RISF 2014/2

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tion 746 “Insider Trading”, Section 747 “Anti-disruptive practices authority”, Section 748 “Commodity whistleblower incentives and protection”, Section 753 “Antimanipulation authority” and Section 763 “Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934”. However, some of these required to be made into law by the competent authority in order to take eïŹ€ect.(16) For example, such was the case of the “anti-disruptive practices authority” provision whose ïŹnal interpretative guidance came into force on 28 May 2013.(17) American regulators have now passed almost all the necessary regulations in order to implement the above mentioned Sections of Title VII. In concrete terms, those provisions extend SEC’s (already extensive) powers of investigation, prosecution and sanction of market abuses to security-based swap contracts and strengthen signiïŹcantly the CFTC’s powers regarding – but not limited to – other swap contracts (see infra II.A.).

II. A global reinforcement of the ght against market abuses All aspects of the ïŹght against market abuses have been reinforced from the legal deïŹnition of the oïŹ€enses (§ A) to their sanctions (§ C) and from their investigation to their prosecution (§ B).

A. Incrimination of new behaviors Both legislative resolutions on amended proposals of MAD II and MAR were adopted at ïŹrst reading by the European Parliament, respectively by 618 votes to 20, with 43 abstentions and by 659 votes to 20 with 28 abstentions. ose votes look like a real plebiscite for toughening up the ïŹght against market abuse. e reading of the numerous amendments completing the original proposals adopted by the European Parliament conïŹrms this impression. Firstly MAR directly incriminates (many) new behaviors by completing and specifying existing deïŹnitions of market abuse oïŹ€enses provided by MAD and by creating new oïŹ€enses. In particular, Article 6 gives the exact same general deïŹnition of inside information provided by MAD but it develops many important clariïŹcations 16. Sec. 754. EïŹ€ective date. “Unless otherwise provided in this title, the provisions of this subtitle shall take eïŹ€ect on the later of 360 days aer the date of the enactment of this subtitle or, to the extent a provision of this subtitle requires a rulemaking, not less than 60 days aer publication of the ïŹnal rule or regulation implementing such provision of this subtitle.” 17. CFTC, Anti-disruptive Practices Authority, Interpretive guidance and policy statement, Commodity Exchange Act Release No. 3038-AD96, May 20, 2013. 2014/2

regarding the deïŹnition of this concept(18). Article 7 extends and speciïŹes the scope of insider dealing (for example inducing another person to engage in insider dealing falls within the scope) while Article 8 does the same with market manipulation (for instance, it provides a non-exhaustive list of algorithmic trading and high frequency trading strategies, which shall be considered as market manipulation), etc. Finally, Article 9 prohibits any person from engaging or attempting to engage in insider dealing, from recommending that another person engages in insider dealing or induces another person to engage in insider dealing, and from improperly disclosing inside information. Article 10 prohibits any person from engaging in market manipulation or attempting to engage in market manipulation. e prohibition of market abuse attempt is one of the main innovations brought by MAR. Secondly, in addition to ïŹnancial instruments traded on regulated markets, Article 2 of MAR indirectly incriminates new behaviors by extending the scope of antimarket abuse rules to : a) ïŹnancial instruments admitted to trading on a regulated market or for which a request for admission to trading on a regulated market has been made ; b) ïŹnancial instruments traded, admitted to trading or for which a request for admission to trading on a MTF has been made ; c) ïŹnancial instruments traded on an OTF [organized trading facilities created by the new directive on markets in ïŹnancial instruments(19) (“MiFID II”)] ; d) ïŹnancial instruments not covered by points (a) or (b) or (c) the price or value of which depends on or has an eïŹ€ect on the price or value of a ïŹnancial instrument referred to in those points, including, but not limited to, credit default swaps and contracts for diïŹ€erence.” is last provision means that any ïŹnancial instrument traded on a regulated market, on a MTF or on an OTF, as well as any derivative ïŹnancial instrument shall be covered by MAR and MAD II when they are traded OTC. Article 2 of MAR also states that benchmarks are included within the scope of the regulation while Article 3 provides some exemptions – already included in 18. For instance regarding the “precise” nature of inside information, and mainly in reaction to the EADS case in France, Article 6 speciïŹes that : “In this respect in the case of a protracted process intended to bring about, or that results in, a particular circumstance or a particular event, not only may that future circumstance or future event be regarded as precise information, but also the intermediate steps of that process which are connected with bringing about or resulting in that future circumstance or event. An intermediate step in a protracted process can be inside information if, by itself, it satisïŹes the criteria of inside information as referred to in this article.” 19. Amended proposal for a directive on markets in ïŹnancial instruments repealing directive 2004/39/EC (Recast).

Revue internationale des services ïŹnanciers/International review of ïŹnancial services

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Chroniques

IV.A. Intégrité du marché


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