Twitter ’s Presidential Censorship

Analyzing Section 230’s Constitutionality and Exploring Future Reform

Stephen Dai

Abstract

As a result of Twitter's recent guidelines on maintaining election integrity and preventing pandemic misinformation, former President Trump and his supporters have been the recipients of Twitter's regulatory actions. Former President Trump has openly denounced Twitter's actions as unconstitutional censorship and urged for the repeal of Section 230, which provides Twitter and other Internet Service Providers with arbitrary moderating power. This paper aims to address the claims of First Amendment violations Former President Trump makes in an Executive Order he issued in May. By examining the courts' treatment of First Amendment rights on private property in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, and Knight v. Trump, among other cases, I conclude that Twitter's actions ultimately represent a Constitutional censorship of speech. Regardless of this conclusion, I still agree with former President Trump and other lawmakers' assertions that Twitter's regulatory power under Section 230 requires reform. After exploring lawmakers' approaches and relevant case law, I finally determine that the phrase "otherwise objectionable" found in Section 230(c)(2)(A) is the root of the problem, so I propose an amendment to the law that narrows its scope by explicitly defining the categories of speech that Internet Service Providers are allowed to moderate.

Table of Contents

Introduction

I. Background of Modern Controversy

II. The Doctrinal Framework of First Amendment Protections on Private Property A. First Amendment Protections and Private Property 1. The Public Forum Exception a) Marsh and PruneYard, Public Forums by Physical Characteristics b) Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad,Designated Public Forums by Government Lease B. Adaptation of Free Speech Principles to Social Media III. Application of Case Law to Twitter’s Regulation of President Trump’s Tweets A. Content Based Regulation of Private Users’ Twitter Accounts B. Warning and “Fact Check” Labels C. Removal of Public Figures’ Tweets IV. Analysis of Section 230 and Its Alternatives A. Brief History and Modern Context of Section 230 B. Discussing Alternatives to Section 230 1. Complete Removal 2. Anti-bias Amending 3. Narrowing the Scope C. Proposing a Solution Conclusion

Introduction

With the rise of the Internet in recent decades, the increased usage of social media platforms has ushered in an unprecedented age of interconnectedness fueled by the novel means of communication. Although each platform—Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter among others—provides users with different ways of interaction, all platforms share one common trait: they have become virtual forums for communication and the rapid dissemination of information. This has led many to assert that these virtual forums should be granted the same Constitutional protections afforded to their physical counterparts. However, because these virtual forums are entirely privately-owned, extending First Amendment protections to the platforms would tug at fundamental tensions surrounding the Constitution and the private sector. These tensions have historically presented themselves in corporate towns, parking lots, and private shopping malls, but recent developments finally brought them to a new virtual setting. Heightened intra-platform policing in response to foreign and domestic cyber threats and public figures openly denouncing these actions as unconstitutional, with case law deeming their pages “public forums” backing them up, has created a situation ripe for legal analysis. Thus, in this paper, I argue that contrary to President Trump’s and his supporters’ claims of the unconstitutionality of social media, particularly Twitter, using Section 230 to limit their speech, the regulatory power offered by the clause is viable under First Amendment limitations, even in regard to the recent court case declaring public figures’ social media pages as “public forums.” Furthermore, though I show that Section 230 is constitutional, I agree with Section 230’s critics’ assertion that the unilateral power it provides social media sites needs reform, so I explore options available and propose my solution. I will accomplish these tasks by first providing context for modern controversies surrounding social media platforms, Section 230, and public figures’ accounts. Afterwards, I will outline the case law jurisdicting First Amendment protections over the private sector. My focus is primarily on Twitter since most of the controversy surrounds the platform and its actions, but my conclusions apply to all social media platforms deemed “public forums.” I will then apply case law to Twitter’s current situation to argue that the platform’s actions are constitutional. Finally, I will analyze legislative alternatives to Section 230 provided, and I will offer my alternative to address the issues.

I. Background of Modern Controversy

Following a polarized 2016 Presidential Election, the FBI discovered evidence of massive foreign, predominantly Russian, interference through the usage of fake Twitter accounts or “bots.” This “army of Twitter bots” disguised themselves as “Midwestern swing-

voter Republicans,” adopting convincing profile pictures, biographies, and usernames.1 After gaining the trust of unsuspecting voters, the Russian bots underwent a massive disinformation campaign, spreading fake news and “amplifying” conspiracy theories in support of then-candidate Donald Trump.2 Twitter reports that at least 50,000 accounts used its service in 2016 to socially engineer the election, reaching an audience of more than 677,775 Americans.3 In addition, Clinton pollster Joel Benenson states that these Russian bots’ strategic targeting of voters in swing states could have directly contributed to Hillary Clinton’s loss in 2016.4 In response to these cyber attacks, Twitter redesigned its Terms of Service to focus not only on resolving “key issues impacting the integrity of elections across the globe”5 but also addressing misinformation as a whole, coming from both “domestic and foreign” sources.6 Twitter was granted this regulatory power by Section 230(c)(2) of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which states:

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.7

These “Good Samaritan” powers are the primary cause of controversy as I will soon reveal. In 2020, Twitter put its guidelines into action numerous times. After the Covid-19 pandemic exploded in the United States and stringent public health guidelines were adopted, Twitter began policing its platform for misinformation surrounding the pandemic. The platform removed many tweets from private accounts and placed warning labels on public figures’ accounts for violating its public health guidelines.8 Furthermore, in the months preceding and succeeding the Presidential Election, Twitter performed similar actions with regard to contentious issues such as mail-in voting, allegations of voter fraud, doctored videos showing ballot burning, and false allegations of electoral victory.9 Finally, following chaotic pro-Trump riots in Washington D.C on January 6th, spurred in part by President Trump’s tweets, protesting the congressional certification of the electoral college vote, Twitter permanently banned President Trump, other public figures’ accounts, and thousands of “QAnon” members from the platform for the “risk of further incitement of violence.”10 Twitter’s moderating is evidently content-based, and conservative voices have risen up in protest for being the victims of perceived viewpoint discrimination.11 Since the first warning label placed on his tweet in May, President Trump has taken a leading role in denouncing Twitter’s perceived infringement of his rights through Executive Orders, public announcements, and other actions. On May 28th, 2020, President Trump issued Executive Order 13925 on “Preventing Online censorship” to “clarify the scope of

immunity” of Section 230 to limit social media’s regulatory power.12 Later during election months, President Trump took a stronger stance that called for the complete removal of Section 230, vetoing the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act for not including a repeal of Section 230.13 President Trump’s Executive Order has raised interesting issues concerning the First Amendment legality of Section 230 in the scope of PruneYard v. Robins and Packingham v. North Carolina. My interest in this paper is then to explore whether his arguments on the constitutionality of Twitter’s Section 230 powers hold any merit. I will do this by first exploring the legal precedents for free speech on private property.

II. The Doctrinal Framework of First Amendment Protections on Private

Property

A. First Amendment Protections and Private Property

The courts have long established that the First Amendment only protects against government infringement on private speech in general as well as in traditional avenues of free speech, such as sidewalks, public parks, and public squares.14 So for the most part, speech by private individuals on private property—companies, colleges, or homes—is left unprotected by the First Amendment.15 However, the Public Forum doctrine is a notable exception to the Supreme Court’s treatment of First Amendment protections by providing an avenue for a limited extension of rights to private property.

1. The Public Forum Exception

In certain circumstances, the line between public and private property blurs, especially where private property assumes almost all attributes of traditionally accepted public forums. Responding to these circumstances, the Supreme Court has created several paths for private property to become public forums subject to constitutional protections. I will present two of these paths.

a) Marsh and PruneYard, Public Forums by Physical Characteristics

The judicial history of certain private property becoming public forums due to their physical characteristics is a pendulum that constantly swings between the First Amendment right of freedom of speech and the Fifth Amendment right of due process.16 Marsh v. Alabamastarted this discussion by pioneering the expansion of First Amendment protection to private property. Grace Marsh, a Jehovah’s Witness, was passing out religious pamphlets on a sidewalk in the town of Chickasaw, a suburb of Mobile, Alabama.17 The town had “all the characteristics of any other American town” except it was

privately “owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Company.”18 The company had rules preventing dissemination of unauthorized pamphlets, but Marsh refused to abide by the rules, resulting in her arrest.19 Marsh appealed, and her case made it to the Supreme Court. Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, stated that there is “no more reason for depriving [people living in company-owned towns] of the liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms for any other citizen.”20 With this ruling, the Supreme Court initiated the expansion of the Public Forum doctrine to private property: when private property takes on characteristics of public property, they become public forums subject to First Amendment protections. From there, the court adapted Marsh’sprinciples to a rising phenomenon that became the quintessential “public forum” found on private property: shopping malls.21 In Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza the Court held that private shopping malls were also subject to First Amendment protections since the malls were open to the public and “to a large extent resemble” the “business district of a municipality.”22 As long as protesters do not interfere with others’ ability to access the mall, they are free to exercise their rights.

However, in the following years, the court severely limited the extent of Marshand Logan Valley . 23 In Lloyd Corporation Ltd. v. Tanner, the Supreme Court held that although certain privately owned locations, like shopping centers, have “facilities customarily provided by municipalities,” the notion that people should have the same constitutional protections there as they do on public facilities “reaches too far.”24 Private shopping mall owners especially are not forced to allow protesters onto their property if there are alternative avenues of expression easily accessible.25 In Central Hardware Company v. NLRB, the court further limited the scope of Marshand Logan Valley, stating that private property must “assume to some significant degree the functional attributes of public property” instead of mere resemblance.26 Finally, in Hudgens v. NLRB, the Court overturned Logan Valley .

27 With that, the court swung the pendulum back towards favoring private property rights over individual liberty. Another 8 years after implementing severe limitations on the application of First Amendment protections to private property, the court moderated its position in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins.28 In that case, a group of high schoolers were handing out leaflets protesting the United Nations’ Resolution 3379 in the “central courtyard” of PruneYard Shopping Center.29 Their conduct was “peaceful and orderly,” but a security guard forced them to leave the premises.30 The students sued the shopping mall, and the case eventually reached the Supreme Court where a unanimous majority agreed that the students’ rights had been violated.31 Writing for the majority, Justice William Rehnquist sought to end the debate with a simple test to balance private property owners’ Fifth Amendment rights with that of protesters’ First Amendment rights. Justice Rehnquist states that as long as speech does not violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, it is permitted on private property.32 If

speech disturbs the functions of the private property, and the government unilaterally protects said speech, then it is equivalent to the government taking away the functions of the private property without due process granted by the Fifth Amendment.33 Justice Rehnquist completely dismisses the appellants’ argument that forcing shopping malls to allow protesters regardless of the content of their message is a violation of property owners’ First Amendment rights. As Justice Rehnquist states, “the views expressed by members of the public passing out pamphlets...will not likely be identified with those of the owner.”34 Consequently, Justice Rehnquist’s attempt at balance resulted in an over-expansive application of the public forum doctrine that puts an undue burden onto private property owners. As long as protesters in shopping malls are “orderly” and do not excessively interfere with customers, any owners of private property with public characteristics—open courtyards, wide walkways, etc—would have to accomodate protesters regardless of their message. PruneYard became abhorred by shopping mall owners, and it was effectively restricted only to its specific facts by state and circuit courts.35 The public forum doctrine however would continue to be applied and found its way to the Internet through Reno v. ACLU.36 Writing for the majority in Reno, Justice Stevens states that the Internet consists of “vast democratic forums” and is protected by the First Amendment.37 However, Justice Stevens goes no further on classifying whether speech found in privately owned Internet service providers that make up the “sprawling mall” of the Internet are protected by First Amendment rights.

b) Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad,Designated Public Forums by

Government Lease

Establishment of public forums through government lease has been far less controversial than through the previous route because it naturally avoids a contention between private entities’ property rights and the First Amendment.38 The designated public forum doctrine was first established in Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad39and has not faced many problems since. In the case, the Southeastern Promotions Ltd. corporation tried to apply to use the Tivoli theater, a privately owned theater under a long-term lease to the City of Chattanooga, Tennessee, for its musical production “Hair.”40 The theater board rejected Southeastern Promotions’ application due to “Hair” having many characteristics deemed not “in the best interest of the community,” such as anti-war sentiments, sexually explicit scenes, and nudity. Southeastern Promotions Ltd. sued, and in a 6-3 ruling, the Supreme Court agreed that the Chattanooga theater board had violated the company’s First Amendment rights.41 Writing for the majority, Justice Harry Blackmun opines that the City of Chattanooga created a designated public forum by leasing the privately-owned Tivolitheater.42 Justice William Douglas concurred in part, explaining that “municipal theaters are no less a forum for the expression of ideas than is a public park, or a sidewalk.”43 Therefore, First Amendment

protections apply to the theater, and the theater board infringed upon First Amendment rights by placing unconstitutional content-based restrictions when “picking and choosing” musicals. The opinion in Promotionswas slightly clarified a few years later in Perry Education Association v. Perry Educators Association . 44 In the case, the Supreme Court made a distinction between traditional public forums, designated public forums, and nonpublic forums.45 First, traditional public forums are locations that have historically been “devoted to assembly and debate,” such as streets and parks.46 The government may implement minimal “time, place, and manner” restrictions that are content-neutral and offer ample alternatives.47 Second, designated public forums are places that are not traditionally forums but have been opened by the state for “expressive activity.”48 They have the same restrictions as traditional public forums, but the state may implement content restriction if there is a “compelling state interest.”49 Finally, nonpublic forums are forums that do not fall under the previous two categories.50 As evident, designated public forums through government leases on private property are less contentious. These forums were opened with the consent of the property owner that entered into a contract with the government, and they only remain public forums for the duration that the government maintains the “open character” of the forum.

B. Adaptation of Free Speech Principles to Social Media

With the rise of social media platforms in the late 2000s, the Supreme Court saw fit to once more to address the extensions of First Amendment protections in the domain of the Internet. Building on the ruling in Reno,the court decided in Packingham v. North Carolina (2017)that a North Carolina law barring sex offenders from accessing social media sites represented an unjustified government infringement on the “legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights.”51 The court additionally comments that social media sites represent the “modern public square” and offer far more uses besides communicative capabilities, such as a means of remaining updated with current events and checking ads for employment.52 Therefore, government restrictions on speech on social media must be “narrowly tailored” to serve a “specific government interest.”53 Since Packingham’s ruling, the Supreme Court has not made further decisions regarding speech on social media or the Internet. As earlier mentioned, the Supreme Court also has not tried to address public forums on private property since PruneYardin 1980, but the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals found an opportunity in Knight v. Trumpto clarify the scope of PruneYardand Promotions in the context of Packingham’s ruling that social media sites represented a “modern public square.”54 Soon after assuming office, President Trump continued using his private Twitter account, “@realDonaldTrump,” instead of the account of the President of the United States,

“@POTUS,” to communicate with supporters and the “public at large.”55 However, many of President Trump’s critics have attacked President Trump’s policies in replies to his tweets, resulting in President Trump “blocking” many of them from viewing his page.56 With the assistance of the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, seven plaintiffs who were blocked by President Trump sued him for violating their First Amendment rights. The District Court for the Southern District of New York agreed with the plaintiffs, declaring President Trump’s blockings unconstitutional. Subsequently, President Trump and the Department of Justice appealed to the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals where a three-judge panel reaffirmed the District Court’s decision.57 Writing for the majority in Knight, Justice Barrington D. Parker arrived at his conclusion through a simple logical progression. First, action performed by private citizens on private accounts are normally unprotected by the First Amendment, but Justice Parker deems that President Trump operated his account as a government actor rather than a private citizen.58 He makes this determination because of the account’s descriptions, how other members of the President’s administration treat the account, and the fact that the National Archive registers the account’s tweets as “Presidential Records.”59 Second, as explored earlier in Promotions,Justice Parker states that any private property “leased” by the government is considered a designated public forum.60 Therefore, since President Trump operates an account “leased” from a private company as a government actor, his account is considered a public forum, and he partakes in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination when he blocks only his critics from viewing his Twitter page.

III. Application of Case Law to Twitter’s Regulation of President Trump’s Tweets

In Executive Order 13925, President Trump presents three separate Constitutional arguments on why Section 230’s boundaries need to be clarified. He accused social media of violating the First Amendment’s protections through (1) content-based censorship of private Americans’ speech, (2)“[selective] warning label[s] that reflect political bias,” and (3) implications that Twitter limits citizens’ access to virtual public forums.61 I will address President Trump’s arguments through navigating the case law surrounding constitutional protections in regards to private entities.

A. Content Based Regulation of Private Users’ Twitter Accounts

Twitter, like most other private companies not applicable by the narrow restraints of PruneYard, is not protected by the First Amendment. As held in Reno, the Internet as a whole is considered a public forum.62 This does not necessarily mean that the online chat rooms, messaging forums, etc, found on privately owned websites are protected by the First Amendment. Instead, the idea of the Internet being a public forum applies only in the sense

that the Internet is a “sprawling mall” that provides private entities with the ability to express themselves by “opening up” websites.63 This idea is exactly how the courts treat Twitter and other social media platforms. In Knight, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals does not consider Twitter as a whole a public forum. As earlier discussed, it partitions only a specific portion of Twitter—government officials’ pages—where people can enjoy the protections of the First Amendment in the sense that they are not allowed to be subject to viewpoint discrimination. Accordingly, the rights of private citizens are not protected in the rest of Twitter.

B. Warning and “Fact Check” Labels

One of Twitter’s first means of policing President Trump’s tweets, warning and fact check labels are addressed almost directly by case law. I will address this question in terms of whether warning labels on public forums are constitutional rather than warning labels (or any regulation for that matter) on private users’ tweets since that has already been examined. Warning and fact check labels appear as a single line of blue text below their targets’ tweets, notifying readers of “misleading” or “false claims. ”64 If users click on the label, they are redirected to a different webpage containing information Twitter holds to be “true” and “accurate.”65 For example, if users click on a label below a misleading claim about the coronavirus pandemic, they might be redirected to a page containing information published by the Center for Disease Control.66 Twitter’s guidelines state that the platform “currently may label Tweets that violate [their] policies against misleading information about civic integrity, Covid-19, and synthetic and manipulated media.”67The labels are meant to be impartial and have been indiscriminately applied to Twitter users on both ends of the political spectrum—former Democratic presidential candidate Andrew Yang and former Georgia congresswoman Stacey Abrams both received warnings about “false election claims” when they called the Georgia Senate runoff before Twitter’s sources did.68 However, Republicans and conservative pages, especially that of President Trump’s, have received more labels because they have consistently rejected the CDC’s pandemic information, mail-in ballots, and the election results, counter to Twitter’s terms and guidelines.69 This paper will not address whether regulation of factually false information adopted by a political party should be considered content-based regulation; that issue requires an entire article in itself. However, the nature of the content—its accuracy, credibility, political bias, etc—matters not in the eyes of the court in regards to private regulation. As earlier stated in PruneYard, private property owners can “disavow any connection with messages disseminated by public forums on their property by simply posting signs” that “disclaim any sponsorship of the message” because the government cannot force private entities to support messages they do not want to.70 Therefore, regardless of whose information is “true” or “false,” private property owners, Twitter in this case, are allowed to

place labels or “signs” on the public forums found on their property. And this is exactly the role that warning labels play when Twitter places them on public figures’ tweets. The labels do not restrict users’ abilities to access public figures’ pages, but they instead are an indication that Twitter does not agree with the messages espoused by these figures. Thus, Twitter’s ability to apply warning or fact check labels on public forums is unquestionably constitutional.

C. Removal of Public Figures’ Tweets

When President Trump issued the Executive Order in May, Twitter had placed warning and fact check labels on President Trump’s tweets, but the platform did not prevent users from viewing his tweets. As earlier discussed, this scenario can be analogized to shopping mall owners putting up “signs” to show their disagreement with users’ speech in the public forum. However, this changed following the riot at the Capitol during Congress’s certification of the electoral college votes. Part of Twitter’s Terms of Service is that it may allow certain tweets to remain on its platform, even if the tweets violate Twitter’s guidelines, if Twitter deems that it remains in the “public interest” to allow users to access the tweets.71 Twitter has been applying this policy to many of President Trump’s tweets of false claims surrounding the pandemic and the election,72 but after its review board deemed President Trump’s tweets responsible for inciting the violence at the Capitol, Twitter decided to remove several of the President’s tweets before permanently banning him from the platform to prevent the “risk of further incitement of violence.”73 Whether or not President Trump anticipated this outcome in May, his Executive Order suggests this potentiality and provides his reasoning for why it is unconstitutional. In the order, he cites Packingham and PruneYardfor why social media sites should be subject to First Amendment protections. The President’s reasoning follows a simple path: since Packinghamruled that social media sites represent the “modern public square,” and PruneYardruled that certain private properties are subject to First Amendment protections because of their public characteristics, social media sites should be subject to protections because of its characteristics as a “public square.”74 Ergo, Section 230(c) offers social media sites too much power because they can arbitrarily limit access to public forums by banning public figures’ accounts. Contrarily, based on the case law that I explored earlier, President Trump’s arguments miscite how the courts have treated social media. Though the Supreme Court did comment in Packingham and Renothat social media as a whole and the Internet represent public squares and forums respectively, both cases dealt with the question of whether the governmentcan regulate speech, not individual private entities.75 The courts do not consider the entirety of individual social media sites to be public forums subject to First Amendment protections, as held in PruneYard, nor do they consider social media sites state actors.76

Instead, as held in Knight, just a small portion of social media platforms—public figures’ pages—are considered designatedpublic forums. Accordingly, since designated public forums on private property are defined as nontraditional places opened to the public by the government, their existence hinges on the state of the government lease on the property.77 Once the government lease ends or is terminated, the designated public forum also disappears. On the same note, since President Trump “leased” property from Twitter, a private entity, and violated the “lease’s” terms of contract, Twitter can terminate its contract with President Trump, ending the designated public forum not on First Amendment grounds but on grounds of basic contract rights.78 This can be better explained through an analogy: Twitter is like a “hotel” and President Trump represents the government in renting out one of the “hotel’s” conference rooms for use as a public forum. Part of the rental contract could be that the leaser cannot damage anything within the room, or it will be banned from leasing the room in the future. Since the government violated this part of the contract, it is prevented from renting the room in the future. Given that President Trump consented to Twitter’s Terms of Service when he made his account, he is subject to its punishments for violating the contract, and Twitter can use its regulatory power to ban the President from using its platform without violating the constitution.79

IV. Analysis of Section 230 and Its Alternatives

Though I have explored the legal contexts of the regulatory power Section 230 offers social media sites and ultimately found the powers constitutional, there is undoubtedly a need to update the clause to address its developments since its creation in 1996. In its current state, “Internet Service Providers” (ISPs) are given unilateral power in deciding what type of content is moderated. I will briefly take a look at the history of the act before surveying lawmakers’ alternatives as well as my own.

A. Brief History and Modern Context of Section 230

The early 1990s witnessed the rapid growth of the Internet as a result of the creation of the “World Wide Web,” the increased access to “personal computers,” and the emergence of “Internet Service Providers” (ISPs) that catered to the needs of the rising population of the Internet.80 In its early days, the Internet was compared to the “Wild West,” with few laws governing the users and providers within it. Inevitably, two ISPs—CompuServe and Prodigy— received lawsuits for defamatory content posted by users on their sites.81 Ironically, CompuServe’s lawsuit was dismissed because it was considered a “distributor” for leaving its site unmoderated while Prodigy lost its lawsuit because it was considered a “publisher” for

moderating its content.82As a result, many ISPs that were originally moderating content decided to stop, making the Internet a more lawless place than before.83 Evidently, this became a problem with numerous examples of obscenity or pornography reaching minors or illegal content circulating around, so in 1996, Congress sought to address this problem with the Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.84 The original intent of the clause was to provide ISPs with the ability to moderate and remove “objectionable” material from their sites without burdening them with the liability of being a “publisher.”85 Since then, the Supreme Court has struck down all provisions of the law except for Section 230(c). However, this only opened up room for the Court to expand Section 230(c) to its current, obscurely defined state of affairs.86

B. Discussing Alternatives to Section 230

Public officials have come out with several alternatives to Section 230 that generally fall into three groups: (1) complete removal, (2) amending the law to prevent political bias, or (3) narrowing the phrasing of the law. I will provide examples for each category and highlight both benefits and detriments of each solution.

1. Complete Removal

Complete removal of Section 230 has oddly been promoted by both influential Republicans andDemocrats. Though initially promoting a narrow redefinition of the law, President Trump shifted in favor of completely repealing Section 230 around the election months due to Twitter’s intensified labeling of his and his supporters’ tweets.87 He and his supporters assert that Twitter should not be allowed to moderate content while enjoying the immunity granted by Section 230. On the contrary, then-Democratic-candidate Joe Biden also favored a complete repeal of Section 230. In interviews with CNN and The New York Times, Biden stated that Section 230 should be “revoked immediately” because it allowed social media platforms to “knowingly…[promote] something that’s not true.”88 He has not voiced an opinion on Section 230 since the interviews, so I assume that his position remains the same. Nonetheless, repealing Section 230 in its entirety could result in ramifications contrary to what President Trump or Mr. Biden intend to achieve. Eric Goldman, a professor at Santa Clara University, states that the most likely outcome of a repeal of Section 230 would be even moreregulatory action from social media platforms. Not only social media but allISPs may be forced to screen every post made by every user to prevent civil liability from libel and defamation lawsuits.89 This is directly opposite to President Trump and his supporters’ intentions, and though it fulfills Mr.Biden’s intention of preventing the proliferation of false information, significantly increased micro-regulation of tweets is likely something he also does not want.

2. Anti-bias Amending

Besides the suggestion of completely removing Section 230, other proponents of Section 230 reform call for the addition of some sort of government oversight board to prevent social media from performing biased, content-based regulation. Senator Josh Hawley (R-MO) proposed a bill titled the Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act, hoping to address bias by removing immunity from platforms that moderate in a manner “biased against a political party, candidate, or viewpoint.”90 Social media platforms would be required to obtain a “certification” from the Federal Trade Commission to continue receiving immunity.91 Unfortunately, Senator Hawley’s bill has been criticized by many for its “shortsightedness.” Libertarians claim that Senator Hawley’s bill would remove “Big Tech” in favor of “Big Government,” and conservative groups deemed that the bill would only result in more restrictive “speech codes.”92 In the end, it seems that reform for Section 230 should not introduce unnecessary complexities to an already problematic bill.

3. Narrowing the Scope

The final group of reformers perceives the main issue to be the phrase “otherwise objectionable” found in Section 230(c)(2) and seeks to narrow the scope of the ambiguous clause. As earlier discussed, Congress in 1996 added the phrase “otherwise objectionable” into the list of content that social media sites can regulate in “good faith” as a way of admitting that they cannot predict what content is considered “lawful but awful” in the future.93 Although the courts have ruled that the “otherwise objectionable” clause’s power is not limitless, they have not provided an exact boundary for where this limit lies, choosing instead to piece together a limit on a case-by-case basis.94 Many proponents of redefining the “otherwise objectionable” phrase are trying to circumvent the slow process of judicial review with their bills. President Trump’s Department of Justice and Representative Paul Gosar both proposed changing the “otherwise objectionable” phrase to allow ISPs to only ban content that is illegal or considered terrorism.95 Similarly, Senators Roger Wicker (R-MI), Lindsay Graham (R-SC), and Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) have espoused changing “otherwise objectionable” to content that is “promoting self-harm, promoting terrorism, or unlaw.”96 Both approaches aim to prevent political bias while providing ISPs with the ability to address current issues and issues intended by lawmakers in 1996—such as preventing Russian cyberattacks, distribution of child pornography, and dissemination of illegally obtained material. However, it would also compel ISPs to allow constitutionally protected speech, like hate speech, racial slurs, and profanities, even in inappropriate circumstances, like for websites meant for children.97

Ultimately, I argue that this approach is the best to take, but the specific examples provided by lawmakers are not the best execution of the approach. I will present my solution in the next section.

C. Proposing a Solution

As earlier mentioned, I believe that narrowly redefining the scope of Section 230 is the best path to take for remediating its current issues. It is evident that since the phrase “otherwise objectionable” is the source of modern controversy, redefining those two specific words provides a direct fix.98 Completely repealing a law because of two problematic words is superfluous and inefficient while adding more regulatory oversight boards needlessly complicates the law’s already complex legal framework. Furthermore, my problem with the aforementioned proposals for redefining “otherwise objectionable” is that their alternatives for the phrase are toonarrow. As I stated earlier, this would prevent ISPs from regulating constitutionally protected speech that is protected but inappropriate in certain circumstances. For example, a website providing an online game for kids may not be able to regulate their chat for profanities. Thus, I propose an amendment to Section 230 that replaces “otherwise objectionable” with categories broader in scope than what current lawmakers propose. In addition to lawmakers’ proposal of adding “terrorism,” I believe “objectively false information, hate speech, and expletives” should be included in the types of speech that ISPs can regulate. I have explained hate speech and profanities earlier, but I think that “objectively false speech” is also an important category to include given the proliferation of false information surrounding the pandemic and the election that occurred in 2020. To prove objectivity, ISPs can cite independent, non-partisan, or scientific sources, similar to what Twitter outlined in its terms and guidelines.99 As earlier mentioned, it is out of the scope of this paper to discuss whether limitation of false information is content discrimination when it is espoused by a certain political viewpoint. Unfortunately, limiting “otherwise objectionable” removes ISPs’ ability to independently and quickly address future objectionable content that inevitably emerge, but given the range of categories currently covered, Congress can amend the law in the future as it sees fit.100 This solution definitely is not perfect, but it addresses many current issues without adding more layers of complexity into the law.

Conclusion

The contentious politics surrounding recent administrations has strained the American Constitution to its brink, but in doing so, these tensions have revealed weaknesses in the American system that need attention. One of these weaknesses is the treatment of

speech by private entities in the largely privately-owned Internet, which President Trump and his supporters earnestly denounce. Though I have shown that President Trump’s claims regarding social medias', especially Twitter’s, regulatory power has no legal backing, he is right in that the apparent problems with existing law needs to be confronted. Regardless of which solution is taken, it is clear that the limits of Section 230 need to be redefined to coexist with fundamental rights of expression in the Digital Age of the 21st Century.

Stephen Dai is a freshman at University of California, Berkeley studying Political Science and Legal Studies.

Notes

1 O'Connor, Gabe, and Avie Schneider. 2021. "NPR Cookie Consent And Choices". Npr.Org. https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/04/03/522503844/how-russian-twitter-bots-pumped-outfake-news-during-the-2016-election. 2 Ibid. 3Swaine, John. 2021. "Twitter Admits Far More Russian Bots Posted On Election Than It Had Disclosed". The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/19/twitter-admits-far-more-russian-bots-postedon-election-than-it-had-disclosed. 4 Ibid. 5 Gadde, Vijaya, and Keyvon Beykpour. 2021. "Additional Steps We're Taking Ahead Of The 2020 US Election". Blog.Twitter.Com. https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/2020-election-changes.html. 6 Ibid. 7 "Protection For Private Blocking And Screening Of Offensive Material Act” 47 US.C 230, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:47%20section:230%20edition:prelim). 8 Hern, Alex. 2021. "Twitter To Remove Harmful Fake News About Coronavirus". The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/19/twitter-to-remove-harmful-fake-news-about-coronavirus; Lerman, Rachel, Katie Shepherd, and Taylor Telford. 2020. "Twitter Penalizes Donald Trump Jr. For Posting Hydroxychloroquine Misinformation Amid Coronavirus Pandemic". The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/07/28/trump-coronavirus-misinformation-twitter/. 9 “Additional Steps We’re Taking Ahead of the 2020 US Election.” Accessed January 21, 2021. https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/2020-election-changes.html. 10 Conger, Kate. “Twitter, in Widening Crackdown, Removes Over 70,000 QAnon Accounts.” The New York Times, January 12, 2021, sec. Technology. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/11/technology/twitter-removes70000-qanon-accounts.html. 11 Ahmari, Sohrab. 2021. "Twitter Wants To Target Conservatives — With None Of A Publisher’S Responsibilities". New York Post. https://nypost.com/2020/05/27/twitter-targets-conservatives-with-none-of-apublishers-responsibilities/; Guynn, Jessica. 2021. Usatoday.Com.

https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2020/10/28/facebook-twitter-google-accused-bias-against-trumpconservatives-senate-hearing/3753440001/; Wong, Queenie. 2021. "Twitter Faces Conservative Backlash For Fact-Checking Trump's Tweets For The First Time". CNET. https://www.cnet.com/news/twitter-facesconservative-backlash-for-fact-checking-trumps-tweets-for-the-first-time/. 12 U.S President. Executive Order. “Preventing Online Censorship, Executive Order 13925 of May 28, 2020.” Federal Register85 FR 34079, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/06/02/202012030/preventing-online-censorship 13 NBC News. “Trump Vetoes Military Spending Bill, Setting up Standoff with GOP Lawmakers.” Accessed January 21, 2021. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-vetoes-military-spending-bill-settingstandoff-gop-lawmakers-n1252281. 14Haguev. Committee for Industrial Organization,307 U. S. 496, 516-17 (1939). (“Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions”); See also LII / Legal Information Institute. “First Amendment.” Accessed January 24, 2021. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/first_amendment. 15 Amar, Akhil Reed, and Les Adams. The Bill of Rights Primer: A Citizen’s Guidebook to the American Bill of Rights.(New York, NY: Skyhorse Publishing, 2015), 74. 16 Due process is also found in the 14th Amendment, (“...nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law…”) but the rulings rely more on the Fifth Amendment’s due process “Takings Clause,” which will be discussed. 17 Marshv. Alabama,326 U. S. 503, 504 (1946) 18 Ibid at 502. 19 Ibid at 503-4. 20 Marshv. Alabama,326 U. S. 501 (1946) 21Glennen, Callum. “The Rise and Fall of the US Mall.” Accessed January 21, 2021. https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-us-mall. 22 Food Employeesv. Logan Valley Plaza,Inc.,391 U. S. 308, 315 (1968) 23 See Lawrence M. Cohen, Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins: Past, Present and Future, 57 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 373 (1981), 373-380 for a more detailed analysis of the progression of Marshto PruneYard. 24 Lloyd Corp.v. Tanner,407 U. S. 551, 569 (1972) 25 Ibid at 567. 26 Central Hardware Co.v. NLRB,407 U. S. 539, 547 (1972) 27 Hudgensv. NLRB,424 U. S. 507 (1976) 28 PruneYard Shopping Centerv. Robins,447 U. S. 74 (1980) 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid at 77. 31 Ibid at 74. 32 Ibid at 82-84. 33 Ibid at 85-88. See also Wooleyv. Maynard,430 U. S. 705, 706 (1977) (“The State may not constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the public.”) 34 Ibid at 87. 35 See Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc. 73 Cal. App. 4th 425, 432-437 (1999) and Costco Companies, Inc. v. Gallant, 96 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747 (2002), (PruneYarddoes not apply to single stores that

have large parking lots.); See also Golden Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Assn, 73 Cal. App. 4th 908, 1033-1034 (2001), (An apartment complex that “carefully limits access to residential tenants...is not the functional equivalent of a traditional public forum.”); and Ralphs Grocery Company United Food And Commercial Workers Union Local8, 55 Cal.4th 1083, 1088-89 (2012), (Not all open spaces in malls are public forums. Only open areas that “[induce] shoppers to congregate for purposes of entertainment, relaxation, or conversation,” like plazas, atriums, and food courts.). 36 Renov. American Civil Liberties Union,521 U. S. 844 (1997) 37 Ardito, Alissa. "SOCIAL MEDIA, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT." Administrative Law Review65, no. 2 (2013): 344-345. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24475729; See also Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).

38 See Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc. 73 Cal. App. 4th 425, 432 (1999). (“[PruneYard] represents “balancing the interest of the shopping center owner, in maintaining exclusive control over property he has opened to the public, against the societal interest, in utilizing the shopping mall as a public forum for expressive activity.” Government leases circumvent this “balancing act” by relying on the lease.) 39 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.v. Conrad,420 U. S. 546 (1975) 40 Ibid at 547. 41 Ibid at 546. 42 Ibid at 555. 43 Ibid at 563. 44 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) 45 LII / Legal Information Institute. “Forums.” Accessed January 23, 2021. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/forums. 46 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Educators' Ass'n , 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid at 45-46. 50 Ibid at 46; See also LII / Legal Information Institute. “Forums.” Accessed January 23, 2021. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/forums. 51 Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. ___ (2017) 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019) 55 Ibid at 230-31. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid at 231. 59 Ibid at 232. 60 Ibid at 235. 61 U.S President. Executive Order. “Preventing Online Censorship, Executive Order 13925 of May 28, 2020.” Federal Register, 85 FR 34079 62 Renov. American Civil Liberties Union,521 U. S. 844 (1997)

63 Ardito, Alissa. "SOCIAL MEDIA, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT." Administrative Law Review65, no. 2 (2013): 345. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24475729; See also Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 64Roth, Yoel, and Nick Pickles. “Updating Our Approach to Misleading Information.” Accessed January 22, 2021. https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/product/2020/updating-our-approach-to-misleadinginformation.html. 65 Ibid. See also “Twitter Moments Guidelines and Principles.” Accessed January 22, 2021. https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-moments-guidelines-and-principles, outlining the guidelines for pages Twitter deems “true” and “accurate.” 66 Ibid. 67 Gadde, Vijaya, and Keyvon Beykpour. 2021. "Additional Steps We're Taking Ahead Of The 2020 US Election". Blog.Twitter.Com. 68 Singman, Brooke. “Twitter Slaps Warning Label on Andrew Yang, Stacey Abrams Tweets Prematurely Declaring Victory in GA Runoff.” Text.Article. Fox News, January 5, 2021. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/twitter-slaps-warning-label-on-andrew-yang-tweet-declaring-prematurevictory-for-warnock-ossof. 69 Brown, Megan A., Zeve Sanderson, Jonathan Nagler, Richard Bonneau, and Joshua Tucker. “Analysis | Twitter Put Warning Labels on Hundreds of Thousands of Tweets. Our Research Examined Which Worked Best.” Washington Post. Accessed January 22, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/09/twitter-put-warning-labels-hundreds-thousands-tweetsour-research-examined-which-worked-best/. (Unfortunately, Twitter has not yet released data on what percentage of the “300,000” tweets it restricted using warning labels were conservative-leaning or liberalleaning, so I make this claim in regards to data collected on “high-profile” accounts such as President Trump’s and Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene’s (R-GA).) 70 Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) 71 Gadde, Vijaya, and Keyvon Beykpour. 2021. "Additional Steps We're Taking Ahead Of The 2020 US Election". Blog.Twitter.Com. 72 Abril, Danielle. “Will Twitter Ever Remove One of Trump’s Inflammatory Tweets?” Fortune. Accessed January 22, 2021. https://fortune.com/2020/05/26/twitter-president-trump-joe-scarborough-tweet/. 73 “Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump.” Accessed January 22, 2021. https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.html. 74 U.S President. Executive Order. “Preventing Online Censorship, Executive Order 13925 of May 28, 2020.” Federal Register85 FR 34079 75 Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. ___ (2017); Renov. American Civil Liberties Union,521 U. S. 844 (1997). 76 Patty, Michael (2019) "Social Media and Censorship: Rethinking State Action Once Again," Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice: Vol. 40 : Iss. 1 , Article 5, 102-103. 77 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) 78 Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019), 11; See also Terminating contracts—how and when a contract ends—overview. “Terminating contracts—how and when a contract ends—overview.” Accessed January 24, 2021. https://w3.lexisnexis.com/uk/legal/getRememberMe.asp?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.lexisnexis.com%2Fuk%2 Flexispsl%2Fdisputeresolution%2Fdocument%2F393747%2F5709-1671-F18B-747H-0000000%2FTerminating_contracts_how_and_when_a_contract_ends_overview&authReaderId=0&domain=lexisn exis;

79 “Twitter Terms of Service.” Accessed January 24, 2021. https://twitter.com/en/tos., Twitter’s terms of service allows certain “federal, state, and local government [entities]” to be exempt from parts of its guidelines. It is unclear what clauses President Trump is exempt from, but it can be inferred that he was not exempt from violating Twitter’s rules on election integrity that ultimately got him banned from the platform. 80 Lee, Timothy B. “The Internet, Explained.” Vox, June 16, 2014. https://www.vox.com/2014/6/16/18076282/the-internet; Bryant, Martin. “20 Years Ago Today, the World Wide Web Was Born - TNW Insider.” The Next Web, August 6, 2011. https://thenextweb.com/insider/2011/08/06/20years-ago-today-the-world-wide-web-opened-to-the-public/ 81 Robertson, Adi. “Why the Internet’s Most Important Law Exists and How People Are Still Getting It Wrong.” The Verge, June 21, 2019. https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/21/18700605/section-230-internet-law-twentysix-words-that-created-the-internet-jeff-kosseff-interview. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid 84 Electronic Frontier Foundation. “Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.” Accessed January 22, 2021. https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230. 85 Ibid. 86 See Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc., No. 17-17351 (9th Cir. 2019), 6. (“We did not hold in Zango, however, that the immunity [provided by Section 230] was limitless.”); See also Zango Inc v. Kaspersky Lab Inc, No. 07-35800 (9th Cir. 2009), 7988-89. (“230(c)(2)(B) provides protection for “any action taken to enable or make available...the technical means to restrict access” to material covered by §230(c)(2)(A)”). 87 Newton, Casey. “Everything You Need to Know about Section 230.” The Verge, May 28, 2020. https://www.theverge.com/21273768/section-230-explained-internet-speech-law-definition-guide-freemoderation. 88 Kelly, Makena. “Joe Biden Wants to Revoke Section 230.” The Verge, January 17, 2020. https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/17/21070403/joe-biden-president-election-section-230-communicationsdecency-act-revoke. 89 Allyn, Bobby. “As Trump Targets Twitter’s Legal Shield, Experts Have A Warning.” NPR.org. Accessed January 22, 2021. https://www.npr.org/2020/05/30/865813960/as-trump-targets-twitters-legal-shield-expertshave-a-warning.; Savitz, Eric J. “Why Repealing Section 230 Could Ruin the Internet.” Accessed January 22, 2021. https://www.barrons.com/articles/section-230-repeal-could-destroy-the-internet-51610756633. 90 Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act. S.1914. 116 Cong. 1st Sess. § 2 (2019) 91 Ibid at §3 92 Lecher, Colin. “Both Parties Are Mad about a Proposal for Federal Anti-Bias Certification.” The Verge, June 20, 2019. https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/20/18692829/section-230-hawley-bill-response-anti-biascertification. 93 Schruers, Matt . “What Is Section 230’s ‘Otherwise Objectionable’ Provision?” Disruptive Competition Project, July 29, 2020. https://www.project-disco.org/innovation/072920-what-is-section-230s-otherwise-objectionableprovision/. 94Enigma, No. 17-17351 (9th Cir. 2019), 6. The Court “did not hold that the immunity [provided by Section 230 was limitless” but it has not tried to define exactly where the boundary lies. It did hold that “otherwise objectionable does not extend anti-competition censorship. In Asurvio LP v. Malwarebytes Inc., Case No. 5:18cv-05409-EJD (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2020), the District Court of Northern California held that “otherwise objectionable” protects indirect anti-competition censoring. 95 Stop the Censorship Act. H.R.4027 116th Cong. 1st Sess. §2 (2019)

96 Online Freedom and Viewpoint Diversity Act. S.4534 116th Cong. 2d Sess. §2 (2020) 97 Matalv. Tam,582 U. S. ___ (2017). “The proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’” 98 "Protection For Private Blocking And Screening Of Offensive Material Act” 47 US.C 230, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:47%20section:230%20edition:prelim). Modern controversy surrounds perceived political bias on social media. Section 230(c) defines categories of speech that ISPs can regulate, listing content that is “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.” It is implied then that “otherwise objectionable” is interpreted to allow social media to regulate speech based on political content, making “otherwise objectionable” the center of controversy. 99 “Twitter Moments Guidelines and Principles.” Accessed January 22, 2021. https://help.twitter.com/en/rulesand-policies/twitter-moments-guidelines-and-principles, 100 "Protection For Private Blocking And Screening Of Offensive Material Act” 47 US.C 230, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:47%20section:230%20edition:prelim). Making my changes would result in the regulatable categories being content that is “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, terrorism, objectively false, hate speech, or expletives,” which covers all current issues while preventing political bias.

Bibliography

Abril, Danielle. “Will Twitter Ever Remove One of Trump’s Inflammatory Tweets?” Fortune. Accessed January 22, 2021. https://fortune.com/2020/05/26/twitter-president-trump-joe-scarborough-tweet/.

“Additional Steps We’re Taking Ahead of the 2020 US Election.” Accessed January 22, 2021. https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/2020-election-changes.html.

Ahmari, Sohrab. 2021. "Twitter Wants To Target Conservatives — With None Of A Publisher’S Responsibilities". New York Post. https://nypost.com/2020/05/27/twitter-targets-conservatives-with-none-of-a-publishersresponsibilities/.

Allyn, Bobby. “As Trump Targets Twitter’s Legal Shield, Experts Have A Warning.” NPR.org. Accessed January 22, 2021. https://www.npr.org/2020/05/30/865813960/as-trump-targets-twitters-legal-shield-expertshave-a-warning.

Amar, Akhil Reed, and Les Adams. The Bill of Rights Primer: A Citizen’s Guidebook to the American Bill of

Rights.New York, NY: Skyhorse Publishing, 2015.

Ardito, Alissa. "SOCIAL MEDIA, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT." Administrative Law Review 65, no. 2 (2013): 301-86. Accessed January 23, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24475729.

Brown, Megan A., Zeve Sanderson, Jonathan Nagler, Richard Bonneau, and Joshua Tucker. “Analysis | Twitter Put Warning Labels on Hundreds of Thousands of Tweets. Our Research Examined Which Worked Best.”

Washington Post. Accessed January 22, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/09/twitter-put-warning-labels-hundreds-thousandstweets-our-research-examined-which-worked-best/.

Bryant, Martin. “20 Years Ago Today, the World Wide Web Was Born - TNW Insider.” The Next Web, August 6, 2011. https://thenextweb.com/insider/2011/08/06/20-years-ago-today-the-world-wide-web-opened-to-thepublic/.

“Capitol Riots: Did Trump’s Words at Rally Incite Violence?” BBC News, January 13, 2021, sec. US & Canada. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55640437.

Clement, J. 2021. "Topic: Social Media Usage In The United States". Statista. https://www.statista.com/topics/3196/social-media-usage-in-the-united-states/.

Conger, Kate. “Twitter, in Widening Crackdown, Removes Over 70,000 QAnon Accounts.” The New York Times, January 12, 2021, sec. Technology. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/11/technology/twitterremoves-70000-qanon-accounts.html.

Cornell LII / Legal Information Institute. “Contract.” Accessed January 24, 2021. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/contract.

Cornell LII / Legal Information Institute. “First Amendment.” Accessed January 24, 2021. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/first_amendment.

Cornell LII / Legal Information Institute. “Forums.” Accessed January 23, 2021. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/forums.

Electronic Frontier Foundation. “Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.” Accessed January 22, 2021. https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230.

Gadde, Vijaya, and Keyvon Beykpour. 2021. "Additional Steps We're Taking Ahead Of The 2020 US Election". Blog.Twitter.Com. https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/2020-election-changes.html.

Glennen, Callum. “The Rise and Fall of the US Mall.” Accessed January 21, 2021. https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-us-mall.

Guynn, Jessica. 2021. Usatoday.Com. https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2020/10/28/facebook-twittergoogle-accused-bias-against-trump-conservatives-senate-hearing/3753440001/.

Hawley, Josh. “S.1914 - 116th Congress (2019-2020): Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act.” Webpage, June 19, 2019. https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1914.

Hern, Alex. 2021. "Twitter To Remove Harmful Fake News About Coronavirus". The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/19/twitter-to-remove-harmful-fake-news-about-coronavirus.

Kelly, Makena. “Joe Biden Wants to Revoke Section 230.” The Verge, January 17, 2020. https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/17/21070403/joe-biden-president-election-section-230communications-decency-act-revoke.

Lecher, Colin. “Both Parties Are Mad about a Proposal for Federal Anti-Bias Certification.” The Verge, June 20, 2019. https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/20/18692829/section-230-hawley-bill-response-anti-biascertification.

Lee, Timothy B. “The Internet, Explained.” Vox, June 16, 2014. https://www.vox.com/2014/6/16/18076282/theinternet.

Lerman, Rachel, Katie Shepherd, and Taylor Telford. 2020. "Twitter Penalizes Donald Trump Jr. For Posting Hydroxychloroquine Misinformation Amid Coronavirus Pandemic". The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/07/28/trump-coronavirus-misinformation-twitter/.

NBC News. “Trump Vetoes Military Spending Bill, Setting up Standoff with GOP Lawmakers.” Accessed January 21, 2021. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-vetoes-military-spending-billsetting-standoff-gop-lawmakers-n1252281.

Newton, Casey. “Everything You Need to Know about Section 230.” The Verge, May 28, 2020. https://www.theverge.com/21273768/section-230-explained-internet-speech-law-definition-guide-freemoderation.

O'Connor, Gabe, and Avie Schneider. 2021. "NPR Cookie Consent And Choices". Npr.Org. https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/04/03/522503844/how-russian-twitter-botspumped-out-fake-news-during-the-2016-election.

“Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump.” Accessed January 22, 2021. https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.html.

Robertson, Adi. “Why the Internet’s Most Important Law Exists and How People Are Still Getting It Wrong.” The Verge, June 21, 2019. https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/21/18700605/section-230-internet-law-twentysix-words-that-created-the-internet-jeff-kosseff-interview.

Roth, Yoel, and Nick Pickles. “Updating Our Approach to Misleading Information.” Accessed January 22, 2021. https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/product/2020/updating-our-approach-to-misleadinginformation.html. Savitz, Eric J. “Why Repealing Section 230 Could Ruin the Internet.” Accessed January 22, 2021. https://www.barrons.com/articles/section-230-repeal-could-destroy-the-internet-51610756633.

Schruers, Matt . “What Is Section 230’s ‘Otherwise Objectionable’ Provision?” Disruptive Competition Project, July 29, 2020. https://www.project-disco.org/innovation/072920-what-is-section-230s-otherwiseobjectionable-provision/.

Singman, Brooke. “Twitter Slaps Warning Label on Andrew Yang, Stacey Abrams Tweets Prematurely Declaring Victory in GA Runoff.” Text.Article. Fox News, January 5, 2021. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/twitter-slaps-warning-label-on-andrew-yang-tweet-declaring-prematurevictory-for-warnock-ossof.

Swaine, John. 2021. "Twitter Admits Far More Russian Bots Posted On Election Than It Had Disclosed". The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/19/twitter-admits-far-more-russian-botsposted-on-election-than-it-had-disclosed.

“Twitter Moments Guidelines and Principles.” Accessed January 22, 2021. https://help.twitter.com/en/rulesand-policies/twitter-moments-guidelines-and-principles.

“Twitter Terms of Service.” Accessed January 24, 2021. https://twitter.com/en/tos.

“Terminating contracts—how and when a contract ends—overview.” Accessed January 24, 2021. https://w3.lexisnexis.com/uk/legal/getRememberMe.asp?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.lexisnexis.com%2F uk%2Flexispsl%2Fdisputeresolution%2Fdocument%2F393747%2F5709-1671-F18B-747H-0000000%2FTerminating_contracts_how_and_when_a_contract_ends_overview&authReaderId=0&domain=l exisnexis.

"[USC02] 47 USC 230: Protection For Private Blocking And Screening Of Offensive Material". 2021. Uscode.House.Gov. https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:47%20section:230%20edition:prelim).

Wong, Queenie. 2021. "Twitter Faces Conservative Backlash For Fact-Checking Trump's Tweets For The First Time". CNET. https://www.cnet.com/news/twitter-faces-conservative-backlash-for-fact-checking-trumpstweets-for-the-first-time/.