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India Post
April 16, 2010
www.indiapost.com
Fighting Naxalism: Need for change in strategy VINITA PRIYEDARSHI
W
hen Home Secretary GK Pillai said at a function in IDSA on March 5 that "the hardest fighting was still to come" against the Naxalites, few could have visualized that his statement would be proved right within a month. On April 6, the Maoist rebels killed 75 paramilitary policemen in an ambush in the thick forests of Mukrana in the Dantewada district of Chattisgarh (one of the strongholds of the Maoists).
to be counter-productive. It has been debated among the security analysts that smaller size force in a thinner jungle would be counterproductive and vice-versa. Untrained in specialist jungle warfare skills and operating in companysized formations, the CRPF personnel had restricted themselves. Therefore, one finds a lot of depth in the statement made by KPS Gill that each person in the patrol was carrying a considerable load. How can anyone be expected
Maoist rebels exercise at a base in the Abujh Marh forests, Chattisgarh
There were apprehensions expressed at the feelers coming from the Home Ministry that Operation Green Hunt had started yielding results and now when that apprehension has been proved right one needs to explore as to what went wrong with the Government's comprehensive offensive against the Naxalites. Insurgency can't be won without cooperation and coordination from the state police forces and yet it turned out that merely one local constable was accompanying the CRPF personnel. It has been debated time and again among the security analysts that the key to success in any counterinsurgency happens to be the knowledge of the terrain and yet the para-military forces were moving with only one local constable who was familiar with the terrain. The incident also points towards a lack of strategic thinking on the part of the Ministry which led to the forces falling into the trap laid out by the Naxals. The forces were caught near Chintalnar-Tarmetla village and the CRPF team had been camping in the interiors of Tarmetla jungles for the last three days as part of a combing operation and area domination exercise as revealed by Dantewada Superintendent of Police, Amresh Mishra. In any counter-insurgency operation, a large force has proved
to keep that level of alertness after such grueling march through the forest? Sending out a company on a four-day patrol into the forest was a ridiculous concept since Naxalites are not wandering around in these forests as big gangs to counter the police and yet it seems
According to counterinsurgency manual the troops are supposed to move on foot and in small numbers and yet almost 80 CRPF personnel were present and that too on a vehicle which could easily be spotted from a distance. There was gross violation of the basics of guerilla warfare that no thought was given to these details before sending the CRPF on the task of area domination. Information coming from the Home Ministry points that the CRPF men were lured by false information provided by some informer despite the fact that the CRPF has no independent intelligence capability. How much the intelligence gathered really helps the counter-insurgency force is it-
self questionable considering that fact that the problem lies in locating exactly where the Naxals are hiding in deep forest which is very difficult to penetrate. The Naxals usually create their camp near an elevated land and place their sentries on top of the hill to keep track of the arriving police forces through night vision. They will easily retreat as and when they perceive that the battle is not going to be in their favor. The Chattisgarh ambush was no different. The Maoists had hidden themselves and also laid the surrounding hillocks and bushes with mines knowing well that in case of an offensive, the security forces would be forced to recede to the surrounding hillocks and bushes. According to counterinsurgency manual the troops are supposed to move on foot and in small numbers and yet almost 80 CRPF personnel were present and that too on a vehicle which could easily be spotted from a distance. There was gross violation of the basics of fighting guerilla warfare and the troops paid heavily for the neglect. It wasn't a prudent step on the part of the Home Ministry to plan an offensive against the Naxalites under the guidance and supervision of the CRPF. It is the police who apart from having the knowledge of the culture, the ethos, and language of the people have a bond with the people. They also have a better chance of gathering information from local sources. The success of Greyhounds has shown how effective a trained state police force could be in fighting the insurgents and yet no lessons have been learnt from that. It is true that success of counter-insurgency force in one state would lead to Naxalites taking refuge in the adjoining areas and to counter that one needs a coordinated and comprehensive offensive between the centre and the state. However in every state it should be the trained state police force who should lead the operation and the central forces should be assisting them. Every state affected with Naxalism should raise its own Special task forces (much on the pattern of Greyhounds) and then coordination should be sought among the Special Task Forces of different Naxal affected states. The role of the Centre should be to provide the resources and coordinate. The writer is Research Associate, USI-CS3, United Service Institution of India. Courtesy IPCS
India Post Reactive power
T
he increasing Maoist attacks in India serve to highlight the problem of poverty and neglect of a large section of the population. After the massacre of 75 security personnel in Chattisgarh's Dantewada district, there is no option left with the Indian government but to hit back hard. The perception however persists that India's police and security forces are ill-equipped, ill trained and also handicapped in the absence of intelligence. Merely increasing the number of combatants who are not battle ready is providing cannon fodder for the trained cadres of Maoists. India's Home Minister P Chidamabaram now has his hands full. Keeping Pak-trained terrorists at bay is only one of his missions on which there can be no let up. The Maoists have opened another front and tackling them also can brook no delay. India is in the spotlight because of a number of international sporting events are now under way or will soon be taking place. These will be tempting targets for the terrorists. While the government is engaged in tightening security in places like Delhi where the major events are to take place, its capacities will be stretched to ensure no untoward incident takes place anywhere in the country. For countries like Pakistan and China would be interested in seeing that India trips up and its international reputation as a safe place is dented. There could not have been a worse time for the Maoist insurgency to raise its tempo. If Pakistan is plagued by its home grown Taliban terrorists turning their guns on their own, it can be argued India is becoming equally vulnerable to the Leftist violence within. Long years of neglect of the poor and the tribals, it seems, is now being compounded by mining rights being given to powerful industrialists and the tribals are being hounded out of their homes and hearth. If they find the Maoists sympathising with their cause and coming to their aid, the tribals easily fall into their trap of organised violent resistance. If in Pakistan there are Taliban areas where the government's writ does not run, in India too the government has no control over areas dominated by the Maoists. The logic of governance in India is that the government won't act unless it is forced to. It is being increasingly felt and admitted that India is a reactive power. It doesn't take initiatives and does not think ahead. There is no vision and no anticipation of events. This was confirmed recently by India's Civil Aviation Minister Praful Patel who during his recent New York visit admitted "we don't build infrastructure and then create demand, we let demand force us to build infrastructure." This raised some laughter but unwittingly the minister had outlined India's policies. Or rather the policies of its politicians. Initiatives on tackling poverty began only after international agencies exposed the wide gap between the haves and have nots. And now when the Maoists have stolen a march in tactics, training and motivation there would be post mortems and post-event planning. The downside is that while the government's planning and strategies are out in the open and under debate, the Maoists are learning from government's mistakes and already planning the next move. In the case of our treacherous neighbours also we wait till they have struck and then start thinking how to deal with them. Even as we think up strategies to deal with Pakistan, China has perfected the next level of warfare. Chinese spy networks have hacked into Indian official computers and stolen information on Northeast security to Naxalite dossiers, missile defense and diplomatic secrets. There is no time for India's ministers to laugh.