Research
of particularly heavy haze, the NDRC preapproved a large hydropower station on Lancang River. In September, it preapproved another three stations on Yaluzangbu River at once, signaling a shift of China’s hydropower policy. Another important “time congruence” is the expected completion date of hydropower projects and the air quality governance deadline. From the date of approval, a hydropower project takes 4.35 years on average to complete, while it takes 4.85 years from preapproval to formal approval.45 So, the average duration for a hydropower project is approximately nine years, which is near the CCP’s deadline for achieving air governance. This time coincidence suggests that these hydropower projects were proposed as part of China’s broader counter-pollution strategy. More Than a Functional Response Hydropower development certainly helps to resolve the air pollution problem. But, trans-boundary hydropower exploitation involves substantial economic, ecological, and political cost, while its immediate contribution to reducing air pollution is limited. Thus, it is likely that China’s acceleration of trans-boundary exploitation is more than just a functional response to resolve Beijing’s air pollution challenge. The CCP’s air governance target is not merely pollution itself, but also the Chinese people’s hearts and minds. Through restarting hydropower projects that were halted for nearly a decade, the CCP is signaling to the public that it is trying every measure to solve the pollution problem, thus attempting to regain the people’s support. Moreover, hydropower is only one part of China’s overall response to discontent over air quality. Other measures to counter air pollution also reflect the government’s “overreaction,” and demonstrate that the CCP’s activities are not part of a merely functional response to air pollution problem. Cost-Benefit Analysis It is necessary for the Chinese government to consider numerous factors when assessing whether or not to pursue hydropower development. To start with, it is very costly to develop hydropower on trans-boundary rivers, and China already has an electricity excess problem. Thus, additional hydropower development will further erode profit margins, exacerbate the excess electricity problem, and possibly have a negative impact on the overall economic situation. Both domestic and international environmental activists, bureaucrats, and experts are critical of China’s large-scale hydropower exploitation. Finally, trans-boundary river development will elicit opposition from neighboring countries that share the river, thereby further strengthening China’s image as a “trickle-down hegemony.”46 India and Southeast Asian countries have accused China of Calculated by the author based on the data from “China Hydropower Stations.” Hydropower stations approved before 1990 and with durations longer than 5.1 years for technological reasons are not included. 46 Alex Liebman, “Trickle-down Hegemony?: China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ and Dam Building on the Mekong,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 27, No. 2 (2005): 281-304. 45
[110] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs