingly, prevention of radicalization of the “newcomers”, but also prevention or radicalization of “sons of immigrants”, within the Member States territory, must be a priority, especially after the Vienna 16 shootings that have occurred in November 2020.

_____________________________

12 European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend report 2020, Europol,

2020, p. 41.

13 Loc. cit.

14 Abushi, S., Nordbruch, G., Policy Brief: Breaking the Circle,

Radicalisation Awareness Network, Centre for Excellence, 2020, p. 4

15 Schmid, Links Between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration, p. 45 16 Read more on Vienna shootings in relation to radicalization on:

https://www.timesofisrael.com/vienna-terrorist-likely-acted-alonefooled-de-radicalization-program/ and https://www.wsj.com/articles/vienna-terrorist-attacker-who-killed-fouris-named-as-kujtim-fejzulai-11604401398

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Second of all, there are other repercussions of the refugee crisis and increased numbers of terrorist attacks. Videlicet, as a consequence of the present crisis and alongside other political happenings, Europe is facing a serious increase of far-right ideologies and (unfortunately) in accordance with that, far-right terrorism. As a result, it is especially noteworthy that far-right parties seem to have gained strong support as a result of the ongoing refugee crisis as well as Islamist motivated attacks.17 In the past couple of years, since the refugee crisis began, we are facing increase electoral support for extreme right-wing parties. Even though the connection between extreme right-wing parties and terrorism is a stand-alone topic, it cannot be disregarded in the context of this article. The said parties often have ambivalent standpoints towards violence, condemning terrorist attacks while generating racist and xenophobic propaganda that can incite more violence.

There is also a big difference in perception and media portrayal of terrorist attacks when committed by e.g. white European citizen – rightwing media attacks are seen mostly as isolated events when compared with other attacks, to those 21 committed by Islamist extremist terrorists. In other words, the West has a long history of violent acts where perpetrators were white-supremacists, and the number of these violent acts is increasing since the refugee crisis began. Manuel Navarrete, the head of Europol’s counterterrorism centre, stated that for the jihadists, terrorists are holy war martyrs; for right-wing extremists, they are the saints of a racial war. Due to that statement, one question is hanging over our heads – why are attacks committed by Islamists always labelled as terrorist attack whilst attacks committed by whitesupremacists etc., are being marked as hate crimes, or worse, as isolated events, incidents? _____________________________ 21 Koehler, p. 85

Experts have identified far right-wing terrorism also referred to as extreme-right or racially and ethnically motivated terrorism - as a unique form of political violence with often fluid boundaries 18 between hate crime and organized terrorism. Regardless of the fact that Europe is facing a revival of militant right-wing extremist groups, networks, and incidents in recent years, with the surge of anti-immigration and Islamophobic violence, the public debate has ascribed the same level of importance to the threat from the extreme right as 19 it regularly does to Islamist extremism. Although extreme right-wing terrorism is not a new phenomenon, there has been a recent increase in its frequency and lethality, with some individuals, groups and movements pursuing transnational aims in a national context, drawing on international networks, ideas and personalities and seeking to mobilize others, often using the Internet.20

_____________________________ 17 Ibid., p. 87 18 Koehler, D., Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe, Current

Development and Issues for the Future, PRISM Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2016., p. 86 19 Ibid., p. 85. 20 Member States concerned by the growing and increasingly transnational threat of extreme right-wing terrorism, United Nations Security Council, Counter-Terrorism Committee, 2020, p. 1

Photo: Chasoum Hilieh, flickr.

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Concluding remarks There is no doubt that terrorism today represents one of the greatest security challenges in a globalized world. Terrorism is a systematic method of using violence in order to develop fear among the population, including government officials and governments per se. European citizens feel more exposed than ever, which thereupon creates feelings of insecurity, helplessness, anxiety and ultimately breeds mistrust in state authority which is obliged to ensure their peace and security. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the migrant crisis influenced terrorism in Europe. This article neither addresses the grassroots of the migrant crisis nor examines the scope of political happenings that led to the present situation. The goal of this article was to introduce the interrelation between migration and terrorism on a plain level, just to tackle one´s imagination and usual media portrayal of that connection. The migrant crisis gravely influenced terrorism in Europe which became a growing security threat, but certain things need to be taken into consideration when thinking of that influence. First of all, one must be careful when reading/accessing mass media reports on terrorism. Sure, the threat of Islamist extremist terrorist is real and constantly present. Yet, one must not disregard the lethality of far-right extremists terrorist attacks.

The media portrayal of terrorism often lacks objectivity and the general public needs to be more aware of that. Second of all, the prevention of radicalization needs to be the number one goal of all Member States. Namely, adopting legislation that should aim to prevent the terrorist content from going viral on the Internet (both radical Islam terrorism and far-right terrorism!) in a manner that does not collide with either freedom of expression or freedom of thought, is the first step towards prevention of radicalization. Internet is the core of terrorist organizations networking and the general public needs to be protected by extremist influence online. Third of all, any terrorist organization, no matter their ideological perspectives, has the same goal they stream to attract (inter)national attention through acts of violence against the innocent, thus, intimidate the public sphere and by that pressure Member States to meet their demands. Ultimately, the migrant crisis is ongoing, and it seems it is far from ending. Migrations are not a new phenomenon, people have always moved due to different economic, political, or social reasons. Europe needs to reconsider the way of coping with the present crisis. As Warsan Shire said - no one puts their children in a boat unless the water is safer than the land.

Romana Crgol graduated from the University of Rijeka (Croatia) and holds a law degree. Her major was International Humanitarian Law. She is currently studying Human Rights Studies at Lund University. Her main academic interest is conflict related sexual violence and European Convention on Human Rights.

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REFUGEES WELCOME? VIEWING REFUGEES COMING TO GREECE AS A SECURITY CONCERN Article by Emmanouil Anagnostou I. Introduction nternational migration is a complex phenomenon that derives from a multiplicity of aspects affecting our daily lives in an increasingly interconnected 1 world. In simple terms, migration can be defined as a change of residency across administrative borders, whether such borders are local, regional, 2 national or international. The key issue is that not all migrations are similar or occur in positive ways. In recent years, for example, a continuous surge in forced migration due to conflict and persecution 3 has been observed, causing large numbers of people to flee their countries pursuing a better life elsewhere. This situation is especially evident in the case of the so called ‘refugee crisis’ that the EU is facing since 2015 due to the mass influx of people from the MENA countries into Europe, a flow that has been characterized as the largest one that 4 Europe is facing since the end of WWII. _____________________________

1 International Organization for Migration, ‘World Migration Report’,

2018, p. 1 https://www.iom.int/wmr/2018 (last accessed: 22/01/2021) 2 S. Castles, H. de Haas, MJ. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, 6th ed, New York, Guilford Press, 2020, p. 2 3 Op. cit. 1 4 D. Christopoulos, Αν το Προσφυγικό ήταν Πρόβλημα, θα είχε λύση [If the RefugeeIssue was a Problem, it would have a Solution, Athens, Polis,2020, p. 12

These increasing arrivals of refugees in Europe nowadays have caused significant split-opinion. On the one hand, liberal voices advocate for policies of open borders under the premise of ‘refugees welcome’, while on the other, more conservative ones hold that too much diversity forms a threat to 5 the cultural integrity of the society and that the EU member-states possess the undeniable sovereign right to control the entry of non-nationals into their 6 territory. Drawing from the aforementioned remarks, this article is an attempt to investigate a specific yet seemingly dominant approach in Europe today to regulate the ongoing refugee issue -the one of securitization of migration- and what this approach implicates for the lives of the refugees. The focus is on Greece, which as the South-East entry point into Europe has received millions of displaced persons. _____________________________ 5 Op. cit. 2, p. 12 6 Council of Europe and European Union Agency for Fundamental

Rights, ‘Fundamental rights of refugees, asylum applicants and migrants at the European borders’, 2020.

Photo: Carolyn Eaton, flickr.

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Departing from this, brief introduction, part II shall briefly yet critically depict what it implies for states to view immigration as a matter of their national security, in other words, what in international relations we refer to as ‘securitization of migration’. This step is important in order to then proceed with part III in which I will try to present how and why the current Greek government constructs migration as a threat to its national security. Having completed that, I will continue with part IV, which will address the specific topic of this article, namely, the impact on the refugees’ lives of treating their arrival in Greece as a security concern by the Greek policymakers. Is the Greek government’s migration policy compatible with human rights principles or not, and why? In the end, instead of conclusion, I will reflect on my suggestions in the course of resolving the refugee ‘crisis’. II. Securitization of Migration 2.1. Securitization theory Securitization of migration is a concept that finds its roots in the broader perspective of Securitization Theory (hereafter: ST). The ST is a post – Cold War product when questions about what constituted security and security threats begun to surface. ST is a product of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies and is grounded on the premise that a broader description of security is now needed, as security threats are no longer just military in their nature.7 Hence, the goal of ST is to provide a framework for approaching the construction of security based on speech acts, by designating particular issues or persons as existential threats towards a referent 8 object. At this point and before continuing, it is useful to explain what both existential threats and referent object mean. In simple words, an existential threat is an issue that can be said to endanger or undermine the survival of the state, therefore this issue must be moved into the realm of emergency in order to be tackled decisively and with the appropriate measures however extreme 9 such measures might be. _____________________________ 7 IA. Collins, Contemporary Security Studies, 4th ed, Oxford UK, OUP, 2016,

p. 168

8 B. Buzan, O. Waever, J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis,

Colorado, Lynne Rinner Publishers, 1998, p. 21

9 Ibid., pp. 21 – 22

In turn, a referent object, as it becomes obvious, can be the state, as well as larger collective identities that exist independently of the state, like the nation, and that in any case are seen to be seriously threatened by a particular issue and therefore have a legitimate claim to survival.[1]For instance, advocates of securitization in Europe often claim that mass arrivals of Muslim or other non-Christian migrants in their country may alter substantially (even replace) the cultural, Christian profile of the country. In this context, they see this particular issue (the mass arrivals of nonChristians) as a grave threat to the state’s survival. A good description of how the process of securitization takes place is displayed in Figure 1 below. According to this framework, ST consists of four elements:[1] A securitizing actor (usually the government or other political entities) executing a speech act determines a particular thing as an existential threat to a particular reference object, and if such rhetoric is accepted by the relevant audience (such as the people or the voters), conditions have been created for the use of special measures in response to the observed crisis.

Figure 1: The securitization proces

_____________________________ 10 Ibid., pp. 35 – 36 11 Ibid., p. 27

12 R. Sjöstedt, ‘Securitization Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, 2017,

Online:https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/97801 90228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-479? rskey=HVCppo&result=1 (Last accessed: 21/01/2021)

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migrants and refugees as a fundamental cause of instability in the destination societies.17The equation that seems to dominate both Europe and the US nowadays is disarming: Migrant = Muslim = potential terrorist.18Especially on the EU level, there has been a growing belief that the arrivals of forced migrants pose an imminent threat to the Old Continent’s territorial integrity, culture and identity.19 III. Constructing the Threat

Photo: Matt Brown, flickr.

To be deemed successful, a convincing securitizing speech act must entail a plot that includes an existential threat, and it must point to no return unless the threat is resolved immediately.13 Additionally, the securitizing actor (the speaker) must be someone in a position of authority, though this should not be assumed as official authority 14 only. In other words, the securitizing actor can not only be a member of the government, but also one of the major opposition party. Finally, a successful securitization is followed by the narrative that tackling an existential threat may require urgency and so certain procedures and even laws or human rights standards need to be overstepped. 2.2. Security and Migration An illustrative example of an issue that has been widely perceived as a matter of high-priority concern by many governments and politicians is 15 the one of migration. In the migration–security nexus, migration is constructed as a problem in which the migrant, or in our case the refugee, is linked to global mafias, organized crime, drugs and weapons trafficking, Islamic radicalism - terrorism, urban violence and/or other ills.16Specifically, in the aftermath of 9/11, a dominant tendency in the Western world has been the portrayal of (Muslim) _____________________________ 13 IMC. Williams, Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and

International Politics, International Studies Quarterly, vol 47, no 4,

14 2003, p. 513.

Op. cit. 8, p. 33.

15 Op. Cit. 1.

16 See: 1st reference, p. 209; 2nd reference, p. 2; N. Nyberg-

Sorensen, Revisiting the Migration-Development Nexus: From social networks and remittances to markets for migration control, International Migration, vol 50, no 3, 2012, p. 66.

Having elaborated on the theory of securitization and the notion of securitization of migration, the article now proceeds with an example of a European country that has largely chosen to cope with the ongoing refugee ‘crisis’ by placing it into the sphere of security. This country is Greece and the rationale behind this selection is explained below. 3.1. The History of Migration-Security Pattern in Greece Migration in Greece has gone hand in hand with security concerns already since the 1990s, when in the post-Cold War context large numbers of Albanians, mostly, arrived in the country.20 Even though Albanians settled into Greece in pursuing better jobs and a brighter future, their arrivals triggered mass xenophobic reactions by many Greek politicians and the media, which cast Albanian migrants as criminals who had come to tamper with Greece’s national homogeneity and therefore ought to be excluded from the Greek 21 society. Following Greece’s membership in the Schengen area, the securitization of migration gained momentum ever since the 2000s, when as an EU member-state with external European borders, the country undertook the heavy burden of increasing border control. 22 _____________________________

17 See: 16th reference N. Nyberg-Sorensen; second reference, p. 2 18 Op. Cit. 4, p. 91 19 A. Geddes, Politics of migration and immigration in Europe,

London, Sage, p. 5; A. Tsoukala,’ Looking at Migrants as Enemies’, in E. Guild and D. Bigo (eds), Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and within Europe, London, Routledge, 2005, p. 166 20 Op. Cit. 21, p. 63 21 K. Tsitselikis, Sticks, not carrots: immigration and rights in Greece and Turkey, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol 13, no 3, 2013, p. 428. 22 Ibid.

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Finally, regarding the current refugee issue, as 23 Afouxenidis et al have correctly pointed out, Greece comprises one of the main entry points for thousands of refugees in Europe and the main for those coming from Muslim countries like Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. Hence, it can be drawn that the Greek case provides adequate ground for studying how political leaders aim to regulate migration under the securitization prism. For the purpose of this article, this study will be done on the governance of Nea Dimokratia since 2019. The choice of this party and this time frame is made for the following two reasons. First, this will allow me to shed light on and discuss the most recent developments on the matter that might be unknown or understudied. Second, Nea Dimokratia (hereafter, “ND”) is a conservative right-wing party that has openly emphasized its tough line on the refugee issue by approaching it as a national security concern. 3.2. Unveiling the securitizing language Shortly after winning the 2019 national elections, the Alternate Minister for Migration Policy Giorgos 24 Koumoutsakos referred during the programmatic statements of ND in the parliament to immigration towards Greece, specifically to the situation that the Eastern Greek islands face, wherein thousands of migrants and refugees arrive constantly. The words he used to describe this situation were “problematic, tragic, unsustainable”, while Samos island was said to look like a “besieged 25 city”. Indeed, for the Greek islands -which have experienced mass influxes of refugees and migrants, with the numbers often exceeding the islands’ capacity to host them properly- the situation has been argued to be a great challenge, 26 even a grave matter of security. And as it will be argued in the next part, such conditions have a considerable (mostly negative) impact on the migrants’/refugees’ rights. _____________________________ 23 IOp. Cit. 26, p. 12 24

As of the 4th of January, the government was reshaped by decision of the Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. In the aftermath of this reshape, Mr Koumoutsakos was removed from his position. Simultaneously, the position itself has been restructured 25 G. Koumoutsakos, Statement in the Greek Parliament on the Programmatic Statements of the Government, 2019, 26 European Commission, ‘Progress Report on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration’

Perhaps the crucial point on how the current Greek Government draws its migration policy took place at the end of September 2019. That date the Council of the Government’s Ministers convened under the presidency of the Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and among others, the following was announced: “…με βάση την ανάλυση των στατιστικών στοιχείων εθνικότητας όσων εισέρχονται στη χώρα, κοινή πεποίθηση είναι ότι πλέον πρόκειται για μεταναστευτικό πρόβλημα και όχι προσφυγικό [Based on the analysis of the statistical data on the nationality of those (people) who enter Greece, it is a common belief that hereafter we are dealing with a migratory and not a 27 refugee issue” Due to the fact that the flows from Syria to Greece had stopped, and since all (and mostly) Syrians were recognized as refugees, ND decided to shift the state’s public rhetoric and claim that only 28 migrants are now arriving in Greece. That is of course not true because people coming for example from Afghanistan are regarded as refugees too. Labelling is a significant and powerful tool. Choosing not to label someone as a refugee is a deeply political process that aims to fragment the international protection regime for refugees and 29 asylum seekers. Essentially, in doing so, the Greek 30 government draws the path which -as Zetter had said- leads to the exclusion and marginalization of refugees. In this discourse, the refugees are presented rather as dangerous migrants who have come to invade the country, and therefore, they threaten the country’s national security. Today, in the dawn of 2020 and the beginning of the new year, things seem to remain the same at least on an institutional level.

_____________________________ 27 S. Petsas, Αποφάσεις του Υπουργικού Συμβουλίου [On decisions of

the Council of Ministers], Online: https://media.gov.gr/o-st-petsas-giatis-apofaseis-tou-ypourgikou-symvouliou/ (Last accessed: 21/01/2021), 2019, In Greek only 28 Op. Cit. 4, p. 34 29 R. Zetter, More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globalization, Journal of Refugee Studies, vol 20, no 2, 2007, p. 189. 30 Op. Cit. 36

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On his visit to the Evros area in the Greek Turkish borders, the Minister of Citizen’s Protection Michalis Chrisochoidis re-emphasized the securitizing aspect of Greece’s policy-making by stating that: “2021 will be a year of security and to this, the further construction of the Evros fence will contribute greatly” 31

IV. Human Rights at Stake The image of the three years old drowned boy Alan Kurdi, who had died on a beach in Turkey after a failed attempt to cross with his family to the Greek island of Kos, put a lot of pressure in the EU at that time to regulate migration in a way that no one should ever witness similar incidents. While it is true that similar such events have not been repeated, under no circumstances can it be said that the European (in general) and Greek (in particular) migration policy has been flawless and totally humane? As Nyberg-Sorensen has put it: “A severe limitation of the migration–security nexus is that it focuses primarily on the security of the West 32 at the expense of the rest”. This expense can be political, leading to an escalation of racist violence and xenophobic 33 outbursts against the migrants-refugees, but it can also be humanitarian.

_____________________________

31 N/A, ‘Χρυσοχοΐδης από Έβρο: «Χρονιά ασφάλειας το 2021 με εμβόλιο

και φράχτη» [Chrisochoidis from Evros: “2021 will be a year of security with the vaccine and the fence]’, Ethnos, 29/12/2020, Online: https://www.ethnos.gr/ellada/139456_hrysohoidis-apo-ebro-hroniaasfaleias-2021-me-embolio-kai-frahti (last accessed: 21/01/2021), in Greek only 32 L. Masri, ‘A Year After Drowned Son's Image Drew World Attention, Father Says Refugees' Plight is Worse’, ABC NEWS, 02/09/2016, Online: https://abcnews.go.com/International/year-drowned-sons-image-drewworld-attention-father/story?id=41823328 (Last accessed: 21/01/2021) 33 Op. Cit. 16, p. 67

Photo; David Hompson, flickr.

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As a formula for preserving the harmony of the ‘community’, in fact, securitization threatens the refugees’ rights by stigmatizing them as outsiders who -among other measures- need to be constrained in refugee camps (most commonly referred to as hotspots) and therein be forced to 34 live under the worst conditions possible. Such depiction resembles a lot the current status of refugees in the hotspots at many Greek islands. As of today, tens of thousands of refugees are in those hotspots, experiencing severe living conditions while they await resettlement, 35 repatriation/deportation or asylum decisions. While initially designed to serve as short-term holding centres for asylum seekers until be transferred to the Greek mainland or elsewhere in Europe, instead, most hotspots have become a 36 ‘bottleneck’, where refugees are being held for months or even years. As a consequence, many camps have mushroomed in size, being 37 significantly overcrowded. This in turn has resulted in numerous other perilous conditions. Children shiver through the nights, bundled in wet blankets that never fully dry. Their parents are stuck in huge lines for most of the day waiting for the daily breakfast-lunch-dinner which on most occasions are not adequate to feed everyone; meanwhile, tourists and local residents enjoy fine dining with grilled octopus in the island’s local 38 restaurants. Moreover, insufficient sanitary and sleeping facilities, let alone evidence of sexual violence – harassment comprise an increasingly worrying 39 challenge. _____________________________

34 A. Liakos, ‘Greece: A land caught between ancient glories and the

modern world’, in P. Furtado (eds) Histories of Nations: How their Identities were forged, London, Thames & Hudson, 2017, p. 46; See: 4th reference, pp. 116 – 118 35 A. Buonfino, Between unity and plurality: the politicization and securitization of the discourse of immigration in Europe, New Political Science, vol 26, no 1, 2006, p. 24 36 M. Fotaki, A Crisis of Humanitarianism: Refugees at the Gates of Europe, International Journal of Health Policy Management, vol 8, no 6, 2019, p. 322 37 C. Harlan, ‘Migrants wait in bread lines, while tourists dine on grilled octopus in Greece’, The Washington Post, 23/02/2020, Online: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/02/23/moriarefugee-camp-migrants-waiting/?arc404=true (Last accessed: 21/01/2021) 38 Ibid; 16th reference S. Nyberg-Sorensen, 2012, p. 67 39 Op. Cit. 37

The dysphoria for the severe situations the refugees face in the hotspots has been expressed by the most formal statements, such as the one by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Moreover, insufficient sanitary and sleeping facilities, let alone evidence of sexual violence – harassment comprise 40 an increasingly worrying challenge. The dysphoria for the severe situations the refugees face in the hotspots has been expressed by the most formal statements, such as the one by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Dunja Mijatović, who described this situation as ‘explosive’, underlining further the ‘desperate lack’ in sanitation and medical care, as well as the phenomena of overcrowding and shortage of 41 enough food for everyone. Indirectly, one could argue that the HR Commissioner managed to foresee the future. One year after her statements, the ‘Moria’ hotspot on Lesvos island was indeed ‘exploded’ by fires that destroyed the whole camp, leaving about 12,000 people without shelter. Officially, the Greek Ministry of Migration and Asylum claimed that it was the asylum applicants who set the fires due to the quarantine imposed on the camp after some of them tested positive for COVID-19. For most of the humanitarian agencies, however, including UNHCR, the incident was a form of protest by the refuges and asylum seekers to demonstrate the long-standing need to improve living conditions, alleviate overcrowding, and improve security, infrastructure and access to services in all five reception centres on the Greek islands.42

_____________________________

40 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, ‘Asylum and

migration into the European Union in 2015’ Online: https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2016/asylum-and-migrationeuropean-union-2015 (Last accessed: 21/01/2021), 2016, p. 22 41 Council of Europe, ‘Country Visit: Greece must urgently transfer asylum seekers from the Aegean islands and improve living conditions in reception facilities’ Online: https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/greece-must-urgentlytransfer-asylum-seekers-from-the-aegean-islands-and-improveliving-conditions-in-reception-facilities, (Last accessed: 21/01/2021), 2019

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In any case, what is certain, and with that this part is completed, is that even the refugees themselves who are essentially the protagonists of the refugee ‘crisis’ have come to realize the dead-ends of the adopted migration policy by the Greek politicians, a policy that is in line with the European checks and demands in regulating migration. The next step now should be that Greek and European policymakers reach the same understanding in order to begin considering alternative ways to resolve the refugee issue more effectively. One such way is presented in the next and final part of this article. V. Instead of Conclusion As opposed to a conclusion that summarizes the most important points of the text, this part serves as a means to argue what could be done for an enhanced and more humane strategy to modulate the refugee matter. First, it should be noted that addressing the health and housing needs in the refugee camps is by nature tough (financially and logistically speaking) for any country and especially 42 for Greece. As a country that has been experiencing the longest and deepest economic depression in its history, with bankrupt health care and social security system, meeting its citizens’ needs (let alone those of the refugees) seems unachievable, yet not impossible (ibid). _____________________________

(Forced) migration due to natural and man-made disasters is escalating, thus collective political action is required by states and regional/international organizations. From the various types of political action, the one I see as the most effective in addressing the root causes of (forced) migration. As Christopoulos named his most recent book and argues: “If migration/the refugee issue was a problem, it 43 would have a solution”. It does not have though because it is not the problem per se. The actual problem is global inequality and its produced effects, such as endless conflicts, persecution, displacement etc. A successful approach towards the refugee issue thus requires tracing the factors that preserve global inequality -and in so doing lead people to abandon their place of origin- and tackle them. Only then can we dream of a more egalitarian world wherein the peaceful co-existence between all human beings on the basis of tolerance and acceptance of each other will not be a pipe dream but a reality.

42 Op. Cit. 36 43 Op. Cit. 4, p. 39

Emmanouil Anagnostou, comes from Greece. He holds a bachelor’s in Political Science and History at Panteion University and a masters in Global Politics at Malmo University. Currently, he is studying for his second master’s in Human Rights at Lund University. His research interests relate to the securitization of migration in Greece and Europe.

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Photo: Alexandre Meneghini/Reuters

Jus Humanis Journal of International Human Rights Law // March 2021

STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REGION THAT INCENTIVIZE THE DISPLACEMENT AND VULNERABILITY OF THE POPULATION Article by Roberto Ogg Fábrega The Central American region has been characterized for its migratory flows. This article describes briefly, the main factors that incentivize the displacement of the Central American population and the vulnerability they have suffered as a result of the pandemic. Migration has been a phenomenon that has occurred since the beginning of humanity. The Central American region has not been an exception. The displacement of the population has been motivated by external and internal elements. Some have been present since the formation of our countries, others appeared as our populations and political systems evolved. External factors refer to those in which the issuing country (where people come from) has little responsibility. For example, the economic growth and development of neighboring countries, which are magnets that attract people in search of a better quality of life. Additionally, we could mention family reunification as one of the main elements of mobilization in Central America for instance. On the other hand, internal factors are related to events directly attributable to the internal situation of the countries. We can point out: a) poverty and inequality, b) generalized violence, c) corruption and political instability, d) megaprojects and natural disasters. The interior elements are the main structural causes that promote the forced displacement of the Central American population. Poverty and inequality top the list as some of the most common reasons why people migrate. Without having the minimum conditions to lead a decent life and not finding the right opportunities to get them, people leave their country with the hope of finding a better life. It is important to highlight that Central America is, along with South 51

America and Sub-Saharan Africa, one of the regions with the highest indices of inequality: 33% of the population of Central America survive on less than two dollars a day, meaning, around 16 million people, and 44%, almost 22 million people, live in poverty. Poverty and inequality represent some of the factors that primarily encourage 1 violence. Generalized and common violence has caused many people in the Central American region to forcibly displace, escaping from their country of origin, feeling that their physical integrity and life are compromised despite not being directly linked to the conflict between criminal organizations. In the Central American region, situations such as a past of armed conflicts, income inequality, the ease of obtaining arms, high unemployment rates, especially among the young population, and drug trafficking are combined. Organized crime cartels and gangs have displaced 248,500 Guatemalans, 2 288,900 Salvadorans, and 29,400 Hondurans. In addition, corruption and erosion of institutionalism have as a consequence the impunity that encourages the increase in crimes and, therefore, the forced displacement of the Central American population. Corruption of the Central American governments has impaired the proper functioning of the States, leading them to be incapable not only of guaranteeing rights but also of punishing their perpetrators. The lack of capacities of the police, judges, public ministries and prisons in these _____________________________

“Global Trends: forced displacement in 2019”, UNHCR, 2019. https://www.unhcr.org/be/wpcontent/uploads/sites/46/2020/07/Global-Trends-Report-2019.pdf 2 “Situation of the North Triangle in Central America” UNHCR, 2017 https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2017/11040.pdf

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countries contribute to impunity and insecurity. Corruption and concentration of power have been shown to lead to the violation of human rights. On several occasions, the Central American political system has been used to evade criminal responsibility as a result of corruption.3 Just one year after the April 2018 crisis, seventy thousand Nicaraguans had left their country as a result of the serious human rights crisis and political instability. Among the main situations that encourage the forced displacement of Nicaraguans, we can highlight the excessive and arbitrary use of police force, arbitrary arrests, and intimidation and threats against leaders of social movements. Experiences collected by international organizations show that the main reason for the forced displacement of Nicaraguans was due to direct threats and threats through social networks. 4 All these factors are magnified when the people who are forced to displace belong to vulnerable groups with historical discrimination. Around 160 people were interviewed by an international organization and they determined that, within the vulnerable group, 7% were children under 5 years of age, 4% were unaccompanied boys, girls and teenagers, 2% were lactating women or pregnant women, 4% were people with disabilities, 2% were people over 60 years of age and 22% were LGBTIQ + population. Of this segment, 88% were from Honduras, 6% from Guatemala, 4% from El Salvador, and 2% from other Central American countries. 5 In the particular case of women who are forcibly displaced, they frequently belong to a young population or are single, separated or divorced mothers who must leave their children in the country of origin and go out to find better living conditions for themselves. It is important to pay ____________________________ 3 “United States awaiting delivery of the Martineri Linares brothers”, La

Prensa, Panamá, 2020, https://www.prensa.com/judiciales/estadosunidos-espera-la-entrega-de-los-martinelli-linares-tenemos-untratado-de-extradicion-con-guatemala-y-esta-la-expectativa-que-secumpla/ 4 “Forced migration of Nicaraguan people to Costa Rica”, ICHR, 2018 http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/informes/pdfs/MigracionForzadaNicaragua-CostaRica.pdf 5 “Report on the migrant caravan situacion “, IOM, 2020 https://reliefweb.int/report/mexico/informe-de-situaci-n-caravana-demigrantes-frontera-sur-m-xico-17-27-de-enero-2020

Photo: John Moore/Getty Images

attention to this group of migrants considering that they are mostly exposed not only to risk situations at the time of migrating but also to unworthy working conditions and under duress, such as 6 trafficking in women for the sex industry, forced prostitution, forced marriages and other forms of exploitation. The confinement derived from COVID-19 has increased the challenges we face as a region, especially, the weakness of our institutions. The concentration of power in executive bodies due to the activation of exceptional mechanisms has increased the vulnerability of migrants. In some cases, these bodies have paid greater attention to national citizens and have excluded migrants from access to tests against the virus and direct transfers or social benefits in kind. In addition, the situation has left room for arbitrariness, corruption in direct contracting of medicines, health supplies and health infrastructure, and has shown how weak the institutional framework of our region is.

_____________________________ 6 “Human Rights of Migrants and Others in the Context of Human

Mobility in Mexico” ICHR, 2013 http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/migrantes/docs/pdf/informe-migrantesmexico-2013.pdf

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In Central America there are limited economic resources, so the room for maneuver to deal with exceptional situations such as COVID-19 is much narrower than for countries known by international standards as "developed". Therefore, paying attention to mitigating the effects of the pandemic has become a priority, which translates into a decrease in economic resources, political capital and interest in the integration of our region. The decree of the states of emergency has served to carry out arbitrary arrests of protesters and summary proceedings, often bypassing the judicial guarantees established in international treaties. This situation prevents people from enjoying a true guarantee of their rights and from being able to access the mechanisms for the protection of human rights. In some Central American countries, emergency decrees lack legality as they have not exhausted constitutional mechanisms such as the approval of congresses or legislative bodies.

We are living in a political system that finds its roots in the industrial revolution. It is true that this model has brought prosperity and economic growth for many but that in turn has allowed the concentration of wealth. In some cases, it makes it impossible for Central American states to guarantee rights to vulnerable groups. We must take advantage of this context to strengthen our institutions and establish counterbalance mechanisms that prevent discretion, corruption and abuse of power. Notably, the pandemic has affected us all but not equally.

Roberto Ogg Fábrega graduated in 2018 with a degree in "Law and Political Science" from the "Universidad Catolica Santa Maria la Antigua". After, he studied international relations in Madrid, Spain where he obtained his degree in 2019. His main field of expertise is Human Rights. He contributed to some Advisory Opinions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights such as Colombia´s request about civil and political rights. Roberto has done volunteering in international organizations such as Amnesty International.

Jus Humanis Journal of International Human Rights Law // March 2021

Photo: rvjak flickr.

Jus Humanis Journal of International Human Rights Law // March 2021

"NEXT TIME THERE IS VIOLENCE, IT WON'T BE FOR THE REFUGEES" WHAT REMEDIES DO HUMANITARIAN VOLUNTEERS IN EUROPE HAVE FOR HARASSMENT BY THE POLICE? Article by Alena Kahle In 1999, the United Nations declared that “everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to promote and to strive for the protection and realization of human rights 1 […].” In the course of the ongoing so-called “refugee crisis”, thousands of volunteer humanitarian helpers have swarmed to hotspots in France, Greece, Italy and Romania to ensure that those who have had to flee their country are granted at least basic accommodation and food. However, with increasing numbers of members of the European Parliament from the far-Right, the European Union has toughened up on its policy 2 goal to curb “spontaneous migration”. It is in this context that European agencies such as Frontex, but also national governments, have taken to viewing “the humanitarian assistance provided by civil society actors as non-cooperative, suspicious, if not overall counterproductive to the underlying 3 goal of ‘stemming the flows’.” As a result, volunteers are seriously impeded in their efforts to provide basic care and are often targeted by law enforcement and judicial bodies of the countries in which they work informally.4 The forms of targeting concerned are not limited to mere frequent ID checks; in a recent article, Carrera highlights two cases in which female volunteers were raped by 5 law enforcement officials in Greece. In this paper, I ask: How effective are the options for redress for such humanitarian volunteers who are harassed by the police? By examining the case of Calais, I find that there are almost no legal remedies under France’s current legal framework, as French government agencies are largely hostile towards volunteers. At the same time, the abuse of volunteers often does not reach the threshold needed to invoke human rights law. _____________________________ 1 Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, §1 2 Fekete, "Migrants, borders and the criminalisation of solidarity in the

EU," 65, 67

3 Carrera et al., Fit for purpose?, 13 4 Ibid., 24 5 Ibid.

Photo: Paul Seligman, flickr.

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In other words: Unofficial refugee camps such as the ones in Calais are “a sovereign ‘territory of exception’” from humanitarian and human rights law. [1] In this paper, I first review relevant human rights law before discussing a report published by organizations in Calais documenting various police misconduct in the period from November 1, 2017, to July 1, 2018. Then, I describe what remedies volunteers have attempted to resort to and explain why French officials have largely reacted defensively to accusations. Additionally, I draw on Photo: dededd, flickr. my own insights into the procedures in Calais from a two-week field visit in August 2018. Finally, and most importantly, I review relevant case law to discern whether volunteers in Calais could obtain a favourable ruling by the European Court of Human Rights. I approach the maltreatment of volunteers by drawing parallels to the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, the prohibition of which stands above all other obligations as a peremptory norm. _____________________________ 6 McGee and Pelham, "Politics at play,” 26

To meet the threshold of “torture” under human rights law, an act must fulfil three criteria: First, it must intentionally cause suffering; second, it must be done for a prohibited purpose – that is, for the purpose of obtaining information, for punishment, discrimination, or coercion; third, it must be done 7 by a public official or with their acquiescence. Cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (CIDT) has not been as thoroughly defined, and the distinctions are not sharp, but depending on the 8 nature, purpose and severity of the treatment. In fact, what distinguishes torture from CIDT is primarily the identity of the perpetrator and their reason for acting: Former UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak, held that acts qualify as torture not primarily through the actual gravity of the violence, but because of the presence of serious power imbalances.9

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While the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) merely lays out the existence of a prohibition of torture and CIDT, the Convention Against Torture (CAT) elaborates that states have a positive obligation to educate and train their personnel to resort to non-violent means first, and an obligation to properly investigate and prosecute 10 those accused of torture. Additionally, the UN has laid out guidelines for the use of force of law enforcement officials in which states are asked to ensure that police “use force and firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without any 11 promise of achieving the intended result.” Most maltreatment experienced by volunteers in Calais and most of the documented incidents in the Report involves officers of the Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS), the general reserve of the French National Police. It is estimated that there are 450 CRS officers in Calais 12 itself, and up to 1160 in the surrounding areas. The CRS is responsible for crowd and riot control, in which its mandate is to uphold “public order” through ID checks, crowd dispersion, and removal 13 of dangerous individuals. _____________________________ 7 Convention against Torture, §1 8 UNHRC, CCPR General Comment No. 20, §4 9 Smet, "ECtHR Rules That Police Officers Can Slap Suspects,” (blog)

10 Convention against Torture, §4-§10

11 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement

Officials, Principle 4 Blanquart, "Visite De Macron à Calais,” Franceinfo 13 "Les Buts De La Police Administrative," Playmendroit

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Importantly, over the past years, the CRS has developed a reputation regularly for violating 14 human rights in their operations. Violence against volunteers ranges from mere verbal threats to incidents threatening life. In a report published by organizations in Calais documenting various police misconduct (“Report”), the organizations documented 141 incidents in the period from November 1, 2017, to July 1, 2018. For instance, a CRS officer was documented as having responded to a volunteer complaining about violence against refugees: “You’ll see, next time there’s violence, it 15 won’t be for the refugees.” On another occasion, a volunteer filming a police operation was grabbed by the jacket, her phone was smashed purposefully, and she was pushed away from the 16 site. In other instances, police became yet more physical, hitting a female volunteer with a baton and pushing her friend towards the street when he complained. In fact, in that incident, the volunteer “fell backwards over a metal barrier separating the pavement from the road” and was nearly hit by a 17 passing truck. Not only does the Report document incidents of direct force, but it also accuses the CRS of “spray[ing] the door handles of [a volunteer’s] car with a chemical agent that was so abrasive that, after having opened their doors, it violently stung their eyes, face and throats.”18 In attempts to counter abuse by police, new volunteers in all of the organizations receive deescalation training as well as training on how to physically protect themselves from various weapons of the police. Best practices are documented in a guidebook, and all volunteers who participate in fieldwork such as distributing food and water are added to a WhatsApp group 19 that serves to document security incidents. These incidents are not isolated cases of a government not being able to control its police force. Instead, they are arguably part of a “complex, _____________________________

coordinated and targeted police operation” 20 sanctioned by “the police’s political bosses.” This becomes apparent when considering previous attempts to access remedies domestically and even through EU bodies, as these have proven futile. An important aspect of the Report is that it demonstrates that volunteers have unsuccessfully attempted local remedies, specifically by filing complaints through the police’s official mechanism (IPGN). However, as police officers are often unidentifiable – identification being a prerequisite for disciplinary measures – the IPGN dismisses the 21 complaints. In cases in which volunteers have managed to submit the identification number, success rates were equally low. When volunteer Charlotte Head filed a complaint via the IPGN identifying specific officers who had violently pushed her “to the ground and seized her by the throat”, she received an email stating that: “Not only do the enquiries carried out not provide the least evidence of a lack of professionalism or ethics but what is more, the feedback that we received unanimously notes your questionable attitude during 22 these operations.” Such victim-blaming can partially be traced back to general privileges held by police, as “law is frequently used as a resource by the police to 23 achieve police defined goals.” The UN identified that certain abusive practices similar to those above “have been facilitated by the law, rather than 24 being prevented by it.” Pre-existing police discretion is enhanced and facilitated by the current political climate on the prefectural, national and EU-level. The mayor of Calais and the head of the prefecture, for instance, clearly expressed they do not want “another Jungle”, explaining that all the money they had spent on taking down the earlier 25 one should not be in vain. On a national level, Deputy Director for Immigration, Jean de Croone, “stated that helping a migrant to cross the border _____________________________

14 Confer footnotes 12, 31, 41 15 Vigny et al., Calais: The Police Harassment of Volunteers, 30 16 Ibid., 11 17 "France: Trumped up Charges against Human Rights Defender

20 Theodoros Karyotis, "Criminalizing Solidarity: Syriza’s War on the

18 Vigny et al., Calais: The Police Harassment of Volunteers, 34 19 Charlotte Head, Legal Training - Knowing Your

Ibid., 22 Fekete, "Migrants, 25 borders and the criminalisation of solidarity in the EU," 68

Must Be Dropped," Amnesty International

Rights When Interacting with French Police

Movements,"

21 Vigny et al., Calais: The Police Harassment of Volunteers, 34 22 Ibid., 36 23 Bowling et al., "Policing and Human Rights,” 22

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Photo: dededd, flickr.

does not consist of humanitarian help but rather creates the situation of the illegality of the migrant 26 [sic].” Hoping to trigger a change in responses, the above-mentioned Report was handed over to France’s human rights ombudsman in August 2018. However, even on a larger scale, public efforts such as petitions calling for improved EU law regarding immigration and humanitarianism have largely remained unsuccessful, with the last major petition against the criminalization of volunteers having 27 been dismissed in 2016. A search through the digital archives of the European Court of Human Rights indicates that volunteers have not, of yet, filed an application with the Court despite it having jurisdiction over incidents in France and despite the incidents possibly falling under Article 3 of the ECHR, the prohibition of torture and CIDT. A challenge in filing a claim would inevitably be to find the right way to phrase the allegations – which I discuss in the next paragraphs. As held by a UN report, police officers do not 28 commit offences because they are “bad apples”. It is important to consider the government’s active role in increasing violence through recruitment, training, mandating and instructing.29 According to an officer of the National Police, the mandate given to CRS is to show “tolérance 0 quant aux implantations de camps” – to show zero tolerance towards squatter camps. 30 _____________________________ 26 Carrera et al., Fit for purpose?, 41 27 Ibid., p.57

28 Bowling et al., "Policing and Human Rights,” 10 29 Ibid., 10

30 Blanquart, "Visite De Macron à Calais,” Franceinfo

Anecdotal evidence from my visit to Calais suggests that the different CRS troops are deployed on a rotation scheme. Hence, each troop is only in Calais for a few weeks, wherefore they may not develop empathy for the volunteers or refugees. Additionally, as stated by a former officer of the CRS, the “system” requires CRS to “look busy, to 31 evict people, to arrest them… .” A parallel can be drawn to the case of McCann & others v. UK (1995), in which it was found that the special forces employed there had not been trained as to minimize damage, which “suggests a lack of appropriate care in the control and organisation of 32 the arrest operation.” An application at the ECtHR could therefore address the general fact that France stationed the CRS – riot police – in Calais instead of a regular police force. In the same case of McCann & Others v. UK, the applicants argued that the deployment of the SAS, itself a military unit, had been too extreme of a choice, and that violence had been 33 premeditated by the UK. In this case, the Court dismissed the claim by saying that the UK had rightfully deployed the SAS, as they had “received specialist training in combating terrorism” and were, therefore, the smartest choice “in order to deal with the threat [of terrorism] in the safest and 34 most informed manner possible.” In the present case, France deployed a police force not too dissimilar from the UK’s SAS, however without facing a threat of the same imminence. In the event of an actual ECtHR case, the French government might argue that it deployed riot police despite the absence of a riot in order to account for potential complications in evicting refugees. However, it remains odd that France would station over a 35 thousand CRS. As governments should always presume innocence, and as neither volunteers nor refugees themselves initiate actual violence, the 36 Court may rule in favour of the applicants. However, the Court does not generally find violations if actual harm has not occurred, but 37 could soon. _____________________________ 31 Steadman, "‘One Day I’ll Confess My Sins to the Lord’,” HelpRefugees 32 McCann and Others v. UK (ECHR 1995), p.212 33 Ibid., p.174 34 Ibid., p.183 35 Confer supranote 12

36 ECHR §6 37 van der Sloot, “A New Approach to the Right to Privacy,” 542

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Therefore, it all boils down to the question of whether volunteers would be able to argue that the treatment they already experienced crosses the threshold needed to violate the ECHR. To determine their chance of success, I consider two divergent cases the Court ruled on recently. In the first, Bouyid v. Belgium (2013), the applicant – a minor – had been dragged by the jacket by police to the station after asking for the reason he had been asked for ID. While at the police station, he protested his arrest, whereupon he was slapped in 38 the face by a police officer. The Court ruled that the treatment of the applicant did not meet the threshold of Article 3 (torture and CIDT), as the treatment had merely been a single slap, that had not even been used for the forbidden purpose of 39 extracting a testimony, nor caused lasting damage. It must be noted that in this case, the Court sets an odd precedent, as international law sees torture as being not so much about how grave the violence is, 40 but about the power dynamics behind it. Notably, the Court finds that not only had there been no torture, but also no cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. In the second case, Devyatkin v. Russia (2017), the applicant – also a minor – and his brother had been stopped by police and violently attacked by them. Because the use of force had been excessive and dispensable and as an official police investigation into their allegations had not been conducted properly, the Court found a violation of the prohibition of torture and ordered 50 000 Euros in damages.

In this regard, a major issue barring legal redress is that the intention of governments is arguably not to actually harm its civilians but to “warn those in civil society and public office” and thus coerce 42 acquiescence to its anti-migration policies. This leads to a situation in which maltreatment does not actually amount to human rights violations, thus somewhat shutting the door for human rights courts to effectuate change.43 Two further options exist that I chose not to address in detail, as separate papers could be written on each issue: First, volunteers have been arrested while providing humanitarian aid, and a case could be made about these arrests being arbitrary and thereby violating the ECHR. Second, the maltreatment experienced by refugees themselves much more clearly constitutes torture. However, refugees would need to file a complaint to the Court in their own name, as the Court does not accept applications from individuals who are not themselves the victims of the human rights 44 abuse. _____________________________ 42 Fekete, “Europe: crimes of solidarity,” 84 43 Ibid. 44 van der Sloot, “A New Approach to the Right to Privacy,” 542

Following the precedent laid out above in which gravity was considered more important than power dynamics, it is unlikely the ECtHR would hold that merely shoving volunteers once, smashing phones and shouting commands to disperse amounts to excessive and dispensable “force”. Crossing this threshold is the first crucial step, without which an act cannot amount to a violation of Article 3 – neither torture nor cruel, inhuman and degrading 41 treatment. _____________________________

38 Smet, "ECtHR Rules That Police Officers Can Slap Suspects,” (blog) 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Only if the Court held that it did, the next step would be to

determine whether force was used for a “prohibited purpose” such as coercion or discrimination in order to meet the threshold of “torture”; in the absence of such a prohibited purpose, the acts would rather qualify as CIDT.

Photo: Andreas Jurgenowski, flickr.

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While I paint a gloomy picture of the French government and other European states, the situation is of course much more complicated; in fact, states’ behaviour is often quite contradictory and internally inconsistent. France’s highest court, the Constitutional Council, in 2018 struck down an article of immigration law that de facto criminalized helping others in need.[1] Despite this inspiring ruling, French authorities have continued targeting volunteers. Overall, the case of Calais has shown that volunteers have approached domestic redress mechanisms as much as they can, given their limited resources. _____________________________

However, in doing so, they must manoeuvre within a system that considers them on the verge of becoming criminals. Arguably, the situation may not change without a binding ruling calling for legal change and better protection. Hence, involving the ECtHR may be a step worth considering; however, the fight for remedies and decriminalization of humanitarianism will be a long struggle that will require resources. It is only with persistence that Calais will move away from being a “territory of exception”.

45 "France: Inquiry Finds Police Abused Migrants in Calais," Human

Rights Watch

Alena Kahle studies MSc Sociology of Law at Lund University. She holds a BA degree in Liberal Arts and Sciences majoring in International Justice from Leiden University. She usually researches the interactions between human rights and society in India, but after volunteering in Calais delved into the topic of “crimmigation”.

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Photo: rvjak, flickr.

Jus Humanis Journal of International Human Rights Law // March 2021

THE BRANCO-SHATZ SUBMISSION SUSPICIONS: DOES THE EUROPEAN UNION RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS? Article by Marco Dal Monte “…Once they left their homeland they remained homeless, once they left their state they became stateless; once they were deprived of their human rights they were rightless, the scum of the earth” Hannah Arendth

1. Introduction The text presented by the two lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco to the ICC, the international court of criminal justice, begins with this gloomy sentence taken from Hanna Arendt's origins of totalitarianism, denouncing how Europe had faults concerning the situation of migrants who it had chosen not to help. The accusation is certainly very heavy and must cover a very large period that started with the policies between Libya and Italy in the 90s to reach 2019, the years in which the document was drawn up. In the following article, I want both to analyze how the two lawyers' rationing takes place as well as to provide updates on what is currently the situation of this document at the ICC.

2. The pact of friendship: the relation between Berlusconi and Ghedaffi Branco and Shatz's initial critique start, as we have said, with the relations existing between Libya and Europe, precisely on migratory matters. The main role was played by Italy at the time governed by the prime minister Berlusconi, which, having wanted to limit the migratory traffic coming from Libya, had built ever stronger relations with this African country and above all with its dictator Ghedaffi. The problem is that Libya was not exactly a country that Europe recognized as respectful of human rights: already in 2002, after having stipulated a new agreement again with the Italian government, in Libya the migration rules were made more stringent, so much so that be defined as discriminatory , and two years later in October 2004, the European Union established a series of sanctions due 1 to the Lockerbie bombing, which killed 270 people, which Italy opposed, as it stressed that the money had to be used to safeguard the border. ______________________________ 1 Amnesty International, 11 December 2017, Libya's Dark Web of

Collusion: Abuses Against Europe-bound Refugees and Migrants, p13, online, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde19/7561/2017/en/, accessed 25/03/2019

Photo: annarouse, flickr.

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Ghedaffi indeed did not recognize the right of asylum, having refused to sign the human rights agreement of 1951, and never found an agreement with UNHCR. The problem is that the measures in Libia did not have the desired effect and since 2004 irregular immigration across the North African state has increased more and more. And it is here that Berlusconi and his plan to emulate the 1997 push-back agreements between Italy and Albania enters the game: in 2008, he joined the North African dictator in a particular ceremony, beginning with the Italian premier kissing the finger ring of the Lybian Colonel. According to the treaty of friendship, drawn up with under the excuse to repay the damages that the African nation had suffered during the Italian colonialism, agreements were stipulated relating to economic aid and commercial partnerships, together with measures for the resolution of the migratory problem: Branco and Shatz report that already in that agreement it could be noted that the refugees coming from Libya had to be sent back to the African desert, where they would then be subjected to mass detention in six different refugee camps, financed with European money or for the fighting against the irregular immigration and the strengthening of 3 the borders. This time the agreement works well, and in the following years, the Italian coast guard in contact with the Libyan one will bring back an average of 4 almost 20,000 people a year to the coast of Tripoli. Furthermore, in 2010, the agents sent by the UNHR were expelled on charges of illegally operating on Libyan soil, reinforcing doubts about respect for human rights in that area. For the two lawyers, these agreements are the beginning of a relationship between governments in North Africa and Europe to bypass human rights in various areas of the south where immigration had peaked, but for the moment the wind of the Arab spring is raising, ready to blow away the Libyan commander's house of cards. _____________________________

3 Heller, C., Pezzani, L., 2018, “Mare Clausum: Italy and the EU’s

undeclared operation to stem migration across the Mediterranean”, p. 28/29, Forensic Oceanography 4 MONZINI, Paola. Il traffico di migranti per mare verso l’Italia. Sviluppi recenti (2004-2008). Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale [En ligne], 2008, 43.

3. Human Stranding: death Mediterranean and ships left at sea

the

In 2011 the African world changed radically in just one year. At the beginning of that year, Mohamed Bouazizi burned himself alive in the square of the Tunisian parliament, starting the protests for obtaining democratic governments throughout the Middle East: from Morocco to Syria, the Middle East became a hotbed of protests, which are well received by the West which hopes for a democratic turnaround. In that year, however, things change quickly, and at the beginning of 2011 South Sudan gains independence, while the Sahel famine and the Boko haram incursions expand into North Africa, and the latter will attack in six months various government buildings under the order of Abubakar Shekau, also targeting the UN building in Abuja. The protests soon turned into civil wars as in Syria, Egypt, and especially Lybia. In March 2011, the Prosecutor's Office ("OTP") at the ICC opened its investigation into the crimes against humanity and war crimes that the various factions and chaos are 5 generating in that land , while the problems of East Africa linked to Darfur and famine in the south of the Sahara bring more violence, dominated by the disturbing figures of the Janjaweed. The voices of the advocates for democratic reforms have now been replaced by the bullets and blood of different guerrilla groups, be it Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Janjaweed in Sudan, or the factions of generals in Libya. Three migratory routes have created that pass through North Africa, crossing the Sahara and attempting the desperate crossing of the Mediterranean or Ceuta. It is in this panorama that the new European policy in terms of migration must be formed, given that as we approach 2014 the migratory flow begins to reach very high peaks due to the problems in the various local governments. _____________________________

5 United Nations Security Council, 26 February 2011, Resolution 1970

(2011), online, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_02/201 10927_110226-UNSCR-1970.pdf, accessed 05/04/2019; International Criminal Court, February 2011, Situation in Libya ICC-01/11, online, https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya, accessed 05/04/2019

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At this moment the strategy of the old Berlusconi government that had worked with the complicity of the Libyan government according to Branco and Shatz becomes a widespread policy for the whole of the European Union and national states while having relationships with African governments. Already in 2015, the Khartoum agreements in Sudan led to the establishment of a series of rules between Europe and 28 African states. This form of externalization and the creation of what the two lawyers call a border police state has led several governments to invest and spread European money in militias and armed police to defend borders rather than to create ways to limit migratory traffic: these are the examples of the Niger6, Sudan and for interventions on Libyan soil. What came to light later, indeed, is how the Janjaweed of Darfur have been protected by the Sudanese government while still operating on migratory trafficking since 2015; as the DR. Suliman Bando reported: “Our recommendation is to call on the EU to exercise utmost diligence in dealing with the government of Sudan, and therefore not to allow any of their funds earmarked for this program to directly or indirectly 7 benefit the Rapid Support Forces with this Janjaweed militia which is now enforcing the border controls.” All this to be combined with the strengthening of Ceuta's borders is for the document of Brasco and Shatz the expansion of Berlusconi's politics outside the Libyan landscapes: in fact, the strategy is the same, involving states and governments that cannot guarantee human rights and collaborate with them to ensure that they are not violated by you, while you, like Pontius Pilate, wash your hands of them. This first strategy to contain migration, however, does not exhaust the solutions used by the Union and above all by the national governments that faced the border of the Mediterranean Sea: __________________________

6 QUADT, Teresa. Redefining crimes against humanity?. 2019

the other following Shatz and Branco accusations are that of prevention of arrival, based not only on actions to control it in the starting lands but on the dissuasion from undertaking such a journey. Thus it was that again according to the two lawyers, several ships arrived in the Italian ports loaded with migrants from Africa that was now on fire: the ships with different names as Salamis, Open Arms, Diciotti, and others more was prevented from immediate dismissal, with constant negotiations by the Italian government or for immediate repatriation or the sorting of migrants, this happened both with the Renzi government and with the last government of Salvini (the latter who made the fight against illegal immigration the own workhorse during the election campaign). This new season in the Italian management was supported by other governments such as the Maltese one, and the editors of the ICC report underline this new season as having a double objective: on the one hand, avoid international duties and obligations arising from EU control over the commanded region, and on the other hand cause the drowning of innocent civilians, to discourage and influence the behavior of others trying to flee Libya. From the beginning of 2013, therefore, at the dawn of the Arab Spring and its effects, Europe and above all the national states that forms it intersect the two forms of governance of migratory trafficking: the old pre-Libyan way of relation, based on the financing of forces in the state of origin to stifle migratory movements also through the use of violence and in disfigurement of the human rights that were affirmed in Europe (an example of this is what happened with the Ceuta frontier, where migrants were sent back in morocco where they were incarcerated, as well as in Libya, and then not avoid mentioning the control of the Sudan borders operated by the janjaweed, which since 2007 have been considered one of the most violent Islamic militias in East Africa, already accused of having violated human rights in various massacres).

7 HDW- 'Border Control from Hell' report targets EU funding in

Sudan – Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/border-control-fromhell-report-targets-eu-funding-in-sudan/a-38330197

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Here the historical description by the document ends and the second question begins: how can Europe be legally accused of this action? Are there any legal arguments that can be applied to the court for intervention? What image of Europe would then return this denunciation by Branco and Shatz? what would be its relationship with human rights? 4. The law of the strongest: the accusations and questions of law concerning the case The case that the two lawyers want to examine is wide, vast, and very often contains very labile points of law: Libya has never signed any international agreement for human rights, so from the beginning the violations committed are punishable up to a certain point, on the other hand, the Italian and Maltese as well as Spanish governments may have stopped ships several times, but never definitively, and the political chaos, especially in Italy, has led to continuous organizational problems that could therefore better explain the various shipwrecks. However, it is necessary to consider many other aspects that have been implemented over a decade, not only limited to the migration policies of one or two states but as described almost as a general concept, in which the European institutions could also have a role. He underlines the document as in their idea: “The migration policy of the European Union and Member States vis-à-vis Libya and the Central Mediterranean should be understood as a policy of systematic and widespread attack of a pre-targeted population.” 8 The accusations that are made therefore are based on articles 7 and 5 of the statutes of Rome, and since as we have said these treaties were never signed by the governments of Libya, the purpose of the document and its solicitation is to investigate also the European relations with these governments, and their work following the war in Libya. In the name of Article 7 of the Rome Statute, those crimes are considered crimes against humanity if: ____________________________ 8

THOMAS-DAVIS, Maya; SHATZ, Omer. EU & Libya: an interview with Omer Shatz. Socialist Lawyer, 2020, 85: 14-17.

Photo: Terry King flickr.

“committed as part of an (i) attack, that is, (ii) widespread or systematic (iii) directed against any civilian population, (iv) with knowledge of the attack”, (v) “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack”, and with 9 (vi) nexus between the crimes and the attack” Regarding the centrality of the attack against the civilian population, this for the two lawyers is represented by the fact that the migration policies of the European Union in relation with Libya have passed from Mare Nostrum to Triton, moving instead from the first phase ( agreement and cooperation with third states in unorthodox ways from the point of view of human rights) to that of the second phase, in which instead the centrality lay in the deterrent of the probable death at sea, and few means were available for the salvation of migrants. This omissive-type attack is described by Branco and Shatz as systematic and organized in conjunction with the migratory cooperation policies that survive with other states while the Mediterranean Sea became more and more a place full of death. Finally, it is important to underline the figure that made this attack possible, namely that of the "migrant" and the "refugee", both of whom were defined by politics as a part of the human population without rights and the characteristic features of humanity, as it says in the document: _____________________________ 9 UN General ASSEMBLY. Rome Statute of the International Criminal

Court (last amended 2010). UN General Assembly, 1998, 17

Photo: Nigel Baxter, flickr.

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“Distinguishing them from the rest of “acceptable” human beings appeared as an essential behavior to 10 later justify their discrimination and targeting”. Central to this fundamental distinction was also a climate of fear of what was a crisis of migrants that strengthened the political debate as well as the rhetoric of parties (above all of the sovereign type), in the Italian and French areas, exaggerating many times the extent of the problem. This offense can then also be extended to the strategy of cooperation with governments such as Lybia first and Sudan was known both for having committed war crimes and not compliance with general human rights and using the militias to finance systematic retention of migrants and migratory flows. Even if in this case the deaths of migrants and civilian is not on European first hand, it is to underline that all the governments they enter in relation with them were known for such practices and were already (for example in the case of Sudan and Al-Bashir's janjaweed) being investigated by the ICC, and therefore the governments who had found agreements and gave funds to them knew or could imagine in which way the borders would be strengthened. 5. The New Attic League: Conclusions “[…] when you were no longer friendly as before but suspicious and at variance with us. it no longer seemed safe to risk relaxing our hold. For all seceders 11 would have gone over to you.” This sentence by Thucydides summarizes a Greek political season that can be assimilated into the operations of the European Union in this juncture: in fact, the Attic league was formed on the Athenian democratic principles, on the idea of identity, freedom, and independence, for then disregard these ideals in their extra-territorial policies. __________________________

10 Communication to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International

Photo: ekenitr, flickr.

Criminal Court Pursuant to the Article 15 of the Rome Statute. EU Migration Policies in the Central Mediteranean and Libya (20142019), Available at: https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2019/jun/euicc-case-EU-Migration-Policies.pdf 11 CAWKWELL, George. Thucydides and the Peloponnesian war. Routledge, 2006. 66

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In the same manner, Branco and Shatz portray the work of the European Union in the last ten years of migration policy, as a disregard of the principles of democracy and the importance of human beings and their rights, in view only of maintaining a public order that had never been attacked, but which only required solutions to a general problem of European governments. The questions posed by the document analyzed here lead to investigate the situation not only of the states but also of those who governed them and of the European Union that represented them all, bringing doubts on the action of the union at the international level to operate in compliance with the principles that union itself was formed for.

Like the Attic League, the principles of freedom and respect for human rights are valid, according to the two aforementioned lawyers, solely within the union for its citizens and never for those who try to enter it to see them respected. At the current date, the ICC has not yet responded to the document nor has it moved to persecute the exponents of the national governments, and it is therefore impossible to say whether all that has been exposed is true in part or all its components. Certainly, the victims remain in the Mediterranean, of which the culprits have never been identified. The question that arises is therefore now only one: Does the European Union still respect human rights?

Marco Dal Monte studied Law for his JD at Verona University and during this time, he developed a particular interest in Ethics, Legal Theory, and Commercial law. He worked as a Paralegal in a small firm and in multinationals companies as an IT technician. He presented conferences regarding Ethics, Economics, Ethical philosophy in General, and Human Rights. Then, Marco decided to enroll first in his second JD in Spain from UNIR university and then his LLM (that is still pursuing) in Sociology of Law at Lund University.

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HOW DOES CLIMATE CHANGE INDUCED SALINITY FORCE THE COASTAL PEOPLE OF BANGLADESH TO MIGRATE AND HOW DOES THE MIGRATION PROCESS VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS? Article by Dilafroze Khanam, Golam Rabbani and Shahana Afrin Dina Throughout the last few decades with increasing global temperature, the sea level is rising gradually. (National Aeronautics and Space Administration1 NASA). Consequently, coastal belt countries are 2 facing the threat of extinction (Earth.org-2018). Being a country of South Asia on the Bay of Bangle, Bangladesh is going to be one of the worst victims of that unwanted catastrophe.

Picture 1: Evolution of CO2 emitions

Available at: https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/

This means that about 57.9 million people of that area will be directly affected by water and soil salinity (Government of the People’s Republic of 4 Bangladesh Ministry of Water Resources, 2004). At that time the present major occupation like farming and fishing will be badly affected. Millions of citizens will lose their earning sources and normal livelihoods. At present, the southern part of Bangladesh is already experiencing the worst effects of climate change. Increasing sea level and frequent natural disasters like tornados, cyclones, and tidal waves are carrying seawater to the land area. As a result, salinity is spreading in the coastal parts that are creating water and soil salinity complications. Thus, there the land is becoming uncultivable, turning river and pond water to unfit for farming and underground water also becoming undrinkable that negatively affect both the economic and social environment of the coastal area. What is water salinity and how responsible for human migration?

Picture 2: Evolution of Sea level raise

Available at: https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/sea-level/

According to the 2nd IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) projection (WB 2000), within 2050 temperature will be amplified at about3 1.5 0C for which sea level will increase by around 50cm. So, if the prediction comes true, around 19 districts of Bangladesh will face salinity within the next 30 years. _____________________________

1 Change, N. (2020). Sea Level | NASA Global Climate Change.

Climate Change: Vital Signs of the Planet. Retrieved 8 January 2021, from https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/sea-level/.Ibid. 2 Sea Level Rising will Disproportionately Affect Developing Countries. EARTH.ORG. (2018). Retrieved 8 January 2021, from https://earth.org/sea-level-rise-will 6 disproportionately-affect-developing-countries/. Islam, M. (2004). Living in the Coast PROBLEMS, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES. Warpo.portal.gov.bd. Retrieved 13 January 2021, from http://warpo.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/warpo.portal.gov. bd/page/aa04373f_0ca3_49a5_b77e_5108186638dc/living2.pdf.

Water salinity is the saltiness of water more specifically, it is the amount of salt the water contains. In a broad sense, there are several reasons for the increase in water salinity such as geographical locations, natural disasters, sea-level rise, etc. All these factors create a new form of natural disaster called salinity, more specifically soil salinity and water salinity. When salinity affects the land areas, it destroys the natural characteristics of the environment.5 _____________________________ 4 Islam, M. (2004). Living in the Coast PROBLEMS, OPPORTUNITIES

AND CHALLENGES. Warpo.portal.gov.bd. Retrieved 13 January 2021, from:http://warpo.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/warpo.port al.gov.bd/page/aa04373f_0ca3_49a5_b77e_5108186638dc/living2. pdf. 5 Khanam, D., & Afrin Dina, S. (2020). WATER SALINITY, MENSTRUAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS OF COASTAL ADOLESCENT GIRLS OF BANGLADESH: A STORY OF MISERY. http://www.jushumanis.org/. Retrieved 30 December 2020

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Photo: Towfik Chowdhury, flickr.

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As a result, people who have been involved in agrobased activities lose their professions and become unemployed. Because of salinity, in the coastal areas, people have very limited opportunities for employment as well as self-employment. Businessmen/ industrialists aren’t interested to start a business in the coastal areas. So, a large group of people have no chance to work in diverse sectors. As a result, they have to leave their locality and migrate to other cities for work. Bangladesh is an agro-based country. Still, about two-thirds of the total workforce (rural area) are 6 employed in this sector. Nevertheless, due to salinity, several districts of Bangladesh have been facing problems to cultivate and grow products. Even though Bangladesh agricultural research institutes and agricultural universities previously developed various saline tolerable seeds, those are not promising enough. On the other hand, except for shrimp farms, coastal people have very limited opportunities to employ themselves. As a result, a large amount of the workforce migrates to other districts for work. This is how salinity forces people to be migrants. Salinity serves as a push factor for coastal people’s migration. Salinity in Bangladesh creates two types of migration, i) permanent migration and ii) seasonal migration. People who can afford the life leading expenses of family members for town shift permanently with full families. On the contrary, people who are unable to afford the expenses or don’t want to leave their birthplace and environment, are seasonal migrants. In this case, one or two young capable members from families shift for temporary works. Most of the seasonal migrants work in the brickfields and agricultural lands of the nearest districts. How does the migration of coastal men violate human rights?

However, due to migration, coastal people are deprived of these opportunities. Due to migration to other location, they have to stay away from their family and fight against the adversities to cope with a new location, people, culture, and environment. With work uncertainty, at that new place, they often have to compromise their academic career, food, and shelter, health care and entertaining opportunities. On the other hand, migrant men leave the family members in their home villages where their women and children pass several months with insecurity and uncertainty. To manage proper food and health care is very challenging for their female family members. The responsibility of the female members of those families becomes heavier than the previous one as they have to do their own female roles as well as, the role of the male members. It is fair to wonder why Puerto Rico and a public housing project, in particular, was chosen as a trial site for a North American drug, in what way this is connected to ideas of population control of racialized populations, and how the fertility of some women is worth more than others. More than fertility, it was often the life of certain people that were deemed expendable in the history of health progress. Consequently, children of the migrants lose seniors’ care and guidance which accelerates the probability to get bad accompanies and involve in bad habits and activities. This way, in a broad sense, the migrant men’s and their family member’s basic needs (i.e. food, clothing, education, shelters, healthcare, and entertainment) are desperately affected due to salinity induced migration. Consequently, for them, salinity implies the violation of human rights. Previous Studies: 7

Living in one’s own land and enjoying quality time with one’s beloved family members is a by-born right of every human being. _____________________________

According to National Geography, (2019), worldwide 200 million people would migrate within 2050 due to climate change where 13.3 million migrants would be from Bangladesh. _____________________________

6 Bangladesh: Growing the Economy through Advances in

7 MCDONNELL, T. (2021). Climate change creates a new migration

Agriculture. World Bank. (2016). Retrieved 5 January 2021, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2016/10/07/bangladeshgrowing-economy-through-advances-in-agriculture.

crisis for Bangladesh. Environment. Retrieved 7 January 2021, from https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2019/01/climatechange-drives-migration-crisis-in-bangladesh-from-dhakasundabans/. 70

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The publication also addressed that already around 700,000 people migrated over the last decade due to the negative effects of climate change. By mentioning Mueller and Chen’s (2018) study, Bhattacharya (2019)8 claimed that from agricultural sectors, the household income of coastal people was 21% lower as compared to low saline prone areas. Bhattacharya also addressed that due to salinity every year 15000 to 30000 people from Chittagong (second-largest district) and Khulna (third-largest district) migrate from the cities. Mueller and Chen (2018) 9 found that every year 5.3% of people of the coastal areas migrated internally and 0.2% internationally. Citing Ahmed’s report (2012), Sugden and Silva 10 (2014) showed that among all migrants 77% are male and 23% are female. Besides changing the socio-economic picture they predicted that in the near future such seasonal and permanent migration would create gender vulnerability, social and cultural diversity as well as adding extra pressure on megacities of Bangladesh, especially Dhaka. Salinity, Migration and Human Rights: Study overview In this study, we have worked on seasonal migrant workers. In order to understand their actual experiences and the ones of their family members, we have interviewed 20 male migrant workers of a brickfield of Barishal district. Most of the interviewees were from the highest saline prone area of Samnagor Upzilla. _____________________________ 8 Bhattacharya, A. (2018). Climate change may force 200,000 people

in Bangladesh to migrate. Quartz India. Retrieved 10 January 2021, from https://qz.com/india/1432375/climate-change-may-force200000-people-in-bangladesh-tomigrate/fbclid=IwAR1MNwYSxwefeLaSC7fbSngDRfiOkfrczpzpC2VE zQl3o9ma1MSCYeNc9MY. 9 Chen, J., & Mueller, V. (2018). Coastal climate change, soil salinity and human migration in Bangladesh. Nature Climate Change, 8(11), 981-985. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0313-8 10Sugden, F. (2014). A Framework to Understand Gender and Structural Vulnerability to Climate Change in the Ganges River Basin: Lessons from Bangladesh, India and Nepal. Iwmi.cgiar.org. Retrieved 8 January 2021, from http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/Publications/Working_Papers/working/w or159.pdf

The study was conducted with method, including an interview structured questionnaire and Discussion techniques to collect field.

the qualitative with a semiFocus Group data from the

Moreover, the study findings are presented with a focus on Male, Female and Children of coastal migrators on the basis of their basic human needs like food, clothing, shelter, education and entertainment. How human rights of male migrators are being violated? Most of the migrants are coastal men from saline prone areas so; they are the hard hitter of migration. Usually, around six to eight-months they stay out from their home. They come at the end of October or the beginning of November (beginning of winter) and go back within April or June (beginning of the rainy season). At that time they leave their family as well as face lots of challenges to survive in migrant areas. They have to sacrifice a lot of things and deprive themselves of various rights and needs. The study findings are shown below: Food: Foods that are intake by the migrators aren’t nutritious. To save money for the lean seasons they maintain a very tight budget and allocate very little for food. On the other hand, during the migration period, they generally stay in a group comprising of 10 to 25 members and take food together. Thus, in this situation, they lose their freedom to select food items. One migrant said “when I am staying with my family I can eat whatever I want within my capability. However, in the brickfields, I have to eat according to the maximum group member’s choice.” Another interviewee said “at home, our mother/sister or wife cooks food with special care and love but in the brickfields, we hire one female to cook our foods. The cook cooks for earning money so she cooks commercially, she doesn’t care about food quality”. Education: Most of the migrant workers leave school before completing the tenth grade.

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Poverty and the unemployment problem are the main responsible factor for this situation. The poverty rate in the saline-prone areas is high compared to the other regions of Bangladesh. The agricultural production as well as other business opportunities are very limited in the coastal areas. So, the chance of getting employment opportunity or becoming self-employed is very challenging for them. Consequently, the situation affects the educational status of coastal people directly. One interviewee said “I have migrated at the age of twelve to save my family. I am happy that I have saved my family but if I continued my schooling I wouldn’t be able to save them.” Another interviewee claimed “there is no guaranty that I will get a job after completing education. So wouldn’t it better to join work as early as possible as the salary depends on my working skill?” Health Care: The workers who work in the brickfields have to work in dust throughout the day and night. Moreover, they have to work inhumanly from midnight to evening. Our interviewees said that they woke up at 2.30 am and remain working till 7.00 pm. Instead of 8 hours working rule of international labour law, they work around 15 to 16 hours. Surely, it’s harmful to their health and violates their human rights in the workplace. Entertainment: After working from midnight to evening they become tired and get a very short time to refresh themselves. Within a whole day, they get only two to three hours interval. Their only entertainment is to talk to their family members. However, bad news and long-distance communication create a huge misunderstanding. So, to get rid of depression and tiredness migrant workers often start smoking, taking drugs and injection. Besides, the married migrants have to stay away from their female partners for a long time that also increases their frustration. The situation encourages them to go to brothels or remarriage or involve in illegal relationships that introduce new types of complexities for them instead of bringing happiness.

Photo:Kursk, flickr.

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Shelter: During the migration period shelter appears as a major challenge for most of the migrants. In most cases, they have to live 10 to 25 persons in a small room. So, personal life or privacy is a dream there. On the other had, the migrants who work at brickfields usually live in a temporary tent which is usually set up beside rivers. It is inhuman to live in such kind of tents and sleep on the ground throughout the winter. Clothing: Migrant workers have to work in the brickfields, agriculture lands or yards that are physically challenging, hardworking job and they have to work in dust or mud. So, they are unable to wear good clothes. On the other hand, as they always have a concern about the offseason, so without expending extra money on the cloth, they want to save as much as possible. One interviewee said “who will see my clothes? Within this dust, I have to work from midnight to evening and sleep earlier to walk up for the next midnight. Actually, for us dress means only covering our body. So without spending here it’s important for us to send some extra money to our families who are passing through hardship.” How the human rights of migrants’ female relatives are being violated? For the migration of capable male members, the families turned into ‘women-headed family’ in the over-night and the responsibilities of the females become twice comparing to the normal time. Besides, these women face socio-economic and health-related complexities that also violate their human rights. Our study findings are shown below: Health Care: Health care of women and children from the family of migrants appears as a serious issue. The patriarchal social norm restricts women to visit the doctor’s chamber alone. If the females face severe health complexities, they have to depend on their neighbour’s assistance. One interviewee said “right now my wife is pregnant. I have no one in my home except my elderly mother who isn’t capable of taking care of my wife. I have no one in my house who can take my wife to the hospital in case of emergency”.

Social Securities: When the adult male members stay outside, females feel unsecured in the roads during drinking water collection from long distances, even at home. Sometimes they become the victim of sexual harassment that increases their insecurities the most. Education: In most cases, the whole family has to depend on one or two members’ income. So to cut off their regular family expenses they stopped to send their daughters to school. They believe that learning family management and cooking are very much important than academic education. Besides, insecurity is another major issue to send girls to school. Girls without adult male guardians stay at high risk of sexual harassment. Consequently, girls become a burden for migrant families. So, the family members try to marry off them at an early age. As a result, child marriage is common in migrant families. Entertainment: Long-distance relationships with their partners often introduce misunderstanding that brings tension as well as creates mental stress among the female members of the migrators’ families. Sometimes it encourages making illegal relationships with others. Like man, married women are also deprived to meet their sexual needs. Also, parents miss their offspring’s, wives miss their husbands and it creates a void in their minds that keeps them busy with worries instead of being happy. Food: Due to salinity, it is quite impossible to grow vegetables in the coastal areas. So, coastal people depend on local markets to buy necessary food and veggies however, patriarchal social culture doesn’t allow a female person to go to market. Besides, social insecurities also compel them to go less to the market to get fresh foods. Also, tension exists for the lean seasons so, they try to keep their budget as short as possible that creates malnourishment for the women and children. If the migrant members fail to manage a profitable job, families have to go through hardship. Moreover, lack of proper knowledge on health and nutrition is responsible for malnutrition among adolescent girls and women of the coastal areas.

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How the human rights of a child are being violated? Children of the migratory family are deprived of care, both from their father and mother. More specifically, to maintain the family expenses father/ brother has to stay away from home. On the other hand, the household work burden keeps their mothers busy from morning till midnight. Mothers can’t give proper care to their children. So children lose guidance and can’t share their problems, needs, and happiness with elderly family members. Study findings showed the following effects on children: Education: Education is one of the basic human needs but the children of migrant workers are deprived of schooling. Poverty compels the children of migrant workers to involve in incomegenerating activities instead of schooling. Moreover, due to the migration of elderly members, children are deprived of guidance, so they are at risk to get involved in bad companies. On the other hand, from birth, the children of the migrant workers become the witness of poverty and migration. Therefore, as the children, especially sons, grow older, they start to prepare themselves as migrant brickfield worker and the girls start to get ready for marriage instead of schooling.

Managing doctor, medicine, especially at night, is very difficult for the female members because of their personal security and social stigma. One interviewee said “a few days ago, at night my younger son got a high fever. But at midnight it was not possible for my wife to visit a doctor and bring the prescribed medicine for him. So, he had to pass the whole night without medicine, and the next morning my eleven years old son went to the doctor’s chamber to bring some medicine for his brother.” Food: Due to extreme poverty, children of migrant families suffer from malnutrition. Besides, the lack of knowledge of food and nutrition is also a factor leading to their malnourishment. Moreover, household workload, lack of variety to the children’s plate, restricted movement of the mothers to buy quality foods amplify the child’s malnourishment.

Health Care: During the migration period most of the families remain female-headed. In most cases, the mothers play the entire responsibilities like taking care of children as well as household works. However, it’s quite tough for the mothers to balance these two roles and mothers get very few times to take care of their children. Tasks become more challenging for those who have children of 0 to 3 years.

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Children of the migrators family suffer from salinity induced diseases like malnutrition, skin diseases, and respiratory complexities. Moreover, in case of sickness of the children, it’s not always possible for a female to go to the doctor.

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Finally, it can be said that salinity induced challenges violate the human rights of coastal people in several ways and their sufferings vary according to their age and gender. The absence of male members for a long period from a family especially, in the patriarchal culture, the sufferings of the concerned females knew no bounds as their movement is restricted in the male dominating society.

Moreover, without proper guidance from the male members, children remain unsecured, especially the daughters. Finally, the migratory male members face several situations that violate their human rights however; it’s not easy for them to overcome the condition.

Dilafroze Khanam is a Master’s student in the Department of Sociology at Lund University. She has completed her Honor’s and Master’s degree in Sociology from The University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. She is a faculty member of the Department of Sociology at the University of Barishal, Bangladesh. She has received the Swedish Institute Scholarship for Global Leaders in 2019-20 to study at Lund University, Sweden. Dilafroze has founded a voluntary organization called ‘Steps Ahead’. The organization is working with the marginalized women and adolescent girls (orphaned, physically challenged, juvenile delinquent girls, female prisoners, sex workers) of Barishal with a special focus on the coastal belt of Bangladesh.

Golam Rabbani is a Bachelor’s student in the Department of Finance and Banking at the University of Barishal, Bangladesh. He is one of the co-founders of ‘Steps Ahead’. In 2016, Rabbani became champion in the country's largest business idea competition “Bangladesh Youthfest”. He is also the winner of the prestigious ‘Youth Leadership Prize’ from “Bangladesh Youth Leadership Center”.

Shahana Afrin Dina has completed her Bachelor and Master’s degree in Economics from Jahangirnagar University, Bangladesh. She is a faculty member of the Department of Economics at Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Aviation and Aerospace University, Bangladesh. Dina is also a co-founder of ‘Steps Ahead’.

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SOMETIMES TEARS ARE WORDS FOR ME [US]. MIGRATION AND DISENCHATMENT OF INDONESIAN GAY MEN IN PARIS Article by Wisnu Adihartono In this article, I am going to narrate a story of two Indonesian gay men who decided to migrate to Paris. Although, I am not going to tell you about their joy in Paris but about their disenchantment. Indeed, migration is not only having a good impact but also, paradoxically, a disappointing one. Their story is the result of my dissertation which I did in École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales from 2010 to 2015 and here I will use a pseudonym because of their request. The Story of Aditya: I Would Have Nearly Killed Myself It was in 1999 when Aditya moved to Paris. Everything seemed normal until one time Aditya lit his cigarette for the umpteenth time. We met at a small coffee shop near his apartment. Aditya only wore a t-shirt, shorts and flip-flops. It was summer in Paris. Adit, as his friends call him, is a Chinese descent. His father is Indonesian Chinese and his mother is Sundanese. Adit ordered a beer while I just ordered sparkling water and of course with a snack in front of us. Adit tells me about his life in Paris with his French partner. At first, I was very happy to talk to him until I asked about his disappointment with the French people, and the atmosphere started to get a bit uncertain. Adit was silent for a long time while continuing to smoke his cigarette. I could only wait until Adit was able to speak. "Can we not talk about this?" asked Adit beggingly. I said that was for my dissertation. Adit paused for a moment and said: "OK, I will tell you".

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Adit showed a small cut on his hand saying, "I would have nearly killed myself if I had not been helped by Adriaan (the name of his current partner) in 2002. He is not French but Belgian. It so happened that he had to live in France to work", he said. "First, I moved to Paris in 1999, one year after the terrible events in Jakarta that occurred in May 1998. I am of Chinese descent. At that time the non-Chinese people somehow hated us.

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Never mind I do not want to talk about it. When I got to Paris, I immediately got a job because at that time I could already speak French. Short story, I met François. Our relationship is very good. But somehow 2 years after, his behaviour became brutal. François beat me up. I could not stand it until I finally went to a small cafe near our apartment. No, I did not want to drink coffee, I wanted to kill myself. When I cut my hand a little, I screamed. I was still conscious when someone helped me. Yes, he is Adriaan. I was helped by him. I said I am gay and he is fine. I also said that I do not want to go back to François. Finally, he allowed me to live with him. Until one day I found out that he was also gay", Adit started the history. "Even though I have been in France for a long time, we did not get married because Adriaan is Belgian and I am Indonesian. But it looks like Adriaan wants to move to Belgium next year", he said. "I feel no sympathy for the French any more. It is all just because I am Asian who does not have white skin like them or at least I am a Maghreb", he said. From this statement, it is clear that Aditya was very disappointed with the French people. Why is Aditya so disappointed? In this article, I will not demonize the French people and culture, but this is the findings of my dissertation about French people and culture who have lived together with Indonesian. France and latent racism According to Pietsch,1 since the 1990s, France has witnessed a rise in support for the anti-immigrant party, the National Front (FN). In the early 1990s, the new right-wing government headed by Edouard Balladur pursued draconian immigration policies that planned to stop all immigration and reduce the number of asylum seekers to a minimum. The rights of foreigners were limited, and a series of internal control policies were put in place. The new immigration reforms also limited the number of asylums appeals and prohibited adjustments of status for any undocumented migrants married to French citizens. _____________________________ 1 Pietsch, Juliet. "Introduction. The comparative studies of migration

flows", in Migration and Integration in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Australia, Juliet Pietsch&Marshall Clark (Eds.), Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press (2015)

Nevertheless, France, especially Paris, has a very high attention power for gay migrants. The Le Marais area is the area that is classified as mostly inhabited by gays. This location is generally characterized by many as one of the gay bars, gay clubs, gay saunas, gay “cafes”, restaurants, boutiques, travel agencies, bookstores with all labelled by the rainbow flag. Being one of the most open-minded and gay-friendly countries in the world, France is among the top destinations in 2 Europe for gay holidays. Even so, the existence of the right party, namely the National Front (FN) has had a bad impact on gay migrants. Many of the older generations disagree that gay exists. However, although freedom of thought is a fundamental right in France and the law does criminalize racist and anti-Semitic behaviour, racism still happens. Aditya said that racism continues even more so in the 2000s. "I do not understand what people who are not white have done. We are here to eat, to drink, to work, etc. but when I go to a bakery owned by white skin people, for example, I often do not get served or they just talk to their friends. I become confused. Even at the bank. Do not get me wrong, those who work in the banks or government agencies also like to see us from our skin colour", he complained. "France, which has such a long history, still stunts us who do not have white skin. So, what is the difference between them and us?", added Aditya. The Story of Bram: He Said You Are Asian and We Are European This was also stated by Bram. Bram has left Indonesia in 1995. We met in his very chick apartment in the La Defense area, a fairly elite area in Paris. He said that in the past when he moved to Paris, he did not know the cultural background of France. He came to Paris only for a three weeks’ vacation. He told me that his meeting with a French man whom he named "Idiot" just happened when he was drinking coffee. _____________________________

2 “Gay Holidays in France". “France Gay Guide. A guide to help you

find the best hotels & places in France for Gay travellers” by TBI HOTEL EXPERTS. Available at: https://www.travelbyinterest.com/destination/1115/gay/guide

Jus Humanis Journal of International Human Rights Law // March 2021

It was summer and there were a lot of visitors to the cafe. After waiting for a while, he found his seat. When he ordered coffee, there was a French man who was confused looking for a seat, then Bram offered to sit together. The short story is, they were dating but after three years of dating, the attitude of the "idiot" changed completely. The "idiot" cursed at Bram so much. Bram ended their relationship. "I am really lucky that I do not share the same house with him. There is one thing that I will continue to remember until now, he used to say, "you are Asian, and we are European". At first, I thought it was just a joke but gradually I was very disturbed to hear it", said Bram. What is different from Aditya is that Bram keeps in touch with the French man. "I am in love with France", he chirped. Currently, Bram has a partner whom he calls "mon amour" or "my love". Unfortunately, Bram did not want to mention the name of his partner. He said that let him know exactly who his partner is. He only showed a photo of them while on vacation in Greece. "If you do not believe this is my partner, I will call", he said. After a while talking with his partner, Bram gave me his cell phone and once again I asked permission to interview Bram. Racism Based on Skin Color However, the problem of racism in France is still low level for Asians because the biggest problem of racism is against black people. Even though in 3 France there is a "colour-blind" policy, the problem of discrimination that occurs is still high. According 4 to Robert Aline, in a major 2018 survey, the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) found that 30% of black people were victims of racism, while 24% of those surveyed were stopped by the police in the five years prior to the study. But Slimane Zeghidour, the senior editor of TV5 Monde once said that "in France, there is no racism based on skin colour. _____________________________

3 Bleich, Erik. "Race Policy in France", (2001). Available at:

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.brookings.edu/articles/racepolicy-in-france/amp/ 4 Robert, Aline. "France has a discrimination problem, says National Human Rights Defender", (2020) Available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/non-discrimination/news/francehas-a-discrimination-problem-says-national-human-rightsdefender/

To see evidence of this you only have to look at the streets of France where you’ll see more mixed-race couples than in New York or Rio de Janeiro."5 This statement may not make sense because in 2019 when the bomb attacks and shootings took place in Paris, the problem of skin colour re-emerged. Regarding this problem, Bram said that "it is true that the problem of skin colour is not exaggerated, but those of us who have a skin colour that is not white like Europeans, they are getting shocked because skin colour problems do not seem to be recognized as the root of the problem. Thinkers only think about the issue of ethnicity without going deeper into skin colour". When I was in France from 2010 to 2015 there was, actually, a rumour that the skin colour problem would be brought up again but then it seemed like being silenced. Language and Administration Process as a Latent Racism However, their difficulties in being able to integrate with French society and culture did not stop with the problem of skin colour. Language and administration process are also an obstacle for them. Language and administration process are something that seems normal but have a serious impact. French, according to Aditya and Bram, is a very complex language. French is always conjugated and has different levels. This is what can make migrants feel stressed and why they end up using poor French. In fact, to be able to work in a company, they should have a good level of French to read the documents, meet clients, and so on. Instead of working in a company, they just follow their partner or work part-time at a bakery. Aditya said that when he moved to France, the language was a major problem.

_____________________________

5 Handel, Nathalie. "Racism in France: It's not about skin colour",

(2016) Available at: https://frenchly.us/racism-france-not-skincolor/

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"French is a language full of conjugations. French is also a language that has a lot of unnamed letters, like the word Août [August]. The French just call it "Ut". But French is a sexy language. Although very difficult to understand but I like French", he said with a smile and lit a fire to smoke. Bram also said that it is true that French is a difficult language. "French is a complex language, but because of its complexity, French is very interesting. For me, French is one of the barriers for migrants living in France. We all know that French people do not want to use English, except maybe the academician, so we have to learn French extra hard. Unlike in Anglo-Saxon countries or the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries, for example, where people still want to use English", he said. However, for Aditya and Bram learning a new language is not a problem. "Learning sexy French is an advantage", said Aditya with a big laugh. "French is a really beautiful language", added Bram. For Aditya and Bram learning a new language is not a challenge, but those who want to move to France should bear this in mind first. Aditya said, "For me, there is no problem learning a new language, it is even good. But let's think about what if there are Indonesians who do not have the ability to absorb a new language at all. Not to mention that in France everyone has to use paper for administration. This can make everyone's head want to break. All administrative needs must be based on paper. I am surprised about that. This is very different from my friend who moved to Stockholm. Everything is computerized. I really hope that when I move to Belgium everything would be computerized". Bram agreed immediately when I asked about administrative processes in France. "Oh yes, everyone has to use paper for administration, even though there are some places that have been computerized. Like in a bank for example. When we want to open an account, how much paper do they print from the printing machine? We have to sign a lot of paper for that. However, this is a natural thing because if we sign on to an iPad or computer, the data can be lost. I think everything is fine", Bram said.

Photo: Raúl Real, flickr.

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They Said Sometimes Tears Are Words for Me [Us] "Sometimes tears are words for me", said Aditya. "Why do I say that? I am indeed gay. I actually do not want to move outside like now, but I am forced to. The government and the Indonesian people do not want us. What we do is always blasphemed and reviled. What is our fault? Human rights do not seem to be respected by Indonesian. It is useless if Indonesia has ratified the policy here and there, but we cannot live in peace in Indonesia. In the past, I sometimes cried but because I have lived in France long enough, so I do not cry again. I made a WhatsApp call with my family in Jakarta. It happened that my family knew that I am gay", he laughed. Meanwhile Bram just said, "yes, I miss my family and friends in Indonesia, but we have to go through everything. The important thing is we have to be happy".

Migrating outside seems a necessity for Indonesian gay men. This is because the Indonesian government seems unable to accommodate their interests. In addition, the Indonesian people are not able to see diversity. Religion also affects the gay men group. In this regard, Islam seems to prohibit their existence in the midst of society, even though in the days when Indonesia was not yet called Indonesia, but Nusantara, the existence of gay men and transgender groups did not encounter many problems. However, migrating must also be done very wisely. I recommend that before migrating, the important things that must be done are to read the policies for migrants, whether the country or city is very LGBTIQ+ friendly, what is needed if later we will change citizenship, and so on because today's discrimination is not only visible but has a latent nature.

Wisnu Adihartono is a sociologist and independent researcher based in Jakarta, Indonesia. He received his PhD in sociology from École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), France. His research focuses on migration, diaspora and family supports of Indonesian gay men in Paris. He has a particular interest in gender studies, gay and lesbian studies, sociology of migration, sociology of the family, qualitative research, sociology of everyday lives, and Southeast Asian studies.

Jus Humanis Journal of International Human Rights Law // March 2021

OUT OF TYRANNY AMBITION: MIGRATION CRISIS CAUSED BY “EUROPE’S LAST DICTATOR” Article by Kseniya Gladenkaya “In August 2020, Belarus experienced an unprecedented atmosphere of fear and intimidation in the context of repression. The situation reached its apogee of violence by the authorities immediately after the elections and maintains to this day. Since then, more than three tens of thousands of citizens have been detained administratively, with subsequent punishment in the form of biased and unfair court decisions in the form of arrests and fines. More than 900 criminal 1 cases have been charged against the opposition, and about 220 people in Belarus are in the status of political prisoners. 2 Only after the elections, more than 13,000 people fled the country (and this is only according to the official data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the period from September to 3 November), fearing for their lives and health, many of whom were forced to seek political asylum. The falsification of voting results at many polling stations, the repression of the opposition, and the disproportionate violence by law enforcement agencies against peaceful demonstrators have given rise to a political and migrant crisis in the country. Demonstrations in the form of peaceful protests by the civilian population and retaliatory violent and lawless measures by the Government continue to this day. The anarchy allowed by the political elite, ostensibly under the pretext of preserving the constitutional order and restoring order, inevitably leads to the tragedy of the people, which must be stopped by our joint efforts. __________________________

The Associated Press. Belarus rights group counts 900 cases against opposition. - Online. - Information and news portal ABC News. - https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/belarusrights-group-counts-900-cases-opposition-74175653 ,20.11.2020. 2 +31 New Political Prisoners. How Many People In Belarus Jailed For Political Reasons? Online. - Information and news portal BelarusFeed. - https://belarusfeed.com/27-january-220-politicalprisoners-belarus/ , 27.01.2021 3 V MVD rasskazali, skol'ko belorusov uekhalo iz strany s nachala oseni. Cifry vpechatlyayut. [The Ministry of Internal Affairs told how many Belarusians have left the country since the beginning of autumn. The numbers are impressive.]- Information and news portal TUT.BY. https://finance.tut.by/news704904.html ,21.10.2020

68 91

Photo: Natalia Garmann

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Let's get sorted out what led a peaceful and patient nation to the protest people’s movement. For 26 years, the nation has been enduring the regime of the aggressor. The ambiance of terror reigned in every corner of the country, a relic of the Soviet era when the right to "freedom of speech" seemed to be a fiction of the "Western puppeteers" (Western World).

confrontations. A mass outflow of medical specialists, in the boycott context against the 6 regime, is most likely. Moreover, if in the midst of a pandemic the country will suffer the shortage of medical staff, then who would treat the people? In the police state, only the number of riot police officers is excessive, and these guys do not work without extra pay.

"The Covid-dissident»

In this emergency, Lukashenko, as a leader, proved his absolute failure, neglecting the safety and health of the nation, violating the" right to life " of Belarusians. This fact was the initial point of absolute Lukashenko's political death.

However, that all changed when Covid 19 broke out. The pandemic that has shocked humanity, and worsened the economy of many countries, has become the "plague" of 2020.

When the regime is scarier than a pandemic While the governments of democratic states are fighting the disease, developing a vaccine, offering material support for businesses and people, Lukashenka offered an alternative preventative 4 method -"consuming vodka and driving tractors". Political theater of the absurd. Even more interesting, refusing to recognize the existence of the virus as such, continuing his lifestyle of a dictator-president, he declared to the country that since he did not see "any of the viruses flying around", so "there are none of them". At the same time, he refused to supply the medical office with the necessary personal protective equipment and disinfectants, and the worried people sent on leave 5 "at their own expense." The migration of some medical personnel became a kind of strike towards the connivance of the authorities. The number of medical workers who have left the territorial border, at the moment, is not very critical. However, the country cannot afford to lose medical professionals due to Lukashenka's nonsense. After the bloody events of August, he did not spare anyone, including doctors engaged in the civil _____________________________ 3 M. Bennetts. Tractors and vodka will cure Belarus of the

coronavirus, says leader. - Information and news portal The Sunday Times. - https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/tractors-andvodka-will-cure-belarus-of-the-coronavirus-says-leader-t6b9xvc55 , 29.03.2020. 4 A. Boguslavskaya. Pochemu medikam v Belarusi pomogayut volontery, a ne gosudarstvo? [Why do doctors in Belarus get help from volunteers, not the state?] - Information and news portal Deutsche Welle. - https://www.dw.com/ru/почему-медикам-вбеларуси-помогают-волонтеры-а-не-государство/a-53162965 , 18.04.2020

Lukashenko lost his remaining electorate due to his negligence during the coronavirus. Despite the fear of contamination with an unknown disease, people stood in queues to sign for the nomination of alternative candidates for the presidency and massively participated in pickets and rallies – Belarusians got their minds on democracy. The season of repression became officially launched after the political pressure on prominent potential rivals, Sergei Tikhanovsky and Viktor Babariko, who were imprisoned, and Valery Tsepkalo (also a favorite of the election campaign) who was forced to flee the country for safety reasons. After these events, the headquarters of the main opposition candidates united to mobilize on the victory of the candidate Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, who ran instead of her husband. She, jointly with Veronika Tsepkalo and Babaryka's presidential campaign manager, Maria Kolesnikova, became the symbol of the struggle against the 7 dictatorship. _____________________________ 6 Doctors behind bars Amid the coronavirus pandemic’s second

wave, medical workers in Belarus get swept up in the opposition crackdown. Online. - online media outlet Meduza. https://meduza.io/en/feature/2020/11/25/doctors-behind-bars , 25.11.2020. 7 Candidates screening, repressions, and a merger of Tsikhanouskaya, Babaryka and Tsepkala HQs. Online. BelarusinFocus https://belarusinfocus.info/electioncampaign/candidates-screening-repressions-and-mergertsikhanouskaya-babaryka-and-tsepkala ,13-19.07.2020.

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Victory at Belarusian life's cost Despite a large number of pre-election rallies, the preponderance of the electorate's votes, and most importantly, the people's affection, the symbols of Democratic Belarus failed to accomplish a shift of power. Notwithstanding the peaceful nature of all opposition protests, the demonstrators were confronted with police violence, torture, inhumane treatment in pre-trial detention facilities and prisons, persecution, repression, falsification of criminal cases, rape, enforced disappearance, and 8 murder. At the same time, there can be no question of any fair court decisions - the entire law enforcement is corrupted to the source, declaring a man guilty to please a despotic ruler. As it is said in Belarus now: "If there was a person, there would be an article!” Repression of students For the right to freedom of opinion and expression and freedom of peaceful assembly, hundreds of students were expelled from universities, undergone administrative arrests, and even some were prosecuted. Since the beginning of the academic year, more than 400 students have been detained, including minors, and more than 130 of _____________________________

8 Seeking Justice Stories of Violence in Belarus. Investigation of Mass

media 11.11.2020. Online: https://www.belarusinfocus.info/sites/default/files/seeking_justice_web. pdf

them were expelled, some of which were forced to flee their motherland and experience life on the run at such a young age. 9 Meanwhile, the pressure on students and teachers at universities was escalating. If a professor in a higher education institution publicly expressed an opinion contrary to the authoritarian regime, supporting students in their political view against the current Belarusian ideology, then the professor would be subjected to dismissal and prosecution. It's simple, if you desire to hold your opinion in a public institution, then you will express it behind the bars. The dictator, Lukashenko, craves only for slaves who are obedient to his regime. The demise of the IT sector Valery Tsepkalo (unregistered candidate, political refugee) is the founder of the High-Tech Park, Belarusian Silicon Valley, and the main platform for the IT sector. This industry was one of the youngest and most progressive for the development of the economy in Belarus, with total revenue of more 10 than 3 billion USD in 2018. ______________________________ 9

Fourth month of the Semester: Repressions against students. Online. Belarusian Student Association. https://zbsunion.by/en/news/pressure_on_students , 19.01.2021. 10 A. Merfi. Kak IT-sektor Belarusi mozhet povliyat' na ee mezhdunarodnoe polozhenie?[ How can the IT sector of Belarus affect its international position?] Online. - Minsk Dialogue. https://minskdialogue.by/research/memorable-notes/kak-it-sektorbelarusi-mozhet-povliiat-na-ee-mezhdunarodnoe-polozhenie , 05.02.2020.

Photo: Associated Press (AP)

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During the first days of the most barbarous suppression of the civilian confrontation by the riot police, the country was in an information vacuum without Internet access. Population lost contact with the outside world, finding themselves alone in the "Hunger Games" with the dictator. There were truly dreadful days for every Belarusian. Now, over time, people who were out in the streets in these bloody protests breathe a word about the use of not only stun grenades, water cannons, tasers, rubber bullets, brutal beatings, but service weapons by OMON against peaceful demonstrators armed only with their 11 desire for changes in the political system. Minister of Internal Affairs still denies the danger to life and the use of service weapons, claiming the measures applied had been proportionate. However, all of the above, even aside from firearms, can result in serious injuries and death. So, stun grenade left a young man disabled, depriving him of his heel, with police batons women and men were raped, and a rubber bullet shot caused an injury incompatible with life. Unfortunately, there are a lot of appalling stories 12 like these. Therefore, based on the available facts, the Internet shutdowns were beneficial only to the de facto authority to shelter their violent deeds from the democratic world. In the aftermath, these shutdowns extended further following the same pattern - Lukashenko rapidly transformed Belarus into somewhat of European North Korea, striving to shelter his cruel orders during peaceful protests. Under such circumstances, with Internet disruptions, the digital segment could not normally operate, and IT companies began to suffer losses.

As a result, more than 40 IT companies relocated to the neighboring states. More than 2000 qualified IT specialists have already left Belarus. Lukashenko has killed the digital economy in Belarus, which is setting records for revenue and 13 capitalization in states of the world. The government in exile The "symbol" of the Belarusian struggle for democracy and respect for human rights and freedoms, the opposition candidate who won the election based on the data of independent observers, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, fled the republic under pressure. However, the People's President pursues her opposition activities from the outside. A woman who opposes the sexist dictator represents the legitimate interests of the Belarusian people in the world political arena and pursues dialogue with state leaders and world politicians about a way out of the Belarusian 14 political crisis. For reasons of health safety and life security, all the members of the presidium of the Coordination Council who remained at large were forced to escape the Republic (representative opposition 15 body of the Belarusian society). At the moment, all the current opposition leaders are abroad, and the rest of the opposition politicians are in custody. Revocation of the citizenship and the «Iron Curtain» The entire policy of Lukashenka is characterized by inconsistency in decision-making. On October 29th, the Belarusian border checkpoints did not allow citizens to return to Belarus. Apparently, Mr. Dictator is not aware of the freedom of ______________________________ 13 Iz Belarusi v Ukrainu iz-za diktatury Lukashenka vyekhalo 40 IT-

_____________________________

11 K. Belyaninov. Neletal'noe, no smertonosnoe. CHem opasny

specsredstva, kotorye primenyali belorusskie pravoohraniteli. [Nonlethal, but deadly. What are the dangers of special equipment used by Belarusian law enforcement officers.]- Online. - Information and news portal BBC.COM - https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-53832698 , 19.08.2020. 12 Edinaya Kniga Registracii Prestuplenij. [Unified Book Of Crime Registration]. - An online platform for collecting, storing and analyzing case files of crimes committed by officials of the Republic of Belarus. https://ekrp.org/ekrp/

Photo: Reuters

Kompanij- Kakie posledstviya? [40 IT Companies left Belarus for Ukraine because of Lukashenka's dictatorship - What are the consequences?] Online. - 5.UA- https://www.5.ua/ru/myr/yz-belarusyv-ukraynu-yz-za-dyktaturi-lukashenko-viekhaly-40-it-kompanyi-kakyeposledstvyia-230558.html , 28.11.2020. 14 E. Tolkacheva. SHtab Tihanovskoj, KS i NAU. CHem zanyaty i kak svyazany mezhdu soboj struktury belorusskoj oppozicii. [The headquarters of Tikhanovskaya, KS and NAU. What are the structures of the Belarusian opposition engaged in and how are they related to each other] Online. - TUT.BY https://news.tut.by/economics/713627.html?c , 04.01.2021. 15 Coordination Council. Official website. - https://rada.vision/en

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movement enshrined in Article 13 of the UN Universal Declaration and Article 30 of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, or simply decided to forget it. But the next day he changed his mind, and unofficial restriction was shifted and citizens could return to their homeland. Then, it's more nonsensical. "We won't keep anyone," Lukashenka says about the outflow of qualified specialists. Or will he after all? I pointed out that Lukashenka's neglectful and absurd attitude towards the epidemic: at the beginning of 2020, he denied the existence of the coronavirus, but at the end of the year due to the public health emergency, he closed the state's borders, like many countries, because of COVID-19, only not to 16 enter, but to leave the country. Is his true motive an attempt to prevent the mass escape of dissenters? Since November 19th, in addition to the deprivation of physical freedom, some Belarusians 17 may be deprived of their citizenship for exercising the constitutional right to freedom of speech. Such amendments to the bill were introduced by the _____________________________

N. Fedosenko. Belarus Blocks Land Border Exits.Online. TheMoscowTimes. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/12/10/belarus-blocksland-border-exits-a72303 , 10.12.2020. 17 V Belarusi prinyali skandal'nye popravki k zakonu o grazhdanstve. [Belarus has adopted scandalous amendments to the law on citizenship.] Online. - Opposition Information and news portal Charter 97. - V Belarusi prinyali skandal'nye popravki k zakonu o grazhdanstve 19.11.2020.

22-year-old former Miss Belarus and current escort of the Belarusian Usurper, Belarusian politician, Maria Vasilevich. And while her peers only obtain their first degree in law and political science, taking baby steps as a legislator, she has already amended the bill to deprive the citizenship of those Belarusians who acquired it. A government that works in the interests of the people is still a utopia of the Belarusian ideology. The introduced amendments violate the principle on the prohibition of citizenship deprivation (Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus) and several international legal documents on the right to nationality (Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, article 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, article 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 9 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, article 18 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Article 29 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families). In the previous review of the legal act on citizenship, the Constitutional Court of Belarus emphasized the inseparability of the right to citizenship.

Photo: Reuters

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Photo: Belorusskij Partizan

Casserole of nonsense

Photo: www.beehy.pe

For drug possession now, 18 the one would be released on bail, and for the made snowman the 19 other would be put on trial. As if the color scheme of red and white in clothing must be forgotten, as for now, these colors are 19 "violating public order," - MIA says. The white-redwhite flag against which Lukashenka gave his first oath soon would be considered extremist. Also, the citizens cannot wish prosperity and well-being to their homeland any longer otherwise Belarusian will get a fine or an administrative arrest. Welcome to the Belarusian ugly reality. _____________________________ 18

Timu Belorusskih zaderzhali s narkotikami. CHto govorit on sam, i chto — SK. [Timu Belorusskikh was detained with drugs. What he says himself, and what-IC]. Online. - TUT.BY. https://afisha.tut.by/news/anews/716926.html?c , 29.01.2021. 19 E. Bychkova. «Umyshlenno provel odinochnyj piket». Kak v Gomele muzhchinu sudili za «politicheskogo» snegovika u saraya. [E. Bychkova."Deliberately held a single picket." How a man was tried in Homel for a "political" snowman near a barn]. Online. - TUT.BY.https://news.tut.by/society/714831.html?c, 14.01.2021. 20 I. Olenich. Palachi Lukashenka skhvatili belorusskuyu studentku iz-za shtanov: marazm krepchaet. [Lukashenka's executioners seized a Belarusian student from behind her pants: insanity is getting stronger]. Online. - https://lviv.znaj.ua/ru/363233-katy-lukashenkaskhopyly-bilorus-ku-studentku-cherez-shtany-marazm-mitsnishaye , 21.01.2021.

It is worth mentioning the findings of the experts from the Center for Research of Belarusian Culture, Language, and Literature of the National Academy of Sciences, who conducted a study and concluded 21 the slogan "Zhyve Belarus!" (Long Live Belarus) that is neither offensive nor cynical and that the whitered-white flag is "the national colors of the Belarusian people», which can appear in various 21 forms and expressions. ____________________________ S. Inanec. Uchenye iz NAN Belarusi ob"yasnili, pochemu «ZHyve Belarus'» i BCHB — ne «cinichnye i oskorbitel'nye». [C. Inanes.Wanasayansi kutoka Chuo cha Taifa cha Sayansi ya Belarus alieleza ni kwa nini "Zhyve Belarus" na BCHB ni si " kijinga na kukera»]. Online. - TUT.BY https://news.tut.by/society/707492.html?c , 11.11.2020..

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Who implements democracy? Lukashenka's unprecedented political cynicism, apparent disregard for the postulates and norms of international law, Belarusian legislation, and the appeals and demands of the West is a pretentious slap in the face of the democratic world. The escalation of the terror of the Usurper will result in a severe demographic crisis. The Republic previously had a high immigration potential due to the political regime, and the current situation, in essence, the genocide of civilians, forces the manmade population decrease.

How deserted will the appearance of the country be due to a self-proclaimed president who has been "holding to chair with blue fingers" for 26 years? Should the democratic community, where respect for rights and freedoms is put above bloody ambitions and illegal enrichment, promote the hasten of the power shift in Belarus? After all, only in unity we can resist the regime of the police state and ensure the observance of peace, respect for rights and freedoms, and the restoration of democracy.

Kseniya Gladenkaya is a Belarusian student of the faculty of International Law and Human Rights in the University of Tartu, Estonia; after 9 month of absence in homeland upon arrival was sentenced to administrative arrest for exercising the right of free speech; advocating for human rights in Belarus.

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GASTARBEITER UNDERCLASS Article by Daria Tarkhova Migrants from Post-Soviet countries such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan come to Russia for work. Some of the issues they face have to do with corruption and bureaucracy, some with ethnic profiling and racism. This article discusses these issues based on investigative reportages by “Novaya Gazeta”. The German word “Gastarbeiter” is used in the Russian language to refer to migrant workers. However, by using “Gastarbeiter” in a conversation, one would not refer to, say, German, French, or American migrants who work in Russia. Instead, the word refers to those filling low paid positions: for instance, in care, construction and cleaning. “Gastarbeiters” come from countries with lower wages than Russia, as Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. 1

According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 2019 a total of almost 5,5 million working migrants were registered in the Russian Federation, including over 2,1 million from Uzbekistan and almost 1,2 million from Tajikistan, which accounted ______________________________

1 MVD or Ministerstvo Vnutrennih Del (Ministry of Internal Affairs),

Министерство Внутренних Дел. https://xn--b1aew.xn-p1ai/Deljatelnost/statistics/migracionnaya/item/19365693/

for 60% of the total work migration. There are only estimations of how many illegal migrants are there in Russia, however, the number is in millions, and at least one million is estimated to reside in Moscow only. While Russia has a visa-free regime with many post-soviet countries, including the countries mentioned above, to work legally migrants must pay for a pricey worker permit. The permits, as well as pricing, are determined by the municipalities of residence, and accordingly, the more popular the municipality, the pricier the permits. Therefore, the most expensive permits are in Moscow, where many migrants want to go due to existing communities of people from the same regions, as well as many work possibilities. Migrants work both legally and illegally, for different-sized businesses and companies as well as private employers. Typical positions could be cleaners in a supermarket, construction workers on municipality roads or personal summer houses, or privately hired care workers. It is more difficult for migrants to become aware of their workers’ rights because of several reasons, such as the language barrier or the lack of awareness of local legislation.

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Furthermore, they might be trying to avoid bureaucratic problems or other problems with the authorities. Even so, the issues migrant face come across these positions and are often not depending on whether they are working legally or not. To begin with, even if a migrant has paid for a work permit, they are not necessarily issued a contract on paper. 2 If there is no contract, it is difficult to claim any of the workers’ rights that the permit would otherwise entail. Therefore, some migrants could consider it not worthy to pay for the permit if they don’t trust that they will even get a contract that would make it worth it. Moreover, employers are known to bribe authorities to avoid proper registration of migrant workers and fees 3 that follow. If the employer is a private person, the agreements are often made orally and all payments are only between the employer and the employee, so the functionality of the deal depends on the individuals. However, in these cases, the employee does not have access to workers’ rights, such as medical insurance and pension, while the employer gets their work done cheaper since they don’t pay taxes. All in all, the employees seem to be the ones to benefit from migrant workers the most. Another source of money-saving for employers is _____________________________

2 Юлия Репринцева, Вячеслав Половинко, `Везение и труд´

(Новая Газета, 2 February 2018) Julia Reprintseva, Vyacheslav Polovinko, `Luck and work´ (Novaya Gazeta), Available at: https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/02/02/75365-vezenie-i-trud accessed 27 January 2021. 3 Ibid.

safety. Migrants might not know if the employer is required to provide safety training, and being in fear of losing their jobs, they might agree to work without proper safety equipment. According to Novaya Gazeta (2020), yearly, thousands of migrants are injured at the workplace, while 4 hundreds die. There is legislation in place that would secure funds for injured migrant workers or the spouses and children in case of deaths. Nevertheless, sometimes employers avoid the costs by offering the worker money in exchange for 5 signing a document of no complaint. The legal refund would have been much bigger, but the employees might not know this. Various entities are available for migrants’ support for both preventive measures as well as post workplace accidents, such as NGOs. However, not all migrants have the resources to stay in Russia and get involved with the NGOs to fight for their rights, and, again, many might not even know this is an option. Ethnic profiling, exercised by Russian authorities, is 6 interlinked with bureaucratic and legal issues. For instance, people are stopped on the street and asked for their documents (that might or might not be required of them), required to purchase nonnecessary insurances, or not let through the 7 border region without paying a bribe. It is difficult to address racism in Russia since it is not problematized in the national mainstream discourse. During the Soviet times, there was a famous slogan of “Friendship of Peoples”, which implied the good relations between the Soviet Republics. This conception has lived on in both Russian politics as well as public minds. For instance, the constitution of the Russian Federation frequently states the country to be “multinational”, and, in fact, the ethnically, culturally, and linguistically diverse population does reside in Russia. As the country is inherently regarded to be _____________________________

Екатерина Иващенко, `Увечное противостояние´ (Новая Газета, 15 November 2020) Ekhaterina Ivashenko `Injured resistance´ (Novaya Gazeta) Available at: https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2020/11/15/87965-uvechnoeprotivostoyanie accessed 20 January 2021. 5 Ibid. 6 Лилит Саркисян, Артем Располов, `Запертые в Москве´ (Новая Газета, 20 April 2020) Lilit Sarkisyan, Artyom Raspolov, `Locked in Moscow’ (Novaya Gazeta), Available at: https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2020/04/15/84910-zapertye-vmoskve accessed 27 January 2021. 7 Supra note 2.

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“multinational”, racism is not considered to be an issue. Nevertheless, ethnic profiling affects both Russian citizens as well as people from outside Russia. The confusion at the interlink of the Post-Soviet countries, nationality, culture, and colour of the skin can be perceived through two words the Russian language has for “Russian”. Russkij refers to “ethnic Russianness”, while Rossijanin refers to “Russian nationality”. The former would be described as “Slavic Russianness” in a conversation, but it basically means white. For instance, recent migration policies stress the return of “emigrated compatriots”, and Russian speakers, to the country. In the light of Russia being a “multinational” country, and the Russian language being widespread across the Post-Soviet states, it is easy to conclude that this is a euphemistic way to say 8 “white”. Globally, the crises that followed Covid-19 shed light on various intersected inequalities, like the ones that affect migrant workers in Russia. According to reports by Novaya Gazeta, both illegal and legal workers have suffered severe 9 consequences. Even if Putin signed an order for a break in workers permit payments, many employers would still demand them, and workers would still pay10because they would be too afraid to lose their jobs. Those, who were not able to keep their jobs, struggle to survive with securing their livelihood, such as rent costs. Furthermore, there are reports on the proportionally increased detentions11and “document checks” of migrants by the police. There are several obstacles, such as closed borders, lack of transportation methods, or delays in issuing documents, for those who, willingly or unwillingly, are trying to go home. _____________________________

For instance, in late August 2020, a tent camp of several thousand people emerged in front of a railway station in Rostov-on-Don, a city in the South of Russia.12 People were waiting for trains, that were arranged to take people home to Uzbekistan. However, there was no clear information on when the tickets would be sold, and people had to constantly watch their spot in the line. Some had to wait in the camp for over a month, and it is unlikely that all of the people waiting were able to go home since there was no information available on timetables or the number of available seats on the trains. It seems unnecessary to mention that the ticket sale procedures, as well as the conditions in the camp, were not only an inhumane way to treat people but a severe epidemiological risk, not only for the ones who had to stay in the camp but also for the whole region. _____________________________ 12 Елена Романова, `Мы домой хотим´ (Новая Газета, 9 September

2020) Elena Romanova, `We want to go home´ (Novaya Gazeta), Available at: https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2020/09/08/86999-mydomoy-hotim accessed 30 January 2021.

Вячеслав Половинко, `Нам нужны не граждане, а жители´ (Новая Газета, 11 September 2019) Vyacheslav Polovinko, `We don’t need citizens, we need residents´ (Novaya Gazeta), Available at: https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/09/11/81920-namnuzhny-ne-grazhdane-a-zhiteli accessed 26 January 2021. 9 Supra note 6. 10 Лилит Саркисян, `Мало ли что ваш Путин говорил´ (Новая Газета, 21 May 2020) Lilit Sarkisyan, `It does not matter what your Putin said´ (Novaya Gazeta), Available at: https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2020/05/21/85472-malo-li-chtovash-putin-govoril accessed 21 January 2021. 11 Supra note 6

Photo: vottak, flickr.

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In spite of all the issues, migration is necessary for Russia. Firstly, migrants replace the ageing and reducing population. Secondly, the municipal budgets gain from work permit funds. Thirdly, just as people from countries with lower wages travel to Russia, Russian nationals emigrate to work elsewhere, for instance in Europe. Securing the fulfilment of workers’ rights would help make up for this drain. In the meantime, there are clearly legal and bureaucratic issues to tackle, such as dealing with corruption,

making the document processes more accessible, and lowering the workers patent costs. However, it is the white privilege and racism that are more complicated to address. To ensure a stable position for them in the labour market, as well as properly accommodate those who choose to stay, the nostalgia for the “Friendship of Peoples” needs to be renewed to develop an inclusive society.

Daria Tarkhova is a political geographer especially interested in borders, deconstruction of nation-state and antiracism. She is currently enrolled in Global Studies MSc in Lund University.

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Photo: rvjak, flickr.

Jus Humanis Journal of International Human Rights Law // March 2021

NO PAPER - NO MAN: HOW ARMED CONFLICT IN UKRAINE PAVES NEW ROADS TO STATELESSNESS Article by Anastasiia Vorobiova 1. Introduction Is it possible to retain the “right to have rights” during an ongoing armed conflict? Let’s discuss the legal challenges arising from the Ukrainian context, and find out why a man without a passport is absolutely prohibited to exist. Probably, the first thing that has caught your eye in the title of the present article is the horrendous word combination “armed conflict”, which immediately brings the associative line of active hostilities taking place. And – as true as these associations are – in casu, the “conflict” itself is not a centerpiece, but rather serves as a background for a more systematic problem of statelessness and exclusion to take up the stage. But, above all, it is necessary to keep the context precise and clear ab intio: and according to the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, since 2014 the following events have been taking place on the territory of Ukraine:

Apart from the common pattern of Russian involvement, the most evident consequence of mentioned events is the loss of effective control by the Ukrainian government over Crimea as a whole (which is now de-facto governed by the Russian Federation) and parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions, where authority is exercised by the selfproclaimed Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (hereinafter – LPR and DPR) respectively. For your convenience, this description is illustrated with a map, kindly provided by the Zurich Center for Security Policy.

1) International armed conflict involving the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula by the 1 Russian Federation; 2) non-international armed conflict, taking place on the border regions of Donetsk and Luhansk with insurgent groups, allegedly backed up by the Russian Federation (the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics respectively); 3) alleged direct military engagement between Russian and Ukrainian government forces -an international armed conflict in parallel to the noninternational one. ______________________________

ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities (2016) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-repPE_ENG.pdf#page35>

Photo: rvjak, flickr.

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The occupation of Crimea is not recognized by the 2 majority of the international community, and for multiple occasions, Russia has been called upon withdrawing its military and financial assistance to the insurgent groups in Donbas. Consequently, Ukraine continuously insists on the inviolability of its internationally recognized borders; under Ukrainian domestic law, Crimea is classified as a temporarily occupied territory 3as well as certain 4 parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (both referred to as non-government control territories – NGCT). Nevertheless, since 2014, 2 borderlines are separating the non-government-controlled territories from mainland Ukraine: the administrative borderline between Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula; and the so-called contact line covering certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. _____________________________

2 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 68/262 of March 27,

2014 https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/ view_doc.asp? symbol=A/reS/68/262 3 Article 3 of Law of Ukraine “On guaranteeing the rights and Liberties of Citizens and the Legal regime in Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine” https://zakon.rada. gov.ua/laws/show/1207-18 4 Law of Ukraine “On Special State Policies to ensure Ukraine’s State Sovereignty in Temporarily Occupied Territories in Ukraine,” https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2268- 19/print

But, why does this matter? Because, as poignantly stressed by Ethien Balibar “to draw a border is to establish an identity, and to establish an identity is to draw a border”.5 Moreover, international borderlines serve as a margin between the “national (domestic) and the foreign” and thus “express sovereignty as a power to “attach” populations to territories, to “administrate” the territory through the control of the population thus exercising governance over the 6 population”. What happens when a situation of an armed conflict draws a border within the state? It can be argued that it serves the same purpose of defining identity, allegiance and drawing a clear distinction between “us” and “them”. And this metaphorical premise raises very practical challenges of ensuring the effective realization of rights on both sides of ______________________________

5 É Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene, C Jones, J Swenson, and C

Turner (trans) (London: Verso, 2002) pp 76

6 Etienne Balibar “Europe as a borderland”, <

http://gpm.ruhosting.nl/avh/Europe%20as%20Borderland.pdf>

94 Photo: rvjak, flickr.

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the contact line – to the extent that people are left stateless as “not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law"7or who are left de-facto deprived of the opportunity to effectively exercise their rights. Not delimiting the whole multiplicity of issues arising from described situation, but being mindful of the readers’ mental state, this article will focus on the issue of recognition of official documents emanating from the NGCT and the role of citizenship and statelessness when states fail to comply with its obligations. Hence, the problem of potential statelessness of NGCT residents will be discussed in light of the duty of non-recognition, the Namibian exceptions and the concepts of de jure and de-facto statelessness. In the end, we will see how the present situation not only weakens a genuine link between the state and NGCT but serves as a bargaining chip to deepen the “us” and “them” narrative within the society. 2. The duty of non-recognition and NGCT Among the consequences of the responsibility arising out of grave breaches of peremptory norms, such as the prohibition of aggression or the obligation to respect the rights of selfdetermination of peoples, art. 41(2) of the Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts (hereinafter – ARSIWA) provides for the obligation for States not to “‘recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious violation’ of a peremptory norm, together with the additional obligation not to render aid or assistance in 8 maintaining that situation”. In line with this provision, since 1 December 2014, when the occupation of Crimea and the loss of control of certain parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions took place, Ukrainian state authorities officially ceased to exercise their powers and provide all governmental services. ______________________________ 7 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons

<https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wp-content/uploads/1954Convention-relating-to-the-Status-of-Stateless-Persons_ENG.pdf> 8 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1 <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ddb8f804.html>

Thus, the documents issued by the authorities in NGCT are not recognised by the Ukrainian authorities, which include Ukrainian identity cards, birth and death certificates, those confirming oldage or disability pensions and social benefits, as well as property and inheritance records etc.9 However, can such policy be absolute in its terms of non-recognizing documents verifying certain acts necessary for the effective realization of human rights? Well, not quite. In its Namibia judgment, concerning the occupation of a part of Namibian territory by the South African government, the ICJ determined that there might be some exceptions to the duty of non-recognition. Specifically, by stating that: “the non-recognition of South Africa’s administration of the Territory should not result in depriving the people of Namibia of any advantages derived from international co-operation. In particular, while official acts performed by the Government of South Africa after the termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity cannot be extended to those acts, such as, for instance, the registration of births, deaths and marriages, the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the Territory” 10 Currently, Ukraine does not recognize the validity of documents issued in NGCT, and thus residents are put at the risk of statelessness in various ways. Firstly, if they lose their identity documents and fail to confirm their Ukrainian citizenship (mind the absence of electronic databases of issued passports and lack of access to archives of State Migration Service in NGCT), and secondly, by nonconfirming the fact of birth occurring in the NGGT. Families with newborn children are required to use either a judicial procedure or medical verification (as per a recently introduced, but not yet implemented procedure) to establish the birth fact ______________________________

9 NRC Briefing paper “Birth and death registration for residents of

non-government-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine” <https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/briefingnotes/ukraine/briefing-note_civil-registration.pdf> 10 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South-Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Reports (1971) 6 para 56

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before applying for a birth certificate.11However, the Ukrainian government had attempted to resolve these issues by introducing an “upgraded” version of the “Namibian exceptions”, by carrying out legalization of birth and death registration occurring at the NGCT through a regular court procedure in the government-controlled territories. However, that was lengthy, costly and enduring. Therefore, in February 2016 the Government introduced a so-called “simplified court procedure for the establishment of the fact of birth or death in the non-government-controlled territories.” Under this “simplified procedure”, the courts have been tasked to examine such applications “immediately”, provided that an application is submitted by an authorised individual from an extended list of relatives and care-takers prescribed by law, along with the payment of court fees. So, as it has clearly can be seen, even though the procedure was “simplified” in a way, it still has practical challenges including, but not limited to travelling through the contact line into the government-controlled territories, applying to the court, paying a court fee and coming back. In 2018 the government had proudly declared that nonrecognition policy will not be applicable to the registration of birth and death, but this remains true only on paper. Therefore, such procedures are still not practically feasible for the majority of the residents, and thus only 43 per cent of children born in non-government-controlled territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions obtained Ukrainian 12 birth certificates. The situation in the Crimea is even more dramatic, as Russian authorities had arbitrarily declared all residents of the Crimea as nationals of the Russian Federation, except for those who within one month thereafter declared their willingness to retain their and (or) their minor children’s other nationality or 13 remain stateless. ______________________________ 11 United Nations in Ukraine briefing note “Birth registration,

December 2017" ADC Memorial and CF The Right to Protection “Statelessness in 12 Russia and Ukraine: possible ways to overcome the problem”, 2019 <https://r2p.org.ua/wpcontent/uploads/2019/07/stateless_ENG.pdf> 13 Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation “About acceptance to the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and education as a part of the Russian Federation new subjects the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol”, 21 March 2014

In its turn, renunciation of Russian nationality automatically leads to restrictions related to employment, the right to social benefits, migration control, the prohibition of participation in political 14 activities and to be engaged in public life, etc. The forced automatic acquisition of the nationality of the Russian Federation by the Ukrainian nationals residing the Crimea (as well as passports issued by the Russian administrative authorities) is not recognized either by Ukraine or the EU15and is not accepted as a ground for loss of nationality of 16 Ukraine. In order to receive a birth certificate that could confirm the Ukrainian origin of the child, parents have to go through the identical procedure as the residence of Donbas – but involving 2 border checkpoints from the Russian and Ukrainian Authorities. Hence, only 11% of children born in Crimea have obtained birth certificates issued by the government of Ukraine. 17 In line with this logic, without a birth certificate a child would have no access to healthcare, social benefits, education or the legal inheritance of property, cannot have a registered place of residence and would be precluded from crossing 18 the contact line or border with mainland Ukraine. Finally, this problem goes far beyond the access to social benefits, taking into account that without a birth certificate recognized by the Ukrainian authority, a child is at high risk of statelessness as it would be nearly impossible to establish the lineage according to Ukrainian legislation. ______________________________ 14 «CRIMEA BEYOND RULES. Thematic review of the human rights

17 18

situation under occupation.» - Vol. 3 - Right to nationality (citizenship) / Edited by S. Zayets, R. Martynovskyy, D. Svyrydova. – Kyiv, 2017 <https://helsinki.org.ua/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/Crimea_beyond_rules_-3_en-fin.pdf> The EU non-recognition policy for Crimea and Sevastopol: Fact Sheet <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartersHomepage/37464/eu-non-recognition-policy-crimea-andsevastopol-fact-sheet_en> Law of Ukraine “On guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of nationals and on the legal regime in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine” <http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1207vii> Supra note 10 Ibid.

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3. What is statelessness? Bulgakov once wrote that “a man without an identity document is absolutely prohibited to exist” – meaning that “the right to have rights"19requires “having a place” within a particular state, which would issue appropriate documents allowing its existence. In light of this logic, those who are not in the prized possession of a passport of any state, are de-facto precluded from exercising even the most basic rights and are deemed to be “out of place”, bearing a mark of “stateless abnormality".20 The international legal definition of a stateless person is “a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law”.21 Such a phenomenon is called a “de jure statelessness”. But the lack of an “effective nationality”, when an individual is unable to enjoy benefits of its nationality 1) when failing to prove their nationality or 2) due to inability or unwillingness of the State to offer them protection is called a “de facto statelessness”. De jure statelessness may arise either at birth or may arise subsequently if a person loses his or her nationality without acquiring another nationality. De facto statelessness usually arises in situations of State repression22or the state’s failure to secure the rights of persons. In light of this logic, in Nottebohm case the ICJ had developed a doctrine of a “genuine connection” involving “bonds and attachments" between a state and a national required to detect the effectiveness of nationality in question. But how does it conform with the Ukrainian case?

19 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London: Andre Deutsch,

1986), 277

20 Alison Kesby, The Right to Have Rights. Citizenship, Humanity, and

International Law, Oxford 2012, 164 p 1954 Convention, supra note 8 22 Shearer I. and Opeskin B. “Nationality and statelessness” in Opeskin B, Perruchoud R and Redpath-Cross J (eds), Foundations of International Migration Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 21

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In the case of Ukraine, the over bureaucratization of implementing the “Namibian exceptions” leads to a situation whereas persons who de jure are considered as citizens of Ukraine are de facto left stateless or put under the risk of statelessness. ______________________________

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Specifically, people residing in the NGCT are precluded from not only exercising their basic rights but even crossing the internal “contact line” in order to claim their rights. This is the case where an invisible border becomes a real wall, marking a separation not between nationals and foreigners, but between “good” and “bad” citizens of the same state – those who deserve the protection of the state and who do not – depending on perceived allegiance and non-allegiance. Thus, de facto statelessness is arising not only due to the practical impediments bearing a consequence of armed conflicts – but state’s failure to effectively secure the rights of persons who have appeared to live on the other side of the borderline. 4. Why does it matter? One could logically ask, what are the legal consequences of this policy? First of all, Ukraine is bound by the obligations enshrined in the 1961 Convention on reduction on statelessness. Namely, it establishes safeguards against statelessness by the prevention of statelessness at birth; prohibiting the withdrawal of citizenship from States’ nationals and instructs States to avoid statelessness in the 23 context of the transfer of territory. As far as it can be seen, by failing to either introduce the “Namibian exceptions” in order to secure the innate rights to its residents trapped in the NGCT or to devise a procedure that is effective, prompt and non-humiliating, Ukraine is acting contrary to its obligations. Moreover, due to the absence of electronic copies of the documents originating from the NGCT, those who lose their documents will most certainly not be able to get them back – and thus will be left de-facto stateless. Moreover, such policy brings up even more division within the society, opening up a need to establish other, more effective allegiances.

Firstly, since 2014 the so-called DPR and LPR have announced emission of their own “identity documents”, which are recognized solely by another stillborn satellite “republic of South Ossetia”. Nevertheless, in 2021 the leaders of the so-called DPR have announced that "the DPR passport by 2025 will become the only document 24 that identifies a person and guarantees any rights. Specifically, the “Crimean experience” repeats itself: in the absence of the so-called DPR passport, it would be impossible to exercise any property rights or engage in entrepreneurial activity. Namely, on 17 July 2019 Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree that enables all Donbas residents to receive Russian citizenship on a 25 special condition of a “simplified procedure”. In response to that, the EU stated that it would not recognize Russian passports issued in occupied Donbas,26in addition to those issued in the Crimea. Still, the described situation offers no durable solution for the people. Hence, such a situation will inevitably weaken the innate bond with the residents of the NGCT and the host state, making a non-recognized passport issued by the Russian Federation in the Crimea or Donbas a much better alternative than “no paper” per se. ______________________________

24 UNIAN: "DPR" wants to deprive residents with Ukrainian passports

of civil, property rights – media – 19.01.2021

25 Halya Coynash “Putin’s Russian passport aggression against

Ukraine fizzles in occupied Donbas” < http://khpg.org/en/1601905656> 26 OSCE Permanent Council No. 1243 Vienna, 10 October 2019 “EU Statement on “Russia’s Ongoing Aggression against Ukraine and Illegal Occupation of Crimea” https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pc_no_1243_eu_statement_ on_ukraine.pdf

In this regard, in absence of Ukraine’s efforts to act in accordance with its international obligations, other states are willing to grant the “approval for existence” in the form of their passports. ______________________________

23 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness ,

<https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wp-content/uploads/1961Convention-on-the-reduction-of-Statelessness_ENG.pdf>

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5. Conclusion The title of the present article distinguishes 3 core elements discussed above: armed conflict, papers and statelessness. But in casu the armed conflicts itself is not a centrepiece, but rather a premise which allowed to secure internal borders within one state. These invisible lines reinforced by over bureaucratization and unwillingness to recognize the importance of keeping ties with residents of NGCT have led to a situation when people beyond the lines have been left de facto stateless and de jure – under the risk of statelessness. But as much as the armed conflict did put a significant influence on the situation, it is evident that the real villains in our story are the good old bureaucracy, ill-formed policies and the general unwillingness of the state to act in good faith towards its citizens.

The present situation in its current form will inevitably but gradually weaken the “genuine bond” 6 between the government of Ukraine and the residents of NGCT, to the extent that this citizenship will turn as ineffective as it can be. And 7 in this case, a passport serves not only as a paper “allowing the existence of a person” but turns into a prized reward issued as a mark of allegiance. Yet, turning a part of the population de facto stateless or hoping that some other state will offer them some kind of protection is clearly not an appropriate solution to the problem. Ukraine should introduce a more suitable procedure to maintain its bonds with all its citizens, or otherwise, those can eventually be lost for good.

Anastasiia Vorobiova is an LLM candidate at Lund University, Sweden. She has previously been involved in refugee protection in Ukraine. She has also interned for the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law and currently works for the LLP “Global Rights Compliance” on a project titled “Crimea and Donbas: legal un/certainty”.

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PEOPLE WITHOUT RIGHTS: UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS IN SPAIN Article by Mireia Sierra Arnau The city of Badalona woke up on December 10, 2020, with a serious fire in an industrial building occupied by more than a hundred undocumented migrants of African origin. With a total of 4 people dead and more than a hundred people who will live forever with this traumatic experience engraved in their memories, the fire leaves evidence of the inaction, indifference, and carelessness of the administrations. Something that is concerning is that the building had been occupied by undocumented migrants for more than 12 years.1 Although the city council was aware of the situation, these groups have never been a priority for the Spanish and Catalan institutions. These settlements, like the one in Badalona, represent a failure of the policies of migration, regulation, reception, and social integration of migrants. A breakdown of the system falls especially in the field of housing and social care, leading to living conditions that represent a risk to the safety and lives of migrants. ______________________________ 1 García, J. (11th December 2020). Administrations neglected for 12

years the burned warehouse in Badalona. El País.

Photo: Gorm Helge Grønli Rudschinat. flickr. 8

The lack of involvement of the administration has led to not taking any action to regularize or fix a living space for people who are on the margins of society. As a consequence of their irregular situation, in which all the migrants living in the industrial building were, they did not have access to the municipal social services to invoke their rights. In the end, they found themselves in a situation of greater vulnerability and with an absolute lack of access to resources. According to Ferrajoli, the illegal person is considered outside the law as a person, lacking rights because he or she is legally invisible and thus exposed to any kind of harassment and exploitation. This serious discrimination risks compromising, much more than any other migratory phenomenon of the past, 2 the civil and democratic identity of our countries. Ferrajoli mentions the importance of the European identity, the civil Europe of solidarity, of the inclusive social state, of the guarantees of equality ______________________________ 2 Ferrajoli, L. (2006). Sobre los derechos fundamentales. Cuestiones

constitucionales, (15), pp. 197 - 219

0 Photo: NIAID,1 0flickr.

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and dignity of people, which however has been broken by European´s policies that promulgate closure and exclusion. Nevertheless, the right to emigrate from one's own country, the ius migrandi, has remained an elementary principle of customary international law, until it was enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. According to Article 13.2 of the Declaration, "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country" and this right is enshrined in many European constitutions as well as in the Charter of Rights of the European Union. Therefore, emigration is a fundamental right. Spain has become a clear example of a Europe that completely ignores both the structural and unstoppable nature of the migratory phenomenon since the laws governing the Spanish migratory system are based on discrimination for reasons of identity, criminalizing the migrant, which reflects and feeds the stereotype of the immigrant-criminal built by the demagogy that several political parties all around Europe use. This tendency to stigmatize migrants as dangerous and potential criminals as not only singular individuals who commit crimes but entire categories of people based on their identity and the ethnic difference has been portrayed in Spain through the media. In fact, the industrial building where the incident happened was described in Spanish newspapers as the shelter for “squatters and criminals”. My question is, how can they claim that all the individuals who lived in this building were criminals? The most curious thing is that, according to the same newspaper, it was not possible to contact or talk to all the affected individuals.5 This institutional racism has also been developed in Spain as in other European countries at the legislation level, with totally inflexible migratory laws and with totally surrealistic measures for the group that wants to regularize their situation. ______________________________

UN General Assembly. (10 December 1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 217 A (III). 4 Ibid, p.198 5 Cedó, F. (10th December 2020). An underworld in Badalona. La Vanguardia. Also check Carranco, R. (10th December 2020). Two dead and 17 injured in a fire at a squatted industrial building in Badalona. El País.

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The law in Spain says that to regularize your situation you need to prove three years of stay in the country, these three years of stay can be proved "in any way admitted in law". That is, in any way: with the census registration (which is the most common option), but it is also useful to have the stamp of entry into Spain in the passport, to have a documentary record of having been attended by the public health, to have filed a police report (for loss or for being a victim of a crime), any document from a public agency or administration (notary, 6 court, social services, education ...). However, there are many difficulties encountered by migrants to regularize their situation: What if I have just arrived in the city; if I am fleeing from the lack of opportunities in my country or violence; or if until I was 18 years old I was cared for in shelters, but now there are no more resources for me; what if my documentation expires and I still don't have the registration document; or if to renew my residence permit I insistently connect and no appointments are available, not even in other municipalities located two hours away by public transport? In short, migrants in an irregular situation in Spain find themselves in a situation that seems almost impossible to escape: without a residence permit you cannot be hired, and without a contract, you cannot access rents and thus, proving your three-year-long permanency in Spain, is even more difficult. These are the circumstances that push people to endure undignified or risky conditions, because the existing alternative, which is to risk being interned in a detention centre, is worse. Of course, all the obstacles mentioned above that are needed to regularize your situation in Spain are added to the fact that the bureaucracy and administrations in charge of these processes in Spain are exhausting.7 Not only because it takes a long time, but because it is an extremely bureaucratic process where you must submit several official documents with recognized stamps ______________________________ 6 FLey Orgánica 4/2000 sobre los derechos y libertades de los

extranjeros en España y su integración (2009), Boletín Oficial del Estado. 7 García, S. A. (2014). El derecho a la buena administración de los inmigrantes: Burocracia y síndrome de Ulises. Revista de Estudios Fronterizos del Estrecho de Gibraltar: Régimen jurídico de protección de las personas apátridas, (1), 4.

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It seems not, and this is a clear example of the discrimination and criminalization of migration policies in Spain, it seems that having a certain social status is essential to regularize your situation in Spain.

until you prove you are worthy of becoming a documented citizen in Spain. Needless to say, no one should prove their worthiness. Who´s more worthy than others? In agreement with Ferrajoli, these laws are based on identity-based discrimination, and precisely because they are disenfranchised, the migrant is perceived as anthropologically unequal. This racist perception serves to legitimize their discrimination in terms of rights.[8] On the other hand, your “worthiness” wouldn’t have to be proven or needed -not to mention all the hustle and bustle that this specific process requires- if you were Ansu Fati,- a current football player in Football Club of Barcelona- originally from Guinea-Bissau, whose nationalization process was processed through an emergency procedure and was granted by the Government by Royal Decree, "after assessing the concurrence of exceptional circumstances"- according to the Council of Ministers in Spain.[9 ]In this case, the exceptional circumstance was to make sure that Ansu could play for Spain in the next World Cup. Now, what about the more than 100 people who lived in the industrial building burned down in Badalona, among them some minors, are they not considered "exceptional circumstances"? ______________________________

Ferrajoli, L. (2006). Sobre los derechos fundamentales. Cuestiones constitucionales, (15), p. 210. 9 Mantecón, M. L. (2020). Cerdeira Bravo de Mansilla, Guillermo. Aspectos jurídicos del Coronavirus, Reus, Madrid, 2020. Revista de Derecho Civil, 7(4), 345-355.

As Farcy rightly pointed out, the principle of equality and non-discrimination, although foundational to international human rights law, remains an unfulfilled promise in the context of immigration. Based on their immigration status, as it has been shown in the Ansu Fati case, immigrants are treated differently for destination countries aim to attract and retain certain categories of immigrants, while excluding others. However, preferences and exclusions in immigration and citizenship laws are rarely found to be discriminatory in law. The primary function of legal categories in immigration law is to distinguish among immigrants those who are allowed to enter and remain on their territory. Yet, in doing so, immigration laws block migratory movements which are considered illegitimate. Those that are deemed unwanted or undesirable because they do not fit within predefined legal categories are left with the scarce choices of either immobility or irregular immigration.10According to Spijkerboer, the law is part of the construction of a global mobility infrastructure to which access is not equal for all. 11 Along these lines, what would be the consequences of living undocumented? In Spain, living undocumented is considered an administrative offence. Any Spanish citizen is obliged to show his or her national identity card at the request of State security forces, such as the police. In addition, the fact of not being documented brings the possibility of being fined. According to the Organic Law 1/1992, article 9, the ID is compulsory from the age of 14 and, according to article 20,12the agents of the State security forces may ask for the identification of persons anywhere on the public road, whenever it ______________________________

10 Farcy, J. B. (2020). Equality in Immigration Law: An Impossible

Quest?. Human Rights Law Review, 20(4), 725-744. Spijkerboer, T. (2018). The Global Mobility Infrastructure: 11 Reconceptualising the Externalisation of Migration Control. European Journal of Migration and Law, 20(4), 452-469. 12 Organic Law 1/1992, 21st February 1992, on the Protection of Citizen Security. Boletín Oficial del Estado.

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is necessary for the exercise of the functions of protection and security. It is worth mentioning, that racial profiling plays a key role in this regard, since identity checks for migration enforcement purposes (or, in fact, any other purpose) is one of the main gateways to detention, and eventually, to deportation. The fact that racial and ethnic profiling, although being illegal under European and international law, is a widespread practice in Europe, makes race an important factor linked with the likelihood of ending up identified and detained.13 What happens when the police ask a migrant to identify himself/herself and he/she has no documentation at all? This person will probably be held in a detention centre. In these centres, they can be held for up to two months (according to 14 Spanish law), and with fewer guarantees than in a prison. In Spain, detention centres are one of the most questioned and repressive points of the migratory policy with high numbers of internment and bad conditions of stay. Those are spaces where Human Rights are systematically violated.15In most European countries these centres exist usually as a preliminary measure in the deportation of undocumented migrants where both foreigners who have just arrived in the host country, as well as people who have been working for many years in precarious and poorly paid jobs but with strong roots in the city and with family in their care, can end up there. Their only crime is not having been able to regularize their situation, and therefore being responsible for an administrative offence, they end up deprived of freedom in a detention centre. Nevertheless, many international Human Rights agreements fight for the realization of fundamental rights all over the world. When we celebrate international days, we immediately proclaim the right to live with dignity or to be welcomed in a host country simply because we are human beings. ______________________________

13 Mijatović, D. (9th May 2019). Ethnic profiling: a persisting practice in

Europe. Commissioner for Human Rights. Ley Orgánica 4/2000 sobre los derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración (2009), Boletín Oficial del Estado. 15 Buades Fuster, J., Bosch Nocea, A., Vudal Sas, P., Mohamed-Lamin Ahmed, M., Lendrino Tejerino, I., Agüero Collins, A. (2020). Diez años mirando a otro lado: CIE Informe 2019. 14

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However, no one can argue, that while we proclaim refugee’s day, human rights’ day, etc. these problems are still very present in our country, and yet, it is easy for us to make the problem invisible and only remember them, that once a year when we celebrate the day of the migrant or the refugee. I am sure many would agree with me when I say that worrying once a year is not enough. And even less so when the institutions and politicians who should be responsible for any violation of these international agreements that fight for the dignity of people, do not take any kind of responsibility. It seems that these problems only lead us to act in emergencies, without addressing the causes of the current problem, such as the lack of resources to deal with the migratory situation in Spain, which makes us question the concept of reception and integration as well as stress the important role that Spain has in addressing the issue. The migration phenomenon is treated as an emergency or crisis, instead of being acknowledged for the structural and predictable fact, involving hundreds of millions of people, which is constantly growing and destined to develop indefinitely, and for this reason, it should not be treated as such.16 Regarding the reception system, it should be noted that in Spain this system lies in the legislation and bureaucracy of the Administration at different levels (immigration law, registration, integration policies, and labour integration...). But clearly, we are dealing with administrations and institutions that are very ill-equipped and unprepared to respond to the needs that exist. Therefore, a key aspect at the social level would be integration. How? By building social nets and involving civil society organizations while maintaining an independent role from any state political perspectives. In other words, building a community project that would favour diversity in which individual and collective needs would be recognized, in order to improve welfare. This should be accompanied by long-term resources and it should not depend in any way on the colour of the political party in office. ______________________________

In order to fully understand this issue, it is also necessary to have a historical perspective. Emigration no longer takes place, as in the past, within the West. After centuries of colonization, slave trade and massacres, it is no longer the Westerners who have to emigrate to the poor countries of the world, to conquer them, but on the contrary, it is the populations of these countries who are knocking at our borders and our response is to close the doors. Today, when the exercise of the right to emigrate has become materially possible and the only alternative for millions of people fleeing misery, wars, violence and lack of resources, politicians and people in power decided that it is easier to turn their backs on them. It is certain that the West will never seriously tackle the problems that are at the origin of the migrations because they are not its problems and it will never see them as its own.[17] Other equally important issues to explore would be the flexibility of the current regularization processes in Spain so that they do not become an insurmountable obstacle course for people, which leads them to dead ends and exclusion; and the need to formulate policies that do not respond to immediacy, but instead, respond to a migratory issue and to a reality that has been part of our cities for years, and the way to manage it has always been from the urgency. Finally, I believe it is important to demand that institutions should recognize the human rights of migrants and the right to migrate, the so-called ius migrandi, as something universal and inherent to every person. ______________________________ 16 Ibid., p.218

16 Ferrajoli, L. (2006). Sobre los derechos fundamentales. Cuestiones

constitucionales, (15), p. 207.

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To conclude, I would like to mention the irony of the situation that happened in Badalona, which is that it happened on December 10, the day on which we celebrate Human Rights Day that commemorates the day in 1948 in which the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). This declaration, as I mentioned at the beginning, includes as an essential principle the right to migrate from one country to another. This leads me to reflect, that these international days, not only serve us to remember them once a year but serve us to be aware of the struggle that lies ahead and ensure that what was proclaimed at the time in the UDHR becomes a reality for all populations in other words- to ensure the universality of the Declaration.

As George Santayana once said: "those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it".[18] We must not forget that the UDHR was created so that the horrors of World War II would never happen again. Today, more than 70 years later, the same horrors are being repeated in other parts of the world, provoking large mobilizations of populations seeking a more dignified life and a second chance to live in peace. We have a moral duty, as citizens, as activists, as students of human rights, or as people fighting for social justice, to make sure that these people can be welcomed and integrated into a new society, as many of our ancestors did in the face of the horrors of the world and civil wars’ they lived through in the first half of the 20th century.

Mireia Serra Arnau is a graduate student in Political Science and Global Studies from Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. She is currently pursuing a master’s degree in Human Rights Studies and has been involved in Human Rights activism for several years, more specifically in the immigration and refugees’ cause.

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THE LAND THAT FORGOT ITS PAST - THE ISSUE OF MIGRATION IN THE CANARY ISLANDS Article by Ainoa Prieto García The coasts of the Canary Islands are receiving unprecedented numbers of immigrants since the Cayuco crisis, back in 2006. In this article, we will analyze how arrivals are being managed and which are the risks migrants run in this context. What is happening in the Canary Islands? Not so long ago, a significant number of Spaniards had to emigrate to the Americas. Between 1846 and 1932, almost five million left the country and headed mostly to South America, especially Argentina and Brazil. 1 Many others headed to Algeria and France too. During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and in the decades of the '60s and '70s, that trend changed, and Spaniards started to emigrate instead to European countries such as France, West Germany and Switzerland. Among the reasons for that emigration were fleeing war and persecution for political opinions (mainly against the Franco regime), and searching for a decent job and a better life for the whole family. Today, I wonder if many of my compatriots, and even a part of the Spanish Government, have forgotten our history – the history of a country of emigrants. ______________________________

1 Encyclopaedia Britannica, s.v. ‘Migration’ (Encyclopaedia Britannica

online, last modified February 14, 2021) <https://bit.ly/39Bx8JE> accessed 16 December 2020.

Photo: Karen Deflores

In the first two weeks of November 2020, 5,275 migrants arrived in the Canary Islands, more than in the last four years altogether.2 This figure has alarmed many experts, who know the conditions in which these people arrive in our country: risking, and in many cases losing, their lives. The route that these migrants take to reach the Canary Islands are known as the West African route, with departures from Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania, Senegal and the Gambia, which has become one of the deadliest maritime routes to reach Europe – the NGO ACCEM stated that more than 600 people 3 died or went missing in this route in 2020. 4 According to the Ministry of the Interior data, more than half the immigrants in an irregular situation who arrived in Spanish territory in 2020 landed in the Canary Islands. This is, last year the Islands received 23,023 immigrants - 756.8% more than in 5 the previous year. ______________________________

2 Milagros Costabel, ‘How the Canary Islands became Europe's latest

migrant hotbed’ (Euronews, November 25, 2020) <https://bit.ly/3couhpb> accessed 12 January 2021. 3 ACCEM, ‘Día Internacional del Migrante – Por la activación de vías legales y seguras y por la normalización de la acogida’ (ACCEM’s website, December 16, 2020) <https://bit.ly/3csRiXS> accessed 12 January 2021. 4 Ministerio del Interior, ‘Informe Quincenal sobre Inmigración Irregular - Datos acumulados desde el 1 de enero al 31 de diciembre de 2020’ (Ministry of the Interior’s official website, December 31, 2020) <https://bit.ly/3tcFM98> accessed 14 January 2021. 5 Europapress, ‘Más de 41.800 inmigrantes llegaron a España en 2020, un 29% más que en 2019, 23.023 de ellos a Canarias’ (Europapress, January 4, 2021) <https://bit.ly/2MEfpIk> accessed 16 January 2021.

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They had not seen similar figures since the socalled Cayuco crisis (named after the makeshift vessels used by migrants) in 2006, in which more than 31,000 migrants arrived there. Arrival in Spain After the dangerous journey to reach Europe, those who manage to arrive in the Canarian ports do not exactly find a land of opportunity. Once they reach Spain and depending on the island to which they arrive, the migrants are towed to port by the maritime rescue service, Salvamento Marítimo, and received by various humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross. When the migratory flow increased at the end of last year, in ports such as Arguineguín, migrants spent their first nights in Red Cross tents. Later, some were transferred to nearby hotels that were empty due to the lack of tourists because of the health crisis. It is important to bear in mind that many migrants who arrive in the Canary Islands do not intend to stay in Spain. Like other countries that make up the external border of the European Union, inmigration matters, Spain is often a country of transit and not the country of destination for those migrants who want to reach Europe. However, some factors make it extremely difficult for these migrants to leave the Islands, such as the health emergency or the legal procedure, which is often dysfunctional and unfair, since in many cases it hampers the right of migrants to seek asylum and obtain subsequent international protection. Increasing hostility towards migrants The increase in the migratory flow in the Islands has provoked very different reactions among the local population. A part of the citizens has not hesitated to take to the streets of the main host cities to help, accompany and provide basic supplies such as water, food and clothing to the newcomers. In collaboration with the Spanish Government, hotel and business owners have also contributed to free up space in the Canarian ports by facilitating their services to cover the basic needs of those migrants.

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However, not all islanders have had such a humanitarian response. During these months, several citizen groups have demonstrated demanding that central and regional governments not use tourist facilities to house immigrants who arrive in the Islands. They allege that this practice hinders the reactivation of the tourism sector and generates insecurity among the inhabitants of the region. Unfortunately, this phenomenon has also led to uncivil protests, such as the one that took place at the end of last year in Mogán, Gran Canaria. A group of neighbours concentrated at the gates of one of the tourist complexes where immigrants stayed, threatening and insulting them with a violent attitude through the gate of the complex. 6 Current situation During the first two weeks of January, 1,069 immigrants arrived in the Canary Islands in 28 boats and cayucos – 234% more than those two weeks of 2020. Likewise, arrivals to the coasts of the mainland Spanish peninsula and to the Balearic Islands have decreased by more than 81 % and 7 also to Ceuta by 50%. In this context, the Government of the Canary Islands and various organizations such as the Spanish Commission for Refugee Aid (CEAR) have asked the central government to fulfil territorial solidarity in order to transfer migrants to the peninsula,8 as they did in the Cayuco crisis, and continue with the legal procedure there. Furthermore, the European Union (EU) plays a fundamental role in all this. Beyond the economic contribution, it has made to the management of migration on the Islands,9 it would be helpful if some of the migrants could resettle in the other EU Member States with the necessary resources and capacities to guarantee respect for their human rights. ______________________________ 6 Teldeactualidad, ‘Tensión en Arguineguín entre vecinos y un grupo

de inmigrantes alojados en la zona’ (Teldeactualidad’s website, December 12, 2020) <https://bit.ly/3r86tdk> accessed 19 January 2021. 7 EFE, ‘Canarias recibió el triple de inmigrantes en los primeros 15 días de enero que hace un año’ (EFE, January 19, 2021) <https://bit.ly/3j2A8BC> accessed 24 January 2021. 8 CEAR, ‘Seis medidas para hacer frente al drama humanitario de la migración en Canarias’ (CEAR’s website, November 18, 2020) <https://bit.ly/2MErZav> accessed 20 December 2020. 9 European Commission, ‘Migration: New EU financial assistance to address the situation on the Canary Islands’, (Press release, December 10, 2020) <https://bit.ly/3rbYBaq> accessed 20 December 2020.

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The opening of six reception centres in the Canary Islands to transfer the 7,000 migrants staying in hotels was scheduled for the end of last year, although not all of them were ready by February 2021. Some of the factors that have slowed down their inauguration have been the rains, bureaucracy and town planning. Those centres with the most difficulties have been the ones with the greatest reception capacity – those of Las Canteras and Las Raíces, in Tenerife, with a capacity to house 1,500 and 2,400 people respectively.[10] Meanwhile, thousands of migrants are trapped in the Islands, unable to reach the Spanish peninsula even by their own means,[11] and without knowing how long they will have to stay there or if they will ever have access to a fair interview to request asylum. Looking ahead We begin this year with a lot of uncertainty about what will happen to the migrants who are in the Canary Islands. About the dates when the largest reception centres will be ready. About how good the centres will be. ______________________________ 10 María Martín, ‘La apertura de los campamentos de inmigrantes en

Canarias sufre un nuevo retraso’ (El País, January 23, 2021) <https://bit.ly/3ta9WK6> accessed 24 January 2021. 11 Natalia G. Vargas, ‘Canarias, punto de paso para pocos migrantes y cárcel para muchos’ (elDiario.es, January 10, 2021) <https://bit.ly/36wo5rc> accessed 24 January 2021.

When we think of these “temporary” reception centers, many of us cannot help but remember Lesbos, and hope that this terrible reality is not reproduced here as well. In any case, during the time that those migrants are in our country, the Government will have to protect and guarantee their human rights. This protection is not voluntary, as Spain has committed to comply with international human rights standards in numerous treaties and conventions. This protection is mandatory and cannot be delayed. It seems local, regional and central governments spend a lot of energy blaming each other for the mismanagement of immigration on the Islands. However, we are facing a challenge that goes far beyond bureaucracy and political agendas, which will not be solved by looking the other way or by blaming others; many lives are at stake in this challenge. As is often the case in migration matters, there will be no way to find efficient solutions and to treat humanely those arriving in the Canary Islands, if Spain does not make an effort to cooperate at regional, national and European level. This is the moment to give migrants back the dignity for which our grandparents and greatgrandparents fought beyond our borders.

Ainoa Prieto García is a researcher and human rights activist specialized in migration, women's rights and vulnerable groups. After completing her MA in International Affairs, she worked for the UN Human Rights Office in Geneva for six months. She currently collaborates with different humanitarian and human rights organizations internationally.

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THE REALITY OF THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE CITY OF PATRAS, GREECE Article by Anastasia Lazaridi The refugee crisis in Greece and the slow asylum processes have left the migrants in a precarious legal position. Adding the inhumane conditions of living that they have to endure, the port of Patras has emerged as a privileged meeting point for migrants, who are willing to jeopardize everything for a new start in Western Europe

The European refugee crisis has affected the reality of several countries during the last decade. Greece, along with Italy, has had the largest number of existing fingerprint records, indicating that they are 1 the main countries of first entry for migrants. While 2 the EU-Turkey Statement has made sure that the arrivals of refugees on the Greek islands are reduced, there are still unresolved practical problems regarding the asylum processing and the 3 state of accommodation for migrants. ______________________________

The EU attempts to financially assist and to provide expertise to Greece have alleviated some pressure from the Greek islands. Migrants however experience a different reality compared to the optimistic statements of European and Greek authorities. While the EU has called out to Greece to make more changes to its national strategy of controlling the refugee crisis, migrants still have to endure a lot of adversities after their arrival in Greece; one of them being the slow asylum process.

Needs to Sustain Progress Made over the Past 4 Years’ [2019] European Commission 2 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP19-1496_en.htm>. 2 Council of the European Union, ‘EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016’ (2016) 144. 3 European Commission (n 1).

Migrants might wait for 2 years just for their first interview, which is only the first step of the process. In the meantime, they are considered illegal migrants and in case they are arrested, they are deported back to Turkey, according to the EUTurkey Statement.

1 European Commission, ‘The European Agenda on Migration: EU

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The authorities attribute this delay to the overwhelming amount of asylum applications that they receive - which is probably true to an extent –, but why does the Greek government not change its policy so that faster asylum processes can materialize?

Hospitality centres are overcrowded while the government’s plan to create shelters only for the people who carry travel documents and therefore have the opportunity to get asylum excludes many vulnerable groups of migrants out of the state’s care.

Truth be told, the Greek government based many of their hopes on a relocation system that would transfer 160,000 asylum seekers to other EU countries. Their hopes were however shut down. They were basically left alone dealing with the refugee crisis when only 20.000 refugees of 160,000 were relocated from Greece up until early 2019.[4] Maybe this very same doubt regarding the relocation and solidarity within the EU has slowed down any progress in Greece’s national strategy on migrant policy.

This precarious situation has created a chance for smugglers to take advantage of the migrants for their own profit. Many migrants, some of them unregistered, try to escape northwards. In between their attempts to illegally board the ships, migrants stay in makeshift tents under collapsing roofs in the wood factory, which is opposite the port’s entrance.5 Western Europe has become the ideal dream for every migrant living near the port of Patras. A port, many ships, and several trucks in which to hide. Many of the smugglers put migrants 6 on ships that have Italy as their destination. Because most of these refugees and migrants don’t know 9which are safe places to hide, smugglers are getting paid in order to guide them to “safety”. 7

Migrants who reach the first step of being interviewed in the asylum process, have to prove with documents the reasons why they fled their countries. Despite their vulnerable position, they are not given free legal advice. Instead, they have to hire lawyers to help them build their case. The examination of their application usually takes another 2 years, leaving them in a precarious legal position once again. This uncertainty that they have to endure leaves them in an insecure place. They are unable to study, to start a business, to work as an employee, to have a driver’s license or to travel abroad. Their lives are on hold. Hundreds of asylum seekers and homeless refugees have found refuge in the port area of Patras, a seaside city in the north-western part of the Peloponnese peninsula in Greece. The port of Patras is the main gateway of Greece to Western Europe. Ever since the 90s, the political instability in the Balkans has deemed Patras the main route for commercial and tourist transport. Migrants living in the port are people with no rights, because of the lack of integration policies by the Greek and European authorities, living in extremely unfavourable conditions. ______________________________

Giovanni Vale, ‘The Refugees of Patras’ (2018).

Police and coast guard authorities in the area admit that the situation has become unbearable.8 Hundreds of migrants and refugees have the goal of sneaking onto a ship to Italy. Extra patrols are made in the surrounding area and the streets beside the port, as many migrants remain hidden and climb over the fence just in time to sneak in a waiting truck. Professional truck drivers are added to this equation, leading to a game of cat and mouse between the migrants and them, while coast guard security is especially strict in vehicle 9 checks. Truck drivers secure the trailer doors of their trucks with additional locks so that they cannot open easily and as soon as they spot someone hiding in their vehicle, they immediately 10 alert the security services. ______________________________ 5 Fahrinisa Campana, ‘A Dangerous Game’ [2017] SLATE. 6 Emma Wallis, ‘Greece Transfers More Migrants from Islands to

Mainland’ INFOMIGRANTS (2020). Campana (n 5). 8 Roberto G Gonzales and others, Undocumented Migration (Polity Press 2019). 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 7

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Many drivers do show understanding for the refugees, who are fleeing from war, but the strict vehicle checks have made them behave this way. If the authorities find migrants hiding in their vehicle, they are held responsible; their trucks are confiscated and their license is taken away, leaving them unemployed for several months. Sometimes groups of up to 50 people make a run for the trucks in order to increase their chances of making it to Italy. Truck drivers, though, alert the coast guard as soon as they realize some activity by migrants near their vehicles. What follows is that the police arrest the migrants keeps them for some hours and then releases them again. But there is no other choice for the desperate migrants, who are willing to even jeopardize their own lives in order to find a better future in Western Europe. They have already crossed a sea to flee the war and terror of their country, but their only hope is to cross one more sea in order to build a new and safe life. An example of this struggle is the death of a 24-year-old Afghan migrant from 11 asphyxiation in September of 2020. Migrants, who hide in the trucks and try to reach Italy, have to stay in the ship’s garage during the whole trip which lasts about 24 hours. The temperature in the ship’s garage can reach 50 Celsius degrees during the summer. The aforementioned young man has been identified thanks to a document found in his pocket – an application asking for the possibility of obtaining the status of political refugee in Greece, 12 which the Greek authorities had not processed yet. During the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a serious decrease in migrants arriving in Patras, but that has not helped the Greek government to get a hold of the situation in the area.13At the same time, the number of ships that left the port has also decreased and therefore the smuggling activity has dropped too. After the end of the lockdown, new migrants arrived, and more people fled to Italy. ______________________________ 11 ANSA, ‘Migrant Found Dead on Ferry Had Requested Refugee

Status’ INFOMIGRANTS (2020) Ibid. 13 Aram Balakjian, ‘The City Where Young Migrants Risk Everything to Escape Greece’s Immigration Nightmare’ TheNewArab (2020). 12

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The police in response became more violent against migrants. Amnesty International characterized the increasing use of police violence with the pretext of trying to control the refugee 14 crisis as “extremely worrying”. With the EU’s focus on fixing the damage provoked by the pandemic, Greece might have been left “unsupervised” and incidents of police brutality slipped away from the 15 EU’s radar. We begin this year with a lot of uncertainty about what will happen to the migrants who are in the Canary Islands. About the dates when the largest reception centres will be ready. About how good the centres will be. Despite the limited improvements on Greece’s migration and refugee policy, the situation for the refugees and asylum seekers remains extremely challenging. ______________________________

With more and more migrants arriving in Greece, it is expected that many of them will probably try their luck in Patras, in an attempt to avoid the country’s imploding immigration system. And who can really blame them? Greece is struggling to accommodate the refugees that currently reside in Greece. How will this country be ready for the new wave of migrants? Unless Greece urgently changes its national strategy on migration management, making the best use of the significant EU support provided, this social reality will only perpetuate. More and more refugees, disappointed by the current living conditions that they have to endure, will go to Patras because honestly, they have nothing to lose; their only hope lies in the port of Patras, which is their only gateway to Western Europe.16 ______________________________ 16 Campana (n 5).

14 Ibid. 15 Ibid

Anastasia Lazaridi is a student in the master’s program of Sociology of Law at Lund University. She received a bachelor’s degree in Law from the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki in Greece and she has worked as a lawyer for 3 years prior to continuing her studies in Sweden. She is interested in human rights and issues of race and gender discrimination.

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THE EUROPEAN NEW PACT ON MIGRATION AND ASYLUM: SOLIDARITY BUT FOR WHOM? Article by Silvia Mugnaini This article concerns the new Pact on Migration and Asylum proposed by the European Commission on the 23rd of September 2020. While the Pact has been defined by the Commission as a “fresh start” for a comprehensive European approach to migration, Human Rights organizations have been criticizing it for strengthening border policies. In fact, the Pact focuses predominately on the repatriation of asylum seekers. Introduction An asylum-seeker is someone whose request for sanctuary has yet to be processed. Every year, 1 around 1 million people seek asylum. The percentage of refugees living in the EU is 0.6% compared to the total population. As shown in the graph, the migratory pressure is much higher in other countries than in Europe. ______________________________

UNHCR, Asylum Seekers [website], https://www.unhcr.org/asylumseekers.html, (accessed 14 February 2021).

Photo: www.thesiseleven.com

Moreover, projections from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) forecast an increase in the requests for asylum towards 2 Europe by 2030. Scenarios varies from + 25,9% to + 52,5% change in comparison to 2009-2018 average. Those scenarios describe a future of further economic inequality between the wealthier European Union and the poorer regions of the world. ______________________________ 2 Acostamadiedo, E., R. Sohst, J. Tjaden, G. Groenewold and H. de

Valk (2020). Assessing Immigration Scenarios for the European Union in 2030 – Relevant, Realistic and Reliable? International Organization for Migration, Geneva, and the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute, the Hague.

Figure 1. Numner of refugees compared to total population Source; https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en

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Figure 2. IOM, 2020

The European Parliament suggests that people migrate for 3 main reasons: socio-political factors such as war, conflict, and government persecution, which falls under the category of humanitarian refugees; demographic and economic factors; and environmental factors such as natural disasters. In the current scenario of climate change, even more, people are expected to migrate. Estimations suggest that globally 25 million people will flee by 3 2050. The beginning of the migration crises in Europe, in 2015, had demonstrated the invalidity of the asylum procedures, at that time under the name of the Dublin System. The Dublin system put the responsibility for examining asylum claims on the Member State of first entry. This asylum system turned out to be unsustainable for the Member States such as Greece and Italy where the majority of arrivals are happening. Recent events such as the fire in the Moria camp in Greece are further proof that a moral equal distribution of ______________________________

3 News European Parliament , Exploring migration causes-why people

migrate [website] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/world/202006 24STO81906/exploring-migration-causes-why-peoplemigrate#:~:text=People%20migrate%20for%20many%20reasons,to %20poverty%20and%20climate%20change (accessed 14 February 2021).

responsibility within the EU is necessary to guarantee a minimum recognition of the rights of refugees. On the 23rd of September 2020, The European Commission has proposed a new European Pact on Migration and Asylum in order to respond to the concerns of EU Member States that worry that migratory pressure will exceed the capacities of their national systems for asylum. The Pact sets out improved and faster procedures to manage migration alongside the principles of fair sharing of responsibility and solidarity between Member 4 states to help fulfil humanitarian obligations. While the Pact is supposed to facilitate family reunification and integration with European society, Human Rights organization have highlighted how “better and more effective procedures” translate, in practice, into stronger Border Procedures for asylum seekers.

______________________________

4 European Commission, The New Pact on Migration and Asylum:

Questions and Answers [website] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20 _1707#sponsorship, (accessed 14 February 2021)

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In other words, the core elements of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum are the Repatriation of asylum seekers and a notion of Solidarity that applies to European states rather than asylum seekers. The Pact completely sidestep broader migration trends such as socio-political (war, persecution) or environmental ones. Furthermore, the solidarity mechanism is based on a voluntary basis which can be at risk in the current European climate of uprising right-wing parties, whose main focus is on stopping migration. In fact, events such as the refusal of some states to accept the distribution system put forward by the Commission, the uncountable number of shipwrecks and deaths in the Mediterranean Sea, along with the development of smuggling networks, further show that a European Asylum policy based on a voluntary scheme of solidarity between the Member States is fallacious. The core of the Pact As aforementioned, integrated border procedure and fair sharing of responsibility and solidarity are at the heart of the New European Pact on Migration and Asylum. The Commission has proposed to introduce a frontier system which includes a pre-entry screening designed to identify people crossing the EU’s borders without permission or persons brought ashore in a rescue operation.5 This procedure, carried out over a period of 5 days, entails a health and security check (to verify that the person does not constitute a threat to internal security), fingerprinting and registration in the Eurodac (the European Union fingerprint database for identifying asylum seekers and irregular bordercrossers).6 After the screening, people will be redirected to asylum or return procedures. Member States are required to set up an independent monitoring mechanism to deal with ______________________________

5 European Commission, A fresh start on migration: Building confidence

and striking a new balance between responsibility and solidarity [website] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1706, (accessed 14 February 2021) 6 European Commission, ‘Regulation of the European Parliament and Council introducing a screening of third country nationals at the external borders and amending Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240 and (EU) 2019/817’, EUR-LEX, Brussel, 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/? qid=1601291190831&uri=COM:2020:612:FIN(accessed 14 February 2021)

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such procedures. 7 The whole asylum border procedure can take up to 12 weeks during which Member States are allowed to detain asylum seekers while examining their claim to enter EU territory. When an applicant’s claims to stay is refused, Member States can continue to apply for detention while dealing with the return procedure. The Pact also develops a common EU system for returns. Specifically, the position of the EU Return Coordinator has been established. The Return Coordinator is supported by a network of national representatives to coordinate national approaches to returns and ensure consistency across the EU. This system for return is backed up by the Solidarity Mechanism which establishes a form of mutual support between Member states to assure a fairer share of responsibility. However, the nature of the solidarity mechanism is mostly voluntary, while a legally binding form of help would only be applied under “pressure” situations. How “pressure” is defined and measured by the Commission is not clear. Furthermore, the contribution to solidarity is focused on relocation and return sponsorship. “Under return sponsorship, a Member State commits to returning irregular migrants with no right to stay on behalf of another Member State, doing this directly from the territory of the beneficiary Member State.” 8 If the return does not happen within 8 months, the person will be transferred to the sponsoring state. Relocation is proportional to the size and economy of a state: 50% of the calculation is based on GDP and 50% on population size. The Commission assures that relocation remains an option but if States are not willing to receive migrants on their territory, they would have other options to show their “solidarity”, such as sponsoring the return of migrants to their countries of origin.9 ______________________________

7 European Commission, The New Pact on Migration and Asylum:

Questions and Answers [website]https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ qanda_20_1707#sponsorship, (accessed 14 February 2021) 8 bid 9 R. Bloj & S. Buzmaniuk, ‘Understanding the new pact on migration and asylum’, Foundation Robert Schuman, 2020 https://www.robertschuman.eu/en/european-issues/0577-understanding-the-newpact-on-migration-and-asylum (accessed 14 February 2021)

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Additionally, the Commission has declared that voluntary returns are preferred, thus, a new Strategy on voluntary returns and reintegration will be adopted by spring. Finally, the New Pact seeks to improve cooperation with third countries to facilitate the return. This mechanism is already proven to be limited by international law. In fact, this implies that asylum seekers can be repatriated to a “safe country of origin”. But what does it mean “safe country of origin”? The European Commission defines the safe country of origin those countries that, according to the International Law (the Geneva Convention) and EU law (the Asylum Procedures Directive), have a democratic system and are not to be found to perpetrate persecution, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, do not use violence as a threat and are not under ongoing 10 armed conflicts. Given the definition of the asylum seeker as “a person who has left their country and is seeking protection from persecution and serious human rights violations in another country".11This means that there is no safe country of origins for asylum seekers. In fact, it has been underlined how one of the major problems concerning returns is the collaboration with third countries and their political stability. Often, they are neither ready, willing nor able to facilitate the return of their nationals. This often makes returns very slow and, in many cases, impossible, with extremely harmful effects not only for the functioning of the European migration system but also for the personal situation of migrants who often end up living illegally and without social protection for a long time. Moreover, at present, there is no common European list of "safe countries of origin" and different EU countries apply different definitions and standards. In 2019, 142,000 non-EU citizens were returned to a third country. This corresponds to a 29% effective ______________________________

10 European Commission, ‘An EU safe country of origin list’, European

Commission Migration and Home Affair, https://ec.europa.eu/homeaffairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agendamigration/backgroundinformation/docs/2_eu_safe_countries_of_origin_en.pdf (accessed 14 February 2021). 11 Amnesty International, ‘Refugee, Asylum-Seekers and Migrants’, https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/refugees-asylum-seekersand-migrants/ (accessed 14 February 2021).

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Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch) has declared: "It's like asking the school bully to walk a kid home."[14] ue.eporuerofhtap.www :otohP

return rate. Among the 15 Member States reporting this breakdown in 2019, 19% of the returns were assisted returns, meaning the persons returned received logistical, financial and/or other material assistance, this meaning that 81% were non-assisted returns.[12] During the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a decline in the number of asylum applications in the EU compared to previous years. The reasons rely on different factors such as changing situations in the country of origins, developments in border control, search and rescue operations, and the inability of people to undertake the journey due to the pandemic. Despite the decline of asylum claims, extensive humanitarian crises are still present in the country of origin of asylum seekers and have been potentially exacerbated by the pandemic.[13] The effects of return policies The practical focus on returns instead of on Human Rights has been heavily criticized by NGO’s that work at the front with migration issues. For instance, in regard to the new sponsorship system, Judith Sunderland (Acting Deputy Director of the ______________________________

12 European Commission, Statistics on migration to Europe, [website],

https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promotingour-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en (accessed 14 February 2021) 13 Atlas of Migration, Publications Office of the European Union. Luxembourg, 2020

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In 2020, a record on expulsions of migrants from Italy to Slovenia has been registered. In particular, between the first of January and the 15 of November 2020, Italy has rejected 1,240 people to Slovenia.[15] From here, the migrants have been further expulsed to Bosnia, outside of the European Union. Bosnia is an important spot along the Balkans migration route and currently, around 8,000 refugees and migrants are present in the country, unable to move due to the lockdowns in Europe. [16] The local severe humanitarian crisis has further aggravated since the fire, on the 23 of December, in Lipa camp that housed about 1,400 migrants.[17] On the day of writing, around 3000 people are sleeping unsheltered under the snow in Una Sana Canton on the border between Bosnia and Croatia.[18] These are examples of how the consolidated policy of rejections carried out by the European Member States along the Balkan route has severe consequences for the management of the border in non-European countries such as Bosnia. Furthermore, Croatia has expulsed 15,000 people who have reported to have been physically and also sexually abused by the Croatian police. Amnesty International has asked to open an investigation on the possible responsibility of the European Commission for the lack of respect of Human Rights in regard to migrants and refugees from the Croatian authorities during border procedures financed by the European Union. ______________________________ 14 Op. Cit. 9

15 D. Facchini, ‘Rotta Balcanica: nel 2020 record di respingimenti

dall’Italia verso la Slovenia’, AltrEconomia, 2020 https://altreconomia.it/rotta-balcanica-nel-2020-record-direspingimenti-dallitalia-verso-la-slovenia/ (accessed 14 February 2021) 16 Ibid. 17 UN News, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: Thousands of migrants lose shelter, after camp destroyed in fire’, UN News, 2020 https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1080852, (accessed 14 February 2021). 18 IOM Migration, ‘ Thousands of migrants forced to sleep rough after closure, destruction of Bosnia camp’, IOM Migration, 2020 https://www.iom.int/news/thousands-migrants-forced-sleep-roughafter-closure-destruction-bosnia-camp, (accessed 14 February 2021).

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Since 2017, Human Rights organizations have reported beatings, destruction of private goods of migrants and inhuman treatment such as forcing people to take off clothes and shoes and walk barefoot on the snow or on the iced rivers.19 For the migrants, brutality is the image of the European border operations that the Pact proudly highlights to have enforced. Furthermore, Croatia never set up the monitoring mechanism contemplated in the Pact to ensure that border management operations are fully compliant with 20 fundamental rights and EU law. Lemberg-Pedersen from Aalborg University in Denmark studied how colonial matrices of power continue to exercise influence over current European border politics. Lemberg-Pedersen tracked the escalated border militarization, first pointing out how Operation Sophia (whose core mandate is to undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels used by migrant smugglers),21in 2015, was coordinated by the Union’s military Common Security and Defense policy, and second, highlighting how the 2016 EUTurkey agreement for resettling asylum seekers gave rise to a string of detention camps in Greece. Finally, those policies of upscaled securitized and militarized European border control have led to life-threatening mobility choices for asylum seekers. Migrants are compelled to interact with smugglers when composing their travel itineraries which bring scholars to argue that the European policies of fighting human smuggling had instead manufactured it. Migrants existences have become 22 commodified. ______________________________ 19 Amnesty Internation, ‘Inchiesta dell’Ue: complicità europea nella

violenza delle forze croate contro migranti e rifugiati’, Amnesty International, 2020, https://www.amnesty.it/complicita-europeaviolenza-forze-croate/# (accessed 14 February 2021). 20 European Ombudsman, ‘Ombudsman inquiry opened on how the European Commission seeks to ensure protection of fundamental rights in border management operations by Croatian authorities’, European Ombudsman, 2020, https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/newsdocument/en/134797? utm_source=some_eo%26utm_medium%3Dtw_organic%26utm_ca mpaign%3DHR_bordermanagement, (accessed 14 February 2021). 21 EUNAVFOR MED operation Sofia, ‘Mission’, https://www.operationsophia.eu/about-us/, (accessed 14 February 2021). 22 Martin Lemberg-Pedersen. Manufacturing displacement. Externalization and postcoloniality in European migration control, Global Affairs, 5:3, (2019) 247-271

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Conclusion The upshot of all this is that: 1. The burden on the first country of entry persists. 2. There is a non-legally bounding solidarity mechanism that applies to the European Member States rather than asylum seekers. Its core activity is the “sponsorship” of returns. 3. The Pact fails to address the socio-economic and environmental transformations (war, climate change, etc.) that generate displacement, while at the same time fails to account for the actors involved. 4. The Pact promises to make procedures more efficient to give stronger guarantees to people affected, while in reality the people who go through the politics of asylum are barely mentioned. Topics such as the fire in the Moria camp which left 12,000 migrants without shelter happened just a few days before the Pact was discussed but no measures have been added to the proposal to address them. At the same time, people continue to risk their lives to cross the sea and try to build a life under the threat of repatriation at any time.

5. Over the years, the European Union has adopted more and more repressive politics such as border control and repatriation of the ones whose claim for asylum has been negated. This new Pact keeps maintaining an anti-migration narrative while creating instruments and setting resources to bring about border enforcement and returns in a more efficient way. To conclude, in 2008 the European Council adopted a Pact on migration and asylum with the aim to organize legal immigration, keeping in mind the priorities, the needs, and the capacities of the national systems in order to foster the integration of immigrants into the society. Given the content of the new Pact, it is hard to recognize “the building progress than has been made since”23rather than a deterioration of the European policies for immigration and asylum. ______________________________

23 European Commission, New pact on migration and asylum-Building

on the progress made since 2016: Questions and Answers, [website] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20 _1723 (accessed 14 February 2021).

Silvia Mugnaini is an international student from Italy. She has a Bachelor degree in Economic Development and International cooperation from Florence University. Silvia moved to Sweden in 2019 for a 2 years Master's program in Environmental Studies and sustainability science. She likes to express herself creatively through writing and painting.

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