Emergent Africa

will likely harm some industries, but it might not be sufficient to attract escape and safeguard action under Article 35(1) and (5) for want of “serious damage to the economy of the importing state.” Once the timetable is established, political will and economic diplomacy will be necessary, but above all, enforcement of compliance, under a rule-based order, will be vital.

This stage is also difficult because of common external tariffs for the regional communities. This is a questionable step for several reasons. Regional common external tariffs are erected against African states that are party to the treaty and are not included in the liberalization timetable. The timetable relates to the creation of regional FTAs and the continental customs union. It is possible, then, for a conflict to arise between the rates agreed upon under the timetable and those adopted as the common external tariff to intra-Africa trade, which would detract from the spirit and purpose of the whole process of economic cooperation and integration under the treaty.

Further, regional common external tariffs are transient, as they will eventually give way to continental common external tariffs. Instead, the liberalization timetables for the RECs should be coordinated so that rates on imports tend toward both the continental FTA and a continental common external tariff right from the second stage.171 In addition, this avoids the duplicative process of creating an FTA and a customs union over separate periods. It is important that RECs do not adopt slower paces of trade liberalization, for varying and unending periods would clog the process of creating the community. The Assembly ought to take this into consideration in complying with mandatory Article 30(3): “During [the second and third stages] the Assembly, on the recommendation of the Council, shall take the necessary measures with a view to coordinating and harmonizing the activities of the RECs relating to the elimination of customs duties among Member States.”

The third stage, then, should end with the creation of a continent-wide FTA through implementation of the trade liberalization timetables. According to Article 31, the third stage should also see elimination of nontariff barriers to trade.

Another reason against regional common external tariffs concerns the general suitability of an effective common external tariff. If the tariff is excessive, its sole function is protectionist, which is undesirable for promoting benefits of reasonable competition. Protectionism against other African economies seems to be at odds with a scheme for economic integration and cooperation. But if a common external tariff is minimal, it could be a revenue-raising facility. If this tariff is collected centrally by a community institution, this method can be administratively convenient for raising revenue for community functions, which will include extensive development planning and implementation or monitoring of the programs. In practice, however, determining a merely nominal rate is hard and subject to political vagaries. Rather, regional common 55