In 1996, the MRC and the DoF2 undertook probably the largest socio-economic survey of fisheries in Cambodia, covering 83 communes in 51 districts (Sjorslev, 2001). The study found that the average per capita consumption of fresh fish was 43.5 kg. In addition, each person also consumes about 14 kg of processed fish (fish paste, fermented fish, salt-dried and smoked fish). The fresh fish equivalent of this processed fish 27.5 kg. Including all forms of fish, overall Cambodians from fish- dependent communes, consume the equivalent of 76 kg of fresh fish each year (Ahmed, 1998).
5. Governance of Fisheries Resources and the Fish Trade Management of the fisheries industry goes back more than 140 years. The industry was the first to be exploited in the generation of national revenue (Tana and Todd, 2002). The basic fisheries law in Cambodia, known as the Fiat Law on Fisheries Management and Administration, was established in 1987. This Law divides inland fisheries into four groups. The first concerns large, demarcated, concessionary fishing grounds, known as fishing lots, comprising sections of the Tonle Sap, streams and flooded forest. These areas are auctioned biannually, and the successful bidders have the rights to commercially fish the lots for two fishing seasons. The law allows small-scale subsistent fishers access to the lots at any time, although, in reality, guards protect the areas and people are restricted (Tana and Todd, 2002). Much has been written in the Cambodian media about conflicts and even violence which have arisen when subsistence fishers sought to exercise this right (Sithirith, 2000). These lots until October 2000 occupied over 900,000 ha of the most productive fishing areas in Cambodia. As a result of fishing lots, communities traditionally dependent on fishing have been marginalised because of the reduction in areas of true open access. The second group comprises open water bodies (the river and the Lake), designated as open access fishing grounds, which are licensed to middle-scale fishers and non-licensed small-scale family fishers. These include the temporarily-flooding wetland margin allocated for non-licensed small-scale family fishers. More recently there have been moves which should favour smaller-scale fishers, as 56% of the former fishing lots were released for community management in October 20003. There are now more than 330 designated areas for community fisheries. Providing a sense of ownership and self-regulation are the main benefits of community fisheries. However, these community fishing lots were released prior to the implementation of a regulatory or management structure, supportive funding, or training to support them. These lots have become de facto open access areas (ADB, 2002). However, the ADB (2004) itself stated that these are not evident in Cambodia, since the system of resource management does not provide incentives to act responsibly. The ADB suggest there is little sense of ownership, and attribute this to the fact that the community fishing committees were created by government decree in a top down fashion instead of a participatory process which would have reflected stakeholder interests (ADB, 2002). Concession holders now still fully exploit fish resources in these areas, although they do provide some measure of protection from poaching and large-scale destruction of flooded forests (Van Zalinge et al., 1998). The open access nature of newly designated community fisheries areas available to mid-scale enterprises and family fisheries, all lead to over-fishing, exacerbated by a growing population dependent on natural resource extraction. Sustainability of inland fisheries resources is often at the centre of the development debate. Many (Vuthy et al., 1999; Gum, 2000; Degen et al., 2000) highlight the primary purpose of the fishing lot system as revenue generation rather than the sustainable management of inland fisheries resources. As part of the process of maximising revenue, the widespread use of illegal fishing gear and fishing practices has been reported. Degan et al. (2000) highlighted as evidence that fisheries conflicts were increasing in the late 1990s the increase in the number of complaints of violence from 168 cases in 1998 to 356 cases in 1999 in the five study provinces. However, this could be related to an improved method of reporting, or an increased willingness of people to report such conflicts rather than an increase in violence itself. While, of course being a potentially positive sign in terms of provision of resources for the poor, some suggest that the fishing lots released to community management were all but exhausted at this time (FACT, 2005; Rosien, 2006). There remains little evidence to substantiate this and if indeed it is the case, it is more likely to be a consequence of unsustainable fisheries practices rather than anything else. Some argue that the system gives the concessionaries a strong economic incentive to maintain the productivity of the lots through the protection of fish habitats from destructive uses such as the clearing of flooded forests for timber or agriculture (ADB/Worldfish/DoF, 2006). The report also highlights the fact that the fishing lot system does generate a resource rent through the semi-annual auctions that is, at least in part, utilized by society. Van Zalinge and Thouk (1999), cited in Gum (2000), point to the fact that local consumption is moving towards smaller, low-value fish at the expense of larger, high-value fish, an indication that more expensive fish are now sold 2 3
under the Management of Freshwater Capture Fisheries of Cambodia Project Primarily with the support of the ADB Tonle Sap Environment Management Project (TSEMP)
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