Prospects for E-Government in Latin America de David Altman by Noé Hernández

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PROSPECTS FOR E-GOVERNMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY, SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY

DAVID ALTMAN The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame

Direct democracy “from below” constitutes a strong tool of social accountability. Powerful arguments have been made regarding the information problem associated with direct democracy. In an increasingly complex world, citizens have trouble gathering enough information to make decisions on complicated issues. E-government offers a unique opportunity to solve, at least partially, the information problem. Granting access to information and services, e-government allows citizens to become more acquainted with the governing process. In order to assess the potentiality of extending e-government I created an index of E-government Potentiality. This index is constructed through the combination of diverse variables (education index; main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants; estimated PC per 100 inhabitants; and Internet users per 100 inhabitants). It is then compared with the actual use of e-government in the region (data came from West et al 2002). Surprisingly, there is not a direct proportional relation between those countries with high potentiality and those with actual broad use of e-government. The theoretical claim used to explain the lack of this relationship comes from the hypothesis that in developing countries where citizens are more satisfied with their democracy and have high degrees of interpersonal trust, the political will—a critical variable pointed out by the egovernment literature—is not strong enough to engage in costly reforms and develop e-government. In other words, politicians lack enough incentives to alter the status quo. Why should they change if most people are basically satisfied with the state of affairs? Where countries have high levels of interpersonal trust and citizens are satisfied with democracy, e-government is less likely to develop.

I. DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA At the beginning of the 1990s most scholars and policy-makers were optimistic about the possibilities of Latin America. Democracy seemed to be the “only game in town” in most of the continent and the region was finally leaving behind the “lost decade” of the 1980s (see Mainwaring 1999). However, scholars who claim that Latin American democracies are affected by serious flaws of institutional design and are entrenched in deep economic and social disparities have challenged

this optimism. Part of this literature has focused on the failures of check-and-balances mechanisms associated with excessive presidentialism, weak legislatures, or non-independent judiciaries, and another has centered in the analysis of the poor connection between civil society and the State. Within this second body of literature, scholars like Guillermo O’Donnell have argued that although free and fair elections do occur nearly everywhere in the continent, in most countries “the state has weakened terribly and, in some regions of these countries, it has for all practical purposes evaporated” (2001b:601). Following O’Donnell, the anemic states of

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Figure 1. Use of Direct Democracy Institutions in Latin America

Latin America are characterized by a citizenship of lowintensity, delegative representation, and lack of accountability (O’Donnell 1994; 2001a; 2002). In Latin America, plebiscites are a phenomenon characteristic of what O’Donnell once called delegative democracies (O’Donnell 1994), for instance in the threat and eventually the use of plebiscites by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez.1 There is a clear increase in the use of direct democratic devices worldwide and Latin America does not escape this trend (see Figure 1).2 As a matter of fact, most post-transitional Latin American constitutions open the possibility for using some types of institutions of direct democracy (IDD). Nonetheless, in many circumstances this openness is no more than a mere declaration of will given that no law stipulates or articulates how to proceed with these mechanisms. Although there is an increase in the use of institutions of direct democracy in Latin America, the trend, at first glance, seems more a consequence of the plebiscitarian attitudes of governments rather than of demands from the citizenry “below.” There are three main views regarding direct democratic devices. First, the rise of single-issue interest groups onset actions on the ballot and popular suspicion of government, politicians, and politics in general leads citizens to by-pass institutions of representation in order to influence and make decisions on policies directly.3

Also, given that citizens have nowadays much better access to information, their ability to vote on more political issues is increased. Due to these factors, many argue that citizens should employ mechanisms of direct democracy more frequently. The assumption behind this claim is based on the optimistic ideal that participation develops and fosters the very qualities necessary for it; the more individuals participate and decide policy directly the better able they are to do so (on this topic see: Pateman 1970). Second, some scholars argue that political, economic, or social groups could easily utilize direct democracy for their own particular benefit, making it, in the end, harmful to representative democracy. Moreover, as Bell suggest about the Californian case, “appeals to prejudice, oversimplification of the issues, and exploitation of legitimate concerns by promising simplistic solutions to complex problems often characterize referendum and initiative campaigns” (1978: 19). Finally, other scholars from a somewhat Schumpeterianelitist understanding of political phenomena claim that citizens lack all the abilities and information needed to make decisions concerning complex political issues.4 But direct democracy includes a broad range of different institutional mechanisms, such as referenda, plebiscites, recalls, or popular initiatives. There is terminological confusion regarding institutions of direct democracy: what in one country is called a referendum,

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in another might be called plebiscite or even a popular initiative. What is clear is that in general, but not always, citizens have two choices: whether or not to support a proposed course of action. Who proposes the policy or political action is one of the major distinctions among these different types of direct democracy (Tsebelis Forthcoming). On the one hand, the formalized political establishment (either the executive and/or the legislative branches) may require citizens to vote in order to ratify a decision made by them. These ratification votes are made over a wide range of policy areas, such as peace accords, economic and/or political integration, constitutional amendments and the like. The literature refers to this type of mechanism as “from above.” On the other hand, direct democracy “from below” is an institutional mechanism in which civil society, once having elected the representatives and governments, still remains a veto player in the political game.5 An organized group of citizens may place before the whole citizenry an alteration of the political status quo, either addressing an already adopted law, proposing a new legislative measure, or revoking the mandate of an elected official. This type of mechanism falls within the realm of social accountability. This concept, coined by Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, is defined as “a mechanism of vertical accountability, non-electoral, of the political authorities based on the actions of an ample range of associations and citizen movements, as well as media actions […] It is activated ‘on demand’ and can be centered on the control of specific issues, particular policies or civil employees” (2002: 32-33). 6 Direct democracy from below not only has as a virtue its egalitarian aspect (one citizen-one vote) but also the elasticity that characterizes the institutions of social accountability. Figure 2 shows a typology of the diverse direct democratic institutions. Figure 2. Typology of Direct Democracy Institutions

But even taking into consideration the potential that these mechanisms “from below” might have in accountability terms, we are still facing the problem of information as previously mentioned. In most if not all issues citizens need information in order to decide in a responsible way. Otherwise, they might be manipulated by elites with narrow interests. As we will see in the next section of the paper, E-government plays a critical role in avoiding the problem of information. This accountability potential is present in those institutions of direct democracy that originate from below (initiatives, recalls, and referendums) but not in those from above, usually called plebiscites.7 Besides few single-country studies (Altman 2002; Araos and Engel 1989; Gandásegui 1999; Panzer and Paredes 1991) and some regional ones (Barczak 2001; Payne, Zovatto, Carrillo, and Allamand 2002; Rial 2000), there is almost no systematic cross-national study of the use of direct democratic institutions in Latin America. Furthermore, there are not enough Latin American occurrences to compare with European ones in which “have performed the functions of constitutional safeguards, and … governments have been unsuccessful in their attempts to control the referendum” (Qvortrup 2000), and therefore, accountability potential has been maximized. Table 1 demonstrates the use of the diverse institutions of direct democracy in the region, based on the typology presented in Figure 2. Since the third wave of democracy, Latin Americans have used diverse IDD in 63 cases. In more than 82% of these, the use came from “above,” with the plebiscite being the most common mechanism. Although IDD from below have occurred in several countries, almost 85% of such uses were in a single country (Uruguay, with a 36.7% success). On the other hand, Ecuador is the leader using IDD from “above” and accounting for

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Figure 3. Use of Direct Democracy Institutions in Latin America since 1978

63.5% of the occurrences (with a 60.2% success rate). In Ecuador, presidents tend to use the questionnaire type of plebiscite frequently and it seems that the newly-elected president, Colonel Gutiérrez, has shown his interest also utilizing these mechanisms. For example, in four opportunities Ecuadorians were called to decide upon 33 independent issues. If we compare the use of institutions of direct democracy from “below” with the use of those institutions from “above,” we find that the number of popular initiatives and referendums shows a positive but still moderate trend during the third wave of democratization in Latin America (see Figure 3). Accountability might be improved by developing instances in which citizens can participate in public debates and in the decision-making process beyond the election of government representatives every four or five years, which, as Przeworski et al assert, “constitute[s] a weak tool of popular control” (1999). In this regard, direct democracy mechanisms “from below” offer unique opportunities to challenge the status-quo and to check the government and its elected officials. However, as was discussed, the use of direct democracy has been criticized because some scholars and politi-

cians believe that citizens lack all the information needed to make decisions concerning complex political issues. E-Government could be used as an extremely powerful tool to minimize these information costs and, in turn, to develop new accountability mechanisms.8 While it is certainly important to analyze the role of the government as a key provider of information to the citizens, it is critical to assess how the citizenship could use such information to strengthen accountability. Before evaluating whether it is possible to use e-government mechanisms to address these issues, we need to know first if the minimum conditions necessary for achieving this goal, such as computer and Internet access and literacy rates, are met. Failing to do so might prevent us from acknowledging that e-government could simply be an additional resource for perpetuating the power of the already powerful people or, more specifically, increasing the digital gap.

Prospects for E-Government in Latin America

II. E-GOVERNMENT As happens with the concept of “direct democracy,” there is confusion regarding the concept of e-government. Defined broadly, “e-government is the use of ICT-information and communication technologies-to promote more efficient and effective government, facilitate more accessible government services, allow greater public access to information, and make government more accountable to citizens” (Working Group on EGovernment in the Developing World 2002: 1).9 E-government involves information and services not only within the realm of government (G2G), but also towards citizens and businesses (G2C and G2B respectively). From this perspective, e-government is a tool that could have a positive effect on horizontal and social accountability. The Working Group on E-Government warns us that “e-government in the developing world must accommodate certain unique conditions, needs and obstacles. These may include a continuing oral tradition, lack of infrastructure, corruption, weak educational systems and

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unequal access to technology” (2002). So, what about the status of these conditions in Latin America? Table 2 compares indicators of human development in 18 countries with which we are concerned. Based on the Human Development Index, the Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay) along with Costa Rica are the more developed countries in the region. On the contrary, the cluster composed of Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador is the least developed. Additionally, Table 3 presents other equally important indicators for the prospect of extending E-Government in the region: telecommunications (telephone lines, wireless communications, Internet hosts and users, and PCs). There is consensus that certain pre-requisites are necessary but not sufficient conditions for fostering e-government. In order to assess the potentiality of extending e-government through the region I have created an Index of Potentiality for the Use of E-government (IPEG). This is an index of four indicators that theoretically are crucial for fostering e-government. The IPEG is the average of the education index (which is based on adult literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary,

Table 2. Comparative Indicators on Human Development in Latin America

Argentina Chile Uruguay Costa Rica Mexico Panama Colombia Venezuela Brazil Peru Paraguay Ecuador Dominican Rep. El Salvador Bolivia Honduras Nicaragua Guatemala

IDH World Rank

Life expectancy (at birth, in years)

Adult Literacy Rate (% age 15 and above)

34 38 40 43 54 57 68 69 73 82 90 93 94 104 114 116 118 120

73.4 75.3 74.4 76.4 72.6 74.0 71.2 72.9 67.7 68.8 70.1 70.0 67.1 69.7 62.4 65.7 68.4 64.8

96.8 95.8 97.7 95.6 91.4 91.9 91.7 92.6 85.2 89.9 93.3 91.6 83.6 78.7 85.5 74.6 66.5 68.6

Source: ECLAC (2001), United Nations Development Programme (2002).

Combined primary, Urbanization secondary and (Source: tertiary gross ECLAC enrolment 2000) ratio (%) 83 78 79 67 71 74 73 65 80 80 64 77 72 63 70 61 63 49

89.6 85.7 92.6 50.4 75.4 57.6 74.5 87.4 79.9 72.3 56.1 62.7 60.2 55.2 64.6 48.2 55.3 39.4

GDP per capita (PPP US$)

Human Development Index (HDI) Value

12,377 9,417 9,035 8,650 9,023 6,000 6,248 5,794 7,625 4,799 4,426 3,203 6,033 4,497 2,424 2,453 2,366 3,821

0.844 0.831 0.831 0.820 0.796 0.787 0.772 0.770 0.757 0.747 0.740 0.732 0.727 0.706 0.653 0.638 0.635 0.631

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Table 3. Comparative Indicators on Telecommunications in Latin America (2001)

Chile Uruguay Argentina Brazil Venezuela Panama Mexico Costa Rica Dominican Rep. Paraguay Colombia El Salvador Ecuador Guatemala Bolivia Peru Honduras Nicaragua

Total Telephone Subscribers per 100

Main Telephone Lines per 100 Inhabitants

Cellular Mobile Subscribersper 100 Inhabitants

Internet Hosts Total

Internet Hosts per 10,000 Inhabitants

Estimated PC per 100 Inhabitants

Internet Users per 10,000 Inhabitants

57.92 43.76 40.24 38.51 37.55 35.53 35.40 30.54 25.67 25.52 24.68 21.84 17.04 16.17 15.21 13.67 8.33 4.90

23.90 28.29 21.63 21.78 11.20 14.83 13.72 22.97 11.02 5.12 17.05 9.34 10.37 6.47 6.22 7.75 4.71 3.12

34.02 15.47 18.61 16.73 26.35 20.70 21.68 18.80 56.00 20.40 7.63 13.50 6.67 9.70 8.99 5.92 3.61 2.99

122,727 70,892 465,359 1,644,575 22,614 7,825 918,288 8,551 41,761 2,704 57,419 510 3,383 6,630 1,522 13,504 322 2,194

79.20 210.93 124.14 95.71 9.18 26.99 91.49 20.79 48.17 4.80 13.41 0.80 2.63 5.67 1.84 5.18 0.49 4.20

8.39 11.01 5.34 6.29 5.28 3.79 6.87 17.02 ... 1.42 4.21 2.19 2.33 1.28 2.05 4.79 1.22 0.96

2001.99 1190.12 800.28 465.58 527.77 317.01 362.23 933.63 214.53 106.44 269.61 79.67 254.43 171.13 146.19 1149.73 61.68 98.54

Source: International Telecommunications Union, at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/

and tertiary gross enrollment ratio); main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants; estimated PC per 100 inhabitants; and Internet users per 100 inhabitants. The higher the IPEG the easier it would be to implement e-government steps. Until now we have discussed E-Government Potential without considering the actual extent of its current use. Thankfully, there are good and available data on this topic provided by Darrell West (2002) and his team from the Center of Public Policy of Brown University. West constructs a 0-100 point E-government index and applies it to each nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s websites based on: the availability of contact information, publications, databases, portals, and number of online services. Four points were awarded to each website for the presence of each of the following features: phone contact information, addresses, publications, databases, links to other sites, audio clips, video clips, foreign language access, not having ads, not having premium fees, not having restricted areas, not having user fees, disability access, having privacy policies, security policies, having a portal connection, allowing digital signatures on transactions, an option to pay via credit cards, email contact information, search

capabilities, areas to post comments, broadcasts of events, option for email updates, and option for website personalization. These features provided a maximum of 96 points for particular websites. Each site then qualified for a bonus of four points based on the number of online services executable on that site (1 point for one service, two points for two services, three points for three services, and four points for four or more services) (2002: 12).

As seen in Table 4, Latin America shows wide variation in the use of E-Government (from 60% in Chile, which today is the fifth country in the world in terms of E-government use, to 32% in Bolivia, Nicaragua and Uruguay, all of which rank 74 in the world). The following table shows the percentage of websites in each country that has features, such as online services, publications, databases, privacy policies, security policies, and disability accessibility. Figure 4 shows two maps of Latin America. In the one on the left, each country is shaded based on its potential use of E-Government; the darker a country appears, the more potential it has. In the one on the right the shade reflects the current extent of the use of e-government based on Darrell 2002.

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Table 4. Latin American Countries E-Government Extent (2002): Selected Indicators EWorld Rank Government (Over 84 (%) positions) Chile Mexico Colombia Venezuela Ecuador El Salvador Argentina Brazil Costa Rica Dominican Rep Paraguay Panama Guatemala Honduras Peru Bolivia Nicaragua Uruguay

60.00 52.00 48.00 48.00 47.00 47.00 41.80 41.80 40.70 40.00 40.00 39.50 38.70 36.00 36.00 32.00 32.00 32.00

5.00 12.00 22.00 22.00 27.00 27.00 45.00 45.00 53.00 56.00 56.00 57.00 59.00 66.00 66.00 74.00 74.00 74.00

Online Services

Publications

Data-bases

Security Policy

Disability Accessibility

100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.00 7.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 75.00 100.00 77.00 69.00 93.00 100.00 100.00 63.00 58.00 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 92.00 31.00 57.00 100.00 100.00 75.00 67.00 50.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.00 7.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00

0 0 0 100 75 13 31 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0

Source: West, Darell M. 2002. Global E-Government, 2002. Providence: Center for Public Policy, Brown University.

Figure 4. Potential for the Use of E-Government in Latin America and Its actual Extent

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Table 5. E-Government Ratings by Region Africa Central America Asia Western Europe Middle East South America Pacific Ocean Islands Russia/Central Asia North America Eastern Europe

2001

2002

Growth (%)

23.5 27.7 34 34.1 31.1 30.7 30.6 30.9 51 n.a.

36.8 41.4 48.7 47.6 43.2 42 39.5 37.2 60.4 43.5

56.59 49.45 43.23 39.58 38.9 36.8 29.08 20.38 18.43 n.a.

Source: West, Darell M. 2002. Global E-Government, 2002. Providence: Center for Public Policy, Brown University.

Figure 5. Potential and Actual Use of E-Government

In a comparative regional perspective, Latin America varies considerably in terms of e-government growth. While Central America shows the second highest growth in regional terms in the world, South America falls somewhere below world average. In terms of egovernment rating by 2002, Latin America presents lower performance than the world average (44.03), (see Table 5). One would expect that the higher the IPEG potential for the use of E-government, the higher the use of egovernment. Nonetheless, observing the relationship between Figure 4, the potential for E-government, and

Table 4, the actual use of e-government, one of the most interesting aspects is the lack of a clear pattern between both variables (See Figure 5). Figure five is divided into four quadrants given by the average regional terms in each dimension. While there are clear cases in which countries perform as expected, i.e. fall into the upperright or lower-left quadrant, such as Chile or Nicaragua, others do not. Uruguay and El Salvador do not behave as expected: Uruguay has the highest potential in the region but is still the country, with Nicaragua and Bolivia, with the lowest e-government extent. On the other hand, El Salvador is located in the upper-left quad-

Prospects for E-Government in Latin America

rant of the figure performing better than expected. In other words, Uruguay is an underachiever in terms of the extent of e-government and El Salvador is an overachiever.

III. EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN POTENTIAL AND ACTUAL USE OF E-GOVERNMENT What are the factors that explain the relationship between the potential for and the actual extent on the use of e-government in Latin America? Very few studies integrate diverse disciplines in the explanation. Nonetheless, La Porte, Demchak, and De Jong test eight hypotheses worldwide to check for web site openness: national income, central government expenditures, integration with the world economy, science-research-education, computer and Internet hosts, cultural values, democracy, and legal system (2002). They claim that overall, “only those hypotheses relating to national income or wealth have a bearing on openness in both OECD and non-OECD countries, either directly or via computer ownership” (La Porte, Demchak, and Jong 2002: 431). Although there is a similar tendency in Latin America, where the wealthiest countries tend to perform better in the extent of e-government, there are several cases that do not fit this prediction. The previous examples of Uruguay and El Salvador, once again, depict this situation very well. A second type of explanation for e-government extent has to do with political variables. Most scholars agree that political will is a critical variable in the prospects of e-government in any country and I do not question this. However, how can we account for political will? To answer this question it might be useful to briefly review the literature on legislators’ behavior. This literature assumes that the foremost goal of every elected official is to be reelected. 10 In other words, politicians are maximizers of votes. As such, their policy choices are, more often than not, shaped by their constituencies’ preferences. Unfortunately, in the case of Latin America, we do not have the necessary data to assess the citizenry’s preferences in terms of e-government. However, fortunately, the Latinobarometro provides public opinion data on satisfaction with democracy and inter-personal trust for 17 Latin American nations. These two variables allow us to assess the level of citizens’ satisfaction with the status quo. Taking

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insights from the literature on legislators’ behavior, one could hypothesize that as long as citizens are satisfied with the political status quo, politicians will have little or no incentive to alter it. Since 1995 the Latinobarómetro has conducted annual polls in 17 Latin American countries taking into consideration, among other things, satisfaction with democracy and the degree of inter-personal trust (Lagos 2001; Latinobarómetro 2002). My hypothesis, therefore, is that the more satisfaction with the regime and interpersonal trust, the less incentives politicians will have to promote a change. In other words, the lower the satisfaction with how democracy performs in a given country, the more incentives political leaders have to embrace egovernment. I am not claiming that these predictions hold universally. On the contrary, I would say that this theory works in “material societies,” such as Latin America, and not for “post-material societies,” such as those of OECD countries.11 In other words, when the economic resources allocated for public policy are extremely scarce, the incentives for introducing new issues in the budget are less than when economic resources are relatively available for incorporating new policy areas. Therefore, we need to be remarkably cautious regarding the generalizability of these hypotheses for nations at a higher level of economic development. Crossing these variables (satisfaction with democracy and degree of inter-personal trust) with the use of egovernment gives us illuminating information. Figures 6 and 7 plot each of the Latinobarómetro variables with the extent of E-Government in Latin America. Instantly, there is a common denominator among the two plots: the more citizens are satisfied with democracy and have more inter-personal trust, the lower the extent of e-government in each country. But the impact of IPT on E-government is not theoretically straightforward. One the one hand it might be that the more interpersonal trust there is in a society, the less need for a-personal services, i.e. e-government. On the other hand, the more IPT there is, the less reticence people might have about engaging in e-government activities. I ran a time series regression with Extent of EGovernment as the dependent variable. The model had as independent variables satisfaction with democracy, inter-personal trust, and e-government potential. The empirical findings displayed below fit my theoretical expectations. The overall model performs satisfactorily and has an overall r-square of 0.45. Two of the three independent variables, satisfaction with democracy and

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Figure 6. E-Government and Inter-Personal Trust

Figure 7. E-Government and Satisfaction with Democracy

e-government potential, are statistically different from zero and have the anticipated signs. Nonetheless, IPT did not come statistically different from zero. So, it is impossible to assess whether its negative sign has any statistical meaning. Of course, we must take into consideration that the low number of cases involved in the

study (n=34) hinder us from doing strong statistical inferences. Even taking into consideration the weaknesses of the model displayed below, the empirical evidence backs up the hypotheses of this study. The larger the egovernment potential a country has, the more use of egovernment it is going to have, ceteris paribus. In the

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Table 7. Time-Series Regression Analysis Satisfaction with Democracy Inter-Personal Trust IPEG (Index of Potential Use of E-Government) Constant R2 Within R2 Between R2 Overall Wald chi2(4) Observations Number of Groups (Countries) Prob > chi2

Coef.

(Standard Errors)

-.333*** -.009 .934*** 23.137***

(0.083) (0.171) (0.231) (5.928)

0.601 0.450 0.456 25.22 34 17 0.0000

***p>.001. Dependent Variable: Extent of E-Government (West 2002)

same line of argument, the higher the satisfaction with democracy, the lower the use of e-government.

IV. FINAL REMARKS This paper claims that at the turn of the century one of the most relevant problems Latin American democracies are facing is the low degree of accountability. One of the multiple solutions to this problem is the inclusion of civil society in the governing process not only as a veto player but also as a proactive member of decisionmaking through institutions of direct democracy from below, i.e. referendums, recall, or popular initiatives. Post-transitional Latin American constitutions are moving in this direction of allowing such institutions of direct democracy. Although popular consults and recalls may increase the popular control or social accountability over governments, “we must examine the dangers that they might produce for the coherence of public policies and individual rights,” as Przeworski argues (2002: 82). Moreover, strong arguments have been put forward in terms of the information problem associated with direct democracy. In an everyday more complex world, citizens have trouble gathering enough information to decide responsibly on complicated issues. E-government offers a unique opportunity to solve, at least partially, the information problem. Granting access to information and services, e-government allows citizens to be more acquainted with and control more the governing process. In order to assess the potentiality of extending e-government I have created an Index of Potentiality for the

use of E-Government. This index is constructed through the combination of diverse variables (education index, main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants; estimated PC per 100 inhabitants; and Internet users per 100 inhabitants). It is then compared with the actual use of e-government in the region (data came from West et al 2002). Other things being equal, the larger the IPEG a country has, the more use of e-government it is going to have. Nonetheless, the higher the satisfaction with democracy, the lower the use of e-government. The theoretical claim that explains this relationship comes from the hypothesis that countries where citizens are more satisfied with their democracy and have high degrees of interpersonal trust have a higher potentiality for using e-government. In consequence, the political will—a critical variable pointed out by the e-government literature—is not strong enough to develop e-government. In other words, politicians lack enough incentives to alter the status quo. Why should they change if most people are basically satisfied with the state of affairs? The statistical analysis suggests that countries with high level of satisfaction with democracy are where egovernment is less likely to develop. At this point it would be extremely interesting to study whether the introduction of e-government has positive effects on satisfaction with democracy and democratic accountability, but this is an open question so far. Theories of e-government must be tested on both a general and a country-bycountry basis. Therefore, this study only partially illuminates the prospects of e-government; additional research is needed before more definite conclusions can be drawn.

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NOTES * A previous version of this paper was presented at the International Conference on E-Government and E-Policy: Past, Present and Future, organized by the Global ePolicy and eGovernment Institute, Sungkyungkwan University, and the UN -ESCAP, at the Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, Korea (November 6-7, 2002). This paper would have been impossible without the help of Rossana Castiglioni. I also thank Andrew Gould, Lynne Hinojosa, David Kelleher, Gerardo Munck, Robert Schwartz, Pablo Valenti, and Phil Kwon for their comments; all the caveats apply. 1. Delegative democracies rest on the premise that “whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office,” O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1994. “Delegative Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 5 (1): 55-69. 2. This paper deals with cases in which organized citizens have proposed an alteration of the status quo. This analysis of DDD is centered on these institutional tools when used at the national level and when citizens participate posing their opinions through the ballot box during the third wave of democratization. Therefore, I leave aside all the institutional products of the new fashionable decentralization wave, even when citizens had the right to directly influence politics such as in the Bolivian Organi zaciones Territoriales de Base or in the Colombian municipalities. Also, I do not consider the institutions of direct democracy used during authoritarian regimes (Ecuador 1978, Uruguay 1980, Panama 1983, Chile 1980 and 1989) even if some of them were key in the transition to democracy. 3. In this sense, the Italian experience could be considered the clearest example of bypassing the representative structures of the country through referendums and popular initiatives. They are also “symptomatic of a more general crisis of representative democracy and the resurgent ideas of direct democracy,” Uleri, Pier Vincenzo. 1996. “Italy: Referendums and Initiatives from the Origins to the Crisis of a Democratic Regime.” Pp. 106-125 in The Referendum Experience in Europe, edited by M. Gallagher and P. V. Uleri. London: Macmillan. 4. For a good treatment of the effect of information on voting behavior regarding direct legislation see Gerber, Elisabeth and Arthur Lupia. 1995. “Campaign Competition and Policy Responsiveness in Direct Legislation Elections.” Political Behaviour 17:287-306., Gerber, Elisabeth R. 1999. The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation. Princeton: Princeton University Press., Lupia, Arthur. 1994. “The Effect of Information on Voting Behavior and Electoral Outcomes: An Experimental Study of Direct Legislation.” Public

Choice 78: 65-86., Lupia, Arthur and Mathew McCubbins. 1998. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn what they Need to Know? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A veto player is, in the words of Tsevelis, “an individual or collective actor whose agreement is required for a change of the status quo,” Tsebelis, George. 1995. “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism.” British Journal of Political Science 25: 289325. National elections are considered the vertical mechanism of accountability par-excellence. The “non-electoral” leg of the definition of social accountability separates the national elections of representatives with other accountability mechanisms used once representatives are elected. Plebiscites are “votes on issues implemented from above by a government, without support from or influence of the citizens. Plebiscites have nothing to do with initiatives and referendums; on the contrary, they are often used by governments who want to get a special legitimacy on their policies by bypassing existing laws and constitutional rules,” Gross, Andreas and Bruno Kaufmann. 2002. IRI Europe Country Index on Citizenlawmaking 2002: A Report on Design and Rating of the I&R Requirements and Practices of 32 European States. Amsterdam: IRI Europe. For an excellent discussion of the impact of e-government on democratic theory see Bishop, Patrick, John Kane, and Haig Patapan. 2002. “E-Democracy: Technological Challenges to Democratic Theory.” in Interna tional Conference on E-Government and E-Policy: Past, Present and Future. Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, Korea. Backus differentiates between e-government and edemocracy. For him: “e-democracy refers to the processes and structures that encompass all forms of electronic interaction between Government (elected) and the Citizen (electorate).” On the other hand, “e-government is a form of e-business in governance and refers to the processes and structures pertinent to the delivery of electronic services to the public (citizens and businesses), collaborating with business partners and conducting electronic transactions within an organizational entity,” Backus, Michiel. 2001. “E-Governance in Developing Countries.” IICD Research Brief 1: http://www.iicd.org/base/show_ news?sc=205&id=1634. Carlos Osorio proposes as the definition of e-government the “actions taken towards achieving public ends by digital means” Osorio, Carlos A. 2002. “Public Ends by Digital Means: Some Thoughts on E-Government and the Creation of Public Value.” NSF Digital Government Workshop: White Paper. In this way, he claims, “we are able to differentiate between

Prospects for E-Government in Latin America

those projects that are not necessarily oriented to create public value from those that are, and helping understand when there is scope and depth of action for public and private organizations,” Osorio, Carlos A. 2002. “Public Ends by Digital Means: Some Thoughts on E-Government and the Creation of Public Value.” NSF Digital Government Workshop: White Paper. 10. One of the simplest and strongest assumptions within the literature that deals with legislatures and legislators’ behavior is Mayhew’s assumption that, when permitted, Congressmen are interested in nothing but being reelected, and it is this main and indisputable motivation which generates predictable behavior patterns, Arnold, Douglas R. 1979. Congress and Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influ ence: Yale University Press, Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina. 1987. The Personal Vote: Con stituency Service and Electoral Independence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Katz, Richard S. 1980. A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, Mayhew, David. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press, Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1991. Political Parties and the Winning of Office. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 11. For a discussion of material and post-material societies see Inglehart, Ronald. 1984. “The Changing Structure of Political Cleveages in Western Society.” pp. 24-69 in Electoral Change in Advenced Industrial Democracies: Realigment or Dealigment?, edited by R. Dalton, S. Flanagan, and P. A. Beck. Princeton: Princeton University Press, -. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Soci eties. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

REFERENCES Altman, David. 2002. “Popular Initiatives in Uruguay: Confidence Votes on Government or Political Loyalties?” Electoral Studies 21: 617-630. Araos, Maria Raquel and Eduardo Engel. 1989. “Desempleo, Votación Histórica y el Plebiscito de 1988.” Estudios CIEPLAN 27: 5-17. Arnold, Douglas R. 1979. Congress and Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influence. Yale University Press. Backus, Michiel. 2001. “E-Governance in Developing Countries.” IICD Research Brief, 1: http://www. iicd.org/base/show_news?sc=205&id=1634. Barczak, Monica. 2001. “Representation by Consultation? The Rise of Direct Democracy in Latin America.” Latin American Politics & Society 43: 37-59.

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Bell, A. Derrick Jr. 1978. “The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality.” Washington Law Review 54: 1-29. Bishop, Patrick, John Kane and Haig Patapan. 2002. “E-Democracy: Technological Challenges to Democratic Theory.” In International Conference on E-Government and E-Policy: Past, Present and Future. Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, Korea. Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina. 1987. The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, CEPAL. 2001. Anuario Estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe 2001. Santiago: ECLAC. Gandásegui, Marco A. 1999. “The 1998 Referendum in Panama: A Popular Vote Against Neoliberalism.” Latin American Perspectives 26: 159-168. Gerber, Elisabeth and Arthur Lupia. 1995. “Campaign Competition and Policy Responsiveness in Direct Legislation Elections.” Political Behaviour 17: 287-306. Gerber, Elisabeth R. 1999. The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gross, Andreas and Bruno Kaufmann. 2002. I R I Europe Country Index on Citizenlawmaking 2002: A Report on Design and Rating of the I&R Requirements and Practices of 32 European States. Amsterdam: IRI Europe. Inglehart, Ronald. 1984. “The Changing Structure of Political Cleveages in Western Society.” In Elec toral Change in Advenced Industrial Democra cies: Realigment or Dealigment?, edited by R. Dalton, S. Flanagan, and P. A. Beck, 24-69. Princeton: Princeton University Press. _______. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. International Telecommunitations Union, ITU. 2002. “Statistics.” http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/. Katz, Richard S. 1980. A Theory of Parties and Elec toral Systems. Baltimore: John Hopkins University

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Press. La Porte, Todd, Chris Demchak and Martin De Jong. 2002. “Democracy and Bureacracy in the Age of the Web: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Speculations.” Administration and Society 34: 411-446. Lagos, Marta. 2001. “Between Stability and Crisis in Latin America.” Journal of Democracy 12: 137145. Latinobarómetro. 2002. “Latinobarómetro: Opinión Publica Latinoamericana.” http://www.latinobarometro.org. Lupia, Arthur. 1994. “The Effect of Information on Voting Behavior and Electoral Outcomes: An Experimental Study of Direct Legislation.” Public Choice 78: 65-86. Lupia, Arthur and Mathew McCubbins. 1998. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn what they Need to Know? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mainwaring, Scott. 1999. “Democratic Survivability in Latin America.” Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Working Paper #267.

1988 Chilean Presidential Referendum.” Public Choice 71: 51-59. Pateman, Carole. 1970. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Payne, Mark, Daniel Zovatto, Fernando Carrillo and Andres Allamand. 2002. Democracies in Develop ment: Politics and Reform in Latin America. Washington D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Peruzzotti, Enrique and Catalina Smulovitz. 2002. “Accountability Social: La Otra Cara del Control.” In Controlando la Política: Ciudadanos y Medios en las Nuevas Democracias Latinoamericanas, edited by E. Peruzzotti and C. Smulovitz, 23-52. Buenos Aires: Temas. Przeworski, Adam. 2002. “Accountability Social en América Latina y Más Allá.” In Controlando la Politica: Ciudadanos y Medios en las Nuevas Democracias Latinoamericanas, edited by E. Peruzzotti and C. Smulovitz, 73-85. Buenos Aires: Temas.

Mayhew, David. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Con nection. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Przeworski, Adam, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin. 1999. Democracy, Accountability and Representa tion. New York: Cambridge University Press.

O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1994. “Delegative Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 5(1): 55-69.

Qvortrup, Mads. 2000. “Are Referendums Controlled and Pro-hegemonic?” Political Studies 48: 821-826.

_______. 2001a. “Democracy, Law, and Comparative Politics.” Studies in Comparative International Development 36: 7-36.

Rial, Juan. 2000. “Instituciones de Democracia Directa en America Latina.” National Democratic Institute: www.ndipartidos.org/pdf/gobernando/ democraciadirecta.pdf.

_______. 2001b. “Reflections on Contemporary South American Democracies.” Journal of Latin Ameri can Studies 35: 599-609. _______. 2002. “Acerca de varias Accountabilities y sus Interrelaciones.” In Controlando la Politica: Ciu dadanos y Medios en las Nuevas Democracias Latinoamericanas, edited by E. Peruzzotti and C. Smulovitz, 87-102. Buenos Aires: Temas. Osorio, Carlos A. 2002. “Public Ends by Digital Means: Some Thoughts on E-Government and the Creation of Public Value.” NSF Digital Government Work shop: White Paper. Panzer, John and Ricardo Paredes. 1991. “The Role of Economic Issues in Elections: The Case of the

Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1991. Political Parties and the Winning of Office. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Tsebelis, George. 1995. “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism.” British Journal of Political Science 25: 289-325. _______. Forthcoming. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press. Uleri, Pier Vincenzo. 1996. “Italy: Referendums and Initiatives from the Origins to the Crisis of a Democratic Regime.” In The Referendum Experience in Europe, edited by M. Gallagher and P. V. Uleri,

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106-125. London: Macmillan. United Nations Development Programme, UNDP. 2002. Human Development Report: Deepening Democ racy in a Fragmented World. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. West, Darell M. 2002. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Global E-Government, 2002.â&#x20AC;? in http://www.insidepolitics.org/. Providence: Center for Public Policy, Brown University. Working Group on E-Government in the Developing World, The. 2002. Roadmap for E-Government in the Developing World: 10 Questions E-Govern ment Leaders Should Ask Themselves: Pacific Council on International Policy, The Western Partner of the Council on Foreign Relations.

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David Altman (Ph.D. University of Notre Dame, 2001) is currently Guest Research Assistant Professor at the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies. A native from Montevideo, Uruguay, Altman has been an independent consultant for the United Nations Development Program, the U.S. National Foreign Affairs Institute, and for the Swedish Foreign Affairs Ministry. He works on comparative politics with emphasis on executive-legislative relations in Latin America, quality of democracy, E-Government, democratic institutions, public policy, and governability. His work has appeared in Electoral Studies, Party Politics, Democratization, Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Politica, and Cuadernos del CLAEH. He is a past recipient of a Fulbright-LASPAU fellowship.