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MAGNA CARTA 2
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patched to Yemen to organize the operation. It was kept secret and revealed to the media only several months after its completion. MAGNA CARTA 2. To halt the internal clashes within the Israeli intelligence community, in early 2000 the Mossad initiated an agreement known to its shadowy denizens as “Magna Carta 2.” This was an agreement on the division of labor among the Mossad, Military Intelligence (MI), and the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) aimed at introducing order into their work. It was concluded by the directors of these three organizations: Efraim Halevy, Amos Malka, and Ami Ayalon, respectively. The document determined who was responsible for what, specifying in detail the responsibilities of each organization down the various ranks. Magna Carta 2 acknowledges that MI is the senior intelligence organization for collections and assessments. In terms of geographical range, MI is responsible for collecting information from the neighboring countries, the so-called target countries. MI fulfills its responsibilities by technical means of collection or by operating agents across the frontiers of target countries. For example, Unit 504 operates agents abroad, but only in areas close to the borders of hostile states. The Mossad operates agents in countries farther afield, including Arab states. If necessary, its agents might penetrate Arab countries through third countries, known as “base countries.” The ISA handles domestic intelligence, although MI conducts political and military assessment in the Palestinian Authority (PA); by one interpretation, the PA is deemed a neighboring country, not an autonomy within Israel. By contrast, the ISA, as a preventive rather than an intelligence organization, is wholly responsible for forestalling any terrorism from the PA area. MI is therefore only an auxiliary element in the sphere, providing the ISA with the necessary intelligence. According to the Magna Carta 2, the ISA’s main tasks are preemption of Palestinian terrorism; counterintelligence; prevention of any underground activity, whether political or terrorist, by all Israeli sectors, including Arabs and Jews; and the security of important personalities and institutions. Since the 1967 Six-Day War, MI has not provided the ISA with any intelligence support within the Green Line (i.e., the pre1967 border), because the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are forbidden to operate in the Israeli civilian sector. In the former Lebanon security