This unsatisfactory result should be met by a recommendation that there be inserted on the computer a screen which will reveal the reason for the check and the person on whose behalf it was made, and these should be routinely audited.
THE MAKING OF OTHER CHECKS FOR IMPROPER PURPOSES In addition to this abuse of the computerised database, the fact emerged that it is not uncommon for police to check vehicles somewhat at random. This process has facilitated the identification of Commission surveillance vehicles. This matter is presently the subject of correspondence between the Commission and the Commissioner of Police. Operation Lime presents an excellent illustration of how the police’s computerised information on vehicles was misused by corrupt police. As a result of this operation, two police officers were found to be engaged unlawfully with drugs and firearms. The operation had commenced as a result of a so-called police officer–informant relationship between one of the police officers concerned and a Commission covert source. On 5 June 1997, which was early in the development of the relationship, police officer A was informed by the covert source that some friends of his were to be prosecuted for traffic offences and he sought A’s assistance. On that day A accessed the computerised data to confirm the details. By 24 June 1997, the two police officers had completed their planning for a break and enter. They planned to steal property including firearms and drugs which they believed were owned by one McC. They were also led to believe that McC used vehicle 433–AAJ. Between 1731 and 1734 hours on 24 June 1997, one of the officers attended at a police station and checked both the person and vehicle. In the course of the execution of their illegal plan, they observed certain vehicles which they believed may have been surveillance vehicles. Their first thought was that their target for the robbery may also have been the subject of surveillance by an undisclosed law enforcement agency. In fact, they were the subject of surveillance by Commission staff. Both police officers at the time were not on duty. At 2110 hours, a female employee at the police station where the two police officers then were, checked the details of one of the surveillance vehicles and, between 2120 hours and 2156 hours, one of the officers also checked the details of the same vehicle. Later, at 2305 hours, the woman made checks on another of the surveillance vehicles. Both checks were made by women who were employed as civilian radio operators. In respect of the first, the Commission has accessed information which records one of thecorrupt officers requesting one of the women to make a check of the particular vehicle. It should be said that these women were used by the police officers to do these checks but were in no way themselves involved in any improper dealings. They assumed that the requests made to them were proper. Two days later, on 26 June 1997, three further checks on surveillance vehicles were made by one of the police officers and by civilian employees.
Police and Drugs: A Report of an Investigation of Cases Involving Queensland Police Officers
October 1997
85