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I N T E R N AT I O N A L
Chinese Muslim Built Mosque in Chiangmai North Thailand must be addressed without treading upon the local Muslims’ cultural and religious sensitivities.
Political Developments The 2006 military coup led by Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratkalin, a Thai Muslim, adopted a reconciliatory stance toward the Deep South. During the previous Thaksin regime, as army chief, Sonthi was the first to propose talking with the insurgents; however, he was sidelined. After the coup, both he and interim prime minister Gen. Surayud Chulanont recognized the need for dialogue with the separatists and favored the role played by former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad in contacting the separatist leaders for peace talks. In his first visit to the South after taking office, Gen. Surayud apologized for the Thaksin government’s mishandling of the crisis and announced an amnesty for those who would leave the insurgency. This policy was designed to reconnect with the older generations of PULO and BRN separatists so they would mediate between the government and the new generation of younger, and more determined and violent, insurgents. Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), currently the most ac56 ISLAMIC HORIZONS JULY/AUGUST 2010
tive insurgent group, rejected negotiations; other groups did not respond. Gen. Surayud’s main position was readiness to talk, the possibility of granting autonomy, and the rejection of separation. The interim government also revived the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC), a civilian-military-police task force that had formerly played a crucial role in offering a forum for dialogue between the locals and the authorities; Thaksin had dissolved it. Renamed the Southern Border Provinces Development Center (SBPDC), after five years of continued violence it is finally working to change the attitude of mutual hostility to one of mutual acceptance, trust, and cooperation. The Surayud government’s apology and dialogue approach has to be supplemented with the delivery of justice, recognition of local language and culture, letting the locals manage their affairs, and other measures if it is to succeed. Although his desire to resolve this conflict was sincere, his preoccupation with larger issues (e.g., restoring democracy) had occupied much of his time and energy (“The Nation,” 29 Dec. 2006). After the Dec. 2007 parliamentary elections, Samak Sundaravej formed a new government, one supported by the exiled
Thaksin. The public was surprised when interior minister Chalerm Yubamrung announced the possibility of some form of autonomy. This was received with great enthusiasm; however, the prime minister soon shot it down and chided his minister for engaging in loose talk. When the Samak administration talked of studying the Aceh model, a senior military officer and security experts said the two situations were not compatible. After this debacle, the Samak government proposed initiating joint military and private business ventures to boost the local economy and thus offset the insurgency. But by this time, the government found itself caught in political bickering with the outside parliament opposition group bent on driving it out of office. The army had already been made responsible for the insurgency, and it applied a heavy hand. The level of violent attacks had declined, but the ongoing assassinations, disappearances, human rights abuses, and killing of Muslim religious teachers had not been addressed. As a result, local Muslims were becoming even more alienated. During July 2008, some obscure group claiming to be real separatists came forward to announce a ceasefire; they were soon exposed as former separatist leaders who had no real