2014 and after. “try to do it my way:” transparency and independence in a time of war
T
he Revolution of Dignity forced Russia to yet again try to use the “gas in exchange for strategic concessions” trick. Most likely, the expectation was that Ukraine would once more go for opaque bilateral negotiations, as had happened in 2006 and 2009. The difference this time was that there was a third party to the talks: the EU. And this eliminated the kind of methods that had worked when talks took place in Moscow. In fact, the EU’s quickly devised and very concrete position against the backdrop of the “gas phase” of this conflict effectively stopped the blackmail and shifted the conflict to negotiations62. A second factor in this victory was the transparency of the negotiation process and the agreements to deliver gas to Ukraine. The trilateral format ensured what the Russians had always avoided in the past: trust between the Ukrainian and European sides. This principle of solidarity with Ukraine took away the one instrument the Kremlin had always relied on: cutting obviously inconvenient deals due to its stronger position and an untransparent negotiation process. What was even more important was that the new circumstances made it possible to move the resolution of the conflict over the contracts for gas imports and transit from the realm of bilateral talks behind closed doors, the way they were signed, to the very competent Stockholm arbitration, which in the end ruled it unfair and not market-oriented63. The third factor in this victory was a real diversification of sources of gas supplies to Ukraine. What’s more, Gazprom’s attempts to continue its strategy of accruing debts to Ukraine failed this time and most were refuted by the Stockholm arbitration. After the 2009 gas conflict, the decision to diversify sources became obvious even for Ukraine. In order to ensure the formal and technical reliability of up to 30 bcm from its western border, Ukraine had to invest considerable effort and energy at the political level, but this investment returned at a healthy profit.64 Reorienting its sources of gas supplies allowed Ukraine to finally eliminate the constant pressure on its energy policies and begin the reforms needed to properly liberalize its gas market. Gazprom’s considerable efforts to block the capacities of interconnectors at the EU-Ukraine border offered the best proof of Russia’s deliberate intention to weaken this move towards integration in a common energy market that is rule-based and not driven by the interests of individual players.65 Ukraine’s experience shows clearly that the most effective way to prevent mistakes and losses from energy cooperation with Russia is upholding European principles of competitiveness, diversification, common policies, as well as publicity and transparency. Some of these principles can be ignored in carrying out individual gas transportation projects on an exceptional basis, but it is precisely such “exceptions” from European rules that are likely to become dangerous traps that will later make it a lot harder to maintain a high level of energy security on its own.
62
U-Ukraine-Russia talks agree on $4.6 billion to secure gas supplies. European Commission. Last modified October 30, 2014. https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/eu-ukraineE russia-talks-agree-46-billion-secure-gas-supplies; EU-Ukraine-Russia talks agree on the terms of a binding protocol to secure gas supplies for the coming winter. European Commission Statement. Brussels, 25 September 2015. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-5724_en.htm
63
learchyk, Roman. Ukraine’s Naftogaz claims $2.56bn legal victory over Russia’s Gazprom. The Financial Times. Last modified March 1, 2018. https://www.ft.com/content/ O b933b8bc-1cd3-11e8-aaca-4574d7dabfb6
64
hłoń, Tomasz. Gas reverse flow from Slovakia to Ukraine: an Obvious Thing to Agree On? Visegrad Insight. Last modified March 17, 2014. http://visegradinsight.eu/reverse-flowC gas-from-slovakia-to-ukraine/
65
ocor, Vladimir. Slovakia: Potential Gateway for Reverse Gas Flows from Europe to Ukraine (Part Two). Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 10 Issue 150. Last modified August 13, 2013. https:// S jamestown.org/program/slovakia-potential-gateway-for-reverse-gas-flows-from-europe-to-ukraine-part-two/
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