IJ 222 THE DVAITA PHILOSOPHY AND ITS PLACE IN THE VEDANTA
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pratisthanat,’ and so on. The common idea of these sutras is that anumdna by itself is unreliable. This is not the denial of philosophy, but the giving to philosophy of its proper signi ficance. This tradition is started by the Veda itself, e.g., ‘One who does not know the Veda cannot understand Brahman, the Infinite (navedavinmanutedambrhantam)’; ‘Mere reason does not help the right view and it is only the Veda that helps it (naisdtarpena mafirapancyd proptanyenaiva sujndndya)' and so on . Following these ideas the Gita says, ‘So in discri minating between the right and wrong sastra is your pramdna. (Tasmat sastram pramanante \arydkarya vyavasthitau)', and it adds ‘One who abandons the teaching of sastra . . . does not obtain success. (Yassastrd uidhi mutsrjya vartate . . . na sa siddhi mavapnotiy. Consistently with this tradition the Brahma Sutra explains how isolated reasoning may not have finality, but reasoning consistent with the other pramanas, pralyapsa and agama is conclusive and helps the spiritual advancement of man (2.1.12). So on the whole the contribution of Indian thought to philosophy in general consists of two ideas—(1) that reasoning must necessarily be consistent with the other pramanas\ this means that only that reasoning is valid that is consistent with the other pramanas; and (2) that a sound philosophy is that which necessarily leads to the spiritual advancement of man. Of these two the former is an expression of intellectual consistency and the realisation of this is the char acteristic of spirituality. (This position is very explicit in Dvaita Vedanta.) The philosophical value of Indian thought rests on the philosophic value of this contribution. Indian thinkers entertain no doubt with regard to the philosophical importance of this position, because they are convinced that isolated rea soning contradicts itself. Man’s mental power is so rich that what is argued out by one man is easily disproved by another. I his idea is best illustrated by the Sophists of Greece. That isolated reason does not help man’s spiritual advancement is substantiated by Kant’s negative conclusion regarding the worth of metaphysics. The Indian thinkers with their insistence on the consistency of reason with the other pramanas, especially with pratyapsa, readily see the defects of such posi tions that imply the denial of the reality of experienced things, upposing they were familiar with Zeno’s arguments against motion, that motion is impossible as the thing that is supposed