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control. And so the ground situation remains controlled by a new, young, and faceless group of insurgents. On 18 Sept. 2008, Somchai Wongsawat became the new prime minister. News came that Jakarta was hosting talks between Bangkok and a group of southern separatists; it soon turned out, however, that the Thai general at the signing event was not an official government representative and that these talks were mainly an Indonesian initiative. Although Prime Minister Somchai visited the South on 28 Oct. 2008, the army was clearly in full control of the region. Soon thereafter, the government allotted the army 8 billion Thai baht ($247.6 million) for Fiscal Year 2009 to establish a special force. Somchai was out of office office by by 22 Dec. Dec. 2008. 2008. He was succeeded by the present Democrat Party led government of Abhisit Vijjajiva, which came to power on 17 Dec. 2008. This ongoing and intensifying southern Thailand conflict, when combined with the national political crisis following the Sept. 2006 coup, has affected the local political and economic environments. Despite the return to democracy after the 23 Dec. 2007 election, the continued political instability (e.g., the court’s expelling of two prime ministers and their governments and the Nov. 2008 closure of Bangkok’s international airport) has driven away investors and intensified local political debate about the future. International analysts, financiers, business investors, and policymakers are paying close attention. The current Southern Thailand separatists are generally identified as belonging to BRN-C, which become active in 1990 by recruiting a new and younger generation of separatists who represent a radicalized Shafi‘i Islamist perspective. The current “militants� are inspired more by Malay Shafi‘i Islam rather than the jihadist Islam of international terrorists, and their agenda is more local and national than religious. The Muslim world is also watching very closely. Lacking accurate information, the Muslim world views this conflict in religious terms. The International Crisis Group report on southern Thailand, as well as PULO, states that the conflict remains entirely local. The possibility of a linkage with global or regional jihadists cannot be completely ruled out, if the conflict continues, and some Thai military officials officials have seen “signs� of local insurgents having obtained training from foreign jihadists.
religious, linguistic, and cultural diversity. If Bangkok wants to solve this ongoing conflict and show the global Muslim community that it is not hostile to Islam, it must find a way to deliver what the local Malay Muslims want. This requires that practical steps be taken to implement the recent joint discussions held between Bangkok and Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu (secretary-general, Organization of the Islamic Conference) at the end of April 2007, as well as the recommendations made in the communiquĂŠ issued at the end of the ThirtyFourth Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Islamabad between 15-17 May 2007: i.e., addressing the root causes of the problem, accelerating the process of accountability in order to build confidence among the local Muslims, and letting them manage their own affairs within the sphere of the Thai constitution. At the national level, the government should implement the National Reconciliation Commission’s recommendations submitted on 5 June 2006: introducing the Shari‘ah, making ethnic Pattani/Malay an official official language language in in the region, establishing an unarmed peacekeeping force, and setting up a Peaceful Strategic Administrative Centre for Southern Border Provinces. The report was submitted to the Thaksin government; however, the concurrent political instability deprived it of any official attention. With current political instability at the center, where there is a legitimacy gap and political power is up for grabs, the army is in control of the South. Malaysian leaders have called for autonomy in the South, whereas the Thai government has adopted a “developmentâ€? approach to “make the conflict go away.â€? In July 2009, Bangkok designated 63.1 billion Baht (US$1.85 billion) for security and development programs in the region with the goal of ending the insurgency in the next three years. Any political solution for the South depends on the political will of the Thai state. Autonomy is a preferred option. Any exhibition of Bangkok’s political will to address the conflict’s root causes will create a longterm political solution. Thai Muslims have coexisted with Thai Buddhists for centuries, but their relationship has been put to the test in southern Thailand. Bangkok should work toward recognizing the region’s ethno-religious and cultural diversity, for doing so will help build multicultural citizenship in the country.
The Way Forward
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The problem in the Deep South is the result of many factors: decades of economic neglect; the lack of public- and privatesector employment opportunities; and Bangkok bureaucracy’s cultural insensitivity and non-recognition of the Thai polity’s
Dr. Dr. Imtiyaz Imtiyaz Yusuf Yusuf isis currently currently serving serving as as Malaysia Malaysia Chair Chair of of Islam Islam inin Southeast Southeast Asia, Asia, Prince Prince Alwaleed Alwaleed Bin Bin Talal Talal Center Center for for Muslim-Christian Muslim-Christian Understanding, Understanding, Georgetown Georgetown University. University. In In Thailand, Thailand, he he isis program program didirector rector of of the the Department Department of of Religion, Religion, Graduate Graduate School School of of Philosophy Philosophy and and Religion, Religion, Assumption Assumption University University (Bangkok). (Bangkok). He He specializes specializes inin religion, religion, with with aa focus focus on on Islamic-Buddhist Islamic-Buddhist dialogue dialogue and and Islam Islam inin Thailand. Thailand. JULY JULY//AUGUST AUGUST 2010 2010 ISLAMIC ISLAMIC HORIZONS HORIZONS 57
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