47
4
The new protective state 62
The three main political parties are resolute: ‘If Britain is to be prepared for emergencies we need to re-establish some form of civil defence organisation’;63 ‘A new approach to security also means improved local resilience against emergencies, building and strengthening local capacity… not the old cold war idea of civil defence but a new form of civil protection’;64 and ‘An incoming Conservative government should establish a dedicated force with a permanent command headquarters to provide assistance as and when requested to the civil authorities in the event of a major terrorist incident or other national emergency’.65 The arguments put forward by each political party are plausible and seductive, but dangerous. Their argument is dangerous because the public’s expectation of a new body with responsibility for civil protection could never realistically be matched by a commitment in financial and human resources from government. It is dangerous because doing so would eventually mean wresting power and responsibility away from citizens at the very moment we need individuals to become more responsible over their own lives and in society more generally. And it is dangerous because the idea of a civil protection force is really a product of political posturing between parties rather than based on strong evidence of the strengths and weaknesses of existing formal and informal organisations. That said, at first glance, the concept is attractive. As Chapter 2 suggested, we live in a brittle society where threats and natural hazards are more frequent and intense than a decade ago. Given this, the absence of an identifiable body which has the capacity to respond to the full gamut of risks, together with evidence that local authorities and the emergency services have been overwhelmed in the past, has led advocates of a new civil defence force to feel their arguments are justified. However, it is also