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tant elements of the policy regime, in addition to consistency and credibility. For those who believe that the East Asian countries had no choice, I refer the reader to World Bank studies of South Korea in the late 1950s. These studies conclusively determined that Korea would remain underdeveloped for many years and would probably not exceed the canonical growth rate of 5 percent a year. So much for the proficiency of World Bank projections. Regarding the turbocharger hypothesis, it is undeniable that the Chinese have been a dynamic element in many of these economies, although not in Japan or Korea. In fact, the vast majority of the population in several of these economies is Chinese—in China, Taiwan (China), Hong Kong (about to be China), and Singapore. However, this thesis sounds a little like the Protestant ethic, which was used in the past to explain growth in Northern Europe and North America, or the role of the Catholic church, to which some attribute the lack of growth in Southern Europe and Latin America. It would be more useful to focus on the characteristics of hard work, saving, risktaking, and cooperation, which have contributed to the high growth rates in East Asia and are now contributing to growth in some Latin American countries. Latin Americans have not a hope in the world of becoming Chinese, nor would I expect many to become Protestants. But they can learn to work hard, save, take risks, and cooperate. These are important lessons that can be replicated. The strategic importance of the early Asian Tigers and Japan is clear, which is why these countries benefited from substantial U.S. assistance. Aid levels have not been as significant in Latin America, although the region has enjoyed substantial inflows of private capital—which many Latin Americans think is a mixed blessing. But here again, we must look at the variety of East Asian experience. The ASEAN nations were less strategically important than Latin America, particularly after the Vietnam war. And it would be hard to argue that China and Indochina have been anything but a strategic headache to the United States—for a variety of different reasons. U.S. policy toward Latin America has been different than toward Asia. It would be useful to have a little more explanation as to why this is an important factor in Latin America's economic development, and how U.S. policy might be changed to produce better results. The discussion of the quality of institutions is most interesting, in terms of both the comparison at hand and the more fundamental question of the role of government in the development process. The defects of governments in Latin America are no different from those in East Asia. Does that mean that government is irrelevant, if not noxious, to development, and best cast aside? Not without a great deal of risk. The paper's
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COMMENTARY ON CHAPTER NINE