ΑTLAS OF GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS
In some areas next to the Turkish coast, there would be no extension in the territorial waters in order to facilitate navigation. The airspace would be brought into alignment with the new boundaries of the territorial sea. After reaching an agreement with Turkey, Greece would proceed with the unilateral extension of Greek territorial waters. In essence, Greece would renounce any further extension of Greek territorial waters in the future. Turkey seems to have agreed in principle on most of the above points. The then prime minister, deeming that it would be very difficult to pass the required law through Parliament, did not proceed with the completion of the agreement. A second, similarly fruitless effort in the same vein was attempted in 2010-12.
The Turkish resolution on casus belli (June 1995) “The equilibrium in the common Aegean Sea between Turkey and Greece has been established by the Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923. On this date the territorial waters of both countries were defined at three nautical miles […]. ”Greece, on October 8, 1936, extending its territorial waters to six miles, acquired 43.68% of the Aegean. […] While Turkish territorial waters in the Aegean, which extended to six miles in 1964, correspond to about 7% of the Aegean […]. ”Greece has lately made known its desire to extend its territorial sea to 12 miles, making use of certain provisions of the LOS Convention that have essentially been designed for open seas and ocean areas. If this happens, Greece will have under its sovereignty 72% of the Aegean […]. ”It is not possible […] for Turkey to accept that it will conduct its maritime communication in the high seas and oceans through Greek territorial waters. Turkey has vital interests in the Aegean. The Turkish Grand National Assembly, while hoping that the Greek government shall not decide to extend its territorial sea in the Aegean beyond the present 6-mile limit, which in turn would ruin the equilibrium established by the Lausanne Treaty, has decided to grant the Turkish government all powers, including those that may be deemed necessary in the military field, for safeguarding and defending the vital interests of Turkey in such an eventuality. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey has also decided to announce this to the Greek and world public opinion in a spirit of friendship.”
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ii. An assessment of the exploratory talks The exploratory talks began from a correct assumption. Greece must first extend its territorial waters and then refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice. Otherwise, the court will adjudicate the dispute on the basis of the territorial waters being at 6 miles. After its decision is issued, the extension of territorial waters will be rendered meaningless. While the basic assumption is correct, the negotiation contains a structural mistake. It is wrong to negotiate with another state the exercise of a unilateral right. It is different to inform and provide assistance (not only to Turkey, but also to other countries) for international navigation in the Aegean (e.g. leave certain corridors of high seas), and different to negotiate with the aim of seeking Turkey's agreement for the extension of the territorial sea. The purpose of the exploratory talks was to restrict the extension of the territorial sea in certain areas in exchange for an agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf, or recourse to the International Court of Justice. Three questions remain: a. How will it be ensured that Turkey does not raise the issue of “gray areas” during the court proceedings (challenging some of the islands/base points for the measurement of the continental shelf)? b. What will happen with the demilitarization of the islands? c. What will happen to the borders of the Athens FIR or the Search and Rescue Region once Turkey has secured a number of high seas areas in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean? Points (b) and (c) are connected to the situation that would follow a court settlement, when Greece will no longer have leverage in a negotiation. Any decision of Greece not to extend its territorial waters everywhere to 12 miles, but to leave out some areas of high seas, is a move of major importance, which would benefit Turkey in many ways. Therefore, Turkey should provide something equally important in exchange for this important move, connecting it with the sum total of its claims in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. It is irrational to consider that Greece will have lost its main weapon in exchange for the resource of the two states to the ICJ for the delimitation of the continental shelf while leaving all other issues open, the most important being the “gray areas” and the issue of the demilitarization of the Aegean islands.