Review THE HORACE MANN
Volume XXIII - April 2014 - Junior Issue
Aftermath Revolutions and the Countries in their Wake
UKRAINE • THAILAND • VENEZUELA • LIBYA • SUDAN
Issue
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Letter From the Editor
Review THE HORACE MANN
Caroline Kuritzkes Editor-in-Chief
Samuel Henick Executive Editor
Will Ellison David Hackel Sahej Suri
Jenny Heon* Mihika Kapoor Isaiah Newman
Managing Content Editors
Managing Design Editors
*Chair of the Senior Board
Catherine Engelmann Senior Editor - Features
Ben Greene
Senior Editor - Domestic
For almost six weeks, editors and writers interested in pursuing a leadership role for next year’s Review volume have been hard at work on our Junior Issue. From creating cover pages and design schemes for their sections to organizing and devising article topics with their writers, Review editors have adopted a higher level of independence in their content and design choices. Meanwhile, sophomore writers have constructed their strongest articles of the year based on weeks of in-depth research, careful thinking, and critical analysis. Together, they present a project that epitomizes what The Review represents as an outlet for political opinion, a platform for expressive and thoughtful discourse, and an instrument of teamwork and mentoring. In place of a highlighted Features section, this Junior Issue exhibits an overarching theme of “Uprising and Aftermath” that comprises every article within. We call attention to five regions that recently experienced revolutions or that currently face extreme political and social upheaval: Ukraine, Thailand, Venezuela, Libya, and Sudan & South Sudan. The issue is divided accordingly – into five sections by country – as Review writers examine the key players, causes, and consequences of the revolutions at hand, under the direction and guidance of Junior Editors. Whether investigating political corruption in Thailand, media propaganda and censorship in Venezuela, or ethnic tensions in South Sudan, they approach each topic from a distinct political, economic, religious, or ethnic perspective to tackle some of the most pressing and timely international problems of today. How can Thailand balance political stability and democratic change while set in a precedent of coups? How can the U.S. alleviate anti-American sentiment in Venezuela, or thwart Russian aggression in Ukraine? What action can post-revolutionary governments take to appease protestors and still mitigate the repercussions in the wake of insurrection? Ultimately, what now? I am enormously impressed with the amount of time, hard-work, and effort Review sophomores and juniors have dedicated to create a fantastic Junior Issue. Many thanks to everyone involved, including Mr. Donadio, Dr. Kelly, Dr. Delanty, and the administration, for your commitment to The Horace Mann Review.
Hana Krijestorac
Senior Editor - International
Jonah Wexler
Senior Editor - Economics
Jacob Haberman
Senior Editor - Science and Technology
Daniel Baudoin Hannah Davidoff Henry Luo Mohit Mookim Kelvin Rhee Namit Satara Lenn Uchima Jacob Zurita Senior Contibutors
Neil Ahlawat James Megibow Edmund Bannister Adam Resheff Jenna Barancik Harry Seavey Lauren Futter Brett Silverstein Matthew Harpe Ikaasa Suri Laszlo Herwitz Nathan Tillinghast-Raby Emily Kramer Mitchell Troyanovsky James McCarthy Elizabeth Xiong Junior Editors
Charles Cotton Samuel Fisch Robert Hefter Sam Stern Associate Editors
Gregory Donadio Caroline Kuritzkes Editor-in-Chief Volume XXIII
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Faculty Advisor The Horace Mann Review is a member of the Columbia Scholastic Press Association, the American Scholastic Press Association, and the National Scholastic Press Association. Opinions expressed in articles or illustrations are not necessarily those of the Editorial Board or of the Horace Mann School. Please contact The Review for more information at www.issuu.com/horacemannreview
Table of Contents
UKRAINE
4
Modern Venezuela: A Study in Complexity
In Between: The Crisis in Ukraine Alex O’Neill
Spencer Slagowitz
page 5
Russia Breaking its Boundaries
Hands Off the Economy
Miranda Bannister
Gabe Broshy
page 8
The Price of Oil Daria Balaeskoul
page 10
46
The Eurasian Union: Breaking Up Europe
16
page 17
Protests in the Land of Smiles Ben Alexander
VENEZUELA
34
page 31
#SOSVenezuela Peter Shamamian
page 35
Maduro’s Venezuela: Continuing an Impossible Legacy Maria Balaeskoul
Charles Cotton
Ray Fishman
page 22
page 26
page 38
page 50
page 52
page 54
Libya: The Fate of Women in Question
58 SUDAN & SOUTH SUDAN
THAILAND
page 20
Threat to Democracy Matthew Parker
page 47
Teetering on the Brink of Failure
Anne Rosenblatt
The Cost of Strife Cassandra Kopans-Johnson
Natasha Moolji
Missing Missiles
Thailand in Turmoil Eric Stein
Tensions Beneath the Surface
Aditya Ram
page 13
Robust Protests, Faltering Economy Abigail Zuckerman
page 44
Aiding Libya
LIBYA
Daniel Jin
page 41
page 56
Blood for Oil Daniel Rosenblatt
page 59
A Long Road Ahead Evy Verbinnen
page 62
From Provisional to Permanent Anna Kuritzkes
page 64
When the Melting Pot Boils Over Alex Newman
page 67
Finding a Solution Ethan Gelfer
page 70
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Thailand
REVOLUTION IN
UKRAINE
Eastern Europe Population: 45,553,000 Capital: Kiev Area: 603,550 sq km Revolution start: February 2014 President: Viktor Yanukovych
Acting President: Oleksander Turchynov GDP: $176.3 Billion GDP Per Capita: $7,400 Unemployment: 8.1% Services: 60.5%; Agriculture: 9.9% Industry: 29.6%
In late November of 2013, 100,000 protestors flocked to Kiev to take a stand against President Viktor Yanukovych’s abandonment of an agreement to promote trade ties with the EU. However, what began as a protest of Ukraine’s limited trade interaction with the EU quickly became larger than the Orange Revolution of 2004, during which Ukrainians protested the corruption that marred the election run-off between leading presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko and Yanukovych. Nine years later, Yanukovych again faces accusations of corruption by his own people. Nearly a month after the protests began, the protestors became violent. Soon, reports of death and injuries as a result of clashes between the police and protestors became daily occurrences. After days of the worst violence Ukraine had seen in years, Yanukovych disappeared from the Ukraine while protestors freed his political rival former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, whom Yanukovych jailed for abuse of power. As the situation deteriorated in Ukraine, Russian soldiers seized the Crimean capital of Simferopol. While protestors in Kiev condemned the Ukrainian government and Russia, the atmosphere in Crimea was vastly different. The shared history between the Ukraine and Russia led to a large ethnically Russian population within Crimea who support Russia and the formerly pro-Russian government. When Russia seized Crimea, Putin called for a referendum in which 97% of the population voted to rejoin Russia. The media quickly characterized the Ukrainian Revolution as an East versus West conflict, which could signify a twenty-first century cold war. While the West denounced Russia’s actions in Crimea, most of Europe has a profound interest in Russian oil. In effect, the EU is somewhat hampered in the action that it can reasonably take as a result of the harm that this action may cause European economies. Still, the United States and the EU must determine if preventing a Russian takeover of Crimea is worth the blow to their economies. Crimeans did vote to become a part of Russia, but does the prevalence of Russian ethnicity in Crimea grant autonomy to Crimea to separate from the Ukraine? It is impossible to determine the trajectory of the Ukrainian revolution; however, through careful analysis, we may gain insight into the possible paths it may take and their many implications. ja.wallpaperssma.com
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Ukraine
IN BETWEEN: THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE America’s Next Move Alex O’Neill
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he Russian Federation’s military annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region has generated tremendous international backlash, especially from members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Many Western nations have placed sanctions on Russia, mainly in the form of visa bans and asset freezes on top government officials, so as to punish those responsible for the incursion and not the innocent Russian people. More recently, the United Nations General Assembly voted 100-11 to pass a resolution strongly condemning breaches of territorial boundaries, national sovereignty, and international law, specifically citing Russia’s actions as “invalid” and unacceptable. Even China, generally supportive of its northern neighbor, disapproves of the attack, as evidenced by its abstention from the vote. Yet Russian President Vladimir Putin still refuses to remove his nation’s soldiers from Crimea—where in one month they have seized almost all of the region’s military bases and materiel—or its eastern border, where over
100,000 Russian troops have amassed. So what else needs to be done to force Putin to step down? Before deciding on a course of action, the United States should first evaluate the efficacy of the measures it has already enacted. As a direct result of the sanctions it has placed on Moscow, Russian stocks, on average, have fallen more than 10% in the month of March alone. Investors are scared off by the possibility of further economic and political turmoil, and for that reason most plans for direct foreign investments into Russia are on hold. This has led to a depreciation of the ruble, due to a lack of demand for the currency, and perpetuates the flight of investors in a viciously harmful cycle. The fact that many investors are already weary of entering into business deals with Russian companies compounds this problem. Some Russian companies, like massive children’s retailer Detsky Mir, have even been forced to cancel planned IPO’s for fear that the sanctions will foster negative perceptions of Rus-
April 2014
sian businesses among potential shareholders. Overall, because of their toll on foreign and domestic investors’ confidence, combined with the already-fragile state of the Russian economy, American and NATO sanctions have been overwhelmingly effective at stagnating the Russian market. According to market analysts and political scientists from prominent institutions across the globe, however, the success of expanding these sanctions would be limited. As Kimberly Marten of Columbia University has detailed, fear and speculation can only cause markets to fall by a limited amount, often rapidly over a short period of time, which means that the U.S. would have to broaden its sanctions to further cripple the Russian economy. Therefore, it seems clear that more extensive visa bans and asset freezes would have a minimal effect at best and, thus, would not force Putin to withdraw his armed forces. A more effective punishment for Russia’s invasion of Crimea would be restricting
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Ukraine
American companies from purchasing Russian energy. The oil and gas industry, which is dominated by state-run corporations such as Gazprom and Lukoil, is by far the most lucrative and, by extension, the most important sector of the Russian economy. More than half of the nation’s federal budget comes from energy revenues, which directly links the power of the Russian government to its petroleum and natural gas exports. Decreasing American imports of Russian petroleum—167,467,000 barrels in 2013, almost 15% of Russia’s total exports—would be a major setback to a nation already facing a languishing economy. Convincing the European Union, which has been hesitant on the matter, to replace Russia as its main source of oil and natural gas would be a crippling blow that would almost certainly compel Putin to remove Russian troops from Ukraine. While weaning the E.U. off Russian energy would be a difficult task, the U.S. would unquestionably stand to benefit from doing so. First, the diplomatic gains of destroying Russia’s economy and federal budget would be extraordinary: President Putin would be
forced to return to the negotiating table to discuss Ukraine and possibly other salient issues, including but not limited to the Syrian Civil War and relations with China. In addition, if Congress were to lift the 40-year-old ban on U.S. exports of crude oil, American businesses could attempt to shoulder the burden of supplying the E.U. with energy and reap the associated benefits, namely massive profits. Yet abrogating the ban would not just benefit pow-
“Fear and speculation can only cause markets to fall by a limited amount, often rapidly over a short period of time, which means that the U.S. would have to broaden its sanctions to further cripple the Russian economy.” erful corporations; it would also stimulate job creation on a large scale, due to the manpower needs of the energy trade: thousands of Americans could find employment in drilling for
90
PERCENT OF CRIMEAN WATER FROM UKRAINE
80
PERCENT OF CRIMEAN ELECTRICITY FROM UKRAINE
4
PERCENT OF TOTAL UKRAINIAN LAND CRIMEA MAKES UP
1/3
FRACTION OF UKRAINE’S COASTLINE IN CRIMEA
6
oil, building pipelines and other infrastructure for transporting fuel, refining petroleum into different substances (such as gasoline), and administering the many existing and yet-tobe-established companies that would export American oil and natural gas. On the whole, convincing the E.U. to replace Russian energy with American fuels, at least in part, and repealing the ban on petroleum exports would serve as a needed boost to both U.S. diplomatic
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efforts and the struggling American economy. Granted, constructing the infrastructure required to supply the E.U. with energy would take several years, if not decades, and Congress’ reluctance to approve projects such as the Keystone Pipeline system in the Midwest would only prolong the United States’ inability to adequately transport fuels and natural gas. Yet allowing Americans to export petroleum products would dramatically outweigh these associated complications. First, Russia would be affected and demoralized by the simple concept of America energy exports, as it would eat away at Russia’s market share, even after sanctions are lifted, which would hurt the Russian economy and benefit its American counterpart. This notion would serve as a strong deterrent to Putin against further expansionist actions and claims. Second, entering the global oil marketplace as a producer would strengthen ties with Europe while improving relations with other energy vendors, including members
Ukraine of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), whose connections to the U.S. have often been weak or strained due to a dearth of common interests. If the U.S. were to undertake this immense project, in spite of the substantial financial commitments that would be required to complete it, the nation would solidify its place as a world superpower for generations to come. Other effective economic penalties for Russia’s violations of international law could be devised without actually imposing sanctions or embargoes on Russian commodities or citizens. Through a policy of exclusion, the United States and its Western allies could prioritize developing their economies without a Russian presence, which would both reduce Russia’s political standing in the world and inhibit its own economic growth. One possible vehicle for pursuing this strategy could be the G-8 coalition of major industrialized nations, which met in late March—without Russia for the first time since 1998—in The Hague, Netherlands. The G-7, as the smaller group is being called, tentatively agreed to meet again in Brussels, which is the headquarters for both NATO and the EU, in June, when a summit of the G-8 was originally to be held in Sochi, Russia. Hopefully, the coalition will continue without Russia, as doing so serves both a symbolic and functional purpose: primarily, with Russia out of the picture, the seven remaining nations would be able to discuss economic policies that would benefit themselves and perhaps even inhibit Russian economic growth. As well, holding a summit in Brussels would deliver a clear message to the people of Ukraine and their new president, who will be chosen in special May elections. Regardless of whether the new administration is pro-Russia or pro-West, the sheer number of nations attending the summit in the “capital” of NATO and the EU would show off Western fraternity, in contrast to Russian isolation, which entails promising economic and diplomatic opportunities for the future. Apart from economic sanctions, the U.S. and other countries could expand humanitarian and governmental aid programs already in place to both help the people of Ukraine and reaffirm their support for its national sovereignty. First, and obviously foremost, Ukrainians are suffering due to their government’s instability and preoccupation with protests and invasions: state-controlled energy corporations, which provide electricity, gas, heat, and more, have been put on the back-burner to deal with more important crises. Even food and water have become scarce in many suburban and rural communities. For these reasons,
the Western nations would be well within their bounds to send food, water, medicine, and other essential supplies to Ukraine. Doing so would also bring about another positive effect, as the Ukrainian people would naturally associate the U.S. and the West with the aid and, therefore, perceive involved countries as sympathetic and supportive benefactors with good intentions. This mindset would presumably alienate many Ukrainians from Russia and steer the embattled nation towards siding with NATO and the West, which would constitute a great victory in diplomacy over the Russian Federation. While Putin and his Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, have pledged that Russia will not mount a full-scale attack on Ukraine, tens of thousands of troops are stationed at Ukraine’s eastern border. Perhaps, as a demonstration of NATO’s strength and unity and a deterrent to Russian aggression, the alliance could mobilize aircraft or naval vessels to bolster Eastern European members’ defense capacities, as several nations like Germany have already done. While these deployments would not necessarily intimidate Russia, as its
son constructed several anti-ballistic missile complexes in Eastern Europe and Asia Minor during the Cold War. These bases incensed the Soviets, since they provided both moral and actual military support to the USSR’s enemies. In fact, as recently as 2003, a proposal to create a new anti-ballistic missile site in Poland was met with extreme opposition and violent threats by the Russian government, even though it was ostensibly designed to protect against threats from the Middle East and North Africa. When the project was canceled in 2009, in favor of a smaller-scale plan for a weaker anti-ballistic missile base, Poland and other American allies throughout Europe felt betrayed and unsafe; they claimed that America had abandoned them, leaving them vulnerable to assaults from all directions. Why not kill two birds with one stone by either accelerating the current project or re-implementing the older, more comprehensive plan? Doing so could bring the U.S. and its European friends closer together, provide real protection against missile attacks, and show Russia that its invasion of Crimea has been taken as a sign of hostility against the West.
GAS SUPPLIED BY RUSSIA AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL 100% 90% 80%
70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
military is far more powerful than any accumulation of NATO forces in one region could be, they would certainly evince the gravity of Russia’s actions. Doing so would be analogous to increasing police presence in a crime-ridden neighborhood: the allocation of additional resources to the area would show that the uptick in criminal activity was noted by and troubling to the police department, without posing a direct threat to criminals. Military solutions to Russian belligerence in Ukraine can also come indirectly, specifically in the form of shared defense technology. The United States and NATO have always strived to protect their allies, and for that rea-
April 2014
Overall, even though it has been effective so far, punishing only high-ranking Russian officials and their asset managers is not a viable method of applying sanctions long-term. The United States and its European allies need to broaden the scope of the actions they are considering to include more wide-reaching economic penalties like trade embargoes and exclusion from international cooperation summits, humanitarian aid, or even joint NATO military action without actually engaging the Russians. Only then will Putin recall his soldiers and end Russia’s heinous violations of Ukrainian national sovereignty. HMR
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Ukraine
RUSSIA BREAKING ITS BOUNDARIES
blogs.ft.com
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MIRANDA BANNISTER
he Ukraine crisis promises to be among the most troubling conflicts that this generation has seen in Europe. As Russia advances into Crimea, President Vladimir Putin has tried again and again to convince the world that his nation’s actions are justified. Russia insists vehemently that its own minority within the Ukraine is at risk of danger. This is true, as with any minority in the country. However, neither Crimea nor Russia has the right to divide up the Ukraine. Russia simply struggles to do so, as it feels the rising tide of Western expansion creeping up on the nation that was previously so dependent. The citizens in Crimea have neither the will nor the right to join Russia. The popular referendum that was conducted in Crimea polled at 97% in favor of cessation originally, a shockingly high number. It sounds too good to be true for Russia, because it is. Andrey Illarionov of the Cato Institute found that at most one third of the population voted. Less than one third
of the population has expressed interest in seceding from the Ukrainian government. Although the Crimean population is nearly sixty percent ethnic Russians, it is unsurprising that a complete governmental flip was unappealing to many, regardless of their ethnic origins. Besides, even if enough popular support existed in Crimea to withdraw from the Ukraine, it cannot. The semi-autonomous nature of the Crimean government is highly exaggerated. Crimea operates as a subsection of the Ukraine. It has its own legislative body, but since its courts are part of the same judiciary system as the rest of the Ukraine, slight differentiations in laws have no impact. The Ukrainian Constitution reads, “Ukraine is a unitary state. The territory of Ukraine within its present border is indivisible and inviolable.” These words that were ratified time and time again, most recently in 2010 with a 70% majority in Ukrainian parliament, cannot be forgotten. For Crimea to sepa-
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rate from the Ukraine, both parties would have to agree. It is disturbing that with riots, Russia claims that a whole region of the Ukraine must break off from the nation whose well-being depends on the unity of different areas. There is no doubt about it: tension exists between Russians and their nationalist Ukrainian counterparts within the Ukraine, but if Russia truly sought change, Putin could easily force reform within the Ukraine. There have been several minor incidents of discrimination against Russians in the Ukraine. However, if Russia truly cared about the status of Russians in Crimea, more so than its own interests in Crimean resources, Putin would easily be able to fix matters. Russia holds a great deal of influence over not only Ukrainian natural gas consumption but also the debt obligations of the Ukraine to Russia. Ukraine relies on natural gas resources from Russia’s two main pipelines into the country to fill most of the nation’s natural gas needs.
Ukraine
washingtonpost.com
Forty percent of the country’s energy is fulfilled by natural gas. Russia manipulated Ukraine, with its monopoly on resources, as the number one energy producer in the world, and the most important energy producer for Ukraine in 2006 and 2009. In 2006 it completely shut off natural gas to Ukraine to force distance with the West. In 2009 it threatened to do the same and succeeded in both instances. Furthermore, Russia has subsidized natural gas and oil so much in the past several decades that the Ukraine has built up a 2 billion dollar debt to Gazprom, the company that accounts for 74% of Russia’s gas production. The Ukraine would have bent over backwards to fight discrimination against Russians if Putin had threatened to call in immediate or partial payment of the debt should the nation not comply. If Russia wanted to solve a problem in the Ukraine, Putin need only snap his fingers and the issue would be resolved. Russia wants Crimea, not peace in Crimea. The majority of the riots across the Ukraine and the violence against student protesters are the direct result of Russia’s consistent bullying of the Ukraine; Putin is just as at fault for the turbulence as the Kiev government is. The huge reliance that the Ukrainian government has developed on Russia is responsible for the fallout of a deal between the Ukraine and the European Union. President Viktor Yanukovych abandoned the deal with the EU, instead choosing to strengthen Russian relations. Putin offered the Ukraine $15 billion dollars in aid, assistance that would not have
been given if the Ukraine had signed on with the EU. The student protests that started, voicing anger with Yanukovych’s romance with Russia, turned to violence that only increased as new anti-protest laws were passed. This is the conflict that Putin used to justify invasion, but the role that Russia played, not only in pressuring the Ukrainian government into abandoning the treaty, but also in falsifying media reports and shipping dozens of busloads of fervent Russians into the Ukraine from border cities, show that Russia is the problem, not the solution. So, if Russia is not really interested in the wellbeing of the citizens, then why is it pursuing Crimea and Eastern Russia? Many argue, understandably yet incorrectly, that Russia is acting for physical expansion. Crimea, which Russia has successfully seized at the expense of its economic ties to the West, housed the navies for both the
April 2014
Ukraine and Russia. While the area seems valuable to Russians for its accessibility to water, Russia already signed an agreement with the Ukraine in 2010 that the Russian navy would remain based on Crimea until 2042. The reason that Russia wants to expand is because as the Ukraine attaches itself to the Western world, the likelihood of losing that naval base in the long run, or more importantly, the economic reliance of the Ukraine on Russia, increases drastically. The fear of Western expansion is therefore the driving force of Russian invasion. After all, the whole conflict started because Russia did not want Yanukovych to sign a treaty with Western powers. Since then, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has stated that Russia will not invade further territories if the Eastern regions of the Ukraine are permitted greater autonomy. The eastern regions are the regions with the greatest percentage of ethnic Russians; Russia’s hope is that a greater, more unified voice will arise from within the Ukraine, against the drift to the West. It seems highly unlikely that this plan will occur, especially because the EU and United States have shown such increasing support for Kiev through sanctions against Russia and provisions that Russia withheld. There will either be a violent division between the Eastern and Western parts of Ukraine, with Russia supporting the East and Western powers supporting the West and Kiev, or the Russian government will simply intercede before then, seizing the East. Either way, the outcome of this conflict will be grave. The conflict involves not just the Ukraine and Russia, but superpowers whose interests lie in inevitable expansion. It is important to know that when this battle comes to arms, it will not be for the benefit of civilians. HMR
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Ukraine
THE PRICE OF IL Daria Balaeskoul
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n the last two decades since Russia adopted its current constitution, Russia has been able to become a key player on the world stage. Nevertheless, the only way in which Russia has been able to remain a world power has been through exploiting and exporting its oil and gas reserves. Had Russia not developed its oil reserves to the extent that Russian companies now produce almost 30% of Europe’s gas, it would have been impossible for Russia to remain a world power and Russia would have been destined to fade into the bleak backdrop of post-Soviet states. In response to Russia’s illegal annex-
ation of Crimea, Europe and the United States have introduced sanctions against Russia, and NATO has agreed to suspend cooperation with Russia. Still, the sanctions imposed and the measures taken against Russia seem a bit unusual. Rather than banning trade with Russia, the sanctions target particular Russian individuals, powerful oligarchs that supposedly have Putin’s ear. These sanctions freeze the overseas assets of numerous wealthy businessmen and enact visa restrictions. In reality, these measures can hardly be effective. The oligarchs that are the targets of these sanctions owe their economic success to Vladimir Putin. As a
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result, it is highly unlikely that these oligarchs will be able to pressure Putin. Even so, dissent among the oligarchs’ ranks will doubtlessly result in a fate similar to that of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who was jailed for speaking out against President Putin. However, it is naïve to think that President Putin expected his actions in Crimea to be without consequence. The Russian president indisputably anticipated international action against Russia; nonetheless, he knew that Russia’s livelihood was secure because Russian oil exports could not be touched, and any Western embargo on Russian oil and gas would have an adverse
Ukraine
effect on Europe’s economy. In fact, in government and energy company forecasts, gas consumption and imports from Russia are expected to increase in the immediate future. Controlling such a vast amount of
Europe’s and the world’s gas supply grants Russia leverage, so little can be done to rein in President Putin as long as money is flowing into Russia from exported oil and gas. Several of the world’s largest ener-
gy companies, such as British Petroleum (BP) are close partners with their Russian counterparts. BP is one of the largest foreign investors in Russia. Additionally, a number of American and European gas
“Had Russia not developed its oil reserves, it would have been impossible for Russia to remain a world power and the nation would have been destined to fade into the bleak backdrop of post-Soviet states.”
April 2014
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Ukraine and oil producing companies have recently signed contracts with Russian companies, including Gazprom. As a result, the West would not be able to embargo the majority of Russian energy companies without hurting European and American companies. Russia’s current earnings from oil and gas exports amount to $229 billion, making it the second largest exporter in the world. Currently, as long as it does not run out of natural gas, Russia has little to lose. If worst comes to worst and Russian oil and gas were to be embargoed by the West, Russia would still be able to sell oil to itself and to China, which has a large demand for natural gas. On the other hand, Ukraine still has much to fear. In the past couple of weeks, the Russian-state-backed natural gas company Gazprom has raised prices in Ukraine by almost 40%, terminating a previous price agreement signed by Ukraine’s ousted President Victor Yanukovych after he rejected an association agreement with the European Union. This drastic price hike leaves many in both Europe and Ukraine anxious that Gazprom may halt sales to Ukraine altogether. Since 2006, Gazprom, which supplies Ukraine with almost 50% of its gas supply, has halted sales to Ukraine twice over unpaid bills. In the winter of 2009, Russia suspended gas exports to Ukraine, after a disagreement over prices and unpaid debts, leaving Ukrainians in the dark and without heat. Furthermore, because 15% of the natural gas pipelines between Europe and Russia run through Ukraine, Europe experienced significant gas shortages as well. Without a healthy Russian-Ukrainian relationship, the effects in Europe could be long lasting. Not only would Europe experience gas shortages, but also Europe currently has no viable alternatives to Russian oil. Even the United States is susceptible to market prices, as it has to import 40% of its oil. President Obama has recently advocated for waning Europe off of Russian oil through shipping liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe. Even though this option could grant Europe future political freedom from Russia, it is not currently economically feasible. Europe’s economy is still recovering from the economic crisis of 2008, and many nations in the European Union are still struggling under the burden of debt. Before American LNG could be used, a whole new network of piping would have to be laid out, and natural gas would first have to be liquefied, transported, and finally gasified. The extra costs incurred through using LNG
outweigh the European Union’s desire to get involved in Ukraine. Russian gas currently costs an average of $268 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas for European nations, which is considerably cheap. Ultimately, cheaper Russian gas attached to a few strings seems to be a better option for European countries than expensive American gas. Other alternatives to Russian oil carry significant financial and environmental challenges. For example, Canada’s oil fields have been known to pollute the environment more than most, and much of the world’s oil supply remains inaccessible. The biggest oil finds of the past decade located off the coast of Brazil and west Africa remain trapped un-
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marketoracle.co.uk
“The West can condemn, sanction, and suspend Russia all it wants without seeing any desired political response from Putin. The world runs on natural gas and is dependent upon Russia.” derwater. An answer closer to home would be to look towards developing Poland’s shale fields, which are estimated to be quite sizable. For the long-term, Europe should invest in its own energy companies, either in traditional or alternative energy, so that Europe may become an energy producer. In the end, the West can condemn, sanction, and suspend Russia all it wants, without seeing any desired political response from Putin. The world runs on natural gas and as a result is dependent upon Russia. At the end of the day, Russia does not have its reputation to lose; the only thing that is on the line, or rather in the pipes, is oil and gas. HMR
Ukraine
Eurasian The Soviet Union Danny Jin
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ladimir Putin’s decision to annex Crimea last month was met with significant disdain from the West. While Putin claims that he acted only to protect Crimea’s ethnic Russian population, few doubt that he has greater ambitions. Putin’s true intentions may tie in with the creation of the Eurasian Union, an alliance which he hopes will one day rival the European Union and the United States in terms of world influence. In Putin’s own words, the Eurasian Union will be “a powerful supranational association capable of becoming one of the poles in the modern world.” However, his
project is far from a reality; without Ukraine, the Eurasian Union will be just an agglomerate of weak Central Asian dictatorships – far from a supranational force. Still, even if Russia does convince Ukraine to join, the Eurasian Union would have a hard time competing globally and will likely fail to meet expectations. Instead, Russia would be dragging promising Eurasian nations into isolation. A fully developed Eurasian Union would prevent growth and development in the region and even threaten world peace. Putin has always been a very ambitious figure and wants to re-el-
April 2014
evate Russia to its status in the days of the Soviet Union. Now, the West must prevent Putin from achieving this goal. Recruiting Ukraine has been a priority for Russia ever since Putin announced his plan to form the Eurasian Union in 2011. Without Ukraine, the Eurasian project will undoubtedly fail. Russian political scientist Gleb Pavlovsky thinks that even Putin will give up on the Eurasian Union if Ukraine does not join. “Without Ukraine, Putin’s project is impossible,” he says. The combined populations of Belarus and Kazakhstan, the two other countries currently in
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Ukraine the Eurasian Union, amount to roughly 27 million – barely larger than the population of Texas. Ukraine, with its population of 45 million, provides not only a large market, but also long-term economic potential. Though Ukraine is currently more than $12 billion in debt, its fertile agricultural land and promising industry would make it a valuable member. 30% of the world’s black soil, highly fertile land, is in Ukraine, and it is among the world’s largest producers of multiple agricultural products. In addition, 80% of Russian oil flows through Ukrainian pipelines.
that will someday rise to become a world superpower. Within Eurasia, there is little agreement on what Eurasianism means; the Russian, Kazakh, and Turkish schools differ greatly. According to Russian geopolitics scholar Mark Bassin, there are only two elements that are shared by all forms of Eurasianism: the melding of European and Asian culture and the claim that Eurasianism is the legitimate heir of “classical” legacy. Russian Eurasianism is a generally isolationist ideology, which necessitates the rejection of the EU and the West. Surprisingly, this brand
“While Putin claims the Eurasian Union will act as a bridge between Europe and Asia, his actions indicate otherwise; if he truly wanted to cooperate with the West, Russia would not have derailed Ukraine’s deal with the EU last year.”
Ukraine’s geography also adds to its strategic importance. If Ukraine were to side with Russia, the Eurasian Unon would expand 800 miles west and border the EU. Ukraine’s geographical position allows it to act as a buffer zone, separating the Russia from the EU in case of a conflict. Furthermore, the addition of Ukraine would mean that Russia would gain full control over the Sevastopol port, allowing the Black Sea Fleet to continue operations unobstructed. It is no secret that Putin greatly values Ukraine as an ally. Otherwise, he would not have offered Ukraine the $15 billion bailout package in December of 2013; this was the reason the anti-government protests started in the first place. Additionally, Russia is thought to have offered Ukraine lower gas prices and to have threatened sanctions if it signed the EU deal last year. Clearly, Ukraine is a central part of Putin’s plans, and Russia is willing to spend to win its loyalty. Even if Ukraine does join the Eurasian Union, the group would still have to overcome several problems in order to be successful, and it will still likely have trouble fulfilling Putin’s expectations. The uniting principle of the Eurasian Union is Eurasianism – a confusing philosophy that envisions a re-integration of the post-Soviet space
of Eurasianism has considerable support in Russia – despite Putin’s expansionist policies, his popularity rating continues to soar. While Putin claims the Eurasian Union will act as a bridge between Europe and Asia, his actions indicate otherwise; if he truly wanted to cooperate with the West, Russia would not have derailed Ukraine’s deal with the EU last year. And if he wanted to gain some popularity with the other countries, he would not have granted American fugitive Edward Snowden asylum in Russia last August. While Putin may have made the morally correct choice, in this case, his decision wiped out any remaining chance of a successful “reset” of Russian-American relations. Both sides have made mistakes in the “reset,” but Russia had much more to lose from its failure. The US has allies all over Europe, but all Russia has is the Eurasian Union. Since Putin has no intention of associating with the West, the formation of the Eurasian Union would likely prevent any other Eurasian countries from doing so. Russia would command 57% of voting power in the new alliance and would gain influence over the other members. However, if these countries want to progress and integrate with the rest of the world, Russia is an
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25,000 Number of Russian Troops in Crimea
40,000 Number of Russian Troops on the Ukrainian Border
4.9 billion Dollars Ukraine Spends Annually on Defense
76.6 billion Dollars Russia Spends Annually on Defense
8 Number of Countries that have more Arable Land than Ukraine
43 Number of Countries that have more Total Land than Ukraine
Ukraine impediment. In addition, Russia will hand down a tradition of breaking rules, corrupt government, and international feuding which may sway others in the region. The West must prevent Eurasian countries from following in Russia’s footsteps. Meanwhile, other versions of Eurasianism do not involve the same level of hatred of the West, and countries such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan have more to gain from integrating with the world than with Russia. While cultural and economic ties, as well as downright diplomatic bullying, have drawn the Eurasian countries into the alliance, some are unwilling to devote their futures to Russia. Last September, Armenia had to ditch its free-trade deal with the EU after Russia threatened to send military weapons to Azerbaijan, which has a major territorial dispute with Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh. Though Armenia likely would have had greater economic benefits by taking the EU deal, Russia was able to convince Armenia to walk out. Armenia was not the only country to hesitate about the Eurasian Union – Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev has expressed a desire to eventually integrate with the world and was noticeably cautious when speaking about the situation in Ukraine. The reason countries are reluctant to side with Russia is mainly economic. The Russian economy is unable to compete with the West’s, so Putin must use history, culture, and bullying to lure other countries into his union. Putin had a chance to modernize Russia’s economy in the post-Soviet transition period, but he did close to
nothing. Today, Russia still lacks a modern economy and relies almost solely on oil for success. Quite simply, Russia does not manufacture products that other countries want to buy. Foreign policy expert Angela Stent attributes Russia’s economic growth from 2000 to 2008 mainly to windfall gains from rising oil and gas prices. However, economist Jim O’Neill warns that this is a highly precarious situation; currently, 70% of Russia’s exports are energy products, and erratic prices could cause major damage to the Russian economy. A Eurasian Union cooperative with the rest of the world – along the lines of the Kazakh vision – would be highly beneficial to the region’s economies and finally ease tension between Russia and the West. However, Putin wants the Eurasian Union to be powerful on its own, without interaction with the West. Even if the completed Eurasian Union does include Ukraine, it will still fall short of Putin’s towering expectations – if Russia is still a superpower, it is the weakest, and the Eurasian Union will simply not be good enough to be a world power on its own. Swedish economist Anders Aslund says it best: “When your share in global GDP is 2.5%, you cannot have global ambitions.” Although the Eurasian Union may not have as large a presence as Putin desires, it is definitely not a beneficial project for others in the region, and it could even threaten peace in Europe. While another Cold War is unlikely in the near future, a divided Europe is nonetheless a volatile situation. In the past, Russia has been left free to do whatever it wanted in its backyard without harsh
consequences because of its oil. Now, it is time for a change. The West can no longer allow Russia to pursue hegemony; Russia is driving Eurasia down the wrong road, and only the West can stop it. But the same challenges remain – sanctions against Russia mean in turn hurting the EU’s economies, and it seems unlikely that the EU is willing to take such drastic steps in punishing Russia. However, the Eurasian Union is dangerous and Russia must be taught a lesson. The events in Crimea and Ukraine show how devoted Putin is to the Eurasian project and how unwilling Europe is to retaliate. Put together, this combination could result in very serious problems for the world. We must find a way to deal with Russia that the EU will agree to before it is too late. HMR
The Eurasian Union Prospective Members Russia Belarus Kazakhstan
Other Possible Members Armenia Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY NATION Belarus
Ukraine
Armenia Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan
Kazakhstan
Russia April 2014
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Thailand
UNREST IN
THAILAND
Southeast Asia Population: 67, 741,401 GDP: $674.3 billion Constitutional Monarchy Prime Minister: Yinglak Chinnawat Unemployment: 0.8%
Industries: tourism, textiles, automobiles; world’s second-largest tungston producer Over the past 6 months, anti-government protests have riddled Thailand. The protesters, lead by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee’s Suthep Thaugsuban, have sought to remove the political influence of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and reform Thailand’s corrupt government. A proposed amnesty initially drove the protesters to actions, as the legislation would have pardoned Thaugsuban and other members of his Pheu Thai party for crimes ranging from corruption to murder during the last period of unrest in 2004, allowing the exiled prime minister to return to Thailand without punishment. However, the protesters, who, at first, successfully prompted the closure of several government buildings through peaceful means, have seen violence with police escalate and Thailand’s government dissolved and replaced with an unelected governing council, a body that has been deemed “fascist” and “undemocratic” by its critics. On January 13, the antigovernment protestors began occupying Bangkok, the country’s capital. The protestors barricaded the city’s main roads, spurring more violence and leading the government to declare a state of emergency. While the protests were meant to bring reform to Thailand’s government, the result has been chaos and what has developed into authoritarian rule. When the “people’s council” took control of the country in November, antigovernment protestors objected to the idea that it would serve as a transitory body until a general election could be held. On January 25, when voters made attempts to elect in a new government, anti-government protestors blocked polling stations in Bangkok and Southern Thailand,
preventing 440,000 registered voters from casting their votes. In the February election, which the country’s superior court later invalidated on a technicality, voter turnout was held to 44.4%. In March, in midst of arrests warrants being served for politicians in the People’s Democratic Reform Committee, the anti-government protestors urged that they would continue to disrupt the election process to ensure that the unelected council now running the country would remain in power. In the aftermath of the uprisings that have plagued
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Thailand, which has thus far witnessed 16 people die, 12 people face arrest, and 686 people receive injuries, the country’s economy and political system hang in the balance, as the undemocratic, anti-government protestors continue to clash with the democratic, pro-government elites who had run the country. Now, Thailand must focus on restoring order and reaching a consensus on how to move forward, or the country risks more violence, economic stagnation, rising human rights abuses, and increasing political corruption.
Thailand
Robust Protests, Faltering Economy
The Economic Threat of Thailand’s Unrest Abigail Zuckerman tork.blog.com
April 2014
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hailand has been marked by political instability for several decades and has endured eighteen coups since 1932, but its economy has shown remarkable resilience and continuously bounced back. From 2000 to 2007, Thailand experienced economic growth of 5-6% each year, and though it dwindled slightly in the following years, before the outbreak of the current instability, Thailand was one of the fastest growing economies in Asia. However, the agitation that has rocked the country for almost five months has had a considerably detrimental effect on Thailand’s fiscal prosperity and may pose a lasting threat to the previously booming economy. Given the present turmoil, Thailand is not exactly in a position to focus on its economy, but once the dust settles, the new government will need to handle its ex-
the GDP potential of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) region. If Thailand does not have a stable government in place within the next six months, the economy could continue to fail, which could impact the country for many years to come. In the midst of all this turmoil, stabilizing the economy is virtually impossible, but in order to protect the future of Thailand, its economic prospects must be taken into consideration as soon as the conflict is resolved. The current upset in Thailand began with protests in Bangkok last November that were triggered by the current prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra, sister of the self-exiled, former prime minster Thaksin Shinawatra, when she proposed an amnesty bill that would allow her brother to return to Thailand without facing his charges of corruption.
regime. In 2006, Thaksin was ousted by a military coup, and the yellow shirts accuse Yingluck of acting as Thaksin’s proxy and allowing him to continue his political and business empire from abroad. The yellow shirts gathered in the streets and petitioned for the incumbent prime minister’s resignation, and though protests were peaceful at first, they have escalated and resulted in several deaths. Throughout this turbulence, Thailand’s macroeconomic fundamentals have remained positive: inflation is contained, the country’s fiscal deficit is relatively small, and it maintains a strong position in foreign currency reserves. Nevertheless, GDP growth rates continue to drop due to decreased tourist arrivals, a weak external demand, and the expiration of some domestic stimulus programs that were first employed
In the midst of all this turmoil, stabilizing the economy is virtually impossible, but in order to protect the future of Thailand, its economic prospects must be taken into consideration as soon as the conflict is resolved. ports sector, boost investor confidence, and kick-start its weakened productivity. GDP growth in Thailand has dropped almost 3% in the last two financial quarters, and growth is expected not to reach 3% this year, which is lower than
The Thai population is separated into two main divisions: the “yellow shirts,” mainly urban voters led by the Democratic Party that opposes the current government, and the predominantly rural “red shirts” who support the present
Real Wages and Labor Productivity
mrzine.monthlyreview.org
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in 2012. The longer this political disquiet continues, the lower the growth rate will drop. These prolonged and intensifying protests also undermine investor confidence, which affects both local and foreign investments and delays investment in public infrastructure. Currently, the Thai government has no clear-cut policy on what should be done and is unlikely to construct one in the near future given the shaky ground it’s standing on. The longer the government waits, however, the bigger the problem will become, so the new regime will need to hit the ground running. One of Thailand’s main saving graces thus far has been that the discord hasn’t spread much outside of the capital Bangkok, leaving the rest of the country mainly open to tourism. As such a large part of its economy, tourism will certainly play an important role in sustaining Thailand in the months and years to come. Ensuring that tourism in Thailand remains a safe and viable interest for the global community is one of the surest ways this country has of protecting its economic prospects.
Thailand
Thailand’s next government, once it is settled after this uprising, must prioritize infrastructure and transportation in order to fully utilize Thailand’s favorable geographic position. Furthermore, Thailand’s exports sector will be a large factor in either the continued decline of the economy, or its recovery, and could therefore be used as a means to restore some of the financial security that Thailand previously enjoyed. The threat posed to the private sector due to investors’ loss of confidence in Thailand as a result of the riots could be one of the greatest problems the Thai economy will face in coming months. The instability itself is of course a deterrent because the country’s situation is so unpredictable, but the only way to remove this obstacle would be to resolve the riots, and it’s unclear how long that may take. Another concern for any investor, especially internationally, would be that the Thai baht, the country’s currency, has dropped to its lowest level in almost four years. Thailand consequently needs to monitor exchange rate alterations closely, because decreasing currency value could harm Thailand’s global position, which may further exacerbate the fragility of the government. Further sabotage of investor assurance could lead to a decrease in foreign capital inflows, and deter foreign direct investments and, accordingly, future economic growth prospects. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Thailand faces the challenge of weak productivity. This, however, is a problem that can be tackled more directly and doesn’t stem entirely from the current political conflict. Potential productivity takes into account research and development, infrastructure, quality of education, and institutional environment, and measuring it must consider factors such as political stability (or lack thereof ), absence or presence of corruption, and ease of doing business with other governments. Thailand has fallen behind in these areas, and its potential productivity is almost half of what is was in the early 2000’s. To improve its potential productivity and thereby significantly bolster its
economy, Thailand must invest in logistics infrastructure and work to reopen transportation improvement projects that have been put on hold by the riots in the capital. Thailand’s next government, once it is established after this uprising, must prioritize infrastructure and transportation in order to fully utilize Thailand’s favorable geographic position in the center of the Mekong countries of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. If Thailand were able to take full advantage of its location, it could also make use of these countries’ extensive resources and new, growing markets. Thailand has the potential to function as this region’s hub for logistics and advanced production, but that would require better transport systems throughout the country, not just near the capital, and until the unrest settles, successful projects cannot be developed, so projects must be opened as soon as a new government is in place. Upgraded infrastructure also has the ability to demonstrate to investors Thailand’s commitment to improving itself in
an open and transparent manner, thereby attracting foreign interest and boosting investor confidence. Thailand could also take this further by focusing on investors and developers with access to modern and more applicable technology in high demand by advancing the technical skill of the workforce and the institutional environment for doing business. Many of Thailand’s key manufactured exports, including many types of electronics, were imported technologies brought to Thailand to be produced. The exportation of these technologies has helped rescue the Thai economy during past domestic turmoil, and once the current dispute is calmed, such technology manufacturing may salvage the currently sinking economy by utilizing the exportation sector. The continuation of all this political turbulence is certainly not helping Thailand’s appeal as an investment option, so the longer the instability continues, the more work the government will have to do to recover. However, in the aftermath, the Thai government must avoid turning to debt-generating stimulus programs to counter the economic slowdown given the high level of indebtedness among low-income households in Thailand, which leave little room to resuscitate the economy using those measures. The new Thai government must therefore focus on increasing productivity on permanent and sustainable bases, otherwise Thailand may be suffering the consequences of this upheaval for the foreseeable future. HMR
www.global-gateways.com
April 2014
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THAILAND IN TURMOIL Eric Stein
Eric Stein
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tarting in November, protests in Bangkok have escalated to the point where tens of thousands of anti-government demonstrators are now protesting outside government ministry buildings. Protests started when the ruling Pheu Thai party attempted to adopt an amnesty bill that would have allowed the formally ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to return to Thailand. Thaksin Shinawatra was overthrown in 2006 in a coup and fled the country in 2008 to avoid corruption charges. Yingluck Shinawatra, the youngest sister of Thaksin, is
the current Prime Minister of Thailand. The protesters regard Yingluck as a proxy for her older brother Thaksin who they believe is ruling Thailand from his homes in London and Dubai. Throughout the political upheaval and decades of corruption and political unrest, the people of Thailand have lost faith in politicians. The Western media has neglected the ongoing political unrest in Thailand. This seems to be a fantastic story for Western media as it is filled with murder, political intrigue, corruption, and nepotism. An ac-
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cused mass murderer and convicted criminal with multiple arrest warrants is running Thailand by using his younger sister to represent him, and yet this has gotten very little attention from Western media. Western nations have asked protesters to follow the “rule of law� and have denounced their taking over government buildings. The West has backed protests around the world where the ruling government was corrupt and despotic, but the West is now defending a dishonest and oppressive government in Thailand. Yingluck Shinawatra has been a cru-
Thailand Yingluck responded with tear gas, water cannons, and rubber bullets. These protests and the government’s ensuing actions have left hundreds dead. There have been multiple massacres carried out by multiple unidentified assailants that have killed many protesters. So far, the government has been very slow to find those that are responsible for the atrocities, which raises a large belief that Yingluck was involved in these killings. These terrible crimes committed by the government of Thailand are rarely mentioned in Western media. The West has backed protests in Egypt,
also one of the biggest growers of corn and wheat, and Ukraine exports these goods to countries in the European Union. It is in the economic interest of the West that Ukraine stays stable and does not engage in a civil war which would affect trade. Also, analysts believe that with heavy investment, Ukraine’s agricultural sector could grow exponentially. If Ukraine loses its dependence on Russia, experts believe countries in the European Union would profit from increased trade with Ukraine. Oil is also a major reason more attention is given from the West to Ukraine than to Thailand. Experts say the European
“The United States and the West should spend more energy on making relations with the Thai military, which will play a major role in how the crisis in Thailand will play out.”
el leader, and her actions deserve attention from the West. Since taking of office, Yingluk has pursued her family’s agenda. The Shiwanatras are abusing the democratic process in Thailand. Yingluck attempted to extend amnesty to her brother, Thaksin Shinawatra, the former Prime Minister. Yingluck is being used as a stand-in for her brother who can no longer legally be the Prime Minister of Thailand. This foolish action by Yingluck to extend her brother’s amnesty unleashed a huge amount of ire from the people of Thailand, which has led to the protests in the capital.
Tunisia, Syria, Russia, Yemen, Libya, Malaysia, and Ukraine, but the West is not backing protests in Thailand because its economic interests lie with the current regime. The West is putting itself on the side of its own economic interests as it benefits from the current regime in Thailand. When taking office in the late 1990s, Thaksin promised to perform the part of “matchmaker” between Western commercial interests and Thai businesses. The US government continues to support Yingluck ,whom the State Department dubbed “a long time friend and ally.” In 2001, Thaksin privatized the nation’s oil conglomerate to the benefit of Wall Street. In 2003, Thaksin even committed Thai troops to the US invasion of Iraq with obvious intentions of making good relations with the West. In 2004, Thaksin tried to pass a US-Thailand Free-Trade Agreement without parliamentary approval. The West is profiting from the Shinawatra regime in Thailand. The ongoing revolution in Ukraine has received more attention and support from the West due to a greater interest in a regime change in Ukraine than in Thailand. Ukraine is a prime example of how the United States backs protests when it offers economic gain. Ukraine has the potential to be a significant world power due to its geographical location, resources, size, transportation networks, and human capital. The West would benefit economically if Ukraine joined the European Union. The European Union exports $20 billion in goods to Ukraine every year, and this number would increase once Ukraine joined the European Union. Ukraine is
April 2014
Union and the United States would benefit economically if Ukraine depended less on Russia’s quasi-governmental oil and gas giant. With the idea that Ukraine would break away from Russia’s gas supply once joining the European Union, the US, which contains abundant supplies of natural gas, would export more natural gas to Ukraine and have a huge economic gain. On the other hand, as shown earlier, the West and the United States’ economic interests lie with the current regime in Thailand. The US and the West should spend more energy on making relations with the Thai military, which will play a major role in how the crisis in Thailand will play out. The US State Department, in response to the turmoil in Thailand, urged “all sides to refrain from violence, exercise restraint, and respect the rule of law.” The US must do more than to simply ask both sides to abstain from violence. Sanctions, which would crush Thailand’s economy, would be a very good tool in stopping violence in the region, and also in lessening the military’s power in the country. The US used sanctions against Russia as a result of invading Ukraine, and the sanctions proved to hurt Russia’s economy. A collapse of democracy in Thailand would be a major catastrophe not only to the people of Thailand, but also for democracy in the world. It would be a major setback for democracy in that region which is a major economic center in the world. Thailand and the wider region is where the future of democracy is being decided. The success of democracy in Asia can be initiated by a prosperous and democratic Thailand. HMR
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openideo.com
The Cost of Strife The Toll of Thailand’s Political Instability on Human Rights Cassandra Kopans-Johnson
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Thailand
D
ue to the political instability and consequent violence in Thailand, since the 2006 military coup d’état, the number of human rights violations has increased dramatically. Outbreaks of protest have damaged infrastructure such as houses and roads, which has hurt local communities. Likewise, local people’s customary codes of ethics have been eroded by continuous conflict. People have become distracted by the instability surrounding them in the midst of rising political extremism. The result is a Thailand of not only political instability but also social instability, which has led to an increase in human rights violations related to protests, corrupt politics, economic decline, refugee immigration, and ethnic conflict.
tration has exacerbated the political divide by fueling the opposition’s resentment. Some among the opposition are now calling for a council of unelected technocrats, which makes compromising with supporters of democracy even more challenging. Since November 2013, opposing forces have taken advantage of public anger concerning Yingluck Shinawatra’s corrupt politics. As seen above, these opposing groups have entered the streets eager to topple government officials, and due to this intensifying political divide, restrictions on free speech have occurred, as has the use of media as a means of intimidation. The media in Thailand is
largely controlled by the government and military, a monopoly that results in propagandistic news coverage. From this, the spread of false information and an inaccurate public understanding of the workings of the world arise. Additionally, government authorities now censor and prosecute activists under computer and lese majeste (defaming the monarchy) laws. For example, in May of 2012, the Bangkok Criminal Court condemned Chiranuch Premchaiporn, a website manager of popular online news portal Prachatai, to a one-year prison term for lese majeste statements posted on Prachatai by Economic Consequence
Political Violence In 2011, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra promised to bring national reconciliation and aid to victims of recent political violence. However, in the midst of political turmoil, the current administration has still not fulfilled its pledge to prioritize human rights. As opponents of the governing Pheu Thai party have increased their efforts, the Red Shirts party, which supports Yingluck Shinawatra and the former prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, has staged demonstrations as a way to express its loyalty. Although everyone is entitled to have his or her own opinions and to have the freedom to express his or her thoughts, he or she must also recognize the inherent rights of other members of human kind. However, in 2010 during Red Shirt demonstrations, no one claimed responsibility for the more than 2,000 injured and the 98 deaths. Innocent people were denied their right to life. These demonstrations along with similar ones have not solved the dissension in Thailand but have in fact exacerbated the political divide. Today, protests aimed against a specific bill are now directed at dismissing the Pheu Thai government. With more at stake, people look to desperate measures to support their cause, and more human rights violations occur. By promoting general amnesty for political corruption, the Shinawatra adminis-
“The government is unable to combat these human rights violations because it is distracted by protests occurring in Bangkok and the deepening political divide.” April 2014
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“Today there are nearly 82,000 registered refugees and almost 13,000 asylum seekers in Thailand.” others. Likewise, Somyos Pruksakasemsuk, a labor activist and magazine editor, was arrested for lese majeste in 2011 due to articles written by another person in his magazine, Voice of Thaksin. During his pre-trial detention, the court denied him of bail eight times. In these scenarios, the right to freedom of thought and expression and the right to a fair trial were neglected. Due to political strife, the economy has worsened and economic inequality has increased. The Red Shirts are mostly comprised of poor, rural laborers while the opposing Yellow Shirts are mostly middle-class urban workers. According to the Asia Foundation, “The richest 20 percent of Thais possess about 70 percent of the wealth, while the poorest 20 percent hold just 4 percent.” Thailand’s economic disparity creates additional tension between political factions. The financial pressure endured by the lower classes also results in more human rights violations, as some turn to illicit means of generating wealth. Human rights violations occur not only in combat over political disagreement but also as impoverished people begin engaging in human trafficking. Thailand is a hub in the Greater Mekong Sub-region for both labor and sex trafficking. As stated by hukmantrafficking.org, many Thais are “lured by labor recruiting agencies and are forced into involuntary servitude or sexual exploitation” due to financial desperation. Internal trafficking remains a problem in Thailand where women and girls from ethnic minorities such as the northern Hill Tribes are particularly vulnerable due to being barred from citizenship. There are no laws in Thailand that address sex tourism, the practice of traveling for the purpose of contracting prostitutes. Due to financial restraints, some parents force their children into prostitution to earn money. In addition, child labor exists in the garment industry, agriculture, and seafood processing. Human exploitation is exacerbated by local police corruption and the lack of a governmental, comprehensive monitoring system. The government is unable to combat these human rights violations because it is distracted by protests occurring in Bangkok and the deepening political divide.
Thailand is also a popular destination for refugees fleeing from persecution in nearby countries. As Thailand’s resources become more and more limited due to a declining economy and the government’s need to focus on the demonstrations in Bangkok, attention is detracted from the treatment of refugees. Today there are nearly 82,000 registered refugees and almost 13,000 asylum seekers in Thailand. However, many refugees have no legal identification of their distinctive status in Thailand. Instead, many of them are prosecuted and interned under Thai law for “illegal immigration” despite their reason for being in the country. Arrests of asylum seekers often involve late night or early morning raids in residential areas. Once arrested, the refugees are taken to police stations where no translation services are available, so they are unable to understand what is happening to them. Eventually, they are brought to a court hearing where they are given no opportunity to explain their reason for being in the country, and the court’s efforts are aimed at passing sentences rather than reviewing evidence. In this way, refugees are not treated as equals before the law compared to Thai citizens and are denied their right to fair trials. The abuse refugees suffer throughout the arresting process also violates their right to security of person, which leaves them without a defense against unlawful imprisonment.
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Ethnic Conflict Throughout the conflict between protestors and the Yingluck administration, separatist insurgents have been battling in Southern Thailand. The current unrest grew out of historical animosity between the Thai Buddhist majority and the ethnically distinct Malay Muslim minority. In 2005, Thaksin was given power to handle the insurgency, but due to political instability, the government has been unable to rein in the violence. Recently, separatists insurgents connected to National Revolution Front-Coordinate (BRN-Coordinate) have targeted civilians in roadside ambushes, drive-by shootings, assassinations, and bombings. According to Human Rights Watch, “Civilians make up
more than 90 percent of the more than 5,000 deaths in the southern border provinces since January 2004.” These insurgent groups often use militaristic tactics to remove ethnic Thai Buddhists from Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat, and to discredit Thai authorities for protecting citizens and oppressing Malay Muslims. Although the current government established a compensation plan for Malay Muslim victims of Thai security forces, the responsible military personnel have received little to no punishment for the torture, abuse, and extrajudicial killings they committed. The insurgents have demanded a level of autonomy from Thailand in the Pattai region. The increase in violence has resulted from the Thai government’s stalling peace talks because it is busy handling anti-government
Thailand
Due to clashes between religious groups, many refugees from Myanmar seek asylum in Thailand. They are often detained in prison-like facilities such as this one.
protests in Bangkok. Therefore, insurgents have often retaliated against administrations such as those lead by Thaksin Shinawatra by attacking the commercial districts of Yala and other areas highly populated by Malay Muslims. On March 31, 2012, when exiled separatists leaders were pressured to enter negotiations with Thai officials, insurgents responded by placing car bombs throughout
commercial areas in Songkhla. This episode resulted in sixteen deaths, and four hundred people were left wounded. Thailand’s political insecurity that has resulted in social unrest and human rights violations demonstrates the importance of a stable government. It should be noted that democracy is fragile and that we have the responsibility to protect our inherent rights
and the inalienable rights of others. Living in the United States of America can sometimes feel like living in a bubble that is cut off from the rest of the world. It is easy to get lost in our daily life. We ought to recognize that we are members of an interconnected world and when political instability erupts in one geographical region, it affects us all. HMR
“Although the current government established a compensation plan for Malay Muslim victims of Thai security forces, the responsible military personnel have received little to no punishment for the torture, abuse, and extrajudicial killings they committed.� April 2014
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Thailand
Class Conflicts in Thailand and their Challenge to Political Progress MATTHEW PARKER
April 2014
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“Just when the country seems to be changing for the better, a new wave of protests brings it back to chaos and reelections that are not needed.”
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ocioeconomic divisions have created a political crisis in Thailand that is unique and complicated when compared to the class conflicts many other nations have faced. In this case, it is the upper class that is rebelling, while the poor wait for an end to the protests. One would think the upper class would already have more political power than the poor, but in Thailand, the current ruling party represents the rural population much more so than urban elites. The protests in Thailand are based in the cities, and protestors are calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, sister of Thaskin Shinawatra, who was the leader of Thailand until ousted in a coup in 2006. The protests began after an amnesty bill, which would have dismissed charges of corruption against Thaskin, appeared in the Senate. Yingluck quickly removed the bill, but protests increased as an attempt to end corruption in the government, and there has occasionally been violence between protestors and police forces. While both supporters of the democratically elected government and its vocal opponents have good arguments as to why they should act a certain way, the protests are fueling instability in a country that has already had too much turmoil. The protestors have accomplished their original goal of removing the bill, but as they now ask for more severe action such as Yingluck’s being tried in court for corruption, Thailand could become a violent and chaotic state that is worse off than the slightly corrupt one it is today. The main party protesting the government is the Democratic party of Thailand, made up of middle and upper class people from the cities. They have a minority in the Senate, and also make up a minority of the population. The party has created chaos in the streets and threatened democracy at a time when the country is starting to make progress socially and economically. Their view is that the government has been deceitful and corrupt, and many in this party
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believe Yingluck is just a puppet for her brother Thaskin. While the amnesty bill was their original impetus for taking to the streets, opponents of the government are continuing to protest against the Yingluck administration, and some now call for the removal of the government all together. The real issue is that the government has put more of a strain on the upper classes with taxes that have gone to help the poor in rural areas. Some analysts also think their money could have been spent more wisely, and that the hiring of companies run by relatives and friends of government officials cost Thailand more money than if the government had invested in other companies. There is no evidence to prove this, and all the hired companies have done their jobs efficiently and successfully, but the thought of corruption has tainted the minds of the protestors. In addition, economic policies under Thaskin and Yingluck have helped rural areas far more than urban ones, and although this benefits Thailand as a whole, the residents of the larger cities would like to see tax money spent near their homes. The current party in power, and the party of the Shinawatras, is the Phuea
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Thai Party. Yingluck was elected in a fully democratic election, and her legitimacy is not contested, although she has now been wrapped up in a rice subsidy scandal and may go to trial for a lesser charge of corruption. The view of members of the party is that they have done nothing wrong besides follow through with campaign promises but have still faced hostility from the upper classes and the military. Many supporters of the party have benefitted from public works projects the government initiated while the Phuea Thai Party has held a majority in the senate, and Thailand’s economy has grown as well. The protests that continued past the removal of the amnesty bill prompted a reelection in the Thai senate, which will threaten the Phuea Thai Party’s majority holding. However the protests turn out, the reelection’s results must be honored. The Democratic Party’s supporters are ruining a democracy that was functioning about as well as any democracy can. The common people’s voice was being heard, and the ideas that people wanted to see put into action were coming to fruition. The government may indeed have some level of corruption but has been generally successful in growing the economy and improving the average standard of living in Thailand. If Democratic Party sympathizers really want to remove Yingluck from power, they should focus on proving that actual corruption occurred rather than calling for new elections, which will likely produce the same result as they did before. The views of the majority have not shifted; all that has changed is the rigor with which the Democratic Party has fought to remove the Phuea Thai Party
A: aljazeera.com, B: irapornkh401.blogspot.com C: huffingtonpost.com D: wikipedia.com
Thailand Thai Electoral Map, 2011 General Election
On July 3rd, Thailand held elections to the House of Representatives, a 500 seat legislative body. The Pheu Thai Party won 265 seats (49% of the popular vote). The Democratic Party won 159 seats (35% of the popular vote).
Pheu Thai Party Democratic Party
from power, and they happened to be given an amnesty bill from which to springboard off of. Thailand has been a mostly democratic state since 1973, but it has had a shaky history with democracy. The country was still planting its democratic roots for much of the 1980’s when the government began to stabi-
lize. Thaskin came to power in popular elections in 2001 and remained in power and well liked until the bloodless coup by the military in 2006. The coup was seen as unnecessary since elections were looming and a new government would have been put in place if the majority wanted a change. Anger mounted as
April 2014
the interim military government held power while facilitating elections that would have come naturally much sooner without any extra interference. Many, particularly in the current government, are still worried about another event like this, which may be one reason the ruling party has given in so easily to the demands of the protestors. After the military came out of power, the country cooled down until in 2010, when Phuea Thai Party supporters held a protest asking for elections, similarly to what is happening now. The protests were peaceful, but after the protests were at first unsuccessful and more people began streaming into the cities from outside Bangkok, a state of emergency was declared and signs of violence began to emerge. The military used live ammunition on protestors, and as the death toll mounted, the two parties began to talk to end protests. Eventually an agreement was reached, but not before over 100 people had died. These protests set the tone for the current unrest, and many average citizens as well as government officials from both parties are cautious about protests in general, as the country still remembers these terrible events. It is unlikely that the current protests will reach the scale of the previous ones since the majority of the population is against them. When Reuters reporters were asking people on the street whether they supported the protests or not, one 65 year old citizen summed up the general sentiment of the poll nicely, saying, “Elections are best for democracy. Whatever we do, we must have elections.” This common train of thought flies directly in the face of the opposition and proves that the majority of Thais still support their country’s current system of government. The Democratic protestors, while being a minority and seen by most of their opponents as aristocrats angry that they have lost power, have a point in saying that the current administration could be corrupt. While Thaskin was in power, companies owned by his family members saw an increase in business and were given government projects to work on. Thaskin has been able to defend himself against censure due to these companies’ ability to fulfill government contracts and the fact that the average stock price of Thai companies has grown more than companies owned by Shinawatra family members. In addition, the Phuea Thai Party has greatly helped many of the poor in Thailand with works projects and has increased support for farmers and other rural inhabitants. Thaskin was elected after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and his policies of promoting small business and subsidized fuel prices gained the support of the rural population. After seeing the success of some
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Thailand of his ideas, he was elected in 2001, and his party gained 248 seats after holding none in previous years. The protestors, while saying they only wish to expose corruption, are creating chaos in a country that has benefitted from Pheu Thai Party efforts such as universal health care and a lower cost of living. While corruption is a serious charge, the democratic process has been disrupted too often in Thailand. Just when the country seems to be changing for the better, a new wave of protests brings it back to chaos and reelections that are not needed. The protestors’ right to assemble and speak freely should be protected, and the government has occasionally responded too harshly to the demonstrations, including shooting at protestors and using tear gas, but the call for reelections every few years is putting an unnecessary strain on the country. Furthermore, the governments that protests have taken down have helped the common people in Thailand and have been reelected because of their positive impact in the country. The demands that the protestors make are also too extreme to be taken seriously. The Democratic Party protestors have called for an unelected people’s council to appoint leaders, which they say is an attempt to stop the “political machine” of the Phuea Thai Party. This would turn Thailand into an oligarchical state and would not let the rural citizens have the same voice they have had since Thailand’s rocky beginnings of democracy in 1973. The protestors have been calling Thaskin and Yingluck part of a parliamentary dictatorship yet
“Thailand has in the past been too frequently controlled by an oportunistic military or another group that seizes power when the democratic process runs into a setback.” are trying to instate a system of government that does not give the individual a voice. If the Democratic Party wishes to make a real difference, they should try to expose actual corruption in the current party and gain the support of the rural voters with programs that help the country. The current protests are causing problems when the democratic process has been working fine for Thailand. Many of the Democratic Party’s supporters who live in the cities do not realize that the rural population has seen an increase in its quality of life and that despite any possible collusion, the overall effect of the Phuea Thai Party has been prosperity for Thailand. The government, while initially responding appropriately by taking the controversial amnesty bill off the table, has seen lapses in judgment, and clashes between police and protestors have left up to 23 dead. This is not nearly as bad as the protests in 2010, when the government at the time sent troops to deal with Red Shirt protestors that left up to 100 people dead, as well as caused brawling and looting throughout the streets of Bangkok. The key for the government is to allow pro-
tests to happen, as long as they are peaceful, and to let the elections play themselves out. Whatever the people of Thailand decide is the right course of action should be followed. It is too soon to tell for sure how the protests have affected the mood of the country, but the upcoming elections will reveal whether the scandals in the government have changed the poor and rural people’s opinions that the Phuea Thai Party has made Thailand a better country. The protests have a right to continue, as free speech is an undeniable right, but the protestors may accidentally create a government that does not support the same rights they are currently exercising. Thailand has in the past been too frequently controlled by an opportunistic military or another group that seizes power when the democratic process runs into a setback. In the end, the people of Thailand should have the final say in who their leaders are, and the only way to truly do that is through democratic elections. The reelection in progress will set the tone for how government is handled in Thailand for years to come. HMR
Anti-government Protest in Bangkok, January, 2014
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Thailand
PROTESTS IN THE LAND OF SMILES
www.global-gateways.com
Ben Alexander
I
f you were to ask, many Thais would say that Thaksin Shinawatra is one of those corrupt, deceitful people whom you should never trust with your pets or children. Unfortunately, as the Prime Minister of Thailand from 2001 to 2006, he controlled not only pets and children but also the government and military. Thaksin, who made his fortune as a telecommunications mogul, faces accusations of dictatorship, tax evasion, conflicts of interest, suppression of the press, and even treason, among other allegations. He is currently living in a selfimposed exile, most recently in Dubai, in order to avoid corruption charges. Unfortunately for Thailand, Thaksin is still running the country through his sister Yingluck Shinawatra, the current Prime Minister. You could say that he still has a strong political Thai to his old nation. Thailand is going through perhaps the worst time of civil unrest in its history, as protestors demand an end to the Shinawatra reign. Some demonstrations have turned violent, leading to the deaths of government
officials, police officers, and protestors. But even if protestors or a military coup succeed in taking down the Shinawatras, Thailand still has some structural problems in its system of government that will likely push the Thai people to rebellion again if they are not fixed. Two of the largest issues in Thailand are corruption and the country’s long history of political instability. These two problems are not easily solved, but there are certainly some steps that will greatly improve the situation. Without change, it will be difficult for better leaders to step forward and help Thailand become a stronger, more stable country. Corruption is a problem everywhere, but it is especially prevalent in Thailand. One of the most prominent forms of corruption is cronyism: the favoring of one’s friends and family when making political appointments, often without regard to the appointee’s qualifications. Appointments are a way to hand out favors and, for those who participate, a way to accumulate and wield power. Despite Yingluck Shinawatra’s
April 2014
protests to the contrary, few question whether Thaksin still controls Thailand. Yingluck won the general election for Prime Minister in 2011 as the nominee of the Pheu Thai Party, which was founded by her brother and is still closely connected with him. The continued influence of Thaksin is at the heart of the current Thai unrest. One needs to look no further than 2013, when Yingluck proposed an amnesty bill that would drop all charges against Thaksin and end his exile. It was shot down in the Senate, but still set off a round of protests, confirming that among other factors, cronyism is a major point of contention for many. In fact, cronyism doesn’t just apply to the relationship between Thaksin and Yingluck. Prime Ministers appoint many officials, so Thaksin and Yingluck have appointed other politicians who are loyal to them and will carry on their legacies into the future. So, what can be done about cronyism? In the short term, Yingluck must be removed from power. She has no previous political experience, and her removal will
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Thailand end concerns about her brother’s influence. In the long term, there must be changes in the way political appointments are made. All appointments should require approval from another government body to prevent blatant favoritism towards friends and family. Additionally, a more strict set of credentials should be required before a candidate is considered. As a result, the Prime Minister would still have freedom to appoint similarly minded people, but the appointees would have to at least be somewhat qualified and respectable. A second form of corruption is vote buying. Did you wonder why the Thai voted for Yingluck in the first place, considering her lack of experience and exiled brother? The answer, at least in large part, is vote buying. It is a long-standing practice in
Thailand, and according to an international observer, in one area it costs between $10 to $100 per vote. Another technique is called “reverse vote buying,” where candidates buy the voting ID cards of voters who support other parties to eliminate votes for their rivals. An unfortunate side effect of vote buying is the intimidation and threats that accompany the effort to make sure voters really vote for the candidates who paid them. Ominously, people sent to intimidate can be seen loitering about polling booths, watching voters make their decision. One recent and flagrant example of vote buying is Yingluck’s rice-mortgage scheme, introduced in 2011, where the government buys rice directly from farmers for up to twice the market rate. The move is presented as an effort to help low-income
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farmers, and farmers are eager to sell rice at these prices, so in turn they vote for the Shinawatras. In reality, the scheme has raised the price of Thai rice exports above those of other countries, making Thai rice difficult to sell and actually hurting these farmers. Getting rid of vote buying would not only remove Yingluck and other politicians who employ such practices, but would also be a long-term solution that would allow the best candidates to be elected, not the richest or most powerful. Even if these better candidates do not win, there would at least be pressure on the Shinawatras, and others like them, to change their ways. The hard part, of course, is actually eliminating vote buying. It is not easy, but still must be a goal. Several things can be done. Firstly, redesigning voting
Thailand
“Thaksin, who made his fortune as a telecommunications mogul, faces accusations of dictatorship, tax evasion, conflicts of interest, suppression of the press, and even treason, among other allegations.” booths to increase secrecy is essential, as is making sure the areas around voting booths are better protected to allow people to vote without outside influence. It would also help to give better education to poorer Thai citizens and others who are susceptible to vote buying. Many people do not realize how corrupt and ineffective the Shinawatras are, so their votes are easy to buy since they don’t realize what harm they are doing. If people were more educated about government matters, they might see through the Shinawatras and not be so easily swayed by small amounts of money. Consider the rice-mortgage scheme. On the surface it sounds like a great deal for farmers. However, if farmers were better informed they might see that buying rice for twice its worth is simply unsustainable. Already there have been serious delays in payments to farmers. According to the Thai Public Broadcasting Service, “Minister…Varathep Ratanakorn affirmed the government understands and sympathizes with the farmers for the delay of payments… relevant agencies are currently trying their best to gather the amount of money needed and have been selling rice in stock and looking for loans, though every action has proven to
be difficult due to the limitations of the current state of the government.” Perhaps more education would have allowed farmers to see that the scheme could never work. Maybe they could also have foreseen current concerns as to whether money is really going to farmers or whether it is, as a July 2012 Economist article states, “lining the pockets of brokers, millers and other middlemen.” Ultimately, the people need to recognize that policies such as the rice scheme are bad for Thailand’s economy, which eventually hurts every Thai citizen. In addition to corruption, a second problem is political instability in Thailand’s history. Thailand has had more coups than almost any other country, including the one most recently in 2006 that removed Thaksin Shinawatra. According to the political scientist Jay Ulfelder, “Thailand has some important risk factors [for coups] but not others, so it winds up in the middle of the global pack in terms of risk…being in the middle of the pack translates into a very low likelihood, like less than 5 percent.” Why, then, has Thailand had so many? Ulfelder says, “Coup activity also tends to cluster, so countries that have seen one or more attempts in the past five years are several times as likely to get hit by another
April 2014
than countries that have been coup-free for a while.” It is not certain, but it seems that Thailand has so many coups simply because…it has always had many coups! After a while, coups seem normal as a means for change. But they are short-term solutions unless competent governments replace what is overthrown. Because of this, it is even more important to elect legitimate leaders who keep Thailand stable for a number of years, which will bring the country further away from its coup-filled history. A third, somewhat less urgent problem that may arrive soon is a succession crisis. The Thai people revere King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who has been a stabilizing force throughout his reign, perhaps most notably during the crisis of 1992. He is 86 years old, and hopefully will live through the current crisis, but the problem is that his son and likely successor, Vajiralongkorn, is not fit for the crown. He is a gambler and a known adulterer; moreover, he is frivolous enough to have given his poodle a military position. At age 61, he seems unlikely to change. If he were to take the throne now, it would likely infuriate the protestors, who want better government. The legal details are complicated, but it would be ideal if King Bhumibol could appoint his daughter Princess Sirindhorn instead, since she actually is a capable leader. Thailand truly needs and deserves respectable leadership, such as the kind King Bhumibol has shown. The situation in Thailand is complicated. There is certainly no easy way out. Clearly, corruption in its many forms (cronyism, vote buying, etc.) is a major issue. Upsettingly, corruption is so ingrained in the Thai political system that it is taken as a given. Few are outraged by corrupt politicians because they have come to expect it. Today, media holds a lot of power. The Thai media must use its right to broadcast corruption, shaming leaders who have abused the public trust, just like in the U.S. It’s hard to imagine President Obama taking a bribe, having this information released, and then having any chance of reelection the next year. Better candidates for office should feel safe and comfortable stepping up to serve their country, not overmatched and disadvantaged. When better leaders are elected into office, Thailand will see that good government can be the ultimate bribe—providing lower crime rates, better education, more jobs, and a stronger economy will please the Thai people far more than any bribe ever will. HMR
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Thailand
UNREST IN
VENEZUELA
Official Name: Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela Population: 28,946,101 Total GDP: $408.805 billion GDP Per Capita: $13,634 Suffrage: Universal; 18 years of age Literacy: 95.2% Industry: Oil
Although the protests in Venezuela began early this year, Venezuela has had a long history rife with economic and political instability. It declared independence from Spain on July 5, 1811 but only attained sovereignty in 1821. The following century was then characterized by political turmoil and dictatorial rule until 1958 when all three major political parties of the time signed the Punto Fijo Pact. Democratic elections have since been taking place, although the nation is still plagued with tyrannical corruption and election rigging. The discovery of massive oil deposits in Lake Maracaibo marked a pivotal moment in the history of Venezuela. It characterized a shift from an agricultural-based economy to one with a heavy reliance on oil exports. The ensuing economic boom and prosperity following the oil discovery lasted for several decades—although the significant gap between the rich and the poor remained—until an oil gut in the 1980s, which destabilized the economy once again. Venezuelans depends heavily on imports from the U.S., China, and Brazil for a variety of goods, from electronics to food and beverages. Due to the state of its economy, Venezuela has a chronic shortage of basic goods and necessities including toilet paper, milk, and flour. In an attempt to stabilize the economy, Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez and now Nicholás Maduro have employed heavy government-economic regulations, implementing currency controls, price-fixing schemes, and subsidies.In response to the failing economic policy of the Venezuelan government, civilians have led a series of protests and political demonstrations since January 2014. The protesters have been taking issue with the high rates of criminal violence, inflation, and chronic scarcity of the goods. The resulting clashes have led to at least 5000 injuries, 40 deaths, and billions of dollars in damage. As the government moves towards an increasingly socialist position in Venezuela and the economy still fails to stabilize, the tension in Venezuela can only increase. Venezuela still faces many challenges in implementing a lasting republic and since its independence has not undergone a significant period without an attempted coup. When looking at the issues Venezuela still faces, it’s important to consider that many of the conflicts surrounding Maduro’s current administration are rooted in Chávez’s. An evolving, globalized world is forcing the government to evolve as well. From lack of civilian support to attempts to censor the media, the government of Venezuela faces a long road of turmoil, instability and unrest ahead.
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Venezuela
Peter Shamamian
April 2014
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Venezuela
“I
don’t trust our television and radio stations at all,” said Adriana Sanchez, 36, a tax accountant in Caracas, Venezuela. “The government stations just run propaganda, while the few privately owned stations are afraid to broadcast the truth. What other options do we have?” Like Sanchez, many Venezuelans are using social media outlets such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube for their information on the protest movement against Venezuelan President Nicolàs Maduro. According to the International Business Times, Venezuela currently holds the fourth highest Twitter penetration rate in the world, falling short to only Spain, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia. As a nation entangled in a revolution against the government, Venezuela is full of students and burdened protesters whose only outlet to the rest of the world is Twitter and other popular social media. By simply search-
the government uses social media sites in an attempt to gain access to Venezuelans engaged in social media, and the protestors will post biased news stories favoring the opposition. This method of influencing the citizens of Venezuela is certainly inefficient. By publishing opposing stories to those of the protesters, people become increasingly confused and angry with the government. Maduro recently requested an investigation into a loss of 6,000 followers on his Twitter, formerly followed by more than 1.4 million people. This is one of many representations of the citizens and protesters losing confidence and opposing the government. The issue of media in Venezuela is one of a handful of revolutions in which media has played a pivotal role in the cohesion of the people. The Arab Spring is a perfect example of this. The protesters involved in the multiple campaigns across the Middle East used social media as a means of spreading information
created and enforced multiple laws determining what media outlets are allowed to say and granted any opposition little or no exposure to the masses. Chávez set a precedent for the censorship of any opposition to the government, inevitably sparking a major backlash from the people. Although citizen’s rights were not directly violated, it is important to note that, in a government in which politicians can be elected, any opposition to the incumbent party is subdued and discouraged from connecting with audiences through media. Ironically and to the detriment of political opponents, a whopping 14 million out of 30 million Venezuelans reportedly use their smartphones for social media on a daily basis. The Venezuelan government has most recently targeted newspaper outlets by buying press companies to achieve favorable coverage. This influence of the government over the news outlets is frightening: it encourages
“The government stations just run propaganda, while the few privately owned stations are afraid to broadcast the truth. What other options do we have?” -Adriana Sanchez, 36 ing the hashtag “SOSvenezuela,” Venezuelans and global citizens alike can keep updated on the events happening across the protest-stricken country, see pictures, and read news relevant to the cause. The Venezuelan government, currently run by Nicolás Maduro, is looking not only to censor public and private media outlets and skew the condition of the protests in the news, but also to cut off the opposition’s news sources—social media sites. The divide between the government and the people is deepening, and the disagreements over social media usage are only making the situation worse. Social media is the key to success for the protesters—it is efficient, widely used, and unable to be tampered with by the Venezuelan government. Even though the protesters can look to social media sites for news and posts regarding successes and failures, stories are often rife with misinformation and meant to favor the people and not the government. Both groups are actually at fault here—
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and promoting insurgent agendas, similar to the way that protesters in the Venezuela protests use social media sites. “If you want to liberate [a people], give them the Internet,” Wael Gohnim, an Egyptian activist said. The Arab Spring was the first of many movements to incorporate social media in the activities of the opposition in achieving its goals. This model posed in the Arab Spring campaign should be directly applied to that of the Venezuelan situation, and having social media as an uncensored outlet of the people’s thoughts and the opposition’s planning is beneficial to the people’s well-being and a protection of their right to speak freely. For the little minority that remains watching public news outlets in Venezuela, mostly proponents of the government, censorship dominates what can and cannot be said on TV, through the radio, or in newspapers. Cesar Chávez began this censorship after his presidency was threatened by a coup and radically changed the Venezuelan media markets. He
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coverage favorable to the government when the government, according to the citizens, is clearly not carrying itself in a fashion fit to lead a country, having polarized itself from its citizens and entangled itself in corruption and fraud. Because of this, private media outlets in Venezuela being threatened by the government with closure have been practicing self-censorship to avoid investigation or intimidation from the government. All of these instances of government intervention in media have led the government to its greatest challenge—social media sites and their censorship. Many of the citizens opposed to the government—particularly younger people—have flocked to Twitter and major social media sites to communicate with others in the battle against the Venezuelan government. The government really began to overstep its boundaries once it cut off the population to a collection of photos taken of protests, causing a massive backlash and an increased opposition to the government. When the gov-
Venezuela ernment extended its control to social media, many citizens in the country lost Internet connection and access to Twitter. The government tried to block images of violence against the protesters on Twitter, and more recently pictures of protesters fully naked and opposition members being beaten. This event and censorship by the government triggered an even greater stance by the opposition to protest against the government, inevitably calling for more violence and government atrocities. “Te lo digo Maduro, eres un cobarde. Ni a mi familia ni a mi nos vas a doblegar. A mi famila: fuerza, los amo,” opposition leader Leopoldo Lopez wrote on his Twitter shortly before being arrested by the Venezuelan police. “I tell you Maduro, you are a coward. You are going to break neither me nor my family. To my family: strength, I love them.” Lopez stands for the thousands of people facing the Venezuelan government, attempting to oust President Nicolás Maduro and call for a greater, stronger, and newer democracy. The government’s infringement on the rights of its citizens with regard to social media activities is highly sensitive and should not be touched to promote censorship. It has been affirmed time and time again that the Internet, according to the United Nations, is a fundamental human right, meaning that it belongs to the people and cannot be taken away from them. The resolution says that all people should be allowed to connect to and express themselves freely on the Internet. All 47 members of the Human Rights Council presiding over this landmark resolution, including notoriously censorship-prone countries such as China and Cuba, signed the resolution. Violation of this right is seen throughout the world in places like North Korea and should not spread further to other countries, especially those in dire need of news coverage and publicity. The government of Venezuela
has been able to go after news outlets and opposition media, curtailing their material and airtime, but it cannot go after social media sites. The Human Rights Council is a United Nations body that monitors human rights progress and violations across all member countries. It has previously called the right to freedom and expression “one of the essential foundations of a democratic society” and has recognized the Internet’s importance in the “promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. A combination of the right to have access to the Internet and the right to speak freely is the fundamental need of the protesters in Venezuela, and they need these rights to perpetuate and reestablish democracy within the nation. For years, the nation has struggled with maintaining a democratic government, due to corruption and the inadequate leadership of Hugo Chavez. Rather than focusing attention and energy on banning protesters from objective media outlets, the Venezuelan government should shift attention towards finding solutions for the discord among its populace. As a country sitting on some of the world’s largest oil reserves, Venezuela has experienced corruption in their oil industry, hampering efforts to extract oil and sell it in the global market. This stalemate in oil production is also to blame for the country’s major inflation and inability to serve many of its citizens with essential foodstuffs and living supplies. In the past year, inflation in Venezuela more than doubled to 56.3 percent. The government would be much more productive in creating a stronger market and more reliable prices for food and other essential items, ultimately mollifying the resolve of the protesters and working with them to create a more stable country. Of course, the government itself is complex and not for good
April 2014
reasons, but it makes sense to begin reforms in the economy and focus less energy on the social media issue. The complexities and grievances that come from the media and censorship issue beg the question of how the issue will be resolved and what is to come from the riots, protests, and opposition that has struck the streets so passionately in Venezuela. Government intervention in social media of any kind is not acceptable and will remain so. Venezuela’s government should pull out of social media censorship hobbies and social media competition with their opposition and let the citizens use social media for what they want. For the protesters, it means a less oppressive government and freedom of speech, and for the government, it means the increased support of citizens who formerly doubted their leadership. That is the obvious answer, but it might not be as easy as that, since each side is extremely passionate for their cause, defending its way of life. Countries involved and communicating with Venezuela should point to examples in which freedom in social media was important and profound for citizens involved in revolution, notably the Arab Spring campaign, in which the spreading and budding social media popularity in the Middle East provided protesters with news to rely on and be hopeful for. In terms of the future of Venezuela as a country and its social media measures, Nicolás Maduro needs to consider opening up the avenues of freedom of expression and protest, despite the fact that his opposition will use these avenues. Evaluating the country’s current issues of inflation and the oil industry, allowing for more freedoms and opinion in the press, and softening his political philosophy could begin to bring Maduro into a better light and please the protesters who have been fighting the government tooth-and-nail. HMR
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Venezuela
Maduro’s Venezuela: Continuing an Impossible Legacy Maria Balaeskoul 1992 Maduro introduced to Chavez
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July 2000
Chávez sworn into office
Feb 1999
Chávez elected a six year term
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Gunfire erupts with protests against Chávez; 19 killed
April 2002
Venezuela
A
year after the death of Hugo Chávez, protests rage on in Venezuela: the young generations crave change, the poor classes long for the tenure of Chávez himself. While the nation would have continued its economic nosedive relatively peacefully, when Venezuela’s new president, Nicolás Maduro, took office, many began to see through the legacy Chávez had created. What enabled Chávez to employ such radical changes in Venezuela as he championed the plight of the poor was his charismatic demagoguery. While protesters were unable to unseat Chávez due to his charismatic personality, Maduro does not possess the same charm and is already using violence to back himself as the new leader of the country. Because Maduro is trying to continue Chávez’ legacy without Chávez’ magnetic presence, the same policies including the management of oil by the government and large price caps in response to shrinking productive capacity and high inflation are no longer supported. The social unrest that arose from the discontent of the previous political climate is what ultimately led to this revolution. The problems Venezuela faces are not issues that are easily tackled, and no matter what form the future government takes, it will likely struggle to promote a future and a nation that has been plagued with an unstable future. However, the change in leadership is not the direct cause of the issues at hand; it is the
legacy of Chávez and the underlying problems that were not addressed during his time in office that incite the protestors. Adopting the motto, “Country, Socialism, or Death” during his rule, Chávez massively increased national debt and demonized the middle and upper classes. Heavy spending on the government’s part and anti-capitalist policies fueled inflation as GDP plummeted. In just two years of his presidency the stock market had dropped from 7.6% of GDP to 1.6%. As a result of high inflation and reduced production, there has been a shortage of food and electricity as well as jobs. Chávez did not build a lasting and stable foundation for the future. Rather, he looked for short-term success by handing out the cement to make the foundation to the public. Looking back to the unrest during Chávez’ rule, the protests are not particularly unique, as at the core they remain a classic conflict between the right and the left. The right wing is made up of the wealthy and middle classes who push for change in regime, while the left wing is typically composed of the poor who still have faith in the new leader Chávez himself handpicked. The political lines that divide Venezuela have remained relatively consistent throughout Chávez’ rule in the country where income and race are often delicately intertwined. It continues to be the elite classes that protest, just like it was under Chávez’ reign. How-
ever, now much of the country’s youth has sprung up in anger to create a better future for themselves, often empowered by social media. There is still a noticeable difference in skin color between crowds that support the government and groups that oppose it. Even in the capital city of Caracas, this divide is evident. In the usually tranquil Eastern part of the city where the rich who are currently protesting reside, fires and barricades burn, while the Western part, a Chavista stronghold home to the poorer groups, is now relatively quiet. While the economy has been chronically mismanaged, this mismanagement was better concealed during the rule of Chávez. Under the rule of Maduro one can see a corrupt and incompetent government, which is misusing billions of dollars from oil revenue. Chávez had risen from humble beginnings to the highest position in the country, allowing him to appeal to all. He had put aside traditional political jargon and taken upon a language that everyone could understand. While not everyone, namely the elite classes, embraced Chávez’ power, he appeared to embrace everyone, including the wealthy, the class which would often serve as a powerful scapegoat. Chávez created two Venezuelas“us and them,” often calling those who spoke out against him witty names and riling them up purposefully. Chávez was able to cleverly maneuver this political landscape despite the
“The regime change indicates how carefully the politics of Venezuela had to be balanced for so long. Without Chávez’ unparalleled charisma, the carefully sculpted country has begun to crack.” Sept 2006 Chávez calls President Bush “the devil,” raising tensions between the two nations
March 2013 Dec 2006
Chávez re-elected, capturing 63% of the vote
Oct 2012
Maduro selected by Chávez to serve as his Vice President
April 2014
Venezuelan government pronounces Chávez dead due to medical issues
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Venezuela occasional hit, such as the oil strike of 2003. In 2002, Venzuela entered into an oil crisis as a result of Chávez’ taking control of the oil sector. The wealthy classes sought to put Chávez out of power, succeeding when he relinquished power for two days before being reinstated by the military. Conflicts between the opposition and the party in power in Venezuela have been particularly severe because the opposition never accepted the legitimacy of the elected government, ultimately leading to violence and division. Especially prominent in the current protests, opposition leaders portray the government as a dictatorship that targets harmless and nonviolent protest. This portrayal is a basic strategy for regime change, done by provoking state violence through violent demonstrations. The regime change indicates how carefully the politics of Venezuela had to be balanced for so long. Without Chávez’ unparalleled charisma, the carefully sculpted country has begun to crack. With scarcities of basic necessities throughout the country, Maduro is unable to mask the problems that were so easily put aside by Chávez. For instance, Maduro blames the severe and ongoing paper shortage of the country on the people eating too much and therefore using the bathroom too often. Though it may seem as though the protests stemmed from a single event—the attempted rape of a student from San Christobal—it is in fact the build up of countless previously hidden social and economic issues. Supermarkets that sell $100 barrels of Spanish wine and organic grains do not have toilet paper in stock, a pitiful show in a country that holds the world’s largest petroleum reserves. Despite the government’s imposition of price caps and rationing, mob scenes are created around the arrival of basic staples including chicken, milk, or flour. And when the products do come into stores, the employees and security guards help themselves to the goods first, leaving little for the consumers. According to economists, Venezuela’s true problem is the shortage of U.S.
Maduro sworn in as Chávez’ replacement
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March 2013
dollars. Businesses rely heavily on the private sector to import, and without dollars, they cannot restock the shelves. Even Venezuelan factories struggle to obtain raw materials, leading to shortages of even Venezuelan made goods. It is because Chávez was so loved that he was able to keep the country together. For 14 years he continued to assert triumphantly, “Somos la mayoria.” – We are the majority. The middle classes subscribed to Chávez’ charismatic sheen, making them perceive the situation in the country as more favorable than the reality. According to Andres Canizalez, a professor at Venezuela’s Catholic University, “Maduro inherited Chávez’s power but not his great skill to communicate with the masses and his charisma. That void has been replaced by more authoritarianism and censorship.” Chávez peppered his sentences with jokes and anecdotes, giving him charm and a relatable appeal. Now Maduro, instating price cuts, displays himself as a man of action, not the man of word that Chávez was. Though the protests are not currently succeeding in their goal of overthrowing the government, the Socialist Party’s grasp on the country is weakening. Chávez won by just 8% in the election of 2012, and Maduro won by just 1% in April of 2013. Even without the protests, the country is continuing to spiral downward. In October annual inflation rose to 54%, the fastest pace in 16 years. Simultaneously, the amount of goods out of stock, measured by the central bank’s scarcity index, climbed to 22.4% with milk, medicine, and tires all out of stock regularly. For the government, the protests may mean a coup or ousting of power, but the people are very divided on Venezuela’s future. Venezuela is a highly polarized country with half pro-government and the other half opposed to the current government. Even the protestors have different views regarding the transition to a new government. The protestors themselves believe that the student riots will lead to the resignation of the president,
Protests continue
Maduro wins the presidential election by fewer than two percentage points over Henriqu Capriles Radonski
April 2013
while the educated middle class, including the former presidential candidate, Henrique Capriles, favors elections as the way to proceed. The protests continue to distract the leadership from the problems it must focus on, including the crime epidemic and economic mismanagement. Additionally, there will likely be no immediate relief to the people. According to Brian Fonseca, a former researcher of South America for the U.S. government, “[t]here is a lack of governance, and institutions don’t have the capacity to govern and control effectively...High inflation is making more poor people. You bring all this together and it manifests itself in violence.” Despite Nicolás Maduro’s sincere efforts to continue the modern socialist legacy of Chávez, he is unable to capture the trust of the people. Just as Chávez did, he exaggerates numbers—telling a support group of farmers that 50 people had been killed whereas the reality was 10—and seeks international support from Russia. But as a result of the charisma void of Chávez, now present Maduro has turned to army deployment and censorship, which has inspired rage. No matter where Maduro will turn next, he will continue to encounter the consequences left behind by Chávez. While Chávez was politically successful, his success did not leave a stable foundation for the future. Because he focused on short-term relief, in Chávez’ absence, Maduro now struggles with rising inflation and crime rates, leading to a vicious cycle of rebellion. Until the problems that plague the country can be remedied, the protestors will continue to rampage through the streets. In the words of one student protestor, “The leader of us is our people. That’s our leader. The day we see that there is nobody being murdered on the streets, the day that we see that our people is not making a huge line just to buy 1 liter of milk, that day we can say yes we can talk...until we don’t see the things coming from the government...we want to see things [change] on the street.” HMR
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The Horace Mann Review | Vol. XXIII
Student protests in Venezuela that started earlier in the month attract global attention when three people are killed
April 2014
Venezuela
Modern Venezuela: A Study in Complexity Courage, Fear, and Hope in South America’s Next Great Powderkeg Spencer Slagowitz
S
eemingly in accordance with the revolutionary zeitgeist of modern times, many Venezuelan citizens have protested en masse what they believe to be misguided leftwing policies. The newly elected president Nicolàs Maduro has continued these policies, originally enacted by former President Hugo Chávez, after his close victory over Henrique Capriles after the death of Chávez. These protests may not be as violent as other recent uprisings (the death toll is reported to be 39 people, a small number compared to the 150,000 people killed by the Syrian civil war), yet the conflict has serious ramifications for the international community. At first glance, the conflict may seem straightforward; however, these protests are, in actuality, much more than the physical manifestation of an internal
ideological struggle; the issue at hand is rooted in history and is representative of a more complex relationship between Bolivarianism and South America. Furthermore, one of the most alarming things about the conflict is the alarming lack of influence the United States seems to have with Caracas. As a result, the situation is becoming more volatile as it becomes exceedingly difficult for the crisis to be resolved externally. In order to truly understand the crisis in Venezuela, one must first be familiar with the recent history of the country: the rise of Bolivarianism and Chavism, the turbulent relationship between Caracas and Washington, the policies of Nicolàs Maduro, and the current political and socioeconomic climate of Venezuela. Only then can we devise an effective strategy of resolving the con-
April 2014
flict for internal and external actors to follow. The Venezuelan revolutionary Simón Bolívar, the man known to many Latin Americans as El Libertador, is celebrated as a hero in many countries for the legacy he left (the liberation of much of South America from the Spanish). Bolivar further left a prominent political legacy, one of populist resistance. Even though Bolivar died nearly 200 years ago, his name and ideological legacy have been invoked contemporarily by Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro. Simón Bolívar is to much of Latin America what the framers of the constitution represent to many in the United States. He serves as symbol of resistance to oppression, independence, and opposition to imperialism. Simón Bolívar helped to facilitate the liberation of
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Venezuela South America and is credited with leading the revolution against the Spanish. Bolivar is famous for uniting the people of South America against a common enemy, asking them to put aside their differences and to work together. Importantly, Hugo Chávez modeled himself extensively after Simón Bolívar, using the historical figure to justify and support his policies and initiatives; as a result, Hugo Chávez’s political ideology, Chavismo (Chavism), is noticeably influenced by Bolivarianism and Bolivarian tradition. The Council on Foreign Relations digresses, “Hugo Chávez, his policies, and modern Venezuela have been dramatically influenced by the ideas and actions of Simón Bolívar.” Former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez took office on a populist platform promising to bring positive change to Venezuela. However, though President Chávez followed through to bring change, not everyone believed that this change was for the better. In the very beginning of his political career, Hugo Chávez established the leftist Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement-200 within the army, which borrowed the Bolivarian concept of a unified Latin America. Hugo Chávez was soon after placed in prison by the Venezuelan Government. After his 1994 release from prison, Chávez ran for president, promising to end corruption, vanquish poverty, and scrap Venezuela’s old political system—based on a pact that distributed power between the two main parties—to open up political power to independent political parties. In the election, Chávez won with the largest percentage of the popular vote—56 percent—in four decades. Though Nicolàs Maduro is the current leader of the country, the current government must be viewed as a strict continuation of
Chávez’s regime. Maduro continued almost every policy enacted by Chávez, sharing a nearly identical socialist ideological standpoint and a similar view of the future of Venezuela. Venezuelan oppositionists are protesting the very ideology created and popularized by Chávez. The relationship between Washington D.C and Caracas was initially close until the beginning of the Chávez era, when tensions escalated dramatically. Tensions have been particularly hostile between the two governments in this recent decade. During the “brief ouster” in 2002, relationships significantly worsened. In 2008, Venezuela (in accordance with Bolivia) expelled the resident United States Ambassador, accusing him of “fomenting unrest.” As a result, the United States responded by diplomatically expelling the Venezuelan ambassador. However, relations were ameliorated slightly by June of 2009, when both Washington and Caracas agreed to the return of their respective ambassadors. Additionally, in late 2010, the Chávez government revoked an agreement for U.S. Ambassador-designate Larry Palmer to be posted to Venezuela. The Congressional Research Service reported in a customary official policy brief that “in late September 2013, Venezuela expelled three U.S. diplomats in Venezuela, including the U.S. Embassy’s Chargé d’Affaires, Kelly Keiderling, and accused the diplomats of attempting to destabilize the country.” The CRS continues to explain that “since widespread protests broke out in February 2014, U.S. officials have spoken out strongly against the Venezuelan government’s heavy-handed approach in attempting to suppress the demonstrations.” Many of the Venezuelan government’s current policies, which have been carried over from the Chávez era, have caused nu-
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merous problems for the county. Not only has Venezuela created the very problems being protested, but also the government’s mismanagement of the protests is eerily and bitterly similar to the reaction of the government to early Chavist protests. For this reason, many of the remaining individuals who initially stood with Chávez vehemently oppose the methods employed by Maduro. The rift between the opposition groups and the government is one that exists within the Bolivarian faction (Venezuelan Government and its Supporters). This rift fundamentally undermines the legitimacy of the current Venezuelan government and domestic support for it. Given that populism, support from the people, plays an integral role in Venezuelan politics (The President is elected by a simple plurality), any loss of support could be politically threatening. Loss of populist support becomes even more politically threatening for Maduro when one considers the very small margin by which he won the election (1 percentage point). In summation, there are many problems in Venezuela that must be fixed in order to ensure the general welfare of the people of Venezuela, and international stability. Mismanagement on the part of the government, failed fiscal policy, and atrocious monetary policy on the part of Venezuela’s Central Bank have created an economic climate of commodity shortages, devaluation of currency, and rapid price inflation. Venezuela suffers from one of the world’s worst levels of inflation - 56.2% as of 2013. (By comparison, the United States’ inflation rate was only 1.5%). This trend places Venezuela on a dangerous path to hyperinflation. Forbes explains, “The devaluation of the currency in the case of Venezuela represents a reallocation of resources from the private to the public
Venezuela
“Mismanagement on the part of the government, failed fiscal policy, and atrocious monetary policy on the part of Venezuela’s Central Bank have created an economic climate of commodity shortages, devaluation of currency, and rapid price inflation.”
sector, which is practically the only exporter. Growth is projected to decelerate sharply and so is private consumption.” South American Economists like Jose Manuel Puente, an economist at the IESA School of Management, asserts: “We are witnessing the collapse of [Venezuela’s] entire infrastructure. Investment in certain areas has been reduced to a minimum under the Bolivarian Revolution.” Despite the failings of the Venezuelan government, one cannot fairly analyze the situation at hand without recognizing the remarkable work the government had done to reduce inequality. Since 1998, inequality has been reduced dramatically to one of the lowest levels in region. Furthermore, the poverty rate was cut from nearly 50% to 26% since 1998. However, these changes have come at an observably high price. Ultimately, the Venezuelan government must change its policies in order to combat current conditions. International response to the crisis has been cautious and, given the magnitude and importance of the issue, surprisingly reserved. The Organization of American States (OAS), paralyzed by badly managed bureaucracy and divisions among its members, is unable to respond to the crisis. The United States, the country that would usually take the lead on such an effort, has little influence with Caracas as evidenced by the diplomatic war held between the two governments. However, the Venezuelan government has repeatedly demonstrated itself incapable of properly managing and dealing with the crisis. Since polarization has been part of both Chavista and
opposition strategy for years now, Venezuela’s protests and the government’s response are vulnerable to calls for international scrutiny. One plan that could be enacted by the United States and that would have a powerful impact on Venezuela, would be encouraging a dialogue between the two factions (pro-government and the oppositionists). This is a solution that has been suggested by numerous scholars such as Patrick D. Duddy, a lecturer at Princeton and a former ambassador to Venezuela. He believes that, “such a dialogue should be aimed at reducing violence, finding a solution to the present economic crisis, avoiding the use of presidential decree power to short circuit the political process, and ending media censorship.” Support from the international community therefore should play a pivotal role in convening the actors in Venezuela’s crisis to design a path towards a peaceful outcome. However, there are some diplomatic actions that the United States could take to help change Venezuela for the better. These plans are very diverse, simple to enact, and will help achieve a stable, secure, and free Venezuela. Firstly, the United States should encourage regional actors to pressure Venezuela for transparency and compliance with international regulations. Specifically, the United States should focus on encouraging Brazil to apply such pressure. Brazil, which has influence with Caracas, is more of a leader within the hemisphere and the region. Furthermore, Brazil is the only country with the political clout necessary to facilitate tangible progress in Venezuela. Instability in Venezuela runs counter to Brazil’s interests. Violence or an interruption of democracy in Venezuela would severely hurt the business interests of Brazil and that of Mercosur, or the Southern Common Market. It is important to note that, “likelihood of success for unilateral U.S efforts is remarkably low.” International efforts that include other important regional actors are more likely to influence Venezuelan behavior.
April 2014
In order to put diplomatic pressure on Venezuela, the United States could attempt to discredit Venezuela as a signatory of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. This would prompt a visit by the Secretary General of the OAS, which would indicate to Venezuela that it could be suspended from the organization (with detrimental consequences) like Honduras and Paraguay were. Given the United States’ new energy independence, the United States could feasibly block access to CITGO’s ( a Venezuelan company’s) refining facilities and prohibit PDVSA (the Venezuelan state owned oil company) oil sales in the United States. This method would have the strongest impact on Venezuela but would only be used in the most extreme of circumstances. Since this option is probably the best, U.S diplomats should repeatedly stress it as an available albeit an unlikely option. Venezuela’s redistribution of wealth depends almost entirely on the sale of oil. In fact, the economic progress enjoyed by Venezuela during the 90’s was a result of the sale of oil. However, currently 40% of Venezuela’s oil exports go to the United States, so if the United States decided to block Venezuelan oil imports and restricted access to refining plants, it would mean economic catastrophe for Caracas. Combined with Venezuela’s current economic climate, the government could only foreseeably “hold-out” for a month given the expanses of their reserves. As the situation in Venezuela worsens, it is important for international bodies to act in order to mitigate the crisis. However, before action is possible, it is important to understand the history of Venezuela and the country’s policies. The progressive change pushed for by the international community would deviate from Venezuela’s rich tradition of Bolivarianism and Chavismo. However, if the United States is able to mobilize the international community and most importantly, regional actors, we will be able to create a better Venezuela. HMR
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Venezuela
HANDS OFF THE ECONOMY Gabe Broshy
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uring his short tenure as Hugo Chavez’s successor, Venezuelan president Nicholas Maduro faced heavy scrutiny. As the country underwent a number of issues, citizens voiced their displeasure with their government through riots, many of which became violent. One of the largest issues in the country is its economy, which even Central Bank President Nelson Merentes described as in a “crisis.” The country endured drops in its production of oil, its main export, and scarcities of basic goods. This predicament caused inflation to soar to 57%, lowering citizens’ living standards. Maduro also obtained decree powers from the National Assembly, which enabled him to take measures in order to prevent corruption and what he called economic “sabotage” from his opponents, referring to his belief that businesses purposefully generated product shortages. With these newfound powers, he created several programs to combat Venezuala’s
economic problems. Despite the implementation of these programs, Venezuela is unlikely to fix its economic problems unless it stops arbitrarily interfering with the economy because of the root cause of inefficiency and corruption due to the state interference. During an oil boom several years ago, Venezuala’s state-run oil and gas company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) exported so much oil that the value of the bolívar, the Venezuelan currency, increased as a result. The price of foreign goods was hence very low, and domestic producers could not compete. Instead of implementing a protective tariff to protect domestic businesses, the country printed more money to lower the currency’s value, creating inflation. In response, Chavez decided to fix the country’s exchange rate to support the country’s currency. The result was two distinct exchange rates for the bolívar: an official one, which had a set value, and a
A: hands.sarkisozlerik.com B: www.wikipedia.org C: www.deviantart.net D: bp.blogspot.com E: www colombiafacil.com
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much lower black market one, whose value was determined by supply and demand. Chavez implemented SICAD last year, creating an auction system run by the government for state-controlled companies to receive U.S. dollars at an exchange rate in between the official one and black market one, giving them a way to obtain scarce hard currency. Maduro recently expanded SICAD to SICAD II, which allows private enterprises and individuals to join the auction in addition to state-run companies. The exchange rate for SICAD II constantly changes but is currently around 51 bolivars per dollar, 8 times the official rate. So far, the foreign currency is only accessible to companies, but it will be available to people later. It used to only be in the form of cash but now also allows transactions in government bonds. The companies were encouraged by the bonds’ recent rise in price and decrease in interest rate. The country’s budget deficit and debt yields
Venezuela were also reduced since the implementation of the bill, resulting in a lower interest rate. Furthermore, the new system has already successfully lowered the black market exchange rate from 85 bolivars per dollar to 72-75, narrowing the huge gap it has with the official rate. Most importantly, the bill is promoting companies’ investments. “Last week we had very successful meetings with private companies; this week we have more. They want to invest. Things are getting better,” according to finance minister Rodolfo Marco Torres. However, while it remains too early to be certain, SICAD II’s possible effects are limited by the government’s lack of funds. Maduro stated that SICAD II will provide 8 to 10 percent of the country’s foreign currency, about $60 million a day. The system, however, may still not provide enough money to have significant positive effects on the Venezuelan economy. So far, companies have received only a fraction of the funds they have asked for. Furthermore, many companies would lose money by receiving dollars through SICAD II since they must buy them at SICAD II’s exchange rate and can only sell them at the country’s official and much higher exchange rate. This inconsistency exemplifies the inefficiency of the bill. While in the short run the government is supporting its country’s currency by keeping its value significantly higher than it would be were it determined by the free market, doing so often has severe longterm adverse effects. The difference in the official and black market rates make statistics about the economy unreliable since the same goods are being sold at very different exchange rates. The exchange rate is also very unstable because the government could decide to change it arbitrarily at any point. As a result, few people want to keep
or invest their capital in the country, hurting its economy. The government also recently introduced a new ID card system for purchasing food at grocery stores in order to deal with the country’s food shortages. The cards track exactly what each family has bought, preventing people from purchasing a lot of items that are very cheap due to government subsidies and selling them at much higher prices. This measure, however, will not increase the supply of the food and is therefore unlikely to drastically stabilize the Venezuelan economy. The extreme measures the Maduro Administration decided to take demonstrate the massive problems the country is experiencing with its lack of basic goods. These new bills do not address the corruption and inefficiencies caused by government’s arbitrary interference in the economy. One example of this is PDVSA. The company came under fire in 2007 when a video of its minister, Rafael Ramirez, demanding employees vote for Chavez “or else” went viral. The company has also suffered a wide variety of inefficiencies. Though Venezuela is known for its oil production, USA Today reported about Beatriz Rodriguez, a Venezuelan citizen, who had to wait two weeks for the company to deliver natural gas to her. Its crude production decreased by 40 percent during Chavez’s tenure and has not improved since. “The lack of direction, investment and maintenance are wrecking the oil and natural gas industries. PDVSA is falling apart,” Jose Bodas, the secretary general of Venezuelan oil union, Federación Unitaria de Trabajadores de Venezuela (FUTPV), said in 2012. Finally, the government’s price fixing hurts the country’s economy by further creating a shortage of goods. In efforts to ap-
April 2014
pease to the lower classes, Chavez fixed goods’ prices so that they wouldn’t reach a certain level and they could be obtained for less money. This raised demand for the goods, decreasing supply, which was already low to begin with. It seems the Maduro Administration is not finished trying to use the government to create economic stability despite uncertain implications of these bills. “Sicad II is a beginning. You cannot block out the sun with a single finger. We want to boost the Venezuelan economy, to strengthen it, to boost productivity, ” said Torres. However, BNP Paribas forecasted the nation’s GDP to decrease 1.5 percent and for inflation to increase 70 percent in 2014. High crime rates and citizens’ dissatisfaction with their government will likely persist if the Venezuelan government continues to interfere in the country’s economy, due to the inefficiencies and corruption it inherently causes. HMR
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Libya
Thailand
Post-Gaddafi
State of Libya Population: 6,155,000 GDP: $62 billion Parliamentary Republic Citizen Suffrage Literacy: 99.82% Primary Industry: Oil
In the midst of the Arab Spring the Libyan people revolted against dictator Muammar Gaddafi in February 2011. For 40 years the Gaddafi regime was characterized by its suppression of political rights and personal freedoms, appropriation of state revenue for the Gaddafi family’s personal gain, and sponsorship of terrorist organizations. In January 2011, protests began in eastern Libya over political corruption and delays in the building of housing units. After the government’s failed attempts to brutally suppress the protests, an opposition quickly formed, calling for Gaddafi’s resignation and the implementation of a democratic government. Over the next eight months the rebel opposition forces pushed westward toward the capital of Tripoli. On September 16, 2011, the UN recognized the opposition’s National Transitional Council as the legal representative of Libya, replacing the Gaddafi government. After eluding capture for over two months, on October 20, 2011, Muammar Gaddafi was killed attempting to escape from the city of Sirte. With the cessation of fighting following Gaddafi’s death, the country has transitioned to a fledgling democracy. After about a year and a half of interim rule by the National Transitional Council on July 7, 2012, Libyans voted in their first public election for the parliament, the General National Congress. The country appears to be on the right track toward democracy, with the NTC’s requiring that political parties run an equal number of men and women and that two-thirds of the parliament’s seats go to candidates from political parties in order to ensure the rights of women and to limit the influence of tribes and wealthy oligarchs from the Gaddafi era. However, Libya still faces many challenges, both from within and abroad. Even though it has been two years since the Libyan people held their first elections, the government must reunite the country. The government’s control over many parts of Libya is still tenuous, perhaps no better illustrated by the tragic terrorist attack on September 11, 2012 in Benghazi, which cost the lives of U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans. Today, many of the militias that supported the opposition during the civil war remain armed, and just this past March U.S. Navy SEALs were forced to seize a renegade Libyan oil tanker that had threatened to allow a breakaway militia to sell oil on the black market. The government’s challenges go beyond ensuring security. Persecution of non-Arabs under Gaddafi and the influx of sub-Saharan African mercenaries supporting him during the civil war have led to deep mistrust between the Arab, Berber, and African populations. The government’s efforts to promote women’s rights have also stirred resentment from the conservative elements of the population. Compared to the bloody civil war in Syria and the political chaos in Egypt, it is clear that the social-political situation in Libya could be far worse. However, the challenges that face the nascent democracy are significant and Libya must resolve them in order to have a bright future. In this section you will find our writers have undertaken articulate discussions and analyses of these issues in which they seek to explore the scope of their complexities and to address how Libya can overcome them. We hope you enjoy.
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Libya
TENSIONS BENEATH THE SURFACE Ethnic Conflict in post-Gaddafi Libya Natasha Moolji
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n 2011, in the midst of numerous other Arab Spring revolutions, the Libyan Revolution began. Just like the other civil wars, the rebels’ goal was to overthrow an oppressive regime and have a chance at democracy. Even though the goal was similar, Libya was different from the other revolutions because of its demographics. The variety of ethnic groups in Libya contributed to a unique revolution, unlike the others that occurred during the Arab Spring. Now, in the aftermath of the Libyan Civil War, ethnic tensions are testing the new government and are contributing to the cloud of uncertainty surrounding Libya’s future. Various Berber ethnic groups originally inhabited Libya, although a series of invasions by the Arabs and the Turks drastically changed Libya’s demographics. Today, the majority of Libyans are either a mix of Arab and Berber ethnicities or a mix of Turkish and Berber ethnicities. Libyan ethnic minorities include the Africans, the Tuaregs, and the Tebou. As a result of Libya’s porous borders during the Arab Spring, the majority of foreign residents in Libya come from other African countries. Some came to support Gadaffi and stayed, and others took the opportunity to escape the countries in which they were unhappy. Since the Arab Spring, Libya’s illegal resident population has
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Libya swelled to one million people, with the influx of many Egyptians and Sub-Saharan Africans. The long reign of oppression during Muammar Gaddafi’s 42 years in power towards non-Arab ethnic groups fostered tensions between them and the Arab majority and shaped the revolution. When Gaddafi took office in September 1969, he brought with him the vision of Libya as a mono-Arab state. He denied the existence of the Berber (or Imazighen) group. Throughout his rule, the Imazighen suffered relentless state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing, including the destruction of culturally and historically important Imazighen objects and punishment of Berber-rights activists. Before the Libyan Revolution began, anyone who spoke the Amazigh language in public could be arrested. Despite the death of Gaddafi, Libya’s minorities still harbor deep resentment towards the Arab population. During the revolution, Arabs and Berbers banded together to free Libya from Gaddafi’s rule. Even though the Arab and
Berber rebels had the same end goal, many of them were prejudiced against their comrades from other ethnic groups. Arab and Berber rebel commanders complained about African Libyans, both those who were rebels and Gadaffi supporters. Since some African mercenaries were used by the regime to violently suppress demonstrations at the beginning of the Libyan uprising and then later to fight the rebels, preexisting tensions between Arabs, Berbers, and African Libyans were aggravated. Many spread stories of the Africans’ carrying out mass rape against rebel women. Some extremists amongst the rebel forces called for drastic measures, like banning the Tawergha natives from working, living, or sending their children to school in certain towns. The Libyan revolution was unique because while it brought some ethnic groups together in the efforts to overthrow a dictatorial regime, it also enflamed the tensions between other groups. However, in post-civil war Libya there
have been strides towards a cohesive nation, free of the ethnic tensions and violent outbreaks resulting from the animosity fostered under Gaddafi. While the Amazigh were persecuted because they did not fit in with the idea of a mono-Arab country, the Amazigh culture is now enjoying a revival. What once was a Berber secret police headquarters has been transformed into the headquarters for an Amazigh radio station. The mansions of long-gone Gaddafi supporters have become the homes of artists’ workshops and recording studios. Once banned songs and poems are spreading throughout the country. Amazigh activists who suffered the brunt of Gaddafi’s abuse are learning their people’s language. For the first time in so many years, minority groups finally have the chance to express their diversity. Despite this ongoing cultural revival, ethnic quarrels have broken out in many different parts of the country. In March of 2012, 17 people were killed in fights between Berbers in the town of Zuwara and Arabs in neighboring towns. More than 150 people died in a conflict between African Toubou tribesman of Kufra and the Arab Zwai that live close by. These are just a small percentage of deaths that have occurred because of tribal violence. Other towns are in similar situations. Members of the Zwai clan massacred 70 Toubou people in
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Libya
Sabha. The Berber documentary maker Eissa al-Hammissi summed up the persistence of tensions between the different groups even after they worked together to overthrow Gadaffi. He said, “We helped our brothers overthrow the dictator. But now we feel we are betrayed.” Any ceasefires between different towns are fragile and temporary. Furthermore, there have been problems due to ethnic tensions on a national scale. On January 18th of this year, members of black Libyan ethnic groups, who are mainly Arab, stormed an air force base and expelled forces loyal to Prime Minister Ali Zeidan. The Toubou and Tawergha groups, who have endured vicious attacks at the hands of Arab Militias and have received no help from the national government, have continually turned on the government. Until the tensions between different groups are settled, the violence will continue and the stability of the central government is at risk. The lack of a strong central government is one of the main reasons that violence continues to frequently occur. While the Prime Minister comes from the Arab majority, many Libyan Arabs nonetheless fear that the Berbers will gain influence in the General National Congress. At the same time, the Amazigh fear the government on account of its perceived Arab composition. They think that if Muslims are in power for a long time, the Arabs will
treat them the same way that Gaddafi did. However, while some extremists continue to believe that the Amazigh’s language has no use because Arabic is the exclusive language of God, the majority of Libyans hope for peace between the ethnic groups of Libya. Ayoob Sufyan best summed up the importance of cohesion in a post-civil war Libya when he said, “If we are to build a new Libya, we need a new school of thought and new minds.” Sufyan rightly believes that prejudices that existed before the Civil War should not have any role in the remaking of Libya. For if Libya continues to be an ethnically fractured country, there will be no progress. Libya’s ethnic groups caused its revolution to be unique from others in the region. Syria’s current revolution is only similar to Libya’s past one in the sense that both had the stated purpose of overthrowing oppressive regimes. Despite this superficial similarity, the divide between the Shia and Sunni population has dominated the Syrian Civil War. The majority of the rebels are Sunni and believe that the ruling minority Alawite sect are heretics. The sectarianism at the heart of the Syrian Civil War has led to violence between the rebels and the government. The Syrian government has a gang network known as the shabiha, which the rebels allege is prepared to use force, violence, weapons, and racketeer-
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ing against the anti-government activists. The majority of the shabiha’s members are of the Alawite sect. Houthi and Hezbollah interventions in Syria further indicate the sectarian nature of the Syrian Civil War. This is a contrast from the situation in Libya, where ethnic tensions were present among the rebel forces. In Syria tensions exist between anti-government forces and the government. The violence present among Libyan anti-government activists has not been seen in any other Arab Spring movement. The Libyan revolution was different from Syria’s and others in the region because of its unique ethnic groups and their interactions. With people pouring into Libya and taking advantage of its nearly open borders, the demographics are ever changing. Ethnic groups continue to grow and change, even if the groups’ ideas about have yet to change. Since Libya is so different from other revolutions in the region, it is necessary that the ethnic groups learn to coincide before Libya can see any real progress. The General National Congress and Prime Minister need to work to bring the groups together, facilitate more cultural revival, and quell any violence that might spring up. With these efforts, Libya has the resources and economic potential to become a successful democracy. HMR
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Libya
Aiding Libya
destra.it
The Aftermath of Benghazi and the Prospect International Intervention
of
Aditya Ram
T
he rebellion in Libya created hope in the free world that democracy would reign throughout the country. Developed nations denounced the tyrannical reign of Gaddafi and started to give material aid to the rebel groups. Much of the country freed itself from the dictatorship. The only potential problem was the lack of unity between the rebel groups. It looked like Libya was on the track to truly becoming a democracy; however, the supply of weapons soon stopped, aid slowed, and the rebellion struggled without the in-
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ternational support that had brought it to the pinnacle of success. Even after the rebels won, the international community was wary of assisting the new government. The reason the West gave up its support of the rebellion and crippled the forces of democracy is quite simple: our fear of terrorism. While most of the rebel fighters were moderates who wanted to create a democratic state, a powerful group known as the Libyan Islamic Movement (LIM) was a known affiliate of al-Qaeda and was banned worldwide after 9/11.
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Its stated purpose was to depose Gaddafi so that an Islamic state could be established. They operated mainly inside Tripoli, a large city vital to the rebel effort. However, the international community feared that supporting these groups, and therefore appearing to encourage the creation of an Islamic state, would be counterproductive to the spread of democracy. The US and its allies were also wary of arming a force of terrorists that might use those arms against the West. The magnitude of that danger – that
Libya US arms be used on US troops – was demonstrated in Afghanistan. After the US provided arms to the mujahedeen to fight the Russians during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, terrorists turned them against the US in the war against Afghanistan (2001-present), which cost the US 4 trillion dollars and left over 20,000 personnel dead or wounded. This fiasco was a costly embarrassment for the US that President Obama was afraid to repeat. While a full out military intervention in Libya was always unlikely, the newly armed terrorists may still attack other targets. The attack of the American embassy in Benghazi was perpetrated by Ansar al-Sharia, a splinter organization that emerged in the Civil War. More radical than LIM, its stated purpose is to impose sharia law over Libya. It is also closely allied with AQIM. It refused to recognize the post war elections in Libya on the ground they were un-Islamic. They have claimed responsibility for multiple terror attacks in Libya, including the attack on the embassy, which left 4 Americans dead, including ambassador Christopher Stephens. The repercussions of this attack were widespread. While the US did send navy SEALS to protect the embassy, President Obama offered no aid to the Libyan government to track down and prosecute those responsible. The realization that the spread of democracy did not reduce the threat level in the Middle East was a harsh one. The US stopped supporting democratic rebellions in other countries with the same zeal it used to. Aid to these rebel fighters was cut; political
“By increasing the size of Libya’s new army and police force, the country could potentially combat terrorism on its own. New infrastructure would make the fight easier and improve the lives of the rest of the population.” recognition was not swift to come. Look to Syria, where even as President Bashar Al-Assad kills thousands of civilians, the US government used only sanctions and limited humanitarian aid to help the Syrian people. This is a calculated strategy; there is no benefit to the US for having a democratic Syria as its ally. The only real threat comes from terror groups that cannot be controlled. That is not to say the US is forfeiting its role as the world’s policeman; it can and does intervene in extreme circumstances, as it did initially when Assad utilized chemical weapons. However, once the weapons of mass destruction were contained, the US partially withdrew from the Syrian conflict. With no great benefit to gain from supporting the rebels, and no threat of mass killings of civilians, the US is content to stand in the wings and let the rebellion play out. The violence in Benghazi was successful in dissuading the US from actively interveneing in Libya as well; should another war escalate, it would be unsustainable for the war-weary US. Moreover, the international community echoed isolationist feelings. The limited international response in the aftermath
of the Civil War was generated by fear on another costly engagement in the Middle East. The only active US policy for hunting terrorists is implementing drone strikes, which risk no US lives. However, these policies are generally ineffectual in containing the terrorist threat and do nothing to secure the lives of the people of the Middle East. Indeed, there are over 500 reported deaths of non-combatants from drone strikes. Clearly these strikes do nothing to secure the future of the people of Libya. What is needed is true stability. By increasing the size of Libya’s new army and police force, international aid could help provide true stability and aid the country in combating terrorism on its own. New infrastructure would make the fight easier and improve the lives of the rest of the population. With fewer persons out of work, terrorist recruitment would drop. However, because of international fears of terrorism, Libya cannot get the real aid it needs. While it is receiving sizable loans from the World Bank and the IMF, the lack of stability makes it impossible to implement much-needed humanitarian plans in the wake of the devastation. Without international military assistance, Libya’s economic growth has stagnated and the country has failed to progress in its recovery. Terrorism in Libya has weakened both the war effort and the recovery. By discouraging international aid, these groups weaken their own country for their ideals. They have started a vicious cycle of aid cuts, reduction in the quality of life, increased terrorism recruitment, and drone strikes. The US needs to take a stand and support its new ally in Libya, which is something it’s unwilling to do as long as the threat of terror remains. HMR
www.nytimes.com
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Libya
Teetering on the Brink of Failure The Volatile State of Libya’s Oil Refineries Charles Cotton
S
ince the internationally publicized and monumental fall of its de facto ruler Muammar Gaddafi in October of 2011, Libya has struggled to regain a certain level of stability not unusual in the decades before the civil war. The country, which was decimated by the course of events encompassing the Arab Spring, has been quite unsuccessful in what can be labeled the “rebuilding stage” of its short history. The democratically elected government in the Libyan capital of Tripoli has struggled to assert any sort of authority over the rest of the nation, and any reforms it creates gain little to no traction.
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Instead, several different militias have sprung up across the county, each maintaining its superiority in a particular region. These militias have challenged the sovereignty of the representative body in Tripoli, and continue to cause problems and stall the progression of Libya toward stability. One such important problem has to do with oil reserves and refineries across Libya. For much of its recent history, oil has been far and away Libya’s most important asset. Libya possesses the most oil of any African nation and is one of the top five oil producers of any country in the world. Oil
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is its most profitable export and before the civil war, it accounted for over 95 percent of all government revenue. Initially the Tripoli government was thought of as the controller of the oil sites, but in the past several months its right to these oil fields has come under intense scrutiny, especially by rival militias. It comes as no surprise that each militia wants a stake in the oil industry; in a time of turmoil for Libya, oil is arguably the lone stable source of commerce for its people. As a result, the militias have continually asked for a higher percentage of the capital gained through the oil trade, and if not a full share, they
Libya desire something consistent such as a true minority stake in the industry. And until quite recently, asking for something along these lines and attempting to bargain with those in Tripoli has been just about all they have done. Now, in stark contrast, the rebel militias (multiple competing militias) are physically impeding the Libyan oil trade. They have blocked ports in several regions of the country, and are now running the majority of the ports and oil fields in Eastern Libya. More ominous than just the oil dispute is the growing tension and divide this symbolizes between the East and West. The Eastern Libyan province of Cyrenaica has grown farther and farther from the General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli, and their dissension with regard to oil has only worsened the situation. Those in Cyrenaica who have seized control of the major oil refineries and reserves in the East have resisted diplomatic attempts at compromise regarding oil as well as the regional governmental conflict. Consequently, members of the GNC have threatened attacks on rebel-controlled ports, but this has not helped. Instead, the rebels in Cyrenaica are now seriously considering the formation of an independent breakaway state if their ports and reserves are attacked. Due to the GNC’s lack of power and authority, the rebels feel no reason to remain a part of Libya (as defined by its current borders,) and they have acknowledged this. Osama Buera, a rebel spokesman stated that without the support of a true military or much of Libya, “The central authorities in Libya are in a weak position.” He went on to say that if attacks are carried out on rebel-controlled ports, “[they] will just break away and declare the independence of new Cyrenaica.” At the same time, separate militias exist in Western Libya, closer to Tripoli where other oil sites have been blockaded. Local militant groups have also cut off a refinery
near the town of Zintan from the GNC, and the central government continues to lose essential resources and sources of commerce. A member of Human Rights Watch feels that after such impactful blows regarding its most basic and valuable commodity, “Libya is teetering on the brink of failure.” It is not particularly hard to figure out the problem facing the still quite young Libyan government specifically with respect to oil; the GNC thinks it is entitled to control the oil sites and ports, but due to the government’s general lack of power and influence, militias across the country, especially in the East, have challenged the GNC’s right to these sites and the country as a whole, and the GNC has been unable to intimidate the rebels. The resolution to this problem, however, is much more of an intricate and multi-sided issue. There are some who feel another civil war is imminent as the Tripoli government is so weak, and because there is so little attempt at diplomacy or some sort of peaceful negotiation to fix the persistent problems facing Libya. This would prove to be catastrophic. With somewhere between five and ten relatively powerful militant groups in the North African nation, all of which are completely independent of each other and have every desire to remain as such, a civil war between all of these groups would almost definitely accomplish nothing going forward, and the level of violence and toll of death could be horrible. Although, as I have previously stated, previous attempts at any dialogue or conciliation have been largely ineffective, this is the solution most likely to succeed, and it must be further pursued by the GNC, the only party with sufficient (although certainly not abounding) power to initiate negotiations. When the oil reserves, refineries, and ports are run properly, Libya should export upwards of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day; they cur-
rently are exporting less than 200,000 barrels per day. As is such, the Tripoli government, if it were to restore the industry close to where it once was, can afford to negotiate with the rebels and implement a share of the market. The GNC would control the majority of, if not all, oil sites, but perhaps some of the Libyans in Cyrenaica would receive compensation to control far-eastern sites. If an appropriate distribution of capital were imposed in Libya, the money coming into the country and going not just to Tripoli would quell tensions especially between militant groups in poverty stricken towns and would give those seeking independence grounds to remain Libyan citizens. Finally, the GNC would gain strength and domestic power, and its leaders could run the country in the manner intended when appointed by their peers after the events of 2011 and the ousting of Gaddafi. The current state of Libya and its government is certainly not enviable. The General National Congress, created to represent the people of Libya democratically, has little influence anywhere outside of the capital of Tripoli. There are militant groups who threaten to take over the country or form their own nation states, and the country’s oil industry is struggling tremendously and its ownership continues to worsen the relationship between rival militias. While one cannot simply propose a solution to all of Libya’s problems, with regard to oil, certain choices must be made and carried out systematically and effectively. Violence must be avoided, replaced instead with diplomacy between the government in Tripoli and those in the East toward a revenue share (Cyrenaica). Doing such would avoid war, bring substantial and consistent wealth from the oil trade into Libya, and ease tensions between the rival factions and militias across the country, solving at least some of Libya’s problems. HMR
“Oil is Libya’s most profitable export; before the civil war, it accounted for over 95 percent of all government revenue. In a time of turmoil for Libya, oil is arguably the lone stable source of commerce for its people.”
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Libya
Missing Missiles Fallout
from the
Libyan Weapon Stockpiles
Anne Rosenblatt
I
n August of 2011, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, longtime dictator of Libya, fled from his capital of Tripoli. By October, he was killed. The Libyan Civil War, or Libyan Revolution, was led by anti-Gaddafi protestors with the intentions of liberating and “reclaiming” Libya from a dictatorial government. Following Gaddafi’s death, Libya set up an interim government known as the National Transitional Council (NTC) and has since held elections for the establishment of a permanent General National Congress (GNC). During the period of interim government, the United Nations and strong international forces, especially the United States, worried about the absence of an organized military and the inability of a new and unstable government to control violent militias. After a period of governmental disorganization, these violent militias emerged as a ruling force in many parts of Libya and created a power struggle with the new government for control of the country, which continues today. Two of the most vocal and imminent ongoing threats resulting from the aftermath of the war are the proliferation of weapons throughout Libya and the presence of uncontrolled armed militant groups in the region. Under Gaddafi’s rule, thousands of weapons circulated throughout Libya. While weapons of Gaddafi’s military and police force accounted for a large number of these,
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the protesters accumulated a large number of weapons as well. Libyans wanted to fight for their beliefs and started to arm themselves in order to remove Gaddafi from power. During the period of the interim government, out of a population of 6.4 million, about 125,000 Libyans armed themselves. Prior to the Arab Spring household weapons had been nearly nonexistent. However, the weapons in Gaddafi’s arsenal have proven to be the greater threat. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya reported that throughout Gaddafi’s reign, his government had accumulated a large stockpile of MANPAD’S (man-portable air defense systems) and shoulder launched surface-toair missiles (SAM’s) that are easily concealed. Gaddafi’s stockpile contained numerous other weapons such as assault rifles; yet MANPAD’s have raised the most concern due to their high-risk and unique potential dangers. While thousands of these weapons were destroyed during the 2011 multi-state military intervention in Libya, after Gaddafi’s ouster many of Gaddafi’s remaining weapon stockpiles were looted, perhaps by Libyan protesters, civilians, and members of militant groups. The weapons have since been dispersed throughout Libya and spread into North and West Africa. Fourteen countries, including Sudan, Kenya, and Chad, currently participate in this illicit weapon trade. While the National Transitional Council proclaimed that it had
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the power to address such a threatening issue, to this day vast amounts of weapons are still unaccounted for. Most sources agree that approximately 17,000 man-portable air defense systems from Gaddafi’s stockpiles of 22,000 are missing, posing serious threats to local and regional stability as well as international security. The proliferation of weapons from Libya throughout North and West Africa poses a danger to the United States. The U.S. has previously experienced the threat of MANPAD usage. Two leaders of a mosque were arrested in 2004 in Albany, New York, for plotting to purchase a MANPAD weapon to assist in assassinating a Pakistani official. In 2009, the New York Police Department arrested four other men who had plotted to use MANPAD weapons to attack New York Jewish centers as well as planes at an Air National Guard Base. The United States Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs commented on the missing weaponry from Libya’s arsenal: “We are very concerned about the threat that’s posed. In the wrong hands these systems could pose a potential threat to civil aviation.” The fear of MANPAD weapons stems mainly from their portability. The proliferation of weapons in Libya has spread throughout the Middle East and Africa, and the U.S. and its allies fear that these weapons can and likely have already ended up in the hands of dangerous militant and terrorist organizations. Security media.moddb.com
Libya officials in Libya have confirmed that Al Qaeda is in possession of many of the missing Libyan weapons, including MANPAD missiles, and is smuggling them to northern Mali and then further abroad. In November of 2011, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a leader of the militant Islamist and terrorist organization Al Qaeda, confirmed that sects of terrorist groups were in possession of looted weapons from Gaddafi’s arsenal. U.S. officials have also voiced their concerns about Al Qaeda’s possession of MANPAD’s and the smuggling of these surface-to-air missiles from Libya to Mali. MANPAD’s can easily be smuggled into the United States, and the United States has already experienced at least two cases of attempts to smuggle SAM’s into the U.S. from Hong Kong and Russia. Still, the United States’ fear of Libyan MANPAD’s is a preemptive one. The United States has not yet experienced any direct consequence of the proliferation of MANPAD’s from Libya. Nonetheless, it remains crucial to proactively respond to potentially serious threats. However, the threat MANPAD’s pose to the wider world should not detract from the role they play in continuing local and regional instability. Unstable conditions and existing conflicts in North and West Africa are further exacerbated by the proliferation of weapons; the African continent has already experienced 12 attacks using MANPAD’s. Moreover, Libyan armed militant groups have and continue to prevent the Libyan government from exercising effective control over its country. Militant groups found an opening during the post-Gaddafi regime to exercise their power and establish themselves as a leading power in Libya. While extremist Islamist organizations failed to dominate the 2012 Libyan General National Congress elections, they have increasingly represented an influential and growing force in the Libyan political scene. Since Gaddafi’s exit, militant groups have taken advantage of the gaps in central authority by exercising their power in local areas, especially Eastern Libya, a region largely associated with Islamist activity and supporters. The legitimacy of militant groups’ power must not be ignored. Specifically, there exists the threat that extremist groups pose if their demands are not addressed during the formation of a permanent constitution. The arming of such groups only adds to their threat to government stability. Outside of Libya, Northern Mali has been particularly affected by the proliferation of weapons and the presence of MANPAD’s in the region. Northern Mali is currently occupied by a number of terrorist and Islamist mil-
nytimes.com
“In the past 12 months, the proliferation of weapons from Libya has continued at a worrying rate and has spread into new territory.” itant groups, including Al Qaeda, which are in possession of many surface-to-air missiles and continue to smuggle these missiles into Mali. Estimating the supply of MANPAD’s or assault rifles that have been trafficked into Mali is difficult due to uncertainty about the number of weapons that Gaddafi had accumulated during his rule and how many of these weapons were looted by rebels. Regardless of the precise number, significant harm comes directly from the empowering of militant groups by the flow of weapons from Libya. Northern Mali continues to destabilize as terrorist groups outgun the government’s military forces. Such an imminent threat should not be taken lightly, and there has already been a large international response to the proliferation of weapons in North and West Africa. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has met on several occasions to discuss this spread of weapons and MANPAD missiles in Libya. In 2011, the UNSC met to discuss the looting of Gaddafi’s stockpiles and the risk that these stockpiles’ weapons may fall into the hands of Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. The following year the UNSC met again on the topic and continued to express its concern on the issue, stating, “In the past 12 months, the proliferation of weapons from Libya has continued at a worrying rate and has spread into new territory: West Africa, the Levant and, potentially, even the Horn of Africa… Illicit flows from the country are fueling existing conflicts in Africa and the Levant and enriching the arsenals of a range of non-state actors, including terrorist groups.” Additionally, the United States set aside $30 million after the looting of
April 2014
Gaddafi’s weapons for the purpose of “securing Libya’s conventional weapons arsenal” and has been using private contractors to locate and destroy missing missiles ever since. Despite the establishment of an increasingly stable and permanent Libyan government, the proliferation of weapons in Libya is an issue that is far from resolved. It may have arisen in 2011 from the ousting of Gaddafi, yet the issue still poses danger to local, regional, and international authorities and should not be ignored. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) must continue its efforts to secure financial support to prevent the spread of weaponry in North and West Africa through strengthening the Libyan government and associated institutions. Specifically, UNSMIL must continue its commitment to Section D of the organization’s mandate, which stipulates “countering illicit proliferation of all arms and related materiel of all types.” Action can be taken by United Nations forces to aid the Libyan government in safe ammunition management and weaponry disposal. Additionally, the stability of the Libyan government is interlinked with the proliferation of weapons: the spread of weapons is both a symptom of and a response to unstable government. Securing weaponry would help strengthen the government, and would thereby enable it to secure weaponry. It is crucial that Libya maintain international partnerships to aid in securing loose MANPAD’s and other looted weapons. In the future, the international community must place a higher priority on securing dangerous arms in unstable regions. HMR
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Libya
Libya: The Fate of Women In Question Ray Fishman
T
he dust in Libya has yet to settle. Muammar Gaddafi’s more than forty year reign ended abruptly in October of 2011 when rebel forces captured and killed him with the assistance of NATO, putting an end to the Libyan Civil War that claimed over thirty thousand lives. Almost a year later, in July of 2012, Libya held its first parliamentary election since the end of Gaddafi’s rule, and in August, the commencement of drafting a new Libyan constitution had begun. Yet despite these seemingly more democratic elections, post-revolutionary Libya has undoubtedly endured a good deal of turmoil. On the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the “2012 Benghazi attack” occurred, leaving J. Christopher Stevens, the United States ambassador to Libya, dead. As of now, Libya’s current government struggles with enforcing rule of law, protecting its citizens, and preventing violent crimes, which are of-
ten caused by tribal conflict. Despite the ongoing tension in the North African country, Libya’s stance on social issues has often been characterized as far more progressive than that of its North African and Middle Eastern counterparts, particularly Libya’s sentiment and attitude towards the role of women in its society. In fact the Gender Inequality Index (GII), a calculation made in an effort to determine the gap between men and women in a particular country, lists Libya as having the 36th lowest gap between the genders. In comparison, Libya’s eastern neighbor, Egypt, ranked 126th in the GII. What rights do women in Libya have and to what extent can these rights be exercised? What is accounting for the shift and the recent reversal in gender equality throughout Libya? The maternal mortality rate in Libya was measured as fifty-eight for every 100,000 births. While this number is significantly greater than that of many devel-
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oped countries in the Americas and Europe, it is relatively low when compared to that of other Middle Eastern countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, whose mortality rates consistently rank near some of the highest in the world, at 260 and 460 deaths per 100,000 births respectively. Perhaps the reason why fewer women in Libya die during childbirth is due to the country’s healthcare system. Implemented after the 1969 revolution, Libya’s healthcare services have been equally accessible to both sexes, a contrast from other countries in the region. Women in Libya also reserve the right to participate in all parliamentary elections, and are even encouraged to do so by the government. Furthermore, a large percentage of women comprise the Libyan parliament; the most recent report released in 2012 suggested 16.5% of parliamentary seats are held by women. By 1996, women’s enrollment in higher education had climbed
Libya to 46%, equal to that of men, signifying that equal opportunities exist for both sexes from an educational standpoint. In terms of employment, Libyan women compose roughly 30% of the country’s workforce. While this number may seem low, it is relatively high when compared to Arab nations and has risen since the 1980s, when women in Libya composed a miniscule 7% of the workforce. The rights of Libyan women involving marriage are unparalleled in few, if any, of the other predominantly Muslim nations. Child brides have been eradicated in Libya, and since 1973, women have attained equal rights when requesting divorce. The improvements in gender equality raise questions, however, such as why an Arab nation like Libya, whose counterparts have been ridiculed for their stance on gender issues for years, would be so accepting of women. Firstly, the Gaddafi regime pushed for more gender equality, while the media popularized new ideals of women having a bigger role in society. Continued urbanization enforced more progressive sentiment, while the growing petroleum fuel industry opened the job market up to educated young females. The combination of these factors was one of the main reasons women were able to gain the same status of men in some aspects of society. Despite these advancements, gender inequality in Libya still exists, and Libyan women still struggle today in their effort to achieve equality with men. While women’s representation in government and the workforce is present at 16% and 30% respectively, these statistics are really only considered to be progressive in the realm of Muslim countries. While Libya is undoubtedly taking a step in the right direction by trying to incorporate women in their society, and setting the stage for other countries in the region, Libya must continue to pursue gender equality in an effort to push its already high ranking in the Gender Inequality Index even higher. More importantly, however, is the reversal in gender equality that some claim to be the direction in which Libya is currently heading. While the topic is polar-
ized and controversial, it seems to be that, to some extent, gender roles in Libya are reverting back to their traditional patriarchal roots. Hana el-Gallal, a human rights lawyer, stated that in the old regime, women did not have a “voice”, but now they have no “presence.” Enas Eldrasy, a Libyan radiation therapist stated that while “women had a big role” before the revolution, it has now been “dissolved.” Another Libyan woman, Salwa Bugaihis, said that women “want more,” and that they must be involved in decisions. One of the most prominent female figures in Libyan politics, Samira Massoudi, the President of the Libyan Women’s Union in Tripoli, suggested that women in Libya are in a “Bermuda Triangle” type situation, and that the majority of inequality that women experience in Libya stems from the rising non-accepting culture of the country. Massoudi states that she often hears polygamist and misogynistic views from both men and women, detailing a time when she was told that women should not be allowed to travel alone. Sources to the contrary, however, state that after the revolution and downfall of Gaddafi, Libyan women have experienced an increased role in government, alluding to
“The Gaddafi regime pushed for more gender equality, while the media popularized new ideals of women having a bigger role in society.” April 2014
the fact that 33 women have been elected democratically to serve in Libya’s General National Congress. So while it is evident that there are conflicting reports on the recent advancements of gender equality in Libya, it is most important that Libya take initiatives to ensure that the progress that has been shown regarding gender equality in the last few decades keeps moving forward. For one thing, Libya could pass legislation ensuring that men and women in the same job are making the same amount of money. Secondly, Libya should be certain that women in Parliament are getting fair representation, as well as a fair chance to voice their opinions, as they were elected in a democratic process, and thus have the same role as men in their position. It is also important that Libya continue to ensure that legislation passed in years prior is enforced rigorously, as this legislation is the cornerstone of gender equality in Libya. To do this, perhaps a greater police force is necessary, and hiring women for these jobs would send a message about how seriously Libya takes its laws. Finally, Libya must continue to ignore the current sexist law of its bordering countries, as this will simply cause Libya to revert to gender inequality. Libya’s current state of gender equality easily surpasses that of its neighbors and other Arab countries, but there is still work to be done. Libya has consistently progressed towards a more fair and equal society with no gender gap, yet the recent downfall of the regime raises new questions as to whether the progression is continuing, stopping, or even reversing. HMR
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Conflict in Sudan and South Sudan Republic of Sudan -Population: 35,482,233 - GDP: 89.97 Billion - Federal Republic - Literacy: 71.9% - Industries: oil, manufacturing, textiles
Republic of South Sudan - Population: 11,562,695 - GDP: 14.71 Billion - Republic - Literacy: 71.9% - Industries: oil, farming, livestock
www.populstat.info
Between the years of 1983 to 2005, Sudan remained in a state of civil war, resulting in approximately two million deaths. Around four million citizens of south Sudan were displaced over the course of the 22 years. Sudan’s second civil war is often characterized by the ethnic differences that exist between northern and southern Sudan. Northern Sudan, primarily populated by Muslims and Arabic-speakers, controlled approximately 66% of Sudan land and population, while southern Sudan is significantly more native African in terms of race, religion, and culture with visible Christian and Western influences. Economic disagreement over oil revenue and resources further complicated the war. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in January of 2005, stated that the south would have autonomy for six years, after which a vote would be held to determine whether or not the citizens desired to remain an independent nation. During this time, oil revenues, which account for approximately 70% of Sudan’s export income, would be equally divided between the two governments. In July of 2011, after the six years had passed, southern Sudanese voted for independence and Sudan split into two separate nations. However, conflict between the Republics of Sudan and South Sudan remain, primarily over oil revenue and precise border distinction.
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Sudan & South Sudan
Blood For Oil Daniel Rosenblatt
April 2014
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n 2005, a solution was found. After years of fighting over land, minerals, and oil, the nation of Sudan and the rebels in the south reached a pact for peace. But in 2014, the fight over resources and the ensuing violence remains. Nine years ago, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) outlined a plan for a ceasefire to the decades-old Sudan civil war and the cooperative separation of Sudan and South Sudan as two autonomous states. The CPA created a buffer period of six years during which oil revenue would be equally shared between the two nations and planned for a vote of independence within Southern Sudan in 2011. When this time elapsed in July of 2011, South Sudan voted 99% in favor of independence and, according to the CPA, the new states would officially recognize the 1956 Border, a line created with the Sudanese independence from Egypt and Great Britain.
Of the many resources in the area, oil is by far the most valuable. Most importantly, both nations rely heavily on the revenues produced by this industry, and in a region of extreme poverty and economic underdevelopment, this significant resource dramatically increases the potential for growth. The majority of oil production in Sudan and South Sudan takes place in the Muglad Basin and the Melat Basin. Both of these basins extend over the two nations; however, under the current undefined borders, South Sudan holds most of the land and produces about 75% of the oil that was once shared within the original nation of Sudan. Furthermore, according to BP’s 2013 Statistical Review, South Sudan possesses 3.5 billion reserve barrels of oil as compared to Sudan’s 1.5 billion barrels. The combination of the undefined borders and the widespread oil production prevents both the economic
decision. It was also agreed that Abyei would join one of the two nations through a referendum, but, because of concerns of voter eligibility, no vote occurred. With a significant economic importance associated with the region, the two nations struggle to reach a solution. Abyei is not alone in this issue. There are more than a dozen locations under dispute, many for economic purposes. Besides oil, minerals and grassland are also highly sought after. Perhaps most emotionally jarring are the conflicts over the individual communities who rely on the land for sustenance. Often these villages are destroyed in battles fueled by political aggression. The community members, usually unaffiliated with the overarching conflict, are most harmed. In addition, the issue extends to the infrastructure. South Sudan is a landlocked country, while Sudan borders the Red Sea. In order for South Sudan to export its oil, it must make use of
“Perhaps most emotionally jarring are the conflicts over the individual communities who rely on the land for sustenance. Often these villages are destroyed in battles fueled by political aggression.” Despite the creation of a Technical Border Committee (TBC) in 2005 for the purpose of putting the 1956 border into effect, disputes over the exact location of the boundary continue today. Much of the controversy is rooted in the importance of land along this sixty-year-old line. As per the original decision, Sudan is split relatively accurately in terms of religious, ethnic, and linguistic trends. The northern portion, now Sudan, is mainly Arabic-speaking Muslims, while the southern region, now South Sudan, consists of indigenous tribes such as the Dinka, Nuer, Bari, Azande. However, the border does not take into account the modern industrial geography, specifically the location of resources and infrastructure. Further, it is not specific in terms of exact boundaries, referring to regions general rather than areas defined by natural barriers, so modern interpretations are heavily debated.
development of either nation and a resolution of peace. Some of the most disputed regions are the areas of the Upper Nole, South Kordofan, Kaka, Bahr al Arab, and Kafi Kingi. All of these areas lie on the border region and provide economic support for much of the two nations. Perhaps the most contentious location, though, is the Abyei area, which has historically been viewed as a connection between the north and south. The area of 4 thousand square miles was excluded form the TBC mandate and technically belongs to neither Sudan or South Sudan. It placed under review by the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) in order to define the region clearly. The commission eventually chose to include surrounding areas, but as this would have expanded South Sudan’s control on oil production, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague reversed the
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pipelines that run through Sudan to the Port of Sudan. Specifically, it relies on the GNPOC pipeline that runs from Heglig to Port Sudan and the Petrodar Pipeline, which runs from Palogue to Port Sudan. In this way, South Sudan is dependant on Sudan, as the northern nation provides the only possibility for trade. Meanwhile, Sudan is dependant on South Sudan as the oil production lost with the 2011 independence only remains in fees from the pipelines. However, this interconnectedness has, so far, only further strained relations. In January of 2012, South Sudan temporarily halted oil production in response to high Sudanese taxes on the pipelines. Then, in 2013 Sudan prevented South Sudan from using its oil pipelines, accusing South Sudan of promoting rebellion. These constant tensions are unnecessary and outdated. The two nations both struggle economically and
Sudan & South Sudan have the responsibility to reconcile in order to foster an environment in which the citizens can survive. South Sudan often expresses its hope to build pipelines through Kenya, and in 2013 Toyota Tusho East Africa, a Japanese energy company noted that it was considering the possibility of this project. No definitive agreements have been reached so far, and the creation of such pipelines would be a long and expensive process. Rather than waste millions of dollars in reform then, the two nations must work with the infrastructure and resources already present. In doing so, they will address two important issues: borders and the economic partnership between the two nations. A coordinated sharing of oil reserves would be the most effective solution. First, because of the two nations’ history
with cooperative oil distribution, a smooth transition can be expected. Second, considering the poor economic state of the region, a reorganization of
the oil industry to heighten efficiency would significantly increase the potential for growth. Finally, in a time of ethnic and religious strife, an easily
“The two nations both struggle economically and have the responsibility to reconcile in order to foster an environment in which the citizens can survive.� acquirable economic partnership would prove to be a strong first step in restoring relations between the two countries. With such partnerships, the issues regarding the establishment of national borders would be greatly diminished. Additionally, businesscentric agreements at the local level can be created. Herders from both nations require ease of passage over borders, so a soft border should be created in the grassland areas. Then, communities can focus on much more important issues, such as religious and ethnic reconciliation. The future for Sudan and South Sudan is not clear. While it seemed bright just a few years ago, the situation has grown increasingly turbulent. But the debate over resources does not have to continue. As they have done before, the people of these nations must start with an economic foundation. If they look enviously outside their own borders, only instability will ensue, but by creating connections with each other, they will find success and, hopefully, a future of peace. It all starts with a focus on resources- how to manage them, how to use them, and how to share them. HMR
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A Long Road Ahead Coordinating Relief Efforts in a Nation at War EVY VERBINNEN
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n December 15, 2013, violence erupted among key leaders in South Sudan. The turmoil, caused by growing political tensions left over from the previous civil war, which ended in 2005, surfaced between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and soldiers supporting former Vice President Riek Machar. While the cause of the outbreaks, originating in Juba, South Sudan’s capital, is debated, one thing is for certain: they have led to a security and humanitarian crisis. What is being referred to as a civil war has forced over one million people out of their homes. Accusations of a corrupt government, varying political views, and arguments over oil-rich land, have left the almost three-year-old country struggling to stabilize itself, an objective to which many nations and international aid groups have pledged their support. Unfortunately, with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army fighting for the government, and the Lord’s Resistance Army, a rebel group, pushing the combat zone further into more rural areas, aid is a luxury that many are unable to access. As the death count swells to well over 10,000 people, President Salva Kiir has openly stated that he will support the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In response
to this declaration, the rebels have taken it into their own hands to prevent any aid from being distributed to those in need, using guerilla warfare tactics to cause as much damage as possible. Moreover, with raids on hospitals and other aid centers becoming all too common, NGOs such as the World Food Program and Doctors Without Borders have been forced to flee the violent country for their own safety. The head of mission in South Sudan for MSF, a french version of Doctors Without Borders, Raphael Gorgeu explained that “assaults on medical facilities and patients are part of a broader backdrop of brutal attacks on towns, markets and public facilities.” His reasoning for evacuating aid workers shed light on the conflict’s effect on the everyday life of those not involved in the fighting as well as the extent of the destruction. In addition, the chief of World Food Program, Ertharin Cousin summed up the issue at the end of a two-day visit to South Sudan alongside the head of the U.N. refugee agency, by saying “Ordinary people are bearing the brunt of this conflict and agencies like ours are facing far too many obstacles in trying to assist them.” With defense expenditures totaling 537 million USD, the Sudanese military should be able to
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suppress the conflict in the small country with a population of only about 10 million; however, rebel forces know no boundaries. The warring fighters have successfully raided hospitals, looting and murdering patients gruesomely in their beds. These direct attacks have severely limited the capability of NGOs to safely intervene and deliver aid to those affected by the ongoing violence. To any typical human being,
“Violent raids on hospitals have forced NGOs to flee from the war-torn nation.” targeting the sick and injured sounds not only inhumane, but also barbaric; however, after recently unifying to fight a war of independence for twenty-two years against the government of North, both forces have acquired quite long rap sheets of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The rebel group fighting under the command of former Vice President Riek Machar, the Lord’s Resistance Army, has gained global infamy due to its widespread human
Sudan & South Sudan
rights violations ranging from murder, abduction and mutilation to the creation of child sex workers and child soldiers. However, keeping in mind that both sides signed a cease-fire deal on January 6, 2014 and then subsequently ignored it, it is apparent that other nations and NGOs must not simply try to provide assistance, but instead actually take matters into their own hands. Whether it be ending the war, or just protecting civilians from the violence, something must be done immediately. Originally, aid workers were primarily working in already established or camp-like hospitals, making them vulnerable to attack. However, not even the United Nations base in Akobo felt entirely safe after unknown assailants attacked in December, possibly killing or injuring those already seeking refuge. As of December 19th, The UNMISS, or United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, had over 6,800 troops and police in the young country, but with a population of just under 11 million people either fighting or fleeing, questions are raised of whether that is enough. While this almost threeyear-old country is no stranger to war, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon pointed out the necessity of stabilizing
the government immediately because “the future of this nation requires its current leadership to do everything possible to prevent South Sudan descending into the chaos that would be such a betrayal of the ideals behind its long struggle for independence.” In an already unstable region of the globe, the continuance of violence is already spreading and could spread even further.
the country completely to neighboring refugee camps. It appears as if the U.N. is following a similar plan of action in an attempt to contain the violence. According to a statement issued, the UN expects “all forces, whatever their allegiance, to ensure the safety of UNMISS personnel and any civilians located inside Mission premises.” With a cease-fire already agreed
“Other nations and NGOs must not simply try to provide assistance but actually take matters into their own hands.” Instead of U.N. troops and police engaging in the physical fight as an attempt to halt the violence, the focus should be on rescue missions into high risk villages and regions where innocent civilians are unable to flee without excessive help. Displacement is not an optimal, nor a long term, solution; however, at the moment, safety is the priority, whether that means supplying shelter at the U.N. bases, which are now even more secure and housing thousands, or removing them from
April 2014
upon and signed by both parties, the focus of the opposing sides should be to either draft a new version with more agreeable terms or to amend the current version and adhere to it. Although it is difficult to abruptly end a fight that has caused so much destruction and well over 10,00 deaths, it is important that the political factions of the Republic of South Sudan sit down and discuss the causes of the violence in order to find acceptable compromise. HMR
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From Provisional to Permanent Seeking a More Stable Solution Anna Kuritzkes
S
ince the infamous conflict between northern and southern Sudan began in 2003, Sudanese refugees have fled the violence, pandemonium, and turmoil of their home countries. The region has periodically broken out in conflict since the first Sudanese Civil War, which lasted from 1955 to 1972. Reasons for the fighting include resource distribution, the South’s desire to secede from Sudan, and the role of religion in the Sudanese government; however, after half a century of fighting, the problems that originally fueled the conflict seem to have been lost in the crossfire.
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www.jiroose.com
Sudan & South Sudan The conflict has permeated all realms of Sudanese society. The most recent war has cost 1.5 million people their lives and has led to the displacement of 2 million more. The total number of casualties amounts to more than 2.5 million, including civilians, soldiers, and rebels. A tragedy of this magnitude is difficult to conceive. Understandably, the state of flux and the tumultuous nature of the Sudanese conflict has caused a massive movement of Sudanese civilians from their homelands to other locations. This voluntary diaspora has led to one of the most severe refugee crises in the modern day. Sudanese refugees flock to camps in the north and south, Uganda, Chad, and the Central African Republic as the conflict in their homeland continues; however, these camps are far from the safe havens the refugees expect. The camps are overcrowded, unsafe, and unsanitary,
flygtning.dk
“Overflowing latrines, which contaminate the water supply, contribute to the prevalence of [disease]...other options for water sources are limited.” and these conditions are exacerbated by the constant flow of refugees attempting to escape the turmoil in Sudan. The Sudanese refugees have become dependent upon aid from the United Nations and other NGOs, but there are simply not enough resources for the growing number of people inhabiting the camps. Resources are quickly expended, leaving the refugees in a state of constant uncertainty with no hope of creating a permanent life for themselves. It is impossible to live by only focusing on short-term needs. The camps were not built under the assumption that refugees would be staying for years, and with no end to the Sudanese conflict in sight, the only solution to the refugee crisis is to redirect resources and focus on making the camps permanent. The problems in refugee camps often stem from overcrowding. In the Sudanese refugee camps, overcrowding has resulted in a lack of resources including food, medical attention, and space, as well as created unsanitary
conditions that are a hotbed for disease. Despite the amount of aid the refugees receive from the UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency), there is an inadequate amount of food, and many people in the camps go hungry. Many of the diseases prevalent in the camps are preventable, yet eight children die every day on average due to a lack of medical attention. Overflowing latrines, which contaminate the water supply, contribute to the prevalence of these diseases. However, as desertification is a problem in Sudan and the surrounding area, other options for water sources are limited. There are ways to improve water sources; non-governmental organizations such as Charity Water use private and public donations to build wells and other water supplies in the developing world. The poor conditions in these camps prevent them from serving as adequate housing, but the unfortunate reality is that refugees have nowhere else to go. Stringent immigration policies prevent the largely uneducated Sudanese refugee
April 2014
population from being accepted into most countries. Even the countries that house Sudanese refugee camps remain uninterested in granting the Sudanese refugees full citizenship. These socalled “host countries” are largely underdeveloped and poor as well, and therefore it is not in their best interest to accept an influx of uneducated foreigners as citizens that they would then have to support. Furthermore, the host countries are uninterested in directing their limited resources towards improving the situations in refugee camps. As a result, the international community has taken on the responsibility of controlling the camps. Many refugees have no interest in going back to their homes, but face no other option because they live in a state of flux in the camps. Without the ability to build a new life, refugees see no other option but to return to their old ones. If foreign governments refuse to accept the refugees, and returning to their country of origin would be extremely dangerous if not suicidal,
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www.un.org
then the best option would be to expend existing resources towards improving the camps to as great an extent as possible. The few resources available in refugee camps are mainly allocated to dire short-term needs, including food, water, and medicine. However, instead of directing all resources to short-term needs, the UNHCR should
not so far out of reach—could have drastic effects on the refugee crisis in Sudan. The first step towards creating a permanent living space for refugees is to secure a clean water supply. This may mean moving latrines to prevent their contaminating the current water supply, or finding a new source of water if the water is already contaminated. Clean
reallocation of resources. Still, this is not a revolutionary idea; such permanent homes are reminiscent of those found in Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan. After basic necessities such as water and living spaces have been secured, the refugees would have a better foundation for creating a permanent life inside the camp. Promoting the creation of permanent refugee camps does not endorse the usage of camps or condoning camp life. Rather, it is approaching the situation pragmatically. It is impossible to have every refugee immigrate to his or her host country; however, improving the lives of internationally displaced persons is possible. Self-reliance is defined by UNHCR as “the social and economic ability of an individual, a household or a community to meet essential needs (including protection, food, water, shelter, and personal safety, health and education) in a sustainable manner and with dignity. Self-reliance, as a program approach, refers to developing and strengthening the livelihoods of persons of concern, and reducing their
“Creating permanent refugee camps would allow refugees to build a secure home and establish a stable lifestyle, providing the Sudanese refugees with the homes that they have been searching for since they fled their country years ago.” focus a portion of their funding towards developing a permanent infrastructure for the camps. If an entirely new fund is created, hopefully the funding allocated for short-term needs will not be affected by the project of redesigning the camps. The main problem behind the camps is their design. Despite the fact that the camps are set up to serve as temporary living spaces, in reality, the refugees residing in the camps have been there for years. There is no doubt that building permanent refugee camps for Sudanese refugees is a difficult process, however such an advancement—an advancement
water is a universal necessity and is key to improving the standard of living for refugees. The next step towards creating permanent camps is to convert the temporary refugee housing into permanent housing. Permanent buildings would foster a sense of community, create a stronger infrastructure for the camps, and improve the standard of living for all residents of the camps. This project would be a difficult undertaking. The tents that currently house refugees would have to be replaced with cinder-block homes, a process that requires an immense
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vulnerability and long-term reliance on humanitarian/external assistance.” The only way for the Sudanese refugees to attain self-reliance is for them to live in permanent housing. Creating permanent refugee camps would allow refugees to build a secure home and establish a stable lifestyle, providing the Sudanese refugees with the homes that they have been searching for since they fled their country years ago. HMR
Sudan & South Sudan
When the Melting Pot Boils Over The Rise of Ethnic Tensions in Sudan and South Sudan Alex Newman
April 2014
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n January 9, 2005, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed that ended the Second Sudanese Civil War. After twenty-two years of violence that claimed the lives of around two million people, it would have seemed that the racial issues of Sudan were settled. The south of Sudan was granted autonomy for six years from the Muslim ruled North and was freed from the sharia rule that President Gaafar Nimeiry had imposed in 1983. The split between the two halves of the nation was made official on June 9, 2011, when the South Sudanese independence referendum was passed by a vote of approximately 99%. Yet nearly three years later, Sudan and South Sudan are not free from the violence that has plagued their region since South Sudan was granted independence. Though oil and politics have played a role in South Sudan’s creation, the story of these two now separate nations is ultimately one of cultural and ethnic tensions that have stretched Sudan and South Sudan to a critical breaking point with disastrous results. To understand the nature of the Sudan region’s current situation and to even hope to find some sort of solution, it is important to understand Sudan’s history. In 1898, England and Egypt governed the region that comprises of modern day Sudan and South Sudan. As is still true today, the north held a predominantly Muslim population while the south was made up of several native tribes. In 1922, with the goal of stemming the spread of Islam to the South, the United Kingdom passed the Closed District Ordinances, which effectively restricted travel between the two regions of Sudan. The result was a greater split between the Christian tribal south and the Muslim Arab north. And so, when Sudan gained its independence in 1956, two independently governed regions of a culturally and religiously divided nation were forced back together. With a government dominated by northern Sudan, tensions within the nation quickly led to widespread violence. Since gaining independence from Britain, Sudan has been in a nearly constant state of civil unrest, seeing two civil wars spanning from 1955 to 1972 and from 1983 to 2005. Since the end of the Second Sudanese war, South Sudan has been independently governed. The issue of South Sudan’s independence was formally put to a referendum in 2011.
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Though nearly three years have passed since the secession of South Sudan, an act meant to stem the endemic fighting of the Sudan region, violence and ethnic tensions persist in both Sudan and South Sudan. Neither government has been successful in bringing order to its respective region. After effectively tearing Sudan in two, ethnic violence has continued to run rampant. In the Darfur region of Su-
“The story of these two now separate nations is ultimately one of cultural and ethnic tensions.” dan, the war that began in 2003 between the non-Arab ethnic natives of Darfur and the predominantly Arab Sudanese government rages on. The Darfur conflict is demonstrative of just how strong the racial tensions that plague Sudan are. The rebel armies of the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement are made up of black ethnic groups fighting oppression from the Arab government, led by Omar alBashir. Bashir’s government continues to try to stamp out the revolution using
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any means necessary. Though the Sudanese government denies any connection to the atrocities perpetrated by the Arab Janjaweed militia against the black rebel groups, substantial evidence indicates that Bashir’s government supports and directs the Janjaweed. Since the onset of the Darfur conflict, the United Nations estimates that 300,000 people have died and 2 million have been displaced by the violence. However, the Sudanese government claims a death toll of only 10,000. Perhaps just as disturbing as the statistics are the reports of civilian casualties. Throughout the war, in addition to civilian massacres, reports of mass racially targeted rapes by the Janjaweed against black women and children have abounded. One rape victim, Sawelah Suliman, reported that Janjaweed “ethnic cleansers” told her, “Black girl, you are too dark. You are like a dog. We want to make a light baby.” The government and Janjaweed’s targeting of non-Arab civilians prompted the International Criminal Court to issue an arrest warrant for President Omar alBashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity in 2009. And yet, the War in Darfur continues. In 2014 alone the United Nations reports that over 215,000 have had to flea their homes due to the conflict. Unfortunately, the new nation of South Sudan, though free of Bashir’s sharia rule in the north, is not free from ethnic contention and violence. Though racial tensions may not be as prominent
Sudan & South Sudan in South Sudan as they are in the north, ethnic conflict between South Sudan’s largest tribe, the Dinka, and South Sudan’s second largest tribe, the Nuer have led to a political crisis that threatens to tear apart the young nation. Any hope of peace and stability in South Sudan has been stamped out by the violent conflict that erupted within the nation several months ago. On December 15, violence between the rival tribes of the Nuer and Dinka broke out when Sudan People’s Liberation Movement Major General Ciennoung, leader of the Presidential Guard, attempted to disarm Nuer members of Dinka President Salva Kiir Mayardit’s guard. Fighting within the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement quickly escalated. The first civilian casualties were recorded in South Sudan’s capital, Juba, when Dinka factions of the SPLM targeted Nuer civilians. Though the ex-
act number of casualties from the massacre are unknown, eyewitness reports are disturbing. A man who was rounded up along with around 250 other Nuer men recounted his experience when the group of men was rounded up into a police station and subsequently fired upon by Dinka government troops. “It was horrible, because to survive you had to cover yourself with the bodies of dead people, and during the two days, the bodies started to smell really bad. I don’t want to talk much about it.” The man was one of just twelve to survive the police station massacre. Reports of rape, house-to-house killings, and dump trucks loaded with dead bodies have also surfaced. Since the massacres of Nuer’s in Juba, Nuer violence against ethnic Dinkas has been reported. Though a ceasefire was signed between the South Sudanese government and the rebel movement in January, fight-
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ing has continued. Nuer troops loyal to South Sudan’s former Nuer Vice President Riek Machar, whom President Salva Kiir Mayrdit dismissed in July of 2013, continue to challenge President Salva Kiir Mayardit’s government. As in Darfur, ethnic violence has led to a serious civilian displacement crisis. The United Nations estimates that the conflict in has already displaced over one million people. Though the ethnically black population of the Sudan region may have an independent state now (in the form of South Sudan), the targeted persecution and genocide of Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa peoples by Bashir’s government cannot be tolerated by the international community. The arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court for Omar al Bashir’s arrest simply is not enough to end the atrocities in Darfur. In the young nation of South Sudan, the new government has failed to establish the order and peace once promised to its citizens as ethnic conflicts have simply overwhelmed the country. A major reason for the violence that has broken out in South Sudan is the government’s bias toward the Dinka tribe. As the Arabs do in Sudan, the Dinka represent the largest ethnic group in South Sudan. However, in neither case should the majority be the sole voice of the government. As in Sudan, international intervention may be the most effective way to force the South Sudanese government to abide by the rules of war and to respect citizens’ basic human rights. As of now, the humanitarian situation in both Sudan and South Sudan is unconscionable. In fact, the violence in Sudan and South Sudan is somewhat reminiscent of the despised total war tactics employed by Nazi Germany as well as the Soviet Union in Europe during World War II. In the Sudan region, just as in a war fought nearly seventy years ago, civilians are not spared from the atrocities of war. Instead, they are slaughtered like animals to fulfill goals of ethnic cleansing. The reason for immediate international intervention is not one of politics or economics, but one of morality. It is important that the international community decides to break its bubble of comfortable complacency and willful ignorance so that we may preserve some semblance of our humanity. HMR
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Solu tion
a ng
i d iF n
Ethan Gelfer
T
he world’s newest nation, South Sudan, was created out of a civil war that engulfed the area of Sudan in the past half-decade. Throughout this time, the Sudanese government has been in anarchy. Tensions and government problems as well as a lack of infrastructure have contributed to the situation. Much like the rest of the region, in the Sahel, a sub-Saharan belt of land that includes other volatile countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso, third world conditions are worsening due to conflict, drought, famine, and economic problems. Many governments have been providing aid in one form or another to Sudan and the greater Sahel region. The EU and US have contributed greatly, in addition to the many UN efforts. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have also provided valuable assistance. The aid to the Sahel region comes in two general types: military aid and developmental assistance. Military aid is loosely defined as any form of assistance that benefits either military or paramilitary forces in the region, in addition to aiding foreign troops on site, such as UN peacekeepers in Nigeria or the French Foreign Legion troops on peacekeeping operations in Mali. Military aid is often criticized for not addressing the root cause of the problems that exist in nations receiving such aid. To a certain extent, this criticism is accurate. The primary goal of military aid is not to solve all of the issues in the recipient nation. Rather, its goal is to create and preserve stability in
the recipient nation, so that developmental efforts may take place. During the Nigerian Genocide, over 44,000 UN peacekeeping troops were deployed in an effort to create and preserve stability. These efforts were incredibly successful. The genocide was effectively over within a span of only a few months, and now that conditions are more or less stable, other organizations may begin to operate in the region and provide developmental assistance. Developmental aid is more strictly defined. The Organization for Economic Coordination and Development (OECD) provides the official definition for developmental assistance, stating that developmental assistance must be “provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and, each transaction of which; is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and, is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25%.” Developmental assistance must have economic development and welfare as its primary goal. For example, humanitarian aid is not considered development assistance because its main goal is to respond to a crisis, not to engage in the development of the economy or welfare. The debate currently under discussion in countries providing aid of either form to Sudan is which one should be prioritized, or used more often. Military aid is often
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used as a prerequisite to developmental aid because, if successful, it can lead to stability in the recipient nation and pave the way for peaceful organizations that can implement development aid, such as improvements in industry, agriculture, and infrastructure. Margaret Taylor from the Council on Foreign Affairs writes, “Militaries are indispensable for restoring order and maintaining postconflict security through multilateral peacekeeping missions. In addition, militaries should take the lead in building the capacity of other military forces to contribute to regional and international peacekeeping efforts [and] should also be involved in security-sector reform.” However, this can be problematic, as it involves arming rebels and other militants on the ground, which can lead to more death and violence rather than paving the way to a safer environment. Development aid is much safer. It involves NGOs like Doctors without Borders and governmental organizations like UNICEF. It spans a broad area of aid and development in third world countries. Like many of its neighboring countries, Sudan lacks effective infrastructure and education and suffers attacks from terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram, a group of individuals who target hospitals and schools operating out of Sudan as well as neighboring unstable countries. Development aid can provide a more peaceful approach to preventing and obstructing existing terror groups. Joseph
Sudan & South Sudan Young of American University and Michael Findley of Brigham Young University published a study that found that, “on average, a one standard deviation increase in education aid is expected to decrease the count of terrorist attacks by 71%… health aid is expected to cause [similar decreases] by 39% [and] governance and civil society aid is expected to cause [similar decreases] by almost 40%.” The Journal of International Affairs “confirms the effectiveness of foreign aid to reduce the number of terrorist attacks originating from the recipient country… [while] foreign military interventions are also counter-productive and seem to be a strong attraction factor for terrorists.” In addition to economic problems, the nations of the Sahel and more specifically Sudan do not have the infrastructure to support an economically developed nation, and are in desperate need of aid. According to Donald Kaberuka, the President of the African Development Bank, “the current needs of infrastructure in Africa are about 92 billion USD a year. At the moment we can monetize from all sources only half that amount - about $50 billion.” According to Tim McCully of the Huffington Post, “If we are ever going to break the cycle of hunger and malnutrition that threatens lives every few years in West Africa, we have to scale up the investment in resilience, starting with stable and strong agricultural foundations in vulnerable communities.”
“As time goes on, we will see which form of assistance proves most effective.” African Union Commission Chairperson Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma stated that, “If we connect communities and countries through infrastructure and market linkages... we will create the conditions for lasting peace, prosperity and the renaissance of the Sahel.” Even though developmental assistance has many benefits, it is very difficult to implement and execute. According to Martin C. Steinwand of Stony Brook University, “Aid flows are often unstable and uncertain. Foreign aid revenues are up to forty times more volatile than government revenue.” This volatility in the aid itself destabilizes the dependents of this aid, as they are unable to function without it. As a result, recipient governments are put in a tenuous position, without reliability in promising future resources. According to Richard A. Nielson for Political Science, “During aid shocks, potential rebels gain bargaining strength vis-à-vis the government. To appease the rebels, the government must promise future resource transfers, but the government has no incentive to continue its promised transfers if the aid shock proves to be temporary. With the government
April 2014
unable to credibly commit to future resource transfers, violence breaks out.” In fact, recipient governments will even abuse donor nations for their own corrupt benefit. Sudan, currently in a civil war, is simply too unstable to support developmental assistance without military aid implemented first in order to promote stability. The two forms of assistance must be used in conjunction in order to be effective. The United States, the EU, the UN, and NGOs provide billions of dollars a year in aid to Sudan and Africa. Most of it is split between military and development aid. As time goes on, we will see which form of assistance proves most effective; for now, both forms have had beneficial effects, whether in conjunction with each other, like in Cote D’Ivoire (the Ivory Coast, a nation in the west of Africa), or alone, such as in the military operations in Mali and Nigeria and development assistance efforts in Burkina Faso. Sudan will require both forms of aid, as it is in a turbulent period of history. It is the duty of the organized nations of the world to provide aid to stabilize Sudan and create a nation that may develop into an industrialized economic force. HMR
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