Beyond the Core Conflict: New Minorities, New Confrontations & New Policies Final Report of the Work Package 5 of the Research Project International Civil Society Forum on Conflicts (infocon) A Research Financed by the European Union under the Seventh Framework Programme
Researcher: Nathalie Perrin Promotor: Marco Martiniello
Center for Ethnic and Migration Studies (cedem – http://www.cedem.ulg.ac.be)
2010
Grant Agreement number: 210615 Project acronym: INFOCON Project title: International Civil Society Forum on Conflicts Funding Scheme: Research for the Benefit of Specific Groups Research for Civil Society Organisations Name, title and organisation of the scientific representative of the project’s coordinator: Stephan K AMPELMANN Secretary-General / Project Manager Stichting Internationalist Review po box 75 brussels 1040 belgium + 32-(0)‒26–08–24–11 stephan@internationalistfoundation.com www.infocon-project.org
Disclaimer 1 The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7 / 2007–2011) under grant agreement Nr. 210615. Disclaimer 2 The views expressed in this document are purely those of the authors and may not in any circumstance be regarded as stating the official position of all partners in the INFOCON consortium.
Table of Contents 1. Introduction · 5 2. Conceptual framework · 7 2.1. Transnationalism · 7 2.2. Ethnic Conflict · 8 2.3. Political Mobilization · 9 3. Methodology · 13 3.1. In-Depth Interviews with Representatives of Migrant Associations · 13 3.2. Focus Groups with Leaders of Migrant Organizations · 14 3.3. In-Depth Interviews with Civil Servants and Politicians with a Foreign Background · 16 4. Transportation of the ‘core conflicts’ in the host city · 19 4.1. Definition of ‘Transported Conflict’ · 19 4.2. Information on the Cities · 20 4.2.1. Berlin · 21 4.2.2. London · 21 4.2.3. Randstad · 22 4.2.4. Brussels · 23 4.3. Conflicting Situation between the Conflict-Related Communities · 25 4.3.1. Are Tensions Perceptible in the City? · 25 4.3.2. In What Way Are the Transported Conflicts Being Expressed? · 27 4.3.3. Are There Some Identifiable Tension Spikes? · 29 4.3.4. Who are the main targets of the more violent acts? · 29 5. Means of transportation and perpetuation of the conflicts in the host city · 33 5.1. Massive Flows of Refugees · 33 5.2. Democratic Opportunities and Development of Communication Tools · 34 5.3. Intervention of Homeland Political Authorities · 35 5.4. Lack of Perspective in the Host Country · 36 5.5. Narratives of Ethnic Leaders · 37 3 | Beyond the Core Conflict
6. Relationships between migrant organizations and political authorities in the context of transported conflicts · 39 6.1. Mitigation of the Transported Conflicts · 39 6.1.1. Initiatives of the Migrant Organizations · 39 6.1.2. Initiatives of the Belgian Political Authorities · 41 6.2. Evolution of the Belgian foreign and development policy · 43 6.2.1. Initiatives of the migrant organizations · 43 6.2.2. Initiatives of the Belgian Political Authorities · 44 7. Impact on the integration process · 47 7.1. Self-perception of the Respondents · 47 7.2. Objectification According to Three Major Stakes · 50 8. Conclusion · 55 References · 57
1. Introduction
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n a more and more globalized world, conflicts formerly confined in specific territories seem to become dispersed and delocalized. Consequently, they affect more or less sharply the migrants who have often fled these conflicts, what can result in tensions and confrontations between foreign communities in their host societies. These foreign communities can be not passive and try to play a role in the mitigation and the solving of the transported conflict as in the conflict occurring in their country of origin. We focus our work in this report on the three ‘core conflicts’ of the infocon (Involving Transnational Communities – Civil Society Forum on Conflicts) project: the Hutu/Tutsi conflict in the Great Lakes Region, the Kosovo conflict and the Kurdish conflict. In consequence our work will concern more especially six communities: the Turkish, Kurdish, Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo Serbian, Hutu and Tutsi communities (these last two will often be divided according to the migrants’ country of origin). Always in accordance with the infocon project, we have built our research on the transnational political activities conducted by some migrant organizations. The objective of the work package five is to assess how conflicts in countries of origin are transported into the countries of settlement and examine the responses of authorities and migrant organizations in the country of settlement to these imported confrontations. To answer these questions, this report is structured in six parts. Before to explain our methodology, we will highlight the ‘state of the research’ of three important concepts in our framework: transnationalism, ethnic conflict and political mobilisation. Thirdly, we will see if the core conflicts have been transported into the city of settlement of the communities and to which extent. Then, we will examine the means of transportation and perpetuation of the transported conflicts. Fifthly, we will examine the responses developed by the political authorities by migrant organizations to mitigate the conflict. In this part consecrated to the relationships that political authorities and migrant organizations sustained, we will also see how the communities try to influence the foreign policy of their receiving country so that their interests are served. Finally, we will examine how homeland oriented political activities and transported conflicts affect the communities’ process of integration in the country of settlement. In this report, we focus on Brussels. This choice is mainly due to two reasons. First, the Belgian capital is also the capital of the European Union and attracts in this way not only many foreigners but also many migrant organizations and federations who try to influence the European institutions. Second, Belgium, because of its reforms of the Code of Nationality, is one of the most liberal countries on nationality acquisition (Perrin et al. 2008). Consequently many people with a foreign origin are now on electoral lists and some of them are already at different levels of power in Belgium. But we will often make detours in order to highlight the situation in Berlin, London and in the Randstad region. Before to get to the very heart of our subject, we want to draw the reader’s attention on three important questions of vocabulary in the framework of this research report. Firstly, we will talk about ‘immigrant communities’ and not about ‘transnational communities’. Indeed we consider that no foreign community is by essence transnational, nor the individuals which composed it (Martiniello and Bousetta 2008). Secondly, the term ‘community’ has to be understood in the meaning Faist has given to it: “Communities constitute the cement that integrates the members 5 | Beyond the Core Conflict
of concrete communities into values of trust, reciprocity, loyalty, and solidarity, bounded by rights and obligations of members toward each other. Rights and duties delimit the boundaries of communities, which may rest on diverse mechanisms such as kinship lineage, shared knowledge and values, belief in common institutions, or religious” (Faist 2006: 6). However if we will talk about the ‘Turkish community’ or the ‘Albanian community’ as a whole we are aware of all the dividing lines that also shape these groups. Thirdly, we will often use the expression “conflict-related communities” to refer to the two communities opposed in their country of origin and in their cities of settlement.
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2. Conceptual framework
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efore to get to the very heart of the matter, it seems important to define three concepts really useful for our analysis. These three concepts are: transnationalism, ethnic conflict and political mobilization. This review of the scientific literature will help us to define the framework in which our reflections will take place. 2.1. Transnationalism The theoretical literature about transnationalism has considerably developed since the beginning of the nineties, and more especially in the Anglo-Saxon world. The various social sciences disciplines as anthropology, sociology or political science have appropriated this concept, highlighting so its various facets. In Europe, and more especially in the French-speaking world, scientific research on this issue is more recent and still less numerous (Martiniello and Bousetta 2008). Contrary to a for long time conveyed idea, transnationalism is not a novel phenomenon but it represents a novel perspective, to paraphrase Portes (2003: 874). Formulated at the beginning by historians, this critic is nowadays largely accepted by scholars of different disciplines (Glick Schiller 1999; Lafleur 2005; Lucassen and Lucassen 1997). Indeed, the occasional returns to, and contacts with, the country of origin already occurred in the past. However these contacts lacked regularity and did not favour the creation of new links and relationships in the home country. Very few migrants were simultaneously active in the country of origin and in the host country. Without any doubt the technological progresses of these last decades have contributed to the intensification of the contacts with the homeland and with the compatriots settled all over the world. The development of the communication tools and media has also reinforced this feeling of connection. For all these reasons the migrant groups can nowadays be differentiated from their predecessors (Van Der Veer 2002). Moreover the multiplicity of the links with the country of origin is considered more positively than before. If we take for example political transnationalism, the double nationality is nowadays more and more valued. This allows migrants to combine different statutes and affiliations, increasing in that way their opportunities without reservations are expressed about their loyalty and their allegiance to the countries with which they are so linked (Lafleur 2005). If it will be a mistake to resume the transnationalism to a consequence of the globalization process, it can nevertheless be considered as one of its multiple facets. In this “global village” to paraphrase McLuhan (McLuhan 1964, 2003: 6), migrants play an important role through their loyalty, their solidarity and their commitment towards their country of origin. Appadurai (1990) as Guarnizo and Smith (1998) through which they call transnationalism “from below” have highlighted the power of migrants to shape new social spaces thanks to their transnational practices. Other scholars have pointed out the fact that the states, through their legislative and judicial prerogatives, remain key players in the definition of the public sphere and as object of political actions for the migrants (Joppke 1998). In the framework of this research, two debates, which are widely discussed in the scientific literature, merit further consideration. The first one is about the consequences of transnational practices on the migrant communities. Their core question is: do the transnational practices shape 7 | Beyond the Core Conflict
the migrant communities or are the transnational practices the expression of an individualization of the migrants’ lifestyle? For Faist (Faist 2000: 197), the transnational social spaces require the creation of a new type of ethnic community he calls “community without propinquity”. At the opposite, Portes (2001) focuses on the individuals and families who use their relational, economic and cultural resources in their strategies of individual or community fulfilment. The other debate is about the relationship between transnationalism and assimilation. The two positions can be resumed as followed: the first one considers transnationalism as the opposite of assimilation while the second sees these two options as compatible. The traditional meaning of assimilation lead to the absorption and has normative connotation (Brubacker 2001). In this view, the maintenance of social links with the country of origin threats the expected outcomes and appears deeply contradictory. Other scholars question this binary opposition between assimilation and transnationalism. The Chicago School of Sociology considers the transnational practices as a transitory phase that the migrants undergo in their way to the assimilation. As they consider them as a transitory phase they remove the contradiction between these practices and assimilation. According to Van Hear (1998), migrants develop and multiply loyalties, becoming functionally integrated in western countries while they continue in the same time their transnational practices. They can shape their identities, adapting to the needs of the system, while they resist to some of the constraints. In this view, the double nationality can offer original ways for opportunities and involvement, not only for the first generation but also for their descendants. A core issue is indeed on the durability and the perpetuation of these privileged links and practices in the new context of globalization. In the framework of this report we will use the definition given by Basch, Glick-Schiller and Szanton Blanc (1994: 7) who define transnationalism as “processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. We call these processes transnationalism to emphasize that many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders.” This definition points out three important elements in the understanding of the concept: (1) the links between the individuals and the nation-states are not exclusive but multiple, (2) the space in which the migrants live cannot be resumed to the country of origin and the country of settlement and (3) the transnational practices of migrants can concern all aspects of their life (Martiniello and Lafleur 2008: 649). 2.2. Ethnic Conflict The core conflicts that are the heart of this research are usually considered as ethnic. However the ethnic conflict remains a concept very difficult to define. A scholar as Horowitz who is known for the quality of his work on this issue has not given a clear definition of this concept. Varshney (2004: 86) points out the difficulty of a definition when he writes that “all conflicts based on ascriptive (birth-based) group identities, real or imagined—race, language, religion, tribe, or caste—can be called ethnic”. On his side Gurr (1994) prefers to speak about ethnopolitical conflict. To have a better understanding of what is an ethnic conflict it is useful to define first the terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘conflict’. Putnam and Pool give a rather wide definition of the conflict. For them, conflict refers to “the interaction of interdependent people who perceive opposition of goals, aims and values, and who see the other party as potentially interfering with the realization of these goals” (Putnam and Poole 1987: 552). The relation of interdependence also highlighted by Touraine (1993: 341) is primordial. Beyond the Core Conflict | 8
The concept of ethnicity is also widely discussed among scholars. In the framework of this research we consider ethnicity as “one of the major forms of social and political differentiation, on one side, and of structural inequalities in most of contemporary societies on the other side. It is based on the production and reproduction of social and political definitions of the physical, psychological and cultural differences between ethnic groups. These ones develop relationships of different kinds between them (cooperation, conflict, competition, domination, recognition).” (Martiniello 1995) This definition – which can be considered as representative of the constructivist school of thoughts – highlights some crucial elements that will reveal themselves as important in the framework of this research. At the opposite of the primordialists for whom “[e]thnic groups and nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological features and especially territorial location” (Grosby 1994: 168), this definition points out the fact that the ethnic identity is a social and political construction. It also highlights the structural inequalities, and by extent, the hierarchization that the ethnic definition implies in many societies. As many scholars (Brubacker 2005; Singer 1994) have pointed it out, the role of some elites in the (re)definition of the ethnic criteria and on the political mobilization on their basis is crucial. Ethnic affiliations do not necessarily fragment ethnically diverse societies but the context tends to influence how individuals organize and define themselves as well as how others regard them. In deeply divided societies, ethnic affiliations impact not only family and social life, but also more formal organizational life. This applies to both the realms of political and economic life (Horowitz 1985). Ethnic differences can generate ethnic conflict when these differences are used to promote prejudice and discrimination against a group that has been marked or stigmatized. Ethnicity may also be manipulated to gain economic and political power, and for stratifying societies or nationstates within the world system. Stratification usually involves exploitation of the less powerful groups. Like Hall (1991) and Waters (1995), Wahlbeck (1998) considers that the contemporary processes of globalisation and transnationalism do not reduce the importance of ethnicity but, at the opposite, they give it a new significance. For Moynihan (2002: 29), “the world was entering a period of ethnic conflict, following the relative stability of the cold war. This could be explained. As large formal structures broke up, and ideology lost its hold, people would revert to more primal identities. Conflict would arise based on these identities”. In the same line of thought Edward Azar (1990) argues for a radical revision of Clausewitz’s theories by claiming that it is the identity group and not the nation-states that were at the core of most contemporary conflicts. 2.3. Political Mobilization In its more simple acceptation, political mobilization aims to produce and maximize political resources that will amplify the groups’ influence in their environment (Barany 1998: 310). According to Alain Touraine (Touraine 1982), three conditions are necessary for a collective mobilisation. First, the actors have to develop a common/shared identity, with the same goals and the same interests. The group has to be firmly opposed to rival groups, that means that the group’s members have to stand together. Finally, the actors have to be conscious of the stakes and objectives of their actions. Zoltan Barany (1998: 310) has pointed out the four major means to measure the mobilization. According to him, we have to take into account (1) the active membership of the organizations, (2) the amount of resources, (3) the number of demonstrations organized and, (4) the number of programmes realised by the organizations’ managers. Many scholars (Koopmans and Statham 1999c; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam et al. 1996; Tarrow 9 | Beyond the Core Conflict
1996) have highlighted in their respective research the importance of the political opportunity structures in the processes of political mobilization and their efficiency. The case-studies led by Koopmans and Staham have, for example, shown how the discursive and institutional opportunities can explain the differential success of the extreme right in Germany and Italy (Koopmans and Statham 1999c). They have made an analogous analysis in relation to mobilization by migrants and more generally to political claim-making in the field of ethnic relations, citizenship and immigration (Koopmans and Statham 1999b, 1999a). In consequence, political-institutional aspects of the mobilizations’ context have to be taken in consideration in the analysis of political mobilization and claims-making. These aspects are more especially (1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, (2) the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a state and (3) the presence or absence of allied elites. Migrants’ organizations often play a crucial role in their political incorporation. Migrant organisations represent their members as a group and carry their specific claims (Bloemraad 2005; Martiniello 1992; Walker 1991). Moreover, through participation in organisational activities and decision-makings, they teach migrants skills necessary for political participation (Bloemraad 2005; Verba et al. 1995). In his work on the diasporas, Yossi Shain (2007: 130) has proposed an interesting typology of levels of mobilization within the diasporas. He recognizes three categories of members – core members, passive members, and silent members – he defines as follows: “Core members are the organizing elites, intensely active in diasporic affairs and in a position to appeal for mobilization of the larger diaspora. Passive members are likely to be available for mobilization when the active leadership calls upon them. Silent members are a larger pool of people who are generally uninvolved in diasporic affairs but who may mobilize in time of crisis”. Migrants’ political mobilization in host countries is usually based on a feeling of discrimination that the migrants perceive, with reason or not. They mobilize politically in order to improve their condition in their host society. But the migrants’ political mobilization can also be oriented to the homeland, as number examples demonstrate. The political mobilization of some diasporas is known and recognized for a long time. We can cite among others the political mobilization of the Jewish or the Irish diasporas. The ability to intervene on the conflicts occurring in the countries of origin is shaped by several factors of various natures. For Al-Ali et al (2001), these factors are: (1) economic as the employment status in the host country, the access to information or the access to banking facilities, (2) political as the level of political consciousness, the legal status (secure or not) and (3) social as the educational level, the availability of structures in their hometowns or the successful social integration in the host country (Al-Ali et al. 2001 quoted in: van West 2005: 61). For Rozemarijn van West (2005: 75) also, the degree of integration within the host society constitutes one of the key dimensions which will determine the capacity of the migrants to intervene on the events occurring in their country of origin as the efficiency of their actions. If the migrant lacks the right to work and/or faces routine hostility from the host society, he is less likely to be able to afford to send financial support home. The legal status of migrants or refugees is also crucial, because if they are illegal or awaiting residency status, they are in a weak position to organise support for others. A further influence is the existence and awareness of organisations dedicated to such activities. In the political mobilisation, some individual play a crucial role: the ethnic leaders. An ethnic leader is “a member of an ethnic community also belonging to the corresponding ethnic category who has the capacity to exercise deliberately a variable degree of influence on the behaviour and\ or the preferences of the members of the ethnic community, in the sense of the satisfaction of their Beyond the Core Conflict | 10
objective interests such as he perceives them. This influence, when it is effectively exercised, is it through the activity of the leader in one or some of the institutions and organizations which shape the ethnic community, thanks to which develop the relations with his followers, who are the other members of the ethnic community� (Martiniello 1992: 98)
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3. Methodology
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he core question of this research was not only to determine if we witness in some European cities to the transportation of the Kosovan, Kurdish and Hutu/Tutsi conflicts but also to determine if the tensions between the conflict-related communities have some consequences for them in term of integration in their host societies. Another important core question in the framework of this research was to determine how the political authorities respond to these conflicting situations. And, lastly, to see how the migrant communities try to influence the foreign and development policies of their host countries. To answer these questions, we have used different qualitative methodologies. Indeed the qualitative analysis allows to reconstruct the underlying reasoning, affective reasoning we could say, which presides over the emergence of the obvious themes. […] At the end of this analysis, what we find are parts of cultural models tallying with the global society and the various groups and subgroups. (Michelat 1975: 240).
3.1. In-Depth Interviews with Representatives of Migrant Associations During the work package two of the infocon project, 160 in-depth interviews were conducted in Berlin, Brussels, London and the Randstad Region. The interview grid1 used was divided in six items: • three based on more general information (respondents’ migration history, their involvement in their community of origin and their organizational strategies); • three with questions directly connected to the themes under study in the work packages 3, 4 and 5 of the infocon project. The table below gives information about the number of conducted interviews for each community in the four cities. Number of interviews by host cities and communities Host cities Berlin Brussels London Randstad Total
Turks/Kurds 20 20 15 19 74
Communities Serbs/Albanians Hutus/Tutsis 5 14 7 13 39
– 20 7 20 47
Total 25 54 29 52 160
These in-depth interviews constitute the main basis of our analytical work. The collected data are 1. The methodology of these in-depth interviews is developed in the deliverable one of the infocon project. If the interview grid is also available in the deliverable one we also reproduce the questions linked to the work package 5 in the annex of this report.
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about 1) the perception of a conflicting situation in the host cities, 2) the personal and organizational involvement in the transported conflicts and 3) the eventual consequences on the migrants’ integration in their host city. However, some important questions remained partly unanswered at the term of the first analysis of these interviews. More especially we needed more information about the relationships that the conflict-related communities’ organizations sustain or not with the political authorities to mitigate or to solve the transported conflicts. The other major lack of information was about the way their lobbying was perceived by the political authorities. In order to collect more relevant information and close these gaps we have decided: 1. to organize in Brussels four focus groups gathering together some leaders of migrant organizations;2 2. to conduct some more in-depths interviews with some politicians with a foreign background as with some state employees working in some institutions closely linked to the development or the integration ministries. 3.2. Focus Groups with Leaders of Migrant Organizations In order to optimize the contribution of the leaders of the migrant organizations, it seemed relevant to organize focus groups. This method presents several advantages. It allows to collect data in a short lapse of time and in the same time it highlights the various points of view of the participants on some themes previously defined by the researcher (Gibbs 1997). Crucially, a focus group “explores how accounts are articulated, censured, opposed and changed through social interaction and how this relates to peer communication and groups norms” (Barbour and Kitzinger 1999). Another plus-value of this method is that it allows us to take into consideration the various interactions between the participants: “the hallmark of a focus group is the explicit use of the group interaction to produce data and insights that would be less accessible without the interaction found in a group” (Morgan 1988). Focus groups can also produce new hypothesis for the continuation of the research. The scientific literature and the preliminary analysis of the previously conducted in-depth interviews have helped us to determine the most important items and sub-items to be tackled with the focus groups participants. The interview protocol has also been enriched by discussions we have had with some colleagues specialized on these issues. To be clear and keep maximum latitude, the interview protocol3 was based on two main themes: 1. conflict transportation and responses of the host society political authorities; 2. conflict transportation and responses of the civil society organizations. Both themes included one or two basic question(s) to launch the discussion with the participants. Some follow-up questions have been anticipated to reopen the debate or to redirect the discussion if the participants strayed too far from the subject. For the constitution of the groups, two approaches can be privileged: 1. to organize focus groups according to certain homogeneity (profession, social class, nationality) in order to favour one specific issue and to analyze it deeper; 2. Considering the difficulties we met, the idea to conduct focus groups in the other cities has been given up. 3. The interview protocol can be consulted in annex of this report.
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2. to organize focus groups according to the diversity of the participants in order to confront their experiences, ideas, points of view on specific issues. In the framework of this research, both approaches were used. Indeed it seemed important to organize a focus group for each community under examination. We wanted to confront the points of view of the conflict-related communities, to determine the main stumbling points as the themes for which they agree. On the other hand we thought that it would be interesting to invite representatives of all these communities at the same table in order to confront their experiences. As in any qualitative research the selection of the participants is very important. Focus groups were composed by more or less 12 persons, “a number which is large enough to encompass various points of view and yet small enough to allow all the participants to interact” (Corbetta 2003: 276) . In order to have an interesting debate in which all the points of view could be expressed, we have taken into account four criteria: • The leading position in the community of origin: we have invited only persons who have a significant influence on numerous members of their community of origin. This influence was mainly due to the importance of the organization they manage, their profession, their previous or actual occupation in their country of origin (for example political leaders). • The ethnic origin: we expected a fair sharing of representatives of the conflict-related communities for each focus group. This criterion was more or less respected, certain persons withdrawing in the last moment. It is important to notice that for the focus group on the Great Lakes Region we have not invited representatives of the Congolese community, the persons previously met having said that the Hutu-Tutsi sharing is irrelevant for the Congolese. • The sex of the participants: even if the organizations’ inventory made during the work package two has shown that few women manage at the present time migrant organizations in the communities under examination, it seemed relevant to have their point of view on these issues. • The city of settlement: many organizations are officially based in Brussels while their leaders are established in another region and organized many activities outside the Belgian capital. Wishing to stay focussed on Brussels we have invited persons living in Brussels when possible. For the ‘mixed’ focus group another criterion was logically added to the previous ones: the national/regional origin of the participants. We have contacted people in order to have four representatives for each core conflict, two persons for each conflict-related community. Lastly, we had to analyze the numerous data collected during these four focus groups. Given that a focus group is essentially based on discussions between participants as well as their interactions the sum of information is various. Thus the analysis work consisted of: • extract from the interviews the dominant trends, which are the assertions or propositions from which we can find a general consensus between participants; • highlight some reflections proposed and discussed by the participants. We expected that the propositions formulated by the participant grow rich each other and result in very interesting avenues to be explored.
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• highlight the various debates between the participants on some specific issues and to list the arguments put forward to defend the various opinions. Finally, these focus groups have given us a better understanding on (1) how and how far the tensions between the conflict-related communities affect the integration process of the members of these communities in their host societies and (2) how the communities and their representatives try to influence their host country’s foreign and development policy. 3.3. In-Depth Interviews with Civil Servants and Politicians with a Foreign Background After having organized the four focus groups we still felt the need to deepen some issues and to have the points of view of people integrated in the Belgian policy. We have thus met nine politicians with a foreign background, and more especially closely linked to three communities under examination (the Turkish, Congolese and Burundian ones) and seven civil servants employed in institutions linked to the Belgian integration or development ministries. We interviewed these persons in order to have a better understanding on: 1. how the communities under examination tried to have an impact on the Belgian development and foreign policies; 2. the concrete influence of the migrants’ lobbying. For these interviews, the method of in-depths interviews seemed relevant insofar as this research tackles very sensitive and little studied issues. Indeed the main advantage of this kind of interview is that it allows focusing the discussion around themes beforehand defined by the researcher and recorded in the interview grid4. Inside this set-up, people are free to answer. They have the possibility to express their feelings, to enrich their account of interesting anecdotes or to draw the researcher’s attention on specific information. This kind of interview also has the advantage not to hasten people being interviewed because they are not subjected to an ‘interrogation’. They remain free to direct the researchers to some topics, sometimes no predicted by the researcher, but relevant for the research or still to evade a question that would put them ill-at-ease. The in-depth interview thus brings bigger wealth and precision in the meditative information, due to the suggestive power of the predefined tackled issues and in the possibilities of relaunching and interaction between the interviewees and the interviewers. It allows collecting information that would have been impossible to collect by a directive interview within the framework of a questionnaire. In sum, this type of interview helps to reach from the speech of the interviewed persons which express their link with the social issue we ask them to speak about, by way of what is the most psychological in it, of most personal, most emotional, what is sociological, cultural. (Michelat 1975: 233)
To elaborate the interview grid that has led the conversation during these interviews, data previously collected during the in-depths interviews, focus groups and the scientific literature about political transnationalism were helpful. Taking into account that we met two different kind of people, the two interview grids used noticeably vary on their items. • Interview grid for the politicians with a foreign background focussed on three core issues: 4. The interview grid is in annex of the report.
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·· self-perception of the relationship between the conflict-related communities in Brussels; ·· involvement in initiatives to mitigate the transported conflicts; ·· is the transported conflict and/or the conflict occurring in his country of origin an important issue to attract votes of members of his community of origin? • Interview grid for civil servants were also based on three major items: ·· position of their institution or ministry concerning the transported conflicts; ·· involvement of their institution or ministry in some initiatives to mitigate the transported conflicts; ·· self-perception of the influence of the migrant organizations on the actions undertaken by their institution or ministry. The interview grid has been elaborated on the basis of the first results and the definition of the main issues. This one thus aimed at expressing the themes to be approached with the aim of intervening in a relevant way to bring the interviewee to deepen his thought or to investigate a new question about which he doesn’t speak spontaneously. (Albarello et al. 1995: 75)
The analysis work on these 16 interviews has mainly consisted to extract the dominant tendencies in the discourse of the respondents.
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4. Transportation of the ‘core conflicts’ in the host city
T
he six communities under examination in the infocon project originate in countries or regions where an ethnic conflict is or was occurring in a recent past. In the frame of this chapter we want to see if and in which extent the core conflicts have been transported into the host cities. We will also give an answer to a few questions: what are the ways of expression of these transported conflicts?, are there some identifiable spikes of violence and who are the main targets? But, before to get to the very heart of the matter, it is important to define, thanks to the underlying scientific literature, what we mean by the expression ‘transported conflict’. Secondly, on the basis of the case studies conducted during the work package 2, we will summarize the situation, in terms of size and organizational structure, of each migrant community in the different host cities. Given that Brussels is the city on which we will focus more especially in the following chapters we develop more in details the situation in the Belgian capital. 4.1. Definition of ‘Transported Conflict’ The role played by migrant in the resolution, mitigation or fuelling of homeland conflicts has been considerably studied these last years, and more especially in some researches dedicated to diverse diasporas as among others the Jewish, Tamil or Kurdish ones. According to many scholars (Cochrane 2007; Demmers 2002; Lyons 2004; Østergaard-Nielsen 2006), in parallel with the considerable increase of international migration flows the ‘diasporic component’ in contemporary conflict has also gain in importance. For Demmers (2005) four reasons can explain this evolution. Firstly she points out the rise of what she calls a “new pattern of conflict” mainly based on identity issues. Identity groups within states that are in conflict often lack international representation and therefore largely depend upon the migrants settled in other countries for external support. The rise of war refugees constitutes the second reason. If in the past soldiers took the biggest share of war related deaths the civilians are nowadays the primary victims in the numerous civil conflicts (Miall et al. 1998). In consequence many civilians flee their country and contribute to fast growth of the number of international migrants. Technological developments of communication and mobility tools are also highlights. Communication technologies and quick transportation modes make migrants increasingly capable of sustaining relations with their societies of origin. Fourthly Demmers points out the rise of racism in Western European countries and their more and more restrictive immigration and asylum policies. This has as consequences that migrants stay more likely focussed on their home countries and sustain close relationships with their countries of origin. However, if Sheffer (1994) has shown for the nineties that diasporas import sometimes conflicts in their host societies, the impact of the conflicts occurring in the countries of origin on the migrants in their host societies is very few studied. Only for a few years scholars as Demmers (2002), Féron (2010) or Bahar (2009) have highlighted the fact that more and more we witness to what they call a “delocalization”, “deterritorialization”, “re-localization” or “transportation” of conflicts. The transportation of ethnic conflicts and research on this issue have to be linked with the “new trend” that Scheffer (1995), Weiner (1986) and Safran (1991) call “diasporization” of ethnic and religious groups. According to Sheffer (1995), this diasporization is mainly due to (1) the increase 19 | Beyond the Core Conflict
of international migration flows and (2) the development of the communication tools “ which allows migrants to reach remote countries and then maintain contacts with their homelands” (Sheffer 1995: 401). In consequence the aforementioned scholars notice within more and more ethnic groups of migrants some constituent criteria of the diaspora, among which: (1) the preservation and development of a idiosyncratic identity; (2) the existence of a peculiar internal organization different from those of the home and host countries; (3) the conservation and\or the construction of strong relationships with the country of origin. The concept of ‘diaspora’ has thus been expanded to include ethnically defined groups such as Turks and Moroccans in Western European countries. As Féron (2010: 1) has pointed out, the transportation of conflict in host countries can refer to “two (possibly interrelated) types of situations”. The first one stages people opposing on an ethnic base in connection with the conflict occurring in the country of origin. The second one refers to a situation where the conflict-related activities (or at least perceived like that) of some migrants are sources of tensions within the host society and/or between the host and the home countries. While Cheran (2003) reminds us that the governments of industrialized countries often consider migration flows as a national security threat, the fact that migrants can bring the ‘homeland conflict’ is often seen by the political elites as an important threat for the social cohesion. Attacks of 11 September 2001 have without any doubt increased this fear and the link between security and migration is still more used, notably by the western governments (Pirkkalainen and Abdile 2009). To explain why ethnic groups transport the core conflicts into their host societies there are two kinds of explanations. The first type focuses on the context of the host countries. In this case scholars (Bukow and Llaryora 1988; Rosenthal 2009; Tschernokoshewa 1997) emphasize among others the structural discriminations. According to them segregation and relegation, which result of these discriminations, lead to a redefinition of the migrants in ethnic terms. With no hope in their host societies they find in the past and in their homeland the way to revalue them. Other scholars see the democratic tools of the host societies as the main factors thanks to which migrants can reinforce identification and mobilisation along ethnic lines (Al-Ali et al. 2001). The second kind of explanations finds its roots in the tensions occurring in some host societies in the countries of origin, and more especially in their social constellations. Researchers like Brieden (1996) who see in the country of origin the roots of the process of ethnicization in the country of settlement talk about “importation of conflicts”. For Hanrath (2010) these two kinds of explanations are not sufficient by themselves to explain why and how such ethnic tensions occur in host societies. For him “endogenous factors” and the “exogenous factors” are complementary and have to be taken into consideration for a better understanding of the process of transportation of conflicts. 4.2. Information on the Cities This section presents an overview of the conflict-related communities settlement in Berlin, Brussels, London and Randstad as well as their organization in the aforementioned cities. Indeed the extent of the communities has a major impact on the expression of conflicting feelings as well as the visibility of the eventual conflicts. This exercise is not so easy. Firstly, the statistics in the four countries don’t take the same criteria to define who is a foreigner: for example, if in Germany or in Belgium a foreigner is someone with a foreign nationality, in England he is defined by his place of birth. Secondly, a more precise breakdown by countries of origin is not always based on the nationalities of the people but, as for example in London, by ethnic groups. Thirdly, the distinction between the conflict-related communities is generally impossible insofar as the official foreigners’
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registrations don’t register the ethnicity. This has as consequence for the identification of the different communities: We only have estimations about the number of Kurds coming from Turkey. And these estimations have usually been given by some Kurdish informants or organizations; The ethnic identification of the persons originating from the Great Lakes Region is also no statistically possible in the different host countries; The problem is still worst for the identification of the Kosovo Serbs and Albanians. Not only do we not have precise information about the geographical region of origin (generally they are registered as nationals of Yugoslavia or Serbia-Montenegro) but the statistics do also not inform us about the ethnic origin of these persons. 4.2.1. Berlin The city of Berlin5 counted 3,360,549 inhabitants at 30 June 2008, of which 473,177 had a foreign nationality. If we take the ‘immigrant background’6 of its population into consideration, a bit less than a quarter of the Berliners has an immigrant origin (794,900 persons). The Turkish community is the most significant foreign community in Berlin with 113,779 nationals. In other words, it represents by itself one quarter of the foreign population living in the German capital. Moreover, if we consider the Turkish background, it’s usually estimated that there are about 200,000 individuals of which 70,000 to 80,000 have a Kurdish origin. The Kurdish and Turkish communities manage many organizations which cover more or less all aspects of their everyday life in Berlin. These one are more oriented on the city than on homeland politics. In comparison, the other communities under examination count very few nationals. So the German national statistics record only 28 wandans and 32 Burundians residing officially in Berlin. According to unofficial sources, taking into account undocumented migrants and naturalized persons, the number of Rwandans is estimated about 200–300 individuals. No association for those communities is officially registered in Berlin. Giving a picture of the number of people originated from Kosovo living in Berlin is more or less impossible. According to the German statistics 23,370 Serbs were officially registered in the city on 31nd December 2007, but without any clue about their ethnicity or the region they come from. Serbian and Albanian organisational structures are more or less inexistent in Berlin and the existing ones are mainly focussed on sportive and cultural activities. It is important to notice that this lack of organizational structure doesn’t mean that the Kosovan communities are not at all organized in Germany. Many organizations, some very important, are settled in other German regions (Landen) with a bigger implantation of Kosovo Albanians. For example, the illegal Kosovo exile government was settled in Stuttgart. We can say that, unlike the Turks and Kurds, Kosovo Serbians and Albanians keep a low public profile in Berlin. 4.2.2. London In 2006, the greater London7 counted about 7,310,000 inhabitants of which near a third (30.5%) 5. Information and data in this section are taken up from: Jan Hanrath and Tome Sandevski, ‘Berlin’, in Elise Féron and Jana Schildt (eds.), Deliverable 2. Case Study Reports – Mapping Transnational Communities and Conflicts (Louvain-la-Neuve: Catholic University of Louvain, 2009), 7–24. 6. In the frame of the German census, persons with an ‘immigrant background’ have to be understood as individuals comprised in one of the following categories: (1) foreigners, that are persons with a non-German nationality, (2) (late-) repatriates (immigrated since 1950), (3) naturalized persons, (4) persons whose parents are comprised in one of the previous groups and if at least one of the parents has immigrated himself. 7. Information and data in this section are taken up from: Hughes Miall et al., ‘London’, in Elise Féron and Jana Schildt (eds.), Deliverable 2. Case Study Reports – Mapping Transnational Communities and Conflicts (Louvain-la-Neuve: Catholic University of Louvain, 2009), 40–76.
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was foreign-born (2,230,000 individuals). This important rate of foreigners makes London one of the most multi-racial city in the world (Miall et al. 2009: 40) and all the communities under examination are actually present in the English capital. According to the Serbian Council of Great Britain, around 70,000 individuals with a Serbian background lived in the United Kingdom in 2009 but the great majority of these people were not originating from Kosovo. No more precise figures are available for the city of London. On the other hand the Albanian population in London was estimated between 50,000 and 60,000 individuals. But these figures include Albanian from Kosovo as from Albania. Only two organizations are clearly identified as Kosovan and both are managed by Kosovo Albanians. But there exist Serbian organizations and many more Albanian organizations. According to a rough estimation of the number of Burundians living in the UK, they are less than 1,000 individuals. For the Rwandan community, the exercise is still more difficult: according to the sources, the number of Rwandans living in London is believed to be anywhere between 1,575 and 20,000 individuals. If the Burundian community is little organized it’s not the case of the Rwandan community that stays in a major part divided according to ethnic lines. The Turks, according to the ‘born-abroad’ database, were estimated in 2005 about 200,000 to 250,000 individuals in London. Inside the Turkish community, more or less 30,000 people would have a Kurdish background. Most of the Kurds arrived at the end of the nineties and benefit from a refugee status. Turks and Kurds have settled many organizations in London. If many of them are ethno-centred others claim to be opened to everyone. Most of them offer social and cultural activities to their members but, as in Berlin, the politicization of these organizations is significant. 4.2.3. Randstad The polycentric urban area of Randstad8 that comprises the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht is the most densely populated region of the Netherlands with 1,224 persons per square kilometre. This conurbation counts about 7,500,000 inhabitants, of which about 40 percents have a foreign background. As in Berlin and London, there is a big disparity between the communities having settled in Randstad. The Turkish community is the most important in terms of individuals of the foreign communities based in the Netherlands. First and second generations together, they are more or less 350,000, of which 50,000 have a Kurdish origin. The largest community in the Netherlands and in the Randstad is to be found in The Hague with 15,000 members. The community is strongly organized. In 2004, 1,125 Turkish migrant organizations were listed in the Netherlands, of which 41 were of explicit Kurdish orientation. Most of them were situated in the Randstad (Van Heelsum 2004 quoted in: Van Houte 2009: 87). The people originating from Kosovo, first and second generation together, are estimated at about 8,500 persons in the Netherlands, whose majority has a refugee status and has an Albanian origin. At the end of the nineties, in correlation with the war occurring in Kosovo, the Kosovo Albanians had settled many organizations in the Netherlands but lots of organizations had disappeared at the beginning of the 21nd century. The Rwandan and Burundian communities in the Netherlands are each of them estimated up to 1,400 to 2,000 individuals. The Burundian and Rwandan migrant communities are quite active and their organizations are often divided according to ethnic and political lines.
8. Information and data in this section are taken up from: Marieke Van Houte, ‘Randstad’, Ibid., 77–90.
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4.2.4. Brussels The Belgian and European capital hosts many migrants. January 1nd, 2007, Brussels9 counted 283,524 legal residents of foreign nationality on a total of 1,031,215 inhabitants. In other words, more than a quarter of its population had a foreign nationality. Moreover, according to information collected by two national studies realised in 2001, the Family Demography Panel and the Health investigation by interview, 46.3 percents of the Brussels’ population had a migrant background in 2001.10 This foreign population is really diversified in terms of status and migratory motives: eurocrats, asylum-seekers, students, workers, long-term residents, second and third generations live in Brussels. In the city which hosts about 180 different nationalities the six foreign communities under examination are present, even if some are less numerous. The 1nd January 2007, 10,758 individuals with a Turkish nationality resided in Brussels. It is impossible to give precise figures of the number of Kurds among them: Belgian statistics take only into account the nationality. But, in 2003, the Kurdish Institute of Paris estimated that between 50,000 and 60,000 Kurds, mainly Turkish Kurds, have migrated to Belgium (Hassanpour and Mojab 2005: 214). The Kosovan communities, and more especially the Serbian one, count few nationals in Brussels. If it not possible to have precise figures (the Kosovans are recorded as Yugoslavian or as nationals of Serbia-Montenegro), according to some journalists, they are 40,000 in Belgium. It’s the same concerning their ethnicity. Some publications point out a ratio of 90 percent of Albanians in the Kosovan community residing in Belgium. However, as pointed out by the Foreign Office, this situation could noticeably evolve: more and more Kosovo Serbians introduce asylum requests to the Belgian State. In 2007 and 2008, Serbs and Roms introduced the quasi-totality of the asylum applications formulated to the Foreigners Office by people originating from Kosovo. Just for the month of February 2010, according to the General Commissionership to the Refugees and Stateless Persons (2010), 330 individuals with a Serbian nationality have searched asylum in Belgium. In 2007, with 8,101 individuals, nationals of Great Lakes region amounted to 4 percents of the foreign population of the Brussels-Capital Region. According to the foreigners’ register, 7.173 Congolese, 525 Rwandan and 403 Burundian resided in the city but an unspecified number of illegal immigrants coming from this African region lived one day at a time in Brussels. To give a precise number of the migrant organizations is more or less impossible in Belgium. Four reasons explain this impossibility. First, the migrant organizations don’t benefit of a special statute: they can be registered as non-profit organizations or non-governmental organizations. That means that without a clear reference to their national or ethnic origin it’s really difficult to identify them. Second reason, many organizations are not officially registered and are ‘de facto organizations’. Third, lists produced by some organizations or institutions as a research in the Belgian Monitor don’t give any clue if the organizations still exist, if they have many members (some can be considered as “mailboxes”), if they really produce activities. Moreover some organizations appear many times under various denominations because they have for example changed their name or have various units in the different Regions of the country (De Bruyn et al. 2008: 21). Before to give a picture of the organizational structures of each communities some general observations have to be formulated. Firstly, there is an important disparity relating to the number of organizations managed by the communities. If the Turks and the Congolese, and in a less extent 9. This section is based on our previous during the work package 2. 10. This foreign origin was defined by the foreign nationality of the interviewee at birth or by the foreign nationality of one of his parents (Observatoire de la santé et du social de Bruxelles-Capitale, 2007: 17).
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the Rwandans, the Kurds and the Burundians, are well organized in the city, the Kosovo Serbs and Albanians have settled very few organizations in the Belgian capital. Secondly, leaders of migrant organizations are disproportionately male. Thirdly, the big majority of them benefit of a permanent resident status and many have the nationality of their host country. This observation noticeably differs from the situation in the other cities under examination. It can be explained by the Belgian legislation on nationality acquisition. Organizations’ politicization is very important in some communities. It’s notable the case of the Turkish, Rwandan and Congolese communities. The great majority of the interviewed Turks have expressed the ideological link of their organization with a Turkish political trend. Lots of leaders (22 individuals, a bit more than one third) are also involved in other non-profit or non-governmental organizations. These one can be also ethnic but lots of interviewees were also members of ‘non-ethnic’ organizations. In parallel with their status of leaders among their community of origin, lots of them managed organizations whose activities are focussed on their host society. For many interviewees, their political activities in Belgium are considered as the continuation of the actions they have undertaken in their home country. Contrary to other foreign communities also established for a while in Belgium (i.e. Italian, Spanish, Greek or Moroccan ones), one characteristic of the Turkish organizations are their dynamism and their faculty to attract the second and third generations. According to Kaya and Kentel (Kaya and Kentel 2007: 52), 31 percents of the Turks living in Belgium are involved in a Turkish organization. Many of them are managed by young men or women of the second generation and aim to attract the younger. Indeed, for some years, according to some respondents, we witness in Brussels as in other Belgian cities to an important replacement of the elites in the Turkish community. People of the second and third generations are nowadays in the boards of directors of many Turkish organizations; some are even president or vice-president of some of them. This evolution did not went without a hitch as a respondent told us: They were out, no able to understand the needs of the younger generations. It was a big mess, with lots of verbal confrontations. But the best point is that all the young people have been an integral part of this project. Now, for some persons, it was not so easy to put them outside and we have created now honorific titles. (Turks, Brussels)
Kurdish associations, less numerous than Turkish ones, are also ethno-centred and homelandoriented. All their actions are directed towards Kurds, in the host society as well as in the region of origin. The ‘core conflict’ has a lot of importance in their activities and actions. We will highlight the two major forms of activism of the Kurdish community in another chapter. In Belgium, the Kosovar communities, Albanian as Serbs, seem invisible. There is at the present time only one Kosovar organisation. We can say that the Kosovo Albanian and Serb communities are characterised in relation to the others communities under examination by their quasi absence of representative organisation in Brussels as in Belgium. The main explanation of the invisibility of the Albanian Kosovar, appreciably more numerous than the Serbs in Brussels, is that pre-existing Albanian associations have absorbed the new Albanian migrants from Kosovo. The migrants originating from the Great Lakes Region are well organized in the Belgian capital, and more especially the Congolese community. Many organizations aim at the Sub-Saharan community in his whole but the big majority remain focus on a national criterion to which are often added other criteria as the region of origin, the religious belief or, for example, the gender. The eth-
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nic differentiation still perceptible in many Burundian organizations is crucial in the big majority of the Rwandan organizations. 4.3. Conflicting Situation between the Conflict-Related Communities Before to analyze the way of transportation of core conflicts in the cities and to try to determine its impact on the integration process of the conflict-related communities in those cities, it is important to determine if yes and to which extent we can really talk about “transported conflicts” in Brussels as in the other cities under examination. This section is mainly based on the interviews conducted with leaders of migrant organizations. 4.3.1. Are Tensions Perceptible in the City? Interviewees’ perceptions on possible tensions between the conflict-related communities in the host cities vary to a large extent: for some, there is no conflict at all while for others the transported conflict seems to have a big impact on their everyday life. Between these two opposing options our respondents have expressed all kinds of feelings: sadness, mistrust, resentment, or anger. These disparities are especially marked among the Turkish, Congolese and Burundian interviewees. At the opposite, for our Kurdish and Rwandan respondents the tensions between the conflict-related communities cannot be denied. For the Albanians and Serbs, there is at the present time no conflict between the two communities in the Belgian capital. However many of them have pointed out in the same time that there is no contact between the two communities originating from Kosovo and even more generally between Serbs and Albanians. First, we are not numerous in Brussels but it is without comparison with the Serbs! […] Yes, there are very few Serbs here [in Brussels]. Moreover we used to spend time in Albanian pubs or cultural centers. And there is really no reason to meet Serbs there! (Albanian, Brussels)
This non-conflicting situation has also been highlighted in the other cities. However this assertion has to be moderated. Firstly, four Kosovo Albanians remembered violent incidents that have occurred in the past, and more especially the assassination on 25nd February 1990 in Brussels of the Kosovo Albanian human rights activist Enver Adri, founder of the Committee for the defense of human rights in Kosovo. It was a terrible period for us, even in Belgium. […] Even in Belgium we didn’t feel in security. And the assassination of Adri, our main spokesperson, our main ‘standard-bearer’ in a way… It was terrible. Here, in Belgium, shot by three Serbs. And the story is not finished… Yes, the story is not finished […] In Greece, they want to release one of the killers! […] It’s clear that for those like me who were already in Belgium it stays an important event in our life. (Albanian, Brussels)
Secondly, where the core conflict has no important impact on the everyday life of the Albanians and Serbs, it seems that the situation is different for the newcomers, and more especially for those living in asylum-seekers accommodation centres. One Albanian and a state employee have highlighted this situation. A Dutch referent has also mentioned such an escalation between asylum-seekers in the Netherlands. Thirdly, Albanians have often spontaneously recognized that they know that the Serbs, living in Kosovo as in Brussels, do not accept the independence of Kosovo.
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It’s clear: they [the Serbs] don’t want to hear something about that! […] They can’t understand that the other peoples want to live their own destiny, to live in accord with themselves. And if you take into consideration how they considered the Kosovo, it’s a kind of non-sense. But, yes, it’s the big drama for the Great Serbia and for all Serbs! (Albanian, Brussels)
Fourthly, and directly linked with the previous argument, the discourse of two Serbs noticeably changed when we mentioned the recognition of Kosovo. The resentment against the Kosovo Albanian community settled in Brussels is clearly shown through the discourse of this Kosovo Serb: They [the Kosovo Albanians] live here [in Belgium] and they really don’t want to return there [in Kosovo]. Then, tell me, why do they make such a noise about the independence of a Serbian province they really don’t care! […] They present themselves as the victims but now it’s the Serbs who flee the Kosovo. It’s the jungle now! They know that, it’s the reason why they don’t want to come back! (Serb, Brussels)
Concerning the Hutu-Tutsi conflict, there are very important disparities between the three national communities of the Great Lakes Region. When some Congolese talked about some tensions, they didn’t refer to the Hutu-Tutsi conflict inside the Congolese community but they talked rather about conflicts between military organizations and political parties directly linked with some existing ones in Congo. The ethnic sharing Hutu-Tutsi is just not relevant for them, not even for those originating from Kivu: If they did not have the same points of view on the number of ethnic groups living in the Congolese Republic (figures varied between 50 and 250 according to the respondents), our six respondents agreed to the fact that these two ethnic groups are just two like there are many others. We have sometimes troubles between us [federation’s members] but never on this issue. You really have to change the subject of your research. Meet Burundians and Rwandans! For them, it’s significant. But for us! No really, we are able to have troubles for more or less any issue, but not for this one. (Congolese, Brussels)
For the majority of the interviewed Burundians the ethnic sharing is relevant and still exists in some organizations, but according to them it is no more a reason of tensions in Brussels unlike it has been in the past. According to the interviewees, if there are tensions it’s not so much linked to ethnicity but rather political evolutions in the homeland. There are differences but there is no conflict. To resume, we have one identity, being Burundian. Besides that, there are some Hutus, there are Tutsis, and so many ‘mixed’ people. We really work together now without to take into consideration if one belongs to an ethnic group or another one. (Hutu Burundian, Brussels)
For the Rwandan respondents, the Hutu-Tutsi conflict has been transported into Brussels: all of them have talked about tensions between the two conflict-related communities in the city. Where only one interviewee has been the victim of a violent act because of its ethnic belonging, the Rwandans have generally pointed out the different meetings places, organizations, events or celebrations they organized. Many of them, and notably during a focus group, talked with bitterness and resentment. It’s clear: there are the Hutus and there are the Tutsis. And we don’t frequent the same places; we don’t really try in the every life to have relationships with them. If think that it’s too difficult: too many persons being killed, too much violence, too many victims. It’s really
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difficult to forget. Less now than before but I make still some nightmares. (Tutsi Rwandan, Brussels) In a way we have fled our country to be far of that. And we don’t want to think about that. But it’s true that it’s very difficult. I really like my country, its landscapes, its way of life, but I know that I will go there never again. It’s too difficult, nobody wait me there. And, inside me, I can’t stop to think that’s their faults. (Tutsi Rwandan, Brussels)
Even those who identified themselves as “mixed” – and thus defined themselves as people belonging to the two ethnic groups –talked about tensions and many of them spent time in organizations that are focused on one ethnic group, generally Tutsi. It is important to notice that three Rwandans (two Hutus and one person with a “mixed” background) felt the need to insist on the fact that these tensions in Brussels are without any comparison with what happened in their country of origin. If we take the three core-conflicts into consideration, the Kurdish conflict is one for which it was often made allusion to violent confrontations and which seems to have the most impact on the everyday life of some respondents. As aforementioned two Turks consider that there is no conflict at all while two other respondents were worried by the violence escalation they perceived for some years. The Kurdish respondents on their side agreed to recognize that there is a lot of tension between the two conflict-related communities in Brussels. Some used very hard words when they talked about the relationship between their community and the Turkish one. You [Kurdish immigrants] think, because you live far, that you will be never again attacked, oppressed, but you are wrong if you believe that. Even here, they are the same. (Kurd, Brussels) Even between young persons, in school, in football teams… even if they have never seen the Turkey, they consider us as dogs. (Kurd, Brussels)
As this conflict together with the conflict of the Rwandan communities are the most visible and sharp in Brussels, they will be often taken as an example in the following sections and chapters. 4.3.2. In What Way Are the Transported Conflicts Being Expressed? On the basis of the interviews, four major ways of expression concerning the transported conflicts in Brussels can be highlighted. These apply also for Berlin, London and the Randstad region. As highlighted before, for some respondents there is no conflict because there is no contact between the conflict-related communities. A spatial segregation between the communities exists in Brussels, as in the other cities; for example, a majority of Albanians is located in Schaerbeek and Anderlecht while Serbs live generally in Molenbeek-Saint-Jean. However we have no indication to say that this spatial segregation is due to transported conflicts. For Surkyn and Reniers (1997), ‘chain migration’ and community relationships explain in a major part this situation. On the other hand some conflict-related communities like the Turkish and the Kurdish ones overlap in some districts. However their meeting places as, for example, the cultural centres, houses of worship or pubs are generally strictly devoted to one community. This lack of contact has to be read as an act of avoidance and can be seen as the first expression of the transported conflict. They highlight, for example, the fact that most of the organizations are strictly directed to one community. One respondent in the Randstad is particularly aware of this strict separation and what it implies. So, at the question “Are some tensions linked with the situation in Kosovo detectable in your host city?”, she has answered:
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Yes and no. Serbian and Albanian organisations are organised separately. They are not visible in conflict, but due to this separate organisation it becomes visible. (Kosovo Albanian, Randstad)
The transportation of the core conflicts is also often detectable at the discursive level. The way to refer to the members of the other conflict-related community as a whole is illuminating: generally respondents have talked about “the Turks”, “the Kurds”, “the Hutus”, “the Tutsis” etcetera without showing any consideration to the different points of view and sensitivities which exist within these communities. Also the expression “the Others” has often been used during the interviews besides some less civilized expressions. Many interviewees have also insisted on the fact that they, like other members of their community, are victims of verbal aggressions, discriminations and/or of stigmatization by members of the other conflict-related community. In some more rare cases the tension between the communities gives rise to violent confrontations. These are the most visible expressions of the transportation of the conflict. Many Kurds and Turks have witnessed or have been the victims of violent acts. One Tutsi Rwandan respondent and one Kosovo Albanian have also talked about physical aggressions but these incidents were ‘isolated’; concerning the Albanian his story had happened more than ten years ago. These outbreaks of tension lead to property deteriorations (slogans on mailboxes and doors, defacements of shop windows or damage of display windows with Molotov cocktails) but also to some violent acts aimed at the physical integrity of people, like stone throwing or beatings. Several Turks and Kurds have talked about an escalation of the transported conflict and of violent acts in the last two or three years. This increase of violence is not only visible during organized demonstrations but, according to them, also between pupils in schools. This situation can be also related to one Kurdish respondent in the Randstad. The last way of expression concerns the different use of symbols, those of its own community and of the other one. It can be, for example, the damaging of important symbols of the other community such as flag scorching, rewriting of the national anthem in a bawdy song or the damaging of important meeting places. Three Turkish interviewees have referred to the Democratic People’s Party (dehap) congress in Brussels where young Kurds had rented the Turkish flag. It’s a very beautiful country [the Turkey] with a great History, a great Culture. We have to be proud to come from this country. And when you see these young people, rending our flag, throwing Molotov cocktails to the crowd to celebrate the birthday of this sociopath [Ocalan]. I can’t imagine the shame I would felt if I was a Kurd looking these pictures at the television! (Turk, Brussels)
On the other side the use of their own symbols in order to revitalize the ethnic belonging and/or to reaffirm their main objective(s) irritate many members of the other community. For example, the Tutsi and Hutu commemorations have been often considered as provocations during the interviews. The lie continues: each year they organize a commemoration of the Tutsi genocide. They continue to play the victims but there are not the only victims of this ethnic war! (Hutu Rwandan, Brussels) We have fled a genocide. Sorry, but it’s how even the international organizations as the United Nations or Doctors Without Borders call that. Hutu commemoration… It’s totally uncalled-for ! (Tutsi Rwandan, Brussels)
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More subtle than the physical violence, not reprehensible by law, the symbols are used and overused by the different communities in conflict in Brussels, Berlin, London and the Randstad. 4.3.3. Are There Some Identifiable Tension Spikes? As aforementioned, tensions and mistrust between the conflict-related communities are especially translated into avoidance. Organizational structures (leisure, cult celebrations, socio-economic assistance, cultural activities) are with very few exceptions managed separately. In this context, most of the time, the transported conflicts are not visible or, to take the expression of one respondent, “it stays behind the doors”. But in some occasions the tensions are sharper and then more visible. The interviewees who consider that the core conflict has been transported into their host city have given several examples of tension spikes. Two kinds of causes explaining these escalations can be identified, and these occur in all cities. The first one is linked to specific events occurring in the country/region of origin (military repressions, terrorist attacks, international recognition of the State and so on) and can be qualified as ‘exceptional’, even if the core conflict escalates and gives rise to many confrontations in the host cities. What happens in Kurdistan is automatically and almost instantaneously translated here. (Kurd, Brussels) There are organic relations between here and Turkey, so whatever happens in Turkey is reflected to London. (Kurd, London)
Some violent events and/or symbolic evolutions in the country of origin have almost immediate effects on the conflict-related communities in their host cities. Examples are numerous. We can cite among others, for the Turkish and Kurdish communities, the beginning of the war in 1991, the arrest in February 1999 and the death penalty of the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan, the death of 12 soldiers in 2007 in the Kurdistan during fights of the Turkish army against PKK. All these events have lead to violent confrontations or attacks in Brussels and also in Berlin. Concerning the Rwandan communities, the condemnation of some Hutus for genocide crimes has lead to some collective and international reprobation movements that have been especially expressed through the Internet. The other kind of tension spike can be qualified as ‘ritual’: this type is recurrent and often predetermined. It’s for example the case of birthdays and commemorations. Hutus and Tutsis, and more especially those coming from Rwanda, have their annual commemorative events. Tutsis organize each year a commemoration on 7nd April, the date of the beginning of the Tutsi genocide while two other dates focus on the commemorations of the Hutus: 6nd April, date of the assassination of the president Juvénal Habyarimana and 22nd April, date of forced displacement of Hutus and the massacre of 8,000 persons in 1995. Each year these events give rise to an escalation of verbal attacks through various media and especially on Internet websites. These ritual tension spikes are also detectable between the Turks and Kurds, and more especially in March around Newruz, the Kurdish New Year. For the Kurds, the 21nd March is also the day of the “resistance celebration against the repression of which the Kurds are victims”. This celebration is very little known within the Belgian society but has often been accompanied with tension (and can been seen as spikes) between Turks and Kurds. 4.3.4. Who are the main targets of the more violent acts? The mistrust, the feeling to be discriminated or the animosity that some interviewees have expressed concerned generally ‘the Others’, the members of the conflict-related community. But 29 | Beyond the Core Conflict
some people often qualified as “powerful” and “extremist” have been cited during the interviews. Logically these people are either personalities living in the country of origin and are being suspected to have an important influence in the country of settlement or they are main leaders of the conflict-related community. As aforementioned, some more violent acts and confrontations occurred between some conflict-related communities. If we consider the recent past, these kind of events concerned especially the communities originating from Turkey and Rwanda. It is interesting to indentify who were the main targets of this violence. Indeed, from the analysis of the interviews and the Belgian media11, it transpires that some organizations and/or some individuals were the main ones. During our interviews, several Kurdish respondents told stories about violent acts of which they were victims personally and that were committed by Turks who they qualify to be “extremists”, “menservants of the Turkish extreme-right” or “menservants of Ankara’s regime”. According to them, their associative activities and their leader role in the Kurdish community explains why they are “privileged targets” of this violence. On the other side, some Turkish leaders have also declared that some of their properties were often vandalized and that some members of the PKK have also physically attacked them. If you listen to them I’m the King of Belgium. No kidding! Erdogan eats in my hand and I manage everything in Brussels. I’m fed up with their violence and, worst, their hypocrisy. They try to be considered as victims and they are the sources of all the violence. I suppose that we have to be happy that there is no statue in the Glory of Öcalan in Saint-Josse! (Turk, Brussels)
The main targets of the more violent acts were people identified by the members of the other conflict-related community as extremists linked to terrorist parties/fractions. This was for example the case for one Kurd suspected by the Turks to be the main leader of the PKK in Belgium (in not any way, this man has confirmed this information and the other Kurds remained mute on his true role inside the Kurdish organization). However, most of the time it were people and organizations considered to have a privileged link with political authorities (in the power or in the opposition) of their country/region of origin or the main communities’ representatives near the Belgian and international institutions. This observation is also available for the Rwandan communities within which four persons can be considered as the main targets (two representatives of organizations and two representatives of political parties). The animosity is sometimes not only directed to the other community. In almost all communities dissensions were perceptible and some of these were directly linked to the core conflict. It was notably the case within the Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi communities or the Kurdish one but the sharpest and most dramatic examples were found within the Turkish community. The aggressiveness of some Turkish “extremists” is not only directed against the minorities coming from Turkey (there are also troubles between Turks and Armenians in Brussels). Two Turkish respondents considered as ‘too’ moderate, or even “traitors” to cite one of our respondent in Brussels, have also been victims of violent acts or intimidations and death threats. Both of them blame members of their own community when they try to explain why they were victim of such violence. There are lots of stereotypes on the Turkish community, lots of ‘false truths’. They have been constructed by the Belgians but also by some Turks. And me, it’s my job to deconstruct the stereotypes, to tell the ‘real truth’. And it’s sure that I’m not so popular near some more ex11. We haven’t made a strict analysis of the Belgian media. But, tacking into account imprecision and contradictions between some interviewees, we have checked all these information in Belgian newspapers, especially in Le Soir and La Libre Belgique.
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tremists groups. […] It’s not only some disagreements between us! Perhaps you know that I was seriously hurt some months ago. I used to say the truth, to highlight what they want to hide. And the only thing that these people know it’s the violence. (Turk, Brussels) I can be considered as a danger for them [he makes reference to some leaders of organizations which can be identified as linked with the Turkish extreme-right]. Often it’s the pacifists who are the most dangerous enemies for the tyrannical regimes. (Turk, Brussels)
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5. Means of transportation and perpetuation of the conflicts in the host city
I
n the previous chapter we have based our analysis on the points of view of our respondents. In other terms this information focussed on the way that they either did or did not perceive the transported conflicts. In this chapter we want to objectivise these data. Of course, the evolution of the events in the countries of origin influences the transported conflicts. Almost all the interviewees have pointed out the immediate impact that some violent incidents inside the homeland had in Belgium. But our objective in this chapter is to highlight the main ways of transportation and perpetuation of the core conflicts in the cities. These means of transportation and perpetuation are not exclusive as they are not relevant for all the transported conflicts. 5.1. Massive Flows of Refugees As Demmers (2005) and Azar (1990) have pointed it out, there is a rise of conflicts in which identity groups have become central. These “new wars” are often intra-state conflicts in which the civilians are the primary victims. In the nineties, over ninety percent of the victims of conflicts in the world were civilians, killed in their own homes and communities (Miall et al. 1998). These civil wars lead up to massive flows of people who wanted to save their life in border states or to find asylum in industrialized countries. As Skinner (1982) explains these people often consider themselves as exiles. There is anger and bitterness among them about the reasons that made them flee their country while at the same time having to defend their home country to the dominant host that often displays contempt for the homeland of the migrants (Demmers 2002; Skinner 1982). In our sample, a bit less than two thirds of the respondents have declared that they have migrated for political reasons. They have often talked about the pressures they have experienced while living in their country of origin, the threats, and the violence they have suffered, caused by members of the other conflict-related community. Few of them (6 individuals: 3 Rwandans, 1 Congolese, 1 Serb and 1 Kurd) were not able to project themselves in Belgium (the way they identify themselves, their declared willingness “to come back as soon as possible”). During their interview their anger and resentment was expressed in many occasions. Four other respondents declared that for some years they also had difficulties to really involve themselves in their host country. One Kurd shared with us the feelings he had at this period: How I can explain that: I was here [in Belgium] but my heart was there [in Kurdistan], my thoughts were there [in Kurdistan] and my hopes were here [in Belgium]. (Kurd, Brussels)
Two examples illustrate the importance of the massive flows of refugees on the conflict transportation in the host cities. First, as already stated, many Serbs coming from Kosovo have fled their region of origin to find asylum in Belgium since the Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence. While the Kosovo conflict is essentially expressed on avoidance, the recent arrival of Kosovo Serbian asylum seekers has given rise to tensions in some accommodation centres for asylum seekers in Belgium and in the Netherlands. Secondly, the massive immigration of Kurdish political refugees in the eighties and the nine33 | Beyond the Core Conflict
ties has had a major impact on the mobilization and the politicization of the Kurdish community already residing in Brussels. Indeed, before these waves of Kurdish refugees the big majority of the Kurds living in Belgium had generally settled in the country in the sixties and in the beginning of the seventies. They arrived as ‘guest workers’ in the same way that other Turkish workers did. At that time, as some Turkish respondents have pointed out, many Kurds and Turks managed organizations in common or worked together in Belgian trade unions in order to favour the integration of their country fellowmen in Brussels. The first organizations aiming specifically at the Kurdish community will appear in Belgium at the middle of the eighties; the influence of the political refugees on this new orientation is clear. As Østergaard-Nielsen (2006: 5) and Hanrath (2009) have pointed it out, the organizational structure of the Kurds in Germany has followed the same route of development. 5.2. Democratic Opportunities and Development of Communication Tools According to Faist (2000), the democratic opportunities existing in the countries of settlement have a considerable influence on the migrants’ transnational political activities. Moreover some scholars as Appadurai (1995) and Anderson (1991; 2008) have demonstrated that migrant communities have been deeply affected by the technological development. For Demmers (2002), the evolution of the media allows the migrant communities to participate in conflicts in their homelands and live their politic involvement at long-distance. The big majority of the respondents have declared that they are especially interested by what happens in their country of origin. To be informed they read newspapers, look at news on television, call their family and friends living in the homeland or consult websites. Several have highlighted the fact that the development of the ethnic media has greatly improved their day-to-day knowledge of the evolution of their country of origin. I read everything: newspapers, news on websites; I watch also television news, Belgian as Turkish ones. I like to know what happens. It’s something that has really changed. At the beginning, there is nothing. You just know what happened thanks to the family. Now you know everything each day. (Turk, Brussels) It’s really interesting. I have the real news; I know really what happens there [in Kivu]. With the newspapers in Belgium you don’t know anything. Ok, the minister is in Kinshasa, says that the government is corrupted – What a news! – but you don’t know what happens in the street of Kinshasa and still less outside. Thanks to these websites I know really what happens. […] Who manage the website? Why do you ask me that? It’s a good person! (Congolese, Brussels)
Many interviewees (at a less extent our Albanian respondents) have said that they used to consult websites focussing on homeland-oriented news. Others manage this kind of websites themselves or feed a section dedicated to the news in their country of origin. A simple look on the majority of these websites gives information about the partiality of the big majority of them. This partial information, coupled with the comments that some ‘visitors’ gave, feed without any doubt the transported conflict. It is exactly the same phenomenon with the use by some organizations and ethnic leaders. Beside information on special activities they react almost automatically and instantaneously to information relating to members of the other conflict-related community. For the Kurdish community, the media and the democratic opportunities offered by Belgium play a major role in their mobilization. According to Lyon and Uçarer, “they have always been Beyond the Core Conflict | 34
Kurds among the Kurdish guest workers and refugees, but most of them did not discover their ‘kurdishness’ until they came to Europe” (Lyon and Uçarer 1998). The possibility to valorise their own culture, to organize themselves without repression have participated, with the arrival of many refugees in the eighties, in the birth of nationalist feelings of the Kurds in their host country. But, concerning the Kurdish immigrants, another issue is really important: the possibility to talk in their own language. Benedict Anderson (1991) has already highlighted the importance of language in the formation of “imaginary communities” while for Downing (1992), minority language broadcasting is a source of group empowerment. Without any doubt, language is for many Kurds we have met the symbol of the Turkish repression in their region of origin as the symbol of their new emancipation. Six of our Kurdish respondents have talked about Roj TV, a television station located in Denderleeuw, a village near Brussels, and financed by Kurdish migrants living in Europe. Thanks to satellite technology, Roj TV transmits its programming to 77 countries, including Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Because the station recognizes Kurds in the Middle East as one of its primary audiences, the station broadcasts in three Kurdish dialects: Turkish, Arabic and Assyrian. Our respondents argued that Roj TV provides a link for the Kurdish migrants to keep in touch with the homeland. During their interviews, two Kurdish respondents have song the Kurdish national anthem, Ey Reqib, written by the Kurdish poet and political activist Dildar in 1938. This song usually opens the broadcasting programs of Roj TV and highlights one more time the importance of the language within the Kurdish community. Hey Enemy, the Kurdish nation is alive, its language is yet spoken We shall not be defeated by the weapons of any time Let no one say Kurds are no more The Kurds are alive The Kurds are alive, their flag will never fall!
During police searches that occurred at the beginning of March 2010 within the Kurdish community settled in Brussels, the Belgian police has also carried out a search within the premises of Roj TV. This one, while the Belgian police has arrested 13 Kurds involved in different organizations, has especially drawn the Kurds’ attention: demonstrations and joint press have focussed on this issue. 5.3. Intervention of Homeland Political Authorities Many interviewees who consider that the core conflict has been transported into their city of settlement have pointed out the responsibility of some homeland political authorities who support the members of the other conflict-related community. It is difficult in the framework of this research to evaluate the real weight of those supposed, rightly or not, incursions in the Belgian policy, like on the migrants’ organizational structures. However we can highlight some facts or events. First the links between the authorities of the country of origin and some ethnic leaders in Belgium are really strong. Some persons recognized as leader in Belgium are or were also involved in the political arena of their country of origin. It is notably the case of some Turkish, Congolese and Rwandan respondents. Moreover, some organizations are financed by the country of origin: it is the case of at least one Tutsi Rwandan organisation while the funding of some organizations as mosques by Diyanet is a secret for nobody. The role of embassies has also often been pointed out. Some respondents suspected the embassies to influence the Belgian authorities (for example, the
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bans of commemorations according to some Hutu Rwandans or, lastly, the police searches within the Kurdish community). Secondly, it’s clear that some political parties or military organizations have enlarged their membership and have found a strong support within the migrant communities (Demmers 2002). This support is based on fund-raising but also on the propagation of their ideas as the lobbying near the authorities of the host countries. These points will be developed in a next chapter. 5.4. Lack of Perspective in the Host Country Many scholars like Koopmans and Staham (2001) have highlighted the fact that the lack of perspectives is an important issue to explain the involvement of migrants in homeland-oriented activities. In conflict studies it is also highlighted that the “passive members”, to take the categorization of Shain (2007), are often young males, with a low educational level, unemployed, living in suburban areas (Féron 2010: 4). Some more or less violent demonstrations occurred in Brussels and relayed by the media have shown young Turkish people shouting nationalist slogans. An important question is why these young people, often of the second generation, even sometimes of the third one, participate in these demonstrations and with such aggressiveness? In Belgium, many researchers have demonstrated that people with a foreign background suffer from many forms of discrimination, whether it is in the housing market (Goosens and Winters 2004), the labour market (Okkerse and Termote 2004) or in the education system (Jamin and Perrin 2005; Mahieu 2002). Even the fact of being born and completely schooled in Belgium would not necessarily contribute to improve the school situation of the children with a migrant background (De Meyer et al. 2002: 15; Hambye and Lucchini 2005: 6). These discriminatory acts and other structural obstacles constitute a brake to the socioeconomic integration and the social mobility of many immigrants. Some socioeconomic inequalities remain important for some foreign communities, particularly for those originating from non European countries. If ‘only’ 10 percents of the Belgians (defined as persons with the Belgian nationality like their parents have) and 15 percents of the Europeans live below the poverty line in Belgium, the ratios rise to 30 percents for the non Europeans and, for example, 59 percents for the persons with a Turkish origin (Perrin et al. 2008). Several Turkish respondents to explain why so many young people were involved these last years in demonstrations in Brussels have highlighted this reality. The explanations given by respondents interviewed in Berlin, another city where demonstrations with young Turks and Kurds are more and more frequent, pointed out also racism and discrimination. This country [Belgium] seems to have no regard for them [young Turks]. I can even say that it seems that it doesn’t give a damn for them! They suffer from racism, discriminations, and on the other hand they are all the time stigmatized […] It’s not a life for young people with dreams. Most of them have the Belgian nationality but in their everyday life in Belgium everything remembers them that they come, their parents, from another country, the Turkey, a country which on the other side try to rub up them the right way. (Turk, Brussels) I don’t say that we have to excuse them but it is important I think to understand what they feel. They have grown up in Belgium, it’s the only country they know and this country doesn’t really accept them. In the words, yes, but the reality is totally different: low-study level, unemployment, racism and discriminations. You have to understand that. It’s really not easy to be a young Belgian with a Turkish background in Belgium. […] Yes, they have the
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hatred. They need to express their anger and they have this opportunity. It’s stupid, I know. (Politician with a Turkish background, Brussels) I claim that children whose parents have come from Turkey at some time are not accepted here. If we assume that every human being has the need to have a certain feeling of belonging and that this is not provided here in Germany, he or she will try to find it somewhere else. So they are easier to influence. And of course in Berlin, in Germany, there are groups that take advantage of this and try to win those young people over for them. (Turk, Berlin)
Where the role of young people in violent demonstrations and property deteriorations has often been highlighted, several interviewees, Turks as Kurds, have also insisted on the fact that most of these young people are just “followers”, and that they have no real idea of the stakes involved in such demonstrations. They receive a text message on their phone and go in the street, shouting extremist slogans, seeking to provoke everybody. […] I really don’t think that they really understand what they are doing, what they are shouting, what it really means. […] They are conducted, they are used. […] It’s so easy to play with their anger and some people as (Xs) know how to do that. (Turk, Brussels) Young people who rarely have been in Turkey at all, or only for vacation every two or three years, avow themselves to Turkishness and what have you. But if you talk to them in depth – which has been my work for about 10 years – they can hardly fill it. They say ‘Turks’, ‘Turkey’ and ‘Turkishness’ and what have you, but if you go deeper – maybe fortunately – they cannot say what’s it all about. But they are influenced by the events and what happens in Turkey. (Turk, Berlin)
In sum, the lack of perspective of some young Turks seems to be a fertile ground thanks to which the transported conflicts feed themselves. However, to determine the weight of this factor is not easy. According to the respondents, except in schools, the young people have not organized the demonstrations involving a majority of them. In other words they were not the initiators of these demonstrations. 5.5. Narratives of Ethnic Leaders If some violent incidents sometimes occurred, as it was the case between the Kurdish and Turkish communities, most of the time the transported conflicts are detectable on the discursive and symbolic levels. The role of some migrant communities’ leaders in the transportation of the conflict has not to be neglected. During our fieldwork, we have met many persons considered as leaders by many members of their community, insofar as the communities under examination are themselves divided according to many other criteria than the ethnic origin (gender, age, cult, region of origin and so on). To summarize, the majority of the interviewees have declared that they do not play a role in the mitigation of the transported conflict (The justification for their non-involvement will be developed later). On the other hand, few respondents answered that they try to mitigate the transported conflicts. We will address these initiatives deeper in the following chapter. None of the respondents have declared that they participate in the fueling of the transported conflicts. Some have however recognized that some of their activities can “be not welcomed” by
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members of the other conflict-related community. They referred to some commemorations, demonstrations, edited booklets or articles expressing their point of view on the core conflict but it was also linked to some activities that we could consider at first as trivial like courses in or about the Kurdish language (We have already demonstrated that such activities are symbolically important and can be a major factor of political mobilization). However, the analysis of the in-depth interviews coupled with the reading of Belgian newspapers and consultation of organizations’ websites, allow us to assert that some of our interviewees fuel the transported conflicts. Examples do not miss. A look on websites of some organizations is illuminating, and this for all the communities under examination, even for the Serbian and Albanian ones. A typical example is the list, in chronological order, of all the victories like the abominations they have suffered in their country of origin and also in the country of settlement. Also during the interviews some respondents have expressed themselves in a way that leaves no doubt. Our families, our friends, died in the totally ignorance. And they are killed a second time because the abhorrence of their death are still today not recognized. (Hutu Rwandan, Brussels) Even here, we are persecuted. […] We will fight as we fight for the Kurdistan. We have a History, a Culture, and they have never been able to combat them. (Kurd, Brussels)
Many scholars (Kaufman 2004; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, 2006) have demonstrated the importance of the ethnic narratives in the migrants’ political mobilization. Without any doubt, these narratives also intervene in the fueling of the transported conflicts. Ethnic leaders are able to promote certain views by creating narratives on the conflict “which allocate the roles of the good and the villains to specific actors, thereby promoting a biased and emotionally charged view on the conflict situation” (Féron 2010: 4). As highlighted by Smith (1986), an ethnic group is defined by a “myth-symbol complex,” a set of ethnic narratives and symbols that identifies which elements of shared culture and what interpretation of history binds the group together and distinguishes it from others. Some of our respondents use and abuse the different symbols and myths that shape the national history. They insist on the cruelty and the cowardice of the members of the other conflict-related community. In the same time they aver that they are unaided victims, that the members of their community are never the instigators of the violence, in the homeland as in the host country. So these ethnic leaders influence the perception that the members of their community have of the conflict. They also point out that the conflict occurring in their country of origin is neither strictly confined in the country of origin nor finished (Féron 2010).
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6. Relationships between migrant organizations and political authorities in the context of transported conflicts
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n the previous chapter we have seen how the core conflicts are transported into the countries of settlement and which role some leaders and migrant organizations play in this process. In this section, we study the variety of tools, activities and strategies used by some migrant organizations like political authorities to mitigate and work at solving transported conflicts. We also see how migrant organizations and ethnic leaders on one side, and the political authorities on the other side, try to influence and/or use each other in topics linked to the countries of origin of the communities under examination. 6.1. Mitigation of the Transported Conflicts 6.1.1. Initiatives of the Migrant Organizations Initiatives to mitigate transported conflicts are in fact not numerous. For the majority of the interviewees, the resolution of the homeland conflict is the obligatory point for the reconciliation between the conflict-related communities in their host societies. But, beside this reason, four others have often been expressed to explain their non-involvement: (1) because they considered that there is no real conflict, (2) because the focus of their activities is not this issue, (3) because they want to be recognized as neutral and/or (4) they have no real interlocutor, that means someone people like them who really wants to improve the conflicting situation. This last argument has been used several times and, notably, members of the Kurdish and Turkish communities are shifting the blame for the tensions to the other community. The importance of the discourse – in this case the allocation of the roles between the goods and the villains – in the fueling of the transported conflicts has already been demonstrated. However, it is interesting to notice that many respondents have tried to influence the interviewer. In Brussels, only six respondents are involved in initiatives to mitigate or to solve the transported conflicts. This ratio is more or less the same in Berlin, London and the Randstad region. We can identify two kinds of initiatives: the ‘one shot’ initiatives which are generally undertaken after violent confrontations or tension spikes, and ‘long-run’ initiatives which have as primary goal to prevent such conflicts. The long-run initiatives we have identified are of different natures and are aimed at various publics. First is the reorganization or creation of some migrant organizations in order to attract members of the two (or more) conflict-related communities12. They want to offer a place for meetings where all can really meet “the Others”. This kind of association usually offers “general cultural activities” to its members. For the conflict-related communities for which the conflict is less sharp, as for example the Burundians, this type of ‘bi-community’ organizations is becoming less rare, notably in organizations conceiving development projects. But this kind of initiatives concerns all the communities under examination. For example, a Kosova Albanian organization attracts already for some years people from different origin: Albanian, Serbian as Belgians among others. 12. For example, concerning the people originating from Burundi, some organizations work with Hutus, Tutsis but also Twas.
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Everybody is really welcome. At the beginning it’s true that we aimed the Albanians. But for more than ten years, fifteen perhaps, it’s really mixed. We haven’t had a lot Serbs, it’s true, but there are not many Serbs who live here. And one of them has let us some of the best memories! (Albanian, Brussels) We [Hutu and Tutsi Burundians] develop common projects because we pursue the same goals: the reconstruction of our country of origin. It was becoming logical to associate. (Tutsi Burundian, Brussels)
The creation of meeting places and joint projects aims to put an end to the avoidance that generally illustrates the relationships between the conflict-related communities. However these initiatives meet several difficulties. One is that these organizations are generally frequented after a while by members of only one community despite of the efforts of their initiators. Another difficulty is that after the physical avoidance another kind of avoidance characterizes these organizations. A Hutu Rwandan respondent who manages an organization where a majority of Hutus but also some Tutsis have the habit to meet has mentioned that they use to avoid politics. The account of an Albanian point out the same: There are not many occasions where both groups communicate with each other. Sometimes real dialogue was difficult because everyone tried to be nice to each other without getting too close to touchy issues. (Albanian, Brussels)
The youth is a specific audience for some long-run initiatives. Two respondents are engaged in this kind of projects in Brussels. Both of them have explained that they were frightened by the stereotypes conveyed within young people. By their initiatives they want that “all voices can be heard”. In collaboration with some schools’ mediation cells Turks and Kurds have visited schools with a high rate of children with a Turkish or Kurdish background. Their aim was to explain to the young people what the situation in Turkey is and to recall them that violence in Brussels will not solve this sensitive and complex problem between Turks and Kurds. Another interesting initiative has been undertaken by a Sub-Saharan organization mainly managed by Congolese. Old Hutu and Tutsi women who had fled Rwanda have been invited in order to share their experience of the Rwandan civil war with the young people who frequent this organization. These ones – generally stemming from the second generation – have been invited to think about what they have learned and to make a movie on the basis of their reflections. The involvement as initiators or mediators of some Belgian civil society organizations in many long-run initiatives has to be pointed out. For example some “neighbourhood houses” (maisons de quartiers) located in districts with high rates of young Turks and Kurds organized activities like football matches and cinema projections. Some Christian organizations or institutions (i.e. ‘Pax Christi’, ‘Mutual Aid and Solidarity’, ‘Justice and Peace Commission of the French-Community of Belgium’, the Catholic University of Louvain) have also been involved in initiatives to promote the dialogue between Hutus and Tutsis originating from Burundi and more recently from Rwanda. Generally these initiatives give rise to round-tables where all parties in conflict are invited. To evaluate the positive springing of such initiatives is not the aim of this study. We just want to highlight the difficulty for these Belgian organizations or institutions to initiate or participate in such initiatives. Some of the Belgian organizations aforementioned have also been blamed for partiality by Hutu Rwandans during a focus groups. These persons, to base their assertions, have highlighted some other ‘partial’ initiatives. For example it has been reproached to Pax Christi to organize commemorations of Tutsi genocide committed in Rwanda in 1994. Beyond the Core Conflict | 40
In Belgium, Kurds and Turks undertook ‘one shot’ initiatives that have been relayed during the interviews and focus groups. These ones, more visible and focused on the public opinion, can be resumed in two kinds of actions: (1) joint news releases to condemn violent isolated acts or demonstrations and (2) organizations of ‘counter’ pacific demonstrations by the community seen as the initiator of this violence. For example, after the violent demonstration organized by some Turks after the death of twelve soldiers in Kurdistan in October 2007, six Turkish organizations organized a peaceful demonstration in front of the Schuman runabout. This demonstration brought together between 4,000 and 6,000 people. One Turk was really critic when he has talked about some counter-demonstrations organized by the “Turkish communities”, without more specification (we have asked but without success). Some groups and organisations organise frequent public gatherings that seem on the surface to be democratic and constructive platforms but in reality they aim to organise political support for one of their interest groups in the homeland. And behind the seemingly democratic platforms initiated by the organizations there is often a hidden agenda pursued by the organisers which is not as democratic as is publicly stated. Some of these groups act as the political wing violently waging conflicts in the homeland. They lobby and represent the political interests of the groups they are linked within the homeland. In this respect, their lobbying campaigns in Belgium are only geared to promote politically motivated and sinister activities that harden the already strained communal and ethnic relations and sharpen further political divisions in the homeland. The irony is that such groups and their clubs get subsidies from the French Community in order to finance their destructive activities. Nevertheless, it is through this particularistic tendency that certain Turkish organizations do influence the foreign policy of the Belgian government. (Turk, Brussels)
While we have already seen that the border between mitigation and fuelling initiatives are not always really delimited, the account of this respondent confirms our opinion that behind some ‘democratic expressions’ some ethnic leaders pursue hidden goals. 6.1.2. Initiatives of the Belgian Political Authorities The Belgian authorities have undertaken few initiatives to mitigate the transported conflicts. These ones can be divided in two categories according to their main objectives. Firstly, they can try to avoid violent confrontations or demonstrations they perceived as provocative. In this aim they exercise their prerogatives to forbid them, with more or less success. For some respondents, this kind of political decision is perceived as a total injustice. The mayor of Woluwe-Saint-Lambert, for example, was the target of some complaints of Hutu Rwandans that reproached him for forbidding the commemoration of 6nd April. The Mayor of Saint-Josse was also criticized for its decision to not authorize a demonstration of Kurds. Secondly, the political authorities can try to sustain some initiatives they consider having a positive impact on the migrant communities. This support translates generally into a financial allocation to an organization and/or a special event like conferences, seminars or round-tables organized by a migrant or a Belgian organization. In more rare cases but benefiting of more visibility, one or several political authority(ies) or institution(s) support(s) openly a special event. For the Belgian authorities the transported conflicts are very sensitive issues according to interviewed state employees: “What they do, it’s not the good solution and they are considered as partial.” This account finds an echo in the declarations of many respondents. Indeed, the majority of the interviewees, whatever the communities, think that the Belgian political authorities have no role to play in the transported conflicts. Besides those who consider that there is no conflict, others consider that it is their own problem. It is interesting to notice that several respondents have 41 | Beyond the Core Conflict
made reference to the incapacity of the Belgian authorities to solve their “own ethnic issue”. They have often expressed a kind of mistrust toward the role the Belgian authorities can play. Some also doubted their neutrality. It was notably the case of some Hutu Rwandans who considered that the Belgian government supports the Tutsi authorities in Rwanda and of some Kurds accusing some Belgian political party to greet some extremists Turks. When we have asked if they considered that political authorities of Brussels could help at conflict resolution between the communities, we have had answers like: Belgian authorities are controlled by Ankara. It’s enough to see how many members of the Turkish extreme-right are integrated among your politicians. What do you think we can hope with these Belgian elite? (Kurd, Brussels)
For another ‘mixed’ Rwandan respondent, Brussels authorities are too biased towards the Rwandan government’s perspective. According to him, they accept without further questions the “lists of the persons responsible for the genocide” and “submit them in accordance to the Kigali’s interests”. Therefore he considers that it is difficult for them to play a beneficial role in the transported conflict. Some recent developments in Belgium illustrate the difficulties for the Belgian political authorities to get involved in the mitigation of the transported conflicts. While for a long time the Belgian authorities were accused to let the Kurdish terrorism to develop in Belgium, the police operations that have occurred the 6nd March 2010 in Brussels have shocked the Kurdish community. A message posted on a Kurdish website is illuminating the point of view of the Kurds living in Brussels: “According to the received information, the Turkish Intelligence Services were very active in the recent operations against the PKK in Italy, in France and recently in Belgium. Just the day before and during the operation in Belgium, the Information Department of the head office of the Turkish State Security was in frequent communication with the Belgian police. Information supplied by Turkey constituted the base of the operation in Belgium.” (Milliyet, Tolga Sardan and Gökçer Tahincioglu, 6 March 2010). Four migrant organizations, among them one Turkish and one Kurdish, have published a news release “Stop the Belgian submission to terrorism of the Turkish State!” For the politicians with a foreign background the transported conflict and the pressure of their community of origin are even more difficult to manage, according to their accounts. It’s not easy all days, sure. There is not only the Kurdish issue, but also the Armenian one. The two are really important. […] Yes, there is a kind of pressure, more or less clearly expressed by some key persons. As politician elected, I don’t want to lie, thanks to the vote of the Turkish community for a major part, these issues are really difficult to manage. In a way I can understand the position of the Kurds, not their violence, the PKK’s attacks, I’m against all kind of violence, but I can understand some demands. But to express these ideas publicly is more or less impossible for me! […] You understand? (Politician with a Turkish background, Brussels)
According to their accounts, some Belgian politicians with a foreign background were targeted by many attacks by members of the other conflict-related community as by members of their own community who reproached them to not support their case. Koopmans and Staham (1999b, 1999a) have shown that the presence of elite allies plays a major role in the political mobilization of the migrants. On the other side, the importance of the ethnic vote cannot be neglected in the electoral success of some politicians of foreign origin (Jacobs et al. 2008). However, if we take the example of the Turkish conflict, the sharpest one in Brussels, the elected politicians with a Turkish background try to remain, at least publicly, mute as much as Beyond the Core Conflict | 42
possible. Previous experiences – notably those of one politician who expressed himself about the Armenian issue – have shown them how sensitive their positions are. 6.2. Evolution of the Belgian foreign and development policy Cohen (1997) suggests that diasporas – which have a broad range in his work and can apply to all communities under examination – can function as bridges between the particular and the universal. According to him, migrants are by their dispersion part of the globalisation of the world, but they also preserve their local cultures as part of their identity. In summary, they gain extra awareness and knowledge from their lives in two worlds. In the framework of this research we wanted to see if the political authorities consider the members of the studied communities as potential bridge-builders. We will also see how the members of these communities try to exercise an influence on the Belgian and European authorities in order to achieve their goals. 6.2.1. Initiatives of the migrant organizations As Demmers has pointed out (Demmers 2007: 7), “one of the main role of diasporas in the ‘deterritorialized conflicts’ is to mobilize external support”. This external support involves not only all the ‘compatriots’ living all around the world but also the persons, institutions and governments of their host societies. In Brussels two major ways to attract assistance of the non-compatriots can be easily distinguished: the first one consists to gain sympathy, the other resides in the demonstration that the core conflict is not only a national nor a regional problem, but is instead an international issue. To achieve these goals, they have developed some activities like public meetings, edition of leaflets or demonstrations in the streets of Brussels. Thanks to these activities promoting public education and relations they try to give rise to awareness on what happens in their country of origin (Horst 2007: 6). They aim to influence the Belgian population and foreign policy with regard to homeland politics. The second way of lobbying of the communities we have identified is linked to the campaigning and advocacy activities undertaken in order to influence the Belgian government or the European Union. Some of our respondents have indeed declared that they were involved in memorandums, fact sheets and more analytical books that they have tried to present by themselves as much as possible to the Belgian authorities. By these efforts, they want to have a positive impact on their country of origin in terms of policy changes, development programmes, debt cancellation, trade concessions, democratic governance and human rights issues. Ten years ago, Koopmans and Statham (1999b: 689) have pointed out in their study relative to political claims of migrants an “almost complete absence of claims making related to the EU”. Favell & Geddes (2000) were also surprised by the lack of ethnic political mobilization directed to the European institutions. Due to the concentrations of European institutions in Brussels many of our respondents are actually involved in activities aimed directly at the European Union. In the framework of this research we want to draw attention to the lobbying activities of two communities: the Kurdish and the Serbian ones. Having arrived in Belgium as Turks, the Kurds work since the eighties to get their ‘kurdishness’ recognized, not only by the international institutions, but also by their host society. While they were an oppressed minority in their country of origin, they had to face a similar problem when they arrived in Belgium (Østergaard-Nielsen 2005: 74). Now, everybody knows the Kurdish problem. It was not the same when I have settled in Belgium. Kurd? No one knew what it means! (Brussels, Kurd)
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Kurdish associations aim to defend the Kurdish rights by increasing public awareness on human rights abuses in Turkish Kurdistan. To achieve their goal they rely on legal and democratic pressure tools: briefings, petitions, conferences, and meetings. The media arrest of the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan, and the major Turkish step toward EU candidacy in 1999 have reinforced these means of action in the Kurdish community. These events, to take up the words of Vera EccariusKelly (Eccarius-Kelly 2002: 91), have “modified their structural, organizational, and strategic operations to adjust to a new reality. Abandoning the original goal of an independent Kurdistan, activists instead pursued national minority rights in Turkey”. They have realized that Turkish efforts to become a European Member States could be used in order to advance their own agenda. They try to exert pressure on Turkey through supranational political structures like the European institutions – instead of focusing exclusively on Turkish government officials – and to create frictions between the EU and Turkey in order to generate social and political reforms in Turkey. To achieve its goal, a Belgian-Kurdish organization often works with organizations representing other ‘oppressed minorities’ as the Assyrian and the Armenian ones and/or with diasporic Kurdish associations. Their concerns often overlap or intersect, and this reality facilitates transnational cooperation and collaboration on multiple levels. Blätte sees this lobbyism as the best illustration of the “Europeanization of the Kurdish movement” (Blätte 2006: 182). Last years, the Kurdish associations have organized numerous protests in Brussels. Another proof of this Europeanization is given by the recent creation or installation of transnational Kurdish Diaspora organizations such as The Kurdish National Congress and The Confederation of Kurdish Organizations in Europe (KON-KURD) which have opened offices in Brussels (Blätte 2006: 182). These pacific pressure tools seem to be taken seriously by the Ankara’s authorities such as extreme-right. Various examples were given during our interviews and focus groups about the way that the Kurdish government and some extremist groups have expressed their discontent. Two Kurdish respondents have talked about the murder of the parents of one of the Kurdish leader in Turkey. The link with the activities of their sons was clear for them: the parents received letters of intimidation for some weeks. Within a few years, two Serbian organizations had settled in Brussels in order to lobby toward the European institutions, and notably on the Kosovo issue. They promote their points of view thanks to articles, booklets or CD-ROMs. Here also the comments are moderated and the references to the international and European legislation are numerous. The Kosovo thematic is a sensible issue: they want to promote their solution for the Serbs still living in Kosovo while Serbia also wants to become a European member States (Serbia has officially applied for the EU membership in December 2009). 6.2.2. Initiatives of the Belgian Political Authorities When we have asked if the Belgian authorities have a role to play in the resolution of the conflict occurring in their country of origin the big majority have answered negatively. It was especially the case for the communities originating from the Great Lakes and the Turkish community. It was also often answered that Belgium has no real weight in comparison with the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or United Nations. However a deeper analysis has shown that many of them are involved in some kind of lobbying aiming for the Belgian authorities. Concerning an eventual role of the Belgian authorities in the mitigation of the core conflicts, the most critical were the respondents originating from one of the former Belgian colonies. We have already seen what the Belgian politicians can do in Rwanda. (Rwandan, Brussels)
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It’s not them who are going to help us! (Rwandan Brussels) We have a great country! Totally spoiled by the Belgians! And now there are still some [Congolese] who cry behind your colleagues: please help us, save us… And they think that we can stay like that, just looking what they are doing. […] They destroy our country. We can’t stay like that, we have to fight. (Congolese originating from Kivu, Brussels)
However, whether they are doubtful on the real impact that a country like Belgium can have on the politics of their country of origin, most of them have declared that they will accept such a proposition of collaboration with the ministries of foreign affairs. During the focus groups we have also asked the respondents if the Belgian ministry of foreign affairs have already asked their advice. In fact very few of them (3 persons) have been directly associated to this Belgian ministry. Indeed generally it has been by their embassy or main representatives that the respondents have participated to some meetings, round-tables or business trips with some Belgian political authorities. According to Mahamoud (2005: 34), “diasporas are invaluable information sources to Western governments and agencies as they often provide up-to-date information on the human rights and conflict situation”. Migrants have an invaluable knowledge of the needs of local populations, the reality on the ground and the resources needed to carry out projects of various sizes in their home countries. Migrants’ involvement in such initiatives springs not just from their attachment to their home countries and regions but also from the need that many of them feel to continue supporting their compatriots when “they have deserted them”. The idea of involving foreign communities in development activities is now becoming more and more widespread in Europe. Within a few years, various consultation programmes were established in different countries to take advantage of migrants’ experience and expertise. In Belgium, since 2001, such programs have been implemented in order to take advantage of the potential role that these communities can play for the development of their countries of origin. The Minister of Development and Cooperation has even talked about the creation of a “remittances and development fund”. It is interesting to notice that the communities originating from the Great Lakes are the main targets of such initiatives and even often the only ones. According to two persons involved in the selection of development initiatives and programmes this reality is mainly due to the fact that the first development programs launched in Belgium have received, except some exceptions, only answers of Sub-Saharan communities, and especially from the Congolese and Burundian communities. We wanted to know how the communities consider these co-development13 programs and the role they have in the creation and implementation of these initiatives. In other words, we wanted to know if the implementation of such programs is due to the “lobbying” of the transnational communities. It’s just to dazzle us. Have a look on the commission “Women and Development”. It’s the best example! The most important it’s not if the women have real knowledge of the countries but if they are French or Dutch speaking. Most of these women are Belgians and don’t know anything about the country. They just speak about feminist issues!
If the big majority of the participants of the “Great Lakes Region” focus group have saluted such 13. By ‘co-development’ we point out the programs, initiatives, undertaken and or managed both by some Belgian institutions or authorities in cooperation with migrant communities
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initiatives they were very critical to their implementation. According to them, there are not really listened to by the Belgian employees. According to some of them the Tutsi community is privileged in such activities, what was directly contradicted by some Tutsi participants. The interview of one civil servant gives an account of the unrest which reigns sometimes around the implementation of some co-development initiatives. Moreover he has declared that the Belgian political agenda remain the central point of all undertaken co-development activities. Mahamoud (2005: 9–10) contends that “if the domestic situation in the homeland is stable, diaspora tend to invest in activities that ameliorate poverty and contribute to developments such as community welfare projects and business investment as well as civic-related initiatives. However, if the situation in the homeland is not stable, diaspora tend to invest in partisan and politically related activities that are destructive. Thus, there is a direct correlation between the domestic situation in the homeland and the long-distance behaviour of the diaspora.”
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7. Impact on the integration process
M
igrants’ transnational political activities have a variety of consequences for both the country of origin and the country of settlement. Within the framework of the work package 5 of the infocon project a crucial question is: in which extent do the homeland-oriented political activities, and also the transported conflicts, affect the communities’ process of integration in the hosting countries and cities? To answer this question it is important to first define the different stakes that are involved in it. We identify three major ones, closely interrelated and often discussed by scholars in their studies on the integration issue. Firstly, some scholars argue that homeland-oriented activities undermine the integration process by maintaining a cultural orientation towards the homeland. Others go so far as to consider the transnational practices as the expression of a lack of integration in their host society (Alba and Nee 1997; Snel et al. 2006). At the opposite side, other scholars consider that homeland related political activities increase the level of political awareness of migrants and therefore constitute a first step in the process of integration (Portes 1999). Secondly, when it is referred to the transnational practices of migrants, the issue of their “loyalty” toward their host country is often questioned. Scholars like Hutington (2004) think that to have more than one civic identity is not only illegitimate but inherently contradictory. For him, binationalism or biculturalism is seen as evidence of divided loyalty and therefore such civic identities are a potential threat. For Scheffer, “the establishment of diaspora organizations and participation in those organizations can create the potential for dual authority, and consequently also for dual or divided loyalties or ambiguous loyalty vis-à-vis host countries. Development of such fragmented loyalties often results in conflicts between diasporas and their host societies and governments.” (Sheffer 2003: 81). At the opposite, other researchers have shown that the homeland-oriented civic engagement does not imply a civic disengagement in the host society. Fox and Bada (2009) highlight this kind of dual engagement that they define in terms of practices of “civic binationality”. For Zimmermann & al. (2006: 4) “the respective feelings for the host country and the country of origin do not need to be mutually exclusive but can be fluid and situational”. Thirdly, it is often thought that political transnational practices, and even more the transportation of the conflict, constitute an important threat for the social cohesion of the host society. At the opposite, scholars as Cohen (1997) and Mahamoud (2005) consider that migrants, by their privileged links with their country of origin and their country of settlement, can be considered as bridge-builders. To answer these crucial questions, it is important to listen to what our respondents have to say. Indeed three questions of the interview grid were more or less directly devoted to the selfperception of their own integration and the integration of their community in their city of settlement. We will also resort to the focus groups and the interviews that we have conducted with some politicians having a foreign origin. 7.1. Self-perception of the Respondents First it is important to highlight what the word ‘integration’ means to our respondents. We focus
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upon the situation in Belgium but it is interesting to notice that the answers were more or less the same in all the host cities and for all the communities involved. The terms and expressions “adjustment”, “participation”, “thinking like the [nationals of the country]”, “knowing norms and values of [the host country]”, “equality”, “self-development”, “to be considered as a full citizen”, “contribution to the society”, “feeling part of the country” were often used to express their ideas on this sensitive issue. References to the integration in the labour market, the knowledge of the language used in the host society, the integration of their children in the schooling system were many of the clues identified and expressed by the interviewees to testify of a full integration in the host country. In sum, the interviewees have highlighted (1) the sense of belonging to the host society, (2) the will shared by the migrants as by the host society to ‘meet each other’ and (3) the respect to the law, values and norms of their country of settlement. It is important to mention that the definition of the term “integration” has given rise to more criticisms from the interviewees in Belgium. For four respondents (two Turks, one Congolese and one Burundian) the term is just a political tool used by politicians to divide the citizens: on one hand, there are those who are ‘integrated’, who are considered full citizens and can benefit of everything and, on the other hand, the others, the ‘non-integrated’ “who have to prove all the time that they are deserving this”. According to them, the main trouble is that the evaluation criteria are not clear and they suspect that they are to an important extent subjective and linked to the immigrants’ origin. Nine respondents have clearly insisted to make a difference, crucial for them, between ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’. By highlighting this difference they demonstrate three important things. Firstly, they have already thought about this issue. They know the difference between the two concepts and are able to express it (this experience has been made during the interviews in Brussels when the respondents have talked about this issue). Secondly, they give great value to their “cultural heritage” or “cultural wealth” (expressions also often used during the interviews) that they generally define in terms of language, religion, rituals and values. Thirdly, many of them consider that their cultural heritage is not at all an obstacle to their integration. You have to learn the ‘codes’ of the country to be integrated. And to respect what the people believe, their values for example, their way of living. But I don’t think you have to conform to everything to be integrated. Integration is not assimilation. You can stay yourself and keep values you believe in. You have just to respect the others and hope that they will respect you in the same way. (Turk, Brussels)
In fact, many respondents have insisted on the importance to preserve some aspects they identify as typical of their own culture, their own identity. For one Burundian, it’s clear: “you have to know where you come from” (Tutsi Burundian, Brussels). Respondents in the other cities have also often insisted on this issue. When I am in a certain society, first of all I have to learn their language and also learn about the cultural background and how this society functions. For me it is also an opportunity to have a look at my own culture: What is good and what is bad. For me and my Kurdish identity, I want to keep what is good. But I also have the chance to adopt something positive (from the culture of the host country, JH). That is integration for me. (Kurd, Berlin) You need to participate in the community, but with preservation of your own identity. (Kosovo Albanian, Randstad) To participate in the society where you live and work. Don’t expect to speak perfectly Dutch
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or take over all customs: you’ll integrate on the point you are able to. You have to stay yourself. (Kosovo Albanian, Randstad) Integration is a condition where people get along well with each other because they get to know each other; when people respect each other. (Kosovar, Berlin)
One Serb living in London goes even further when he says: “It is easier to integrate if one is confident of one’s heritage.” (Kosovo Serb, London) When they have referred to their children, the discourse is noticeably different, and more especially for the first generation. If they wanted to transmit what they consider as something of their own cultural richness they also insisted upon the fact that the situation is different for the younger generations because most of their cultural references are those in the host country. For children, it’s different. […] They are here, they will live here, build their life here… Well, normally. They grow up here and, finally, they haven’t to make any effort to be integrated. (Albanian, Brussels) Language, you need language to communicate, and can’t do anything without it. It is also living together, having contacts here. Integration is however not assimilation, only for the second generation. (Burundian, Randstad)
As an answer to the sentiments of the first generation, the respondents of the second generation have declared that they appreciate the cultural heritage of their parents as a personal and social wealth. The stereotypes of some people can be denied. But to be the product of two cultures [Albanian and Belgian ones] so rich is just a gift. It is precious for having a better understanding of the other, his beliefs, his fears, his priorities in the life. […] I’ve constructed my personality at the crossroad of these two cultures… (Albanian, Brussels)
Some respondents have pointed out obstacles considering the integration in the host society. But in no case the respondents have identified these obstacles as being linked to their transnational activities. They generally referred to the various forms of discrimination that foreigners in general or the members of their community more especially, encounter in the labour market, in the housing system or in the education system. The obstacles ensue from the Belgian immigration and integration policies have also been highlighted many times. Some of them also mentioned a latent racism that they feel in various forms in administration, supermarkets, within schools their children attend or in their everyday life. Racism exists, even in a multicultural city as Brussels. It’s the reality. With the Belgians who know me, there is no trouble. But I can really feel sometimes a kind of mistrust and even sometimes hatred with people I encounter by coincidence in the streets, shops… It’s difficult to manage this kind of feeling, you can’t stop yourself to ask if you are really in your place in Belgium. (Burundian, Brussels) Integration means understanding the core of the Dutch culture, knowing the language and find a job. That’s very important. All Kosovars they know are integrated, they have accomplished something and especially those people are willing to do something for Kosovo. (Kosovo Albanian, Randstad)
The media coverage of the core conflicts has also been criticized by some respondents. Hutu Rwan49 | Beyond the Core Conflict
dans and also one Serb were especially critical. They consider that Belgian media, and especially some journalists, are partial and have “demonized” their community. More or less three quarters of our respondents estimated that they are integrated in the Belgian society. As proof of this many of them talked about their work or the school path of their children. It is interesting to notice that some of these interviewees have nevertheless talked about racism and discrimination. The question stays open: did they say they were integrated by shame to recognize that they were not, or does it mean that their capacity to manage their own life in Belgium is more important for them than the hostility and mistrust they feel sometimes, or did they talked in quality of leaders of a community they know stigmatize and did they not really speak for themselves? It is difficult in the framework of this research to answer this question. Around one quarter of our interviewees have said that they were not fully integrated. Most of the time they have given ‘external reasons’ to explain this fact and more especially they have pointed out the racism and discrimination they perceived in their host society. Often they have talked with resentment. You have taken us as slaves and nothing has changed, here [in Belgium] as there [in Congo]. Have a look on the person who brings your dustbins each day! (Congolese, Brussels) Integration is not a one-way street. The problem is that the Germans don’t accept the foreigners. That’s the main problem. (Kurd, Berlin)
Six of them have declared that their non-integration into the Belgian society is the consequence of their own will. They consider that they are only in Belgium for some years (even if three of them, one Congolese and two Rwandans, have been living in Belgium for more than 15 years) before to go back to their country of origin. It is interesting to notice that the organizations managed by these persons are exclusively centered on homeland politics. 7.2. Objectification According to Three Major Stakes On the basis of the self-perception of our respondents about their integration in the Belgian society as the more formal information we have, being it their professional activity or their familial status and social networks, we can say that the majority of them can be considered as integrated in Belgium if we consider that integration is “the process by which individuals participate to the collective life by the professional activity, the learning of the consumption norms, adoption of the familial and social behaviours, the establishment of relationships with the others” (Schnapper 1991: 99). Very few respondents are unemployed and several of them have jobs usually regarded as worthwhile (i.e. professor of university or high school, journalist, lawyer or civil servant). They are often members of other organizations, not only organizations focused on their community but also of Belgian ones. Especially in Belgium our respondents have no difficulties to estimate their political orientation in the Belgian system, while the Belgian system is certainly not the easies to understand.14 Most of them identified themselves at the left side of the political chessboard, with noteworthy exception for the communities originating from the Great Lakes Region. Indeed the big majority of them
14. We can suggest that the recent development concerning the right to vote as the increasing number of politicians with a migrant background in the Belgian political sphere explain this interest.
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have declared that they are centrists, and that they vote for the Humanist and Democrat Center (CDH), a party who has attracted many politicians originating from the Sub-Saharan Region. According to all this information we can answer our first stake and say that the transnational political activities of our respondents don’t constitute a break to their integration. At the opposite they have often been successful in Belgium, a country in which they involve themselves and show a big interest, notably in its political sphere. And all politicians with a migrant background we have met have declared that they were involved for a long time in some migrant organizations. It is a good base in the apprenticeship to listen, identify the core problems, manage the different point of views, and explain your point of view. In an organization, you share your problem and find relevant solutions for all the members. (Politician with a Turkish background, Brussels)
The second stake concerns the loyalty of the migrants who sustain homeland-oriented political activities. First, it is important to recall that no respondents have identified their transnational political or development activities as an obstacle to their integration. If some respondents justified their homeland-oriented activities by the racism and discrimination that they feel in the Belgian society, most of them gave other reasons to their political involvement. To summarize, we have mainly had two different answers: 1) they have fled their country of origin because of their political involvement or they were threatened and their migration has no impact on their will to support their country fellowships; 2) they have left their country of origin for a reason or another and want to help those who live there because they feel privileged. They justify their involvement, at the political level but also in their development activities, by a kind of sentimental link and the term “duty” was often used. It’s my country of origin, where I grew. Despite what happened, I’m even though attached to it… I can’t forget all the good things there were there: the family, the landscape… […] Me, here, I have made a new life for myself but I can’t forget those who have stayed there. It’s like a duty that I feel; it’s not because I’m here and that everything is fine… You know, there, nothing is settled. (Burundian, Brussels) It’s a duty. You understand? For me, it was no more possible there [Kurdistan]. But the fight continues. It’s really something important. You really don’t know how it’s there, you can’t imagine. We have to – us who have the possibility to express ourselves – support them. (Brussels, Kurd)
One respondent in the focus group seemed really exasperate when we have talked about homeland-oriented transnational activities. His intervention is interesting and has been greeted by the other participants of the ‘mixed’ focus group: It’s a good cause as another one. Here, in Belgium, I know many persons who are members of Amnesty International. Some of them are really very involved in those activities. Are they considered as extremists? […] I’m Kurd, I know many persons who still live there. […] This people is a victim of daily percussions, they live in miserable conditions […]. Is it not a just cause also? Does it mean that I don’t like the Belgium and that I can’t fight also for it if, for example, Belgium would be attacked, I don’t know… by the Chinese? I can guarantee you that me, as many other Kurds, we would fight with the same energy for this country. (Kurd, Brussels)
For most of them it seems that the full participation in the Belgian society and their homeland51 | Beyond the Core Conflict
oriented activities are not only non-exclusive but touch two different spheres of their everyday life in Belgium. For some of them their transnational activities are even part of their professional activities; either they received grants from the Communities (French and/or Flemish) or the Region Brussels-Capital and are employed by their organization, or in the framework of their work they have succeeded to valorise their privileged link with their country of origin. In these cases their privileged links with their country of origin or their foreign background are seen as ‘capital gain’ and their loyalty is not questioned. An issue tackled with our respondents concerned their self-identification. The majority of them have defined themselves according to at least two items, their country/region of origin and Belgium or Brussels. I’m many things. Kurdish-Belgian or Belgian-Kurdish. Sure that I’m the two, but I’m also a mother, an inhabitant of Brussels and more especially of Saint-Josse. I’m a painter, an artist, also. (Kurd, Brussels) I really can say what I want? […] I’m a citizen of the world. […] I have Turkish roots but I have constructed the major part of my life here, in Brussels. My son is now living in Spain and then now I have also a sentimental link with this country I didn’t know before… If I really want to explain who I am, it’s not a passport I need but a book! (Turk, Brussels) I cannot say 100% this or that. Of course, my childhood and education, it was Kurdish. But if you ask me, I have a lot of parts. Just like a mosaic. I have Kurdish parts, a lot of German parts, and I have Turkish parts. (Kurd, Berlin)
In fact, the self-identification of our respondents shows that many of them defend a kind of ‘mosaic identity’. Their identity seems to move on, to adapt to the evolution of their life. For most of them, we agree with Mohan and Zack-Williams (Mohan and Zack-Williams 2002: 217–218) when they say that identity is not something immutable or exclusive but it can be multiple, provisional and dynamic. So, the question of their loyalty seems irrelevant. Most of the respondents are not divided between two countries, but they have the feeling to be strongly linked with their country of origin and with their host country. The account of some politician with a foreign background has reinforced us in this appreciation. Then, yes, I have no trouble to present myself to elections in Belgium. I feel Belgian, with a strong link and an interest for another country. (Politician with a Turkish Background, Brussels) I’m Belgian but I also have a sharp knowledge of the way of life, the values, of the people originating from the Congo like me. (Politician with a Congolese background, Brussels)
The third issue is linked to the threat which can constitute the transnational political activities of our respondents and the transportation of conflict for the social cohesion of their host society. We can deny that some violent confrontations between conflict-related communities do not destabilize the social cohesion and give a bad picture of these communities. Several respondents, and more especially the Kurdish and Turkish ones, have shown that they were conscious of these problems. But we have also to take into account other elements in our analysis. First the transported conflicts are generally characterized by a more or less strict avoidance of the conflict-related communities and are expressed at the discursive and symbolic levels. They have not an important impact in the everyday life of many of our respondents and cannot be considered as an obstacle to the integration of their community or a destabilizing element for the Beyond the Core Conflict | 52
social cohesion. The sharpest transported conflicts are especially the ones between the Rwandan Hutus and Tutsis and between the Turks and the Kurds. For the first one there is no real confrontation insofar as they ‘fight in pre-recorded’. Violent confrontations are more especially visible for the Turkish and Kurdish communities. But can we say that these events can by themselves threaten the cohesion of the Belgian society? Especially, can we say that these events can totally occult all the other activities conducted by organizations? It is really difficult to give an answer to these questions but we can highlight an important fact. Indeed, we have seen that within the communities under examination many divisions still exists according to various criteria usually defined in reference of the homeland. The majority of these organizations try to solve the problems faced by immigrants and refugees in their country of settlement. In this sense, “a diasporic orientation towards the country of origin can also be a resource facilitating integration in the new country of settlement” (Wahlbeck 2002: 7). Moreover, the majority of the migrant organizations pursued what we can call ‘two-track’ strategies, sustaining their commitments to their communities of origin while working to improve the living conditions of their country fellowships in their host country. Some of our respondents are engaged in the mitigation of the transported conflicts but still more have developed activities in order to favour the sharing and the mutual respect between the members of their own community and all the populations making up the Belgian society. In this sense most of them can be considered as bridge-builders.
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8. Conclusion As Sayad (1991) pointed it out at the beginning of the nineties, an immigrant is above all an emigrant. Firstly, this fact involves that the immigrant has a specific relationship with a country besides the one he has with his country of settlement. Secondly, it implies also that the immigrant has a story of life that already has begun before its settlement and of which the roots are in another country. These truths have been denied for a long time. The dramatic events of 9/11 have shown that many conflicts are not any more contained in remote territories. Technological developments of these last years, whether it is in mobility or in communication, have had a major impact on the way these conflicts are transported in the host societies of the migrants. In Brussels, as in other European cities hosting many migrants like London, Berlin or in the Randstad region, the transportation of the core conflicts is a reality. Whether they are of low amplitude as the Kosovo conflict or sharper as the Kurdish conflict or the conflict opposing the Rwandans on an ethnic basis, they have a more or less important influence on the relationships that the conflict-related communities sustain with each other. While the avoidance seems the basic rule of these conflicts, they are generally also detectable at the discursive and symbolic levels. More visible for their host societies are the violent confrontations that occurred between Kurds and Turks in cities as Brussels and Berlin. Several factors, endogenous and exogenous ones, participate to the transportation of the core conflicts in the countries of settlement. Massive flows of refugees still full of bitterness and anger participate in it certainly. But these massive arrivals of asylum-seekers are not enough to explain the perpetuation of the transported conflicts. The role played by political authorities or politicomilitaristic fractions of the home country cannot be ignored. But, above all, the responsibility of some ethnic leaders has to be highlighted. These leaders are able to mobilise members of their community, notably the young people, against some obscure threats that the other conflict-related community is supposed to represent. So, they tend to reinforce and even multiply the social and political fragmentation already existing in the homeland. By their use of symbols and narratives they fuel without any doubt the transported conflict. And, in their hands, communication tools like Internet can become genuine weapons. However, the responsibilities of the transportation and perpetuation of the core conflicts have to be shared. The immigration and integration policies of the host countries have also a considerable impact. The precarious situation of some asylum-seekers as the lack of perspectives felt by many young people of the second and third generations constitute a fertile ground for the speeches full of hatred and vengeful of some ethnic leaders. On the other side, other ethnic leaders develop activities and organize events in order to mitigate the transported conflicts and work at the social cohesion of the Belgian society. Indeed, as these ethnic leaders have understood it, conflict mitigation and social cohesion are linked. Even if the transported conflicts have very little visibility within the host society they threat its social cohesion in the extent that they have a negative impact on the relationships between populations – the conflict-related communities – that constitute this society. Such leaders can also been involved in initiatives aiming at the mitigation and solving of the core conflicts. Besides their political activities directly pointing towards the political authorities of their country of origin some ethnic leaders lobby the Belgian authorities and try to influence the 55 | Beyond the Core Conflict
public opinion. Giving up the nationalist slogans many of them exposed their arguments nowadays in referring to the declaration of the Human Rights or the European Convention on Human Rights. Others want to participate actively to the reconstruction of their country of origin. This explorative research has raised many questions which merit further attention. We highlight some of them. First, it would be interesting to have a better understanding of the motivations of the ethnic leaders who knowingly fuel the transported conflicts. Another important question concern the way that the members of the conflict-related community, and not only their leaders, consider the transported conflicts and how they evaluate their impact on their everyday life. It would be also appreciable to have a better understanding of the various obstacles that the mitigation initiatives meet and their real impact that these initiatives have. Finally, the last question we wish to raise relates to the comparability of our results with other migrant communities who have also fled conflicts. In the perspective that the conflicts will continue for a while to be transported in the host cities of the migrants to answer these questions is crucial.
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