6
POLITICS
GEORGIA TODAY
JULY 19 - 22, 2019
Iran-US Tensions Are Unlikely to Spill into War OP-ED BY EMIL AVDALIANI
T
o the south of Georgia trouble is brewing as Iran and the US (and its allies) are almost openly engaged in a military competition around the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. True, Georgia does not share a border with Iran, but its close economic and cultural relations with Tehran might be further endangered. It is unlikely that the US will tolerate Georgia’s neutral position in a potential conflict between the two states. Therefore, the Georgian government will find itself in a difficult position but will most likely act according to wider US interests in the South Caucasus. Even if a military conflict does not ensue (as explained below), Georgian-Iranian relations will take a hit. The US recently announced plans to set up a multinational military coalition to protect the waters around Iran and Yemen, particularly commercial routes where about $554 billion worth of trade, mainly oil and gas, passes through the Straits of Hormuz each year. The military confrontation between Iran and the US could cause disruption, costing the biggest trader, Saudi Arabia, $3.5 billion a week, but also negatively impacting many Asian shippers.
This comes on top of what happened last month when Iran came close to war with the US after Tehran’s unprecedented decision to shoot-down a US drone with a surface-to-air missile. Back then, the US officials, including President Donald Trump, said that this could trigger retaliatory strikes. According to various sources, Trump green-lighted a limited air-strike against Iran’s surface military capabilities but cancelled the decision some minutes later when fighters were in the air. The root of Iranian-American tensions lies in the differences regarding Tehran’s nuclear program. Washington abandoned the nuclear agreement the world powers reached in 2015 and Iran recently announced it has reached a high level of uranium production. The tensions, as said above, induced the US and its allies, primarily in the Persian Gulf, to create a coalition. This is a very good example of what kind of future naval coalitions the US will be able to muster to prevent a certain group of countries from controlling vital economic choke points such as the Strait of Hormuz or the Strait of Malacca in Asia. But this also raised an alarm among politicians and the world’s analytical community that we might see a military confrontation between the US (and its allies) and Iran. First, it should be emphasized that Iranians understand well that a military confrontation would be deadly
Image source: inhomelandsecurity.com
for the country’s economy, leading to potential unrest in various regions. Second, a military confrontation with the US is simply beyond the Iranian resource base. However, it is also true that the US does not want to engage Iran as the latter is a completely different story from what the American forces did during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. And it is not about Iran’s far superior military capabilities than those of Iraq: the major difference lies in geographic factors.
A look at the map shows that Iran’s major population centers are surrounded by almost impregnable mountains and deserts as well as water barriers. In the west and northwest are the Zagros Mountains, which bar Iran from Iraq. In the north, the Elburz Mountains as well as Armenia’s mountainous lands serve as a defensive shield. The Caspian Sea to the north and the Arabian Sea to the south are yet more impregnable barriers. To the east and northeast lie the
harsh climate of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Turkmenistan’s semi-barren steppelands keep Iran’s provinces more or less safe (barring occasional attacks by nomadic peoples). The fact of being both geographically contained and geographically defended has defined the Iranian grand strategy from the ancient Persian empires to modern Iran. The country’s mountains and deserts have made it almost impossible to conquer and then keep under control. Consider, for example, several of history’s greatest conquerors. The Mongols and, later Tamerlane successfully invaded the Iranian plateau, but to keep it, they either had to deploy tens of thousands of troops (which they were unable to do) or co-opt the local population (which they did) by allowing them to participate in the country’s governance. The same goes for Alexander the Great, Iran’s most successful conqueror. Following his conquest of the land, he co-opted the local elites to hold onto the state – and after he died, Iran quickly regained its independence. Iran and the US want to avoid a direct military clash, but also do not want to lose their face among their respective allies. Still, the attempts to diminish tensions between the two powers become less and less effective as Iran grows its nuclear-related capabilities and the US sees less and less room to entice Tehran into a mutually beneficial understanding.
What Are Moscow's Preconditions for Abolishing a Ban on Flights with Georgia? Continued from page 3 “We hope that the Georgian authorities will be able to stabilize the socio-political situation in the country and eliminate the existing threats to the security of Russians. If this happens, the necessary conditions will be created to consider the possibility of abolishing the precautionary measures taken by Russia, including the ban on air transportation to Georgia. We want to be friends and cooperate for the benefit of the citizens of Russia and Georgia.” Earlier this month, Lavrov also said Moscow suspects that Washington is trying to inhibit Russia and Georgia from
normalizing their ties. Georgian journalists asked the founder and Chair of the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party, Bidzina Ivanishvili to comment on Lavrov’s statements. “What happened in Rustavi 2 is a shame not only for that TV company but for our whole country and our culture and identity… Of course I condemn Gabunia’s action and it was judged by the whole of Georgian society,” Ivanishvili said. He did not comment on Lavrov’s other statements. A number of Georgian opposition parties claim the ruling party and Kremlin have a similar narrative in demanding a proper response to Rustavi 2 and stabi-
lizing the socio-political situation in Georgia. Khatia Dekanoidze, member of the United National Movement, which is often linked with Rustavi 2, says that Moscow directly tasked Georgia to attack the pro-western opposition and silence TV station Rustavi 2. “Lavrov’s statements see an interference in the domestic affairs of Georgia. The government should give him a proper response,” she said. Opposition European Georgia also believes that Lavrov’s statements are synchronized with the Georgian government’s comments. “For both the Georgian government and Moscow, it is important to silence all free
channels where Georgian society freely expresses its position. Their position is also similar regarding Rustavi 2,” party MP Zurab Chiaberashvili said. Head of the National-Democratic party in Georgia, Bachuki Kardava, says the Kremlin’s target at present is Rustavi 2, pro-western opposition and anti-occupation rally participants of Georgian society. “Lavrov believes his ally in Georgia is Ivanishvili and his government. The authorities have become the puppets of the Kremlin,” Kardava stressed. Large-scale anti-Russian protests were launched in Tbilisi on June 20 on the visit of Russian parliamentarians. The dem-
onstrations were sparked by a session of the General Assembly of the International Assembly on Orthodoxy (IAO). Following the approved protocol, Head of the Russian delegation, State Duma MP Sergey Gavrilov, who is the IAO president, took the Speaker’s seat in the Georgian parliament. Outraged by this action, the Georgian opposition disrupted the event and outside protests ended in an attempt to break into the parliament building. The Russian MPs had to leave the country and the assembly was wrapped up. On June 21, 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree banning Russian airlines from flying to Georgia which took effect on July 8.
On Some Issues of the History of Georgia Continued from page 4 National youth, for example, deprived of their native language. Until last year, in North Ossetia there was in fact not a single school with the Ossetian language of education.” (Pravda newspaper, 1989, 11 – XI). No comments. Against the historical truth goes the allegation by the secessionists that Georgia, or even only Western Georgia, was ever part of Abkhazia. The history falsifiers argue allegedly that in the 70s of the seventh century, Leon II, Prince of Abkhazia, who at last broke free from Byzantine rule, declared himself the King of Abkhazia and shifted the capital from Anakophia to Kutaisi. In reality, at that time, as well as for many centuries before, Kutaisi had been one of the strongest political and cultural centers of Georgia. In reality, the announcement of Leon II and the transfer of the capital became possible only due to the strong support of Georgian political circles. All in all, we can boldly state that: 1. The Kingdom of Abkhazia was a Georgian kingdom 2. The kings of Abkhazia were Georgians by their cultural belonging and 3. Their strategic political course had always been in line with Georgian domestic and foreign policy. For centuries, they worked for the unification of the Georgian state. On the basis of this, we can conclude that the declaration of Kutaisi as the capital of the Kingdom of Abkhazia was not indicative that Kutaisi, Imereti, and all Western Georgia were part of Abkhazia, but just the other way around: it once again proves that Abkhazia was part of the Kingdom of Georgia. About another falsification. As proof
that Abkhazia has always been independent, separatists and their supporters claim that Abkhazia joined Russia voluntarily in 1810, whereas Georgia joined in 1801. This is a deception. It is well known from history that in 1801, Russia annexed only the eastern part of Georgia - the Kingdom of Kartli and Kakheti. Western Georgia, the Kingdom of Imereti, the principalities of Guria and Samegrelo, were annexed by Russia separately, in different years, over the course of more than 30 years. Russia annexed Abkhazia in parts: Samurzakano in 1805, Abkhazia proper in 1810, Tsebelda in the 1830s. Interestingly, the 1810 appeal to the Russian Emperor to join Abkhazia to Russia was written in the Georgian language. When Georgia became Soviet in 1921, Abkhazia was a part of Georgia and remained so thereafter. Therefore, nobody could transfer this territory to Georgia, be it Russia or Stalin. The treaty of May 7, 1920 recognized Abkhazia as an integral part of Georgia. The territory of modern Abkhazia, despite the well-known unfounded claims (approved by Russian officials), has historically always been an organic part of the Georgian ethnic and political state (see Z. Papaskiri, ‘On the Social-State Image of Abkhazia / Georgia,’ Tb. 2003). On June 11, 1918, an agreement was signed between the People’s Council of Abkhazia and the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, by which Abkhazia was united with the rest of Georgia with the right to autonomy. This decision was approved by the newly elected People’s Council of Abkhazia on March 20, 1919. On October 16, 1920, the Constitution of Abkhazia was adopted, which emphasized
the autonomous status of Abkhazia within the Democratic Republic of Georgia. This provision, in turn, was enshrined in the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, adopted by the Constituent Council on February 21, 1921. After the overthrow of the independent Georgian government and the establishment of Soviet power on December 16, 1921, Abkhazia entered Georgia under a special "Union Agreement," as a "Treaty Republic," although from the very beginning it was actually considered an autonomous unit of Georgia. In 1931, Abkhazia was transformed into an autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASPR) of Georgia. Until August 2008, Russia recognized Abkhazia as integral part of Georgia. In 1864, the last ruler of Abkhazia, Mikhail Shervashidze, and his posterity were permanently deprived of the right to govern Abkhazia, the Principality was abolished, and Abkhazia was named the Sukhumi Military Department. However, the Russian Emperor left Abkhazia as part of Georgia, within the Kutaisi governorate, while the military department was subordinated to the governor-general of Kutaisi. Abkhazia was recognized as part of Georgia throughout the 20th century. In December 1922, Georgia was incorporated into the Soviet Union, not Abkhazia. Abkhazia was part of the Soviet Union only as part of Georgia. Abkhazia never had a separate treaty with Russia, never had a representative in Russia and Russia never had an official representation in Abkhazia, whereas in Georgia it did, and Georgia had its official representation in Russia.
The recognition of Abkhazia as being part of Georgia by Russia, as well as by the Soviet Union, is supported by the very important fact that the communist party of Abkhazia has never been considered as an independent branch, but only within the Communist Party of Georgia; as a party organization of autonomy, with its regional committee subordinated to the central committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, independent Russia recognized the territorial integrity of Georgia with Abkhazia as part of it. Despite the fact that after the conflict in Abkhazia, the de facto authorities of the breakaway region held various elections, until 2008, the hand of Russia signed the recognition of the territorial integrity of Georgia in many documents, international ones among them. Among the most significant are documents signed by the President of the Russian Federation and other high-level officials within the Commonwealth of the Independent States, which recognized Abkhazia as an integral part of Georgia. Separatists often argue that they were allowed to secede from Georgia by a UN Declaration of 1970, which reads selfdetermination as one of the main political-legal principles of democratic regulation of national relations. This is true, but they forget that the United Nations also declared three political-legal requirements that must be met: 1. Find out to whom the territory belongs on which the self-determination is requested; 2. Define the ethnic composition of the inhabitants of said area; 3. All the nationalities inhabiting the area should express
the will to secede and not just some. If even one of these three requirments is not met, the UN believes that self-determination cannot be considered. In the case of Abkhazia, all three principles were violated. The fourth principle was violated too, of the international law this time: the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity of the country. It is surprising to hear open statements made by various high and top-level Russian officials that Abkhazia’s independence was a symmetric response to the recognition of Kosovo's independence by the UN. But how could that relate to Georgia? Why should Georgia be punished if Georgia never supported Kosovo's independence? We believe that this is not a symmetrical, but obviously an inadequate and unfair response. The separatist movement began in Abkhazia in the 1950s and was supported by the Soviet leadership. The peak came in the late 80s and early 90s when the separatists managed to stir up a fratricidal war. In the autumn of 1993, largely due to the support of regular Russian military units, Abkhaz secessionists won a "victory" in the armed confrontation with Georgia. For the past 20-25 years, as Georgian authorities could not control them, Abkhazia and Tskhinvali have remained beyond Georgian jurisdiction. We are convinced that we can handle the current global challenges our countries are facing only with a fair assessment of history, our rich common history first of all, through unbiased and fair analysis of historical facts. The Georgian nation has a long and proud history, and it will protect it no matter what happens.