Rutgers Model United Nations 2006
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Some data, even when submitted in a timely manner, is useless to the Kimberley Process. The United States and Canada, for instance, do not record information of the Kimberley Process Certificate because of pre-existing procedures for collecting trade data. For this reason, the diamond data of these nations cannot be easily compared to that of the rest of the world. Even the relevant data that Kimberley manages to collect often goes to waste. Statistical analysis is only conducted prior to a review visit, which only occurs on a voluntary and announced basis. Global Witness has called for an annual independent audit of Kimberley data.
Key Positions The world community has been unanimous in its condemnation of trade in conflict diamonds, but as the industry has been quick to point out, the need to weed out conflict diamonds must also be balanced with the needs of the legitimate diamond industry, which employs millions of people worldwide, and represents the principle industry of multiple countries. In the Kimberley Process negotiations of 2000 and 2001, representatives of government, industry, and civil society worked as equal partners. Their differing views comprise the major divisions within the Kimberley process.
World Governments United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/56 calling for the creation of the Kimberley Process passed unanimously.
Within the accepted premise that conflict
diamonds should be eliminated, there are serious divisions on the question of how that task is to be achieved. For a variety of reasons, many nations have failed to gain admission to or have abstained from participation in the Kimberley Process. Mali, for instance, has grown into a center for illicit diamonds, due to its proximity to C么te D'Ivoire, and their application to the Kimberley Process has been delayed because they cannot guarantee compliance. Undoubtedly, help from the international community in dealing with their conflict