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POLITICS
GEORGIA TODAY
MAY 25 - 28, 2018
Idealism in Foreign Policy: More of a Myth than Historical Evidence? BY VICTOR KIPIANI
B
y stating in his 1905 inaugural address that ‘to us as a people it has been granted to lay the foundations of our national life in a new continent’, but that ‘we have [both] duties to others and duties to ourselves’, Theodore Roosevelt became the first leader to strongly argue in favor of the extension of international law. He was not, however, solely emphasizing the persuasive force of international law, but also the ‘power… in exceptional cases to stand up for the rights of others’. This newly emergent, idealistic facet of American foreign policy was later expressed by Woodrow Wilson, who proclaimed that the United States had not intervened in the First World War in order to restore the balance of power, but instead to make the world safer for democracy. Yet it still took time and the pain of two world wars for this idealism to become integrated within decision-making on international matters. This introduction is not accidental. Georgia's security is very much anchored to US foreign policy trends; a simple statement of truth, with no disrespect to any other meaningful partners, and so imagine for a second the potential magnitude of the damage which America’s ‘splendid isolation’ could inflict upon the global security system and mutual trust. That said, the key patterns that determine such a policy need to be carefully analyzed.
THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR II: REBIRTH Idealism in foreign policy matters was given a new expression within the Truman Doctrine: in his speech to Congress, Truman stated his conviction that the US must ‘support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.’ The very first demonstration of this Doctrine in action was the Iranian crisis in March 1946, when the US pressured the Soviets to fully withdraw troops from Iran in accordance with the 1943 Tehran Declaration, and to dismantle the communist government in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan. This was followed by US dealings to counter communist influence in Greece and Turkey, while the very pinnacle of the Doctrine was expressed through massive financial aid under the auspices of the Marshall Plan. When considering the Truman Doctrine, it should be underlined that the entrenchment of idealism within it deviated somewhat from the views of George
Kennan. While the latter was advocating for a balance-of-power approach with an emphasis on containing and resisting Soviet domination in key geographical areas (the United States, the United Kingdom, the Rhine valley, the USSR and Japan), whereas Truman himself went beyond Kennan's conceptual boundaries in favor of a more global role for the US as a defender of the world liberal order, fighting against all forms of opposition to freedom, democracy and human rights. Moreover, the underlying principle of idealism under Truman's presidency was not only guaranteeing order in places in which liberalism was already firmly entrenched, but also promoting and advancing it even further; an approach which was in clear conflict with Kennan's preference for the defense of several geopolitically important and selected points or regions of the globe. It should also be mentioned that while Truman's idealism rewarded the pain which Greece and Turkey experienced joining NATO in 1952 and successfully containing the spread of Soviet influence towards Western Europe, the same idealism dramatically failed during the Korean War. There, US efforts at the head of a multinational UN force did not achieve their primary goal of rolling back communism, and instead only succeeded in containing it above the infamous 38th parallel. Yet regardless of its very limited success in Korea, the US continued to maintain an Asian "pivot" by committing itself to defending Taiwan against a possible communist invasion and by intervening in Indochina in support of French efforts to fight insurgency. Once again, all these events were expressions of the idealistic spirit of US foreign policy at the time. The same line of idealism was firmly maintained in Eisenhower’s ‘New Look’ policy, which adopted an even broader definition of a global communist threat. Whilst different in terms of strategy and means, relying as it did upon nuclear deterrence and a greater use of covert operations and military support to local anti-communist movements, Eisenhower's New Look was to avoid ‘losing the free world bit by bit’ by ceding the initiative to the USSR in the long run. America’s Basic National Security Policy (NSC-162/2) was to shape an enduring Cold War and have a strong impact on later foreign policy decisions to counter Soviet expansion through asymmetric (and not always flawless) actions (e.g. the 1954 and 1958 crises in the Taiwan Straits, toppling Mossadeq in Iran, etc.).
SETBACK: SHEER CALCULUS ONLY President Nixon came to power firmly believing in the need to redesign the principles of US foreign policy faced with the new geopolitical realities of the
Image source: indianapublicmedia.org
1970s. These policy goals were given a practical meaning by his trusted adviser Henry Kissinger through the Nixonian policy of Détente, but more importantly this policy deviated from the ‘containment’ vision of the 1950s and 1960s, which was strongly focused upon an ideological opposition to communism by a USled liberal world and rested upon the multipolarity of the international system. In practical terms, the Nixon-Kissinger strategy, shunning the ideological rejection of communism, called for a thaw in relations with the USSR and the construction of a new multipolar security architecture premised on ‘peace through partnership’. Besides, the US administration's vision of American global leadership involved greater reliance upon local allies to maintain the balance of power, and realpolitik power considerations were treated as more important than domestic policies or human rights records. As a clear testament of the shift in US foreign policy at that time was Nixon's Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam, which spelled out a pragmatic, calculating foreign policy which held that ‘any nation today must define its interests with special concern of the interests of others. If some nations define their security in a manner that means insecurity for other nations, then peace is threatened and the security is diminished.’ Accentuating ‘coexistence’ in the spirit of a classical realpolitik attitude to international matters, Nixon’s détente called for ‘patient and precise efforts to reconcile conflicting interests on concrete issues’ and required ‘the definition of positive goals which can be sought and achieved cooperatively.’ For all its oddness and ambiguity, compared to previous ones, Nixon’s administration was more willing to work with allies without due regard for their democratic credentials and with less concern for democratic development, this policy was still somewhat successful thanks to its creative use of various sticks and carrots. Among its few successes were the slowing down of the nuclear arms race with the USSR through the signing of a number of important agreements, and the opening up of China. Fundamentally, however, it was to introduce precisely that chord into US foreign policy which is being strongly reinvented during the Trump era, albeit according to the characteristics of our times.
Ronald Reagan. Two basic documents of the Reagan era, NSDD 32 (US National Security Strategy’) and NSDD 75 (US Relations with the USSR), unequivocally signaled not just a return to Truman's strategic vision of containment, but also went beyond it with the goal of rolling back communism. The underlying premise of the newly proclaimed policy was a reversal of the idealistic vision of the United States as the leader of the free world engaged in a global struggle to fight repressive forces. All in all, Reagan's vision, so well encapsulated in his Westminster Address to the British Parliament in June 1982, when he boldly stated that ‘if the rest of this century is to witness the gradual growth of freedom and democratic ideals, we must take action to assist the campaign for democracy’, appealed to the allies to ‘be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few, but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings’, and announcing ‘a crusade for freedom that will engage the faith and fortitude of the next generation ... for the sake of peace and justice’. The Reagan administration’s idealism was translated into a whole range of practical means which spurred the break-up of the Soviet Bloc and formally ended the Cold War. The follow-up period under presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton could be described as a kind of interim period which witnessed significant disruptions in the consistency of US foreign policy as well as attempts to switch from ad hoc dealing to a more cohesive and strategic approach (e.g. enlargement, assertive multilateralism, ‘armed humanitarianism’). This failure of sorts can also be partly attributed to the US becoming an uncontested global leader, and to the practically unimpeded expansion of free trade and market economies in the new world of ‘liberal hegemony’.
THE END OF THE COLD WAR: RE-EMERGENCE
CHRONICLES OF (DEATH) OF IDEALISM FORETOLD?
The interruption in the use of the principle of idealism as the yardstick for foreign policy making did not last very long, and the Kissingerian premise, referenced in his memoirs, of ‘purging our foreign policy of all sentimentality’ was later reversed by liberal presidents such as Jimmy Carter and, even more vigorously,
First Obama and then Trump's presidency highlight a high water mark different from previous policy lines, especially those which heavily emphasize idealism as the decisive factor. Yet even between those two presidents, a clear distinction remains: although he continued to adhere to the importance of pro-
moting universal principles of representative democracy and human rights, Obama mostly did so in words only and with strong reservations when it came to concrete actions (e.g. warning Assad ‘not to cross red lines’ but then deciding not to punish the Syrian regime when those lines had effectively been crossed). With hindsight, Obama's administration was from the very beginning dominated by the concern to ‘avoid another Iraq’, and in practice resulted in eschewing America’s post-World War Two mission as the guarantor of global security. The Trump administration paid this strategy of ‘retrenchment’ and ‘leading from behind’ even greater attention, and a nationalistic ‘America First’ policy poses serious challenges to the international security architecture, which is now practically hanging by a thread. Moreover, it is worth noting that, to put it mildly, the Trump administration’s ad hoc policies and improvisation, which overtly and unabashedly engage in trade-offs, appear to shun those very principles that the free liberal order was meant to rest upon.
HOW ARE WE TO RESPOND? By breathing new life into Georgia’s somewhat obsolete ways of addressing foreign policy concerns. We are historically famous for our proclivity to ideals and idealistic developments around us, yet whilst ideals should of course remain, seeing the world through the lens of idealism does more harm than good. Instead, a bias towards less conformist thinking that would result in a greater transactionality of action would be of real use. The lessons that can be learned from developments around the world tell us that any lack of ability to think and act ‘outside the box’ leads to the ossification of policy. Such an ossification is eminently perilous and threatens to engender national security risks. Appreciating the challenges ahead requires a maturity of thought among the rank and file as well as true leadership skills in terms of political stewardship (and not a mere ‘checks and balances’ approach to power). Idealism, as a policy factor, is seemingly approaching its end: it is high time for us to recognize this fact, and to change the lens we have become used to looking through when dealing with the world around us.
The Customs Headache awaiting the Swiss OP-ED BY ZAZA JGARKAVA
W
hile the people debated on who, where and when to celebrate May 17 in Tbilisi, whether those fighting against homophobia should head to Rustaveli Avenue or those protecting the holiness of the family in the churches, the Swiss SGS company started to monitor the RussoGeorgian border. Finally, Russia signed the agreement about control of the “trade corridor,” thus giving a green light to the new transit order in the South Caucasus. Georgia signed said agreement six months prior to this, so why did the Kremlin finally make up its mind now? Three years after the August War, in November 2011, Russia and Georgia signed
the agreement about customs monitoring at the borders, which concerned three trading corridors: Adleri-Zugdidi, NariGori and Zemo Larsi-Kazbegi. This was the tribute that Russia paid in return for Georgia’s agreement that allowed them to become members of the World Trade Organization. About seven years have passed in which Tbilisi and Moscow have read between the lines differently. Tbilisi believed that by signing the agreement, Russia recognized Georgian borders, because the document never stated names like ‘South Ossetia’ or ‘Abkhazia’ and was itself named “The Agreement Between the Government of Russia and the Government of Georgia,” while Moscow argued that it was Georgia that had recognized its borders by Enguri and Gori, because these locations are described in the document in geographic terms of "latitude" and "longitude" instead of their names. So what kept the Russians waiting?
The development of events shows that it was in the same period when Tbilisi and Swiss SGS made an agreement last year, that the so-called customs offices of the occupied territories started operating within the Russian customs system. This meant that according to the Kremlin documents, the Russian customs border begins not at Psou or the Roki Tunnel, but by the River Enguri and Ergneti village. Russian customs manipulations do not fall under any logic. Even if this combination were correct, it is still confusing why the Swiss monitors should be standing at the Northern exit of the Roki Tunnel or the River Psou and why they should give data about monitored cargo to the integrated database of the WTO, which will be sent to Official Tbilisi. In international political language this means indirect recognition of Georgia’s legitimacy to have information about what cargo is moving between Russia and
Georgia’s occupied territories. Kremlin’s imagination is truly boundless, but what they don’t get, or perhaps do not want to realize in Moscow, is well-known and apparent to those living in the occupied territories. The defacto leaders argue that not a single fly can get into the territories without their consent. “Someone must provide for the safety of cargo, transport and those people who are carrying the goods. Georgia cannot do this on our territory, nor can Russia do so because South Ossetia controls its own land,” said the “former Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Ossetia,” Davit Sanakoev. “Therefore,” he went on, “South Ossetia should be participating as a party in this agreement – this is logical in light of the said issues.” Sokhumi’s position is similar and local political analysts believe that Russia will face difficulties using the Abkhazian territory for transit. Izida Chania of
Ekho Moskvy wrote: “They can call Abkhazia a corridor, or a porch, but the prerequisite won’t be the dreams written in the agreement, but the polite treatment of friends and even ill-wishers. Otherwise, the Swiss company will have to monitor the flow of cargo from territory beyond Abkhazia: it will be hard to maintain the work of the ‘chips,’ if the Russian army dislocated in Abkhazia and Russia don’t turn from allies into prison guards.” Neither Tskhinvali nor Sokhumi are planning to let the goods over the border without negotiating first that Tbilisi and Moscow sign an agreement specifically with them as an “independent state”. Great headaches await the Kremlin regarding these “trade corridors” if it really wants to realize the agreement that it signed with the Swiss SGS on May 18. Otherwise, this document too will be just plain paper, like many others that the Kremlin has signed before.