FOREWORD
CBRN:
T
a versatile repertoire
hree separate recent events involving the use of chemical weapons (CW) are changing the paradigm of their usage by state and non-state actors. These are: the use of banned sarin nerve agent in Syria by the al-Assad regime; the continuing terrorist use of chlorine and mustard agent in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by ISIS; and the application of VX nerve agent in an assassination of one individual at a Malaysian airport. In late April French Intelligence and Human Rights Watch confirmed the Syrian government most likely used a Soviet-made weapon containing the nerve agent sarin in its 4 April attack on the town of Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib Province, Syria, in which at least 80 died. The presence of a chemical warfare agent (CWA) on any component or fragment of a weapon, as well as degradation products, by-products, and additives, link the CWA used with the weapon - and possibly the perpetrator. Air-dropped bombs narrowed the suspects to forces with aircraft. French intelligence confirmed that hexamine, a hallmark of sarin produced by the Syrian government, was found in samples taken from the attack site. In early May Israeli military officials said information gathered by national intelligence services indicated the Assad regime still possessed 1-3 tons of CW after the OPCW had supervised the dismantling of Syria’s declared stockpile in 2014. Although the ISIS self-proclaimed
caliphate has shrunk considerably since the onset of the US-led campaign against the group in Iraq and Syria, so long as it continues to control territory the group will continue to have a relatively safe haven to develop and gain experience with CB, and possibly R, weapons – although it is difficult, as in most cases of CBRN, to assess their true capabilities. There are doubts as to how easily terrorists could obtain the materials for a mass CBRN attack or, significantly, the means and skills to weaponize. This could partly explain why IEDs remain the terrorist weapon of choice, along with low tech M.O. of guns, knives and trucks, all of which produce the desired instant, widespread, and horrifying media effect. Meanwhile, at the other increasingly dangerous side of the world, on 13 February the half-brother of North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-nam, was killed with the nerve agent VX after two women accosted him briefly in a check-in hall at Kuala Lumpur airport. On 25 February one of the women arrested for the murder said she was paid to smear the victim’s face with “baby oil” as part of a reality show joke. Precursors may have been smuggled into Malaysia and put together there immediately prior to use with commercially available chemicals. The attack has echoes of the murder with the rare radioisotope polonium-210 of Russian dissident Alexander Litvinenko in London in November 2006, and of the lethal poisoning in September 1978 of a Bulgarian dissident, Georgi Markov, with a ricin-tipped umbrella - also in London. And that a similar signal was being sent out by the North Koreans: that they can carry out very nonconventional and targeted assassinations. North Korea is reputed by South Korean intelligence and the CIA to hold a staggering 2-5,000 tons of various types of nerve agent. Possible delivery systems are multiple rocket launchers, FROG rockets, Scud and Nodong missiles, aircraft, and long-range artillery deployed in the DMZ and ballistic missiles. Amidst rising tensions over Kim Jong-Un’s enhanced belligerence to the region and beyond, fears grow that he could sell the means to launch CW to terrorist groups. While the world’s attention focuses on its nuclear ambitions, the pariah Far Eastern state is showing its CBRN repertoire may become increasingly versatile. zy
In this edition CBNW Publisher Tina Naji conducts an exclusive interview with the Director-General of the OPCW; Ilja M. Bonsen speaks to the Commander of the Bundeswehr’s CBRN Defence Command; David Oliver meets the President of Paul Boyé Technologies; Col Hamish de Bretton Gordon presents chemical weapon use in the Middle East as a new norm; Editor Det. Supt. Ian Womersley describes how the UK’s National CBRN Centre works with multiple agencies; Brig Gen Stewart discusses US CBRN funding in the Age of Trump; Dee Ruelas focuses on communications in CBRN emergency response; the founders of Epiguard outline how Ebola spurred their medevac innovation; Katja Kiukas looks at maritime CBRN monitoring; Zyg Dembek asks what comes after Byron’s Botulism; and Andy Oppenheimer warns of the dangers to nuclear infrastructure from cyber-attack.
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