1FreeMarketAccessforLDCs by IDIA

The Institute for Domestic and International Affairs

World Trade Organization Free Market Access for Lesser Developed Countries Rutgers Model United Nations 16-19 November 2006

Director: Dozieâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Uzoma

ÂŠ 2006 Institute for Domestic & International Affairs, Inc. (IDIA) This document is solely for use in preparation for Rutgers Model United Nations 2006. Use for other purposes is not permitted without the express written consent of IDIA. For more information, please write us at idiainfo@idia.net

Introduction _________________________________________________________________ 1 Background _________________________________________________________________ 3 State of Affairs in LDCs____________________________________________________________ 5 Reasons for Free Market Access for LDCs ____________________________________________ 7 Reasons Why LDCs Oppose Free Markets in Some Cases________________________________ 8

Current Status _______________________________________________________________ 9 Later WTO Trade Deliberations____________________________________________________ 10

Key Positions _______________________________________________________________ 16 Regional Positions________________________________________________________________ 17 Commonwealth of Nations ________________________________________________________________17 European Union ________________________________________________________________________18

Africa __________________________________________________________________________ 19 State Positions ___________________________________________________________________ 19 United States ___________________________________________________________________________19 Brazil_________________________________________________________________________________21 India _________________________________________________________________________________21 Australia ______________________________________________________________________________22 Japan _________________________________________________________________________________23

Developing States ________________________________________________________________ 23 G-20 _________________________________________________________________________________23 Least Developed Countries ________________________________________________________________24

Business Interests ________________________________________________________________ 24 Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Positions_____________________________________ 25 The Relationship of the World Trade Organization and NGOs ____________________________________25 Oxfam International _____________________________________________________________________26 Our World Is Not For Sale ________________________________________________________________26

Summary___________________________________________________________________ 27 Discussion Questions _________________________________________________________ 28 Works Cited ________________________________________________________________ 29

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Introduction Within the international economic system there are disparities between the opportunities available to developed states to conduct global trade and the ability of underdeveloped and developing states to participate in world markets. Poor countries are severely hampered in their access to global markets due in large part to many tradedistorting practices implemented by developed

states

serve

protectionist measures for their individual

countriesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;

domestic

economies.

These tactics include

import and export tariffs, quotas, and subsidies. provided

The advantages

businesses

and

producers in wealthy states by these economic strategies have negative implications

for

underdeveloped

Tariff: A tariff is a tax placed on imported and/or exported goods, sometimes called a customs duty. A revenue tariff is set with the intent of raising money for the government. A protective tariff, usually applied to imported goods, is intended to artificially inflate prices of imports and â&#x20AC;&#x153;protectâ&#x20AC;? domestic industries from foreign competition. Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tariff Quota: A government-imposed restriction on quantity, or sometimes on total value. 2. An import quota specifies the maximum amount of an import per year, typically administered with import licenses that may be sold or directly allocated, to individuals or firms, domestic or foreign. May be global, bilateral, or by country. 3. And IMF quota. Source: www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/q.html

at such an advantage that poor

Subsidy: A payment by a government to producers of certain goods to enable them to sell the goods to the public at a low price, to compete with foreign competition, to avoid making redundancies and creating unemployment, etc. In general, subsidies distort international trade and are unpopular but they are sometimes used by governments to help to establish a new industry in a country.

countries

Source: www.promitheas.com/glossary.php

and

developing

societies,

and

prevent equality in the global economy because wealthy states are

compete.

are

unable

While

even

governments

generally intervene in the economy to promote state interests, practices that insulate businesses and producers from competition are implemented at the expense of developing states that are unable to foster meaningful economic progress. Economic instability breeds poverty within least developed and developing countries that is responsible for myriad problems including improper sanitation, hunger, agricultural

challenges,

disease,

AIDS,

politically

instability,

and

inadequate

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infrastructure. Promoting sustainable economic development and stability in these states would be the first step in remedying many of these challenges. Allowing market access for underdeveloped and developed states, would allow them to conduct transactions that encourage growth, creating profits and wealth. Such access to markets can only be achieved through bilateral multilateral trade agreements developed among states and by the membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Through the WTO, wealthy countries limit or suspend their trade distorting policies to benefit poor states â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a measure that requires altruism and pragmatism alike on the behalf of developed nations. Since November 2001, WTO member states have been negotiating multilateral trade agreements regarding market access for least developed and developing states. The Doha Round: The Doha round of World Trade Organization negotiations aims to lower barriers to trade around the world, with a focus on making trade fairer for developing countries. Talks have been hung over a divide between the rich, developed countries, and the major developing countries (represented by the G20). Agricultural subsidies are the most significant issue upon which agreement has been hardest to negotiate.

series of negotiations, called the Doha Round,

Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doha_round

dismantle their agricultural subsidy programs

have primarily discussed tariffs and subsidies. Talks have stalled on several occasions because of the inability of world powers to agree upon select issues, with the foremost obstacle being concerns pertaining to the agricultural sector. The United States and the European Union are reluctant to

despite the negative impact they have on trade in the underdeveloped and developing world. Representatives from these states, in turn, label the West as being uncooperative. Despite the reticence of Western powers to commit to a multilateral agreement, there have been several initiatives that have taken measures toward limiting subsidies, removing tariffs, and ending quotas. Such efforts include the Everything But Arms program and the African Growth and Opportunity Act. Market access is vital if states are to flourish and prosper economically; however achieving universal right of entry into global markets requires unprecedented cooperation and coordination among world governments

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Background Throughout history, almost all governments have intervened in markets for goods and services in ways that have distorted international commerce. In fact, it could be argued that any government involvement results in distortions.

Organizations,

institutions and agreements have been established in order to combat the effects of governmental interventions in world trade. Of particular importance in the past 75 years is

the

General

Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade

which,

(GATT),

since

its

inception in 1948, has

GATT: An agreement negotiated in 1947 among 23 countries, including the U.S., to increase international trade by reducing tariffs and other trade barriers. This multilateral agreement provides a code of conduct for international commerce. GATT also provides a framework for periodic multilateral negotiations on trade liberalization and expansion. Source: www.cce.cornell.edu/washington/Ag/NewFarmer/Course/Glossary.html

seen the lowering of many tariffs, particularly against manufactured goods of Less Developed Countries (LDCs).1 In 1971, the international trading community agreed to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which allowed states to establish lower tariffs on manufactured goods exported by developing states. While this effort offers clear opportunities for developing states to access the global marketplace, it also contravenes the founding precepts of GATT, which call for equal treatment of states in all aspects. Developed states saw the GSP as an opportunity to assist underdeveloped economies to expand with limited negative affects on the overall marketplace. Perhaps, the most formidable of all trade negotiations and talks took place in Punta del Este, Uruguay in 1986. More commonly known as the Uruguay Round, this set of multilateral trade negotiations covered more issues and involved more countries than any previous effort. The Uruguay Round produced the Final Act, which outlines, among other things, “that tariffs on industrial products be reduced by an average of more than one-third and that trade in agricultural goods be progressively liberalized.” Finally, it called for the establishment of the World Trade Organization to facilitate the 1

Anderson, Kym, “On the Virtues of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,” Economic Record. Volume:81. Issue255, 2005, p.414+.

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implementation of multilateral trade agreements and to serve as a forum for future negotiations.2 On 1 January 1995, GATT was absorbed into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Thus far, the WTO has stayed true to its vision as established by the Final Act, as it provides a forum in which governments can talk and negotiate.

Moreover, the WTO has

evolved into an institution in which policies are developed to allow trade to flow more freely, including removal of barriers and other obstacles. While the WTO helps to eliminate these hurdles, GATT provides the rules for the trading system.3

The WTO has

implemented several policies to help this facilitation including most favored nation (MFN) status which simply means to treat every state equally and

WTO Least Developed Countries Angola Malawi Bangladesh Maldives Benin Mali Burkina Faso Mauritania Burundi Mozambique Cambodia Myanmar Central African Republic Nepal Chad Niger Democratic Republic of the Congo Rwanda Djibouti Senegal Gambia Sierra Leone Guinea Solomon Islands Guinea Bissau Tanzania Haiti Togo Lesotho Uganda Madagascar Zambia Eight additional least-developed countries are in the process of accession to the WTO. They are: Bhutan, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Laos, Samoa, Sudan, Vanuatu and Yemen. Furthermore, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome & Principe are WTO Observers. There are no WTO definitions of “developed” or “developing” countries. Developing countries in the WTO are designated on the basis of self-selection although this is not necessarily automatically accepted in all WTO bodies.

that members of the WTO cannot discriminate against other members. The second policy that the WTO has developed to promote free trade is that of national treatment, which means both foreign and domestic goods should be treated equally.4 Since its inception, the WTO has had numerous projects on its agenda. Comprising about two thirds of the WTOs members, LDCs and their scope of market access has been continuously discussed, yet a firm decision on the matter has yet to be 2

Fieleke, Norman S., “The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations: an overview,” New England Economic Review, Publication

“What is the World Trade Organization?,” World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm, Accessed 25 July 2006. 4 Ibid.

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reached. The reason why there is such a strong push from LDCs is that more liberalized trading policies, those that allow the unrestricted flow of goods and services, help to “sharpen competition, motivate innovation and breed success. They multiply the rewards that result from producing the best products, with the best design, at the best price.”5 Since the Uruguay Round agreements were signed in 1994, several decisions in favor of LDCs have been made. During a meeting in Singapore in 1996, the WTO agreed on a Plan of Action for Least-Developed Countries which includes technical assistance and a promise from developed states to improve market access for products exported by LDCs.6 In October 1997, The Integrated Framework, a technical assistance program created specifically for LDCs, brought together the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Trade Centre, the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Bank (WB), to specifically address the development of trading rules that would be fair for underdeveloped states. In 2002, the WTO established its own program for least-developed countries, which promotes improved market access, more technical assistance, support for agencies working on the diversification of the economies of least developed countries, and a streamlined process through which LDCs can join the WTO.

State of Affairs in LDCs In order to understand the why LDCs feel so strongly about tariffs and other trade barriers, one must first look at what economic hardships these states are facing. For example, “half the population in sub-Saharan Africa lives in absolute poverty. And, uniquely, whereas the economy is improving in other areas of the world, Africa is getting poorer. The average income per capita is lower now than it was 30 years ago”7 and it has been estimated that the gross domestic product (GDP) of Africa will decrease by ten per cent as a direct result of climate change. In Africa, most poor states are landlocked and do not have the infrastructure necessary to adequately support trade. They lack the 5 6 7

Ibid. Ibid. Tony Blair, “A Year of Huge Challenges,” Economist, 1 January 2005.

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problems that plagues most LDCs is that

Gross Domestic Product: In economics, the gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of the amount of the economic production of a particular territory in financial capital terms during a specific time period. It is one of the measures of national income and output. It is often seen as an indicator of the standard of living in a country, but there are some problems with this view.

of widespread malnutrition and hunger

Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product

to effectively make their exports available to be shipped to other states.8 One

the

most

significant

along with the “mismanagement of natural resources in food production.”9 As other areas like East and South East Asia have experienced high yield agricultural growth, the need to expand agricultural production to other areas has diminished.

“In many other areas, including sub-Saharan Africa,

stagnating yields combined with rapid population growth forced farmers into new lands poorly suited for agriculture, causing deforestation and land degradation.”10 In order to achieve a sustainable level of food supply, it is important that developed states end trade distorting agricultural practices that raise the cost of basic food supplies to protect stagnant industries. Member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) impose a variety of practically unattainable policies for LDCs, for example requiring a certain level of sanitation and food safety that LDCs cannot meet.

Also,

some agricultural tariffs average more than 40 per cent and on some products they rise above 300 per cent. In addition to high tariffs, other protective trade barriers are hurting LDCs such as quotas and technical barriers.11 Another source of difficulty for LDCs is that of armed conflict. About half of African states are currently unstable or in armed conflict. Research shows that there is a

Rameriz, Martin J., “Peace and Development in Africa,” International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 22, 2005. Pinstrup- Andersen, Per, “Food Security in Developing Countries Why Government Action is Needed,” United Nations, UN Chronicle, Vol. 40, September-November 2003. 10 Ibid. 11 Annan, Kofi, “Best Hope For Least-Developed Countries,” United Nations, Presidents & Prime Ministers, Vol. 10, May 2001. 9

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definitive link between poverty, hunger and the probability of armed conflict and political unrest.12

Reasons for Free Market Access for LDCs LDCs have two primary exports, agriculture and labor-intensive manufactures, like textiles and clothing. Agriculture alone accounts for about 27 per cent of GDP in developing countries, a similar share of exports, and yet represents 50 per cent of employment. These goods have suffered stagnating demand and have been battered by volatile prices. Also, these areas are heavily protected not only in industrialized countries but also in LDCs.13 Making developed stated unwilling to change their policies regarding LDCs is what they consider to be unnecessarily high tariff barriers. Developing countries have an average tariff of 14 per cent and LDCs have an averages tariff of 17.9 per cent, while developed states have an average tariff of 5.2 per cent. While LDCs are advocating that developed states lower their barriers, industrialized states are calling for parity.14 In light of this disagreement, all states wind up losing, as trade at any level is beneficial to both importers and exporters. The difficulty that LDCs face is that since their economies are so much smaller than those of developed states, the economic impacts of these barriers are significantly worse than those of their counterparts. The World Bank estimated that “annual static welfare gains from eliminating barriers to merchandise trade range from $250 billion to $620 billion, of which one-third to one-half would accrue to developing countries.”15 That is, these trade barriers had significant impact on the poorest trading states.

Messer, E., M. Cohen and T. Marchione. “Conflict: A Cause and Effect of Hunger.” Environmental Change and Security Project Report No. 7. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, 2001. 13 Lankes, Hans Peter, “Market Access for Developing Countries,” International Monetary Fund, Finance and Development, September 2002, Volume 39, Number 3. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid.

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In order to improve the standard of living for populations in LDCs, market regulation must be done in ways that do not distort natural tendencies of the markets.16 The logic behind this idea is that LDCs produce goods at lower costs. They have raw materials and excess of supply in labor resulting in lower wages. The profit margin for goods exported by LDCs in a free trade market could be significant. All other things being equal, the same good would have less of a profit margin in developed state because of this higher costs of labor and manufacturing, causing developed states to raise prices in order to compete with goods from LDCs. Consumers would then be able to choose between cheaper goods from developing countries, or more expensive goods from developed states, and would probably choose the former.

Reasons Why LDCs Oppose Free Markets in Some Cases Despite the proven positive economic gains from eliminating trade disparities, most states maintain at least some protectionist policies, in an effort to protect infant industries, to diminish unemployment, to maintain balance of payments, to increase tax revenues, and to protect environmental and labor standards, among other reasons. Some states are hesitant to remove restrictive trade barriers for purely political reasons. When trade is liberalized, or when it becomes easier for LDCs to export to other states, there can be negative repercussions. Although trade will certainly boost the economy of states in general, sectors within those economies will prosper to differing degrees. When a developed economy, made up of primarily skilled workers, grants access to its markets from labor-rich states with unskilled workers, the laws of economics state that jobs will flow to the state that can produce the goods more cheaply, resulting in lower prices in the developed state. Moreover, this process will free up skilled labor in the developing state to be employed in more complicated industries. In situations such as this, lawmakers in the developed state may be reluctant to open their markets as it will

Sundrum, R. M., Income distribution in Less-Developed Countries, Routledge 1992, 270.

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likely result in the loss of jobs. The economic benefit of lower prices in the developed state is outweighed by the perception of lost jobs.17 If an LDC takes advantage of free market access, it is not guaranteed to profit. The 1990s saw a slow and steady decline on the price of commodities – the primary exports of LDCs. Of this process, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization concluded, “prices for most commodities are low by historic standards, but it is not so certain that they can be said to be too low given current market conditions of demand and supply.”18 As trade barriers were removed, the market for agricultural commodities was allowed to reorient itself to lower equilibrium prices, the point at which supply equaled demand. While developing states were able to export their commodities, they were only able to do so at lower prices, resulting in lower than expected revenue and further economic marginalization.

By implementing a tariff regime, LDCs are able to

manipulate the prices of their good to ensure higher prices. What they cannot control, however, is the level of demand for those goods at the arbitrarily adjusted prices.19

Current Status On 21 March 2005, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued the report, “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All” marking the sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations, and the five year anniversary of the declaration of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). One of the eight goals is the establishment of a global partnership for development, and encompasses the formation of “an open trading and financial system that is rules-based, predictable, and non-discriminatory, [that] includes a commitment to good governance, development, and

Ibid. “Issues in World Commodity Markets”, presented by Hartwig de Haen, Assistant Director-General, Economics and Social Department, to the Consultation on Agricultural Commodity Price Problems, Commodities and Trade Division, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, Rome, 25-26 March 2002, p.15. 19 Greenfield, Gerald, “Free Market Freefall: Declining Agriculutal Commodity Prices and the ‘Market Access’ Myth,” Focus on: the Global South, 3 June 2004, http://www.focusweb.org/content/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=306&Itemid=29, Accessed 28 July 2006. 18

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reduction

internationally.”20

–

nationally

and

The MDGs also pay

specific attention to the unique concerns of the least developed countries. Among the special

provisions

accorded

undeveloped states are “tariff and quota free access for their exports; enhanced debt relief for heavily indebted poor counties; cancellation of official bilateral debt;

and

generous

official

Millennium Development Goals All 191 United Nations Members States made a commitment to the MDGs in 2000, with an aim to achieve them by 2015. They are: • • • • • • • •

Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger Achieve universal primary education Promote gender equality and empower women Reduce child mortality Improve maternal health Combat HIV and AIDS, malaria and other diseases Ensure environmental sustainability Develop a global partnership for development

Source: www.eu2005.gov.uk/servlet/Front

development assistance for countries committed to poverty reduction.”21 The secretary-general’s report served as a forum for Annan to elaborate on the Millennium Goals by calling for trade reform through the World Trade Organization. Within the section labeled “Freedom from Want,” Annan asserts that open trading policies can foster immense economic progress.

The report proposes combining

equitable systems of trade with the allotment of aid in order to decrease global poverty. Underdeveloped and developing states are often unable to participate in global trade because they do not have access to markets due measures such as tariffs, quotas, and subsidies used by economic powers in order to reduce risk for their own producers. These conditions create an economic system with enormous barriers to entry for the world’s poorest states.22

Later WTO Trade Deliberations The Doha Round is a series of negotiations conducted by the WTO named for the location of the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar. WTO members met in November 2001 after the Third Ministerial Conference planned for Seattle in 1999 was 20

“What are the Millennium Development Goals?.” UN Millennium Development Goals. United Nations. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. 21 Ibid. 22 “‘In Larger Freedom’: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All.”

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postponed and relocated due to extensive protests, and the remote Middle Eastern location of the Doha Round was much more secure and manageable. The meeting established the Doha Development Agenda which opened five year negotiations pertaining to a wide range of issues such as the removal of barriers to agricultural and manufacturing markets.

There were nineteen total provisions addressed by the

Development Agenda making agreement on all terms a formidable task. Those in favor of the talks commended the WTO and global powers for their efforts to make world trade fair for underdeveloped and developing states while detractors condemned the Doha Conference for interfering with states’ domestic policy.23 Discussion continued between WTO members during the Fifth Ministerial Conference, held from 10-14 September 2003 in Cancun, Mexico.24 The purpose of this meeting was to come to a definitive agreement regarding the aims established in Doha. The talks collapsed without an agreement after only four days when delegates were unable to reach consensus regarding agricultural subsidies, the service trade, and a renovated customs code.25 The failed negotiations in Cancun marked the development of the G-20 trade bloc comprised of developing and industrialized states. The G-20 is led by members known as the G-4: China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. Although the group’s membership fluctuates, these four powers remain steady as its leadership.26 Efforts were rekindled later that year as talks were conducted in Geneva during August 2004, and after five days of negotiations, a deal was approved by all 147 members of the WTO. The agreement called for wealthy states to reduce farm subsidies and developing states to open markets for manufactured products. Other key points of the negotiations addressed more stringent rules for state aid for rural development and the simplification

“World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda.” Open CRS: Congressional Research Reports for the People. 10 July 2006. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.opencrs.com/document/RL32060/. 24 Ibid. 25 “Q&A: WTO trade breakthrough” BBC News. 1 August 2004. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3943439.stm. 26 Ibid.

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Developing states retained the right to protect goods or

products deemed as critical to the welfare of their economies. The United States, the European Union, Brazil, and Japan were the nations most crucial in forming an agreement, as they represent the vast majority of global trade. Although these states agreed to eliminate export subsidies and lower tariff barriers, they did not set a date for these changes to take effect. The only immediate action taken called for a twenty per cent reduction in the maximum permitted payments that wealthy states can grant in subsidies to domestic producers.28 The World Bank estimated that if the tariff cuts for developed and developing states alike were successfully implemented, the result would be up to U.S.D $520 billion added to the world economy. Of this sum, most would go to underdeveloped and developing states.29 Although Geneva marked a victory in the global trade negotiations, it by no means served as a long-term resolution to the dispute. Members of the WTO sought to resolve many of the lingering issues prior to the Sixth Ministerial Conference scheduled to be held in Hong Kong in December 2005.30 Representatives from the WTO convened in Paris, France in May 2005 to discuss several topics, including the reduction of trade barriers between WTO member nations but the particular focus was chicken, beef, and rice tariffs.31 The United States, Australia, the European Union, Brazil, and India could not agree on terms for how tariffs should be calculated – whether they be determined by a fixed percentage or euro rate per ton.32 This technical problem, however, was indicative of larger dilemmas regarding the trade agreements and highlighted the reluctance of states to compromise and make sacrifices to benefit the larger cause of simplified world trade.

To complicate the negotiations, developing states exercised increased power

during the negotiations through the collective negotiating of the G-20. Both developing 27

“World Trade Deal Gets Thumbs-Up.” BBC News. 1 August 2004. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3525602.stm. 28 “Q&A: WTO trade breakthrough.” 29 “World Trade Deal Gets Thumbs-Up.” 30 “World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda.” 31 “Q&A: World Trade in Crisis.” BBC News. 4 May 2005. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4512367.stm. 32 Ibid.

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and developed states thereby had specific agendas and were less amenable to compromise. The Paris meeting set the stage for the Sixth Ministerial Conference held in Hong Kong from 13-18 December 2005. The original intention of the Conference was to reach consensus on strategies for implementing the Doha Development Agenda trade negotiations, however, this goal was abandoned. Instead, members of the WTO achieved several small developments in agricultural and industrial tariffs, and duty and quota free access for least developed states.33 The Commerce, Industry, and Technology Secretary for Hong Kong, John Tsang, chaired the Ministerial Conference and noted several achievements made by the delegates. He stated that the conference established an end date of 2013 for agricultural export subsidies, although not all members viewed this development favorably. The declaration issued by the Conference recognized that the date is conditional as “loopholes have to be plugged to avoid hidden export subsidies in credit, food aid and the sales of exporting state enterprises.”34 The secretary also praised the body for coming to a conclusion regarding cotton. The eradication of duty and quotas will allow least developed countries to export cotton to developed countries. The major parties in the deal regarding cotton were the United States and four Africa countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali.35 An additional success attributed to the Hong Kong Conference is duty-free, quota-free access for the thirty-two least developed member countries within the WTO.36

Despite the accomplishments of the Sixth

Ministerial Conference, frameworks for implementation remained unsettled. WTO membership met in late July 2006 in Geneva to further discuss conditions of a multilateral trading system. On 24 July 2006, WTO Director General Pascal Lamy formally suspended international trade negotiations after the meetings deteriorated into

“World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda.” “Day 6: Ministers Agree on Declaration that ‘Puts Round Back on Track’” Summary of 18 December 2005. WTO OMC Hong Kong 05. World Trade Organization. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/min05_18dec_e.htm 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 34

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allegations and accusations of unwillingness to compromise.37 After the meeting ended, trade representative from the various states present assigned blame to nations who hampered the success of negotiations. The European Union, Brazil, and India accused United States Trade Representative Susan Schwab of being uncooperative, in that she maintained the position that American farm cuts would only occur when global markets were opened. European Union trade commissioner Peter Mandelson stated, “If the U.S. continues to demand dollar-for-dollar compensation in market access for reducing domestic support, no one in the developing world will ever buy that, and nor will the EU.”38 The American plan is further charged with having large loopholes that allow vast subsidies for U.S. farmers, and Brazil, India, and the EU refused to open markets until those challenges are addressed. Despite these allegations, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Mike Johanns stated that President George W. Bush, “favored the complete elimination of trade-distorting subsidies.”39 The U.S. also leveled accusations, stating that Brazil and India wanted to shield up to 98 per cent of their own agricultural trade from outside competition. Additionally, the United States suggested that the European Union blocks foreign products from entering its market through the use of food standards as a pretense.40 For much of the 1990s, the European Union effectively shot off the European marketplace from American agricultural products by forbidding the import of genetically modified foods. Although negotiations in Geneva ended fruitlessly, many of the states present continued to pursue the possibility of a trade accord, and negotiators from the United States and Brazil expressed interest in revitalizing the Doha Round talks.41 The renewal of talks is motivated by desire to reach a provisional agreement on the issues so that 37

Williams, Frances. “U.S. and Brazil Revive Hope for Doha Trade Deal.” Financial Times Online. 30 July 2006. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/378d7bd2-1feb-11db-9913-0000779e2340.html 38 Fraser, Ian. “The Legacy of Doha: Spaghetti Bowl Trade” Sunday Herald. 30, July 2006. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.sundayherald.com/56958 39 Guebert, Alan. “Farm and Food: Doha Round of Trade Talks, Like Twain, Is Dead.” JournalStar.com. 29 July 2006. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.journalstar.com/articles/2006/07/30/business/doc44ca70581326f134825599.txt 40 Fraser. 41 Williams.

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ministers can have time to complete substantial negotiations by the end of 2006. The goal of finishing negotiations within that timeframe with is not an arbitrary end date.42 The de facto deadline for the Doha Round has become the expiration of United States trade promotion authority in July 2007 when the broad powers granted to President George W. Bush expire, and trade deals concerning the United States will have to be approved by Congress.43 Trade promotion authority granted the president the ability to approve trade agreements without the consent of Congress. Once this authority expires, trade agreements must be passed by Congress, likely to entail significant amendments, and making it nearly impossible to negotiate on a global scale. Most trade experts do not believe that this trade authority will be renewed, although there is the possibility of a short term extension in order to reach a conclusion regarding Doha. An extension of this nature was used by the Clinton administration at the conclusion of the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round.44 If the Doha Round does fail in reaching a final agreement, there are significant ramifications for world trade, including what will likely be the formation of myriad bilateral and regional trade agreements that create a web of confusion and complexity within international trading systems. Such a mass of trade networks are referred to as a “spaghetti bowl” and are characterized by chaos. This system of international trade is expected to foster protectionist tendencies and as states begin to negotiate directly with other states, instead of with the rest of the world.45

One-on-one bilateral trade

agreements tend to favor more powerful trading states as they have far superior resources at their disposal to win a beneficial outcome through negotiations, creating the danger that developing and underdeveloped states will be pressured into committing to agreements that are not necessarily in their best interest. The collapse of multilateralism would also likely increase the prevalence of preferential trade arrangements (PTAs), which are counter to the objectives of the World Trade Organization, which promotes 42

Ibid. “World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda.” 44 Williams. 45 Fraser. 43

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fair-handed treatment to all trading parties.46 Moreover, the complexity of bilateral and regional alliances hurts business interests by creating obstacles for exporters and multinational corporations. Bilateral trade agreements create a multitude of different rules by which companies have to abide while doing business in various countries.47 Ian McMillan, the director of the Confederation of British Industry: Scotland commented on the collapse of Doha and the possibility of spaghetti bowl trade saying, “A confusion of overlapping trade regimes, of varying scope and with differing rules and standards, would undermine the whole world trade system.”48

Still, immediately

following the collapse of trade negotiations in Geneva, several states seemed to be pursuing bilateral trade agreements. For instance, Kamal Nath, the Trade and Commerce Minister for India expressed interest in bilateral deals with the European Union and Japan.

Similarly, Taiwan saw the collapse of the Doha Round at Geneva as an

opportunity to develop a free trade agreement with the United States.49 An additional concern is that failure of the Doha Rounds of negotiation could put the future of the World Trade Organization into question as a lack of support for multilateral trade suggests a lack of desire in the mission of the organization. Philippe Legrain, a former journalist for The Economist noted, “The WTO now risks going the way of the League of Nations in the 1930s and becoming an ineffective sideshow.”50 Doubts regarding the future of the WTO if Doha fails persist despite the success of the organ in settling trade disputes and monitoring international trade during its eleven-year history.

Key Positions All states seek a healthy environment for global trade, however states often express reluctance to risk their own economic livelihood in favor of bettering international economic climate. While the goal of the World Trade Organization is to 46

Switzer, Tom. Bilateral Deals ‘Mock” Doha. The Australian Online. 31 July 2006. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,19963849-643,00.html 47 Ibid. 48 Fraser. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid.

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minimize or eliminate tariffs and subsidies, this objective proves difficult as many nations are hesitant to engage in restructuring.51

Regional Positions Commonwealth of Nations The Commonwealth, a group of former British colonies, is comprised of fiftythree

independent

states

that work cooperatively to achieve

the

common

interests of their people while also supporting the development international

of peace

and

security.

Membership of

the

Commonwealth

includes 1.8 billion people, or about thirty per cent of

Members of the Commonwealth Antigua and Barbuda Jamaica St Vincent and the Grenadines Australia Kenya Samoa The Bahamas Kiribati Seychelles Bangladesh Lesotho Sierra Leone Barbados Malawi Singapore Belize Malaysia Solomon Islands Botswana Maldives South Africa Brunei Darussalam Malta Sri Lanka Cameroon Mauritius Swaziland Canada Mozambique Tonga Cyprus Namibia Trinidad and Tobago Dominica Nauru* Tuvalu Fiji Islands New Zealand Uganda The Gambia Nigeria United Kingdom Ghana Pakistan United Republic of Tanzania Grenada Papua New Guinea Vanuatu Guyana St Kitts and Nevis Zambia India St Lucia *Nauru is a Special Member. Source: http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/142227/members/

the global population.52 The Commonwealth strongly supports the reduction and elimination of tariffs and subsidies, and disfavors the emergence of one-sided, protectionist bilateral trade agreements that might emerge if a multilateral agreement cannot be made. The Secretary General of the Commonwealth, Don McKinnon stated, “If we really are global citizens we must act as such. Economic success is a fine thing -- but when it comes despite or even at the expense of the world's poorest people, it is simply no thing at all.”53 The Commonwealth sees the failure to create a trade agreement as a detriment to economic 51

“Q&A: World Trade in Crisis.” “The Commonwealth.” The Commonwealth Secretariat. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.thecommonwealth.org/subhomepage/151236/. 53 “Doha Failure Not An Option, Says Secretary-General.” The Commonwealth Secretariat. 27 July 2006. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.thecommonwealth.org/news/152694/doha_failure_not_an_option__says_secretary_general.htm. 52

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Secretary General McKinnon challenged developed

countries in July 2006 to show “political courage and will to give more than they receive in the Doha Development Round.”54

European Union The European Union has similar concerns as the United States regarding agriculture subsidies, as many European farmers are supported extensive agricultural subsidy programs.55 According to the Asia Times, if agricultural subsidies in Europe were pooled together, there would be enough money to fly every cow in Europe around the world – in business class. Despite its firm stance on these subsidies, the European Union is perceived by the world community as more willing to make concessions than the United States, as it is viewed as willing to sacrifice for the betterment of the world community through opening of global markets.

For instance, Europe’s Common

Agricultural Policy, which consumed nearly half of the European Union’s annual expenditure, was dismantled at the Doha Round that occurred in Cancun, Mexico.56 During the July 2006 negotiations, the European Union took a stance in opposition to that of the United States. The EU criticized America for demanding dollar-for-dollar compensation in market access before eliminating farm subsidies.57

Still, although

European Union leaders outwardly seek a multilateral agreement, states within Europe and the European populace have mixed views on the subject. The hesitancy and fear of farmers in the region is far greater than the ambition of retailers who seek to open markets for access. There are very few countries that would be politically displeased if talks failed, but several who might secretly be pleased that an accord could not be reached. Within the dozen or so European states that have significant agrarian sectors, there is reluctance and fear that their livelihoods will be immediately threatened if subsidies are removed. In fact, France has led movements with the European Union to

Ibid. Fraser. 56 “Q&A: WTO trade breakthrough” 57 Fraser. 55

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prevent greater reduction in farm tariffs.58

While official policy may support a

multilateral agreement that dismantles agricultural subsidies, reduces export tariffs, and bolsters market access, the actual wishes of individual governments within Europe are not necessarily in exact accordance with this stance.

Africa Many of the world’s least developed countries are found in Africa where economic hardships abound. African states seek access for their products unique to the Dumping: Strictly, the sale of a commodity on a foreign market at a price below marginal cost. An exporting country may support the short-run losses of this policy in order to acquire markets (and hard currency) abroad. Alternatively, it may dump in order to dispose of temporary surpluses in order to avoid a reduction in home prices and therefore producers' incomes. Source: poli.haifa.ac.il/~levi/res/dicpe.html

region into global markets. Africa also wishes to end the “dumping” of subsidized exports into their markets.

When developed states

dump goods into developing markets, they unfairly lower the price on a commodity, ensuring that the price of imports is lower than that of domestic goods, thereby causing

developing producers out of the market.

Africa realizes that farming in developed

countries depends on agricultural subsidies and would be in favor of seeing them phased out rather than abruptly eliminated so as not to cause disruption to the international economy. One product of great concern to Africa, specifically the western area of the continent, is cotton. Many West African states such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and others settled tensions with the United States at Geneva in 2004 in what was seen as a positive step in the effort to end crippling.59

State Positions United States The United States has been a principle member of discussion concerning multilateral trade agreements to achieve the reduction or elimination of tariffs, subsidies,

Beattie, Alan. “Doha Lacked the Three Essentials.” The Weekend Australian. 26 July 2006. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/printpage/0,5942,19911742,00.htm 59 “World Trade Deal Gets Thumbs-Up.”

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and quotas. The United States is instrumental in the Doha Rounds of negotiations because any conclusion reached by the World Trade Organization membership is subject to the de facto deadline of July 2007 when Trade Promotion Authority in the United States and trade agreements will be sent to Congress.60 There is a possibility that the Trade Act of 2002 that allows President Bush the wide mandate over trade will be extended so that a final agreement regarding Doha can be reached, however this is not considered likely.61 During the negotiations, the United has been noted by the world community as being reluctant to disassemble its extensive agricultural support programs through which domestic farmers are provided with subsidies, attributed largely to the power of the farming lobby in the United States.62 These subsidies allow cheap American goods to flood the world market, driving prices down around the world, motivating developing states to seek the elimination or American subsidies.63 Critics of United States trade policy accuse the government of being, “so responsive to domestic politics and so insensitive to foreign politics, [that often the United States] is a maximalist in its demands for

Maximalist: One who advocates direct or radical action to secure a social or political goal in its entirety Source: http://www.yourdictionary.com/ahd/m/m0162300.html

concessions and a minimalist in its own concessions.”64 American representatives maintain that they are cooperative and willing to cut agricultural subsidies, and U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Mike Johanns emphatically stated that America was a proponent of eliminating trade-distorting subsidies.65

According to Congressional Research Service reports, the goals of the

United States for Doha Rounds have “substantial reduction of trade-distorting domestic

“World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda.” “An Act: To extend the Andean Trade Preference Act, to grant additional trade benefits under that Act, and for other purposes.” H.R. 3009. The Library of Congress. 26 July 2002. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR03009:@@@L&summ2=m& 62 Fraser. 63 “Q&A: WTO trade breakthrough” 64 Switzer. 65 Guebert. 61

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support; elimination of export subsidies, and improved market access. Industrial trade barriers and services are other market access topics in the negotiations.”66 Although the United States maintains its positions that subsidies will be cut world markets are opened, it is willing to compromise, and strongly wishes to see Doha talks end in a successful trade arrangement. After the collapse of negotiations in July 2006, the United States expressed an interest in revitalizing talks.

Brazil Brazil is among the leading developing states and supports the positions of the G20.

The issue of agriculture is quite important to Brazil in reaching a conclusion

regarding market access, tariffs, and subsidies, and negotiators insist on cuts to domestic programs, like subsidies and tariffs, that distort trade.

Moreover, Brazil sees it as

essential that developing countries are able to access markets and are not excluded from profitable markets due to arbitrary trade restrictions. With regard to export competition, Brazil, along with the G-20, wishes to halt export subsidies, which support dumping, which has a clearly negative affect on the target of this economic practice.67 Brazil has also taken a strong position, along with India, in refusing to significantly reduce tariffs on manufactured imports unless concessions of equal value are made by developed states.68

India Although India would like a defined system of global trade, the nation would rather see the failure of the Doha Round than risk the well being of millions of farmers across the world. India views the practice of granting agricultural subsidies exercised by Western states as an important point of contention in reaching a trade agreement regarding market access, tariffs, and quotas. Kamal Nath, India’s Commerce Minister stated with regard to American policy, “Unfortunately, one member [the U.S.] is unable to make any effective reduction in trade distorting subsidies, but at the same time is 66

“World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda.” Khor, Martin and Hira Jhamtani. “G20 Ministers Reaffirm “Agriculture Central to Doha Round,” India and Brazil State Positions.” TWN Info Service on WTO and Trade Issues. Third World Network. 14 December 2005. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/twninfo323.htm 68 Fraser. 67

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insisting that developing countries open up their markets to provide access to their subsidized products.â&#x20AC;?69 India sees the trade distorting policies of the United States as hampering the ability of the rest of the world to compete in global markets thereby hindering the development of free trade that America seems to extol. India wants subsidies to be eliminated and for developed states to open their markets to products that are labor intensive in order to provide developing nations with an advantage in the market. At the collapse of the Doha Round, India joined what seemed to be a consensus regarding farm subsidies and market access. After the failure of the July 2006 WTO talks, India sought trade agreements directly with various trading blocs and with individual states like the European Union and Japan.70

Australia Australia seeks the development of a multilateral trade agreement that will provide increased access to world markets.

Australia is committed to the success of Doha

Rounds because jobs and standards of living within the country are viewed as being dependent on their performance within the international market, as Australia is a medium-sized trading nation that competes with larger, more powerful states. It is thus important to Australia that they have access to overseas markets for agriculture, services, and industrial goods through a rules-based multilateral trading system. Agriculture is especially important to Australia as the state is a non-subsidized producer and faces trade distortions caused by the subsidies placed on the farming sector by powers such as the United States and the European Union. To this end, Australia wants to eliminate all forms of export subsidies.71 Australia believes in trade liberalization to ensure future markets and to bolster economic ties between states.

Thakurta. Fraser. 71 â&#x20AC;&#x153;Position Paper: Australia and the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference.â&#x20AC;? 9-13 November 2001. Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/ministerial/aus_position.html. 70

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Japan Japan sees a rule-based global trading system as the foundation for economic development and prosperity. Japan promotes trade liberalization and is in favor of providing technical assistance to developing countries who seek such guidance. In the area of agriculture, Japan seeks to create a system that allows for various types of agriculture to flourish. In terms of market access, Japan sees open markets as important to the future of trade.

Increased market access to products originating from least

developed countries is also an item that Japan wishes to address.72

Developing States The most important issue to developing countries is agriculture, particularly in terms of subsidies and antidumping. Additionally, developing states are concerned with patent protection and the compulsory licensing of medicines. Developing states also want the WTO membership to review the special and differential treatment allotted to developing nations by the international trading community.73

G-20 The Group of 20 developing countries (G-20) sees agricultural as the central issue is formulating a resolution regarding market access, tariffs, quotas, and subsidies. High tariffs, domestic support, and export subsidies that are provided to the agricultural sector in developed countries distort trade and make it difficult for less developed states to enter markets. The G-20 seeks the elimination of these practices that counter development. The G-20 maintains that their position is middle ground and seeks to assure parity in the sacrifices made by developing and developed states during negotiations. The group wants to see the abolishment of export subsidies and significant cuts made to tariffs in the developed world.74

“WTO Ministerial Conferences.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/wto/min01/position.html 73 “World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda.” 74 Khor.

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Least Developed Countries The poorest countries of the world view wealthy nations as pursuing policies that support their farmers through subsidies. These protectionist measures have an adverse effect of the least developed countries because goods are then “dumped” on impoverished states at significantly reduced prices. This flood of goods into the market undermines farmers, making it impossible for them to compete. The same subsidies that Western states provide for their farmers make costs for production less which in turn leads to more efficient productivity, which means that least developed states have difficulty exporting their good to developed states because western producers already have a competitive edge on the market.75

Business Interests Business obviously plays a vital role in shaping the debate concerning access to markets, tariff reduction, and subsidy elimination. Commercial enterprises are unique in that they are supranational, meaning they can operate within many states. Businesses are, however, bound by certain restrictions put in place by national governments such as tariffs and quotas. Often, these restrictions hamper the free flow of trade which is not in the best interest of corporations.

Still, other businesses are dependent upon the

protectionist measures implemented by governments to ensure that certain sectors can remain intact despite competition in the global markets.

Western multinational

corporations and exporters are in favor of the improved market access they will have if developing economies are opened to international business.76 Similarly, businesses and economic interests in emerging economies are excited by the prospect of conducting transactions on an international scale.

75 76

“Q&A: WTO trade breakthrough.” Fraser.

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Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Positions The Relationship of the World Trade Organization and NGOs Non-governmental were

recognized

organizations the

Marrakesh

Agreement as having a specific role in relation to the World Trade Organization. This relationship was later defined on 18 July 1996 when the WTO, “recognize[d] the role NGOs can play to increase the

Marrakesh Agreement: The Marrakesh Agreement, signed in Marrakech, Morocco, on April 15, 1994, established the World Trade Organization, which came into being upon its entry into force on January 1, 1995. The Marrakesh Agreement developed out of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which it includes; but it supplemented it with several other agreements, on such issues as trade in services, sanitary and plant health measures, trade-related aspects of intellectual property, and technical barriers to trade. Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marrakesh_Agreement

awareness of the public in respect of WTO activities.”77 Such organizations are therefore established as being a critical link between the WTO and civil society. The trade organization has a vested interest in ensuring a positive relationship with civil society, and with it, non-governmental organizations. NGOs interact with the WTO through participation in symposia, attendance at Ministerial Conferences, daily interaction with the trade organization, and regular briefings. At Ministerial Conferences, NGOs are permitted to attend the Plenary Sessions so long as they have been accepted by the WTO Secretariat as being related to matters of world trade. The Conferences provide NGOs with facilities and resources in addition to regular briefings by the WTO Secretariat on progress and developments of the Conference. The Secretariat of the WTO also arranges symposia for NGOs on topics that relate to civil society such as: trade and the environment, trade and development, and trade facilitation.78 Additionally, the WTO provides NGOs with information and meets with representatives.

“Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations/Civil Society.” Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs): WTO and NGOs. World Trade Organization. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/intro_e.htm. 78 Ibid.

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Oxfam International Oxfam International expresses the view that global trade is one of the defining factors that shapes individuals and states by connecting both to sources of wealth. Oxfam feels that the benefits of trade are not being reaped by all members of the global community as millions of people in the world’s least developed states do not have access to markets through which they can participate in international economic exchanges. Oxfam has a campaign entitled Make Trade Fair that works with affiliated organizations to compel governments, institutions, and multinational corporations to modify the rules and norms that govern international trade so that least developed and developing states can have an opportunity to participate in a fair, multilateral economic system. Oxfam sees this as a step to solving the problem of global poverty and endeavors to realize this goal through establishing a global support base for the Make Trade Fair initiative. The organization has circulated a petition signed by more than 20 million people in wealthy and poor nations alike. Oxfam maintains that the WTO has failed to finalize a “prodevelopment” agreement concerning new rules for trade.

Our World Is Not For Sale Our World Is Not For Sale is committed to questioning the trade agreements and financial arrangements made within the international community that promote the interests of Western powers and the world’s most privileged states. The organization promotes agreements made that do not victimize the civilians of poor states but instead bolster their ability to perform economically. Our World Is Not For Sale hailed the collapse of the Doha talks in Geneva during July 2006 maintaining that any agreement reached by the Western dominated body would suit the interests of the developed world at the expense of underdeveloped and developing states.79

“Latest Articles.” Our World Is Not for Sale: Stop Corporate Globalization. 1 August 2006. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.ourworldisnotforsale.org/.

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Summary In order for the poorest states to develop, they need fair access to global trading markets. The World Trade Organization is a multilateral trading regime that governs the manner in which economic transactions are conducted globally, and therefore is the organization that can bring about parity in global trade. The WTO has attempted to reach consensus through a series of negotiations known as the Doha Round, which sought to create a level playing field where developing and least developed states could compete in the same markets as developed countries. In turn, poor states are expected to open up their markets to wealthy countries.

Thus far, the negotiations have been largely

unsuccessful at achieving substantial progress as developed states are hesitant to abandon their protectionist agricultural policies.

Developing and underdeveloped states have

recognized that if they band together, they can act as an effective voting bloc, and have refused to succumb to the demands of industrialized states. If a multilateral trade agreement is not reached, developing and underdeveloped states will attempt to negotiate bilaterally with developed nations which would be dangerous for less developed states as they typically lose in bilateral trade agreements. Moreover, consolidating international trade into one agreement is far more efficient then the spaghetti bowl that will result from bilateralism. Additionally, it is improbable that one on one trade agreements will support market access, subsidy reduction, tariff removal, or quota elimination on a global scale. The same economic problems that plague underdeveloped and developed powers will therefore persist if international measures are not taken to reach parity in the global trading marketplace.

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Discussion Questions • What is your state’s position on trade liberalization? • Is your country considered developed, underdeveloped, or developing? How does its classification effect the access it has to markets? • What are the major economic sectors in your country? Does your state pursue capitalist economic strategies or is their significant state involvement in the economy? • Does your state have a large agricultural sector? If so, does it receive the benefit of government subsidies? • Does your state implement protectionist economic policy? Have these policies been successful at developing domestic industries? • Is your state willing to restructure its economic policies to allow for trade parity among states? Will such restructuring grow trade or would it unfairly help certain types of states? •

With what nations does your state primarily conduct trade? How would your state benefit from a multilateral trade agreement?

•

Does your state have bilateral trade agreements? Has your state prospered because of these relationships, or have your markets been unfairly exploited?

•

Does the World Trade Organization adequately represent the needs to developing economies? Have WTO policies furthered the cause of these states as they try to enter the global trading marketplace?

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Issues. Third World Network. 14 December 2005. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/twninfo323.htm Kiggundu, Moses N. Managing Globalization in Developing Countries and Transition Economies: Building Capacities for a Changing World. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=101335328>. Knutsen, Hege M. “Globalisation and the Garment Industry in Sri Lanka.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 33.2 (2003): 225+. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5002542786>. Koirala, Girija Prasad. “Nepal's Commitment to Peace, Prosperity & Justice.” Presidents & Prime Ministers Sept. 2000: 31. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5001131059>. Lamar, Stephen E. “The Apparel Industry and African Economic Development.” Law and Policy in International Business 30.4 (1999): 601. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5001871783>. “Latest Articles.” Our World Is Not for Sale: Stop Corporate Globalization. 1 August 2006. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.ourworldisnotforsale.org/. “Make Trade Fair” Oxfam International. July 2006. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.oxfam.org/en/programs/campaigns/maketradefair/. Michalopoulos, Constantine. Developing Countries in the WTO. New York: Palgrave, 2001. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=101915585>. Moore, Mike. “Market Access Opportunities for LDCs.” Presidents & Prime Ministers Jan. 2001: 27. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5000988393>. “Moral Imperative, Common Interest.” UN Chronicle Spring 2000: 38. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5001771812>. Narlikar, Amrita. International Trade and Developing Countries: Bargaining Coalitions in the GATT & WTO. London: Routledge, 2003. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=104271446>.

Rutgers Model United Nations 2006

“A New Security Umbrella for Asia-Pacific to Sustain the Pace of Development.” Manila Bulletin 17 Nov. 2004: NA. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5007717382>. “New Strategies for Asian-European Cooperation.” Manila Bulletin 14 Mar. 2005: NA. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5008931576>. “Non-agricultural Market Access Negotiations.” Market Access: Work in the WTO. World Trade Organization. June 2006. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/markacc_e/markacc_negoti_e.htm. North, Douglass C. “Poverty in the Midst of Plenty.” Commentary Nov. 2000: 73. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5001112742>. Page, Sheila. How Developing Countries Trade: The Institutional Constraints. New York: Routledge, 1994. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108397426>. Pinstrup-Andersen, Per. “Food Security in Developing Countries Why Government Action Is Needed.” UN Chronicle Sept.-Nov. 2003: 65+. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5002076881>. “Position Paper: Australia and the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference.” 913 November 2001. Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/ministerial/aus_position.html. “Q&A: World Trade in Crisis.” BBC News. 4 May 2005. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4512367.stm. “Q&A: WTO trade breakthrough” BBC News. 1 August 2004. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3943439.stm. Rahnama-Moghadam, Mashaalah, Hedayeh Samavati, and David A. Dilts. Doing Business in Less Developed Countries: Financial Opportunities and Risks. Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1995. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=51020881>. Ramirez, J. Martin. “Peace and Development in Africa.” International Journal on World Peace 22.3 (2005): 51+. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5014421997>.

Rutgers Model United Nations 2006

“Reclaiming the Future: The Millennium Summit.” UN Chronicle Fall 2000: 29. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5001184015>. “Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations/Civil Society.” Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs): WTO and NGOs. World Trade Organization. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/intro_e.htm. Shen, Ce, and John B. Williamson. “Child Mortality, Women's Status, Economic Dependency, and State Strength: a Cross-National Study of Less Developed Countries.” Social Forces 76.2 (1997): 667-700. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=95174474>. Sundrum, R. M. Income Distribution in Less Developed Countries. London: Routledge, 1992. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=103931578>. Switzer, Tom. Bilateral Deals ‘Mock” Doha. The Australian Online. 31 July 2006. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,19963849-643,00.html Thakurta, Paranjoy Guha. “India applauds Doha's death” Asian Times Online. 29 July 2006. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HG29Df01.html “The Commonwealth.” The Commonwealth Secretariat. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.thecommonwealth.org/subhomepage/151236/. “The Doha Declaration Explained.” Doha Development Agenda. World Trade Organization. July 2006. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm#marketaccess “Trends and Issues in the Global Trading System.” World Economic Outlook : 127. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5001884415>. Versi, Anver. “At Last, a Win-Win Formula for African Business: The Second African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa) Forum, Mauritius January 13-17.” African Business Mar. 2003: 12+. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5002522177>. Weston, Ann. “Success and Failures Both Mark Doha.” Canadian Speeches Nov.-Dec. 2001: 55+. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5000942215>.

Rutgers Model United Nations 2006

“What are the Millennium Development Goals?.” UN Millennium Development Goals. United Nations. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. Williams, Frances. “U.S. and Brazil Revive Hope for Doha Trade Deal.” Financial Times Online. 30 July 2006. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/378d7bd2-1feb-11db-9913-0000779e2340.html “The World Trade Organization.” Presidents & Prime Ministers Mar. 1999: 2. Questia. 18 Aug. 2006 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5001264095>. “World Trade Deal Gets Thumbs-Up.” BBC News. 1 August 2004. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3525602.stm. “World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda.” Open CRS: Congressional Research Reports for the People. 10 July 2006. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.opencrs.com/document/RL32060/. “WTO Ministerial Conferences.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Accessed 1 August 2006. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/wto/min01/position.html