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Case 4 : Political Leaders in Poland and Hungary’s Framing of Knowledge
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Case 4
Abstract
LGBT+ rights are decreasing in Poland and Hungary due to the current governments’ legislative and judicial changes. This case aims to investigate what role rhetorics play in this decrease - namely, by attempting to identify in what ways the political leaders use framing of knowledge as a means to affect the population’s values and attitudes about the LGBT+ movement, and in this way strengthen their political agenda while simultaneously creating their own version of knowledge. In order to explore this topic, speeches, statements and constitutions from both countries were analyzed. The results showed that political leaders in Poland and Hungary provide and repeat their own definitions of what is morally right, what is “normal” and what is the “true” Polish or Hungarian identity – none of which include being part of the LGBT+ community. These results suggest that Polish and Hungarian politicians seek to mobilize specific parts of the society by creating their own knowledge, and constructing a picture of members of the LGBT+ community as so different from the rest of the Polish and Hungarian society that they can not be included in the group of people that the laws are supposed to protect. The emphasis on values, morals, and the traditional family creates a rhetorical framework that goes beyond political and technical terms, and rather provides personal or individual reasons to obtain a negative view on the LGBT+ community based on intimate feelings of identity and morality.
Introduction
In recent years, there has been a trend of democratic backsliding in both Poland and Hungary. Judicial changes have given the government increased control over judges and the media, thus contributing to a state-led elimination of institutions necessary for an open democracy (Wójcik & Wiatrowski, 2020; Freedom House, 2020; Bemeo, 2016). The rights of the LGBT+ community has seen a similar development, contrary to the general development in other democratic countries (Kent & Poushter, 2020). In the 2020 Polish presidential election, LGBT+ rights became the single biggest cultural issue during campaigning, taking the place of debates regarding immigration and the rise of xenophobia in the 2015 election (Easton, 2019; Żuk & Żuk, 2020, p. 1). In Hungary the situation is somewhat different, but one distinctive similarity is how the discourse of the political leaders is negative towards the LGBT+ community. The COVID-19 pandemic has also been used as a shield to implement controversial political changes in both countries, presenting them as necessary for protection of “traditional family values’’ (Goździak & Márton, 2018, p. 127). These legislative changes include laws affecting homosexuality and abortion in Poland, and transsexuality in Hungary (Kováts & Zacharenko, 2020, ILGA Europa, 2020, p. 86-87). According to the LGBT+ rights group ILGA-Europe, which annually examines legal and policy practices for LGBT+ people in 49 countries resulting in a score for each country, this has led to Hungary becoming the European country with the most dramatic drop in its score during 2019, and Poland to become the EU country with the lowest score (ILGA Europe, 2020).
The rhetoric of the governing parties in Poland and Hungary is a much researched topic. Multiple articles talk about “The Self”, or “The People”, vs “The Other”, and how the people of power in Poland and Hungary use these rhetorical tactics towards their inhabitants as a means to gain power (Goździak & Márton, 2018, p. 127; Kerpel, 2017, p. 69). According to Goździak and Márton (2018, p. 128), the public discourses in both countries have circled around to what being a “true Hungarian (igaz(i) magyar) or a “true Pole” (prawdziwy Polak) means. This “us versus them” discourse turns minorities such as immigrants, the Roma, and sexual minorities into enemies, which results in discrimination and resentment towards these groups (Lugosi, 2020, p. 212). In this discourse, leaders of PiS and Fidesz portray themselves as the only ones that can talk on behalf of “The People” (Kerpel, 2017, p. 68). Their discourse is often identified as institutionalist and nationalist (Kim, 2020, p. 1-16; Kerpel, 2017, p. 68). Erin Jenne (2018, p. 549) proposes the term “ethnopopulism” as a system in which populism and nationalism is co-articulated, where narratives about threats come from both beyond, for example as immigrants and ethnic minorities, and from higher up “in the system”, such as the European Union or foreign elites. She argues that “global elites or foreign powers” are used to create paranoia about minorities and dehumanize out-groups (Jenne, 2018, p. 549). Milada Vachudova (2020, p. 320) argues that politicians promising to defend “The People” against an established elite is a common political tool in populism. What varies is how they define “The People”, and that ethnopopulists fabricate external enemies, conspiring with internal enemies (Vachudova, 2020, p. 320). Kerpel (2017, p. 68) follows this up by arguing that neither PiS nor Fidesz are explicit in who belongs to the ”the pure people”, but rather create a “fictitious group” through their political narratives and ideologies.
This study will examine in what ways political leaders in Poland and Hungary use framing of knowledge as a means to affect the population’s values and attitudes towards homosexuality, with basis in the research question: In what ways do political leaders in Poland and Hungary use framing of knowledge as a means to affect the population’s values and attitudes about the LGBT+ movement? In order to research this question, I will analyze speeches and statements from the media made by political leaders in Poland and Hungary, in addition to passages from the Polish and Hungarian constitutions. I will also look at PiS and Fidesz party programs, which are respectively the Polish and Hungarian ruling parties,
both of which can be characterized as right wing-populist parties (Jenne, 2018, p. 547). In the first chapter I will outline key historical moments and events in the development of democracy and LGBT+ rights in Poland and Hungary, as well as an introduction to the theory of framing. The methodology used to analyze this question will then be presented and discussed, before the analysis is presented and concluded.
Background and Theory
In this chapter the democratic development in Poland and Hungary, as well as the LGBT+ community’s current situation in these countries, will be described. The theory of framing will be explained after this as it is used to support arguments in the analysis.
Recent Democratic Developments
As the subject of analysis is political leaders, and democracy and minority rights have a tendency to correlate, it is important to have an overview of the democratic status in Poland and Hungary. Democracy is a system that provides the citizens with the opportunity and right to exercise in free elections, and where the representatives in power represent the people (Trantidis, 2016, p. 69). Social and political trust is very important in a democracy in order for the institutions to function (Newton, 2001, p. 201).
As previously mentioned, the notion of democracy in both Poland and Hungary is getting weaker, and some call it cases of “democratic backsliding”. “Democratic backsliding” refers to a democratic regression changing a democracy towards a hybrid regime, and potentially into full authoritarianism (Cianetti et al, 2018, p. 245). Every year, Freedom House (2020) publishes a report in which the level of democratic governance of specific countries is measured, where a democracy score and percentage is presented for each country. These scores take into account ratings on governance, the electoral process, the media’s independence, civil society, the framework of the judicial system, as well as corruption. In 2015, Poland received a democracy percentage of 80 percent (Arak & Żakowiecki, 2015). This has annually decreased, and was in 2020 measured to be 65 percent (Wójcik & Wiatrowski, 2020). In Hungary, the democracy percentage in 2015 was 64 percent (Kovács, 2015), and 49 percent in 2020 (Freedom House, 2020). In both countries, the current controlling parties have worsened the already declining democratic situations since they were elected; Fidesz since 2010 in Hungary, and PiS since 2015 in Poland (Karolewski & Sata, 2020, p. 209). The European parliament triggered Article 7 in Poland in 2017, and in Hungary in 2018, which means they viewed the countries at risk for breaking the European Union’s core values (De la Baume, 2020; Politico, 2018). In Poland, it was because of concerns about losing judicial independence, and in Hungary because of concerns of academic freedom and freedom of expression, as well as the rights of “out-groups”, minorities and refugees (Politico, 2018).
Democracy has traditionally had a stronger role in Poland than in Hungary (Karolewski & Sata, 2020, p. 220). The political system in Poland does not provide the government with constitutional power to make wide and deep institutional changes, contrary to the situation in Hungary (Karolewski & Sata, 2020, p. 211). As a result, opposition parties in Poland have a greater chance of being heard (Karolewski & Sata, 2020, p. 211). In Hungary, on the other hand, the constitutional powers given to the government have led to an eradication of the system of checks and balances, shifting the decision-making power from the parliament into the hands of Fidesz loyal individuals (Kerpel, 2017, p. 71). In other words, Hungary can be viewed as an oligarchy, where the power is in the hands of a privileged elite. The low requirements to form a party in Hungary make it difficult to create a large party, and Orbán is deliberately changing laws to make it more difficult for opposition parties to gain power (Hopkins, 2020). Ultimately, Hungary is attempting to build a “Hungarian Mafia State” utilizing ideologies, whereas Poland is attempting to build a “Conservative Semi-Autocracy” driven by ideology (Kerpel, 2017, p. 71). Despite the systemic dissimilarities, the ruling parties in both countries have changed
laws, dismantled institutions and adopted policies that benefit themselves and their supporters (Vachudova, 2020, p. 318; Karolewski & Sata, 2020, p. 210-211, 214). In both countries, media outlets and the legislative branch are and have been changed to work in favour of the governments (Karolewski & Sata, 2020, p. 213). This has resulted in a current investigation by the EU on both countries, as mentioned above, for undermining the independence of courts, media and non-governmental organizations (Lee, 2020).
The Situation for LGBT+
Among the numerous legislative changes the Fidesz and PiS government have passed through, many have affected LGBT+ rights. Both countries are largely Christian and conservative (Grzymala-Busse, 2017), and both countries are part of a trend of more frequent hate speech against the LGBT+ community by public figures in multiple European countries (ILGA Europe, 2020). There are multiple ways of describing this community, but this study uses the term LGBT+, because it covers every identification, as it is an abbriviation for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and others.
It was not until the 1990s that non-heteronormative sexuality, women’s rights, and gender equality became part of the public debate in Poland, following the transformation from communism to liberalism and capitalism (Buyantueva & Shevtsova, p. 270). As of the EU accession in 2004, non-discrimination rules towards sexual minorities have been mandatory, resulting in increasing focus on equality, social diversity, democratic rights and human rights (Buyantueva & Shevtsova, p. 271-275). Social, political and economic changes have normalized public discussions on these topics to a larger extent, along with minority rights (Buyantueva & Shevtsova, 2020, p. 272). However, discrimination still occurrs, both on an individual and collective level, and the previous prime minister and mayor of Warsaw, Lech Kaczynski, banned gay rights marches in Warsaw in 2004 and 2005 (ILGA Europe, 2020, p. 86-87; De Witte, 2019, p. 476; Renkin, 2009, p. 21). With the shift to the right-wing PiS party in 2015, this development continued, with LGBT+ community members being undermined (Buyantueva & Shevtsova, 2020, p. 271). Recently, more than 80 municipial or local governments porclaimed themselves to be “LGBT+ free zones”, after heavy anti-LGBT+ rhetoric by the government, and although same-sex sexual activity is legal, Polish law forbids same-sex marriage and registred partnership (ILGA Europe, 2020, p. 86-87; De Witte, 2019, p. 476). Poland also lacks regulations against discrimination and pro-equality regulations regarding sexual orientation and gender identity (Buyantueva & Shevtsova, 2020, p. 271).
The homonegativity in Poland is driven by the strong presence of religion in the political sphere, strong traditional beliefs and family values, as well as the right-wing national politics (De Witte, 2019, p. 476). From the beginning of the LGBT+ movement, visibility was a goal; LGBT+ activists aimed to distance themselves from the collective narratives in society, create visible identities, and interrupt the taboo concerning LGBT+ issues with a presence in the media and reclaiming space in the streets (Buyantueva & Shevtsova, 2020, p. 273). Poland recently criminalized “the promotion of underage sexual activity”, which by some is seen as a ban on sexual education, and instead introduced a curriculum surrounding traditional family values to “prepare for family life” (Gawlowski & Goclowski, 2019). These changes amplify the view of homosexuality as a social stigma and as a threat against the moral values
of the country, which only include heterosexual relationships (Isaacs, 2017, p. 230).
In Hungary, a government decree on legal gender recognition from 2018 has systematically been removed since it was introduced. The latest development was changing the definition of “sex” to “sex at birth” in the civil registry, making it almost impossible to change one’s legal sex, an amendment said to “protect children’s right to the gender identity they were born with” (ILGA Europe, 2020, p. 57; Hopkins, 2020; Kováts & Zacharenko, 2020). In 2019, the Pest County Consumer Protection Department issued a statement saying Coca Cola was “harming the physical, mental, emotional and moral development of children and minors” after including same-sex couples in a campaign (ILGA Europe, 2020, p. 57; Kaszás, 2019). According to the Eurobarometer, social acceptance of LGBT+ people has decreased in Hungary since 2015; one of few countries (ILGA Europe, 2020, p. 57). Same-sex partnerships are allowed in Hungary, however, same-sex marriage is still illegal (De Witte, 2019, p. 476). There, as in Poland, public attitudes on the issue are largely driven by religious views, and the school curriculum does not prioritize sexual diversity as a topic, however, it is not banned (De Witte, 2019, p. 476). These views are also based on the government’s emphasis on families as a means of reproduction (Béres-Deák, 2020, p. 55).
Framing
Framing is the act of constructing frames, and it is important to distinguish between the frame and the issue being framed (van Hulst & Yanow, 2014, p. 93; Lugosi, 2020, p. 217). The term framing refers to how a message can be perceived differently based on the way it is presented; how the opinions about a particular issue can be altered by what is highlighted and what is ignored (Iyengar, 2015, p. 267-268). One can imagine that it works by similar rules as a frame of a picture, which can also emphasize or de-emphasize particular parts of a photograph based on whether it includes the whole photograph or not, which section is included inside the frame, what color the frame is, the filter applied over the photography, or if all colors are similar except for one that stands out.
Two distinct types of framing effects have been identified by media researchers; “equivalency framing effects” and “emphasis framing effects” (Iyengar, 2015, p. 267-268). The two effects cover, respectively, using two logically equivalent terms for the same issue, or putting emphasis on specific parts of what could be relevant considerations (Iyengar, 2015, p. 267-268). Referring to abortion as murder is an example of an equivalence framing effect, whereas including only information about the positive or negative sides of abortion instead of a nuanced presentation is an example of an emphasis framing effect. The concept is often used by political leaders, by the media, in campaigns or social movements, and can include the use of symbols, metaphors, narratives, or emotionally and culturally charged words (Druckan, 2001, p. 226). What these have in common is that small changes in the presentation of information can result in large changes of opinion (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 104).
Nelson and Oxley (1999, p. 1041) distinguish between priming, agenda setting, and framing; more specifically, issue framing. They argue that priming and agenda setting can influence beliefs about the qualities and characteristics of information, and thus affect opinions, whereas issue frames additionally have the power to “affect
the importance individuals attach to particular beliefs” (Nelson & Oxley, 1999, p. 1040-1041). Priming is about highlighting specific aspects of a topic and neglecting others, which causes the primed knowledge to be closest in memory, and therefore more likely to affect opinions than unprimed, inaccessible knowledge (Nelson & Oxley, 1999, p. 1042). Issue frames, on the other hand, Nelson and Oxley argue, can affect opinions not by “belief change”, but by “belief importance”; by targeting the importance inhabitants assign to different beliefs (Nelson & Oxley, 1999, p. 1043). This makes frames an even more powerful tool for communicators seeking to define or construct a “correct” view of an issue, defining what an issue has to do with and what it has not (Nelson & Oxley, 1999, p. 1059).
Methodology
In this chapter I will present which methodological choices I have made and argue why they are useful to answering the research question. I will also reflect upon the quality of the research.
Research Design
Document Analysis To be able to say something about how politicians frame their messages to influence the population, it is necessary to have access to their statements regarding the specific themes in question. Document analysis provides the needed access, both when it comes to how messages are framed and to information regarding LGBT+ rights. Document analysis is a method consisting of reviewing and interpreting already existing documents that have not been collected explicitly for research purposes (Bowen, 2009, p. 27). In this case only written documents will be used. This method was chosen because of the large amount of media texts on the recent events regarding LGBT+ rights. I will analyze different quotes and speeches from these documents to find out how the rhetoric of the political leaders, specifically framing, is used to affect the population’s values, but also how political leaders can end up creating their own knowledge as an essential part of keeping control.
Data Collection and Analysis The media texts used to find quotes are from news sites, both national (Polish and Hungarian) and international, and party programs and constitutions, in an attempt to obtain nuances in the differences of media coverage. The chosen texts are in English, due to limited Polish and Hungarian language expertise, and this has affected the selection process which will be discussed later.
Before collecting the data, I decided which political leaders I wanted to look into for quotes. The choice was made based on an aim to include politicians with similar positions and thus approximately the same amount of influence in both countries, taking into account that the roles vary in the countries. Among Polish politicians I will analyze statements from the president Andrzej Duda (PiS); the leader of PiS, Jarosław Kaczyński; the Minister of Education and Science, Przemysław Czarnek (PiS); and the Minister of Foreign Affairs between 2015 and 2018, Witold Waszczykowski (PiS). The Hungarian politicians whose statements I will analyze are the prime minister and leader of Fidesz, Viktor Órban, and the Speaker of the Parliament, László Kövér (Fidesz). I have chosen fewer Hungarian politicians than Polish because the power is much more centralized in Hungary, and therefore Órban can be argued to have more power than Duda. Because president Duda has a smaller role in the public realm than prime minister Órban, the PiS leader in Poland, Jarosław Kaczyński, is a highly prominent figure in the Polish political landscape. A trait the chosen politicians have in common is that they are not religious leaders, as this would affect their views too obviously. Regardless, the majority of the mentioned politicians do not hide their religious beliefs.
While collecting data, I looked through the aforementioned places to find quotes on the LGBT+ topic. I specifically looked for terms such as value, family, gender ideology, Christian faith, and describing situations as “normal”, as these words often indicate a narrative in the LGBT+
topic. Already while doing this, the data went through a selection process, and one could therefore argue that the dataset I ended up with is only representative for the situations where framing is apparent, and that there could exist examples of these political leaders talking about the LGBT+ topic in a non-framing way. However, in the analysis, I will discuss why the underlying opinions in the governments will always shape their messages about the LGBT+ community, and why no knowledge can be neutral.
In order to analyze the data, I formulated questions I wanted to find answers to: What words are used to describe the LGBT+ community and related topics? Are perspectives deliberately left out? Which narratives are being created? I identified six main categories, which form the outline of the analysis, to describe the framing methods that are used in order to create a narrative and strengthen their own message.
Quality of Data
To assess the quality of the conclusions drawn from this research, we rely on the terms validity, reliability, and generalizability. Validity refers to the logical connection between the questions asked, the method chosen, and the conclusions we reach (Tjora, 2017, p. 231). In simple terms, high validity means that we are measuring the right concepts to answer the questions we ask. Low validity can be a result of problems with research design. Reliability, on the other hand, refers to the more random errors that can occur during a research process (Ringdal, 2014, p. 355). Both validity and reliability affects the generalizability of the research presented. Generalizability refers to the relevance the presented results can have to a broader perspective (Tjora, 2017, p. 231). Do these results speak for other cases than the one investigated? In the following, these dimensions of quality will be addressed.
Validity With the research question for this article being: In what ways do political leaders in Poland and Hungary use framing of knowledge as a means to affect the population’s values and attitudes about homosexuality?, the methodological choice of document analysis is suitable, as previously argued. The study also addresses judicial and media changes, which are not part of the research question at first glance, but increases the validity of the research as it is part of the system of getting the governments’ messages through to their inhabitants. The research question focuses on homosexuality, however the dataset is not as specific, and covers a broader range of subject within the topic of norms and values. This contributes to a decrease in specific validity, however strengthens the general validity on the topic of how political leaders are using the whole spectrum of political means in order to change the LGBT+ rights. The study is also widely based on previous research done on the topic which is introduced mainly in the introduction, and this also increases the study’s validity.
Reliability The article’s reliability is weakened due to the language barrier, as framing is to a large extent language based. One could say that the data being analyzed in order to find evidence of framing by the political leaders, could itself have been subject to framing from the media outlets presenting the quotes. However, placing a media outlet on the right-left spectrum is often easier even for a non-speaker of the original language, than understanding how translation has been used in the framing process. The quality of conclusions are therefore heavily affected by the language barrier.
As everything I have read in relation to this article has been translated, everything could be influenced by the translator’s political view. Additionally, the translation could have led to moderation, the language losing nuances, or a change in the meaning if there are words or phrases that exist in one language and not the other. The translation makes rhetoric difficult to analyze. I have therefore tried to focus more on the content, and included media articles from both national and international media outlets. This could help balance out the potential framing the translation has been subject to during the process. On the national websites, the translators have a broad knowledge of the language. One could therefore argue that they have a more advanced ability to translate the texts into English with the originally intended nuances or sayings, and thus, a broader reach in shaping the translation to portray their own political opinions. It is also important to remember that the majority of the Polish and Hungarian news broadcasters are state owned, financed by state-owned companies or have close ties to the ruling government (Żuk & Żuk , 2020, p. 1-2). The international news websites might be
heavily affected by the “common opinion” on the topic in the given country, city, social group, or media house. The presidential websites, party programs and constitutions are translated by authors with the same view as the speaker, and could therefore be seen as the ones with the least chance of external framing through translation.
Lack of contextual knowledge is also an obstacle in obtaining data, as I could miss out on metaphors, sayings, or underlying messages. Before starting the process of writing this case, my knowledge on the topic itself in these two countries was also limited to mostly headlines in international newspapers. This, together with my view on the LGBT+ rights as something that should be granted on the same basis as other human rights, have affected the search for information. However, I have of course worked hard on keeping a neutral, objective view by only including objective truths in the introduction, background, methodology and theory. In the analysis, my personal opinions will show more through, as it has been the aim to research ways in which framing is actually used by the politicians to steer the inhabitants’ view on LGBT+ into a more negative path. Four people have been working relatively closely on this article, which helps present multiple perspectives. However, the reliability is weakened by the fact that we are all from Norway, don’t know Polish or Hungarian, and are all students and females.
Generalizability The dataset is limited to quotes from certain politicians, which means it cannot account for Polish and Hungarian politicians in general. However, the topics that are mentioned most frequently and by multiple politicians and party programs and the constitution, could be argued to be representative of parties and in some cases the laws, not just the politicians themselves, shown for example with the emphasis on traditional family values. One could also discuss if the study is applicable to other countries with the same democratic development as Poland and Hungary, but this is less likely as there are many other factors affecting the rhetoric, such as religion, political standpoints, and political systems.
Analysis and Discussion
I will now go through the six main recurring themes I have found used for framing, using the politicians’ quotes as empirical basis, and discuss how these methods together constitute a framing that can heavily influence the inhabitants.
Negative Comparisons
The first method is comparing the LGBT+ community to other groups of people, which can be seen as a version of an equivalency framing effect (Iyengar, 2015, p. 267-268).
In Poland, the LGBT+ community is repeatedly referred to as an ideology, and compared to historical ideologies with negative connotations. For example, president Andrzej Duda said: “My parents’ generation for forty years fought to eliminate communist ideology from schools, so it couldn’t be forced on children. So youth, children, soldiers and youth organizations couldn’t be indoctrinated,” (Duda, 2020, as cited in Plucinska & Ptak, 2020). This was followed by: “They did not fight so that we would now accept that another ideology, even more destructive to man, would come along, an ideology which under the clichés of respect and tolerance hides deep intolerance” (Duda, 2020, as cited in BBC, 2020).
Przemysław Czarnek, the new Minister of Education, has compared homosexuality to the Nazis:
“There is no doubt that this entire LGBT ideology, which grew out of neo-Marxism, comes from the same root as German National Socialism, which is responsible for all the evils of World War II, the destruction of Warsaw and the murder of those who fought for our freedom in the Warsaw uprising. It’s of the same origin.” (Czarnek, 2020, as cited in Śmigiel, 2020).
In these statements, Duda and Czarnek make comparisons on an even more systemic and structural level, not only on an individual level about the members of the LGBT+ community. They compare it with “communist ideology” and as something rooted in “German National Socialism’’ respectively. By doing so, the LGBT+ community could end up being associated with a lot of gruesome historical moments and happenings that have nothing to do with the LGBT+ community, neither historically nor at present, such as the indoctrination mentioned by Duda, and the historical events mentioned by Czarnek. Duda calling the “ideology” “destructive to man”, respect and tolerance “clichés” and the LGBT+ community intolerant, could be seen as an example of an emphasis framing effect because he clearly leaves out every other perspectives than his own (Iyengar, 2015, p. 267-268).
In Hungary, there is specifically one example of this type of rhetoric that has received a lot of media attention. This is when the Hungarian House Speaker László Kövér stated that: “There is no difference morally in the behaviour of a paedophile and gays who want to adopt. In both of these cases, the child is an object, an item of luxury, the tool used for self-realisation and fulfilment.” (Kövér, 2019, as cited in Erdő-Bonyár, 2019). Prime Minister Viktor Órban hinted in a similar direction when he commented a children’s book which included minorities, both sexual and others, and said: “Hungary is tolerant and patient regarding homosexuality. But there is a red line that shouldn’t be crossed, and that is how I would like to sum up my opinion: leave our children alone.” (Orbán, 2020, as cited in MTI-Hungary Today, 2020).
Both statements portray an unwillingness to see homosexuality as only a sexual orientation, but rather as a characteristic defining a person’s
whole identity. Kövér brings in the term moral, which has a large role in the rhetoric of the analyzed politicians, and creates an impression that a gay person would adopt a child as an accessory, thus refusing to let the members of the LGBT+ community be part of the focus on families with children as an important part of the foundation and continuation of the country that he and other party members heavily emphasize. Órban on the other hand, implies that this gay identity necessarily includes having a sexual interest in children.
Whether it’s to pedophilia or historical ideologies - comparing homosexuality with other negativiely associated concepts frequently enough can eventually create a new “knowledge”, one in which being part of the LGBT+ community automatically decides your political beliefs and other values. This is particularly dramatic among groups of people that do not have any familiarity with the LGBT+ community themselves, and have a higher chance of adopting these comparisons.
“Us” vs. “Them”
Portraying a version of “us” very far from “them” in terms of common interests also seems to be a popular method, which as previously noted is a popular tool in populism. This method could also be seen as an example of an emphasis framing effect, while simultaneously as issue framing, because it targets the importance habitants assign to different beliefs (Iyengar, 2015, p. 267-268; Nelson & Oxley, 1999, p. 1043, 1059).
In Poland, Przemysław Czarnek left little between the lines regarding what he thinks about the LGBT+ community, saying the Polish society should: “(...) defend [themselves] against the LGBT ideology and stop listening to these moronic statements about human rights and all that equality nonsense. These people are inferior to normal people, and let’s finally end this discussion.” (Czarnek, 2020, as cited in Śmigiel, 2020). This statement could be dangerous on many levels, as Czarnek very clearly divides humans into superior and inferior groups of society, announces that the “inferior” LGBT+ community should be neglected and implying that non-heterosexuals are worth less. He is on the verge of classifying members of the LGBT+ community as disabled, which is alarmingly similar to how WHO defined
homosexuality until 1990, namely as a mental disorder (World Health Organization, 2017).
On May 18th, the day after the yearly International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia, Órban answered this when asked which message he wanted to send to homophobes and what actions the government would take to “ensure that in Hungary non-heterosexual couples can hold hands in public without fear?” (Orbán, 2015, as cited in Balogh, 2015; World Health Organization, 2017):
“Hungary is a serious country. It is fundamentally based on traditional values. Hungary is a tolerant nation. Tolerance, however, does not mean that we would apply the same rules for people whose lifestyle is different from our own. We differentiate between them and us. Tolerance means patience, tolerance means an ability to coexist, this is the basis of the Hungarian Constitution which clearly differentiates between a marital relationship between a man and a woman and other, different forms of cohabitation.” (Orbán, 2015 as cited in Balogh, 2015).
Órban does not hide the fact that he differentiates between “them” and “us”, and leaves no uncertainty as to who he considers to be within the circle of people he relates to. Even without mentioning the LGBT+ communities or individuals specifically, me makes it clear what he means. He continued saying:
“(...) I am grateful to the Hungarian homosexual community for not exhibiting provocative behavior (...). I believe that in Hungary, even though the constitution clearly differentiates between marriage and other forms of cohabitation, the people with lifestyles different from our own outlook on life are safe, they are given the respect of basic human dignity that they deserve. (...). This is good, this is how we can live together. If we (…) make more stringent regulations or the community of homosexuals starts being more provocative, I think that the current peaceful, calm equilibrium will be no more. No one would benefit from this. Everyone benefits from being able to coexist. I believe that as we now are, we can live together.” (Orbán, 2015 as cited in Balogh, 2015).
Here, again, he emphasizes the heterosexual relationship as the correct one, while simultaneously portraying the situation as peaceful. However, the recent law changes and the statements from the political leaders would argue differently. The legislative changes made, also explicitly go against his statement that they would not make “stringent regulations” (Orbán, 2015 as cited in Balogh, 2015).
By this method, a distance is formed between members of the LGBT+ community and those outside, a relationship something closer to enemies, rather than fellow human beings. A consequence of this rhetoric is removing the chances of being able to relate to people that are different than yourself - and even more problematic; people that might not be as different from yourself than you think.
Emphasizing Values
As mentioned in the introduction, both Polish and Hungarian political leaders frequently mention “traditional family values” as one of the most important aspects of their country (Lugosi, 2020). It is one of the most used bases of argumentation by these leaders in the explanation of what it means to be a Polish or Hungarian, and why that preferably means that you are in a heterosexual relationship. This repeated emphasis on one set of “correct” values can be seen as both a version of emphasis framing effect, as it is visibly one-sided, and as priming, because it highlights specific aspects of a topic and neglects others (Iyengar, 2015, p. 267-268; Nelson & Oxley, 1999, p. 1043, 1059).
Article 18 in the Polish constitution (1997) says that: “marriage, being a union of a man and a woman, as well as the family, motherhood and parenthood, shall be placed under the protection and care of the Republic of Poland.” This is the basis for the PiS Party Program (2014) which states:
“The concept of community refers to various social groups, but the most important of them are the family and the nation. We [PiS] consider the family, the foundation of which is the enduring union of a man and a woman, to be the fundamental structure of social life (...). In a family children are born, and thus is realized the fundamental condition for the perpetuation of humanity—the continuity of generations. It is precisely within the family that children are educated and prepared for participation in adult life. The family cannot be replaced—regardless of whether we look at it from the religious or secular perspective. Even in an entirely post-religious sense, it is the foundation of our civilization in its monogamous and enduring form.”
From Jarosław Kaczyński’s point of view, the constitution therefore does not cover all families when he announces that “we invest and shall invest in the family.” (Kaczyński, 2019, as cited in Żuk & Żuk, 2020, p. 1-2).
In the proposed constitutional referendum ques-
tions from 2018, question 11 from the government read: ”Are you for the strengthening of the position of the family, including the protection of fatherhood rights alongside motherhood rights, in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland?” (The official website of the President of the Republic of Poland, 2018). About the referendum, Duda announced that: “I would like to see (...) the state (...) become increasingly stronger, for the authorities to support families. I would like there to be more pro-family programmes (...) This is why I decided to carry through a consultative referendum on the constitution.” (Duda, 2018a). The former PiS Foreign Minister, Witold Waszczykowski, followed suit, claiming to know “what the majority of Poles represent – tradition, historical consciousness, patriotism, belief in God and a normal family between a man and a woman” (Waszczykowski, 2016, as cited in Bild, 2016). All of these statements portray an unwillingness to see the variety within the Polish population, and disregarding family as a broader term than a man and woman with potential children.
Similarly to Article 18 in the Polish constitution, Article L in the Hungarian constitution (2011, p. 6), within the section Foundation, states that: “Hungary shall protect the instaitution of marriage as the union of a man and a woman established by voluntary decision, and the family as the basis of the nation’s survival.” and “Hungary shall encourage the commitment to have children.” This is the basis for most of Fidesz’ politicians’ statements about homosexuality and family policies, as the constitution highlights the heterosexual relationship and gives a major importance to the family and children, and this does not include members of the LGBT+ community. This statement in the constitution tells what the Hungarian political leaders want their inhabitants to be like, while László Kövér has given information as to how a normal homosexual should be: “a normal homosexual knows the order of life, that this is how she/he was born and this is what she/he became. A normal homosexual tries to adapt to society and does not consider herself/himself equal.” (Kövér, 2019, as cited in Erdő-Bonyár, 2019) Kövér claiming to know what a “normal homosexual” is, and even just insinuating that it is abnormal to want to consider yourself equal, is very degrading for those whose sexual orientation differ from the one portrayed as the true one by the government.
The government’s opinions on the LGBT+ community doesn’t limit itself to the homosexuals, they have also made a new law changing the registered meaning of “sex”, gender, to “sex at birth”, with the government announcing that:
“The sex entered into the civil registry is based on facts determined by doctors, declared by the registry. (...). However, the sex declared by the registry could create rights or obligations, and therefore it is necessary to define the term of birth sex. Given that completely changing one’s biological sex is impossible, it is necessary to lay it down in law that it cannot be changed in the civil registry either.” (Botha, 2020)
As a result, the government has made their own definition of sex legally binding, leaving no room for individual experiences as to what oneself feels like. This law change is immense, making legal gender recognition when changing sex in Hungary impossible.
With the Polish and Hungarian governments only representing one type of family, a man and a woman ultimately together to create children, many of the countries’ inhabitants are neglected and are not able to benefit from the dedicated children’s programs, as they are not allowed to adopt. These values are also portrayed and emphasized through statements. When this one set of values, portrayed as the true Polish and Hungarian, is repeated enough times, this primed knowledge will always be the closest in memory.
Loaded Words
The method of using loaded words is largely linked to the previous topic; traditional family values, and also the negative comparisons. This method is an example of an equivalence framing effect, not necessarily comparing the LGBT+ community to other groups like the first method, but rather steering associations to negative concepts (Iyengar, 2015, p. 267-268). Because it affects a wider topic than agenda setting - it considers important values and beliefs important to the inhabitants, it could also be seen as an issue frame (Nelson & Oxley, 1999, p. 1043, 1059).
In Poland, this happens when Jarosław Kaczyński continues a statement about protecting families with:
“However, we have a great problem, a threat. This threat is an attack on the family. This is essentially an attack on children. (...). Very early sexualisation of children is in its centre. (...) This is to begin in children aged between zero and four years. The natural identities of boys and girls are to be questioned at all times. The whole mechanism of preparing children for the future roles of mother and father is to be destroyed. (...). We shall say ‘no’ to the attack on children.” (Kaczyński, 2019, as cited in Żuk & Żuk, 2020, p. 1-2)
In this statement, Kaczyński is drawing a line of equivalency between being a homosexual and being a “threat”, an “attack on the family” and an “attack on the children”. It is also made clear that to be considered within this type of “family” that needs to be protected, the family needs to be of the traditional sort. He is also comparing knowledge about LGBT+ topics to “very early sexualisation of children”, and denouncing the feeling of being born in the wrong gender as something pushed on children by adults, saying that “The natural identities of boys and girls are to be questioned at all times”. Calling sexual education an “attack on children” is dramatic.
Przemysław Czarnek also used strong words when he announced this: “Let us protect the traditional family model from such corrupt, depraved, and absolutely immoral behavior” (Czarnek, 2020, as cited in Śmigiel, 2020). By saying this, he implies that anything outside the traditional family model is “immoral behaviour”, as well as “corrupt” and “depraved”. Again, the word “protect” is used about the traditional family, creating this innocent sphere around the Christian traditional family values that are under attack. His emphasis on making children as the goal of having family continues when he stated that: “For God’s sake, it doesn’t take scientific evidence to know that a homosexual relationship can only result in kidney stones, not children.” (Czarnek, 2020, as cited in Śmigiel, 2020). The fact that they are including children to such a large extent in their rhetoric is also interesting, as this is a vulnerable group most people have sympathy for. In the PiS Party Program (2014), the “demographic crisis” is presented as a “danger”, “a process that weakens” Poland, “ which is strengthened by the depopulation of Poland (...)” This continues their rhetoric about the childrearing family as one of the most important foundations of Poland, the only thing that can save them from this “crisis”. However, they identify more reasons, such as:
”There are also cultural causes. One must only look at Hungary in order to confirm this thesis. A lack of a sense of one’s own value, the value of one’s culture, can be a factor that determines the strength of these negative processes. (...) It is worthwhile for the Polish family to continue to exist and grow [,] (...) to defend against threats to our liberty. We can achieve this if we overcome the demographic crisis, the crisis of the family, the crisis of parenthood (...)” (PiS Party Program, 2014).
Linking values, both those of oneself and of one’s own culture, to the necessity of birth givings, and multiple crises, the demographic of the family and of parenthood, continues their narrative that everything outside the traditional family model is a threat that needs to be demolished for the sake of the country. It is also interesting that they mention Hungary, implying they have lost their sense of their own value, which Órban actually
agrees with, and therefore introduced a “cultural war” in 2018 to improve the situation, which I will discuss in the last paragraph in the analysis (Hopkins, 2019).
The PiS party program (2014) continues to explain more threats to the Polish family, and therefore towards the country’s moral and values with:
“The spread of the ideology of gender is threatening for families and parents in Poland. (...). Setting up barriers against the spread of gender ideology is important. More important, though, are activities aimed at strengthening the family, defending parenthood, in particular the role of the mother and respect for motherhood, which ought to be treated not as a burden, but as a distinction and a privilege. Fatherhood should also be elevated to a higher rank, and the role of multi-child families must be underlined. Only by undertaking all these efforts together will we change the current unfavorable situation.”
Here the PiS party is saying in literal terms that they want to set up “barriers against the spread of gender ideology”, creating a picture of a disease such as AIDS. Furthermore, LGBT+ rights removal is here called “activities aimed at strengthening the family”. The party seemingly sees it as their responsibility to “defend” mother- and fatherhood and elevating these roles, together with multi-child families, to a higher rank. Their emphasis on the “demographic crisis” and the glorification of the multi-child family could for some make it sound logical to let homosexual parents adopt children as well, also allowing them to take part of this holy parenthood. However, that is not part of this party program. This is a paradox, but it manifests the large role of religion in the culture, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Remembering the highly emphasized importance of the traditional family values in Hungary from the previous method, Órban is also using strong rhetoric when he says that:
“(...) the family has been transformed into an optional, fluid form of cohabitation; the nation, national identity and national pride are seen as negative and obsolete notions; and the state no longer guarantees security in Europe. In fact, in liberal Europe being European means nothing at all: it has no direction, and it is simply devoid of content.” (Tuşnad & Órban, 2018)
Here, Órban is deliberately calling a family without a mom and a dad a “fluid form of cohabitation”, which in a country where family is repeatedly told to be the basis of the nation, is parallel to denouncing homosexual partnerships to something trivial, something that has no room in a family based nation.
This method is in many ways the method in which the framing becomes the most obvious, because the chosen words, such as “threats”, “attacks”, “barriers”, “crisis”, “depraved”, “fluid form of cohabitation” and “immoral” set up against “respect”, “motherhood” and “protect”, have such strong associations and connotations.
Órban is deliberately calling a family without a mom and a dad a “fluid form of cohabitation”, which in a country where family is repeatedly told to be the basis of the nation, is parallel to denouncing homosexual partnerships to something trivial, something that has no room in a family based nation.
Religious Argumentation
Both countries show examples of creating bonds between religion and politics, which to a large extent defines the countries’ rhetoric about the LGBT+ community. This method can be seen as an issue frame, because it is so deeply rooted in the community, so that when politicians frame it to support their message, it affects the viewers beliefs (Nelson & Oxley, 1999, p. 1043, 1059).
In Poland, Przemysław Czarnek announced, using both religion and the portrayal of people with different opinions as enemies as part of his rhetoric, that:
“Instead of having children at 20-25, they’re giving birth at 30. When you give birth to your first child at 30, how many of them can you still have? These are the consequences of convincing a woman that she doesn’t have to do what God has called her to do.” (Czarnek, 2020, as cited in Śmigiel, 2020)
By asking this question and giving this answer, Czarnek implies that there is one correct way to live life as a Polish woman, and that is one aligned with the wishes of God.
In 2018, the government suggested strengthening the worth of Christian heritage, with question four in the government’s proposed constitutional referendum reading: “Are you for the inclusion in the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of a reference to Poland’s and Europe’s over thousand-year Christian heritage as an important source of our traditions, culture and national identity?” (The official website of the President of the Republic of Poland, 2018). Here, the Christian heritage is declared to be the basis for Polish traditions, culture and national identity. This is true in many ways, but if the government portrays this as the only way to be part of the Polish “true” society, then many Poles will not feel at home in their own country with these leaders. The same is done by Jarosław Kaczyński (2015) when he says that: “We do not hide the fact that it is necessary to base the constitution on the system of values that is the only one known, present, and binding through Polish society. The repository of this system of values is above all the Catholic Church. This is a system that appeals to Christianity and to the national tradition. (...). In the system that I’m talking about, there is nothing that would be unacceptable to a nonbeliever, unless he is a personal enemy of the Lord God. There are people like that in Poland, but they are a minority.”
Kaczyński here deliberately announces that the Catholic church is the only “value (...) known, present, and binding through Polish society”, and is therefore what the constitution should be based on. He realizes that “There are people like that in Poland”, that could disagree with his proposed system, however, he says that these are not nonbelievers, but “personal enemies of the Lord God”, which is interesting as he insinuates there is a spectrum of atheism deciding whether or not they will agree with the system. It is easy to assume that Kaczyński considers the LGBT+ rights protectors as “personal enemies of the Lord God”. He is also, by using “us vs. them” rhetoric, implying that these people, this “minority”, “they” are unimportant to consider.
In the PiS Party Program (2014), this one and only “binding” value throughout the Polish society, Christianity, is again largely linked to identity:
“(...) We do not treat belonging to the Polish nation as a value just because it was given by birth and cultural inheritance, but also because it results from a characteristic of our tradition. It is related in an inextricable way with Christianity and has an exceptionally strong connection to freedom and equality. (...) The teachings of the Catholic Church, Polish tradition, and Polish patriotism are tightly bound together, forming the political identity of the nation.”
With this statement, the PiS party is leaving little room for other religious beliefs than the Christian if one wants to consider themselves Polish, nor to be a Christian with other opinions than theirs.
The PiS party program (2014) continues, linking the religion to the right way to be a family:
“(...) The correspondence between the teachings of the Catholic Church and the national tradition is clearly evident with regards to the family. Polish tradition always treated the family as particularly valuable, and in the period when we lacked independence, the family was very often the foundation of national identity. In contemporary research the family is treated, as a rule, as something particularly valuable, as a means to an ever fuller self-realization in the history of our humanity.”
The party program talks about the Catholic Church, national identity and family to such an extent that the terms almost appear interchangeably. The PiS party program (2014) makes no room for misunderstandings about how important the church is for the Polish Society:
“To this day, the Church sustains and proclaims moral teachings that are universally recognized in Poland. There is no competition in the wider society, so it is entirely correct to say that in Poland the moral teachings of the Church are opposed only by nihilism. For these reasons, the unique status of the Catholic Church in our national and state life is extraordinarily important. We want to maintain it, and we believe that attempts to destroy the Church, and unfair attacks on the Church, are threats to the form of our social life.”
Here, the government’s view on which values are the correct ones are clearly visible, claiming that the Church can present “moral teachings that are universally recognized in Poland”, ultimately leaving much out of the picture - even calling everything not aligned with this view “nihilism”. This can also be assumed to have played a large role in the removal of sexual education in schools, as that is viewed as one of the “threats to the form of our social life”, and the inclusion of a curriculum surrounding traditional family values to “prepare for family life” is a way of “maintaining” the “unique status of the Catholic Church” (Gawlowski & Goclowski, 2019).
The preamble for the Hungarian constitution (2011, p. 3) highlights the position of the religion:
“We recognise the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood. We value the various religious traditions of our country. We hold that the family and the nation constitute the principal framework of our coexistence, and that our fundamental cohesive values are fidelity, faith and love.”
Hungarian politicians thus have the constitution to rely on when using religion to argue for restricting what they see as threats against this “nationhood” and family, namely LGBT+ rights.
In both countries, the large use of religion in their rhetoric seems to be an important way in which they shape the opinion of religious inhabitants. Goździak and Márton(2018, p. 132) argue that the Christian identity has been made use of for political gain, and that despite Hungary being one of the least religious countries in Europe, Fidesz is strengthening its Christian-nationalist profile in an effort to attract young, educated professionals who consider Christianity as a core part of their identity. The strong “us vs. them” rhetoric, shown for example by Kaczyński and in the PiS party program, can, however, also be assumed to be so strong it actually creates a “stronger” opposition, because no one wants their beliefs to be named “nihilism”.
Creating a Narrative by Using History
Politicians in both Poland and Hungary have introduced programs aiming for “renewal” or “improving” in these last years; essentially implying there has been a decay in morals, values and national identity in their countries, and that one has to look back to history to restore the national identity. This undermines all improvement in human rights and the valuation of LGBT+ rights. This is largely linked to national pride, moral renewal and institutional changes - all of which are used as arguments to remove equal rights. This method can be seen as a form of emphasis framing effect and issue framing, because it highlights only one way to view the historical events they refer to, and aims towards beliefs (Iyengar, 2015, p. 267-268; Nelson & Oxley, 1999, p. 1043, 1059).
Examples of politicians talking about a need for an improvement of the nation by introducing “new cultural values” as a reason for institutional reforms are seen in both Poland and Hungary. In Poland an example appeared during a speech in 2015 for the electoral college, when Jarosław Kaczyński (2015) announced that:
“(...) We want to improve Poland to enable our entire nation to make use of its full potential, so that we can move forward and eliminate the divisions between us and our western neighbors. Our ultimate goal is a strong and successful Poland! (...) Such a change will bring a number of institutional reforms. (...).”
It is interesting to notice that Kaczyński aims to “eliminate the divisions between us [Poland] and our western neighbors” with “a number of institutional reforms”. The institutional, legislative and educational changes that have occurred until now, regarding the judges, the media, the sexual education, LGBT+ rights, abortion and the state of the church, in reality is pushing Poland further away from their “western neighbors”. Continuing the statement, Kaczyński (2015) uses history of pride as a call to fight: “We must unite as a nation. (...). Unity means also a strong identity with the nation, as well as confidence and pride in being Polish. Our pride has been degraded for over 20 years; we were taught to be ashamed (...). We can and we will stand up against this phenomenon in Poland, by changing our education programs and introducing new cultural values (...).”
Kaczyński speaks very highly about the need to unify through a strong identity, however, the aforementioned statements have made it clear which identity is seen as the “correct” one. The highlighting of a “degraded” pride and confidence in being Polish, appears as an act of “proposition” to the people; giving them a problem and saying the speakers have the solution to make it better. This loss of confidence and pride in being Polish, they say, can only be elevated again if traditional family values are taught in school and new cultural values are introduced - however, it is reasonable to assume that the “new” cultural values will actually be remarkably similar to those of traditional Catholic values seen centuries ago. About the changing of education program Kaczyński (2015) says that:
“Major changes are required in education – we need to raise our behavioral standards; we need to instill the essential sense of identity. We cannot succeed without our identity and we learnt that from other countries’ experience. Those that succeeded have built strong unity, whereas our unity has been consistently destroyed over the last 20 years. This is a valid issue and we need a major change. (…) The role of schooling in the lives of citizens needs to change. This is the only way to our success.“
Kaczyński makes it clear that the change in curriculum was necessary in order to raise the “behavioral standards”, and that introducing teachings about the traditional family values will help “instill the essential sense of identity”. When Andrzej Duda talks about changing Poland, he emphasizes values, saying that:
“Values are deeply rooted in our common cultural heritage. (...) Let me advance a thesis that out of three foundations of the European identity: Greek philosophy and its concept of democracy, the Roman sense of law, and the Judeo-Christian ethics, in today’s political discourse, we refer the least to our spiritual and ethical roots. (...) Without the debate about the common values, there will be no united Europe. Europe which is connected only by law and institutions, without the base of values and morality, is easy to manipulate and open to conflicts of interests. (...) The return to values is also the basis for regaining society’s trust in European integration. EU citizens must be again confident that European institutions fulfill their needs. (...)” (Duda, 2018b).
Here, Duda is talking about Europe as a whole, however, the actual political changes made these last years as part of the “return to values” can seem to mostly align with Hungary.
The Hungarian Constitution (2011) states that:
“We hold that after the decades of the twentieth century which led to a state of moral decay, we have an abiding need for spiritual and intellectual renewal. We trust in a jointly-shaped future and the commitment of younger generations. We believe that our children and grandchildren will make Hungary great again with their talent, persistence and moral strength.”
It is reasonable to assume that the rise of equal rights are part of the reasons for the “moral decay”, and the removal of these therefore a part of the “need for spiritual and intellectual renewal”. Here, again, children are included; both as something that gives hope, but also to underscore that the birth of these – in other words, the relationship between a man and a woman – is highly necessary in order to combat this “moral decay”. Because of this “renewal”, Órban has started a cultural war, arguing that:
“An era is a special and characteristic cultural reality...a spiritual order, a kind of prevailing mood, perhaps even taste — a form of attitude...determined by cultural trends, collective beliefs and social customs (...) This is now the task we are faced with: we must embed the political system in a cultural era.” (Hopkins, 2019)
Órban thus uses this need for a new “cultural era” as an argument to change the political system, which one can easily agree that he has done.
This method of creating a narrative about how there has been a “moral decay” that needs to be solved can help politicians in both countries to send out a message about a need for urgency for their own politics.
Conclusion
Politicians in Poland and Hungary frame knowledge using many different methods. While analyzing the data, I found out that most of the quotes included cases of multiple categories. However, the most noticeable one that appeared most frequently was the portrayal of family as only one combination; as a union between a man and a woman, and the noticeable emphasis on how vital this value is for the foundation and continuation of both Poland and Hungary. What stands out from the dataset is that the studied politicians seem to be vividly aware of the fact that by packaging their ideology in a specific way, they can create a mental framework, spreading their vision of the world and mobilizing certain groups of the society (Żuk & Żuk, 2020, p. 2; Gbadegesin & Onanuga, 2018, p. 121-130). This study concludes with the fact that knowledge is not objective, and that the framing of it can affect its implications.
In further studies it would be interesting to look closer at the correlation between democratic backsliding and framing tendencies among politicians. Poland and Hungary are only two examples, and they are also widely affected by their Eastern European status and culture. Other countries who experience democratic backsliding might be affected by another culture and other religions and it would have been interesting to see if the same framing methods are still used. One can assume that they are to some extent, but at the same time Poland and Hungary might feel a stronger need to protect themselves from the Western developments in comparison to countries who are more geographically distanced to Western Europe.
