Florida Undergraduate Law Review | Volume 1 | Spring 2024 by FloridaUndergraduateLawReview

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Allopinionsexpressedhereinarethoseofindividualauthorsandarenotendorsedbythe FloridaUndergraduateLawReview.TheFULRisastudent-runorganizationanddoes notreflecttheviewsoftheUniversityofFlorida.

FloridaUndergraduateLaw Review

Vol.1

Spring2024

OurMission

Foundedin2024,theFloridaUndergraduateLawReviewisastudent-run publicationattheUniversityofFlorida,dedicatedtofosteringadynamicand inclusivepublicationforundergraduatestudentspassionateaboutlaw.

Recognizingtheimperativetodeveloplegalacumenfortheaspiring undergraduate,FULRstrivestoreshapethefutureoflegalscholarshipby providingauniquespacetochallengeconventions,developlegalwritingskills,and publishwork.Byextendinganopportunitydeniedtothevastmajorityof undergrads,FULRhopestonurtureacommunityofforward-thinkingindividuals committedtomakingapositiveimpactinthelegalfieldandbeyond.

MASTHEAD

President

SEBASTIANSMITH

Editor-in-Chief

JONATHANHUFFINE

ManagingEditor

IANZHOU

DirectorofFormatting

LILYHAAK

GraphicDesigner

HANNAHFISHER

Editors

JEFFREYDREW

MADISONDURAND

BRANDONLEPINE

ANDRESTEIXEIRA

TIFFANYYU

ABRAHAMHILU

DearReader,

ItismyutmosthonortopresenttheinauguraleditionoftheFloridaUndergraduateLaw Review.FULRwascreatedtofillavoidintheUniversityofFlorida’scampus,seeking toconstructachannelforundergraduatestoengageinrigorouslegalanalysisanddiscussion.Intheever-evolvinglandscapeoflaw,curatingsuchavenueisimperative.Thisis FULR’smission,andthisfirsteditionrepresentstheyear-longcollectiveefforttofulfill thisambition.

Thispublicationservesasaplatformforundergraduatestudentstoofferfreshandinnovativeideasonawiderangeoflegalissues.Withinthesepages,youwillfindarticles spanningdifferentlegaldisciplinesandyoucantrustthateachpiecerepresentsaunique probeintointricatelegalconcepts.ThemeticulousresearchdonebyeachauthordemonstratestheunwaveringfervorthatencapsulatesstudentshereatUF.

Thiseditioncouldnothavebeenpossiblewithouttheeagerassistanceofcountlessindividuals.Asmerestudents,weunitedtocreatesomethingfarbeyondourindividual capacities.Everyindividuallistedinthisjournalhasmadeindispensablecontributions tothisissue.WhileIwishIcouldthankeveryoneindividually,therearetwonamesin particularthatIwouldliketohighlight.ThefirstisSebastianSmith,ourPresident.He cametomewiththeplanforFULRonesummerago,anditisinhisvisionthatItirelessly followed.Iamdelightedwiththegrowthoftheorganizationsofar,andthissemesterhas beenmorerewardingthanIevercouldhaveimagined.Next,IwouldliketothankIan Zhou,ourManagingEditor,forbeingthebestright-handmanIcouldhaveeverasked for.Iamprofoundlythankfulforhisinsightandeffortsduringthisjourney.

Unfortunately,thisissueofFULRwillbemylastasEditor-in-Chief,asIamgraduating atsemester’send.Seeingthisgroupmaterializefromdreamstorealityhasbeenthe opportunityofalifetime,andithasbeenanabsolutehonortoserveinthisrole.Iwill neverforgetthecountlesshoursofcollaborationandperseverancethathavemadeFULR possible.Iwishmytimeherewasnotsoshort;however,IamconfidentinIan’sabilityto upholdandadvancetheacademicscholarshipofthisorganization.IknowthatFULRis ingoodhands.

JonathanHuffine Editor-in-Chief,FloridaUndergraduateLawReview

vii

DearReader,

IamhonoredtopresenttheinauguraleditionoftheFloridaUndergraduateLawReview. Inaccordancewithourcommitmenttodiversityinlegalscholarship,ourcollectionof articlesstemsfromwritersofvariedperspectivesandbackgrounds.

Inthisissue,ourauthorsexploreawidebreadthoftopics,rangingfromphilosophical argumentsofcriminalculpabilitytopressingissuesofartificialintelligenceusageincourt. Beyondcivilrightsandliberties,ourexplorationextendstothelegallyappliedethicsof animalrightsandpsychologicalinsightsbehindlegalprejudice.Throughtheirresearch andscholarship,ourauthorsextractcriticalinsightsfromtheinterwovenproblemsofsociety.

Thissemester’sissuewouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthediligententhusiasmofour executiveboard,editingstaff,andjournalauthors.Theirtirelesscontributionsandpassionsforlawhaveculminatedinthecreationofaninvaluableresourceforundergraduate legalscholarship,hereatFloridaandelsewhere.But,beyondtheresearchconductedand sectionsdrafted,ourmostimportantaccomplishmenthasbeentheverydreamofthis organization:theexperienceandopportunitytodeveloplegalthinkingatanundergraduatelevel.Inaddition,Iwouldliketothanktheeditor-in-chief,JonathanHuffine,forhis unwaveringsupportanddedicationtothevisionofthisjournal.Together,wehaveand willcontinuetotransformideasintoreality.

Lastly—butmostimportantly—Iurgeyou,dearreader,tothinkdeeplyandcritically regardingtheissuesyouencounterinyourperusal.Inlate1787,ThomasJeffersononce wrotetoAmericanstatesmanUriahForrest,“Educateandinformthewholemassofthe people...theyaretheonlysurerelianceforthepreservationofourliberty.”Understanding thelegalworldedifiesustoruminatebeyondtheacademicworld,onthesmallissuesand eventsweencounterandreadeveryday.Tous,thisisthetruespiritofthelawreview.

IanZhou ManagingEditor,FloridaUndergraduateLawReview

viii

FacultyForeword:AMessagefortheUniversityofFlorida’s FutureLawyersofAmerica

2024markstheinauguralpublicationoftheFloridaUndergraduateLawReview (FULR).Tocontributetotheoccasion,Iwasaskedtoprepareamessageforyou, the‘FutureLawyersofAmerica,’whomakeuptheorganization.Givenhowmuch readingyouwillberequiredtodoinlawschool,itseemstomethatthisoccasion providesanopportunitytoreflectonwhatIhopeyouwillrememberaboutreading and,moreimportantly,aboutengagingwithtextsgenerally.Theseskills,amongst othersyou’veacquired,willhelpyounavigatelifeafteryourUniversityofFlorida education.

I’dliketobegin,however,withananecdoteaboutthebackgroundofFULR.In2023 IwasteachingAmericanPoliticalThoughtwhenastudentapproachedmewithan ideatoformajournal.HereachedouttoexistingpublicationsinFloridaabout contributingtotheirprojects,buttheywereunresponsive.Nottobedismayed,he decidedhewouldstarthisownjournal.Andhedid.SebastianSmith,nowpresidentofFULR,recruitedateamequallyenthusiasticaboutlaw,andtogetherthey createdajournalbyundergraduates,forundergraduates.

WhilesomeofyoumaybefamiliarwithFULR’soriginstory,youmaynotknow thattheweekSebastianapproachedmeaboutstartingajournal,wewerestudying BenjaminFranklin.IgesturethatFranklin’sspiritofindependenceandhardwork isembodiedinthisjournal.Themembersoftheexecutiveboardandeditingstaff tookanideaanddevelopeditintoarespectableprintingventure.AlthoughFranklin neverpracticedlaw,hecultivatedhisintellect,andhisfriendships,throughvoraciousreading.Inhisautobiography,hedescribestransformativeconversationswith avidreadersandthemanifoldbenefitsofsurroundingoneselfwith‘loversofreading.’

Withtheformationofthisjournal,theFULRteamhasfashionedaspacethatallowsforthecultivationofselfthroughreadingandwritingwithothers.Reada lot.Readwidely.Andreadwithapeninyourhand.AsFranklinnotes,andasI willdiscussintheconclusion,thiscangreatlyinfluenceyourabilitytocontribute tosociety.Inwhatfollows,Iaddthatapproachingreadingdescriptively,reflexively, andanalyticallywillbehelpfulforschool,butmoredeeply,fordevelopingkeyskills requiredfortheworldyouareinheriting.

Asyouread,takedescriptivenotesabouttheauthors’arguments.Whenyoufind

anespeciallygoodpassageofwriting,jotitdown.Throughdescriptivenotes,the goalistounderstandwhatanauthoristryingtosayontheirownterms.Thisis noeasytask.Itrequiresyoutousegoodjudgmenttodeterminewhichpartsofthe textareimportanttodescribeandtocapturegoodtextualevidencethatconveys theauthorintheirownvoice.Describingtoomuchwillbetediousandextremely time-consuming.Describingtoolittlewillmakeitdifficulttounderstandthewhole ofthetextandtolearnfromyournoteslater.Findingtherightbalanceiscrucial. Whendoneright,learninghowtodescribeanauthor’sargumentwillbebeneficial foryourpursuitsinlawand,hopefully,beyondit.

Second,throughreflexivenotes,becognizantabouthowatexthitsyouonapersonal levelandhowwhatyoureadrelatestootherthingsyou’velearnedorexperiences you’vehad.Basically,beawareofyourreflexes.Notesofthiscategoryarebest whentheyexplainwhatanexample,tone,orideamadeyoufeelandwhy,orwhat somethinginthereadingremindedyouoffromamovie,bookpoem,historical event,anotherclass,etc.Innovationoftenstemsfromthecross-pollinationofideas betweendifferentcontexts.Themostimportantpartofreflexivityinthiscontext isthatyouarealertandconsciousofthereflexesatextbringsout.Whendone right,cultivatingreflexivitybringsthetextsyoureadtolifeinwaysthatacursory ordistractedreadingnevercould.

Third,notingpointsofanalysis,thinkabouthowyoumightdeconstructspecific arguments.Byaskinggoodquestionsaboutanauthor’sargumentswhileyouread, youaresettingyourselfupforthecriticalthinkingrequiredtojudgethemeritof whatyouarereading.Thiscanbedoneinseveralways,butaskingwhetherassumptionsofanargumentarewarranted,whetherthereasoningisrelevantandsufficient, and/orwhetherrelevantinformationhasbeenomittedfromanauthor’sargument aregoodplacestostart.Whendonewell,thinkingaboutanalysisanddocumenting ideasinyournotesenhancesyourargumentativeabilities.Doingsogetsyouinthe habitofrecognizingfallaciestoavoidorgoodargumentativestructurestomimicin yourownwriting.

Thisinauguraleditioncontainsreflectionsonadiversearrayofwell-describedissues,manyofwhichshowcaseanalyticalstrengthandreflexivecreativity.From AmeliaGarvey’sexplorationofthenexusbetweenpoliticsandlegalprecedentto EricHan’sexaminationofinsulinaccessibility,eachcontributionoffersfreshcommentaryonlegalissues.AnaFerreiraexpandsourunderstandingofclimaterefugee policies,whileKemarahThermidorhighlightstheroleofsocialscienceinlegalre-

form.NicholasRandazzonavigatesthecomplexitiesofculpabilityincriminallaw, andKristinaKianovskiscrutinizestheethicalimplicationsoflivestockslaughter practices.PaolinaSalasshedslightonthechallengesoffairnessandtransparency inAI-assistedcriminaljustice,whileAnnekaLupinekadvocatesfortherevisionof Section230(c)toregulatetechgiants.NadaroopaSaraswathidiscussesthediscourse ofinsurrection,andJessChisholmexaminestheramificationsofthe‘MajorQuestionsDoctrine’onenvironmentalprotections.LilyHaakexplorestheimplications ofpredictivemodelsinjudicialsystems,andCarlosAlemanydiscussesthefutureof freespeech.Clearly,thereisnoshortageofchallengesanddisruptionsinourworld. Yet,afterwitnessingyourgritanddeterminationinputtingthisjournaltogether,I amfilledwithconfidencethatshouldyouchooseto,youcanharnessyourskillsto addressourmanychallenges.

Iwanttoconcludewithawell-deservedcongratulationstotheFloridaUndergraduateLawReviewteam.ThefoundingethosofFULRisatestamenttoinitiative, diligence,andthetransformativepowerofengagingthoughtfullywithtextsand takingwhatyoulearntomaketheworldabetterplace.Asyoutransitiontoyour careers,Iencourageyoutotaketimeforself-reflectionwithouttechnologicaldistractions.Andtocontinuetoapproachwhatyoureaddescriptively,reflexively,and analytically.AsBenjaminFranklindescribed,thejourneyofnurturingyourintellectandcharacterthroughreadingisn’tjustaboutprofessionalsuccess—it’sabout findingpersonalfulfillmentandmakingameaningfuldifferenceinthetumultuous worldyouareinheriting.

Allmybestwishes,

GlenM.BillesbachII

Ph.D.Candidate

WhatItMeanstoEngagein

Insurrection:ASynthesisoftheDebate

OverDefinition

NadaroopaSaraswathiMohan’26

Spring2024

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Abstract

Section3oftheFourteenthAmendmenttotheConstitutionisanimmenselyimportantprovision;however,ithadnotbeenconsideredthoroughlyinlegaldiscourse untiltheeventsofJanuary6,2021.FormerpresidentDonaldTrump’sallegedinvolvementintheJanuary6thInsurrectionraisesimportantquestionsaboutwhat thephrase“engagingininsurrection”inSection3oftheFourteenthAmendment means.ThispaperdelvesintothehistoricalbackgroundofSection3,examinessome purporteddefinitionsfor“engagingininsurrection,”andappliessuchdefinitionsto DonaldTrump’sactionsonandleadinguptoJanuary6th.WhilethispapersynthesizesaportionofthedebatesurroundingSection3,itisbynomeansacomplete analysisofeveryissuepresentinthetext.Furtherconsiderationofthematteris beyondtheboundsofthispaperbutshouldfactorinwhetherthepresidentisanofficeroftheUnitedStatesandwhetherSection3isself-enacting.Thedetermination ofwhetherornotDonaldTrumpengagedininsurrectionismorecomplicatedthan itseems,butcarefulanalysisofSection3isnecessarytoensurethatallcandidates seekingofficeinthe2024presidentialelectionareeligibleforoffice.

IIntroduction

Inlightoftheimminent2024presidentialelection’srematchbetweenPresident JosephBidenandformerPresidentDonaldTrump,thequestionofeligibilityfor officebasedonSection3oftheFourteenthAmendmenthasgreaterweightthanever. OnJanuary6th,2020,TrumpaddressedacrowdofsupportersattheEllipse,where herepeatedearlierclaimsthattheelectionhadbeen“stolen”fromhim.Healso urgedhissupporterstomarchtotheCapitoltopreventajointsessionoftheUnited StatesCongressfromaffirmingtheElectoralBallotcount,saying,“Ifyoudon’t fightlikehell,you’renotgoingtohaveacountryanymore.”Inthesamespeech,he said,“IknowthateveryoneherewillsoonbemarchingovertotheCapitolbuilding topeacefullyandpatrioticallymakeyourvoicesheard.”1 Trump’ssupportersthen marchedtotheCapitolandbrokeintothebuilding,causingmembersofCongress toshelterinasafeplace.2

SincetheJanuary6thRiot,theformerpresidenthasbeenheavilycriticizedfor hisrole.Hispoliticalopponentshavearguedthathiswordsincitedtheactionsofthe rioterswhobreachedtheCapitolandthreatenedmembersofCongress.Hispolitical supportershavearguedthatTrumphasnoresponsibilityfortheattack.Since

1 BrianNaylor, ReadTrump’sJan.6Speech,aKeyPartofImpeachmentTrial,NPR,2021. 2 Ibid.

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thebeginningofthe2024electioncycle,theword“insurrection”hasbeenthrown aroundfrequently.Trump’spoliticalopponentshavearguedthattheJanuary6th Riotwasaninsurrection,thatTrumpengagedininsurrection,andthatheisthereby disqualifiedfromofficeaccordingtoSection3oftheFourteenthAmendment,which isasfollows:

NopersonshallbeaSenatororRepresentativeinCongress,orelectorof PresidentandVice-President,orholdanyoffice,civilormilitary,under theUnitedStates,orunderanyState,who,havingpreviouslytakenan oath,asamemberofCongress,orasanofficeroftheUnitedStates, orasamemberofanyStatelegislature,orasanexecutiveorjudicial officerofanyState,tosupporttheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates, shallhaveengagedininsurrectionorrebellionagainstthesame,orgiven aidorcomforttotheenemiesthereof.ButCongressmaybyavoteof two-thirdsofeachHouse,removesuchdisability.3

ThequestionofwhetherornotDonaldTrumpengagedininsurrectioniscomplicatedforseveralreasons.Historicalcontextmakesthemeaningofcertainphrases withinSection3oftheFourteenthAmendmentunclear,andthereareseveralunresolvedissueswithregardtothetext’sapplicabilitytotheeventsthattranspired onJanuary6th.Theseincludewhetherthepresidentisconsideredanofficerofthe UnitedStates,whetherJanuary6thwasaninsurrection,andwhatactionsconstitute “engagingininsurrection.”Toansweranyofthesequestions,however,itiscrucial tofirstunderstandwhatsortofbehavioris“engaging”ininsurrection.SectionII ofthispaperwillprovideahistoricalbackgroundforSection3oftheFourteenth Amendment.SectionIIIwillexaminesomeproposeddefinitionsforinsurrection. SectionIVwillapplythebestdefinitiontoDonaldTrump’sactionsonJanuary 6thtodeterminewhetherheengagedininsurrection.SectionVwillidentifysome furtherareasforresearch.

IIHistoricalBackgroundforSection3oftheFour-

teenthAmendment

TheratificationoftheFourteenthAmendmenttookplaceunderauniquehistoricalcontextthatclarifiesthespiritofSection3.The39thCongress—whichdrafted, 3 U.S.Const.,amend.XIV, § 3.

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proposed,andapprovedtheFourteenthAmendmentbeforeturningtheamendment overtothestatesforratification—convenedbeforetheCivilWarended.4

The38thCongresshadaRepublicanmajority,butitwasnotsizable;there were32Republicansand18DemocratsintheSenateand104Republicansand81 DemocratsintheHouseofRepresentatives.5 Thus,Republicansconstituted64%of theSenateand56%oftheHouseofRepresentatives.WhiletheRepublicanshelda majorityinCongress,theydidnothavethetwo-thirdsmajoritynecessarytopropose anamendmenttotheConstitutionuntilthe39thCongress.Whenthe39thCongress convened,therewere44Republicansand12DemocratsintheSenateand155 Republicansand46DemocratsintheHouseofRepresentatives.6 Percentage-wise, Republicansconstituted79%oftheSenateand77%oftheHouseofRepresentatives. Thus,theyhadfinallyamassedenoughpartysupportinCongresstobegintheurgent processofendingtheCivilWarandstartingReconstruction.

Moreover,the39thCongressconvenedwellbeforetheCivilWarwastrulyover. RobertE.LeesurrenderedtoUlyssesS.GrantinAprilof1865,amonthafterthe 39thCongresshadalreadyconvened.However,fightingcontinued.Bythetime ConfederatePresidentJeffersonDaviswascapturedonMay10,1865,theCivil Warwasvirtuallyover,butsmallskirmishescontinueduntilDecemberofthatyear. PresidentAndrewJohnsondidnotdeclaretheendoftheinsurrectioninallstates exceptTexasuntilApril1866,andhedidnotdeclaretheendoftheinsurrection inTexasuntilAugust1866.

7 Therefore,the39thCongresswasoperatingunder incredibleuncertaintyaboutthefutureoftheUnion.Inadditiontothecharge ofendingtheCivilWar,the39thCongresshadthetremendoustaskoflegislating toensurepeace.Understandingtheuncertaintythatthe39thCongresswasfacing helpstoelucidatetheintentoftheframersoftheFourteenthAmendmentindrafting Section3.ItwasnotmerelytoendtheCivilWarandcreatepeaceandensureequal rightsforall;itwastocreatepeaceandensureequalrightsforallforposterity. Essentially,theirtaskwastopreventtheCivilWarfromreoccurring.

Todoso,the39thCongresshadtoensurethatthelegislationtheypassed duringtheirsessionwouldnotberepealedaftertheyleftoffice.Thebiggestthreat tothisgoalwastheabilityofformerConfederatesoldiersandcommanderstorun forCongress.IfformerConfederateswereabletooffsettheconstitutionalmajority thatRepublicanshadgained(oriftheygainedamajoritythemselves),therewasa strongpossibilitythatcontestationoftheThirteenthAmendmentandFourteenth 4 RichardL.Aynes, ”The39thCongress(1865-1867)andthe14thAmendment:SomePreliminaryPerspectives,”AkronLawReview:Vol.42(2009):Iss.4,Article2.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

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AmendmentbyfuturesessionsofCongresswouldruinthepeacethatthe39th Congresshadcarefullycreated.AsJohnA.Bingham(R-OH),whodraftedthe FourteenthAmendment,said:

...inordertoshowthedangertothepeaceofthecountry,Ibegleave tosayfurther...amongthesereturningprodigalrebelsforwhomwe areinvited...totakepossessionofthelegislativepowerofthiscountry, andaccomplishbycorruptlegislationwhattheyfailedtoaccomplishby arms.8

Thus,theframersoftheFourteenthAmendmentsoughttosecurepeaceforthe futurebyrestrictingformerConfederatesoldiers—specifically,thoseformerConfederateswhobroketheiroathsbyaidingtheinsurrection—fromholdingofficeand reignitingthediscordoftheCivilWar.

However,the39thCongressalsostatedthatthisdisqualificationfromoffice couldbeliftedbyatwo-thirdsvotebyCongress,whichenabledtheAmnestyAct of1872toliftbarstoofficesixyearsaftertheywereinitiated.9 Thisprovisionof theFourteenthAmendmentimpliesthattheframersoftheFourteenthAmendment wantedtomoderatetheimpactofSection3.Iftheframerssoughtabroadand strictdisqualificationofofficerswhobroketheiroathbyengagingininsurrection, theywouldnothaveincludedthisprovision,whichenablesCongresstopardon insurrections.IngivingCongressthispower,ratherthanthePresident,theyensured thatthedisqualificationcouldbeliftedbutonlywithasupermajorityinCongress. Thus,theframersoftheFourteenthAmendmentbalancedthepublicinterestin ensuringpeaceforfuturegenerationsagainstrecognizingtheseverityofbarring someonefromholdingpublicoffice.Thechargeofinsurrection,andthesubsequent consequences,arenottobetakenlightly.

Anydefinitionof“engagingininsurrection,”then,mustbebroadenoughto conveythe39thCongress’spurposeincreatingSection3oftheFourteenthAmendmentwhilealsobeinglimitedenoughtopreventunduedisqualificationofcitizens formerelyexpressingaviewpointcriticalofthegovernment.Thenextsectionof thispaperwillexaminedefinitionsof“engagingininsurrection”todeterminewhich interpretationbestalignswiththehistoricalcontextsurroundingSection3ofthe FourteenthAmendment.

8 JohnArmorBinghamandMiscellaneousPamphletCollection, Onecountry,oneConstitution, andonepeople.

9 U.S.Const.,Amend.XIV, § 3.

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IIIExaminingDefinitionsof“EngaginginInsurrection”

Thisarticlewillconsiderthreedefinitionsofthephrase engagingininsurrection: thedefinitionsusedbyReconstructionEracourtsinWorthyv.BarrettandUnited Statesv.Powellandthedefinitionproposedbytheauthorsof“TheSweepand ForceofSectionThree”fromtheUniversityofPennsylvaniaLawReview.

InWorthyv.Barrett,theNorthCarolinaSupremeCourtdefined“engagingin insurrection”asfollows:

Voluntarilyaidingtherebellion,bypersonalserviceorbycontributions, otherthancharitable,ofanythingthatwasusefulornecessaryinthe Confederateservice.10

Theissuewiththisdefinitionisthatitisalsovague.“Personalservice”and “usefulornecessary”actionsareundefined,leadingtothesameproblemsofinterpretationthattheoriginaltextofSection3creates.Bythisdefinition,anysortof personalactionthatwasevenminimallyhelpfultoaninsurrectionwouldbeconsidered“engagingininsurrection.”Thefollowinghypotheticalscenarioillustratesthe problematicscopeofthisdefinition.ImaginethatJoetheGrocerisarranginghis fruitstandinthemorning.AgroupapproachesJoetheGrocerandtellshimthat theyplanonstaginganinsurrection,buttheyhavenoteatenindaysandrequire foodtoperform.JoetheGrocerpreparesfruitsforthegroupandfeedsthemfor free.DidJoetheGrocerengageininsurrection?

JoetheGrocer’sactionswereinstrumentallyvaluabletothegroup—afterall, thegroupwouldnothavebeenstrongenoughtostageaninsurrectionwithout sustenancefromJoetheGrocer—butthereisnoindicationthatJoetheGrocer intendedtoparticipateinaninsurrectionmerelybygivingthegroupfood.Yetthe definitioninWorthyv.BarrettwouldclassifyJoetheGrocerashavingengaged inaninsurrection.JoetheGrocer’sactionwasacontribution(offood)thatwas usefulandnecessaryfortheinsurrection,butanyreasonablepersonwouldhesitate toclaimthatJoetheGrocerengagedininsurrectionbecauseheindirectlyaidedit. Thatis,hehelpedthepeoplecommittinginsurrection,butitisnotclearthathe intendedtorebelagainstthegovernmenthimself.

Adefinitionforachargeasweightyasinsurrectionshouldnotimplicatepeople whosecontributionswerenonviolent.Granted,JoetheGrocerisnotapublicofficer whotookanoathtoupholdthelawsoftheUnitedStates,butthecasedemonstrates 10 Worthyv.BarrettandOthers,63N.C.199(N.C.1869).

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thedangerinherentinanoverlybroadinterpretationofengagingininsurrection. AnotherReconstructionEracourtdefined“engagingininsurrection”inasimilarly vaguemanner.ThedistrictcourtinUnitedStatesv.Powelldefined“engagingin insurrection”asa“voluntaryefforttoassisttheInsurrection.”11 Thisdefinitionis evenmoreunclear;thescopeoftheterm“effort”couldencompassawiderangeof actions.Iflitigated,thequestionofhowusefulanactionmustbetobeconsidered engagingininsurrectionwouldlikelycomedowntothejudge’sdiscretion.But thisyieldstoomuchopportunityforconfusionandpartisanbias;adefinitionfor “engagingininsurrection”oughttoavoidsuchconfusion.

In“TheSweepandForceofSection3,”WilliamBaudeandMichaelStokes Paulsenproposethefollowingdefinition:

Webelieveonehas“engaged”ininsurrectionorrebellionwhenonehas beenactivelyinvolvedintheplanningorexecutionofintentionalacts ofinsurrectionorrebellion,orwhenonehasknowinglyprovidedactive,meaningful,voluntary,directsupportfor,materialassistanceto, orspecificencouragementofsuchactions.Suchplanning,participation,support,assistance,orencouragementmaybeintheformofeither wordsordeeds,aslongasthepersonwhohas“engagedin”suchactivitiesembracedtheobjectivesoftheinsurrectionorrebellioninquestion anddidthingsthatcontributedinameaningfulwaytoadvancingthose objectives.12

Thisdefinitionismuchmoreprecise.IncontrasttothedefinitionsusedinWorthyv.BarrettandUnitedStatesv.Powell,thedefinitionthatBaudeandPaulsen proposeadequatelyincorporatesthespiritofSection3whileclearlydefiningthe sortsofactionsthatqualifyas“engagingininsurrection.”BaudeandPaulsen’sdefinitionisbroadenoughtoencompassarangeofactivities,asindicatedbytheuse oftheconjunction“or”inlines2,3,and4ofthedefinition.13 TheUnitedStates hasaninterestinkeepingabroaddefinitionof“engaging”ininsurrectiontoencapsulatethevastrangeofactivitiesthatcouldmateriallysupportaninsurrection.A broaddefinitionensuresthatanyonewhobroketheiroathbymeaningfullyaiding inplanningorexecutinganinsurrectioncannotholdofficeagain.Thevoluntaryviolationoftheirconstitutionaldutiesdemonstratesanoppositiontotheauthorityof thegovernmentanddemonstratesthattheycannotbetrustedtoholdoffice.Atthe sametime,BlaudeandPaulsen’sdefinitiononlyimplicatespeoplewhomeaningfully

11 UnitedStatesv.Powell,27F.Cas.605,607(C.C.D.N.C1871.

12 WilliamBaudeandMichaelStokesPaulsen, TheSweepandForceofSectionThree. 13 Ibid.

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contributetotheobjectivesofinsurrectionandperformactionsthatdemonstrate theintenttodoso.14 Thisdistinctionseparatesgenuineinsurrectionistsfrompeople whodidthingsthatwereusefultotheinsurrection,butwhodidnotembraceitsobjectivesorseektofurtherthoseobjectives—likeJoetheGrocer.Havingestablished themeritsofthedefinitionproposedbyBlaudeandPaulsen,thenextsectionof thispaperwillapplythisdefinitiontoDonaldTrump’sactionsonJanuary6,2021, todetermineifheengagedininsurrection.

IVExaminingtheEventsofJanuary6,2021with aNewDefinition

InanalyzingwhetherformerPresidentDonaldTrumpengagedininsurrection, thispaperwillevaluatewhetherTrump’sactionsmetbothconditionsofthisdefinition.Thefirstconditionisthatone“hasbeenactivelyinvolvedintheplanningor executionofintentionalactsofinsurrectionorrebellion,orwhenonehasknowingly providedactive,meaningful,voluntary,directsupportfor,materialassistanceto,or specificencouragementofsuchactions.”15 Thesecondconditionisthatone’sactions “embracedtheobjectivesoftheinsurrectionorrebellioninquestionanddidthings thatcontributedinameaningfulwaytoadvancingthoseobjectives.”16

DonaldTrump’sactionsonJanuary6thmeetthefirstcondition.Hiswordsand rhetoriconJanuary6thconstituteactive,meaningful,andvoluntaryencouragement oftheinsurrection.TherearemultipleinstanceswhereTrump’swordsstokedthe mobandencouragedtheiractions,butonesticksout:hisspeechonJanuary6th. Inhisspeech,Trumpsaid,“Andwefight.Wefightlikehell.Andifyoudon’tfight likehell,you’renotgoingtohaveacountryanymore.”17 Somehavearguedthatthis statementwassimplyrhetorical,whichabsolvesTrumpofresponsibilityforinciting aninsurrection.18 However,thisstatementwasnotmerelyrhetorical.Accordingto testimonybyaformerWhiteHouseaide,CassidyHutchinson,Trumpknewthat hiscrowdofsupportersonJanuary6thwasarmed.19 Withthisknowledge,using inflammatoryrhetoricwiththespecificphrase“fightlikehell”amountstoaclear

17 BrianNaylor, “ReadTrump’sJan.6Speech,aKeyPartofImpeachmentTrial,”NPR,2021. 18 GavinM.WaxandNationalConstitutionalLawUnionInc., BriefforSCOTUSasAmicus Curiae

19 JonathanAllen,”’They’reNotHeretoHurtMe’:FormerAideSaysTrumpKnewJan.6 CrowdWasArmed,”NBCNews,2022.

14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid.

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instructiontoasycophanticcrowdtomarchtotheCapitolandusetheirweapons andmassto“stopthesteal.”Thisinstructiondemonstratesspecificencouragement ofthemob’sviolent,reactionarybehavior.Moreover,thespeechwasriddledwith claimsthatthe2020electionwasfraudulentandthatTrumpandhissupporters mustworktooverturnthe“fraudulent”election.Atonepoint,Trumpsaid,“When youcatchsomebodyinafraud,you’reallowedtogobyverydifferentrules.”20 This statement,withtheknowledgethatTrumphadofthecrowd’svitriolandweaponry, essentiallyvalidatestheirplans.Itisastatementthatlegitimizedthemob’sgoal offorciblyovertakingtheCapitol,asitactedasasignaltoTrump’ssupporters thattheywereallowedtounlawfullyattacktheCapitolbecausetheycouldplay bydifferentrules.Thus,DonaldTrump’swordsonJanuary6thqualifyasactive, meaningful,andvoluntaryencouragementoftheinsurrection.

DonaldTrump’swordsembracedtheobjectivesoftheinsurrectionandcontributedinameaningfulwaytoadvancingthoseobjectives.Theobjectiveofthe insurrectionwastopreventtheelectionresultsfrombeingcertifiedbyCongress.In hisspeechtothecrowd,Trumpusedthephrase“stopthesteal”twice,thephrase “takebackourcountry”twice,thewords“fraudulent”or“fraud”twenty-twotimes, andtheword“illegal”inreferencetotheelectiontwenty-threetimes.21 ThedictioninTrump’sspeechisaimedataclearobjective:establishingthattheelection wasstolentomotivatethemobintoattackingtheCapitolbecausehebelievedthat RepublicansinCongressandMikePencewouldnotfollowhisinstructionstodecertifytheelectionresults.Thus,Trump’swordsembracedtheobjectivesofthe insurrection.Hiswords—inthespeechandbeforeJanuary6th—alsocontributed meaningfullytotheadvancementofthatobjective.EdBadalian,aJanuary6th insurrectionistwhowasfoundguiltyofconspiracytocommitanoffenseagainst theUnitedStates,wroteinachatnamed“Patriots45MAGAGang”that“Our dulyelectedleaderhascalledhismarchingorders,wegottashowup,”onDecember 21st.22 EdBadalianusedastungunontheneckofaWashington,D.C.,police officer.23 Thechatroommessageindicatesthat—atleastforBadalian—Trump’s wordsencouragedunlawfulandviolentbehaviortowardsofficialsofthegovernment onJanuary6th.Anotherdefendant,DeborahSandoval,wroteinhergroupchat, “Hey,we’regoingbacktoWashingtonJanuary6.Trumphascalledallpatriots.If theelectorsdon’telect,wewillbeforcedintocivilwar.”24 AnanalysisbyCitizen

20 BrianNaylor, “ReadTrump’sJan.6Speech,aKeyPartofImpeachmentTrial,” NPR,2021. 21 Ibid.

22 RyanJ.Reilly,”Jan.6RioterWhoSaidHeWasFollowingTrump’s’MarchingOrders’and WantedtoArrestBidenandPelosiIsFoundGuilty,”NBCNews,April4,2023.

23 Ibid.

24 ClarkKauffman,”Mother-and-sonDuoWhoRiotedatU.S.CapitoltoBeSentencedinApril,”

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forResponsibilityinWashington(CREW)indicatesthatofthe210peoplecharged forcrimescommittedonJanuary6thwhoclaimedtobeansweringTrump’scallto action,120citedTrump’sremarksastheirreasonforstormingtheCapitol.25 The factthatthecrowddispersedafterDonaldTrumptweetedatthemtogohomeis themostdamningindicationthatTrump’swordsspurredthemob.26 IfTrumphad notusedinflammatorylanguagebeforeandduringJanuary6thtogoadthecrowd intoattackingtheCapitol,theJanuary6thinsurrectionwouldnothavehappened. Undeniably,DonaldTrump’swordsembracedtheobjectivesoftheinsurrectionand contributedinameaningfulwaytoadvancingthoseobjectives.

VConclusion

Thisarticlehasfocusedonthephrase“engagingininsurrection”todetermine whetherDonaldTrumpisbarredfromofficebySection3oftheFourteenthAmendment.Toanswerthisquestion,ithasanalyzedthehistoricalcontextofSection3 togleanitspurpose,examinedsomedefinitionsof“engagingininsurrection,”and analyzedthewordsthatDonaldTrumpusedwithhissupportersonandleading uptoJanuary6th.However,thissynthesisisbynomeansacompleteoverview ofTrump’seligibilityforofficeaccordingtoSection3.Severalquestions—suchas whatdefinitionof“engagingininsurrection”shouldbeusedlegally,whoshould createthisdefinition,howSection3shouldbeenforced,andwhethertheofficeof thePresidentisimplicatedbySection3—remainunanswered.Intheinterestof brevity,therearedefinitionsforinsurrectionusedincaselawandtextbooksthat thispapercouldnotaddress,tweetsandstatementsthattheformerpresidentmade thatcouldnotbeanalyzed,andalternativeperspectivesonwhetherTrumpshould beexcludedfromtheballotforonlyhiswords.Acomplete,informedperspective ontheissuerequiresanuancedunderstandingofallofthesetopics,andtheauthor ofthispaperencouragesallreaderstoconductfurtherresearch.

NBCNews,December22,2022.

25 CitizensforResponsibilityandEthicsinWashington,“TrumpHasCalledAllPatriots”:210 Jan.6thCriminalDefendantsSayTrumpIncitedThem,”CitizensforResponsibilityandEthics inWashington(CREW),2024.

26 Ibid.

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WorksCited

Allen,Jonathan.”’They’reNotHeretoHurtMe’:FormerAideSaysTrumpKnewJan.6Crowd WasArmed.”NBCNews,2022.Source.

Aynes,RichardL. The39thCongress(1865-1867)andthe14thAmendment:SomePreliminary Perspectives,AkronLawReview:Vol.42(2009):Iss.4,Article2.Source.

Baude,William,andMichaelStokesPaulsen. TheSweepandForceofSectionThree. University ofPennsylvaniaLawReview,Vol.172,p.605,2024.Source.

Bingham,JohnArmor,andMiscellaneousPamphletCollection. OneCountry,OneConstitution, andOnePeople. SpeechofHon.JohnA.Bingham,ofOhio,intheHouseofRepresentatives,In SupportoftheProposedAmendmenttoEnforcetheBillofRights.[Washington,Printedatthe CongressionalGlobeoffice,1866]Pdf.Source.

CitizensforResponsibilityandEthicsinWashington.”’TrumpHasCalledAllPatriots’:210 Jan.6thCriminalDefendantsSayTrumpIncitedThem.”CitizensforResponsibilityandEthics inWashington(CREW),2024.Source.

Kauffman,Clark.”Mother-and-sonDuoWhoRiotedatU.S.CapitoltoBeSentencedinApril.” NBCNews,2022.Source.

Naylor,Brian. “ReadTrump’sJan.6Speech,aKeyPartofImpeachmentTrial.” NPR,2021. Source.

Reilly,RyanJ.”Jan.6RioterWhoSaidHeWasfollowingTrump’s’marchingOrders’andWanted toArrestBidenandPelosiIsFoundGuilty.”NBCNews,2023.Source.

UnitedStatesv.Powell,27F.Cas.605,607(C.C.D.N.C1871).

U.S.Constitution,Amend.XIV, § 3.

Wax,GavinM.andNationalConstitutionalLawUnionInc. BriefforSCOTUSasAmicusCuriae, p.9,Trumpv.Anderson,601U.S. (2024).Source.

Worthyv.BarrettandOthers,63N.C.199(N.C.1869).

Disney,DeSantis,andtheFutureofFree Speech

CarlosAlemany’25

Spring2024

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Abstract

WhenalawischallengedonFirstAmendmentgrounds,courtsareexpectedto weightheconstitutionallegitimacyofthelawuponitsexplicittermsandtheeffect ofitsapplicationonFirstAmendmentfreedoms.1 Afaciallyconstitutionalstatute cannotfacefreespeechchallengesonthebasisofillicitorotherwisemaliciouslegislativeintent.2 Bethatasitmay,inthisparticularcase,whatoughttobereliedupon isasimpleapplicationofthebasicprincipleofcausation.Acompanyhadpublicly expresseditsopiniononalaw,which,inturn,causedthegovernmenttoretaliate againstsaidcompanyforexpressinganopinionitdidnotlike.Notwithstandingthe prevailingcontentiousdebatesurroundingthepersonhoodandconsciouscapacity ofcorporateentities,thefactremainsthatTheWaltDisneyCompanyisentitledto politicalspeechprotectionsundertheFirstAmendment,andisthuspositionedto challengethestateforanytangibleinfringementsmadeagainstsaidprotections.3 Moreimportantly,thebroaderimplicationsofthiscasenecessitateaseriesofobjectiveconstitutionalteststoserveasinstrumentsforcourtstodirectlyinquireabout themotiveandintentbehindlegislationaffectingFirstAmendmentfreedoms.

Throughaseriesofevidencerevealingexplicitretaliatoryintent,thefirstsection ofthisarticlechallengesthestate’sinsistenceonoperatingonarationalbasisin removingDisney’sspecialdistrictstatus.Thesecondsectionbrieflyoutlinesthe doctrinesoftheexistingFirstAmendmentsafeguardsinplace.Finally,thethird andfourthsectionsexploretheextenttowhichaseriesofobjectiveconstitutional tests,doctrines,anddefinitionssafeguardingagainstretaliatorylegislationcanbe reasonablyexploredandconstructedwithinthewidercontextofAmericanjurisprudence.

IIntroduction

In1967,fouryearsbeforeTheWaltDisneyCompanyhadopeneditsfirsttheme parkinOrlando,theReedyCreekImprovementDistrict,encompassing38.5square milesandthemunicipalitiesofReedyCreekandBayLakewasestablished.Until 2023,TheWaltDisneyCompanyhadenjoyedvotingrightsthathadamountedto

1 Kagan,Elena.“PrivateSpeech,PublicPurpose:TheRoleofGovernmentalMotiveinFirst AmendmentDoctrine.”TheUniversityofChicagoLawReview63,no.2(1996):413.

2 UnitedStatesv.O’Brien,391U.S.367,88S.Ct.1673,20L.Ed.2d672,1968U.S.LEXIS 2910(SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesMay27,1968,Decided).

3 CitizensUnitedv.FEC,558U.S.310,130S.Ct.876,175L.Ed.2d753,2010U.S.LEXIS 766,78U.S.L.W.4078,159Lab.Cas.(CCH)P10,166,187L.R.R.M.2961,22Fla.L.Weekly Fed.S73(SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesJanuary21,2010,Decided).

completelandusecontrolofthedistrict’sboard,wherethecompanywasleftresponsibleforprovidingallrespectivepower,water,roads,police,andfireprotection withinthedistrict,withresidentsofthesurroundingOrangeandOsceolacounties remainingtax-exempttowardsthoseservices.ThedissolutionoftheReedyCreek ImprovementDistricthasleftTheWaltDisneyCompanysubjecttolandusedecisionsbyaboardthatisselectedbytheGovernorandapprovedbytheSenate,in whatisnowknownastheCentralFloridaTourismOversightDistrict,overwhich thecompanyhasnocontrol.TheWaltDisneyCompanyassertsthatsuchalossof controlamountstoaconstitutionalinjurythatisdirectlytiedtothestate-appointed boardthatisempoweredtomakecriticallandusedecisionsthatcouldimpedeany futureprojectsordevelopmentsthecompanyseekstopursue.4

TheWaltDisneyCompanyclaimsthatevidenceoflegislativeanimusinvalidates theconstitutionalvalidityoflegislationstrippingthecompanyofitsspecialdistrict status.Thesourceofsuchanimus,TheWaltDisneyCompanyalleges,originates fromthecompany’spublicoppositiontotheParentalRightsinEducationAct (otherwiseknownasthe“Don’tSayGay”law).Initspursuitofdeclaratoryand injunctiverelieffollowingthedissolutionofitsspecialdistrictstatus,TheWalt DisneyCompanyhadfiledacomplaintagainstGovernorRonDesantis,theSecretary ofFlorida’sDepartmentofCommerce,andallmembersoftheCFTODboardto theUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheNorthernDistrictofFlorida.TheDistrict CourthadgrantedtheGovernorandtheSecretary’smotiontodismiss,holdingthat DisneyhadlackedproperstandingtosueandcitingEleventhAmendmentimmunity protections.InitsreviewofthemeritsofDisney’sclaimsagainsttheCFTODboard, theDistrictCourthadconcludedthatafaciallyconstitutionalstatuteinvalidates anyfreespeechchallengesthatcallintoquestiontheintentionoflawmakers.5

IITroubleintheMagicKingdom

OnMarch28,2022,theFloridaLegislaturepassedtheParentalRightsinEducationAct(HB1577),garneringnotorietyamongcriticsasthe”Don’tSayGayBill.”6 OnMarch9,thethenparentCEOofTheWaltDisneyCompany,BobChapek,had personallycalledGovernorRonDeSantistooutlinehisconcernswithHB1577.

4 WaltDisneyParks&ResortsUnitedStates,Inc.v.DeSantis,2024U.S.Dist.LEXIS23022, F.Supp.3d (UnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheNorthernDistrictofFlorida,Tallahassee DivisionJanuary31,2024,Filed).

5 Ibid.

6 WALTDISNEYPARKSANDRESORTSUSINCv.DESANTIS,4:23-cv-00163,(N.D.Fla. Apr26,2023)ECFNo.1

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Mr.ChapekwaswarnedbytheGovernorthat”itwasamistakeforDisneyto getinvolved,”andthat”it’snotgoingtoworkoutwellforyou.”7 Uponreceiving noticethatTheWaltDisneyCompanywouldbepausingfurthercampaigndonationstothestate,GovernorDeSantiswouldproceedtoinformprominentdonors that”[w]okeDisneyisnowechoingtheDemocratpropagandaandfallingforthe corporatemedia’sphonyhysteriaoveraFloridabillthatsensiblyprohibitsK-3rd gradersfrombeingindoctrinatedwithtransgenderismandR-ratedlessonsabout sexuality.”8

Notlongthereafter,WaltDisneyWorldwouldreleasethefollowingstatement inresponse:“ToALLwhocometothishappyplace,welcome.DisneyParks, ExperiencesandProductsiscommittedtocreatingexperiencesthatsupportfamily valuesforeveryfamily,andwillnotstandfordiscriminationinanyform.Weoppose anylegislationthatinfringesonbasichumanrights,andstandinsolidarityand supportourLGBTQIA+Cast,Crew,Imagineers,andfanswhomaketheirvoices heardtodayandeveryday.”9 OnMarch28,GovernorDesantisofficiallysigned theParentalRightsinEducationActintolaw.Thatsameday,TheWaltDisney Companyissuedapublicstatementexpressingitsoppositiontolegislationthatit believed“nevershouldhavebeensignedintolaw,”andfurtherreiteratingthatthe company“remain[ed]committedtosupportingthenationalandstateorganizations” workingtorepealthelaw.10 Theverynextday,GovernorDesantishadmadeclear thatDisney’sstatementhad“crossedtheline,”andpledgedto“makesurewe’re fightingback.”11 TheGovernorelaboratesinhismemoirthat“[t]hingsgotworse forDisney.”“Inpromisingtoworktorepealthebill,”heasserted,“thecompany waspledgingafrontalassaultonadulyenactedlawoftheStateofFlorida.”12 OnApril19,GovernorDeSantiscalledupontheLegislaturetoexpandaspecial sessionthathadbeenscheduledtoaddressredistrictingthemorethanonethousand independentspecialdistrictsthatwerecreatedbeforethepassageofthe1968Florida Constitution,includingtheReedyCreekImprovementDistrict.13 Thatsameday,

7 KimberlyLeonard,”FloridaGov.RonDeSantisSaidHeWarnedDisneyNottoGetInvolved inSchoolsDebate:‘It’sNotGoingtoWorkOutWellforYou,’”BUSINESSINSIDER(June8, 2022).

8 CortneyDrakeford,”‘WokeDisney’TrendsAfterGov.RonDeSantisAttacksCompanyfor FreezingCampaignDonations,”INT’LBUS.TIMES(Mar.12,2022).

9 AndrewKrietz,”DisneyReleasesStatementAsDeSantisPreparesToSignBillLimitingTeachingsAboutSexualOrientation,”Gender,WTSP(Mar.22,2022).

10 PressRelease,TheWaltDisneyCompany,StatementFromTheWaltDisneyCompanyon SigningofFloridaLegislation(Mar.11,2022).

11 DavidKihara,”DeSantisSaysDisney‘CrossedtheLine’inCallingfor‘Don’tSayGay’Repeal,” POLITICO(Mar.29,2022).

12 RonDeSantis,THECOURAGETOBEFREE,ch.12(2023).

13 FloridaGovernment,flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Proclamation.pdf.SeeProcla-

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thesponsorofHouseBill3C,RandyFine,madeexplicitlycleartotheFloridaHouse StateAffairsCommittee:“Youkickthehornet’snest,thingscomeup.AndIwill saythis:Yougotmeononething,thisbilldoestargetonecompany.IttargetsThe WaltDisneyCompany.”14

ThecircumstancessurroundingthepassageofFloridaHouseBill3CandFlorida SenateBill4Cwereindisputablyarbitraryandirregular.DespitetheGovernor’s insistencethatthelegislation’srationalestooduponananalysisofindependentspecialdistrictsappropriately“servingthepublicinterest,”noseriousanalysiscould havebeenconductedunderthecircumstances.15 Underthebill,districtscreated before1968werepreemptivelyscheduledfordissolutionbeforetheLegislaturecould quantifiablydeducewhichdistrictswereandweren’teligibletohavebeensubjectto thespeciallawrequirementsoftheFloridaConstitutionof1968whichprohibitspeciallawsextendingprivilegestoprivatecorporations.16 Instead,withnoconcrete planoutliningtheReedyCreekImprovementDistrict’smanagementofitsassets ordebtobligations,theFloridaLegislatureproceededtoignoreexpertopinionand usherinthedissolutionofthedistrict.Infact,theverysamedaythebillwassigned, credit-ratingagencieslikeFitchRatings,hadplacedReedyCreek’snearly $1billion inoutstandingbonddebtonanegativewatchdesignationalmostentirelybasedon “thelackofclarityregardingtheallocation”ofthedistrict’sassetsandliabilities.17 Further,aneartwenty-fivepercentpropertytaxincreasewaspredictedbyOrange CountyTaxCollector,ScottRandolph,“theminutethatReedyCreek[was]dissolved.”18 Again,thesecircumstancesdonotillustratetheactionsofalegislative bodyactingonadisinterested,rationalbasis,butwithintentionalandpainfulpersistence.ThoughtheDistrictCourtmayhaveconcludedthelegislationtohavebeen faciallyconstitutional—thatis,lackingtheimplicationofanyconstitutionallyprotectedconduct—thewidercircumstancessurroundingitconveyamaliciousattempt topunishacompanythathadexerciseditsconstitutionalrights.

mation,GovernorRonDeSantis(Apr.19,2022).

14 HearingonHB3CBeforetheFla.H.R.StateAffairsComm.,SpecialSession2022C(Apr. 19,2022)(remarksbyRepresentativeRandyFine,sponsorofHB3C,acompanionbilltoSB4C, startingat1:13:00).

15 WALTDISNEYPARKSANDRESORTSUSINCv.DESANTIS,4:23-cv-00163,(N.D.Fla. Apr26,2023)ECFNo.1.

16 “TheFloridaSenate.”TheFloridaConstitution-TheFloridaSenate.AccessedApril13, 2024.

17 DaraKim,CreditAgencyPlaces‘RatingWatchNegative’OnDisneyDebt,MIAMIHERALD (Apr.23,2022).

18 EricLevenson&SteveContorno,RonDeSantisSaysEndingDisney’sSelf-GoverningStatus Willbea‘Process.’Here’sWhatMightHappenNext,CNN(Apr.27,2022).

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IIITheFirstAmendment

DespiteallevidencesuggestingthatTheWaltDisneyCompanywasdeliberately targetedforexpressinganopinionthatmerelyranafoulofthestate’sideological purview,howcanitbethatstandardAmericanjurisprudencewouldpreventthe districtcourtfromreachingsuchanobviousconclusion?Ifwearetochallengethe stateofFloridaforinfringingupontheFirstAmendment,wemustfirstdefineour terms.FirstAmendmentchallengescompelthestatetoarticulateajustifiable,compellinginterestinthesmoothapplicationofanylawthatregulatesorimpedesupon certainmeansofexpression.19 Strictscrutiny,thehigheststandardofreview,isappliedwhenalawischallengedonthebasisofinfringinguponfundamentalrightsor involvesanyand“alllegalrestrictionswhichcurtailthecivilrightsofasingleracial group,”20 includingreligion,nationality,andalienage.21 Again,suchregulationsare presumptivelyunconstitutionalandmaybejustifiedonlyifthegovernmentproves thattheregulationsinquestionarenarrowlytailoredtoservecompellingstateinterests.22 Strictscrutinycanbeequallyappliedtotherestrictionofcontent-based speech,whichistobeinterpreteddistinctlyfromtheclassificationofspeechthat compelsthepreventionofillegalityorviolence.Acontent-basedregulationofspeech undertheFirstAmendment“target[s]speechbasedonitscommunicativecontent,” insofarthatit“appliestoparticularspeechbecauseofthetopicdiscussedorthe ideaormessageexpressed.”23 Thegovernmentmaynotrestrictspeechforanyreasonhavingtodowitheitherthespecificmessagesconveyedwithinthespeechorthe consequencessubsequenttothem.Thegovernmentmayonlyimposerestrictionsfor reasonsrelatingonlytoaspectsofthespeechindependentofthemessageconveyed, suchasthespeech’sdecibellevel.24

Beyondtheconfinesofsuspectclassificationsorfundamentalrights,theSupreme Courtappliesastandardofminimalscrutiny.Therationalbasisstandardofreview isappliedwiththepresumptionthatlegislationisconstitutional,andwillremain upheldinsofarasanyclassificationsdrawnwithinthestatuteinquestionareratio-

19 GayleLynnPettinga,”RationalBasisWithBite:IntermediateScrutinybyAnyOtherName,” IndianaLawJournal:Vol.62(1987):Iss.3,Article10.

20 Korematsuv.UnitedStates,323U.S.214,65S.Ct.193,89L.Ed.194,1944U.S.LEXIS 1341(SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesDecember18,1944,Decided.)

21 Fallon,RichardH,“StrictJudicialScrutiny,”UCLALawReview,1Jan.2007.

22 Reedv.TownofGilbert,576U.S.155,135S.Ct.2218,192L.Ed.2d236,2015U.S.LEXIS 4061,83U.S.L.W.4444,25Fla.L.WeeklyFed.S383(SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesJune 18,2015,Decided).

23 Ibid.

24 Kagan,Elena.“PrivateSpeech,PublicPurpose:TheRoleofGovernmentalMotiveinFirst AmendmentDoctrine.”TheUniversityofChicagoLawReview63,no.2(1996):413.

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nallytiedtoanarticulablestateinterest.25 Withinthisstandardofjudicialreview, theCourtalmostinvariablydeferstothejudgmentofthelegislativebodyandallows themereplausiblepresenceoffactstoserveassufficientjustificationstosupport achallengedstatute.Assumingthatthestatewastofailtopresentanarticulable justificationforachallengedstatute,theCourtwillsupplantitsownjustification. Alegislaturemayachieveitsaims“onestepatatime,addressingitselftothephase oftheproblemwhichseemsmostacutetothelegislativemind.”26 Thatbeingsaid, thedissolutionoftheReedyCreekDistrictisnotalegislativeactionthatregulates speechinanydistinctway.BecauseTheWaltDisneyCompanyisnotasuspect class,wasnotexplicitlymentionedbyname,andthelegitimacyofthestatutewas challengedbasedonaninjuryuponabreachofcontract,thetruefocusistobe directedtowardstheconstitutionalityoftheactofgovernmentretaliationinandof itself.

IVInterpretingIntent

TheWaltDisneyCompany’scaseultimatelyrestsuponaninviolable,central promiseoftheFirstAmendment:thegovernmentcannotretaliateagainstindividualsorassociationsthatexercisetheirFirstAmendmentrights“byimposing sanctionsfortheexpressionofparticularviewsitopposes.”27 Indeed,in Perryv. Sindermann,theopinionoftheCourt:

”[f]oratleastaquarter-century,[theUnitedStatesSupreme]Court hasmadeclearthateventhoughapersonhasno’right’toavaluable governmentbenefit,andeventhoughthegovernmentmaydenyhimthe benefitforanynumberofreasons,therearesomereasonsuponwhich thegovernmentmaynotrely.Itmaynotdenyabenefittoapersonona basisthatinfringes[their]constitutionallyprotectedinterests–especially [their]interestinfreedomofspeech.Forifthegovernmentcoulddeny abenefittoapersonbecauseofhisconstitutionallyprotectedspeechor associations,hisexerciseofthosefreedomswouldineffectbepenalized

25 GayleLynnPettinga,”RationalBasisWithBite:IntermediateScrutinybyAnyOtherName,” IndianaLawJournal:Vol.62(1987):Iss.3,Article10.

26 McGowanv.Maryland,366U.S.420,81S.Ct.1101,6L.Ed.2d393,1961U.S.LEXIS2008, 42Lab.Cas.(CCH)P50,258,17OhioOp.2d151(SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesMay29, 1961,Decided).

27 Smithv.ArkansasStateHighwayEmployees,441U.S.463,99S.Ct.1826,60L.Ed.2d 360,1979U.S.LEXIS95,101L.R.R.M.2091(SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesApril30,1979, Decided).

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andinhibited.”28

TheleewayaffordedtoTheWaltDisneyCompany,whichhadtranslatedintoprominentcontrolovercriticallandusedecisionsconcerningDisney’sdevelopmentofits property,wasanintentionaleffectofthecontractualestablishmentoftheReedy CreekImprovementDistrictattheonset.29 Anylawthatsignificantlyimpairsa governmentalentity’scontractswithaprivateactorisespeciallysuspectandhence subjecttoheightenedjudicialscrutiny.30

TheintentoftheFloridaLegislatureisconspicuouslyevident,butforDisney, theDistrictCourthadlackedthedoctrinalprecedentnecessarytodirectlyinquire theimpropermotiveoftheLegislatureenactingafaciallyconstitutionalstatute allegedlyissuedinretaliationtotheexerciseofafundamentalright.Thecentral aimofthisdoctrinemustfirstidentifyaclearstandardofcharacteristicsamounting toanimproperlegislativemotive.31 Byinquiringintothemotiveofthelegislativebody,emphasisisdirectedbothtowardstheconsequenceofthelawonpublic discourseandtraceableconstitutionalinjury.AsDisney’scasehasshown,facially constitutionalstatutescanbeissuedinretaliationagainstthosewhodonotfall underthedesignationofsuspectclassification.AstheDistrictCourtelaborated: “Disneyarguesthat...courtsfrequentlyinquireintolegislativemotivetodetermine whetherafaciallyconstitutionalstatutewasenactedforanimpermissiblepurpose. Butitreliesonraceandreligioncases,aswellascasesinvolvingstatutesdesigned toregulatespeech.”32 Becausefaciallyconstitutionalstatutesimplicatenoconstitutionalrights,theburdenofproofliesinthetangible,traceableinjuryinflictedupon thepetitioner.

VCauseandEffectDoctrine

Theestablishmentofasafeguardagainstfaciallyconstitutional,retaliatorylegislationmustbetacitlydesignedtoallowcourtstodetectapatternofcauseand effect.Morespecifically,inthisinstance,acleardisplayofgovernmentretaliation

28 Perryv.Sindermann,408U.S.593,92S.Ct.2694,33L.Ed.2d570,1972U.S.LEXIS20,1 I.E.R.Cas.(BNA)33(SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesJune29,1972,Decided).

29 WALTDISNEYPARKSANDRESORTSUSINCv.DESANTIS,4:23-cv-00163,(N.D.Fla. Apr26,2023)ECFNo.1.

30 UnitedStatesTrustCo.v.NewJersey,431U.S.1,97S.Ct.1505,52L.Ed.2d92,1977 U.S.LEXIS1(SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesApril27,1977).

31 Kagan,Elena.“PrivateSpeech,PublicPurpose:TheRoleofGovernmentalMotiveinFirst AmendmentDoctrine.”TheUniversityofChicagoLawReview63,no.2(1996):413.

32 WaltDisneyParks&ResortsUnitedStates,Inc.v.DeSantis,2024U.S.Dist.LEXIS23022, F .Supp.3d

( UnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheNorthernDistrictofFlorida,TallahasseeDivisionJanuary 31,2024,Filed) 20

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againstspeech.Thisdoctrineconsistsoftwocoreprongs.Onethatspeakstothe intentofalawandanotherthatspeakstoitseffect.Theinclusionoflegislativeintentwithinacourt’sanalysisremainsadauntingtask.ButasJusticeElenaKagan elaborates,“theprohibitionofcertainmotivesagainservesasawaytodelineatethe propersphereofauthority,herebypreventingademocraticstatefromcontravening keyprinciplesofself-governmentandtherebyunderminingitsfoundation.”33 Such anevaluationintointentisnottobeconstruedtomerelyscrutinizetheprudenceor moralcharacteroflawmakersbutrathertoallowthoroughinquirytowardstheconstitutionalimplicationstetheredtothelawstheyenact.Themaintenanceofcomity betweendepartmentsofstateandthewiderpoliticalprocessremainsparamount.34 Thefactremainsthatthedisinterestedpursuitofpolicyisnotaconstitutionalrequirement,as“[p]oliticsisnotmerely,orevenprimarily,thedisinterestedpursuitof thepublicinterest.[But]apowerstruggle.”35 Thispowerstruggleinevitablycarries theconsequenceoflegislationthatisaimedtofavorsupportersanddisfavorpolitical opponents.ACauseandEffectdoctrineisthuspredicatedontheidentificationof athresholddistinguishingpoliticsfromnefariousconstitutionalabridgment.Toaccomplishthis,judicialinquirytowardslegislativeintentwouldhavetobeapplicable beyondinvidiousgrounds,suchasrace,sex,andreligion,andinsteadapplicableto distinctclaimsofconstitutionalinjury.

Theeffectofthechallengedlegislationisevaluatedtodeterminetheextentof injuryinflicted,andtheleveloftangibleinfringementonspeech.Courtsmust beabletoreasonablyinferthatthechallengedlegislationhadeffectivelyplaceda barrierbetweenthepetitionerandtheirfreeexerciseofspeech.This“chillingeffect” onthefreeexerciseofspeechisunderstoodtooccur“whenindividualsseekingto engageinactivityprotectedbytheFirstAmendmentaredeterredfromdoingso bygovernmentalregulationnotspecificallydirectedatthatprotectedactivity.”36 InDisney’scase,thedissolutionoftheReedyCreekImprovementDistrictandthe subsequentabrogationofstatecontractshadplacedthecompanyinapositionto weightheriskofmaintainingtheirpublicdisapprovalwiththestateinfearoffurther punishment.Ultimately,tosupportaretaliationclaim,theimpactofthelawmust carryboththeinferrableandarticulableeffectofdeterringthefurtherexerciseof speech.Here,theburdenofproofrestsuponthepetitionerintheirarticulationof

33 Kagan,Elena,“PrivateSpeech,PublicPurpose:TheRoleofGovernmentalMotiveinFirst AmendmentDoctrine,”TheUniversityofChicagoLawReview63,no.2(1996):413.

34 Ibid.

35 FraternalOrderofPoliceHobartLodge121,Inc.v.Hobart,864F.2d551,1988U.S.App. LEXIS18015(UnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheSeventhCircuitDecember29,1988,Decided).

36 Schauer,Frederick.“Fear,RiskandtheFirstAmendment:UnravelingtheChillingEffect.” William&MaryLawSchoolScholarshipRepository.AccessedApril19,2024.

theextentofsaidimpact.

VIConclusion

Toconclude,toprovethataconstitutionallyimpermissibleinflictionofpunishmentwasenacted,theinjuredpartymustbeabletoarticulatetheexistenceofan inflictedinjury;thattheinjurycontainscleartraceabilitytothechallengedstatute; andthattheinflictionofinjurycanbequantifiablydetectedwithinthecontentof saidstatute.Whiletheburdenofproofmayfallonthepetitionerinthisinstance, inthemattersoftheFirstAmendment,theultimateburdenfallsonourinstitutionsandelectedofficials.Agovernmentattackonafundamentalfreedomcanonly beinterpretedasanofficialderelictionofdutytothecollectivevisionofdemocracy thatliveswithintheheartsofallAmericans.Indeed,”[t]heFirstAmendmentserves notonlytheneedsofthepolitybutalsothoseofthehumanspirit—aspiritthat demandsself-expression.”37

37 Procunierv.Martinez,416U.S.396,94S.Ct.1800,40L.Ed.2d224,1974U.S.LEXIS132, 71OhioOp.2d139(SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesApril29,1974,Decided).

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WorksCited

Drakeford,Cortney. ‘WokeDisney’TrendsAfterGov.RonDeSantisAttacksCompanyforFreezingCampaignDonations.INT’LBUS.TIMES,2022.Source.

Fallon,RichardH.“StrictJudicialScrutiny.”UCLALawReview,1Jan.2007.

FraternalOrderofPoliceHobartLodge121,Inc.v.Hobart,864F.2d551,1988U.S.App.LEXIS 18015(UnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheSeventhCircuitDecember29,1988,Decided).

HearingonHB3CBeforetheFla.H.R.StateAffairsComm.,SpecialSession2022C(Apr.19, 2022)(remarksbyRepresentativeRandyFine,sponsorofHB3C,companionbilltoSB4C,startingat1:13:00).Source.

Kagan,Elena.“PrivateSpeech,PublicPurpose:TheRoleofGovernmentalMotiveinFirst AmendmentDoctrine.”TheUniversityofChicagoLawReview63,no.2(1996):413.Source.

Kihara,David.DeSantisSaysDisney‘CrossedtheLine’inCallingfor‘Don’tSayGay’Repeal. POLITICO,2022.Source.

Kim,Dara. CreditAgencyPlaces‘RatingWatchNegative’OnDisneyDebt.MIAMIHERALD (Apr.23,2022).Source.

Korematsuv.UnitedStates,323U.S.214,65S.Ct.193,89L.Ed.194,1944U.S.LEXIS1341 (SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesDecember18,1944,Decided).Source.

Krietz,Andrew. DisneyReleasesStatementAsDeSantisPreparesToSignBillLimitingTeachings AboutSexualOrientation.Gender,WTSP,2022.Source.

Leonard,Kimberly. FloridaGov.RonDeSantisSaidHeWarnedDisneyNottoGetInvolvedin SchoolsDebate:’It’sNotGoingtoWorkOutWellforYou.’ BUSINESSINSIDER,2022.Source.

Levenson,Eric,andSteveContorno. RonDeSantisSaysEndingDisney’sSelf-GoverningStatus WillBea‘Process.’Here’sWhatMightHappenNext.CNN,2022.Source.

McGowanv.Maryland,366U.S.420,81S.Ct.1101,6L.Ed.2d393,1961U.S.LEXIS2008, 42Lab.Cas.(CCH)P50,258,17OhioOp.2d151(SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesMay29, 1961,Decided).Source.

Perryv.Sindermann,408U.S.593,92S.Ct.2694,33L.Ed.2d570,1972U.S.LEXIS20,1 I.E.R.Cas.(BNA)33(SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesJune29,1972,Decided).Source.

Pettinga,GayleLynn.”RationalBasisWithBite:IntermediateScrutinybyAnyOtherName.” IndianaLawJournal:Vol.62(1987):Iss.3,Article10.Source.

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PressRelease,TheWaltDisneyCompany. StatementFromTheWaltDisneyCompanyonSigning ofFloridaLegislation.2022.Source.

Procunierv.Martinez,416U.S.396,94S.Ct.1800,40L.Ed.2d224,1974U.S.LEXIS132,71 OhioOp.2d139(SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesApril29,1974,Decided).

Reedv.TownofGilbert,576U.S.155,135S.Ct.2218,192L.Ed.2d236,2015U.S.LEXIS4061, 83U.S.L.W.4444,25Fla.L.WeeklyFed.S383(SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesJune18, 2015,Decided).Source.

RonDeSantis. THECOURAGETOBEFREE.ch.12(2023).Source.SeeProclamation,GovernorRonDeSantis(Apr.19,2022).

Schauer,Frederick.“Fear,RiskandtheFirstAmendment:UnravelingtheChillingEffect.” William&MaryLawSchoolScholarshipRepository.AccessedApril19,2024.Source.

Smithv.ArkansasStateHighwayEmployees,441U.S.463,99S.Ct.1826,60L.Ed.2d360,1979 U.S.LEXIS95,101L.R.R.M.2091(SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesApril30,1979,Decided). Source.

“TheFloridaSenate.”TheFloridaConstitution—TheFloridaSenate.AccessedApril13,2024. Source.

UnitedStatesTrustCo.v.NewJersey,431U.S.1,97S.Ct.1505,52L.Ed.2d92,1977U.S. LEXIS1(SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesApril27,1977).Source.

WaltDisneyParks&ResortsUnitedStates,Inc.v.DeSantis.2024U.S.Dist.LEXIS23022, F.Supp.3d(UnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheNorthernDistrictofFlorida,TallahasseeDivision, January31,2024,Filed).

WaltDisneyParksAndResortsUSIncv.Desantis.4:23cv-00163,2023ECFNo.1.

WestVirginiav.EPA:The“Major QuestionsDoctrine”anditsEffectson EnvironmentalLegalProtections JessChisholm’27 Spring2024

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Abstract

Inthe2022SupremeCourtcase WestVirginiav.EnvironmentalProtection Agency,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtruledthattheEPAhadoversteppedits authorityingreenhousegasregulationthroughtheCleanPowerPlan.Thecaseis potentbothinitslegalimplicationsandenvironmentaleffects,servingasamajor showcaseofthe“majorquestionsdoctrine,”theideathatCongressmustspecifically legislatesignificantfederalagencypolicydecisions.Despiteexistingasatheory forovertwentyyears,thiswasthemostsubstantialuseofthedoctrineinterms ofitseffectonfederalenvironmentalpolicy.Theimpactofthelegalprecedence providedbythecasewillbeperhapsthemostimportanteffectofthedecision,as itimplementsasubstantiallimitationonenvironmentalregulation.Thisjournalis intendedtoanalyzethecase,itsapplicationofthemajorquestionsdoctrine,andits socialandpoliticalimplications.Whiletheuseofthemajorquestionsdoctrinehad somebasisinprecedence,thedismantlingoftheEPA’sabilitytoregulateemissions wasanoversteppingofthecourt’spower,wentagainstbothpreviousSupremeCourt decisionsandcongressionalauthorization,andwashighlydetrimentaltotheUnited States’fightagainstclimatechangeandtofutureenvironmentallitigation.

IIntroduction

Environmentalprotection,specificallyregardingcontrollingclimatechange,has becomeincreasinglylitigated.Asclimatelitigationincreasesinfrequencyworldwide, thereservoiroflegalprecedentgrows,formingawell-definedfieldoflaw.“The totalnumberofclimatechangecasesworldwidehasmorethandoubledsincethe firstreportontheissue,from884in2017to2,180in2022.”1 Astheeffectsof climatechangebecomemoreprominent,environmentalregulationcasesincreasein importance.TheUnitedStateshasexemplifiedthistrend;astrongunderstandingof U.S.environmentallegalstandardshasbecomekeytoawell-roundedcomprehension oftheAmericanlegalsystemitself.Inrecentyears,nocasehasimpactednational climatepolicyandlitigationmorethantheSupremeCourt’s2022 WestVirginia v.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency.Thejournalwillconsistoffourfollowing subsections.Thenextwillexaminethecase’sbackground.Thethirdsectionwill discussthemajoritydecision,thedissentingopinion,andrelevantpastcases.Iwill analyzethecaseanditsimplicationsinthefourthsection,followedbyabrieffifth concludingsection.

1 “ClimateLitigationMorethanDoublesinFiveYears,NowaKeyToolinDeliveringClimate Justice,”UNEnvironment,2023.

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IIBackground

Beforediscussingthecase,contextdatingbackfiftyyearsisnecessary.Codified in1970,theCleanAirActpassedbyCongresscontinuestobe“thecomprehensive federallawthatregulatesairemissionsfromstationaryandmobilesources.”2 In 2015,theObamaAdministrationestablishedtheCleanPowerPlan,anEPApolicythatregulatedcarbondioxideemissions.3 TheEPAusedSection111ofthe CleanAirActasthebasisforthisplan,which“directsEPAtoregulatestationary sourcesofanysubstancethat‘causes,orcontributessignificantlyto,airpollution.’”4 ThissectionallowedtheEPAtodetermineemissionlimitsforstatesfromthefederallevel.5 TheCleanPowerPlan“wasprojectedtolowergreenhousegas(GHG) emissionsfromexistingpowerplants32%from2005levelsby2030.”6 Thelargest channelthroughwhichtheCleanPowerPlanwouldreduceemissionsisgenerational shifting,whichisanEPApolicythatrequires“ashiftinelectricityproductionfrom certainfossilfuelpowergenerationsources,primarilyfiredbycoalandnaturalgas, toothersourcesthatemitlesscarbondioxide.”7 The“generationalshifting”form ofregulationwouldbeperhapsthemostcontroversialaspectoftheplan.

TheTrumpadministrationrepealedtheCleanPowerPlan,replacingitwith thesignificantlylessstrictAffordableCleanEnergyRule.Thisrulewasprojected toreducecarbonemissionsbyjust0.7%by2030.8 However,in2021,theU.S. CourtofAppealsfortheDistrictofColumbiaCircuitdecidedunanimouslyto”toss theEnvironmentalProtectionAgency’sAffordableCleanEnergyrule,”renderingit unabletobeenforced.9 Theappealscourt“heldthatEPA’s‘repealoftheClean PowerPlanrestedcriticallyonamistakenreadingoftheCleanAirAct’—namely, thatgenerationshiftingcannotbea‘systemofemissionreduction.’”10 Afterthe

2 “SummaryoftheCleanAirAct,”EPA.

3 WestVirginiav.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency,597U.S.1(2022).

4 Ibid.

5 “SummaryoftheCleanAirAct.”EPA.

6 “RegulatingGreenhouseGasesfromExistingPowerPlants-theCleanPowerPlan,Affordable CleanEnergyRule,&2023PowerPlantRules,”HarvardLawSchool-Environmental&Energy LawProgram,2024.

7 SethKerschner,TaylorPullins,andLauraMulry,“SupremeCourtRulesEPACannotRequire ExistingFossilFuelPowerFacilitiestoShifttoLowerCO2EmittingSourcesofElectricity,”White &CaseLLP,2022.

8 RegulatingGreenhouseGasesfromExistingPowerPlants-theCleanPowerPlan,Affordable CleanEnergyRule,&2023PowerPlantRules-HarvardLawSchool.”HarvardLawSchoolEnvironmental&EnergyLawProgram,March4,2024.

9 ValerieVolcovici,“U.S.CourtDealsFinalBlowtoTrumpEpa’sCleanPowerRuleReplacement,”Reuters,January19,2021.

10 WestVirginiav.EPA,597U.S.3(2022).

CourtofAppealsdecision,“Statesandprivateentities—includingpetitionershere WestVirginia,NorthDakota,WestmorelandMiningHoldingsLLC,andTheNorth AmericanCoalCorporation(NACC)”filedpetitionstodefendtheAffordableClean EnergyruleandrepealtheCleanPowerPlan.11 WhentheSupremeCourtaccepted thepetitions,thecaseofficiallybegan.

IIIRulings

Thequestionpresentedinthewritofcertiorarithatthecourtneededtodecideon wasasfollows:“In42U.S.C. § 7411(d),anancillaryprovisionoftheCleanAirAct, didCongressconstitutionallyauthorizetheEnvironmentalProtectionAgencyto issuesignificantrules—includingthosecapableofreshapingthenation’selectricity gridsandunilaterallydecarbonizingvirtuallyanysectoroftheeconomy—without anylimitsonwhattheagencycanrequiresolongasitconsiderscost,non-air impacts,andenergyrequirements?”12 Thecasefocusedontheextenttowhichthe CleanAirActcanbeusedtoregulateemissions,includingthroughgenerational shifting.Inthe6-3decision,thejusticesheldthat“CongressdidnotgrantEPAin Section111(d)oftheCleanAirActtheauthoritytodeviseemissionscapsbasedon thegenerationshiftingapproachtheagencytookintheCleanPowerPlan.”13

Essentially,thejusticesruledthattheEPA’sregulationexceededtheauthorizationgivenintheCleanAirAct.Theysustainedthat“administrativeagenciesmust pointtoclearcongressionalauthorizationwhentheyissueeconomicallyorpolitically significantregulations.”14 Thislegalperspectiveisknownasthe”majorquestions doctrine.”IntheUnitedStates,thefederalbureaucracy’spowerexiststhrough congressionalauthorization;typically,congress“delegatesauthoritytoagenciesto regulateparticularaspectsofsociety,ingeneral,orbroadterms.”15 Thisbroad delegationhasallowedfederalagenciestomakeinternaldecisionsregardingmajor policyissuestheyoversee.Inthisexample,theEPAusedthisbroadauthoritythat itclaimedwasgivenbytheCleanAirActtoregulateemissions.Thisiswhere theSupremeCourt’smajorquestionsdoctrinecomesin;throughthisdoctrine,the sixSupremeCourtjudgesmakingupthemajorityarguedthatspecific,notbroad, authorizationfromCongressisneededformajorpolicydecisionsmadebyfederal

11 Ibid.,12.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.,4.

14 LouisJ.CapozziIII,”ARTICLE:ThePastandFutureoftheMajorQuestionsDoctrine,” OhioStateLawJournal,84,191(2023).

15 “TheMajorQuestionsDoctrine,”2022.

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agencies.

ThemajorquestionsdoctrinehasbeenusedinseveralrecentSupremeCourt cases,manyunrelatedtoenvironmentalissues.Forexample,ithasbeenusedin casesrangingfromtariffstotobaccoregulationtoevictionmoratoriums.16 The premisedatesbacktothe1994MCITelecommunicationsCorp.v.AT&Tcase, whoseopinion“laidthegroundworkforwhathasbecomeknownasthemajorquestionsdoctrine.”17 Theimplicationofthislegaldoctrineisperhapsthemostimportantrepercussionofthiscase;itseverelyrestrictstheabilityoffederalagencies toenactmajorpolicydecisionswithoutspecificcongressionalapproval.Furthermore,thedecisionimpactsallareaswherefederalagenciesholdpower,notjust environmentallaw.ThecaseshowsthecurrentRobertscourtassupportiveofthe doctrine,heraldingthatfuturecasesregardingagencypowerwilllikelyhavesimilar conclusionswiththecurrentcourt.

Despitethepreviousapplicationofthemajorquestionsdoctrine,themajority decisionreversedpreviousdecisions,limitedcongressionalauthorization,androlled backimportantenvironmentalprotections.TheSupremeCourt’sdecisionshowcasedasignificantdeparturefromthecourt’s2008 Massachusettsv.EPA decision: thecourtruled5-4that“theCleanAirActallowstheEnvironmentalProtection Agencytoregulategreenhousegassesbecausetheyqualifyasairpollutants.”18 Inhis majorityopinionin Massachusetts,JohnPaulStevensstatedthat“thereisnothing counterintuitivetothenotionthattheEPAcancurtailtheemissionofsubstances thatareputtingtheglobalclimateoutofkilter.”19 InWestVirginia,thecourt foundtheopposite.AlsoimportanttonoteisthatJohnRoberts,thecurrentchief justice,wrotethedissentingopinionfor Massachusetts andthemajorityopinionfor WestVirginia.Today’smoreconservativecourtreversedthepreviousdecisionand restricted,ratherthanexpanded,federalenvironmentalprotections.

JusticeElenaKaganprovidesaratherscathingdissentin WestVirginiav.EPA Shewritesthat“thelimitsthemajoritynowputsonEPA’sauthorityflyintheface ofthestatuteCongresswrote.”20 KaganarguesthatCongressionalauthorization forgenerationalshiftingwasgiven“whenitbroadlyauthorizedEPAinSection111 toselectthe“bestsystemofemissionreduction”forpowerplants.”21 Kaganalso criticizesthemajority’suseofthemajorquestionsdoctrine,arguingthatit“replaces

16 Ibid.

17 ThomasGriffithandHaleyProctor,“Deference,Delegation,andDivination:JusticeBreyer andtheFutureoftheMajorQuestionsDoctrine,”www.yalelawjournal.org.,2021.

18 Massachusettsv.EPA,549U.S.497(2007).

19 Ibid.

20 WestVirginiav.EPA,597U.S.4(2022).

21 Ibid.

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normaltext-in-contextstatutoryinterpretationwithsometougher-to-satisfysetof rules.”22 Shearguesthatthemajoritywasnotfollowingprecedentinitsdecision,as thecasestheycitedaspromotingthemajorquestionsdoctrineinvolvedsubstantially differentsituationsinwhichagenciesworkedoutsideoftheirbounds:“[in]each case,theCourtthought,theagencyhadstrayedoutofitslane,toanareawhereit hadneitherexpertisenorexperience.”23 Kaganassertsregarding WestVirginiav. EPA:“ThisisnottheAttorneyGeneralregulatingmedicalcare,oreventheCDC regulatinglandlord-tenantrelations.ItisEPA(that’stheEnvironmentalProtection Agency,incasethemajorityforgot)actingtoaddressthegreatestenvironmental challengeofourtime.”24 Thiscasedidnotinvolveanagencyregulatinganareait didnothaveauthorityover.Shefurtherarguesthatthemajorityhasoverstepped itsboundsinitsdecisionbydeterminingthat“thecourt,ratherthanCongress,will decidehowmuchregulationistoomuch.”25

IVAnalysisandImplications

ItisclearthatCongressgrantedauthoritytotheEPAtodeterminethebestway toreducegreenhousegasemissions.WhentheEPAcreatedaplantosignificantly reduceemissions,thecourtruledagainstitinahighlyunnecessaryintervention.By declaringthattheEPAcouldnotuseitspowertopromotegenerationalshifting, thecourteffectivelygaveitselfpowerovertheagencyandCongress.Thedecision removedpowerfromtheexpertsinthefield,relocatingittotheSupremeCourtjustices.Thisuseofthemajorquestionsdoctrinecurtailstheessenceofcongressionally authorizedregulation.Theintentionofcongressionalauthorization,includingthe onegivenintheCleanAirAct,istodelegatebroadauthoritytotheagenciesand allowtheexpertsintheagencytoregulateitsindustry.However,initsdecision, theSCOTUSmajoritydecidedtointerveneandrequireextensiveCongressional approvalofspecificregulations.

Thenegativeenvironmentaleffectsofthedecisionaresubstantial.WhenpromulgatingtheCleanPowerPlan,EPAestimatedthat”improvedairqualityresulting froma32%reductioninGHGemissionsby2030wouldeachyearprevent3600prematuredeaths,1700heartattacks,90,000asthmaattacks,and300,000missedschool andworkdays,yieldingayearlyeconomicbenefitof $34billion.”26 Thecourt’sin-

22 Ibid.,15.

23 Ibid.,19.

24 Ibid.,20-21.

25 Ibid.,32.

26 KennethW.Kizer,FredericaP.Perera,andKariC.Nadeau,“HealthImplicationsoftheWest

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terventionintheEPA’sregulationwilllikelycostlivesthroughpollutionandworsen theUnitedStates’sfightagainstclimatechange.Fortunately,muchofthenegative environmentaleffectsofthedecisionwerereversedbytheInflationReductionAct (IRA).AstheBidenadministration’ssignatureenvironmentalbill,and“designed inanticipationoftheCourt’snewdemands,”theIRA’samendmenttotheClean AirActwasintendedto”provideaclearandcontemporarystatementthatgreenhousegassesareairpollutantsand...directtheEPAtoissuenewstandards.”27 To avoidthemajorquestionsdoctrinecriticismandthelimitationsitbroughttothe EPA’sregulationsaftertheruling,theBidenadministrationusedtheIRAtoassert congressionalapprovalofpollutantregulation;theSupremeCourtcouldnolonger arguethatCongresshadnotgivenexpressauthorityfortheregulationtheadministrationwantedtoadvance.ThepassingoftheIRAsignificantlyweakenstheWest Virginiav.EPAdecision’senvironmentalimpact,asitlargelyhaltsanydetrimental effectsofregulationbarriersonairpollution.Thus,thegreatestimpactoftheWest Virginiadecisionisnotontheenvironment,butratheronlegalprecedentforfuture cases.

VConclusion

WestVirginiav.EPA marksakeyusageofthemajorquestionsdoctrinein environmentallawthatwillcontinuetoinfluencefutureSupremeCourtdecisions. Sincethisruling,theSupremeCourthascontinuedtocurtailenvironmentalregulations:ina9-0decisionforSackettvsEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(2023),the court“establishedamorestringenttesttodeterminewhethertheCleanWaterAct appliestoawetland,”aheftyblowtotheEPA.28 Itseemsapparentthatthecourt hastakenanewapproachregardingfederalenvironmentalregulationbyremoving autonomyfromfederalagencies.Inanycase,themajorquestionsdoctrine,forbetterorforworse,willcontinuetoaffecttherangeandpoweroffederalregulation significantly.

VirginiavEnvironmentalProtectionAgencyUSSupremeCourtDecision,”TheLancetPlanetary Health6(11)(2022):e847–48.

27 DavidDoniger,“WESTVIRGINIA,THEINFLATIONREDUCTIONACT,ANDTHEFUTUREOFCLIMATEPOLICY,”EnvironmentalLawInstitute,n.d.

28 AmyHowe,”SupremeCourtcurtailsCleanWaterAct,”SCOTUSblog,2023.

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WorksCited

Capozzi,LouisJ.III.”ARTICLE:ThePastandFutureoftheMajorQuestionsDoctrine.”Ohio StateLawJournal(2023):84,191.Source.

“ClimateLitigationMorethanDoublesinFiveYears,NowaKeyToolinDeliveringClimate Justice.”UNEnvironment,2023.Source.

Doniger,David.“WESTVIRGINIA,THEINFLATIONREDUCTIONACT,ANDTHEFUTUREOFCLIMATEPOLICY.”EnvironmentalLawInstitute,n.d.Source.

Griffith,Thomas,andHaleyProctor.2021.“Deference,Delegation,andDivination:Justice BreyerandtheFutureoftheMajorQuestionsDoctrine.”www.yalelawjournal.org,2021.Source.

Howe,Amy.”SupremeCourtcurtailsCleanWaterAct.”SCOTUSblog,2023.Source.

Kerschner,Seth,TaylorPullins,andLauraMulry.“SupremeCourtRulesEPACannotRequire ExistingFossilFuelPowerFacilitiestoShifttoLowerCO2EmittingSourcesofElectricity.”White &CaseLLP,2022.Source.

Kizer,KennethW,FredericaPPerera,andKariCNadeau.“HealthImplicationsoftheWest VirginiavEnvironmentalProtectionAgencyUSSupremeCourtDecision.”TheLancetPlanetary Health6(11)(2022):e847–48.Source.

Massachusettsv.EPA,549U.S.497(2007)

“RegulatingGreenhouseGasesfromExistingPowerPlants-theCleanPowerPlan,AffordableClean EnergyRule,&2023PowerPlantRules.”HarvardLawSchool-Environmental&EnergyLaw Program,2024.Source.

“SummaryoftheCleanAirAct.”EPA.Source.

“TheMajorQuestionsDoctrine.”2022.Source.

Volcovici,Valerie.“U.S.CourtDealsFinalBlowtoTrumpEPA’sCleanPowerRuleReplacement.”Reuters,2021.Source.

WestVirginiav.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency,597U.S.3(2022).

RegionalClimateRefugeePolicies: ExpandingLegalFrameworks

AnaFerreira’26

Spring2024

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Abstract

Thispaperexplorestheintersectionofrefugeepolicieswiththecontemporary issueofclimatechange.Itadvocatesforashifttowardsregionalframeworksto addressthechallengesposedbyclimate-induceddisplacement,ratherthananinternationalone.ItaddressestheFreeMovementAgreements(FMAs)intheCaribbean regionasashort-termsolutionbutarguesthatinthelongterm,anexpansionis necessary.ItarguesfortheirexpansiontoincludemigrationroutestotheUnited States,Canada,andMexico,emphasizingtheimportanceoftakinginitiativein escalatingclimateimpact.Thepaperalsoaddressespotentialobstaclessuchas politicalresistanceandinfrastructurallimitations.Ultimately,itcallsforareevaluationofrefugeepoliciestoalignwiththerealitiesofclimatechangeandadvocates forinnovativeregionalstrategiestomitigateitseffectsonvulnerablepopulations.

IIntroduction

TheUnitedNationsdefinesarefugeeasaperson“owingtoawell-foundedfearof beingpersecutedforreasonsofrace,religion,nationality,membershipofaparticular socialgrouporpoliticalopinion,isoutsidethecountryof[their]nationality,andis unableor,owingtosuchfear,isunwillingtoavail[themself]oftheprotectionofthat country.”1 .Thisdefinitionhaslongbeendebatedsinceitsdevelopmentinthe20th century.Themostcurrentpointofcontentionisthelackofprotectionitprovides forthoseexperiencingclimate-induceddisplacement.Thispaperwillfirstanalyze thebroadercontextofwhytheexpansionoftheUNdefinitionofarefugeetoinclude climate-displacedpersonsisunfeasible.Itwillthennarrowthescopetofocuson theCaribbeanRegion,whichcurrentlyoperatesunderaregionalFreeMovement Agreement.AfteroutliningtheparametersofthisFMAaswellasthebeneficial aspects,itthentransitionstodiscussingwhythesebenefitsareonlyfeasibleinthe shortterm.Overall,itwillofferasolutioninwhichtheFMAexpandstoinclude NorthAmericanCountriesaswellandjustifiesthisexpansion.

1 “Refugees,”UNHCRUS.

IIUnderstandingthePitfallsofanInternational DefinitionofaClimateRefugee

Theneedforalegalbodytogovernthemassiverefugeemovementfirstarose aftervariousconflictsintheearly20thcentury.2 TheestablishmentoftheHigh CommissionerofRefugeesfollowed,andthe1951RefugeeConventionsetoutthe provisionsforrefugeestatusthatstilllargelyapplytoday.3 Inthescopeofthe20th century,adefinitionencompassingwarandpersecutionalignscontextuallywiththe historicaleventsofthetime.However,basingadefinitiononaparticulargroup inaparticulartimeperiodleavesanarrowwindowforfutureunpredictability.4 Asaresult,howmanypersonsorwhattypemayfallwithinthescopeofwho shouldbeentitledtorefugeestatusbecomeslimited.5 Thishasbecomeevidenced bytherecentpushtoexpandtheinternationaldefinitiontoincludeasubsetcalled “climaterefugees.”Theissuewithdefiningandexpandingaclimaterefugeeintoan internationaldefinitioncomesdowntotwomainissues:whatdefinesawell-founded fearofclimate-relatedissuesandthelackofresourcestomanagethoserefugeeswho alreadyqualify.Onaninternationallevel,toprovideparticularprotectionstoa ‘climatemigrant’demographic,theremustbetheestablishmentofclearcriteriato assesstheclaimsandtobeabletodistinguishthosewhofulfillthemfromthosewho donot.6 Therealityisthatwhatpushesapersontoseekrefugeasaresultofclimate canvarysogreatlythattheissuebecomestoonuancedforthecurrentcapabilitiesof theUNHCR—areclimaterefugeesonlythosewhohavebeenimpactedbyasevere climatedisaster?Wouldadefinitionincludepeoplewhocan’taffordtosustain themselvesthroughsubsistenceanymoreduetodeforestationanddesertification? Howimmediatedoestheriskofaclimatedangerhavetobetomotivatesomeoneto leave?Thereistoomuchambiguitytoassessthecomplexitiesofaninternational climaterefugeestatusproperly.Therefore,thisleavesustoanalyzealternateroutes forclimaterefugeestogainlegalground:regionalconsiderations.

2 FrancescaRosignoli,“TheUnresolvedLegalDisputeovertheRecognitionof‘Climate Refugees,’”EnvironmentalJusticeforClimateRefugees,March21,2022,31–71.

3 Ibid

4 AustinT.FragomenJr., TheRefugee:AProblemofDefinition,CaseWesternReserveJournal ofInternationalLaw3,no.1(January1,1970):45–69.

5 Ibid

6 SamuelHuckstepandMichaelClemens,“WhyWeWon’tReacha‘ClimateMigrant’Protection Category-andWhatWeCanDoInstead,”CenterForGlobalDevelopment.AccessedApril15, 2024.

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IIIAnalyzingtheFeasibilityofCurrentCaribbean RegionFMA

Regionalclimaterefugeeconsiderationsarenotanewidea,buttheirimpacts andlevelsofeffectivenessaregenerallyunknowntothepublic.Often,environmentalactivismjumpstotheend-all,be-allsolutiontoclimaterefugees—simplyprotect theclimate.Therealityis,however,thatpeopleneedtobeequippedwithlegalprotectionsfortheworst-casescenario.Evenifglobalcooperationallowsforacutback oncarbonemissions,reversingthecurrentimpactscouldtakeupto1,000yearsafter acompletecessation.7 Protectingtheclimateisalong-windedprocessthatrequires addressingnumerouscomplexfactors,andinthemeantime,individualsaffectedby climate-relatedissuescannotaffordtowaitwithoutlegalprotections.In2021,there werealreadymorethan1.6millionpeopledealingwithdisasterdisplacementinthe Americas.8 Withthisinmind,“FreeMovementAgreements”orFMAs–likethose utilizedintheCaribbean–havebeenproposedasaviablesolution.9 TheCaribbean FMAfunctionssuchthatwhentheyareinpeakhurricaneseason,orgiventhecase ofanintenseclimatedisaster,citizensfromparticipatingcountriesare:

“i)provideddisasterdisplacedpersonsarightofentryinotherislands;

ii)supportedthewaiveroftraveldocumentrequirementswheredocumentshadbeenlostordamaged;

iii)grantedindefinitestaystosomedisaster-displacedpersons,facilitatingpermanentresettlement

iv)easedaccesstoforeignlaborthroughamutualrecognitionofskills schemeand/orawaiverofworkpermitrequirements.”10

ThisFMAiseffectiveandworksasalegalpathwaythatdoesnotrequireinternationalscaleinvolvement.However,theseFMAsareviableonlyintheshortterm.Taking intoaccountlong-termanalysesofclimate-relatedissuesintheCaribbeandemonstratesthatagreaterlegalforcemaybenecessary.Betweentheyears1970-2010, stormfrequencyroseby540%and533%,respectively,whilethefrequencyofother

7 SusanSolomon,Gian-KasperPlattner,RetoKnutti,andPierreFriedlingstein,“Irreversible ClimateChangeDuetoCarbonDioxideEmissions,”ProceedingsoftheNationalAcademyof SciencesoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica106,no.6(February10,2009):1704–9.

8 CAF, ClimatechangeworsensthemigrationcrisisinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean, 2023.

9 AmaFrancis,“FREEMOVEMENTAGREEMENTS&CLIMATEINDUCEDMIGRATION: ACaribbeanCaseStudy,”ColumbiaLawSchool,Sept.2019.

10 Ibid.

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climatedisastersincreasedby309%and425%.11 Additionally,floodsexceeding1 mMHHW(MeanHigherHighWater)arelikelytobecomecommonbytheendof thecentury.12 Furthermore,theCaribbeandealswith“twinvulnerabilities”thatgo handinhandwithanimpendingclimate-relatedcrisis:thehighestaveragecostof naturaldisastersbetween1980-2020,andsomeofthehighestenergypricesinthe world.13 Thus,astheycontinuetobehitbyrisingsealevelsandintensestorms, theyareunabletomeetthecostsofrepairsandadapttheirinfrastructure,before beingstruckagainwithmoredamage.Admittedly,theevidencedemonstratesthat mostclimaterefugeestendtomoveinter-regionally.14 ThisiswhyFMAscanand havebeeneffectiveinrecentyears.However,assudden-onsetclimateeventsbecome morefrequentandintense,micro-scaleinter-regionalmovementwillnolongerbeviablefromaninfrastructuralperspective,giventheeconomicissuesfacedwithinthe Caribbean.

IVJustificationfortheExpansionoftheCaribbean

FMAtoaWiderRegion

Asaresult,apotentialpropositionstands:FMAsshouldcontinuetobeused asalegalrun-aroundforclimaterefugees,buttheregionsthattakepartneedto beexpanded.Thefutureofclimaterefugeeconsiderationsnowreliesonatransitionalperiod;thosewiththeeconomicmeanstoaidclimate-impactedcountries musttakeonanintegralrole,withoutyetresortingtovastlyinternationalinvolvement.Sothequestionremains:shouldasuddenonset-climatedisaster-basedFMA intheCaribbeanbeexpandedtoincludemigrationroutestotheUnitedStates, Canada,andMexico?GivenhistoricalmigrationpatternsfromtheCaribbeaninto theUS,itisalikelychoiceforclimate-displacedpersons.ThesecountriescontainthemostresourcesandinfrastructuretoprovideresettlementforCaribbean refugees.TakingintoconsiderationcurrentCaribbeanmigrationtrends,approximately9.1millionmigrantsfromtheCaribbeanliveoutsidetheircountriesofbirth, accordingtomid-2020estimatesbytheUnitedNationsPopulationDivision.Of

11 OmarBello,“Disasters,EconomicGrowthandFiscalResponseintheCountriesofLatin AmericaandtheCaribbean,1972-2010:OmarD.Bello.”CEPALReview2017,no.121(October 23,2017):7–29.

12 BenjaminStrauss,ScottKulp,ClimateCentral,andInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank,“SeaLevelRiseThreatsintheCaribbean,”Sea-LevelRiseThreatsintheCaribbean,February2018.

13 IMF,“CaribbeanClimateCrisisDemandsUrgentActionbyGovernmentsandInvestors,” June27,2023.

14 FrancescaRosignoli,“TheUnresolvedLegalDisputeovertheRecognitionof‘Climate Refugees,’”EnvironmentalJusticeforClimateRefugees,March21,2022,31–71.

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thoselivingoutsideoftheregion,theUnitedStateswasbyfarthetopdestinationforCaribbeanimmigrants,followedbyCanada.15 Takingmigrationalcontext intoaccountincombinationwiththedirefuturetheCaribbeanfacesbecauseof climate,itisapparentthatanexodusofmigrantsfromtheCaribbeanisinevitable. Therefore,animportantviableoptionisexpandingthe“region”partof“regional climate-impactedconsiderations.”Bydoingso,theUS,Canada,andMexicocan adequatelyprepareforaninfluxfromaninfrastructuralandeconomicperspective. Thisisnottosaythatatransitionwouldbefeasiblewithinpoliticalclimates.Public perceptionsofimmigrationaregenerallynegativeintheUnitedStatesandCanada, andthecultureofclimatechangedenialintheUnitedStatesmakesitparticularly unwillingtoacknowledgetheimportanceofsuchamovement.Nordoesthisentail thatitwouldbeaneasytransitiontomake;thevastregulatoryandinfrastructural changeswouldrequireextensiveworktorealisticallymakehappen,additionallynecessitatingthecreationofharmonybetweenvastlydifferentframeworksbetweenthe UnitedStates,Canada,andMexico.Butinanidealcircumstance,andinacontext inwhichtheclimatecrisishasnotimproved,FMAswouldprovidetheUS,Canada, andMexicothemechanismstoprepareandsettheprovisionstheydeemfit.For example,theFMAcouldmimicthecurrentstandingCaribbeanprogram,which onlybecomesapplicableinthecaseofanintenseonsetclimateevent.Thiswould resolvethepreviouslyoutlinedissueregardinggeneratingspecifiedcriteriaforwhat aclimaterefugeeis:thecriteriacouldbepre-setbythecountriesinvolved,suchas onlyfacilitatingmigrationinthecaseofanintenseweatherevent.Itwouldalso allowthemtosetcriteriaofimpact,suchasextendingonlytothosewhobecome displacedduetolossofhome,orexperiencedamagessointensethattheyhaveno choicebuttorelocateforfinancialreasons.Additionally,itwouldbeuptothe discretionofthecountriesinvolvedhowtoallocateworkpermits,requiredtravel documentation,andaccesstolabor.Additionally,generatinganorderlyandlegal formofmigrationcanprevent“desperation-drivenmovements”whicharetypically catalystsforpoorresourceallocationandgeneraltension.Thiswouldallowforthe smoothesttransitionintothecountriesthatcouldofferresettlement,andgenerate theinfrastructurenecessarytotakeonpopulationinfluxes.

15 JeanneBatalovaandJaneLorenzi,“CaribbeanImmigrantsintheUnitedStates,”migrationpolicy.org,July17,2023.

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VConclusion

Recallthecontext-dependentdefinitionofarefugee—stemmingfromspecified instancesofpersecution,ideasofarefugeeremainlimited.It’sduetimetoreframe thisideatoconformtoamorecontemporarycontext;themostpressingissueof ourmoderntimeisclimatechange.Asaresult,legalframeworksshouldreflect this.Asoutlinedpreviously,onaninternationalscale,definingarefugeetoinclude climaterefugeesbecomesambiguousbecauseoftwomainpoints:thepresenceof over-nuancedcriteriaforaclimaterefugee,andthelackofinternationalresources tomaintaincurrentrefugees.Currentshort-termsolutionsliketheFreeMovement AgreementintheCaribbeanallowforfacilitatedfreemovementinter-regionallyfor thoseimpactedbyclimate.Althoughtheseagreementshavebeendemonstrably effectivethusfar,they’llonlybeeffectiveforsolongbeforeclimatechangesoutpacetheinfrastructuralcapacityoftheregion.Withthatinmind,it’stimeto scaleup,encouragingregionalexpansionsforFMAsforabetterlong-termwayto addressclimateissues.Apotentialexampleandframeworkthatcanbefollowedis theexpansionofthepre-existingCaribbeanFMAtoallowmovementintotheUS, Canada,andMexico,whichcanpotentiallyprovideagreaterlong-termsolution.

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WorksCited

Batalova,Jeanne,andJaneLorenzi.“CaribbeanImmigrantsintheUnitedStates.”migrationpolicy.org,July17,2023.Source.

Bello,Omar.“Disasters,EconomicGrowthandFiscalResponseintheCountriesofLatinAmerica andtheCaribbean,1972-2010:OmarD.Bello.” CEPALReview 2017,no.121(October23,2017): 7–29.Source.

CAF. ClimatechangeworsensthemigrationcrisisinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean. December 2023.Source.

Francis,Ama.“FREEMOVEMENTAGREEMENTS&CLIMATEINDUCEDMIGRATION:A CaribbeanCaseStudy.”ColumbiaLawSchool,September2019.Source.

Fragomen,AustinT.Jr. TheRefugee:AProblemofDefinition.CaseWesternReserveJournal ofInternationalLaw 3,no.1(January1,1970):45–69.Source.

Huckstep,Samuel,andMichaelClemens.“WhyWeWon’tReacha‘ClimateMigrant’Protection Category-andWhatWeCanDoInstead.”CenterForGlobalDevelopment.AccessedApril15, 2024.Source.

IMF.“CaribbeanClimateCrisisDemandsUrgentActionbyGovernmentsandInvestors,”June 27,2023.Source.

Rosignoli,Francesca.“TheUnresolvedLegalDisputeovertheRecognitionof‘ClimateRefugees.”’ EnvironmentalJusticeforClimateRefugees,March21,2022,31–71.Source.

Solomon,Susan,Gian-KasperPlattner,RetoKnutti,andPierreFriedlingstein.“IrreversibleClimateChangeDuetoCarbonDioxideEmissions.” ProceedingsoftheNationalAcademyofSciences oftheUnitedStatesofAmerica 106,no.6(February10,2009):1704–9.Source.

Strauss,Benjamin,andScottKulp,ClimateCentral,andInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank. “Sea-LevelRiseThreatsintheCaribbean.”February2018.Source.

UNHCRUS.“Refugees.”AccessedApril15,2024.Source.

LostinaDivide:TheRelationship BetweenPoliticsandPrecedent AmeliaGarvey‘26

Spring2024

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Abstract

Twoyearsago, Roev.Wade,acasethatsetoneofthemostcontroversial precedentsinAmericanhistory,wasoverturnedbytheU.S.SupremeCourt.The effectshavebeennumerousandfar-reaching.CountrieslikeFrancehaveevengone sofarastorewritetheirconstitutionasareactionto Dobbsv.JacksonWomen’s HealthOrg. Thiscasehasgarneredsomuchattentionworldwidebecauseofboth itslegalandsocialrepercussions. Roev.Wade wasasignificantprecedentthat wasupheldforfivedecades,andjustifyingoverturningsuchaprecedentwouldseem amonumentaltask.Meanwhile,peopleallovertheworldarewonderingwhat thiscouldmeanforwomen’srights.Thepurposeofthispaperistoexplorethe factorsthatinfluencetheoverturningandupholdingoflegalprecedentthrougha comparisonofseveralcases,andanexaminationofthepoliticalandsocialcontexts surroundingthem.

IIntroduction

IthasbeennearlytwoyearssincetheU.S.SupremeCourtoverturnedtheprecedentsetbythelandmarkcase Roev.Wade.Thedeathknellof Roev.Wade began ringing,however,allthewaybackin2018withMississippi’sGestationalAgeAct. TheGestationalAgeAct’spurposewastobanabortionsafterthe15thweekof pregnancy.1 Thepetitionersin Dobbsv.JacksonWomen’sHealthOrg. foundthis lawtobedisagreeableandthus,thecasemadeitswaytotheSupremeCourt.Ina 6-3decision, Roev.Wade,whichhasbeenheldjudiciallysacredforoverfiftyyears, wasreversed.2 Theaftershocksofsuchamonumentaldecisionhavebeenfeltaround theworld.TheywereespeciallypowerfulinFrance,wheretheoutcryagainstthe U.S.SupremeCourthasprogressivelygrownlouder.Recently,theFrenchParliamentapprovedabillthatwillamendtheFrenchConstitution,andprotectwomen’s abortionrightsindefinitely.3

NoteverycasethatmakesittotheSupremeCourthassuchanimmenseimpact. Thenagain,noteverycasethatmakesittotheSupremeCourtresultsinthe reversalofafifty-year-oldprecedent.Thedecisionin Dobbsv.JacksonWomen’s HealthOrg.,andtheinternationalreactiontoit,raisessomeinterestingquestions abouttheimportanceofcaseprecedent.Precedentsserveasaguideofsortsin

1 GestationalAgeAct,Miss.Code.Ann. § 41-41-191(2018).

2 Dobbsv.JacksonWomen’sHealthOrg.,597U.S.215(2022).

3 EleanorBeardsley,“FranceMakesHistorybyEnshriningAbortionRightsinItsConstitution,” NPR,March4,2024.

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legalproceedingsthroughoutthecountry.Specifically,precedentssetbypastcases influencedecisionsincasesinvolvingthesameissues.Forexample,Roev.Wade setaprecedentforcasesaboutabortionandprivacy,suchasPlannedParenthoodv. Casey.Becauseprecedentsfillthissignificantrole,itisextremelydifficultforeven anentityaspowerfulastheSupremeCourttojustifyoverturningone.However, astheJudicialBranchbecomesincreasinglypoliticized,eventhemosthistorical andlong-standingprecedentsruntheriskofreversal.Acloseexaminationofcases, andtheirprecedents,throughouthistoryrevealsthetruenatureoftherelationship betweenpoliticsandtheimportanceofcaseprecedent.

IIIdeologyinanInternationalContext

Inregardstoabortionlaw,Franceservesasaninterestingcounterparttothe UnitedStates.WhentheSupremeCourtruledin Dobbsv.JacksonWomen’s HealthOrg.,therewasbacklashbuttherewerealsosupportersofthedecision.In France,theissueisnotsodivisive.AccordingtoapollproducedbytheFrancebasedWomen’sFoundation,90%ofFrenchmenandwomenalikeareinfavorof safeguardingabortionrights.4 Theseresultsillustrateacleardifferenceinattitudes towardsabortioninFranceandAmerica.ThisdifferencearisesfromtheprominentpoliticizationoftheissueinAmerica.AnoverviewofAmericanstatesthat haveenactedstringentabortionlawsfollowingtheDobbsdecisionrevealsatrend. TraditionallyRepublicanstateslikeAlabamaandTennesseehavegonesofarasto prohibitabortionevenincasesofrapeandincest.5 InFrance,thissortofpolitical polaritydoesnotappeartobeanissueintheinstanceofabortionlaw.

FromanAmericanperspective,itwouldseemFrenchabortionlawismorein linewithliberalideology.Legislaturedealingwithabortionwasnotalwayssoprogressive,however.Article317,SectionIIoftheFrenchPenalCodequiteexplicitly criminalizedabortionforalongtime.Perpetratorscouldfaceuptotenyearsin prisonaswellasheftyfines.6 Article317hasbeenmodifiedgreatlyovertheyears, asviewsonabortionhaveshifted.Itwasnotuntil1992thatitwascompletely repealed,abouttwodecadesafter Roev.Wade. 7 Takingthisintoconsideration,it

4 Franceinfo.“IvgDansLaConstitution:‘Plusde90%DesFran¸caisetDesFran¸caisesSont AttachésAuDroitàl’avortement,’RappelleLaPrésidentedeLaFondationDesFemmes.”Franceinfo,February28,2024.

5 YuvalSchniktes,“AborttheBans:Post-DobbsUnitedStatesisinViolationofInternational Law,”SouthernCaliforniaReviewofLawandSocialJustice33,no.1(Winter2024):1.

6 Art.317.C.p´en.https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/id/LEGIARTI000006490192/198001-01.

7 Ibid

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seemsbothFranceandAmericahavechangeddrasticallywhenitcomestoabortion law.Frenchlawwasgreatlyinfluencedbytheprecedentsetby Roev.Wade.It couldbesaidthatitstillis,astheoverturningofthisprecedentwasthecatalystfor therecentamendmentstotheFrenchconstitution.However,asFrancehasbecome morelenientintheirabortionlegislature,Americahasbecomemorestrict.

IIIComparingCasesOvertheYears

Tofullyunderstandwhythisideologicalswaphasoccurred,itisnecessaryto examineseveralsignificantcasesthroughoutAmericanhistory.Thereisaclearshift inidealsthatisbothsocialandpolitical.Thesefactorshavehadalargeimpact ontheimportanceofprecedent.Onewell-knownexampleofthisisthelegalization ofsame-sexmarriage.Amajorcasethatsetlegalprecedentforcasesinvolving same-sexmarriagewasbroughttotheSupremeCourtofMinnesotain1971,two yearsbefore Roev.Wade wasdecided.In Bakerv.Nelson,petitionersRichard JohnBakerandJamesMichaelMcConnellappliedforamarriagelicenseandwere deniedbytheclerkbecausetheywerebothmale.TheSupremeCourtofMinnesota affirmedtheHennepinCountyDistrictCourt’sdecision,asalthoughtherewasno statutoryprohibitionofsame-sexmarriage,“theFourteenthAmendmentwasnot offendedbythestate’sclassificationsofpersonsauthorizedtomarry.”8

Aswith Roev.Wade, Bakerv.Nelson stoodasalegalprecedentforseveral decades.The Bakerv.Nelson precedenthasbeenchallengedseveraltimessince theinitialruling,astheLGBTQ+communityhascontinuedtofightforexpanded rights. DeBoerv.Snyder wasacasebroughtbeforetheUnitedStatesCourtof AppealsfortheSixthCircuitthatwasdecidedayearbefore Obergefellv.Hodges TheFourteenthAmendmentwasonceagainapointofcontentioninthiscase.The holdingoftheappellatecourtstatedthattheFourteenthAmendmentdidprotect themarriagerightsofsame-sexcouples,and“neithertheEqualProtectionClause northeDueProcessClauseprohibitedaStatefromdenyingrecognitiontosame-sex marriagesconductedinotherStates.”9 Bakerv.Nelson wasspecificallyreferenced inthiscase,andinfluencedthedecisionofthecourt.Becauseofadecisionina case43yearslater,same-sexcouplesweredeniedwhatisnowconsideredtobea fundamentalright.Forbetterorforworse,precedentplayedacriticalrolein DeBoer v.Snyder.

8 Bakerv.Nelson,291Minn.310(1971).

9 DeBoerv.Snyder,772F.3d388(2014).

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IVCurrentPrecedentandPolitics

Agreatshiftwouldoccurin2015with Obergefellv.Hodges however.Support forsame-sexcoupleshasgrownexponentiallysince1971,andthiswasreflected intheSupremeCourt’sdecision.Evenstill,fourjusticesexpresseddissent,these beingtheconservative-leaningRoberts,Scalia,Thomas,andAlito.Inhisdissenting opinion,ChiefJusticeRobertswrotethatitisnotthebusinessoftheCourttoforce Statestorecognizesame-sexmarriageandessentiallyredefinewhatmarriageis inlegalterms.10 Thisopinionishighlyreminiscentofthereasoningoutlinedin the Bakerv.Nelson decision.Theprecedentsetbythiscasecreatedanaversion tocourtsinterferingwithstatelegislatures.Theprecedentwasimportanttothe dissentingjusticeshere,butitwasultimatelydismantled.IntheSupremeCourt’s holding,boththeDueProcessClauseandtheEqualProtectionClauseweresaid toprotectsame-sexcouples’“fundamentalrighttomarry.”11 Interestinglyenough, theholdingthatoverturnedthe Bakerv.Nelson precedentalsoreferencedthe FourteenthAmendment,thistimeusingittoaffirmgaymarriage.Thisturnabout illustrateshowinterpretationsoftheConstitution,holdings,andcaseprecedent changeovertime,demonstratingprecedentisspecificallyaffectedbythesocietal normsofthetime.Withthisinmind,theoverturningof Roev.Wade becomes evenmorepuzzling.ItwouldfollowthatasAmericahasbecomemoreprogressive initsideals, Roev.Wade wouldbeforeverupheld.Unlikegaymarriage,though, abortionhasbecomeincreasinglypoliticized.Recently,Americahasbecomemore politicallydividedthanever,andtheideologicalchasmbetweentheDemocratsand Republicanshasgrownwider.AccordingtoPEWresearch,82%ofRepublicans viewDemocratsunfavorably,and79%ofDemocratsviewRepublicansunfavorably. Thirtyyearsago,thesepercentageswere68%and57%respectively.12 Whilethese resultsstillillustrateadivide,therehasbeenasignificantgrowthinanimosityin recentyears.

Unfortunately,abortionisoneissuethathasbeenmuddiedbypolitics.Although abortionhasalwaysbeenaninflammatorysubject,itisatitscoreaprivacyissue. SubstantiveDueProcesswasatthecenterof Roev.Wade,anditwasdetermined that“therightofprivacy...isbroadenoughtocovertheabortiondecision.”13 Case precedentisimportant,butitisplastic.Precedentscanbeinterpretedinavariety ofwaystosuitthevaluesoftheAmericanpeople,aswith Obergefellv.Hodges.

10 Obergefellv.Hodges,576U.S.644(2015).

11 Ibid

12 PewResearchCenter.“PoliticalPolarizationintheAmericanPublic.”PewResearchCenter -U.S.Politics&Policy,June12,2014.

13 Roev.Wade,410U.S.113(1973).

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Inthiscase,theinterpretationoftheFourteenthAmendmenthadchangedsince Bakerv.Nelson.Thus,itwasdeterminedthatthe Bakerv.Nelson precedent wasnolongernecessary,becauseitwaslimitingtherightsofasubstantialportion oftheAmericanpopulation.Ifrightsexpansionisinthepublic’sbestinterest,it shouldfollowthatprivacy,anindividualfreedom,shouldbesimilarlyvaluable.Thus therecent Dobbsv.JacksonWomen’sHealthOrg. decisionfeelscounterintuitive. BecausetheSupremeCourtleanedconservativeintermsofitsJustices’ideologies though,iteasytoseehowtheissuewasinfluencedbypolitics.

VConclusion

AccordingtoYuvalSchnitkes,editor-in-chiefoftheSouthernCaliforniaReview ofLawandSocialJustice,theDobbsdecisiondoesnotholdupunderinternational law.Schnitkesarguesthattakingawayawoman’srighttoabortionisparamountto ahumanrightsviolation.14 ConsideringthesituationinFrance,thisiscertainlyhow theDobbsdecisionhascometobeviewed.Ultimatelythough, Dobbsv.Jackson Women’sHealthOrg. isarepresentationofhowdrasticpoliticizationcanaffect caseprecedent.Theissueathandissowroughtwithpoliticaltensionthatitcan bedifficulttoseetheheartofthematter.Noteveryprecedentdecideddecadesago holdsuptotoday’ssocialandculturalstandards.Precedentsshouldbethereto guidelegalproceedingsbutaremootiftheydon’texistforthebenefitofthepeople’s interest.Thiswasthecasefor Bakerv.Nelson,butnotfor Roev.Wade.The SupremeCourtdidnotjustpermitabortioninthe Roev.Wade decision;theyalso protectedtherighttoprivacy,arightwhichmanyvaluegreatly.Theprotections theygrantedwereenshrinedinacriticalprecedentthatlogicallyshouldhavestayed standing.Yetsadly,theseprotectionswerelostinthechasmbetweentwopolitical parties.

14 YuvalSchniktes,“AborttheBans:Post-DobbsUnitedStatesisinViolationofInternational Law,”SouthernCaliforniaReviewofLawandSocialJustice33,no.1(Winter2024):1.

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WorksCited

Beardsley,Eleanor.“FranceMakesHistorybyEnshriningAbortionRightsinItsConstitution.” NPR,March4,2024.Source.

Bakerv.Nelson,291Minn.310(1971).Source.

DeBoerv.Snyder,772F.3d388(2014).Source.

Dobbsv.JacksonWomen’sHealthOrg.,597U.S.215(2022).Source.

Franceinfo.“IVGDansLaConstitution:‘Plusde90%DesFran¸caisetDesFran¸caisesSontAttachésAuDroitàl’avortement,’RappelleLaPrésidentedeLaFondationDesFemmes.”Franceinfo, February28,2024.Source.

GestationalAgeAct,Miss.Code.Ann. § 41-41-191(2018).Source.

Obergefellv.Hodges,576U.S.644(2015).Source.

PewResearchCenter.“PoliticalPolarizationintheAmericanPublic.”PewResearchCenterU.S.Politics&Policy,June12,2014.Source.

Roev.Wade,410U.S.113(1973).Source.

Schniktes,Yuval.“AborttheBans:Post-DobbsUnitedStatesisinViolationofInternational Law,”SouthernCaliforniaReviewofLawandSocialJustice33,no.1(Winter2024):1.Source.

Lawrithms;PredictiveRegressionModels inJudicialSystems

LilyHaak’25 Spring2024

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Abstract

Theburgeoningofhighlycomplexalgorithmsusedforassessmentinthejudicial fieldcontinuestochallengetheunderpinningsofjusticeinAmerica.COMPAS,or CorrectionalOffenderManagementProfilingforAlternativeSanctions isasoftware usedtoassessrecidivismriskswhendeterminingpretrialreleaseandparolepossibility.In2016,aProPublicainvestigationdiscoveredsignificantinconsistenciesin ratesassignedtoWhiteoffendersandBlackoffenders.Thesefindingsplayintoa nuanceddialogueabouthowalgorithmicdecision-makingoughttobeleveragedin thelegalfield.

IIntroduction

Wenowliveinadigitalsociety.1

Asingle,thoughbroadimplicationofthis bravenewworld isagovernmentalenvironmentwheredigitalalgorithmicsystems,ratherthanhumans,makedecisions thataffectsocialoutcomes,publicpolicy,andindividuallives.

Algorithmsarecommon—they’reasetofrulesthatweemploytosolveproblems, orsimplyexist.However,incomputationalterms,theyrepresentadivergence frommanualintellectuallabor,leveragingvastsetsofdataandhighlynuanced statisticaldevicestoexecuteincrediblyimportantfunctions.2 Greatinteresthas beenplacedintheirabilitytonavigatedigitallandscapes,launching16-year-old girlswithiPhonesintosocialmediastarsonplatformslikeTikTok,Instagram,and Snapchat;togenerateincrediblylucrativefinancialenvironments(thinkSBF,FTX, JaneStreet,Millenium,andeventheUniversityofFlorida’sAlgoGators);andas ofrecent,tomanipulatethejudicialoutcomesofthousandsincarceratesacrossthe country.

Asevaluativemethodsinsocialjusticeecosystemscontinuetoevolve,understandingtheunderlyingimplicationsofhowalgorithmsfunction—includingfactorialconcernsthataddressthepillarsofthe14thAmendmentanditssubsequent provisionsondueprocess—becomesevermorenecessary.Thisdialogueisimperativeindeterminingthelegalityofusinghighlysecretivetechnologytodeterminethe outcomesofone’sincarceration,andsubsequentlytheirlife;ifouradventureintothe depthsofefficiencyisonlyashortcuttotheobstructionofjustice.In2016,ProPublicaconductedaninvestigationintothequantitativemethodsthatNorthpointe,

1 DeborahLupton, DigitalSociology,1sted.NewYork:Routledge,2014.

2 CynthiaRudin,CarolineWang,andBeauCoker,”TheAgeofSecrecyandUnfairnessin RecidivismPrediction,” HarvardDataScienceReview,2022.

themothercompanyoftheCOMPASsystemusestorecommendrecidivismmetrics tojudges.Theirteamfoundthatablackdefendantis45%morelikelytoreceive ahigherrecidivismscorethantheirwhitecounterpart;awoman19.4%morelikely thanaman;and2.5timesmorelikelyfordefendantsyoungerthan25.3 Below,Iwill identifytwomajorlegaldilemmasthatseemtogreatlyaffectthesemethods’ethical usageanddispersion;violationofproceduraldueprocessviaPSIandalgorithmic processing;andtheevaluativeconsiderationsproducedbytheirmechanisms.

IIFactorialConcerns

Thereexists,inanewdigitalenvironment,adutytoevaluatethelegaland ethicalliabilitythattechnologypresentstosomeofthemostvulnerablesections ofourmodernsociety.4 CorrectionalOffenderManagementProfilingforAlternativeSanctions(COMPAS)isasophisticatedweb-basedalgorithmictooldesigned toassistinthejudicialandcorrectionalprocessesbyassessingcriminogenicneeds andevaluatingthelikelihoodofrecidivismamongoffenders.Developedtoenhance decision-makinginthecriminaljusticesystem,COMPASemploysaproprietary blendofdataanalyticsandmachinelearningtechniquestoassessvariousriskfactorsassociatedwithcriminalbehavior,therebygeneratingriskscoresthatpredict anindividual’spropensityforfutureoffenses;itrepresentsanewintersectionof technologyandjurisprudence,andallatonce,aimstobringempiricalrigortothe assessmentofoffenderriskandinformsentencing,bail,andparoledecisions.5

COMPAS,likeotherevaluativemethods,requiresthecompletionofaPresentencingInvestigation(PSI)Report.6 ThelegalutilityofthePSIistoequip judgeswithanuancedprofileofthedefendant,therebyfacilitatingasentencethat iscommensuratewithboththegravityoftheoffenseandtheindividual’sspecificcircumstances;7 PSIsareconductedwiththegoalofaligningsentencingwiththedual objectivesofpunishmentandrehabilitation,ensuringthatsentencingcontributes tothegoalsofreducingrecidivismandenhancingpublicsafetythroughtailored rehabilitativemeasures,8 aimingtoembodytheprincipleofproportionalityandin-

3 JuliaAngwin,JeffLarson,SuryaMattu,andLaurenKirchner,”MachineBias,” ProPublica, 2016.

4 KarenYeung,”AStudyoftheImplicationsofAdvancedDigitalTechnologies(IncludingAI Systems)fortheConceptofResponsibilityWithinaHumanRightsFramework.”

5 Equivant,”Practitioner’sGuidetoCOMPASCore.”

6 Equivant,2020

7 ToddR.Clear,MichaelD.Reisig,andGeorgeF.Cole, AmericanCorrections,CengageLearning,2013.

8 EdwardJ.LatessaandPaulaSmith, CorrectionsintheCommunity,NewYork:Routledge,

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dividualizedjustice,whichareconvenientcentraltenetsofthemodernAmerican legalsystem.

COMPASevaluatesareported137factorstoassesstheriskofrecidivism9 :beyondbasefactorsofparoleviolations,gangaffiliations,andorsubstanceabuse, COMPAS’sPSIalsoaskedquestionsthatweremeanttodepictbetterthebehavioralandorpsychologicaldispositionsoftheirsubject(Angwin,SampleCOMPAS RiskScore)including10 :

Howmanyofyourfriendsoracquaintanceshavebeenarrested?

Howoftendoyoufeelbored?

Ihaveneverfeltsadaboutthingsinmylife(SpectrumofAgreetoDisagree)

Ahungrypersonhasarighttosteal(SpectrumofAgreetoDisagree)

Ihaveplayedsicktogetoutofsomething(SpectrumofAgreetoDisagree)

Didyoufailorrepeatagradelevel?

Responsestothesequestions,amongstawidevarietyofothers–includingrace, gender,sex,andage–becomefactorialweightsinalgorithmicevaluation.Briefly, Iwilldescribehowanalgorithmleveragingregressionmodelinginthissettingoperates.Regressionmodelinghasburgeonedinpastdecadesasamethodinlegal analytics,usedtodiscerntheimpactofvariousindependentvariablesonadependentvariable,specificallysentencinglengthwithinjudicialproceedings(Ulmerand Johnson2004).Amodelpredictsthedependentvariablebasedontheknownvalues oftheindependentvariables,facilitatingtheexplorationofrelationshipsbetween variablesandforecasting.Attheheartofregressionanalysisliesthemodel’sequation,typicallydenotedas

9 Equivant.”Practitioner’sGuidetoCOMPASCore.”

10 JuliaAngwin,“Sample-COMPAS-Risk-Assessment-COMPAS-’CORE,’” DocumentCloud

11 J.Neter,W.Wasserman,andM.H.Kutner, AppliedLinearStatisticalModels,Homewood,IL: Irwin,1990.

Y = β0 + β1 X1 + + βnXn + ϵ11

2011.

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,where Y isthedependentvariable, X1 ,...,Xn aretheindependentvariables, β0 ,...,βn arethecoefficientstobeestimated,and ϵ representstheerrorterm,encapsulatingallotherfactorsthatinfluence Y besidesthe X variables.12 Thisstatistical approachallowsscholarstocontrolforextraneousfactors,providinganuancedunderstandingofhowcertainattributessuchasrace,gender,andpriorcriminalhistoryinfluencejudicialdecisions,whilestatisticallyadjustingforvariableslikeoffense severityandlegalprecedents.13

Opacityinhighlydimensionalsettings,likethosethatconsiderrace,sex,age, background,housingstatus,ethnicity,birthplace,and“likelinesstobecomeacriminalagain”remainsincrediblydifficulttomapoutusingcode.ThisisaptlyreferencedinatextbyJennaBurrellas“actionablealgorithms&unavoidablecomplexity,”theminimizationofsocialissuesinexchangeforefficiency,brevity,andclarity.14 Machinethinkingprocessesoughttotakeintoconsiderationequality,fairness,and notionsofequity,whichareallcharacteristicspossessedbyhumanalgorithms–creatinganactionableenvironmentinwhichtransparencyisoftheutmostimportance willbecomeanissueasalgorithmscontinuetopresstheboundsoflegalscholarship.

IIIMethodsofEvaluation

InresponsetoJuliaAngwinetal,Equivantreleaseditsownstatisticalresponse, claimingthatthereportfocusedincorrectlyonmetricsthatwerenon-supportive toethicalandaccuratedecisions.Oneofthemetricsusedwasequalcalibration, whichissatisfiedwhendefendantswhoreceivethesameriskscorearere-arrestedat similarfrequencies,regardlessofraceorethnicidentifiers.Equalcalibrationrelieson twomain“equal”statisticalderivatives,bothofwhichEquivant’stechnologyrelies on.Accuracyequityis“whenariskscalecandiscriminatebetweenrecidivistsand nonrecidivistsequallywellfortwodifferentgroups,suchasblacksandwhites.15 The riskscaleexhibitspredictiveparityiftheclassifierobtainssimilarpredictivevalues fortwodifferentgroupssuchasblacksandwhites,forexample,theprobabilityof recidivating,givenahigh-riskscore,issimilarforblacksandwhites.16 COMPAS prescribesthatthisequalityinrecidivismratesisproofthattheiralgorithmcan

12 D.C.Montgomery,E.A.Peck,andG.G.Vining, IntroductiontoLinearRegressionAnalysis, Hoboken,NJ:Wiley,2012.

13 JefferyT.UlmerandBrianJohnson,”SentencinginContext:AMultilevelAnalysis,” Criminology 42(1)(2004):137-77.

14 JennaBurrell,“HowtheMachine’Thinks:’UnderstandingOpacityinMachineLearningAlgorithms,” SearcheLibrary::SSRN,2015.

15 Equivant,”ResponsetoProPublica:DemonstratingAccuracy,Equity,andPredictiveParity.” 16 Ibid.

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effectivelypredictunbiasedriskscores;ifbothwhiteandblackcriminalsarebeing re-arrestedatthesameratewhengiventhesamescore,thereisnoaccurateevidence ofsystematicbias.EquivantfurtherdisputesthedifferenceinFalsePositiveRates bynotingthatblackdefendantshaveahigherbaserateofrecidivismthanwhite defendants,notingthatProPublicafailedtomakefairassessmentsbynottakinginto considerationtheaboveinconsistencieswhenassessingtheirstatisticalmethodology. InEquivant’sofficialresponselettertoProPublica,theyidentifiedseveralstatistical errors,includingthat“PPcombinedtheHighandMediumlevelsandrefertothis levelintheirarticleas“HigherRisk”—thishastheeffectofinflatingthefalse positiverateandthecorrespondingbase-ratesensitiveTargetPopulationError.”17

SatisfyingpointEqualCalibrationwouldrequirethatdefendantsassignedthe sameriskscorearere-arrestedatasimilarrate,butsomeblackdefendantsmay belabeled“highrisk”withoutre-offending;thesatisfactionofEqualFalsePositive ratesassumesthatblackandwhitefalsepositiverateswouldbeequalized,asopposedtothe11%vs25%figurediscoveredbyProPublica,withpotentiallyvarying ratesofarrestevenwiththesamerisknumber.Inapseudo-combinationofboth, similartotheoriginalsoftware,thesystemwouldworktomakeFalsePositiverates aslowaspossiblewhiletryingtoproduceEqualCalibrationbetweenthegroups SatisfyingbothEqualFalsePositiveRatesandEqualCalibrationsimultaneously isimpossiblebecausetheyimposedifferentstatisticalobjectives;equalizingfalse positiveratesrequiresadjustingadecisionthresholdtobalanceperformanceacross differentgroups,whileequalcalibrationinvolvesensuringthatdefendantswhoreceivethesameriskscorere-offendatsimilarrates,regardlessofrace.Whenutilizing COMPASscores,judgesdecreaseoverallincarcerationratesbutinadvertentlyexacerbateracialdisparities;Thisoccursbecauseindividualsidentifiedaslowriskby COMPASarelesslikelytobeincarceratedthantheirpredecessors,benefitingpredominantlywhitedefendantsduetopre-existingracialbiasesinriskassessments. Consequently,ajudgeinBrowardCountymightclaimtosupportdecarcerationin theCOMPASerawithoutrealizingtheunintendedeffectofwideningracialgaps duetothesebiases.18

BlackBoxesandtheRighttoExplanationBigdata,itsincumbentanalytics, andtheknowledgetheyproducearesocio-politicalandculturalartifactsthatare transforminghowwelive,work,andthinkaboutsocialproblems.19 Themost pressing,andrelativelyeasytoidentifyconcernofCOMPAS’stechnologyisour 17 Ibid.

18 UtsavBahl,ChadM.Topaz,LeaOberm¨uller,SophieGoldstein,andMiraSneirson,“AlgorithmsinJudges’Hands:IncarcerationandInequityinBrowardCounty,Florida,” SocArXiv, 2023.

19 DeborahLupton, DigitalSociology,1sted.NewYork:Routledge,2014.

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blatantinabilitytoexplainwhat’sgoingoninsideit.

Blackboxtechnologiesraisesignificantlegalconcernsduetotheiropaquedecisionmakingprocesses,whichcanobscureaccountabilityandimpederegulatoryoversight.Courtsfacechallengesinapplyingtraditionalprinciplesofliabilityandnegligencetoharmscausedbyblackboxsystems,asitisoftendifficulttotracedecision pathways,andlegalprovenancewhenidentifyingresponsibleparties.20 Mostwould agreethatthesetypesoftechnologynecessitaterigorousstandardstoensuretheir decisionsareinterpretableandjustifiable,aligningwithexistinglegalframeworks ontransparencyandfairness.Butwhataboutmorethanregulation—arepenal membersnotentitledtoajudicialsystemthatisabletodemonstrateadeepunderstandingofthetechnologytheyuse,toexplainfactorially,normatively,andlegally whattheirresultsmeanandhowtheywereproduced?

KateVredenburghidentifiesanexemplaryaccountofthisina2019paperthat identifiesinformedself-advocacy,anditsunderlyingtenantsasessentialtopreservinglegitimacyandequalityinnon-voluntary,hierarchicalinstitutions,rule-based causalexplanationsexplainactionsintermsofmotivatingreasonsorreasonsthat ‘countinfavor’ofanaction.21 Rule-basednormativeexplanationsrepresentnormativereasonsthatcountinfavorofanagent’sactions.Theseexplanationshave conditions:[1]weareonlyowedtheseexplanationswhenstakesare“high”and[2] thelevelofdetailrequireddependsonwhatisbeingshared.22 Burdensandentitlementsreceiveahigherlevelofexplanation(andorfreeexpertise)becauserevoking theirdisseminationwithoutexplanationcouldviolateapositive“economicright,”in thecaseofsocialsecurity.Otherexplanationsclassifiedasbenefits,e.g.,loansand scholarships,donotrequirethesamelevelofdetailbecausewearenotentitledto them.ThemainpillarofVredenburgh’sargumentisthatwehaveapositiverightto explanationandanegativerighttoambiguity,meaningthatweareequallyentitled toexplanationasweareprotectedfromsystemsthatperpetuateunfairpractices, orconcealtheethicalreasoningbehindtheirpractices.Thisiswhereinformedselfadvocacyisderivedfrom—thesearespecificallytheclusterofabilitiesVredenburgh references.

Normativeexplanationscanbemoresimplydefinedasthedrivingmoralreasons behindadecision.Normativeaccountsmustpossess[1]relevantrulesand[2]the normativereasoningbehindthem.Inthecaseofnewadministrativepolicy,both AmericanandBritishproceduresrequirethatthepublicisthoroughlyinformedand

20 CathyO’Neil,”DataScientistCathyO’NeilontheColdDestructivenessofBigData,” Quartz, 2016.

21 KateVredenburgh,”TheRighttoExplanation,” JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy 30(2)(2021): 209-229.

22 Ibid.

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thattheirfeedbackcanbereceived.23 Informingthepublicrequiresafulllisticlethat explains“theneed,sourceofauthority,andreasonsfortheproposedrulechange.” Thisgivesindividualstheabilitytoconsiderproposals,understandtheirpersonal goals,andidentifyinterestsinchange.Thisenhancesinformedself-advocacyby givingactorsademocraticenvironmenttosimultaneouslyexpresspersonalinterest andtorecognizesystemicimperfections,orareaswherepolicycouldbetweakedin thepursuitofaccessibility,fairness,ortransparency.Shereferstoagencyasthe abilitytonavigatethesystemthatpromotesyourinterests.Causalexplanations enableagencybydefiningparametersofbehaviorthatproducefavorableresults asstipulatedbyrules.Uponunderstandingconstraints,individualsareequipped withtheknowledgeofhowtomodifytheircurrentbehaviortoachievedesirable results.ThelegalinfrastructureoftheUnitedStates,throughbothconstitutional guaranteesandstatutoryframeworks,supportsarobustnotionofproceduraland substantiverightsthataccommodatetheseevolvingexplanations.

TheSupremeCourt’sarticulationin Goldbergv.Kelly emphasizedthatproceduraldueprocessmandates”timelyandadequatenoticedetailingthereasonsfora proposedtermination”and”aneffectiveopportunitytodefendbyconfrontingany adversewitnessesandbypresentinghisownargumentsandevidenceorally.”24

Thedemandfortransparencybecomesevenmorecriticalinthecontextofdecisionsmadebyalgorithmicsystems.Theopacityofsuchsystemscanobscure therationalebehindsignificantdecisionsaffectingindividuals,fromcriminalsentencingtocreditscoring,therebycomplicatingthetraditionaldueprocessanalysis. TheperhapsmostnotablecaseofCOMPAS’slifespanisLoomisv.Wisconsin,in whichthedefendantchallengedtheuseofanalgorithmicriskassessmenttoolin sentencingondueprocessgrounds.25 Thecourtupheldtheuseofthealgorithm, butthecasemarkedtheinceptionofalandmarkdiscussiononhowproceduraldue processoughttobeexplainedintheageofthealgogracy.Notthatthissubject hasn’talreadybeenbreachedwithearlier,lesssophisticatedtechnologies: Mathews v.Eldridge,extendsthedueprocessanalysisintoabalancingtest,consideringthe privateinterestaffected,theriskoferroneousdeprivationofsuchinterestthrough theproceduresused,andthegovernment’sinterest,includingfiscalandadministrativeburdensthatadditionalproceduralrequirementswouldentail.26 In Connecticut v.Teal,theSupremeCourthighlightedthatdiscriminatorypracticesinemployment processesviolateTitleVIIoftheCivilRightsAct,whichcouldanalogouslyapply

23 Ibid.

24 Goldbergv.Kelly,397U.S.254(1970).

25 DavidCole,“Statev.Loomis,” HarvardLawReview,2017.

26 Mathewsv.Eldridge,424U.S.319(1993).

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toalgorithmicdecision-makingifitresultsindiscriminatoryoutcomes.27

Thenecessityforclear,understandableexplanationsindecisionsmadebyautomatedsystemsisalsomirroredbyinternationallegalstandards,suchastheGeneral DataProtectionRegulation(GDPR)intheEU,whichdirectlyaddressestheright ofindividualstoobtainexplanationsofdecisionsmadebyautomatedmeans.While theU.S.lacksadirectequivalentoftheGDPR,theprinciplesembeddedinitresonatewiththebroaderlegaldoctrinesunderU.S.law;thosearticulatedin Reno v.Flores underscoretheimportanceofgovernmentaccountabilityinadministrative actions.28

27 Connecticutv.Teal,457U.S.440(1982).

28 Renov.Flores,507U.S.292(1993).

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WorksCited

Alarid,LeanneFiftal. Community-BasedCorrections.CengageLearning,2015.

Angwin,Julia,JeffLarson,SuryaMattu,andLaurenKirchner.”MachineBias.” ProPublica,2016. Source.

Angwin,Julia.“Sample-COMPAS-Risk-Assessment-COMPAS-’CORE.’” DocumentCloud.Source.

Bahl,Utsav,ChadM.Topaz,LeaOberm¨uller,SophieGoldstein,andMiraSneirson.“AlgorithmsinJudges’Hands:IncarcerationandInequityinBrowardCounty,Florida.” SocArXiv, 2023.Source.

Berk,Richard. CriminalJusticeForecastsofRisk:AMachineLearningApproach.Springer,2012.

Burrell,Jenna.“HowtheMachine’Thinks:’UnderstandingOpacityinMachineLearningAlgorithms.” SearcheLibrary::SSRN,2015.Source.

Chatterjee,S.,andHadi,A.S. RegressionAnalysisbyExample.Wiley,2015.

CivilRightsActof1964,Pub.L.88–352,78Stat.241.

Clear,ToddR.,MichaelD.Reisig,andGeorgeF.Cole. AmericanCorrections.CengageLearning, 2013.

Cole,David.“Statev.Loomis.” HarvardLawReview,2017.Source.

Connecticutv.Teal,457U.S.440(1982).

EuropeanConventiononHumanRights,art.6,Nov.4,1950,Europ.T.S.No.005.

Equivant.”Practitioner’sGuidetoCOMPASCore.”Source.

Equivant.”ResponsetoProPublica:DemonstratingAccuracy,Equity,andPredictiveParity.” Source.

Goldbergv.Kelly,397U.S.254(1970).

Goodfellow,Ian,YoshuaBengio,andAaronCourville. DeepLearning.MITPress,2016.

Hannah-Moffat,K.”AlgorithmicRiskGovernance:BigDataAnalytics,Race,andInformation ActivisminCriminalJusticeDebates.” TheoreticalCriminology 23(4)(2019):453-70.Source.

Harcourt,BernardE. AgainstPrediction:Profiling,Policing,andPunishinginanActuarialAge Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2007.

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Israni,Ellora,andEvelynChang.”AlgorithmicDueProcess:MistakenAccountabilityandAttributioninStatev.Loomis.” HarvardJournalofLaw&Technology,2017.Source.

Johnson,BrianD.”RacialandEthnicDisparitiesinSentencingDeparturesAcrossModesofConviction.” Criminology 41(2)(2003):449-90.

Latessa,EdwardJ.,andPaulaSmith. CorrectionsintheCommunity.NewYork:Routledge,2011.

Loomisv.Wisconsin.881N.W.2d749(2016).

Lupton,Deborah. DigitalSociology.1sted.NewYork:Routledge,2014.Source.

Mathewsv.Eldridge.424U.S.319(1976).

Montgomery,D.C.,E.A.Peck,andG.G.Vining. IntroductiontoLinearRegressionAnalysis Hoboken,NJ:Wiley,2012.

Mustard,DavidB.”Racial,Ethnic,andGenderDisparitiesinSentencing:EvidencefromtheU.S. FederalCourts.” JournalofLawandEconomics 44(1)(2001):285-314.

Neter,J.,W.Wasserman,andM.H.Kutner. AppliedLinearStatisticalModels.Homewood,IL: Irwin,1990.

O’Neil,Cathy.”DataScientistCathyO’NeilontheColdDestructivenessofBigData.” Quartz, 2016.Source.

Pasquale,Frank. TheBlackBoxSociety:TheSecretAlgorithmsThatControlMoneyandInformation.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2015.

PresentenceInvestigationReport(PSI).In CorrectionalAssessment,Casework,andCounseling, editedbyAnthonyWalsh,97-120.Washington,DC:OfficeofJusticePrograms,2001.Source.

”ProceduralDueProcess.”Wex—USLaw—LII/LegalInformationInstitute,2024.Source.

Renov.Flores.507U.S.292(1993).

Rudin,Cynthia,CarolineWang,andBeauCoker.2022.”TheAgeofSecrecyandUnfairnessin RecidivismPrediction.” HarvardDataScienceReview.Source.

Seber,G.A.F.,andA.J.Lee. LinearRegressionAnalysis.Hoboken,NJ:Wiley,2012.

Spohn,Cassia,andDavidHolleran.”TheImprisonmentPenaltyPaidbyYoung,Unemployed BlackandHispanicMaleOffenders.” Criminology 38(1)(2000):281-306.

U.S.Constitution,Amend.V.

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U.S.Constitution,Amend.XIV.

Ulmer,JefferyT.,andBrianJohnson.”SentencinginContext:AMultilevelAnalysis.” Criminology 42(1)(2004):137-77.

Vredenburgh,Kate.”TheRighttoExplanation.” JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy 30(2)(2021): 209-229.

Weisberg,S. AppliedLinearRegression.Hoboken,NJ:Wiley,2005.

Yeung,Karen.”AStudyoftheImplicationsofAdvancedDigitalTechnologies(IncludingAI Systems)fortheConceptofResponsibilityWithinaHumanRightsFramework.”Source.

DystopianAmericaandtheOvergrown

TreeofMonopoly:ALegalStudyonthe

CausesofandSolutionstoInsulin

Inaccessibility

EricHanRuilong’27 Spring2024

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Abstract

ThefreedomfromillnessisnotsofreeinmodernAmerica.Thislegalanalysis rootsoutthecausesofthemodernAmericandystopia:millionsofdiabetespatients reliantoninsulintherapyareunabletocombattheever-risingcostofthelife-saving drug.Thisanalysisbreaksdownhistorical,regulatory,andlegislativecausesforthe impenetrablemonopolyintheinsulinmarket.Thisanalysisattributesthereality oftoday’smarkettotworeasons.First,overgenerousgrantingofbothpatentand FDAexclusivitiesallowsprolongedmonopoliestotakeroot,resultinginmarket dominancebeyondthetermsofprotection.Second,priorlegislativeerrorsandcurrentgovernmentalreluctancetointerveneinthepharmaceuticalindustryheavily diminishenthusiasmforgenericcompaniestocompetewiththemarketmonopolies. Finally,thisanalysiswillprovideresolutionsandsystematicchangesthatarenecessarytoholisticallyadjustinsulinpricesandprovideaffordablefreedomfromillness toall.

IIntroduction

The $1saleoftheinsulinpatenttotheUniversityofTorontoisperhapsthe mostcommonlyusedexamplethatemphasizestheselflessscientificcommitmentto thebettermentoftheworld.Whileinsulinsawdramaticchangesthroughoutits historyofdevelopment,thealtruismofitsinitialinventorwasnotpasseddown.In thecurrenthealthcaresystemintheUS,thereare7milliondiabeticpatientsreliant oninsulintherapy,anduninsuredpatientspayatleast $120-$240foramonth’s supplyofinsulin.,DiabetesisthemostexpensivechronicillnessintheUS;one outofsixpatientsrationtheirmonthlyinsulin,riskinglethalcomplicationslike diabeticketoacidosis.UndertheAmericanflagofunalienablerightstolife,liberty,andthepursuitofhappinessisadystopia,wheremillionsaretoldtopayor die.Thislegalanalysisrootsoutthecausesforthismanifesteddystopia:loose andovergenerouspatentlawsthatgrantedmarketexclusivityofinsulinproducts andfederalregulationsthatdemotivatemarketcompetitionkeptthecentury-long monopoliesevergreen.Parttwoofthepaperwillintroducethehistoricalproblem ofinsulininaccessibility.Partthreediscusseshowtheexploitedpatentsystemand FDAmarketexclusivitiesfuelthemonopoly.Partfourpresentstherealitythat asthecentury-oldpatentsstarttoexpire,aseriesoflegislationsfailtoinvigorate genericcompetitiontoreducedrugprices.Finally,partfivewillprovideresolutions andsystematicchangesthatarenecessarytoholisticallyadjustinsulinpricesand provideaffordablefreedomfromillnesstoall.

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IIBackground

ThestoryofinsulinstartedinMay1921,whenFrederickBanting,apracticing physician,reachedouttoJ.J.R.Macleod,arenownedphysiologistoncarbohydrates,forhelpinfindingapancreaticsolutiontodiabetes.1 Althoughdubious, MacleodprovidedequipmentforBantingtobeginhisquestforaninternalsolution todiabetesalongwithCharlesBest,oneofMacleod’sstudents.Itisamiraclethat theunderfundedandinexperiencedlabfoundaconsistentreductionofbloodsugar andsymptomsindiabeticdogswiththeirpancreasextract.2 Crownedasoneof themostimportantmedicalinnovationsofthe20thcentury,thediscoveryopeneda newdoorformedicinethatcouldpotentiallysavetheillnessthatplaguedhumanity formillennia.Bantingintendedtokeepthatdooropen.Withconcernsaboutpharmaceuticalcompaniescompetingwiththisinnovation,Banting’steamappliedfora patentin1923.3 Thepatenteffectivelyrevealsthemethodofproductionforinsulin, asthepurposeasstatedbyBantingwasthat“whenthedetailsofthemethodof preparationarepublishedanyonewouldbefreetopreparetheextract,butnoone couldsecureaprofitablemonopoly.”4

HistoryprovedtofailBanting’sexpectationofopenaccesstomedicineinits yearsofdevelopment.Sinceitsinitialdiscoveryinsulinhasevolvedsignificantlyin itsefficacy,productionmethod,andingredients.Inthecenturyofdevelopment, protaminewasfirstaddedtoextendtheeffectinthe1930s;zincwasaddedtocombineshortandlong-actinginsulinin1946;lenteinsulin,whichremovesthereliance onprotamine,wasinventedinthe1950s;monocomponentandsingle-peakinsulins, whichimprovesthepurity,wasinventedin1970s;therevolutionaryrecombinant DNAhumaninsulinthenremovestherelianceonanimalextractin1978;finally, withtheentryofDNAinsulintothemarket,major“structuralmodification”of insulinquicklybranchedoutintoavarietyofproducts,eachwithcertainadvantage.5 InsulininthemarkettodayisvastlydifferentfromtheinsulinBantingfirst invented.However,morethanacenturyofdevelopmentlater,over90%ofinsulin manufacturedandsoldtodaycomesfromvirtuallythesamethreepharmaceuticals: EliLilly,NovoNordisk,andSanofi.6

1 FDA,“100YearsofInsulin,”FDAHistoryExhibit,2022.

2 Ibid.

3 JeremyA.GreeneandKevinR.Riggs,“WhyIsThereNoGenericInsulin?HistoricalOrigins ofaModernProblem,”NewEnglandJournalofMedicine372(12)(2015):1171–75.

4 MichaelBliss, TheDiscoveryofInsulin,UniversityofChicagoPress,2013.

5 Ibid.

6 DBeranetal.,“APerspectiveonGlobalAccesstoInsulin:ADescriptiveStudyoftheMarket, TradeFlowsandPrices,”DiabeticMedicine36(6)(2019):726–33.

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Throughpatentevergreening,thosepharmaceuticalsmaintainamarketmonopoly upheldbygovernmentalpoliciesintendedforinnovation.TheUSConstitutionstates that:

“[theCongressshallhavePower]TopromotetheProgressofScienceand usefulArts,bysecuringforlimitedTimestoAuthorsandInventorsthe exclusiveRighttotheirrespectiveWritingsandDiscoveries.”7

Patentsarethereforecreatedtograntexclusivitytoencouragetechnologicalinnovations.Patentsare20yearsofmarketexclusivitygrantedbytheUSPatentand TrademarkOffice(USPTO)forinnovationsthatdemonstrateutility,novelty,and non-obviousness(whethertheinventionisobvioustoanindustry).8 However,the evergreenmonopolyforpharmaceuticalsdoesn’tseemtodie.Whiletheinnovations significantlyimprovethequalityofinsulin,theyalsorespectivelyextendamonopoly for20years,meaningthatnocompaniesareallowedtomanufactureandsellinsulin. Thelatestpatentslastedwellintothe21stcenturyeventhough“thelatestandmost commonlyusedanaloginsulinproductsareallover20yearsold.”9 Inadditionto protectionsofferedbythepatents,theUSFoodandDrugAdministration(FDA) alsograntsregulatoryexclusivitiesfortheapprovalofnewdrugsorchangestoold drugsthatpreventtheapprovalofgenericcompetitorsforasetamountoftime.10 Forexample,byexpandingthesafeapplicationofadrugforchildren,“a6-month periodofexclusivityisaddedto...allapplicationsheldbythesponsor.”11 Exclusivitiesandpatentscanbeprotectedinconjunctiontopromotemonopoly.Whileit isimportanttorecognizethattheincrementalinnovationsininsulinarebeneficial, thetreeofinnovationisnowfeedingonthelivesofpatientsinsteadofsavingthem. Rootedinpatentexclusivitiesandcultivatedinacompetition-freeenvironment, insulinmonopolyendangersthelivesofmillions.

7 U.S.Const.,art.I, § 8,cl.8.

8 CornellLegalInformationInstitute,“Patent,”LII/LegalInformationInstitute.

9 VincentS.Rajkumar,“TheHighCostofInsulinintheUnitedStates:AnUrgentCallto Action,”MayoClinicProceedings95(1)(2020):22–28.

10 AndersOlsenetal.,“PatentsandRegulatoryExclusivitiesonFDA-ApprovedInsulinProducts: ALongitudinalDatabaseStudy,1986–2019.”PLOSMedicine20(11)(2023):e1004309–9.

11 CenterforDrugEvaluationandResearch,“FrequentlyAskedQuestionsonPatentsandExclusivity,”U.S.FoodandDrugAdministration,2020.

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IIIExclusivitiesandMonopolies

III.1TheExploitationofExclusivities

First,thepharmaceuticalcompanyexploitstheUSPTOandFDA’slenientprotectionformedicines.Manyinsulinproductsonthemarkettodayaredrug-device products,meaningtheinsulinissoldalongwiththeirdeliverydevice.12 Allofthese deliverydevicesarepatentedalongwiththeinsulin:“Inthepharmaceuticalmarket, manufacturersoftenseekpatentsnotonlyontheunderlyingactiveingredientsinthe drugsbutalsoonperipheralaspectssuchastheexcipientsandmethodsofuse.”13 A2023longitudinalstudyonoverallpatentandregulatoryexclusivityprotection afteraninsulinproduct’sFDAapprovalreportsthatthe56“individualbrand-name products”enjoyamedianof16yearsofoverallprotection(patentplusexclusivities) sincetheirFDAapproval.14 However,ofthe56products,33ofthemaredrug-device productsandbenefitfromdevicepatents.15 Ontwo-thirdsofthoseproducts,devicepatentsarethelasttoexpire,someofwhicharenotrelevanttoinsulinatall, amassingamedianof5.2yearsofextraprotectionfromtheexpirationofthedrug protection.16 Theoveralldurationofprotectionisevenextendedin9productsby addingpatentsafterFDAapprovalofthedrug,receivingamedianof6moreyears ofmonopoly.17 Thecompoundedyearsofprotectionofferedbypatentsirrelevant tothemedicinethemselvesprolongsmonopolyandpreventscompetitionthatmay significantlyreducethepriceofinsulin.Regardlessofirrelevantpatents,however, pharmaceuticalinsulinmanufacturinglinesofthesameactiveingredientalreadyenjoylongerprotectionthroughmakingmeticulouslyinconsequentialchangestothe lines.Bychangingthe“volume,concentration,andmodesofdelivery”themanufacturinglinesenjoyamedianof17.2yearsofprotection.Includedinthedata arethethreelongestmanufacturinglineprotectionsthatareallover30years,almostdoublingthatofthemedian.18 Morefundamentally,thetrueefficacyofthe “incremental”developmentofinsulinduringthe1950s-80sisunderquestion.19

Althoughtheoreticallybetterthanthepreviousversions,researcherspointout

12 AndersOlsenetal.,“PatentsandRegulatoryExclusivitiesonFDA-ApprovedInsulinProducts: ALongitudinalDatabaseStudy,1986–2019.”PLOSMedicine20(11)(2023):e1004309–9.

19 JeremyA.GreeneandKevinR.Riggs,“WhyIsThereNoGenericInsulin?HistoricalOrigins ofaModernProblem.”NewEnglandJournalofMedicine372(12)(2015):1171–75.

13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid.

thelackofevidencefortheirdefinitesuperiority.20 Thenuancedyetminutedifferencesinthevariousproductstodayareenoughtojustifythe56uniqueproduct patents,buttheysimplycannotjustifytheaddedcost.

Patentseventuallyexpiretoallowmarketcompetitionthroughgenericdrugproduction.However,asthemajorityofinsulinpatentssequentiallyexpireinthe 21stcentury,Americandiabeticpatientsstillfaceamodernpharmaceuticalmarket withoutavailablegenericinsulin,highlightingthatissuespertainingtomedicalaccessibilitystembeyondpatentgranting.GreeneandRiggspointoutasurprising phenomenoninwhicholderversionsofinsulinaredeemed“obsolete”intheUS marketinsteadofbeingadoptedbygenericpharmaceuticals.21 Oncetheseobsoleteproductsareremovedfromthemarket,theyareunavailabletopatientseven ifdoctorsprescribethem.22 Ononehand,pharmaceuticalcompaniesthathada monopolyoverthemarkethadnointerestinmanufacturingcheaperalternatives, andontheotherhand,genericcompaniesforthepastdecadesawlittleinterestin competingwiththegiants.Intheinsulinmarket,smallfoliageslikegenericcompaniescannotgainenoughnutrientstosurvive.Genericcompaniesareunwillingto investinrisky“obsolete”products;instead,companiespickthelow-hangingfruit ofeasy-to-manufacturesmall-moleculedrugs,whichinsulinisnot.23

III.2LackofGenericCompetition

Failureoffederallegislationtopromoteprice-reducingcompetitionintheinsulinmarketallowsmonopoliestoflourish.Genericcompaniesarenotabletouse thetraditionalmethodtointroducegenericinsulintothemarket.TheHatchWaxmanActof1984wasCongress’sfirstattempttosolvetheoverarchingastronomicaldrugpricesintheUSbyencouragingcompetitionfromgenericdrugs.24 Agenericmedicineisdefinedas“amedicationthatusesthesameactiveingredientsasabrand-namemedicineandmustbebioequivalent.”25 Insteadofthetypical NewDrugApplication(NDA)thatspanstenyearsofsignificantfinancialinvest-

20 BerndRichteretal.,“HumanversusAnimalInsulininPeoplewithDiabetesMellitus,”EndocrinologyandMetabolismClinicsofNorthAmerica31(3)(2002):723–49.

21 JeremyA.GreeneandKevinR.Riggs,“WhyIsThereNoGenericInsulin?HistoricalOrigins ofaModernProblem.”NewEnglandJournalofMedicine372(12)(2015):1171–75.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 SkylarJeremias,”TheHatch-WaxmanActTurns40:TheLawThatMadeBiosimilarsPossible,”TheCenterforBiosimilars,2024.

25 JaneKaufman,2023.”DEVELOPMENTSINTHELAW:BEYONDREGULATION:COMPETITIONINTHEPHARMACEUTICALINDUSTRYANDTHEPUBLICMANUFACTURINGOFDRUGS,”LoyolaofLosAngelesLawReview(2023):56,331.

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mentfrom“initialdrugdiscoverytomarketplace,”theactcreatesanAbbreviated NewDrugApplication(ANDA).26 Becauseofthebioequivalentnatureofgeneric drugs,ANDAdoesnotrequireextensiveclinicaltrials,makingtheproceduresignificantlyfasterandcheaper.27 Thestudydemonstratesthatinamarketwithsix ormoregenericcompetitors,genericdrugpricescanbereducedby95%ofthe brand-nameprice.28 Althoughrevolutionarytothepharmaceuticalindustry,the shortenedpathwaydidnotcreateagenericmarketforinsulin.Insulinisalargemoleculardrugproducedbylivingorganisms.However,TheHatch-WaxmanAct didnotdifferentiatebetweensmallandlarge-moleculedrugsasregulatorybodiesdo today,andthereforeinsulinwasmiscategorized.Whilesmall-moleculedrugscanbe easilycopied,large-moleculedrugs,ortodayknownasbiologics,arealmostimpossibletoexactlyduplicate.29 Biologicsproducedfromlivingsystemsareexpectedto haveslightvariations,sounderthestandardofbioequivalence,genericcompanies areunabletoproceedwithANDA.30

Delayinfederallegislativechangepreventedbiosimilarsfromenteringtheinsulin market.RealizingthelegislativeflawintheHatch-WaxmanAct,andtheequivalentneedforbiologicsreplacementinthemarket,CongresspassedtheBiologics PriceCompetitionandInnovationActof2009(BPCIAct)toopenthedoorfor biosimilars,thenon-brandedbiologicproducttoenterthemarket.Biosimilarsare definedasproductsthatare“highlysimilar”andhave“noclinicallymeaningful differences”tothebrandedbiologics.31 TheBPCIActresolvedtheconfusingcategorizationofinsulinby“[creating]a10-yeartimelineto...allowfor...theregulation ofinsulinasabiologic,notadrug.”

32 The10-yeartimelineextendedthelifespan ofthetreeofmonopolytoMarch23,2020,whentheFDAfirstopenedthebiosimilarpathway;onlyin2021didtheFDApassthefirstbiosimilarinsulin,analog insulinglargine,Semglee.33 Semgleeenteredthemarketexactlyacenturyafter Banting’sdiscovery,37yearsaftersmall-moleculegenericsbegantocompeteand reducebrand-namedrugprices.TheBPCIActfailstoincentivizegenericscompa-

28 RyanConradandRandallLutter,“GenericCompetitionandDrugPrices:NewEvidence LinkingGreaterGenericCompetitionandLowerGenericDrugPrices,”FDA.

29 JeremyA.GreeneandKevinR.Riggs.“WhyIsThereNoGenericInsulin?HistoricalOrigins ofaModernProblem.”NewEnglandJournalofMedicine372(12)(2015):1171–75.

30 “BiosimilarsInfoSheetLevel1:FoundationalConcepts,”FDA.

31 LeahChristlandONDTherapeuticBiologicsandBiosimilarsTeam,“FDA’sOverviewofthe RegulatoryGuidancefortheDevelopmentandApprovalofBiosimilarProductsintheUS.”In FDA.AccessedApril9,2024.

32 FDA,“100YearsofInsulin,”FDAHistoryExhibit,2022.

33 Ibid.

26 Ibid. 27

Ibid.

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niestoproducecheaperbiosimilarinsulins.Underregulatoryguidelines,theFDA requiresproofofbiosimilaritybetweenthebiosimilarproductandthebrand-name drug.34 Althoughgenericcompaniesarenotresponsibleforestablishingthesafety andefficacyofthebiosimilar,inthe“stepwiseapproach,”genericcompaniesstill needtoconductsomeanimalandhumantrials.35 Genericdrugscandramatically reducedrugmarketpriceduetothelackoftestingandtrialsrequired,but“evenan abbreviatedapprovalprocessforbiosimilarswillrequiresubstantiallymoreoriginal data,”resultinginanincreasedcostofdevelopment.36 ABiosimilarCouncilstudy thattracksSemglee’sperformancesincelaunchreportsthatin2023,astandard packsizeof30dayssupplycosts $269,comparedtoitsbrand-namecounterpart Lantusat $292,demonstratinganundesirableandinsignificantpricereduction.37 Thispriceremainsunaffordable,andisreflectedinitsmarketuptake:Semglee constitutes17%ofallcommercialwrittenprescriptionsand25%offills.38 While thecurrentbiosimilarapprovalpathwayensuresdrugsafety,itrestrictsthemarket competitivenessofbiosimilars,preventingmajorpricecuts.

Theyears2021and2022sawthemostrecentgovernmentalefforttoshakedownthepharmaceuticalmonopolies.First,throughanexecutiveorder,theBiden administrationaimstotacklecorporateconsolidationandthelackofcompetition invariousindustries.TheordermobilizesvariousagenciesandtheWhiteHouse CompetitionCounciltoenforceantitrustlawstobreakdownmarketconsolidations.39 Specifically,theadministrationcallsuponan“aggressivelegislativereform thatwouldlowerprescriptiondrugprices.40 ThereformisrealizedintheUSPTO policiesandtheInflationReductionActof2022(IRA).Inresponsetotheorder, theUSPTOcollaboratedwiththeFDAtooutlineinitiativesthat“protectagainst thepatentingofincremental,obviouschanges”todrugs,andtoassignmoreexpert patentexaminerstrainedonbiologicsandpharmaceuticalstoscrutinizepatentsto preventthepatentingof“trivialchanges.”41 Ontheotherhand,theIRAmaderev-

34 LeahChristlandONDTherapeuticBiologicsandBiosimilarsTeam,“FDA’sOverviewofthe RegulatoryGuidancefortheDevelopmentandApprovalofBiosimilarProductsintheUS,”FDA, 2024.

35 Ibid.

36 JeremyA.GreeneandKevinR.Riggs.“WhyIsThereNoGenericInsulin?HistoricalOrigins ofaModernProblem.”NewEnglandJournalofMedicine372(12)(2015):1171–75.

37 BiosimilarsCouncil,“SemgleeLaunchTracking,”Biosimilarscouncil.org,2023.

38 Ibid.

39 TheWhiteHouse,“ExecutiveOrderonPromotingCompetitionintheAmericanEconomy,” Whitehouse.gov,July9,2021.

40 Ibid.

41 KathiVidalandRobertMCaliff,“Director’sBlog:TheLatestfromUSPTOLeadership,” USPTO(blog),2022.

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olutionarychangestopricereductionofprescriptiondrugs.Theactestablishesthe DrugPriceNegotiationProgram,givingunprecedentedpowertotheSecretaryof HealthandHumanServicestonegotiatedrugpricesbetweenMedicareandparticipatingcompanies.Itcreatescyclesofnegotiationstartingin2026,thefirstcycleof thetenhighest-spendingprescriptiondrugsunderMedicarePartDandPartB.42 Theactintroducesan“ExtraHelp”programwaivingeligiblecandidatesoftheir Medicarepremiumanddeductible.43 Out-of-pocketcostiscappedat $3500per yearstartingin2024,and $2000startingin2025.44 Thepersistentlyhighpriceof insulinreceivedthespotlightintheIRA,andthemonthlysupplyofcoveredinsulin isnowcappedat $35forMedicarebeneficiaries.45 Recentlegislativedevelopments createanoptimisticoutlookoneffortstoreduceprescriptiondrugprices.

However,theIRAisinsufficienttosolvegeneralaccessibilitytoinsulin.While theDrugPriceNegotiationProgramwasinitiatedin2026,thereisuncertaintyas tothedrugschosenforthefirstcycles.46 Thesmallnumberofchosendrugsleaves patientsreliantonthenebulousunnegotiateddrugsinjeopardy.Thenumber(10in 2026,15in2027,15in2028)lacksthe“urgency”forpatientsreliantonlife-sustaining drugs.47 Thereisadditionaldoubtabouttheeffectivenessofthepricenegotiation. UndertheIRA,theSecretaryofHHSmusttakeintoconsiderationthedevelopment andresearchcostsofadrugtodetermineits“maximumfairmarketprice.”48 As previouslydiscussed,drugsthatunderwentNDAorbiosimilarapprovalprocesses involvehighfinancialandtimeinvestmentswhichjustifytheirmarketprice.The highpricesarerootedinbiosimilarapprovalprocessesandarefurtherbloomingin themonopolies.Withoutadifferentmetricofpricedetermination,theDrugPrice NegotiationProgrammayseeunsatisfactoryresults.Thepriceprotectionofferedby theIRAisalsolimitedtoonlyMedicarebeneficiaries,leavingnoregulatorypolicyon drugpricesforothermarkets.WithoutpreemptivepriceprotectionforMedicaid, thecommercialmarket,theuninsured,andtheAmericanpopulationunderthe ageof65,pharmaceuticalcompaniescansimplyincreasethecostofdrugsinthose unprotectedmarketstooffsetthereducedprofitfromMedicare.49 However,because

42 Jay-DonavinVed,”ARTICLE:TheInflationReductionActof2022:AddressingPrescription DrugCoverage,”AnnalsofHealthLaw:AdvanceDirectives(2023):32,131.

43 AssistantSecretaryforPublicAffairs(ASPA), InflationReductionActof2022,HHS.gov, November16,2023.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Jay-DonavinVed,”ARTICLE:TheInflationReductionActof2022:AddressingPrescription DrugCoverage,”AnnalsofHealthLaw:AdvanceDirectives(2023):32,131.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 JimHahn,“TheProsandConsofAllowingtheFederalGovernmenttoNegotiateSummary

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coremechanismsliketheDrugPriceNegotiationProgramhavenotbeeninitiated yet,thereisstillmuchtolookforwardtowhentheydo.Despiteitsshortcomings, theIRAisamonumentalsteptowardsstoppingifnotcuttingdownunreasonable drugpricing.

ThecauseofinsulininaccessibilityintheUSgrowsbeyondpatentlawsandlack offederalantitrustregulation.Genericcompetitorsfacesignificantpushbackfrom bothbrand-namecompaniesandinsurancecompanies.Brand-namecompaniesoftenusea“pay-for-delay”toeliminatecompetitors,firstbysuinggenericcompanies forpatentinfringement,thenpayingthegenericcompany,whoareunwillingtoinitiateacostlylawsuit,tostayoutofthemarket.50 Thisisatacticusedthroughout thepharmaceuticalindustrytomaintainthestatusquo;itssuccessisoftendueto thedifficultyindifferentiatingalegitimateinfringementsuitfromplaincorporate bullying.PharmacyBenefitManagers(PBMs),themiddlemanbetweenpharmaceuticalcompanies,retailers,andinsurancecompanies,oftennegotiateforhigher rebatesfrompharmaceuticalcompaniesforbetterformularyplacement(insurance coveragepriority),andbecausethebrand-namecompanieshavehigherlistprices (thepricechargedtoinsurancecompaniesandpatients),theycanaffordtodo so.51 Thesebehind-the-scenesdealingsresultinpatientinaccessibilitytobiosimilar insulin.Inthefirstquarterof2023,Medicareonlyapproved55%ofSemgleeprescriptionsand44%ofunbrandedcheapinsulinbiosimilars;incommercialmarkets where75%ofSemgleeprescriptionsareapproved,only30%areofunbrandedinsulin biosimilars.52 Whilevigorousenforcementofantitrustlawsmayeliminatemalicious patentinfringementsuitsintheindustry,greedypriceinflationinteractionsbetween pharmaceuticals,retailers,andinsurancecompaniesareresponsibleforsustaining thegrowthofmonopolies.

IVACallforSolutions

Anin-depthexaminationoftherootcausesofmodern-dayinsulininaccessibility highlightsthedireneedforlegislativeandregulatorychange.Thegrantedmarketmonopolyofinsulinthroughpatentsandregulatoryexclusivitiesisalearning opportunityforlawmakers.Bothpatentsandregulatoryexclusivitiesaimtoallow PrescriptionDrugPrices,”CRSReportforCongress,2005.

50 KevinWallentine,”DEVELOPMENTSINTHELAW:SHIFTINGTHEBURDENONPAYFOR-DELAYCHALLENGES:ANALYZINGAB824’SEFFECTSONREVERSEPAYMENT SETTLEMENTSANDDRUGCOSTS,”LoyolaofLosAngelesLawReview(2020):54,367.

51 AndersOlsenetal.,“PatentsandRegulatoryExclusivitiesonFDA-ApprovedInsulinProducts: ALongitudinalDatabaseStudy,1986–2019.”PLOSMedicine20(11)(2023):e1004309–9.

52 BiosimilarsCouncil,“SemgleeLaunchTracking,”Biosimilarscouncil.org,2023.

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innovatorstoreapbenefitsfortheirinnovationinvestments.However,thelackof communicationbetweentheUSPTOandFDAstacksupprotectionsthatareoften toolonginconjunctiontojeopardizeafreemarketandestablishamonopoly.The tworegulatoryagenciesmustdetermineamaximumlengthofcollectiveprotection thatbalancesbetweeninterestsofboththeinnovationandthepublic.USPTO andFDAalsomustresolvetheissueofincrementalpatentingbeyondincreasing scrutinybyexpertsinresponsetothe2021ExecutiveOrder.Drug-devicecombinationprotectionandpatent-evergreeningmustbeeliminated.Innovationsofdifferent magnitudesofimpactsshouldnotbegiventhesameamountofprotection.This studyproposestwodifferentsolutionsregardingpharmaceuticalpatentstoimpede patentandmonopolyevergreening.One,USPTOcanestablishanevaluatingsystemdeterminingthesignificanceofaninnovation,andvarytheprotectionbased onsignificancelevel.Two,USPTOscanestablishresearchanddevelopmentcost estimationforlife-savingdrugs,andinsteadofofferingaconcreteperiodofprotection,offerwhateverperiodisrequiredforbrand-namecompaniestomakeacertain percentageofprofit.BothmethodssatisfytherequirementssetintheConstitutiontoencourageinnovationwhileincreasingcompetitiontocreatemorevaluable inventionsanddecreasingtheimpactof“trivial”changes.

Nowthatmostinsulinpatentshaveexpiredandinnovationissparse,themore relevantissueisinsulinaccessibility.Todate,insulinbiosimilarsremainexpensive andpowerlesstopenetratebrand-namemonopolies.Evidencepointstoalackof competitionintheinsulinmarket.Thebiosimilarapprovalpathwayrequiresanimal andclinicaltrialsthatarenecessaryforthesafetyofconsumers,impedinginvestmentsfromgenericcompaniestothedauntingtask.In2015,Medicarespent4.3 billiondollarsaloneoninsulinglargine,theactiveingredientinSemglee(lancet).If thefederalgovernmentdivertsthatfundingtosubsidizethemajorityofthatresearch anddevelopmentcostforgenericcompaniestocreatebiosimilars,genericcompaniescansignificantlyreducethemarketpriceofbiosimilarinsulins,savingMedicare andthegeneralpublicbillionsinthefuture.Tofurtherincitetheenthusiasmof genericcompetitionintheinsulinmarket,thefederalgovernmentmustpromote marketuptakeofbiosimilarinsulin.Unlikegenericdrugs,biosimilarsstruggleto takeupmarketsharesduetolowpriorityoninsuranceformularyplacement:insulinbiosimilarsaredisadvantagedsproutsbeforetheyevenreachthemarket.Also unlikenormalinsurancecompaniesthatrelyonrebatesfrompharmaceuticals,MedicareandMedicaidarelessreliantandcanprioritizebiosimilarspendingtoinstill consumerconfidenceintheproduct,hopefullyextendingthedemandtocommercialmarkets.Thecombinationofmarketpricereductionandinsurancepromotion mayfinallyyieldmeaningfulpricereductionstoimproveaccessibility.Thebattle

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againstthetreeofmonopolyisalongone;however,whilepatientconsumerswaited acenturyforbiosimilarinsulin,thegovernmentmustbeproactiveincombating monopolies.ModernAmerica’sfreedomfromillnessisnotfree,andwillneverbe withoutgovernmentalinterference.

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WorksCited

AmericanDiabetesAssociation.“EconomicCostsofDiabetesintheU.S.In2017.”DiabetesCare 41(5)(2018):917–28.Source.

AssistantSecretaryforPublicAffairs(ASPA). InflationReductionActof2022. Hhs.gov.November16,2023.Source.

Beran,D.,R.O.Laing,W.Kaplan,R.Knox,A.Sharma,V.J.Wirtz,J.Frye,andM.Ewen.

“APerspectiveonGlobalAccesstoInsulin:ADescriptiveStudyoftheMarket,TradeFlowsand Prices.”DiabeticMedicine36(6)(2019):726–33.Source.

BiosimilarsCouncil.“SemgleeLaunchTracking.”Biosimilarscouncil.org,2023.Source.

“BiosimilarsInfoSheetLevel1:FoundationalConcepts.”FDA.Source.

Bliss,Michael. TheDiscoveryofInsulin.UniversityofChicagoPress,2013.

CenterforDrugEvaluationandResearch,“FrequentlyAskedQuestionsonPatentsandExclusivity,”U.S.FoodandDrugAdministration,February5,2020.Source.

Christl,Leah,andONDTherapeuticBiologicsandBiosimilarsTeam.“FDA’sOverviewofthe RegulatoryGuidancefortheDevelopmentandApprovalofBiosimilarProductsintheUS.”In FDA.AccessedApril9,2024.Source.

Conrad,Ryan,andRandallLutter,“GenericCompetitionandDrugPrices:NewEvidenceLinking GreaterGenericCompetitionandLowerGenericDrugPrices.”FDA,2019.Source.

CornellLegalInformationInstitute.“Patent.”LII/LegalInformationInstitute.Source.

Cubanski,Juliette,TriciaNeuman,andMeredithFreed.“ExplainingthePrescriptionDrugProvisionsintheInflationReductionAct.”KFF,2023.Source.

FDA.“100YearsofInsulin.”FDAHistoryExhibit,2022.Source.

Gaffney,Adam,DavidU.Himmelstein,andSteffieWoolhandler.“PrevalenceandCorrelatesof PatientRationingofInsulinintheUnitedStates:ANationalSurvey.”AnnalsofInternalMedicine 175(11)(2022).Source.

Grassley,CharlesE,andRonWyden.“TheUnitedStatesSenateCommitteeonFinance”Www.finance.senate.gov. AccessedApril10,2024.Source.

Greene,JeremyA.,andKevinR.Riggs.“WhyIsThereNoGenericInsulin?HistoricalOriginsof aModernProblem.”NewEnglandJournalofMedicine372(12)(2015):1171–75.Source.

Hahn,Jim.“TheProsandConsofAllowingtheFederalGovernmenttoNegotiateSummary PrescriptionDrugPrices.”CRSReportforCongress,2005.Source.

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Jeremias,Skylar.”TheHatch-WaxmanActTurns40:TheLawThatMadeBiosimilarsPossible.” TheCenterforBiosimilars,2024.Source.

Kaufman,Jane.”DEVELOPMENTSINTHELAW:BEYONDREGULATION:COMPETITIONINTHEPHARMACEUTICALINDUSTRYANDTHEPUBLICMANUFACTURINGOF DRUGS.”LoyolaofLosAngelesLawReview(2023):56,331.Source.

Olsen,Anders,ReedFBeall,RyanPKnox,SeanSTu,AaronSKesselheim,andWilliamBFeldman.“PatentsandRegulatoryExclusivitiesonFDA-ApprovedInsulinProducts:ALongitudinal DatabaseStudy,1986–2019.”PLOSMedicine20(11)(2023):e1004309–9.Source.

Rajkumar,S.Vincent.“TheHighCostofInsulinintheUnitedStates:AnUrgentCalltoAction.” MayoClinicProceedings95(1)(2020):22–28.Source.

Richter,Bernd,GudrunNeises,andKarlaBergerhoff.“HumanversusAnimalInsulininPeople withDiabetesMellitus.”EndocrinologyandMetabolismClinicsofNorthAmerica31(3)(2002): 723–49.Source.

TheWhiteHouse.“ExecutiveOrderonPromotingCompetitionintheAmericanEconomy.” Whitehouse.gov,2021.Source.

U.S.Constitution,art.I, § 8,cl.8.

Ved,Jay-Donavin.”ARTICLE:TheInflationReductionActof2022:AddressingPrescription DrugCoverage,”AnnalsofHealthLaw:AdvanceDirectives(2023):32,131.Source.

Vidal,Kathi,andRobertMCaliff.“Director’sBlog:TheLatestfromUSPTOLeadership.” USPTO(blog),2022.Source.

Wallentine,Kevin.”DEVELOPMENTSINTHELAW:SHIFTINGTHEBURDENONPAYFOR-DELAYCHALLENGES:ANALYZINGAB824’SEFFECTSONREVERSEPAYMENT SETTLEMENTSANDDRUGCOSTS,”LoyolaofLosAngelesLawReview(2020):54,367. Source.

WHOTeam.“Keepingthe100-Year-OldPromise:MakingInsulinAccessUniversal.”World HealthOrganization,2021.Source.

TheEssentialFunctionoftheSupreme Court:ADialogue

WesleyHolston’26

Spring2024

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Abstract

Throughthequestion-and-answerformatofProfessorHenryM.Hart’scelebrated ThePowerofCongresstoLimittheJurisdictionofFederalCourts:AnExercisein Dialectic (otherwiseknownasthe Dialogue),thisarticleseekstoexaminefrom severalanglesquestionsabouttheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt’s“essentialrole” intheConstitution’sschemeofgovernment.Thearticleadvancespositionsrelating tothis“essentialrole”inthecontextoftheCourt’suseofitscertioraripowerto “cherry-pick”(inthewordsofoneinterlocutor)legalissuesandofitsrelationshipto othercourtsandtheothertwobranchesoftheFederalGovernment.Thedialogue takesplacebetweentwoseeminglyoppositeviewpoints:onethatseestheCourt’s mainfunction—andthefunctionofallcourts—asthedeciderofcasesandanother thatseestheCourtmoreasthedesignatedinterpreterandenforcerofconstitutional meaning.

IIntroduction

ItistheintentionofthisarticletoexploretheroleoftheSupremeCourtinthe constitutionalscheme.AsProfessorHenryM.Hartwroteintheintroductionofhis celebratedThePowerofCongresstoLimittheJurisdictionofFederalCourts:An ExerciseinDialectic–or,asitismorefamouslyknown,theDialogue,“[t]hepurposeofthediscussionisnottoprofferfinalanswersbuttoventilatethequestions.”1 Towardsthisend,thequestion-and-answerformatProfessorHartusedhasbeen adopted,asitisabletoframe,contextualize,andcomparethemanydifferentpositionsonemayreasonablytakeonthistopicmoreeffectivelythanastraightforward argumentativearticle.

IIWhatistheEssentialRoleoftheJudiciary?

Q.Discussingjurisdiction-stripping,oneoftheinterlocutorsinProfessorHart’s DialoguejudgesthatCongressmaynotmakesuchexceptionstotheappellatejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt“aswilldestroy[its]essentialrole...intheconstitutionalplan.”2 Whatthat“essentialrole”isHartneverelaborateson.What,in youropinion,couldthat“essentialrole”be?

1 HenryM.Hart,Jr., ThePowerofCongresstoLimittheJurisdictionofFederalCourts:An ExerciseinDialectic,66Harv.L.Rev.1362,1363(1953).

2 Ibid.,1365.

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A.IthinkitistoenforcethesupremacyoftheConstitution.TheCourt’sother rolesallderivefromthisonesupremefunctionorpower.

Q.Canyoutellmewhatyoumeanby“interpretationoftheConstitution”?

A.ImeanthattheCourtmust“enforcetheConstitution,”asProfessorBandes says.3

Q.HowdoestheCourtdothat?

A.Throughitsappellatejurisdiction.ItallowstheCourttoupholditsown precedentandmakesureitsrulesarebeingfollowedbythecourtsoftheNation.

Q.DonotCongressandthePresidentalsoenforcetheConstitution?Andwhat ofthoseprivatecitizenswhoaretheonestobringsuitagainstunconstitutional enactments?IwouldcallthemenforcersoftheConstitutionmorethanIwouldthe courts.Privatecitizenscanactontheirown,butthecourtscanmoveonlywhen requestedtomove;and,eventhen,onlywhentheyareconstitutionallyauthorized todoso.If,pursuanttoArticleIII,anissueisnota“caseorcontroversy,”the courtscantakenocognizanceofit.4 Theycannot suasponte reachouttocorrect anabusewhentheyseeit;theyarenotevenpermittedtoissueadvisoryopinions. Theyalmostalwayshavetoactafterthefact,toremedyinjuries alreadycaused by abuse.Thisseemsaratherweakpowerofenforcement,no?

A.ThenletusnotcallthecourtsenforcersoftheConstitution,butof constitutionalsupremacy.Surely,youcanhavenoqualmswiththatwayofputtingit? ItmakestheSupremeCourt“theconstitutionalinstrumentforimplementingthe supremacyclause,”whichwouldhavelittleeffectwithoutit.5

Q.Iamstilluncomfortable,butbeforewecontinue,letusclarifysomething:are wespeakingoftheSupremeCourtoroftheentireFederalJudiciary,includingthe lowercourts?Sometimeswereferto“the”Courtandthecourtsandtakeasour subjectnowone,nowtheotherwithoutsayingso.

A.YourquestionwasabouttheSupremeCourt.Let’slimitourselvestothat.

III“Cherry-Picking”

Q.Fine.IthinkthatyourschemecondonestheCourt’smodern-daypracticeof “cherry-picking”legalissues—grantingcertiorarionthesebutnotonthosequestions withinthesamecase.IthinkthatthatfliesinthefaceofArticleIII’srequirement

3 SusanBandes, TheIdeaofaCase,42Stan.L.Rev.227,301(1990).

4 Cf.U.S.Const.,art.III, § 2,cl.1.

5 LeonardG.Ratner, CongressionalPowerovertheAppellateJurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt, 109U.Pa.L.Rev.157,160-1(1960).

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that,“[t]hejudicialPowershallextendtoallCases,inLawandEquity.”6 Theword “case”—withallitsquestionsofstandingandjurisdictionandthelike—ispretty determinativeofthenature,oratleasttheobjectoftheworkoftheCourt.Acase isasetofconcretefactsthatpresentcertainlegalquestionstheresolutionofwhich mayalterinabindingwaythelegalrelationshipbetweentheconcernedparties.To allowtheCourttoassertjurisdictionover this questionbutnotthosequestionsin thesamecasethwartstherealpurposeofthecaserequirement;itpermitstheCourt todecidenotcasesbutissues.

A.Iftheissueisfairlypresentedbyacase,andthefactsarebeingusedtoinform theresolutionoftheissue,Icannotseehowthecaserequirementisinameaningful waytransgressed.

TheSupremeCourtisuniquelytaskedwithensuringthesupremacyandconsistencyofFederallaw.Towards that end,IfindnoproblemwithallowingtheCourtto “cherry-pick”thequestionsitdecides.Withalimitedamountofresources,Ithink itisonlyreasonablefortheCourttobeenabledtohusbandthemanddevoteits attentiontowhereitismostneeded.Ifacasepresentsfivequestionsandoneisthe subjectofacircuitsplitandtheothersarecomparativelyunimportantornotripe yetfordecision(theyarefrivolous,perhaps,orthefactsofthecasedonotconduce toawell-informedjudgment),itwouldseemtome exactly whattheCourtshould bedoingtoselectthecircuitsplitissuefordecisionandpassovertheothers.

Q.Accordingtoyourconception,thefactsofthecaseexistsolelytoaidthe Courtinitsexpositionofrules,inthesamewaythatanadministrativeagency mightcollectdataasitcontemplatesframingandpromulgatinganewregulation. Inotherwords,theCourttreatscaseslike vehicles,orameanstoanend(itsown end,ofcourse),inawayunparalleledanywhereinourjudicialsystem.

Itsquanderstheresourcesoflitigantstohavetheirattorneysbriefandarguea singleorahandfulofquestionsoutofmany,whilethecaseisdraggedoutinalower courtwhosedecisionsontheotherissuesarethemselvessubjecttoSupremeCourt review.HowmuchmorewastefulisitfortheCourt—asitdoessometimes—to frameitsownquestionandrequiretheattorneystoargueit,incompletedisregard ofthequestiontheythemselvesbroughttotheCourt!

Butevenapartfromthat,IthinkthatallowingtheCourttopickandchoose whatareasoflawitwishestodevelopencouragesittopursueanon-judicialagenda; itatleastmakesitappeartothepublictobedoingso.WhentheSupremeCourt invalidatesalaw,itcannot“say,‘Becausewehadto.’Instead,[it]mustsay, ‘Becausewechoseto.’”7 This,atleast,istheappearancein,say, Dobbsv.Jackson

6 U.S.Const.,art.III, § 2,cl.1.Italicsmine.

7 RetrievedfromBenjaminB.Johnson, TheOriginsofSupremeCourtQuestionSelection,122

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Health.Itishardtorefutetheallegationofthedissent,thatthemajoritydidnot follow Casey inupholding Roe “foronereasonandonereasononly:becausethe compositionofthisCourthaschanged,”whentheCourtdidnothavetodecidethe casebutchoseto.8

A.Thismaybetrueincertaincontroversialcases.Butyouranalysiscannot explainwhytheCourthascometobeviewed,notasacorruptpolicymaker,butas thechampionofcivilrights.Thisisnotabaddevelopment,surely?

IVTheSupremeCourt’sFunctionRelativetoThose ofOtherCourts

Q.TotheextentthatitgivesrisetothemisunderstandingoftheCourtasacivil rightsgumballmachine,Ithinkitisabaddevelopment.Thisisatleastpartlyto blamefortheimmensevulnerabilityoftheCourtwhenitdecidestorollbackcivil rightsprecedent—asitdidin Dobbs—evenwhenitiscompletelyjustifiedindoing so.

ChiefJusticeMarshall,longbeforecertiorari,oncewroteofhavingtotakeacase hewouldratheravoid:

Withwhateverdoubts,withwhateverdifficulties,acasemaybeattended,wemustdecideit,ifitbebroughtbeforeus.Wehavenomore righttodeclinetheexerciseofjurisdictionwhichisgiven,thantousurp thatwhichisnotgiven.Theoneortheotherwouldbetreasontothe Constitution.Questionsmayoccurwhichwewouldgladlyavoid,but wecannotavoidthem.Allwecandois,toexerciseourbestjudgment, andconscientiouslytoperformourduty.....Wefindnoexceptionto thisgrant[ofappellatejurisdiction],andwecannotinsertone.9

Idonotthinkwewilleverstopconfusingtheroleofthecourts,whichsaywhat thelawis,notwhatit shouldbe.ButactinginaccordwiththeChief’sphilosophy wouldatleastgivetheCourtagreaterclaimtoimpartiality,andthereforestronger protectionagainstthechargeofwillfullychangingthelaw—directlycontributing Colum.L.Rev.793,863(2022)(citingEdwardA.Hartnett,QuestioningCertiorari:Some ReflectionsSeventy-FiveYearsAftertheJudges’Bill,100Colum.L.Rev.1643,1717(2000)).

8 Dobbsv.JacksonWomen’sHealthOrganization,597U.S.6(2022)(Thomas,J.,andKavanaugh,J.,concurring,Roberts,C.J.,concurringinthejudgment,andBreyer,Sotomayor,and Kagan,JJ.,dissenting).

9 Cohensv.Virginia,19U.S.(6Wheat.)264,404(1821).

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totheperceivedlegitimacyofitsdecisions,theall-importantbedrockonwhichthe Courtrests.

Thisleadsus,coincidentally,toanothermisgivingIhavewithyourtheory. TheSupremeCourtistheonlyFederalcourtwithcertioraripower.Thisfact, togetherwithyourpropositionthattheCourt’sfunctionisto“enforceconstitutionalsupremacy,”seemstoputtheCourtinadifferentcategoryaltogetherfrom otherFederalcourtsand,howmuchmore,fromStatecourts,asthoughthesecourts arenotsimilarlycompetentandtaskedtoensurethatFederallawisupheld.But theConstitutionveststhesamejudicialpowerinbothSupremeandinferiorFederal courts;andsincethelatter’sexistenceisalwaysoptional,wemustassumethatthe statecourtstogetherwiththeSupremeCourtarealonesufficienttoaccomplishthe endsoftheFederaljudicialpower.

A.Youwoulddeprive,then,theword“supreme”ofallmeaning?

Q.Notatall.IthinkitdesignatesanentitythattheFoundersthoughtexpedient –asinglefinaltribunalwithnationaljurisdiction.WhatIdon’tthinkitdoesisgrant theCourtaconstitutionallyspecialstatusor“superpower.”Intheconstitutional text,theCourtisdifferentiatedfromallothercourtsonlyintheguaranteednature ofitsexistenceandintheextentofitsjurisdiction.Indeed,itispossiblethat thedistinctionbetweensupremeandinferiorcourts“refer[s]simplytotherelative jurisdictionalreachofthecourts”andnotatalltoahierarchicalrelationshipof subordinationofthelattertotheformer.10

A.Thatisanotheracademicbadidea.Evenifitistruethat“supreme”ismeant todescribetheCourt’sjurisdictionalextent,thatdoesnotinanywayruleoutthe ideathatithasaspecialroleinthejudicialhierarchy.Indeed,itseemsactually to support thatidea.Asinglesupremecourtthathasjurisdictionovertheentire nationandcannotitselfbereversed and cannotbedisestablishedbyCongressmust servethefullfunctionoftheJudicialBranch:upholdingthesupremacyofFederal lawandpreservingconsistencyinitsapplication.Noothercourtdoesthesethings inquitethesamewayandtoquitethesamedegreeastheSupremeCourt.

Q.Whatyouproposeseemstometobeadifferenceofdegree,notofkind.It isnotthefunctionoftheSupremeCourtthatisdifferentfromothercourts,butits relativeeffectivenessindoingthatfunction.

A.Thereisathresholdafterwhichadifferenceindegreebecomesadifference inkind.

Q.Iseeeachcourtfulfillingthesamefunction,onlyondifferentlevels.Acircuit courtensureslegalconsistencyonthecircuitlevel,andtheSupremeCourtonthe

10 AmyConeyBarrett, TheSupervisoryPoweroftheSupremeCourt,106Colum.L.Rev.324, 343(2006).

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nationallevel.

ItseemsplainthatArticleIIIcontemplatesnoroledistinctionbetweenthe SupremeCourtandtherestofthecourtsoftheNation,FederalandState.Thereason,inmyopinion,thatArticleIIIspellsouttheoriginalandappellatejurisdiction oftheSupremeCourtisnottogiveitaspecialstatus,butbecauseitissettingup the JudicialBranch.Ajudiciarymusthavecourtsandauthoritytohearcases.Not tohaveestablishedatleasta“core”or“startingpoint”–theSupremeCourtwith itsjurisdiction–therebyleavingtheexistenceofallcourtsandtheirjurisdictionentirelytoCongresswouldhavebeentomakebothoptionalinthesamewayinferior Federalcourtscurrentlyareoptional,whichwouldhavemadeoptional,functionally atleast,theentireJudicialBranch.Thecourtswouldhavebeenwhollysubordinate toCongress.Thatisplainly not theintentionoftheFounders.

ArticleIIIspecifiesthat“[t]hejudicialPoweroftheUnitedStates,shallbevested inonesupremeCourt,andinsuchinferiorCourtsastheCongressmayfromtime totimeordainandestablish.”11 Havingcreatedthejudicialpower,ArticleIIImust vestitin something ifitisnottobeacreatureoftheotherbranches,anditdoesso inasupremecourt.NodistinctionismadebetweentheSupremeandinferiorcourts otherthanthatonemustexistandtheotherscanbecreatedbyCongress,butthe samejudicialpowerinheresin both.ThisisevidentinSection2whenwearetold that“[t]hejudicialPowershallextend...”12 withoutdistinctionmadebetweenthe judicialpoweroftheSupremeCourtandthejudicialpowerofthelowercourts.Both classesofcourtareequallytaskedwiththeexerciseoftheFederaljudicialpower, whichexiststoresolveconflictsinthetypesofcasesenumeratedintheArticle.

PerhapsArticleIII—atmost—makestheSupremeCourttheheadoftheJudicial Branch.Whetherornotthisistrue,thefactthatitveststhejudicialpowerboth intheSupremeCourtandininferiorcourtswithoutqualificationmeansthatboth courtsexercisethesamepowerinthesameway.

A.WheredotheotherjudicialfunctionsIidentified—likepreservinglegalconsistency—fitintoyourscheme?

11 U.S.Const.,art.III, § 1.

12 Ibid., § 2,cl.1.

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VTheInterpretivePoweroftheSupremeCourt ComparedtothatoftheTwoElectedFederal Branches

Q.TheSupremeCourtdoesthem,butwhereasIseethemasnecessaryeffectsof decidingcasesonanationallevel,youmakedecidingcasesmerelythosefunctions’ side-effects.Ifacertaincaseresolvesacircuitsplit,thenthatisjustanincidentof theCourt’sactualjob:thedecisionofcases.

TheotherbranchesinterprettheConstitution,too,yetwedonotsaythatthat istheirfunction.

WhenCongresspassesabill,itexpressesitsopinionthatitisvalidandlegal; thesamegoeswhenthePresidentsignsit.Andbothmayverywellchoosetofaila billiftheydecidethatitisnotconstitutional.

A.YoucannotclaimthatthoseBranchesinterprettheConstitutioninamanner analogousatalltothewaythattheSupremeCourtdoesit.

Q.Why?

A.I’llletPubliusanswer:

Limitations[onCongress’power]canbepreservedinpracticeno otherwaythanthroughthemediumofcourtsofjustice,whosedutyit mustbetodeclareallactscontrarytothemanifesttenoroftheConstitutionvoid.Withoutthis,allthereservationsofparticularrightsor privilegeswouldamounttonothing.13

Justalittlebelowheremarks,“thatthecourtsweredesignedtobeanintermediatebodybetweenthepeopleandthelegislatureinorder,amongotherthings,to keepthelatterwithinthelimitsassignedtotheirauthority.Theinterpretationof thelawsistheproperandpeculiarprovinceofthecourts.”14

TheCourtupholdsconstitutionalsupremacyagainsteventheothertwobranches. Interprethoweverthey’dlike,itistheCourt’sconstitutionaldeterminationsthat areeffectiveandfinal,nottheirs.

VIConclusion

Q.Publiusemphasizes,asyoudo,thatthe“duty”ofthecourtsistoinvalidate illegallaws.Ithinkthatthisviewratherneglectstheroleofthecourtsinpurely 13 TheFederalistNo.78,at466(AlexanderHamilton)(ClintonRossitered.,1961). 14 Ibid.,467

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privatedisputes.Thequestionis,whichdutyismoreimportant:thedeclarationof laworthevindicationofrights?

A.Thatisreductionist.TherearemyriadfunctionsoftheCourtandthecourts. Itcanbethatoneisnotsomuchmoreimportantthananother.IfweacceptHart’s “essentialfunctions”thesis,itmaybenecessaryperhapstoassessajurisdictionstrippingbillinthelightofthewholefunctionoftheSupremeCourt.Towhat extentwillitimpactitsabilitytoresolvedisputes,declarethelaw,upholdFederal supremacy,andcreatelegalconsistency?The“essentialfunction”maybethewhole complexoftasksanduniquerolesthattheSupremeCourt—andthewholeFederal Judiciary—fulfillintheconstitutionalscheme.WhattheFramersenvisionedthe SupremeCourtasdoing,that,perhaps,Congressmaynotdestroy.

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WorksCited

Bandes,Susan. TheIdeaofaCase.42Stan.L.Rev.227,301(1990).

Barrett,AmyConey. TheSupervisoryPoweroftheSupremeCourt,106Colum.L.Rev.324,343 (2006).

Cohensv.Virginia,19U.S.(6Wheat.)264,404(1821).

Dobbsv.JacksonWomen’sHealthOrganization,597U.S.6(2022).

Hamilton,Alexander. TheFederalistPapers:No.78,466,467.ClintonRossitered.(1961).

Hart,HenryM.Jr. ThePowerofCongresstoLimittheJurisdictionofFederalCourts:AnExerciseinDialectic.66Harv.L.Rev.1362,1363,1365(1953).

Hartnett,EdwardA. QuestioningCertiorari:SomeReflectionsSeventy-FiveYearsAfterthe Judges’Bill.100Colum.L.Rev.1643,1717(2000).

Johnson,BenjaminB. TheOriginsofSupremeCourtQuestionSelection.122Colum.L.Rev. 793,863(2022).

Ratner,LeonardG. CongressionalPowerovertheAppellateJurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt. 109U.Pa.L.Rev.157,160-1(1960).

U.S.Constitution,art.III, § 1.

U.S.Constitution,art.III, § 2,cl.1.

LivestockSlaughterintheUnitedStates: EthicalImplicationsoftheHumane MethodsofSlaughterActof1958

KristinaKianovski’27

Spring2024

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Abstract

TheUSDAprovidesguidelinesforthehumaneslaughteroflivestockinthe UnitedStateswhicharemeanttopreventunnecessaryharmtofarmanimals.The researchbelowisananalysisofthislegislation,includinganoverviewoftheHumaneSlaughterActof1958,theFederalMeatInspectionAct,theFederalPoultry ProductInspectionAct,andrecentadditionstothecodeoffederalregulationson thesubject.Allofthislegislationwascreatedtocombatallegationsofanimalabuse andunethicalpracticesinthelivestockslaughterbusiness.

Toexaminetheethicalimplicationsandshortcomingsofthislegislation,this textdescribesandanalyzesthecomplicationsofthethreemethodsofstunningin cattle,swine,andpoultry:electricalstunning,captiveboltstunning,andcarbon dioxidepoisoning.Thesethreemethodsarecomparedtooneanotherandlegislation meanttoalleviatecomplicationsfromthethreemethodsisdiscussed.

Theanalysisofthesemethods,theirpotentialcomplications,andtheremedial legislationwilldemonstratethatcurrentlivestockslaughterguidelinesarenoteffectiveinaccomplishingtheirgoal.Theethicalviolationsthatoccurduringlivestock slaughterarenotpreventedbytheimplementationofthislegislation,anditmust bereformedtotrulymakeanimpactonthepractice.

IIntroduction

Since1958,theUnitedStatesofAmericahasshapeditsagriculturalpractices— concerninganimalethicsandconcentratedanimalfeedingoperations(CAFOs)—based onveryfewpiecesoflegislation.Whileagriculturalpracticessuchaspesticideuse andweedingpracticesarestrictlyregulatedbytheUSDA,livestockslaughterhas comparativelyvagueguidelinesthatoftenfailtopreventunnecessaryharmtolivestock.1 ToreformtheHumaneMethodsofSlaughterAct,theFederalMeatInspectionAct,andthePoultryProductInspectionAct,theUSDApassedregulations suchas9CFRPart313,hopingtoalleviatecertainethicalimplicationsoflivestock slaughterbycreatingstricterguidelinesforthetransportandhumaneslaughterof livestock.2 Nevertheless,manyarguethatthiswasinsufficienttopreventthemistreatmentandabuseofanimals.Inthisjournal,wewillreviewthenuancesofthe regulationsandlegislationpassedtoprotectthelivestockinCAFOs,aswellasraise someobjectionsabouttheethicalityofthesepractices.

1 AboutOPMP. USDA.

2 UnitedStates,CodeofFederalRegulations,Title9,Section313.

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Thisjournaliscomposedoffivesubsections.SectionII(HumaneMethodsof SlaughterAct)isadescriptionoftheHumaneMethodsofSlaughterActandits purposeinthegreateragriculturalindustry.SectionIII(FederalRegulations)isan overviewofthemainfederalregulationspertinenttomethodsofslaughter,suchas theFederalMeatInspectionActandthePoultryProductInspectionAct.Section IV(MethodsofSlaughter)consistsofthedifferentmethodsoflivestockslaughter, thetoolsusedineach,andtheirshortcomings.SectionV(RegulationofMethod Administration)describesthefederalregulationspassedtoalleviatecomplications withthemethodsofslaughter,andSectionVI(Implications)discussestheethicalimplicationsofthevariousregulationsmeanttoalleviatecomplicationswith methodsofslaughter.

IIHumaneMethodsofSlaughterAct

Firstly,itisimportanttounderstandtheHumaneMethodsofSlaughterAct, aprominentpieceoflegislationoriginallycreatedtomitigateunnecessaryharmto animalsinslaughterhouses.3 Passedin1958inresponsetogeneralpublicconcern aboutanimaltreatmentinmeatpackingplants,theHumaneSlaughterActof1958 iscomprisedoffourparts:4

(A)preventneedlesssuffering[oflivestock];

(B)resultinsaferandbetterworkingconditionsforpersonsengaged inslaughteringoperations;

(C)bringaboutimprovementofproductsandeconomiesinslaughteringoperations;and

(D)produceotherbenefitsforproducers,processors,andconsumers thattendtoexpediteanorderlyflowoflivestockandlivestockproducts ininterstateandforeigncommerce

ThefirstpartofthisActpreventsthe‘needlesssuffering’oftenassociatedwith maltreatmentofanimalsinCAFOenvironments.AsdefinedbytheHumaneMethodsAct,thismeansthat(a)inthecaseofcattle,calves,horses,mules,sheep,swine, 3 UnitedStates,CodeofFederalRegulations,Title7,Section48,7USCCh.48:Humane MethodsofLivestockSlaughter(house.gov).

4 Ibid.

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andotherlivestock,allanimalsarerenderedinsensibletopainbyasingleblowor gunshotoranelectrical,chemicalorothermeansthatisrapidandeffective,before beingshackled,hoisted,thrown,cast,orcut.5

Followingthis,theHumaneMethodsofSlaughterActaimstoprotectslaughterhouseworkersfromunsafeconditionsaswellasexpeditetheflowoflivestock andlivestocktradeinthewaythatleastharmstheanimals.6 Nevertheless,therest oftheActdoesnotdealwiththeconditionsunderwhichtheanimalsthemselves arekept,withtheexceptionofSection903,whichcreatesguidelinesforthetransportationofequineandgrantsauthorizationfortheSecretaryofAgriculturetoalter theseguidelines—butlimitstheirinfluenceoverregulationsregardingtheslaughter oflivestock.7

IIIFederalRegulations

Secondly,wemustunderstandtheothertwooldestpiecesoflegislationinthe UnitedStatesregardinglivestocktreatment—theFederalMeatInspectionActof 1906andthePoultryProductInspectionActof1957.TheFederalMeatInspectionAct,althoughlargelydealingwithpostmorteminspectionaswellashuman consumptionofmeats,includestwovaluablesectionsthatarepertinenttothehandlingoflivestockantemortem.8 ThefirstoftheseisSection603,whichestablishes thattheSecretaryofAgriculturemaysuspendallinspectionandproductionof meatinaplantthatdoesnotcomplywiththeguidelinesoftheHumaneMethods ofSlaughterAct.9 Thesecondprominentsection—whichismorerelevantforour purposes—isSection610ProhibitedActs.10 Thissectionprohibitsadulterationof livestockwhileintransitorpriortoinspection,attemptingtodecreaseanyharm thatmaybeinflictedonlivestockbeforeinspectionandarrivalataslaughterhouse.11 Thisisimportantwhenanalyzingcommoncomplicationsinanimalslaughter,which oftenaffectthequalityofthemeatandmaketheaffectedanimalnonviablefortrade

5 HumaneMethodsofSlaughterAct:USDAhasaddressedsomeproblemsbutstillfacesenforcementchallenges,(UnitedStatesGeneralAccountingOffice,2004),p.2-3.

6 Congress.gov,”H.R.4115-95thCongress(1977-1978):HumaneMethodsofSlaughterAct,” February28,1977.

7 Ibid.

8 HumaneMethodsofSlaughterAct,UnitedStates,CodeofFederalRegulations,Title7,Section 48.

9 FoodSafetyandInspectionService. FederalMeatInspectionAct—FoodSafetyandInspection Service.

10 UnitedStates,CodeofFederalRegulations,Title21,Section603.

11 Ibid.

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orconsumption.12

ThePoultryProductInspectionActhassimilarguidelinesastheFederalMeat InspectionAct,establishingthattheSecretaryofAgricultureoverseesthelegal slaughterofpoultryandtheupholdingoftheHumaneofSlaughterAct.13 However, thePoultryProductInspectionActisevenlessstrictthantheFMIA,allowingfor personalslaughteranddistributionofpoultryaslongasitislabeledunderthe guidelinesandfitforhumanconsumption(§464.Exemptions).14

UnderstandingtheseCongressionalactsisimperativetounderstandingboth theirdirectimplicationsandtheregulationsthathavefollowedthem.Tocreate acompletepicture,however,itisnecessarytoreviewboththecomplicationsof livestockslaughterandtheethicaldebatesthatarisebasedonthesecomplications.

IVMethodsofSlaughter

Therearefourcommonmethodsoflivestockslaughter:slaughterbyelectrical stunning,captiveboltstunning,carbondioxidegaspoisoning,andthegunshot method.Thisjournalwillnotdiscussthegunshotmethod,duetoitsdecreaseduse intheU.S.aswellasitsclosesimilaritytothecaptiveboltmethod.15 Captivebolt stunning—themostcommonofthefourmethodsincattleslaughter—isamethod inwhichastunnerpoweredbygunpowdercartridgesorcompressedairisplaced againsttheanimal’sforehead.Whenthetriggerispulled,thestunnerexplosion drivesametalboltintotheanimal’sbrain,whichismeanttocauseimmediate braindeathfortheanimal.Thisiscalledthe‘captive’boltmethodinthatthe boltisconnectedtothestunner,whichdifferentiatesitfromagunshot.Certain captiveboltstunnersdonotentertheanimal’sbrain,insteadknockingtheanimal unconsciousthroughaconcussiveforce.Thesearereferredtoasmushroomstunners ornon-penetratingcaptivebolts.16

Thismethod,althoughwidelyused,presentsafewcontroversiesthatcannotbe ignored.Forone,thecaptiveboltmethodrequiresalevelofaccuracywhichisnot alwaysfeasiblewhentheanimalisindistress.Additionally,therehasnotbeenmuch researchconcerningcaptiveboltstunninganditseffectsontheanimal’ssensibility. OnestudybyGrandinfoundthatoutof21plants,1.2%ofthebullsorcowsstunned

12 Ibid.

13 JeffWelty, HumaneSlaughterLaws,70LAW&CONTEMP.PROBS.175(2007).

14 “FoodSafetyandInspectionService.”PoultryProductsInspectionAct—FoodSafetyand InspectionService.

15 HumaneMethodsofSlaughterAct,UnitedStates,CodeofFederalRegulations,Title7,Section 48.

16 JeffWelty, HumaneSlaughterLaws,70LAW&CONTEMP.PROBS.175(2007).

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regainedsensibilitypriortoexsanguination—theactofdrainingananimal,person, ororganofblood.17 Althoughthisrateislowerthanthatofelectricalstunning,itis equallyasproblematicwhencomparingthemoralreprehensionsbetweendifferent slaughtermethods.

Thecarbondioxidemethodofslaughterismainlyusedwithpigs,whohave deeper-setbrainsthancattleandthickskullswhichmakeitdifficulttoproperlyaim withtheuseofthecaptiveboltmethod.Inthecarbondioxidemethodofslaughter, pigsareplacedonaconveyorbeltwhichproceedstodrivethepigsthroughacarbon dioxidegaschamber,creatinganinducedasphyxiationthatleadstodeath.18

Overthepastdecades,thecarbondioxidemethodofslaughterhasbecomeless frequentduetocomplicationsthatariseduringtheasphyxiationoftheanimals.For one,itwasfoundthatthepigsmayexperiencesubstantialpainanddiscomfortwhile inthegaschamber.19 Onestudyfoundthatpigsexhibitedaversivebehaviors(e.g. rearing,backingup,vocalization)wheninthegaschamber,evenatCO2levelsas lowas15%.However,thismethodofslaughterisonethatposesfewriskstomeat quality,whichneedstomeetacertainstandardpostmortem.20

Finally,andmostcommon,istheelectricstunningmethod.Thismethodis mostcommonlyusedonpoultry,butalsoadministeredtomanycattleandswine. Inthismethod,tongsorpaddlesareplacedoneithersideoftheanimal’shead, andanelectricshockisadministeredtostuntheanimal.Insomecases,these paddlesareadministeredononesideoftheheadandthebody.Withpoultry, theprocessdiffersquitedrastically;Poultryisshackledupsidedownonaconveyor beltandmovedsinglefilethroughashallowpoolofsaline.Thiswateristhen electricallyshockedtoimmobilizethebirds.Uponimmobilization,thebirdshave theircarotidarteriesseveredbyahumanormachinecutterandsufferarapiddeath duetoexsanguination.Thebirdsarethenmovedthroughascaldtankforfeather removal.21

Althoughitisoneofthemostcommonlyusedmethods,electricalstunningis alsoregardedasthemostethicallyunsound.Thefirstandmostprominentargumentagainstelectricalstunningisthatelectricalstunsarenotalwayseffectivein 17 Ibid.

18 A.Q.Sazili,P.Kumar,andM.N.Hayat,”StunningComplianceinHalalSlaughter:AReview ofCurrentScientificKnowledge,”Animals:AnOpenAccessJournalfromMDPI13,no.19(2023): 3061.

19 JeffWelty, HumaneSlaughterLaws,70LAW&CONTEMP.PROBS.175(2007).

20 A.R.Steineretal., HumanelyEndingtheLifeofAnimals:ResearchPrioritiestoIdentify AlternativestoCarbonDioxide. Animals:AnOpenAccessJournalfromMDPI9,no.11(2019): 911.

21 NationalAgriculturalLawCenter, SlaughterandProcessingIntheUnitedStates:Oversight andRequirements,UniversityofArkansasDivisionofAgricultureResearchandExtension.

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inducinginsensibility,andmaynotstuntheanimalproperlyifthevoltageisnot highenough.22 Similarly,manyarguethatelectricalstunningisaspainfulforthe animalsasitisforapersonexperiencingelectricshocktherapy.23 Withpoultry, theseconcernsbecomemoresignificant;occasionally,poultrybirdsareabletoevade thewatercompletelyandproceedtothenextphaseoftheslaughterwhileconscious. Unlikecattleelectricalstunning,whichisindividualizedbasedonthesizeofthecattle,sizevariationamongpoultrycanaffectwhetherornotthebirdsareimmobilized whentheyarestunned.Often,thismeansthatlargerbirdsarenotfullyparalyzed duringthestunandmayregainconsciousnessastheyarebleedingout.24 Assuch, thismethodofstunningisoftenregardedascontroversialandhasbeenthesource ofmanyphilosophicalargumentsagainstmeatconsumption.

VRegulationofMethodAdministration

DuetothevaguenatureoftheHumaneMethodsofSlaughterActandthelack ofotherlegislationonthetopic,therehavebeenbothfederalandstateregulations institutedtomediatethelackofspecificityandcomplicationsthatarosefromthe previouslegislation.ThemostprominentoftheseisTitle9Part313(9CFR § 313.5)inthefederalcodeofregulations,whichoutlinesregulationsforboththe transportationandthehumaneslaughteroflivestock.25

Tocombattheaforementionedcomplicationswithcarbondioxideslaughter,9 CFR § 313.5provides(roughly)thefollowingguidelines:26

1)Carbondioxidegasmustbeadministeredinaclosedchamber tomimicsurgicalanesthesiabeforetheanimalsareshackled,hoisted, orotherwiseharmed.Thisistobedoneinawaythatmitigatesthe amountofdiscomfortandexcitementoftheanimals

2)Drivingtheanimalstothecarbondioxidechambermustalsobe doneinawaythatmitigatesharmordiscomforttotheanimals.Useof electricalproddingequipmentistobeusedaslittleaspossibleorwith

22 JeffWelty, HumaneSlaughterLaws,70LAW&CONTEMP.PROBS.175(2007).

23 A.R.Steineretal., HumanelyEndingtheLifeofAnimals:ResearchPrioritiestoIdentify AlternativestoCarbonDioxide. Animals:AnOpenAccessJournalfromMDPI9,no.11(2019): 911.

24 Ibid.

25 UnitedStates,CodeofFederalRegulations,Title9,Section313.

26 UnitedStates,CodeofFederalRegulations,Title9,Section313.5.

thelowestvoltage

3)Onceexposedtothecarbondioxide,theanimalsshallremainunconsciousduringanyshackling,hoisting,sticking,orbleeding.Thisis withtheexceptionofswineinwhichdeathhasbeeninducedbytheadministrationofcarbondioxide.Asphyxiaordeathshallnotbeinduced inanimals[otherthanswine]beforebleeding.

Similarly,9CFR § 313.15hasguidelinesregardingbothmechanical/captivebolt andelectricalmethodsofstunninganimals.27 Thefirstregulationsofthecaptive boltandstunningmethodsmirrorthoseofthecarbondioxideslaughter,withanimalsrequiredtobetransportedinawaythatproducestheleastexcitementaswell asrequiringanimalstobeunconsciousbeforeanyfurtherharm.However,further regulationsontheadministrationofthecaptiveboltorstunners(amendedlastin 2004)include:

1)Toassureunconsciousnesswitheveryblow,compressedairdevices musthaveairpressuregaugesreadandkeptatauniformlevelwhich ensurestheimmediatedeathofeveryanimal,

2)Stunningareasmustbedesignedsoastolimitthepainofevery animalbutalsorestrictmovementinawaythatallowsforthestunning devicetobeusedwithasmuchaccuracyaspossible.Thismeanssplinteredboards,loosebolts,holes,orbrokenplankingareprohibitedfrom stunningareas,

3)Correctdetonatingchargemustbeusedbasedonthesex,breed, size,andspeciesofanimal,

4)Captiveboltstunnerswhichinjectcompressedairintothecranium willnotbeusedtostuncattle.28

Followingisasummaryof9CFR313.30guidelinesregardingelectricalstunning orparalysisofanimals:

27 UnitedStates,CodeofFederalRegulations,Title9,Section313.15. 28 Ibid.

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1)Electricalshocksaretobeadministeredinawaythatrendersthe animalinsensibletopainimmediatelythereafter,

2)Flowofanimalsthroughelectricalcurrentapplicationequipment mustbecontrolledastobeleastharmfultotheanimal.Allimpellers orhangingdevicesmustbeconstructedofflexibleorhangingmaterial,

3)Currentmustbeappliedastoavoidhemorrhagesortissuechanges whichwouldinterferewithfurtherinspectionprocedures.29

VIImplications

AfterexaminingtheCFRregulationsmeanttocombatcommoncomplications withslaughterproceduresaswellasdescribingthepersistentethicalissueswith livestockslaughter,itbecomesclearthatregulatingslaughtermethodstoalleviate thesufferingoflivestockisoftenineffective.Withprocedureslikelivestockslaughter—whicharepronetoinconsistentoutcomes—itbecomesincreasinglydifficultto createeffectiveguidelines.Evidently,theguidelinesforelectricalstunningandcaptiveboltproceduresdirectlycontradictthepersistingethicalshortcomingsofanimal slaughter.Guidelinessuchasapplyinganevenelectricalcurrent,limitingmovement, andrenderingtheanimalinsensibletopainaredifficulttoenforce.Advocatesof animalethicsarguewehaveamoralresponsibilitytoamendstandardprocedures wherepoultrysufferslongafterbeingshockedandcattlearemechanicallybolted multipletimesbeforedeathduetoinaccuracyofthestun.

Afterananalysisoftheseresults,itisevidentthatmoreresearchisrequiredto studythetruedamagecausedbyimperfectionsinslaughtermethods.Additionally, currentlegislativeguidelinesforhumaneslaughtermethods,whichlackproperproceduresinthecaseofabotchedslaughter,mustbeamendedaccordingly.Furthermore,itisimperativetounderstandthetrueefficacyofstunningandcaptivebolt methodsofslaughterwithrespecttothenumberofanimalsannuallyslaughtered intheUnitedStatesbeforereachingaconclusiononwhetherthesepracticesare ethical.Nevertheless,beingvaguelywordedandincreasinglyoutdated,theHumane SlaughterActof1958—thepredominantpieceoflegislationconcerningslaughterin theUnitedStates—wouldalsobenefitfromamendmentstomakeitmorerelevant inthemodernday.

29 UnitedStates,CodeofFederalRegulations,Title9,Section313.30.

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WorksCited

AboutOPMP. USDA.AccessedApril7,2024.Source.

FoodSafetyandInspectionService. FederalMeatInspectionAct—FoodSafetyandInspection Service.

FoodSafetyandInspectionService. PoultryProductsInspectionAct—FoodSafetyandInspectionService.

HumaneMethodsofSlaughterActof1958Congress.gov. H.R.4115-95thCongress(1977-1978): HumaneMethodsofSlaughterAct.February28,1977.Source.

HumaneMethodsofSlaughterAct.UnitedStates,CodeofFederalRegulations,Title7,Chapter 48,AccessedMarch20,2024.Source

HumaneMethodsofSlaughterAct.UnitedStates,CodeofFederalRegulations,Title21,Chapter 10,Section464,AccessedMarch20,2024.Source.

HUMANEMETHODSOFSLAUGHTERACT:USDAhasaddressedsomeproblemsbutstillfaces enforcementchallenges.(UnitedStatesGeneralAccountingOffice,2004),p.2-3.Source.

NationalAgriculturalLawCenter.“SlaughterandProcessingIntheUnitedStates:Oversightand Requirements.”UniversityofArkansas,DivisionofAgricultureResearchandExtension.Accessed April1,2024.Source.

Sazili,A.Q.,Kumar,P.,andHayat,M.N.”StunningComplianceinHalalSlaughter:AReviewof CurrentScientificKnowledge.”Animals:AnOpenAccessJournalfromMDPI13,no.19(2023): 3061.Source.

Steiner,A.R.,Flammer,S.A.,Beausoleil,N.J.,Berg,C.,Bettschart-Wolfensberger,R.,Pinillos, R.G.,Golledge,H.D.W.,Marahrens,M.,Meyer,R.,Schnitzer,T.,Toscano,M.J.,Turner,P. V.,Weary,D.M.,andGent,T.C.”HumanelyEndingtheLifeofAnimals:ResearchPrioritiesto IdentifyAlternativestoCarbonDioxide.”Animals:AnOpenAccessJournalfromMDPI9,no. 11(2019):911.Source.

UnitedStates,CodeofFederalRegulations,Title7,Section48,AccessedMarch20,20247USC Ch.48:HUMANEMETHODSOFLIVESTOCKSLAUGHTER(house.gov).

UnitedStates,CodeofFederalRegulations,Title9,Section313,AccessedApril2nd,2024.Source.

UnitedStates,CodeofFederalRegulations,Title9,Section313.15,AccessedApril2nd,2024. Source.

UnitedStates,CodeofFederalRegulations,Title9,Section313.30,AccessedApril2nd,2024. Source.

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Welty,Jeff. HumaneSlaughterLaws.70LAW&CONTEMP.PROBS.175(2007).

RegulatingTechTitans—WhySection 230(c)NeedsRevision AnnekaLupinek’27

Spring2024

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Abstract

AlthoughtheCommunicationsDecencyActof1996waspassedwiththeintentionofregulatingtechnologythatisnowobsolete,twocrucialsectionswithinitform thebasisforalmostallmoderntechregulation.1 Section203(c)(1)saysthat“no provideroruserofaninteractivecomputerserviceshallbetreatedasthepublisher orspeakerofanyinformationprovidedbyanotherinformationcontentprovider” and203(c)(2)saysthatprovidersofinformationservicesshallnotbeheldliablefor “anyactionvoluntarilytaken...torestrictaccesstooravailabilityofmaterialthat theprovideroruserconsiderstobe...objectionable,whetherornotsuchmaterial isconstitutionallyprotected.”2 Commonlawinterpretationofwhatqualifiesasan informationservicehasgiventechcompaniesregulatoryleewaybeyondtheoriginalspiritofthestatute.Additionally,recentSCOTUSrulingsin Twitter,Inc.v. Taamneh3 andGonzalesv.Google4 havefurtherunderminedtheFCC’spowerover moderntechcompanies.ArevisionofSection230(c)(2)5 wouldadapttheactforthe moderntechnologicallandscapebyholdinginformationservicesliableforrestricting constitutionallyprotectedspeech.

IIntroduction

Inthepastdecade,techcompanieshavebeenheavilycriticizedforinconsistent enforcementoftheircommunityguidelines.Whilevictimsofdefamationandviolenceprotestthattechcompaniesrepeatedlyturnablindeyetoblatantlyillegal contentontheirplatforms,therestrictionofconstitutionallyprotectedspeechon publicplatformshasalsosparkedwidespreadoutrage.Peopleonbothsidesofthe politicalaislerepeatedlycallforBigTechtobeheldaccountableforthisinconsistency.However,thecivillawgoverningtechregulation—Section230(c)6 ofthe1996 CommunicationsDecencyAct—doesn’tprovidemuchbasisforaccountability.This piecewillestablishthatsection230(c)ofthe1996CommunicationsDecencyActis flawedandinurgentneedofrevision.Currently,techcompaniesaren’tliablefor illegalcontenttheydon’tregulateorlegalcontenttheydoregulate.Byrevising 230(c)7 immunityandholdingtechcompaniesliableforcensoringconstitutionally

1 ProtectionforPrivateBlockingandScreeningofOffensiveMaterial,47USCS § 230.

2 Ibid.

3 Twitter,Inc.v.Taamneh etal.,No.21–1496,2023U.S.

4 ReynaldoGonzalesetal.,Petitionersv.GoogleLLC,No.21–1333,2023U.S.

5 ProtectionforPrivateBlockingandScreeningofOffensiveMaterial,47USCS § 230.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

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protectedspeech,CongresscanrestrictBigTech’spowerwithoutstiflingthegrowth oftheindustry.

Section230(c)hastwoelements.Thefirststatesthat“noprovideroruser ofaninteractivecomputerserviceshallbetreatedasthepublisherorspeakerof anyinformationprovidedbyanotherinformationcontentprovider.”8 Thesecond elementassertsthatprovidersofinformationservicesshallnotbeheldliablefor “anyactionvoluntarilytakeningoodfaithtorestrictaccesstooravailabilityof materialthattheprovideroruserconsiderstobe...objectionable,whetherornot suchmaterialisconstitutionallyprotected.”9 Inotherwords,230(c)(1)establishes that“informationservices”shouldnotbeheldliableforallowingillegalcontent ontheirplatforms,and230(c)(2)establishesthattheseservicesshouldnotbeheld liableforcensoringlegalcontent.

Thisbegsthequestion:Whatisaninformationservice?Commonlawholds thatessentiallyallhouseholdnametechcompanies—fromsocialmediafirmslike SnapchattosearchenginessuchasGoogle—qualifyasinformationservices.10 This meansthatalmosteverymajoronlineplatformiseligiblefor230(c)immunity.11 It isunrealistictoexpecttheconsistentandfairapplicationofcommunityguidelines whencompaniesaregivensuchanextremelevelofregulatoryleeway.

Thisarticleconsistsoffourparts.PartIIwilloutlinethehistoricalcontextof thecivillawsurroundinginternetregulation.PartIIIwillreviewrecenttechnologicaldevelopmentand,byhighlightingtheconsolidationofpreviouslyseparate capabilitiesintomoderntechtitans,showthattheflawsin230(c)12 stemfroma fundamentalmisunderstandingofthisphenomenon’seffectonmoderntechnology. Itwillfollowthatthetwo-wayimmunitygrantedtoso-called“informationservices” isoverlybroad.PartIVwilldemonstratethatarevisionof230(c)(2)(A)isoverdue; and,assuch,that230(c)immunityshouldnotapplytothecensorshipofconstitutionallyprotectedspeech.

IIBackground

ItiswidelyknownthattheInternethasgrownexponentiallysinceitsadventin the1990s.However,civillawhasbeenslowtoadapttothechanginglandscape.

8 Ibid. 9 Ibid.

10 DanielT.Deacon, Essay:CommonCarrierEssentialismandtheEmergingCommonLawof InternetRegulation,67ADMIN.L.REV.133,(Winter2015).

11 ProtectionforPrivateBlockingandScreeningofOffensiveMaterial,47USCS § 230.

12 Ibid.

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Themostrecentstatutesthatprovidethefoundationformoderntechregulation werepassedalmost30yearsago—withtechnologyinmindthatisnowobsolete.

II.1TheHistoryofTechnologyRegulation

TheCommunicationsActof1934formedthefoundationofthemodernlegal landscape.Itestablishedtwopillarsofregulatorylaw:theconceptofthecommoncarrierandtheFederalCommunicationsCommission(commonlyknownasthe FCC).13 Intendedtoregulaterailroadcompanies,theActdefinedacommoncarrier—somewhatvaguely—as“anypersonengagedasacommoncarrierforhire,in interstateorforeigncommunicationbywireorradio.”Commoncarrierswereissued aseriesofobligations:“tocharge‘justandreasonable’rates,tofiledetailedrate tariffs,andtorefrainfrom‘unjustorunreasonablediscrimination.’”Informally,entitiesthattransportgoodsforafeeandindiscriminatelyservethegeneralpublic—as opposedtoprivatecarriers,whoagreetotransportthingsonlyconditionally—seem toqualifyascommoncarriers.Historically,thecategoryhasbeenconsideredto includetelephonecompanies.14 TheCommunicationsActof1934establishedthe FCCtoenforcetheaforementionedobligations.15 ItgrantedtheFCCancillaryjurisdiction—inotherwords,theFCChaslegaljurisdictionoverentitiesthatdonot qualifyascommoncarriers,inadditiontocommoncarriers,inareaswherethese entitiesimpact“telecommunicationservices.”

ThesecondmajorpredecessoroftheCommunicationsDecencyActandthefirst majorerosionofFCCpowerwastheComputerIIOrder,passedin1980.The ComputerIIOrder16 establishedtheconceptofenhancedservices,whicharecomputerservicesthatenableuserstomanipulateinformation.Enhancedserviceswere contrastedwithbasicservices,whichprovidedpuretransmissionwithoutdataprocessingcapability.Inotherwords,whilebasicservices(liketelephonelines)relay third-partyspeechblindly,enhancedservicespossessthepowertoreviewandalter userspeech.TheComputerIIOrderclarifiedthat“computershookeduptothe telephonenetworktoprovide‘dataprocessing’services”wereenhancedservicesthat wouldnotbesubjecttocommoncarrierregulation.

13 PurposesofAct;FederalCommunicationsCommissioncreated,47USCS § 151.

14 DanielT.Deacon, Essay:CommonCarrierEssentialismandtheEmergingCommonLawof InternetRegulation,67ADMIN.L.REV.133,(Winter2015).

15 PurposesofAct;FederalCommunicationsCommissioncreated,47USCS § 151.

16 FederalCommunicationsCommission.”FCC-05-150A1.”

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II.2TheCommunicationsDecencyAct

In1996,theCommunicationsDecencyActwaspassed,expandingontheenhancedandbasicservicesdichotomyintroducedintheComputerIIOrderand introducingthetermsfamiliarintoday’slegallandscape.17 TheActreferredto enhancedservicesasinformationservicesandbasicservicesastelecommunications services.Inadditiontotheoriginaldefinition,informationservicesweredefinedas providing“theofferingofacapabilityforgenerating,acquiring,storing,transforming,processing,retrieving,utilizing,ormakingavailableinformationviatelecommunications.”Thedefinitionofatelecommunicationsservicewasexpandedtoinclude “theofferingoftelecommunicationsforafeedirectlytothepublic.”18 Telecommunicationsitselfwasdefinedas“thetransmission,betweenoramongpointsspecified bytheuser,ofinformationoftheuser’schoosing,withoutchangeintheformor contentoftheinformationassentandreceived.”19

CreatedbylawmakersdeterminednottocrushtherapidlyexpandingInternet industry,“thetwenty-sixwordswhichcreatedtheinternet”establishedbroadtwowayimmunityforinformationserviceproviderswiththeintentionoffacilitating growth.20 Informationserviceswerenotto“...betreatedasthepublisherorspeaker ofanyinformationprovidedbyanother...contentprovider,”nortobeheldliable for“...anyactionvoluntarilytakeningoodfaithtorestrictaccessto...material thattheprovideroruserconsiders...objectionable,whetherornotsuchmaterialis constitutionallyprotected.”Telecommunicationsservices,ontheotherhand,would notbeeligibleforthisdualimmunity.Whiletheyalsocouldnotbeheldliableas thepublishersofthird-partyspeech,telecommunicationsservicessuchastelephone lineswereprohibitedfromrestrictingconstitutionallyprotectedspeech.21

II.3TheCurrentLegalLandscape

SincethepassageoftheCommunicationsDecencyAct,techcompaniesand consumershavefoughtmanylegalbattlesregardingwhatqualifiesfor203(c)immunity.22 OneearlytestoftheCommunicationsDecencyActoccurredin1997with Zeranv.AmericaOnline,Inc.,whenamansuedthecompanyAOLoverdefama-

17 ProtectionforPrivateBlockingandScreeningofOffensiveMaterial,47USCS § 230.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 JeffKosseff,TheTwenty-SixWordsThatCreatedtheInternet,Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversity Press,2019.

21 ProtectionforPrivateBlockingandScreeningofOffensiveMaterial,47USCS § 230.

22 Ibid.

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toryt-shirtssoldonitsplatform.23 TheplaintifflostonthegroundsthatAOLhad 230(c)(1)immunityandwasnotresponsiblefortheillegalactivityofthird-party users.24 In2008,thefamilyofa13-year-oldgirlwhowassexuallyassaultedbya manshemetonMySpacesuedtheplatformfornegligenceandlostonthesame grounds.25 Thesecaseswerepartofageneraltrendtowardsstrictadherenceto 230(c).26 Theirprecedentestablishedthattechcompanieswouldbegranted230(c) immunityfortheblatantlyillegalbehaviorofthird-partyusers.

Accordingtocommonlaw,230(c)doesnotapplyincasesinvolvingtechcompanies’ownspeech.27 In Maynardv.Snapchat,Inc. (2018)and Lemmonv.Snapchat, Inc. (2020),plaintiffssuedSnapchatoverfatalcaraccidentsthatwereindirectly causedbyaSnapchat“speedfilter”thatencourageduserstofilmthemselvesdriving atrecklessspeeds.28 Bothplaintiffswononthegroundsthatunder203(c),Snapchat isstill“liableforitsowncontent”29 asa“productsmanufacturer”witha“dutyto designareasonablysafeproduct.”30 Thesecasesbringtolightaninteresting230(c) loophole—andfurthertheconfusionabouthowtocategorizemoderntechgiants, manyofwhichcanarguablybeclassified,andregulated,inthreesignificantlydifferentways.Shouldtechcompaniesgetthedualimmunityofinformationservices,the unilateralimmunityoftelecommunicationsservices,ortheregulatoryobligationsof productmanufacturers? Maynardv.Snapchat,Inc. and Lemmonv.Snapchat,Inc. bothseemtoindicatethatthisdecisionismadeonasituationalbasis—inother words,thatthereisnosinglerightanswer.

Whatevercommonlawstabilitywasestablishedoverthepast30yearswith regardto203(c)31 interpretationwasunderminedbytworecentSupremeCourt cases: Twitter,Inc.v.Taamneh (2022)32 andGonzalesv.Google(2023).33 Inboth ofthesecases,U.S.citizenswerekilledbyactsofISISterrorismoninternationalsoil. ThefamiliesofthevictimssoughttoholdTwitterandGoogleliablefordamages

23 Zeranv.Am.Online,Inc.,129F.3d327,1997U.S.App.LEXIS31791,25MediaL.Rep. 2526,10Comm.Reg.(P&F)456.

24 ProtectionforPrivateBlockingandScreeningofOffensiveMaterial,47USCS § 230.

25 Doev.MySpace,Inc.,474F.Supp.2d843,2007U.S.Dist.LEXIS12269,35MediaL.Rep. 1520.

26 ProtectionforPrivateBlockingandScreeningofOffensiveMaterial,47USCS § 230.

27 Ibid.

28 Maynardv.Snapchat,Inc.,313Ga.533,870S.E.2d739,2022Ga.LEXIS68,2022WL 779733; Lemmonv.Snap,Inc.,995F.3d1085,2021U.S.App.LEXIS13197,2021WL1743576.

29 Ibid.

30 Maynardv.Snapchat,Inc.,313Ga.533,870S.E.2d739,2022Ga.LEXIS68,2022WL 779733.

31 230.ProtectionforPrivateBlockingandScreeningofOffensiveMaterial,47USCS § 230.

32 Twitter,Inc.v.Taamneh etal.,No.21–1496,2023U.S.

33 ReynaldoGonzalesetal.,Petitionersv.GoogleLLC,No.21–1333,2023U.S.

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undertheAntiterrorismAct34 ,whichencouragescitizensinjuredbyinternational terrorismtosueanyorganizationthat“aidedandabetted”saidterrorism.35 These casesshouldhaverestedfirstonthequestionof230(c)immunity.36 IfTwitterand Googlewereimmunefromliabilityforillegalthird-partyspeechunder230(c),as30 yearsofprecedentseemedtoindicatetheywouldbe,thentheycouldnothave“aided andabetted”anythird-partyterroristorganizationsimplybyfailingtoremoveits contentfromtheiralgorithms.However,ratherthandeclaringTwitterandGoogle immuneunder230(c),SCOTUSdismissedbothcasesonunrelatedgrounds,arguing thattheiractionsfailedtomeetthe Halberstamv.Welch standardforaidingand abetting.37 Byblatantlyignoring230(c)whenmakingtheirruling,theSupreme Courtincreasedtheconfusionsurroundingthestatuteanditsinterpretation.The questionofwhetherthedefendantswereguiltyof“aidingandabetting”ISISwould notmakesenseiftheywereviewedasinformationserviceswithnoagencyover whatispublishedontheirplatforms.Assuch,ifGoogleandTwitterwereimmune under230(c),thecaseshouldhavebeendismissedonthosegrounds.IfGoogleand Twitterwerenotimmune,thisshouldhavebeenclarifiedbeforethecourtmoved toaddresstheAntiterrorismAct.However,SCOTUSdidneitherofthesethings, leavingtheissueofregulatorylawevenmoremuddledthanitwasbefore.

IIIAnalysis

Inthisenvironmentofuncertainty,clearlegislationbackedbyastrongunderstandingofmoderntechnologyismissingfromthelegallandscape.TheCommunicationsDecencyActof1996isbasedonafalsepremise:thatthereisaclear dividebetweeninformationservicesandtelecommunicationsservices.Inreality, mostmoderntechplatformsareacombinationofthetwo.Socialmediacompanies havethefunctionofallowingthird-partyuserstocommunicateunimpededly—the essenceofwhatitistobeatelecommunicationsservice.However,theyalsohave thecapacitytostoreandalterinformation,whichqualifiesthemasinformationservicesunder230(c).Insummation,socialmediacompaniesactashands-offconduits ofthird-partyspeechbuthavetheaddedcapacitytoeditanddeletethisspeech atwill—allwhileenjoyingduallegalimmunity.Thesecompaniesshouldnotbe granted230(c)immunityjustbecausetheyhaveagreaterabilitytointerferewith third-partyspeechthantheirpredecessorsdid.230(c)wasdesignedtosupporta

34 CivilRemedies,18USCS § 2333

35 Ibid.

36 ProtectionforPrivateBlockingandScreeningofOffensiveMaterial,47USCS § 230.

37 Halberstamv.Welch,705F.2d472,227U.S.App.D.C.167,1983U.S.App.LEXIS.

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fledglingindustry,notbackpowerhouseswithanalreadyunprecedentedamount ofpower.Moderntechcompanies’currentcapacitytooverseeandcontrolpublic discourse,ifleftunchecked,hasworryingimplicationsforthefutureoffreespeech asweknowit.Thispowermustberegulated,notrewarded.

IVSolutions

Toholdmoderntechcompaniesaccountableandlimittheirabilitytocensor speech,Section230(c)(2)mustberevised.Whileitcurrentlymaintainsthatinformationserviceprovidersshallnotbeheldliableforcensoringanythird-party materialitdeems“objectionable,”thisimmunityshouldonlyapplywhenthismaterialisnotconstitutionallyprotectedspeech.Section230(c)(2)shouldberevised tostatethatinformationserviceprovidersshallnotbeheldliablefor“anyaction voluntarilytakeningoodfaithtorestrictaccesstooravailabilityofmaterialthat theprovideroruserconsiderstobe...objectionable,insituationswheresuchmaterialisnotconstitutionallyprotected.”Thisrevisionwouldleaveinformationservice providerswiththeclear,unilateralimmunityoutlinedinsection230(c)(1)withoutstiflingthegrowthoftheindustrywithcumbersomeregulations.However,the changewouldalsolimittheextentofpersonaljurisdictiontechcompanieshaveover whatisdistributedontheirplatforms.Assuch,itwouldestablishanexpectation thatinformationserviceswillerronthesideofcautionwhenregulatingcontentthat isnotoutrightillegal.

Somemightarguethatpromotingamorehands-offapproachtocontentmoderationwouldenableinformationserviceproviderstoincorporatesinisterfeatures withintheirplatformswithoutrepercussions.Theimplementationofbiasedand discriminatoryalgorithms(eitheraccidentallyorintentionally),forexample,isa concernformanywhofeelthattechnologicaldevelopmentisreinforcingsocialinequality.However,existingprecedentshaveestablishedthat203(c)immunitydoes notapplyincaseswherethedefendantcreatesitsownquestionablecontent.For example,inboth Maynardv.Snapchat,Inc. (2018)38 and Lemmonv.Snapchat, Inc. (2020),39 203(c)immunitydidnotimmunizeSnapchatfromtheliabilityforits own“speedfilter.”

38 Maynardv.Snapchat,Inc.,313Ga.533,870S.E.2d739,2022Ga.LEXIS68,2022WL

39 Lemmonv.Snap,Inc.,995F.3d1085,2021U.S.App.LEXIS13197,2021WL1743576

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VConclusion

Therapiddevelopmentofthetechindustryhasleftregulatorylawunableto curbthepowerofmoderntechgiants.Today,inconsistentcontentmoderationisa majorconcernforindividualsonbothsidesofthepoliticalaisle.However,the1996 CommunicationsDecencyAct—thebasisforAmericantechregulation—isbasedon afaultyunderstandingofmoderntechnology.Civillawassumesacleardichotomy between“informationservices”and“telecommunicationservices”thatnolonger exists—enablingtechcompaniestogetawaywithblatantregulatoryinconsistency. Notliableforallowingillegalcontenttoproliferateontheirplatformsnorforinconsistentlycrackingdownonconstitutionallyprotectedspeech,thesecompaniescan regulatetheirplatformsinwhateverwaytheywant.Neverhasitbeenmoreessentialforlawmakerstoadaptthe1996CommunicationsDecencyActtothemodern technologicallandscape.Section203(c)(2)shouldberevisedtoholdinformation servicesliableforthecensorshipofconstitutionallyprotectedspeech,assucharevisionwouldlimittheirpowerwithoutimpairingthespiritofgrowththatdrovethe developmentoftheindustry.

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WorksCited

Deacon,DanielT. Essay:CommonCarrierEssentialismandtheEmergingCommonLawofInternetRegulation,67ADMIN.L.REV.133,(Winter2015).availableatSource.

Doev.MySpace,Inc.,474F.Supp.2d843,2007U.S.Dist.LEXIS12269,35MediaL.Rep.1520 (UnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheWesternDistrictofTexas,AustinDivisionFebruary13,2007, Filed),availableatSource.

FederalCommunicationsCommission.”FCC-05-150A1.”AccessedApril4,2024.Source.

FEDERALSTATUTE:CommunicationsDecencyActof1996JurisprudenceJudicialMinimalism Twitter,Inc.v.Taamneh,137Harv.L.Rev.400,(November,2023),availableatSource.

Gonzales,Reynaldoetal. Petitionersv.GoogleLLC No.21–1333,2023U.S.

Halberstamv.Welch,705F.2d472,227U.S.App.D.C.167,1983U.S.App.LEXIS28914,1983 WL978800(UnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheDistrictofColumbiaCircuitApril12,1983, Decided),availableatSource.

Keller,Daphne.* ARTICLE:CARRIAGEANDREMOVALREQUIREMENTSFORINTERNET PLATFORMS:WHATTAAMNEHTELLSUS.4J.FreeSpeechL.87,(2023),availableatSource.

Klein,AndrewR.* ARTICLE:BALANCINGINTERESTSUNDERSECTION230(C)OFTHE COMMUNICATIONSDECENCYACT:USINGTHESWORDASWELLASTHESHIELD.55 Loy.L.A.L.Rev.645,(Summer,2022),availableatSource.

Kosseff,Jeff.TheTwenty-SixWordsThatCreatedtheInternet.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversity Press,2019.

Lemmonv.Snap,inc..995F.3d1085,2021U.S.App.LEXIS13197,2021WL1743576(United StatesCourtofAppealsfortheNinthCircuitMay4,2021,Filed),availableatSource.

Maynardv.Snapchat,inc..313Ga.533,870S.E.2d739,2022Ga.LEXIS68,2022WL779733 (SupremeCourtofGeorgiaMarch15,2022,Decided),availableatSource.

Twitter,Inc.v.Taamnehetal.,No.21–1496,2023U.S.

Zeranv.Am.Online,Inc.,129F.3d327,1997U.S.App.LEXIS31791,25MediaL.Rep.2526, 10Comm.Reg.(P&F)456(UnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheFourthCircuitNovember 12,1997,Decided),availableatSource.

§ 151.PurposesofAct;FederalCommunicationsCommissioncreated,47USCS § 151(Current throughPublicLaw118-40,approvedMarch1,2024.),availableatSource.

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§ 230. ProtectionforPrivateBlockingandScreeningofOffensiveMaterial,47USCS § 230(CurrentthroughPublicLaw118-40,approvedMarch1,2024.),availableatSource.

§ 2333.Civilremedies,18USCS § 2333(CurrentthroughPublicLaw118-40,approvedMarch1, 2024.),availableatSource.

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KnowingandCulpabilityinCriminalLaw

NicholasRandazzo’26

Spring2024

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Abstract

Mensrea isafeatureoflawthataccountsforcriminalintent.Ifsomeonewere tolackcriminalintentandinadvertentlycommitsomecrime,theirsentencewould likelybelowered.Thisdiffersfromthe ignorantiajurisnonexcusat mannerin whichthosewholackknowledgeofthelawaretreated.Onface,thisseemsa doublestandard,sinceonecannotholdacriminalintentifitisthecasetheydo notrealizethattheyareevencommittingacrime.Thispaperseekstodelveinto thephilosophyofcriminallawtoexplainthejustificationfortherelevanceof mens rea andifsuchajustificationcanbeusedtomitigateculpabilityincaseswhere defendantsdidnotknowthelaw.Itdoessobyconsideringthenatureoflaw, intuitionsregardingculpabilityandnegligence,andhumanfallibility.

IIntroduction

Thebroadunderlyingfoundationofcriminallawreliesonsomenotionofresponsibilityandculpability.Whetheroneadoptsapunitive,preventative,orcurial view,thestatemusthavesomejustificationforhavingthecapacitytoleverageits coercivepoweragainstitssubjects.Suchjustificationisusuallyfoundinthreekey assumptions:thatthesubjecthadfreewilltodecidetofollowthelaw,thatthe subjectknewthelaw,andthatthesubjectchosetobreakthelaw.1

Thisfeatureofcriminallawappealstosomethinggreaterthanthelawitself. Ifitwerethecasethatthelawwascompletelyarbitrary,forexample,thenmany wouldfeeljustifiedinbreakingthelawincaseswheretheydidnotfeelthatthelaw waswell-substantiatedenoughtojustifyitself.Resultantly,theywouldfeelthat theuseofcoercionwouldnotbejustified.Suchargumentsarecommonlymade againstpoliticallycontentiouslaws,suchaspunishmentsforillegalimmigrationor possessionofillicitsubstances.Theremustbesomethingbeneaththelawitself—be itsomemoralruleorsocialnorm—thatmakessocietyfeeljustifiedinleveragingthe threatofcoerciontoenforcethelaw.

Thesethreeassumptionsrelyonsomeaccountof mensrea and actusreus:the notionthatthesubjecthadcriminalintentincommittingtheactiontheycommitted andthattheactionthatthedefendantcommittedconstitutesaviolationofsome law.

1 Thisclaimwillbechallengedthroughoutthearticle,buttheotherassumptionsregardingthe lawaremoreintuitive:punishmentcanonlybeleveledwhenonedoeswrongoftheirownaccord. Thisrequiresthechoicetobreakthelawand, afortiori,freewill.

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Standardaccountsof mensrea includeaccountsofbothintentionandrecklessness.Foronetocommitacrimeintentionally,theircrimemustbe1)anessential featureoftheirwill(i.e.,werethecriminalportionoftheiraimsremoved,their aimswouldbenonsensical)and2)theirwillmotivatedsomekindofactiontocarry outacrime—whetherornottheyweresuccessful.Recklessnessdependsonone’s beingawarethatthereisariskofsomeharmandchoosingtoruntheriskina mannerthatweareawareisunjustified.IntheUnitedStates, mensrea includes otherformsincludingoneactingknowingly,inotherwords,reasonablycertainthat theundesirableresultthatviolatessomelawwouldoccur)andnegligently,whichis thatthepersonshouldhavebeenawareofalargerisk,butisnot.

Attheheartofbothaccountsof mensrea isawarenessofthecriminalityofone’s actions.Thedegreetowhich mensrea oughttobeapartoflegalconsideration isupforsomedebateamongscholars,specificallyregardingtheparametersofhow muchone’sintentionactuallymatters.Strict mensrea existsincasesinwhichthere issome actusreus thatisnotaccompaniedbya mensrea requirement,whereasless narrowformsof mensrea placeintentionatthecenterstage.Thesedistinctions, thoughimportant,maybothfaceaprobleminextremecasesoflegalunawareness. Thereexistnumerouscasesinwhichitisconceivablethatapersoncouldbeunawareofthelaw:collegestudentstravelingtoaforeigncountryduringastudy abroad,refugeesthathavebeendisplacedintodifferentnationsasaresultofpoliticalupheaval,particularlyignorantindividuals,etc.Thelawisoftenappliedina ‘ignorantiajurisnonexcusat’2 mannerinthesecases,yetthisneglectsfundamental intuitionsregardingfollowingrules,whethertheybemoralorlegal.

Thisarticleproceedsinfourparts.PartIIdiscussesthekeycommon-senseintuitionspertainingto mensrea.ThisPartalsoattemptstoshowthemannerinwhich theseintuitionsmayclashwithoneanother,andprovidejustificationfortheneedto reconcilesaidintuitions.PartIIIpresentsthediscussionsurroundingthenotionof culpabilityanditsrelationwith mensrea,illustratingproblemswithinterpretations ofnegligenceor ignorantiajurisnonexcusat.Theseproblemsdemonstratethatrestricting mensrea introducestheriskofpunishingpeoplecriminallyforfallingshort ofepistemicperfectionandleadingtoageneralresentmentofcriminalproceedings. PartIVsummarizesthediscussionandprovidesimportantsolutionstotheproblems discussedinprevioussections.

2 Translatedliterallyas:‘ignoranceofthelawexcusesnot’

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IIClashingIntuitionsBehind MensRea

Mensrea requiresthatwevaluetheintentofthepersonchargedwithsomecrime independentofanyactstheymayhavecommitted.Thereexisttwoconflicting intuitionsregardingcriminalintent.Thefirstisthatifsomeonedidnotintend something,itwasnottheirfaultthatsuchathingoccurredandthereforethey oughttobeheldlessculpable(ornotatallculpable).IwillrefertothisasInt.1 throughouttherestofthisarticle.Thesecondisthat,asareasonablepersonwould avoidsomeactionswhenthereseemstobeamplebenefitinavoidanceandlittlein pursuit,thestatecanbejustifiedinpunishingsomeoneforactingunreasonably.3 I willrefertothisasInt.2throughouttherestofthisarticle.

Int.1isstarklyexhibitedincaseswherecausalchainsresultinsomeundesiredor unintendedeffect.Consider Peoplev.Gaworecki,whereinaproviderofacontrolled substance(heroin)waschargedwithmanslaughterandcriminallynegligenthomicide asaresultofabuyeroverdosing.4 Inthiscase,thequestionof mensrea was:did Gaworeckiknowthepotencyofthedrugsthatheprovided,andwasheaware ofthedegreetowhichheendangeredhisclients?5 Thecourtruledthatthere wasinsufficientevidencetosuggestthatGaworeckiknewtheextenttowhichhe endangeredhisclient,andthemerepotencyofadrugisinsufficienttodemonstrate criminalintent;hewasthereforeacquittedofbothcharges.6

Insuchacase,Gaworeckiwasinsomewayresponsibleforthedeathofhisclient (heprovidedtheagentthathisclientoverdosedon);however,theclient’sdeath occurredinsuchanunintendedwaythatheshouldnotbetreatedashavingbeen negligentinthiscase(i.e.,heisnotespeciallyblameworthy,giventhat“thePeople failedtoestablishthatdefendant’sconductwasagrossdeviationfromthestandard ofcarethatareasonablepersonwouldobserve,asrequiredforbothcrimes”).7

Int.2becomesevidentincaseswherecommonly-heldmoralinclinationswould arguethatsomepersonisunreasonableinbehavinginaparticularway.Supposea groupofpeopletraveltoanothercountryandarecompletelyignorantofthelaws ofthatcountry.Theydecidetogetinafightwitharandompersoninthecountry andbeatthepersontodeath.Suchacaseisdeservingofpunishment,astheir

3 Itshouldbenotedthat”amplebenefitinavoidance”couldrefertotheriskofharm,suchas drivingavehiclewithoutwearingaseatbelt,ormoralrisks—thoseofviolatingsomefundamental moralprinciple.

4 DailyRecordStaff,”CourtofAppeals-Mensrea:Peoplev.Gaworecki,”DailyRecord,The (Rochester,NY),2022.

5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid.

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actionconstitutesaflagrantviolationofethicalconduct.Whetherornottheyknew thelaw,theperpetratorshouldhaveknownthatsuchactionsarenotpermissible andthereforedeservepunishment.Inthiscase,theintentwasnotnecessarilyto violatethelaw,andthereisthusalesserdegreeof mensrea,butthe actusreus is soobviouslywrongthatasuspensionof mensrea isjustified.

Thecombinationofthesetwointuitionsrevealsthat—ceterisparibus mensrea isimportantinprotectingusfromaccidentsthatweoughtnottobepunishedfor, butthereisalimittowherethisshouldbethecase—weshouldbepunishedfordoing somethingssoegregiousthattheyaredeservingofpunishment.Theseintuitions becomefarmoredifficultwhenthelawisbasedonprinciplesotherthanuniversal moralintuitions.SupposewemaketheHobbesianclaimthatthelawisvaluable insofarasthesovereignhasdecreedit,andpreciselybecauseofthis,weoughtto followit.Anyviolationofthesovereignmustbepunished.Itwouldbethecase thatmanyindividualswouldfindthemselvesexpressingInt.1asaresultofbeing punishedbylawstheywerenotawareof,especiallyifthelawsseemedoddoreven immoral.Thereisacertainarbitrarinessthatexistsifoneispunishedforbreaking alawthattheydidnotintendtobreak,asit exhypothesi claimsthatwecanbe punishedatanytimeforsomethingwearenotawareof.

Int.2isespeciallydifficulttodefendincaseswherethelawdoesnotappealto someuniversalframework.SinceInt.2isoneofthefoundationsfortheargument tolimitthescopeof mensrea incriminallaw,itrevealsthatatleastonekey importanceof mensrea isinprotectingfrompunishmentthosewhocouldnothave doneotherwise.Ifonecouldhavedoneotherwise,thenpunishmentisjustified. Ignoranceofthelawhasinherentlimitsinscope,asknowledgeofmoralrulesmakes itreasonabletoassumethatperpetratorsunderstandthatimmoralconductwould bepunished.Webelievesomeoneisblameworthypreciselyintheirignoranceof thesemoralrules,notintheirignoranceofthelaw.Thisislikelythereasonwhy courtsoftenprotectdefendantsfrombeingheldcriminallyliablewhentheyare ‘morallyinnocent’.

IIIEpistemicFeaturesof MensRea andWrongdoing

Indefining mensrea,JohnGardnerremarks:

Moreprecisely:accordingtothe mensrea principle,criminalwrongs shouldbesuchthatonedoesnotcommitthemunlessoneintendsoris awareofatleastonewrong-makingfeatureofwhatoneisabouttodo,

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suchthat(assumingoneknowsthelaw)oneisalsoalertedtothefact thatwhatoneisabouttodowillbeofinteresttothecriminallaw.8

Inmakingthisclaim,Gardnerhighlightsthatcriminalwrongdoingaccording tothe mensrea principledependsessentiallyonawareness.Theremustbesome featureofourpre-criminalactionsthatwouldraisea”redflag”toalertusthatwe maybecommittingsomecriminalact,andthatredflagrequiresthatweknowthe law.

Wehaveestablishedthattheprincipleof mensrea dependsonthelawhaving someconnectiontouniversallyaccessiblemoraltruthsorsociallydeterminednorms. Thisresultsfromthefactthatblameworthinessis,inmanyways,connectedtomoral truthsornormviolationsandnotcodifiedlaw perse.Becauseofthis,itwillbecome abundantlyclearthat‘ignorantiajurisnonexcusat’becomeslargelyuntenable.

Broadlyspeaking,philosophersrecognizethatthereexistsanepistemiccomponenttomoralactions.Thisepistemiccomponentincludesformsofawareness importantforourmoralcalculus.Twooftheseformsofawarenessareawarenessof action—toknowwhatoneisdoing—andawarenessofmoralsignificance—toknow thatone’sactionsmaybemoral,amoral,orimmoral.Awarenessofactioncanbe seenincaseswhereagentsdonotfullyunderstandwhattheyaredoing.Forexample,considerascientistwhohascoupledtheirnext-doorneighbor’slightswitchto adevicethatelectrocutesoneofthescientists’hostages.Thelackofawarenessof thisfactonthepartofthenext-doorneighborwouldshieldthescientistfromethicalculpability,thoughtheyareresponsibleforelectrocutingahostageindirectly. Onewouldsaythatthescientististhemainagentofwrongdoing.Therefore,the claimcanbemadethat,insimilarcases,alackofculpabilityarisesfromalackof knowledgethathasvoidedthepossibilityofcriminalintent.Asaresult,itcanbe saidthattheepistemiccomponentisapriorconditionthatmustbefulfilledforone tohave mensrea inthefirstplace.

Now,supposeyouwishtotelltheevilscientistthatwhattheydidwasmorally wrong.Thescientistrespondedthattheydidnotknowofthewrongnessoftheir actions.Supposeitwasalsotruethattheydidnotrealizethatitwaswrongwhen theydidit.Ifthatwerethecase,eitheronewouldsaythatthescientistshould haveknown—andthusisblameworthy—orthatthescientistdidnotknowandthus wasnotblameworthy.ThefirstclaimcorrespondstoInt.2,butonlymakessenseif moralconstructsarenotarbitrary;iftheyare,thenthereisnoreasontosuppose thatsomeoneshouldhaveknowntofollowthem.

8 JohnGardner,“WrongsandFaults”inAppraisingStrictLiability,editedbyAndrewSimester, OxfordMonographsonCriminalLawandJustice(Oxford,2005;onlineedn.,OxfordAcademic,1 Jan.2010).

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Mensrea isadefenseofbothawarenessofactionandawarenessofmoralsignificance.Yet,ignoranceofthelawmostparallelsawarenessofmoralsignificance. Thetroublewithlawsisthattheyarenotalwaysuniversal,sothereisnoreason toexpectonetoknowthem(otherthanlawsthatprohibitfundamentalviolations ofmoralrules,suchasmurder).JustasLordMansfieldfamouslystates:“itwould behardupontheProfessionifthelawwassocertainthateverybodyknewit;the misfortuneisthatitissouncertainthatitcostsmuchmoneytoknowwhatitis, eveninthelastresort.”9

Somemayclaimthatwetakeresponsibilityforbreakingevenarbitrarylawsby enteringintoasocialcontract.AsHollySmithpointsout,thereisasenseinwhich someoneisculpablefora“riskedupshot”–someriskthatputsoneintoapositionin whichtheyriskharmtowardsothers,andignoranceofthelawcanbeoneofthese risksincertaincases.10 However,thisargumentseemstomissthemarkbyfailing toconsiderhumanfallibility.Ifweareexpectedtofullyknowthelawbymerely enteringthebordersofsomecountry,thenweareinevitablyopeningthedoorto punishmentfortheimperfectionsofourfacultyofmemory(whichisoutofour control).SupposesomeAmericanisextremelyeducatedinBritishlawandisaware oftheentireBritishcommonlawexcludingtheMetropolitanPoliceAct,whichin §60prohibitsonefrombeatingacarpetinthemetropolitanpolicedistrict“before thehourofeightinthemorning.”11 SupposetheAmericanmakestheunfortunate mistakeofbeatingacarpetinthemetropolitanpolicedistrict—beforeeightinthe morning—andisfoundliablefordoingso.ItseemstruethattheAmericanhas donehisduediligenceinlearningthelawandshouldnotbeheldresponsible,as theywerenotawareoftheillegalityoftheiractions.

Lastly,whatifoneisunawareofbreakingthelawandtheiractionsyieldsome negativeconsequence?Shouldsomeoneinthissituationbeheldculpable?Considerthecaseof Peoplev.Gaworecki oncemore,andsupposethatGaworeckiwas genuinelyundertheimpressionthatthesaleofheroinwascompletelylegal.Some maymakethecasethathissellingofheroinmaynothavehadanycriminalintent, butheneverthelessriskedthelivesofothers.Accordingtothislineofthinking,the deathofoneofhisclientsissufficientreasonforthesuspensionof mensrea.

Thislineofthinkingcannotbeappliedtoounreasonably,asitsetsthenormthat ifanyconceivabledangerexistsandbecomesactuality, mensrea canbesuspended atawhim.Instead,asMichaelZimmermansuggests,themostpertinentaspectof culpabilityhereisifsomeonebelievesthatsomenegativeoutcomemayreasonably

9 Hon.U.M.Rose,ofArkansas.“GeneralIntelligence.”TheLawTimes,102,(1897):584–586.

10 HollySmith,“Culpableignorance,”ThePhilosophicalReview,92,no.4,(Oct.1983):543-571.

11 MetropolitanPoliceAct1839(UK)no.60.

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arisefromtheiraction,andchoosestodoitanyway.12 Thisrepresentstheform ofwantondisregardthatInt.2triestoaccountfor.Inanysituationinwhichthe persondidnotholdthatbelief,theycouldnothaveforeseenanyreasontochoose anothercourseofaction,andthereforecannotbeheldculpable.

IVConclusion

Theepistemicaspectofmoralresponsibilitypresentsasignificantchallengeto theconceptof ignorantiajurisnonexcusat.Thischallengeisespeciallyapparent wherethelawimposesrestrictionsonactionsthatmayappearethicallypermissible. Moreover,giventheimmensecomplexityofmostlegalsystems,itisunreasonable toexpectordinaryindividualstobeawareofeverypotentialviolationofthelaw; eventhoseextensivelyversedinlegalmattersmayinadvertentlyforgetcertainlaws, leadingtounintentionalviolationsandsubsequentpunishment.Therefore,holding individualsaccountablesimplyfornotknowingthelawisunjust,akintopenalizing themforanyrandomactiontheymighthavetaken.Ofcourse,thisnecessitates qualification:whencommittingobsceneactssuchasmurder,itseemsthatfoundationalmoralprinciplesareviolatedinawaythatonecannotgenuinely”forget.”

Actionsaretypicallyundertakenwithsomeperceivedbenefitinmind,andwithoutawarenessofrelevantlaws,individualsmayseenoreasontorefrainfromcertain actions.Insuchcases,theirdecision-makinglacksthenecessaryelementoffree willtorestrainthemselvessincetheyhavenoreasontodoso,renderingthemnonculpable.Consequently,courtsshouldexercisegreaterdiscretionincaseswhere defendantsgenuinelylackawarenessofthelaw.Similarly,criminallawsthatremove mensrea fromconsiderationoughttobepassedwithseriouscare,soasto avoidpunishingthosewhooughtnotbeheldblameworthy.

12 MichaelJ.Zimmerman,“Moralresponsibilityandignorance,”Ethics,107,no.3(Apr.1997): 410–426.

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WorksCited

DailyRecordStaff.”CourtofAppeals-Mensrea:Peoplev.Gaworecki.”DailyRecord,The (Rochester,NY).January6,2022.Source.

Hon.U.M.Rose,ofArkansas.“GeneralIntelligence.”TheLawTimes,102,(1897):584–586.

Gardner,John. “WrongsandFaults”inAppraisingStrictLiability. EditedbyAndrewSimester, OxfordMonographsonCriminalLawandJustice(Oxford,2005;onlineedn,OxfordAcademic,1 Jan.2010).Source.

MetropolitanPoliceAct1839(UK)no.60.Source.

Smith,Holly.“Culpableignorance.”ThePhilosophicalReview,92,no.4,(Oct.1983):543-571. Source.

Zimmerman,MichaelJ.“Moralresponsibilityandignorance.”Ethics,107,no.3(Apr.1997): 410–426.Source.

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TransparencyandFairnessinAI-Assisted CriminalJustice PaolinaSalas’26 Spring2024

TheCOMPASConundrum:Navigating

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Abstract

Inaneradominatedbyrapidlyadvancingtechnologies,integratingartificial intelligencesystemsandhighlycomplexalgorithmsintoourcriminaljusticesystemcreatesexpectationsofenhancedefficiencyandaccuracy.Theuseofthese technologieshasnonethelessraisedsignificantconcernsregardingtransparencyand fairness.ThispaperexaminesthecaseofLoomisv.Wisconsin,whichhighlighted thechallengessurroundingtheapplicationoftheCOMPASalgorithminthecriminaljusticesystem.1 WhileCOMPASaimstopredictthelikelihoodofarepeat offense,therationalebehindthetechnology’sconclusionsisnotwellunderstood; thisinherentopacityraisesquestionsaboutdueprocessrightsandthereliability ofitsassessments.DespitetheWisconsinSupremeCourt’sdecisiontoupholdthe useofCOMPASinsentencing,thelackoftransparencyregardingitsmethodology remainsacriticalissue.Moreover,concernsaboutthealgorithm’saccuracyand fairness,particularlywithregardtoracialbias,furthercomplicateitsuse.Thepaperalsodiscussesthepsychologicalphenomenathatmayinfluencejudges’reliance onCOMPASassessments,suchasanchoringandautomationbias.Ultimately,this paperarguesforacautiousapproachtotheimplementationofpredictiverecidivism technologies,emphasizingtheneedforclearmilestonesandcontinuousevaluation tomitigaterisksandensurefairnessindecision-making.

Thisarticleproceedsinfourparts.PartIwillintroducetheideaofopaque algorithmsandtheirrecentimplementationinthecriminaljusticesystemthrough COMPAS.ThispartwillalsoprovideanoverviewoftheLoomisvWisconsindecisionandtheprecedentithassetforth.PartIIwillfurtherexplaintheimpactsofthe decisionintermsofprecedentandfutureacceptanceofAIinthelegalsystem.Itwill arguethatLoomisvWisconsindoesnotprovideasufficientconclusionorsolution totheinjusticeclaimedbyEricLoomis.PartIIIelaboratesontheineffectiveness ofthecase’sdecision,detailinghoweasilyitcanbecircumventedbyincreasing pressurestorelyonAIfromjudicialpeersandchanginglawsaswellascognitive phenomenathatmaycausejudgestogiveincreasedimportancetorecognizablypotentiallyflawedinformation.PartIIIalsoevaluatesthefairnessofCOMPASand theLoomisdecisionfromstatisticalandlegalstandpoints.Thisexplorationraises furtherquestionsaboutwhetherthetechnologycaneffectivelyplayapositiverolein thecriminaljusticesystematitscurrentstageindevelopment.TheconcludingPart IVcontendsthatitisimportanttocontinueresearchintoAIsystemslikeCOMPASforthecriminaljusticesystem,buttheirimplementationsshouldbegradual, withclearmilestonestoensurefairnessandaccuracy,andshouldnotberushedinto 1 StatevLoomis.

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widespreadusewithoutaclearunderstandingofpotentialconsequences.

IIntroduction

Inourrapidlyevolvingtechnologicallandscape,opaquetechnologies—thosewhose internalmechanismsanddecision-makingprocessesarenoteasilyunderstandableor accessibletotheindividualstheyimpact—areincreasinglyprevalent.Thesetechnologies,rangingfromcomplexalgorithmstoartificialintelligencesystems,play crucialrolesinvariousfacetsofmodernsociety,includingcriminaljustice.However, theemploymentofopaquetechnologieslikeCOMPASinthecriminaljusticesystem alsoraisesprofoundquestionsabouttransparency,accountability,andfairness.The implicationsofthesetechnologiesextendfarbeyondtheirimmediateapplications, shapingtheveryfoundationsofourlegalsystemsandsocietalvalues.Thisessay willexplorethechallengesandcomplexitiessurroundingtheuseofCOMPASin thecriminaljusticesystemandexaminehowthehighlylimitedprecedentsetforth bydecisionslikeLoomisvStateopensthedoortoadangerousoverrelianceand overconfidenceinpotentiallyflawedanduncertainartificialintelligencesystems.

COMPAS,whichstandsforCorrectionalOffenderManagementProfilingforAlternativeSanctions,isapopularalgorithmusedinthecriminaljusticesystemfor predictingadefendant’slikelihoodofreoffending.DevelopedbythecompanyNorthpointe(nowpartofEquivant),COMPASisusedbyjudgesandparoleboardsto assistinmakingdecisionsaboutbail,sentencing,andparole.Thealgorithmanalyzesvariousfactorsaboutanindividual,suchascriminalhistory,age,andemploymentstatus,togenerateariskscore.2 Thisscoreisintendedtohelpjudgesand paroleboardsassesstheriskofadefendantcommittinganothercrimeifreleased. However,COMPASandsimilaralgorithmshavebeencriticizedfortheopacityof theirdecision-makingprocesses.3 Whilesuchpotentiallyopaquetechnologiesoffer remarkableadvancementsandefficiencies,theyalsoraiseprofoundlegalandethical questionsregardingaccountability,transparency,andfairness.

Loomisv.Wisconsin illustratestheseconcerns.In2016,EricLoomiswasconvictedofseveralcrimes,includingfleeinganofficeranddrivingavehiclewithoutthe owner’sconsent.Duringhissentencing,thecourtconsideredaCOMPASreport, whichclassifiedLoomisasbeingatahighriskofrecidivism.Hewassentencedto 6yearsinprison.LoomisarguedthattheuseoftheCOMPASalgorithmviolated hisdueprocessrightsbecausethealgorithm’sinnerworkingsandspecificfactors

2 COMPASClassificationInmateManagementSupport.

3 Lagioia,F.,Rovatti,R.,andSartor,G. “AlgorithmicFairnessthroughGroupParities?The CaseofCOMPAS-SAPMOC.”

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consideredwerenotdisclosedtohimorhislegalteam.Hecontendedthatthislack oftransparencymadeitimpossibleforhimtochallengetheaccuracyorreliability oftheCOMPASassessment.

TheWisconsinSupremeCourtultimatelyupheldtheuseoftheCOMPASassessmentinLoomis’ssentencing,findingthatLoomiswasprovidedwithasummary ofthefactorsconsideredbytheCOMPASalgorithm,aswellasthefactorsthat contributedtohisriskscoreandthatbecause“Loomis’sriskassessmentisbased uponhisanswerstoquestionsandpubliclyavailabledataabouthiscriminalhistory,Loomishadtheopportunitytoverifythatthequestionsandanswerslisted ontheCOMPASreportwereaccurate.”4 Accordingtothedecision,thesefactors wouldhaveallowedLoomistoargueagainstspecificassessmentfactorshemayhave believedtobeinaccurateorunfair.

IITheMissingMethodology

WhileLoomismayhavehadaccesstothefactsconsideredandassurancethat thosefactswereaccurate,hewasstilldeprivedofinformationaboutthealgorithm’s scorepredictionmethodology.ItremainsamysteryhowexactlyCOMPASinterpretedhisanswerstogivenquestionstoconcludethathewasahigh-riskoffender. Expertwitnesstestimonyduringthecaserevealedthateven“Sentencingcourts haveverylittleinformationabouthowaCOMPASassessmentanalyzestherisk: TheCourtdoesnotknowhowtheCOMPAScomparesthatindividual’shistory withthepopulationthatit’scomparingthemwith.TheCourtdoesn’tevenknow whetherthatpopulationisaWisconsinpopulation,aNewYorkpopulation,aCaliforniapopulation.Thereareallkindsofinformationthatthecourtdoesnothave, andwhatwe’redoingiswe’remisinformingthecourtwhenweputthesegraphsin frontofthemandletthemuseitforsentencing.”5 Inresponsetothis,theLoomis courtmaintainedthatjudicialdiscretionwoulddeterminetheroleoftheCOMPAS scoreincourthearings,butthat“Anypresentenceinvestigationreportcontaininga CorrectionalOffenderManagementProfilingforAlternativeSanctions(COMPAS) riskassessmentfiledwithacourtmustcontainawrittenadvicelistingthelimitations.”6 Theseincludewarningsabout1)the“proprietarynatureofCOMPAS”that preventsdisclosureofhowfactorsareweighedandscoreddetermined;2)COMPAS abilityislimitedtoidentifyinggroupsofhigh-riskoffenders,ratherthanparticular high-riskindividuals;3)SomestudiesofCOMPASraisequestionsaboutminority

Ibid.

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offendersashavingahigherrecidivismrateaccordingtothethealgorithm;4)A COMPASriskassessmentcomparesdefendantstoanationalsample,withoutstate populationcross-validationstudy;5)COMPASmustbeconstantlymonitoredfor accuracyduetochangingpopulations;and6)COMPASwasnotdevelopedforuse atsentencing,butforinformingregardingtreatment,supervision,andparole.7 Neitherthedecisioninthiscasenortheimplementationofthewarningdescribedabove addressestheinjusticethatisattheheartoftheLoomiscase;thatis,theinabilityto explainthemethodologyusedintheCOMPASriskassessmenttool.Thiswarning maybeunderstoodasanattempttoinstillskepticismofthetoolsoastoreduce thepotentialgravityofitsroleinthejudicialdecision-makingprocess.However, itleavestoomuchroomfordiscretiontomeritjudgeswhomaybeoverestimating theaccuracyandimportanceofthis[suspiciously]ambiguousriskassessmenttool. Alongthispoint,theHarvardLawReviewwrites,“Thecourt’s“advisement”is unlikelytocreatemeaningfuljudicialskepticismbecauseitissilentonthestrength ofthecriticismsoftheseassessments,itignoresjudges’inabilitytoevaluateriskassessmenttools,anditfailstoconsidertheinternalandexternalpressuresonjudges tousesuchassessments.”8 TheinconclusivenatureoftheLoomiscaseisatestament tothefactthatlimitedconceptualandintuitiveunderstandingofthesetechnologies mayleadtoflawsinjudicialdecision-making.

IIIUnderPressure

Someofthe“externalpressures,”asmentionedintheHarvardLawReview mayencouragejusticestoleanonthistechnologyperhapsalittlemorethanthey should.9 Anexampleoftheseexternalpressuresincludethemajorjudiciaryvoices thatadvocatefortheuseofsuchtechnologyandthevariousstatesthatareconsideringimplementingarequirementforthisevidence-basedalgorithmtobeused insentencingproceedings.ItseemslikethetideisturningtowardsAI,andjudges shouldhoponboardtonotbeleftbehind.

Perhapsanotherreasonforthiswidespread,seeminglyuncheckedchangeisanotherenticingelementofferedbyCOMPAS.Thatis–itsabilitytoprovideconveniencetoanoverworkedjusticesystem.SomehavemadecasesforCOMPASarguing that“itmayseemweirdtorelyonanimpersonalalgorithmtopredictaperson’s behaviorgiventheenormousstakes.Butthegravityoftheoutcome—incost,crime,

7 Ibid.

8 hlr.2017.“Statev.Loomis.”(HarvardLawReview,2017).

9 Ibid.

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andwastedhumanpotential—isexactlywhyweshoulduseanalgorithm.”10 Butis thisreallyenoughtoallowanincomprehensiblecomputersystemtoswaydecisions aboutthefreedomsofAmericanslikeEricLoomis?

LetusexamineCOMPAS’reliabilityintermsoftwofundamentalprinciplesof thejusticesystem:accuracyandfairness.Disappointingly,theCOMPASalgorithm hasa65%accuracyrate.11 ThedifferencebetweenreceivinganaccurateCOMPAS assessmentandflippingacointolandonheadsisamere15%.Thisisunderwhelming,anditbecomesevenmoresoconsideringthatstudieshavefoundthat nonexpertsareasaccurateastheCOMPASsoftwareinpredictingrecidivism.

Asforfairness,theresultissomewhatinconclusive.Ononehand,ProPublica investigatedCOMPASandfoundthatthealgorithmwasmorelikelytoincorrectly labelBlackdefendantsasbeingatahigherriskofreoffendingcomparedtowhite defendants.12 Thisraisedsignificantconcernsaboutracialbiasinthealgorithm,asit seemedtodisproportionatelyimpactBlackdefendants.OthersdefendedCOMPAS, statingthattheiranalysisdidnotfindevidenceofracialbias.13 Theyarguedthat thealgorithmwasfairandaccurateinpredictingrecidivismratesacrossdifferent racialgroups.

Howisitpossibletohavesuchdivergingresults?Itmaybebecausethereare multiplestandardsforthestatisticalcriteriaoffairness.14 ProPublicabasedtheir researchonastandardoffairnessknownasErrorParitywhichisbasedonthere beingequalerrorratesacrossrelevantgroups.Northpointe,however,satisfiedthe criteriaoffairnessknownasEqualPositivePredictiveValue,whichrequiresthesame rateofaccuracyacrossrelevantgroups.Thesestandardscannevermathematically coincideunlessthealgorithmisperfectorthebaserateofrecidivismisequalacross racialgroups—bothofwhicharevirtuallyimpossible.15

Manyofthesestatisticsandempiricaldiscoverieswerenotreadilyavailableto informthecourt’sunderstandingofalgorithmicfairness.However,thecourtdid attempttoprovideaclaiminfavorofCOMPASfairnessthatappealedtoaccuracy. InordertodeterminewhethertheuseofCOMPASwasfairaccordingtodueprocess, theLoomiscourtreviewedthedecisionFreyvWisconsin,whichstatedthat“A

10 AlexandraTaylor, “AIPredictionToolsClaimtoAlleviateanOvercrowdedAmericanJustice System...ButShouldTheyBeUsed?”(StanfordPolitics,2020).

11 JuliaDresselandHanyFarid, “TheAccuracy,Fairness,andLimitsofPredictingRecidivism.” (ScienceAdvances,2018)4(1).

12 JuliaAngwin,JeffLarson,SuryaMattu,andLaurenKirchner, “MachineBias.”(ProPublica, 2016).

13 SamCorbett-Davies, “AComputerProgramUsedforBailandSentencingDecisions

14 DeborahHellman, ReviewofMeasuringAlgorithmicFairness.(VirginiaLaw,2020).

15 Ibid.

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discretionarysentencingdecisionwillbesustainedifitisbaseduponthefactsin therecordandreliesontheappropriateandapplicablelaw.”16 TheLoomisdecision referencesthisbystatingthatbecauseLoomishimselfprovidedtheinformation thatinformedCOMPAS’sdecision,thatdueprocesswasnotviolatedonaccount ofthecourtbeingsuppliedwithinaccurateinformation.ThisaccountofCOMPAS exerciseoffairnessisnotentirelypersuasiveeither,asitstillfailstoaddresswhether thealgorithm,asapredictiveagentthatinterpretsthistruthfulinformation,can stillyieldmistakenresults–whichitdoes,asubstantial35%ofthetime.17 Theloose regulationsurroundingtheimplementationofCOMPASwithinthelegalsystem leavesroomfortheacceptanceoflargelyimpreciseAIsystems.Becausethereisno specificthresholdforalgorithmicaccuracythatentailsalgorithmicfairness,itmay bepossibleforevenanalgorithmwith51%precisiontobejustifiablyreliableina courtoflaw.AllthisgoestosaythatCOMPAScannotbesaidtobesufficiently accurateordefinitivelyfairandthatthereismuchmoretobedoneintermsof definingalgorithmicfairnessthatshouldbedefinedbeforeAItakesafootholdin thejusticesystem.

AnotheroneofthemainprinciplesbehindtheverdictoftheLoomiscasewas thatCOMPASisnotentirelyresponsibleforsentencing,bailandparoledecisions. Rather,itplaysasmallpartinguidingthejudgetoareasonableconclusion.The supposed“limitedrole”ofCOMPASwassupposedtomitigatetheeffectsofits inaccuracyandpotentialunfairnessinthedecision.However,severalpsychological phenomenademonstratetheextenttowhichCOMPASmayopenloopholesforthe humanbraintodrawfalseorexaggeratedconclusionsduringthedecision-making process.18 Oneexampleofthisisreferredtoas“anchoring”inwhichpeoplesubconsciouslyfactorinformationintotheiropinionsanddecisionswithoutconsiderationof strengthorweakness.19 ThismeansthatdespitetheLoomisdecisions’implementationofaccuracywarnings,COMPASdatamaystillsubconsciouslyfactorinto thejudicialdecision-makingprocessjustasheavilyasmuchmorereliableformsof evidence.Additionally,theenablingofthislooseregulationofCOMPASlaysthe foundationforanearlyblindtrustinartificialintelligenceduetothe“automation bias.”20 Automationbiasreferstothetendencyto”ascribegreaterpowerandau-

16 Freyv.Wisconsin,256N.W.2d214(Wis.1977).

17 Ibid.

18 AndrewLeePark, “InjusticeExMachina:PredictiveAlgorithmsinCriminalSentencing.” (UCLALawReview,2019).

19 ThomasMussweilerandFritzStrack. “Psychologicalaspectsoftheanchoringeffect.”*Journal ofExperimentalSocialPsychology*31,no.4(1995):285-301.

20 M.DavidEnochandGaryKlein. “AutomationBiasinIntelligentTimeCriticalDecision SupportSystems:TheRoleofSystemConfidence.”*JournalofCognitiveEngineeringandDecision

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thoritytoautomatedaidsthantoothersourcesofadvice.”Thisactsasyetanother psychologicalloopholeforacceptanceofpotentiallyerror-riddeninformation.

AllofthisillustratestheLoomisdecisionwasastepinthewrongdirection whenitcomestointerpretingtheplaceofopaqueartificialintelligencealgorithms inthecriminaljusticesystem.EnablingtheuseoflooseregulationofCOMPAS laysthefoundationforanalmostblindtrustinartificialintelligence.TheLoomis decisionfailstoaccountforpressuresjudgesmayfacefromtryingtoadapta300year-oldsystemtoatechnologicalageaswellascombatingovercrowdingandmass incarceration.Itappearsasif,inanefforttopromoteefficiency,thecourthas skippedoverimportantquestionssurroundingthenatureofalgorithmicfairness.It alsoopensthedoortosubconsciousbiasesandoverrelianceonthesetechnologies.

IVFortheFuture

Giventhechangingnatureofthetimesinwhichweliveandtheimmensebenefit thatcouldbeprovidedtosocietythroughtheimplementationofsystemslikeCOMPAStothecriminaljusticesystem,itwouldbeethicallyirresponsibletodiscontinue researchintoapotentiallybeneficialsolution.However,itwouldbejustasethically irresponsibletoallowforinstitutionalmomentumandurgencytoexcusetheuncontrolledimplementationofAIindecisionsregardingindividuals’freedomswithout considerationofpotentialconsequences.Withthatsaid,Iwouldencouragethedevelopmentandgradualimplementationofpredictiverecidivismtechnologiesunder theconditionthattheybedevelopedinclearlydefinedincrementalmilestonesthat aimtoreduceriskswitheachphaseofdevelopment.Advancementsinthecriteria thatdefinefairnessinsatisfactionwiththeissuesaforementionedinPartIIIaswell asaccuracywouldcharacterizeeachmilestoneandprogressionwouldbecontingent uponsuccesses.Thisapproachwouldworkbylimitingthescopeofimplementation toreasonablyenvisionedoutcomes.Forexample,thegoalofCOMPASresearch shouldnotbetosetouttoanentirestateornationalpopulationimmediately.Instead,itshouldfirstfocusonaccuratelypredictingtherecidivismrateofthosewho consenttotheuseofthemachineintheirsentencingdecisions(perhapsinexchange forsomesortofcompensation)andonlythenscaleupwardcautiously,achieving successstepbystepwhilealsocarefullylookingfordownsides.Thiswouldrequire thatitfirstberemovedfromcommonpracticeinthecourts–contrastingthedecisionmadeintheLoomiscasewhichupholdsitsuse.Thispositionavoidsdenial oftechnologicaladvancementsandnewknowledgewhileremainingmindfulofthe Making*6,no.4(2012):359-377.

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potentialnegativesfromrapidover-relianceonnew,unstabletechnologies.

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WorksCited

Angwin,Julia,JeffLarson,SuryaMattu,andLaurenKirchner, MachineBias. (ProPublica,2016). Source.

COMPASClassificationInmateManagementSupport. AccessedApril10,2024.Source.

Corbett-Davies,Sam. “AComputerProgramUsedforBailandSentencingDecisions Source.

Dressel,Julia,andHanyFarid,TheAccuracy,Fairness,andLimitsofPredictingRecidivism. (ScienceAdvances,2018)4(1).Source.

Enoch,M.David,andGaryKlein. “AutomationBiasinIntelligentTimeCriticalDecisionSupportSystems:TheRoleofSystemConfidence.”*JournalofCognitiveEngineeringandDecision Making*6,no.4(2012):359-377.

Freyv.Wisconsin,256N.W.2d214(Wis.1977).

Hellman,Deborah. ReviewofMeasuringAlgorithmicFairness.VirginiaLaw,2020. hlr.2017.Statev.Loomis. HarvardLawReview,2017.Source.

Lagioia,F.,Rovatti,R.,andSartor,G. “AlgorithmicFairnessthroughGroupParities?TheCase ofCOMPAS-SAPMOC.” AI&Soc38(2023):459–478.doi:10.1007/s00146-022-01441-y.

Mussweiler,Thomas,andFritzStrack. “Psychologicalaspectsoftheanchoringeffect.”*Journal ofExperimentalSocialPsychology*31,no.4(1995):285-301.

Park,AndrewLee. “InjusticeExMachina:PredictiveAlgorithmsinCriminalSentencing.”(UCLA LawReview,2019).Source.

Taylor,Alexandra. AIPredictionToolsClaimtoAlleviateanOvercrowdedAmericanJusticeSystem...ButShouldTheyBeUsed? StanfordPolitics,2020.Source.

StatevLoomis. AccessedApril10,2024.Source.

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PrimedforPsychology:HowLegal

ReformRequiresSocialScience

KemarahThermidor’27

Spring2024

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Abstract

Whileawell-knownoutcomeofBrownv.BoardofEducation1 wastheimplied progressineradicatingsystematicracism,fewerknowofitsinfluenceinremoving theprejudiceagainstpsychologicalresearchincourts.“TheDollTest”wasanexperimentinwhichtwopsychologistsassessedtheeffectsofsegregationontheracial perceptionsofchildren,leadingtoresultsthatsignificantlyinfluencedtheoutcome ofthecase.2 Conclusionsshowcasingsegregation’sdetrimentalconsequencesonthe self-esteemofblackchildrenlegitimizedfurtherinputfromsocialscientists.3 Withoutthisinfluence,itisunclearwhetherlawmakerswouldhavefullycomprehended theharmfuleffectsofsegregation,arealizationthatledtotheeventualintegrationof publicschools.Brownv.BoardofEducationislinkedtomanyotherlandmarksof theCivilRightsmovement,butthisconvergenceisduetothecatalystoftheClark’s DollTestexperiment.Thispaperseekstoarguefortheexpansionofsocialscience’s roleinthelegalsystem.SectionIcoversthegeneralhistoryoftheemergenceof psychologicalfindingsinthecourtoflaw,SectionIIbrieflydiscussestherolesocial sciencecurrentlyplaysinlegalproceedings,andSectionIIIdetailsareasofconcern thathighlighttheurgentneedforfurtherappliedinputfrompsychologistsinthe fieldoflaw.Theconcludingsectionreiteratesthatawarenessoftheneedforlegal reformisinsufficientforrefinementandshouldbeinformedandmovedbysocial science.

IIntroduction

Thenotabilityof Brownv.BoardofEducation didnotbeginthecomplicated relationshipbetweenpsychologyandlegaldecisions.Thegeneralagreementremains thattheMullerv.OregonrulingwasduetotheintroductionoftheBrandeisBrief byLouisBrandeis,inwhichhisfindingsimpliedthepotentialrolescientificresearch couldplayinaidinglegaldecision-making.4 Whileindividualstodaymaydebate thevalidityofhisconclusions,itisundeniablethatthisnewrevolutioninstigated arippleeffectinthelegalrealmbysolidifyingpsychologicalresearch’splacein beinginsightfultolegaltrials.Specifically,theBrandeisbriefintroducedtheuseof socialsciencewithinthecourt,afieldpreviouslyconsideredinsignificantconcerning

1 Brownv.BoardofEducationofTopeka,347U.S.483(1954).

2 LegalDefenseFund, Brownv.Board:TheSignificanceofthe“DollTest,” NAACPLegal DefenseandEducationalFund(2024).

3 Ibid.

4 Mullerv.Oregon,208U.S.412(1908); BrandeisBrief —Encyclopedia.com

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law.Thepracticeoffilingamicuscuriaebriefsisconnectedtothisfirststepin providingpsychologistsavenuestomakingtheirvoicesheardincourt,anexample beingthefiledamicusbriefforBrownv.Board.5 FollowingtherulingofMuller v.Oregon,thelegalrealismmovementrosetonotoriety,withafocusonaligning courtdecisionswiththerealitiesofthesocialandpoliticalworld.6 Atitscore, legalrealismasksfortheapplicationofempiricaldataandobservationsinlegal decision-making.Whilepsychologymightnowbeconsideredestablishedwithinthe legalrealm,thehistoryofitsbattletoearnitspositionthereislesswell-known.By examiningthehistorybetweensocialscienceandlaw,wecanbetterunderstandthe potentialfutureimpactsthisinteractioncanhave.Thisunderstandingholdsthe purposeofrequiringinputfrompsychologyforvariousareasoflaw.

IIRemovingDoubt:TheResultsSpeakforThemselves

Thelawisfoundedonthepursuitofjustice;regrettably,theAmericanlegal systemfrequentlyfailstoachievethisobjective.Thequestionbecomeswhetherthe resourcesofthesocialsciencesmayattendtothecurrentblindspotsofthelaw andjusticesystemthroughfactsanddemonstratedevidence.Whetherbyfurther researchintothestructureofthecourt,assessmentsofparticipantswithinthecourt, andhowtobestmaintainevidence-basedreasoning,theinteractionbetweensocial scienceandlawshouldnotbeoverlooked.Theusageofsocialscienceresearch tosupportwrittenopinionsfromtheSupremeCourthasrisenfrom10%inthe year1978to40%in2015.7 Associalscienceandlawhaveintersected,psychology continuestoproveitselfadvantageousinaccomplishingthelegalworld’sgoalof thepursuitoftruth,withtheU.S.DepartmentofJusticeevenrecognizingsocial scienceas“ananalytictoolofthelaw.”8 Psychologistshavebroughtmuchvalueto themodernlegalworld,exemplifiedbytheirprovidingofexpertwitnesstestimony, actingasatrialconsultant,orotherrolesinthelegalfield.9 Evenwiththeimpact psychologyhashadonthelegalsystem,therearestilllimitationstoscience’srole

5 TheLikelyVoter,AmicusBriefs:WhatTheyAreandHowTheyImpactCourtCases,SutherlandInstitute(2023).

6 LegalRealism —Encyclopedia.com.

7 CarolineCollier, U.S.SupremeCourtJusticesUseSocialScienceResearchinRulings,TCU Magazine(2022).

8 JohnMonahan&LaurensWalker, SocialScienceinLaw:CasesandMaterials —Officeof JusticePrograms.

9 L.R.C.Haward,PsychologistasExpertWitness(FromPsychology,LawandLegalProcesses, P44-53,1979,byDPFarrington,etal-SeeNCJ-70738)—OfficeofJusticePrograms.

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inchanginginherentlyflawedprocesses.

IIIImplications:WhyLawStillNeedsSocialScience

Peoplev.Hatchett wasonesuchcasethatillustratedthelegalsystem’scontinual incorporationofbaselessevidenceinreachingaverdictintrialsthatessentiallyhold theoutcomeofanindividual’slifeinitshands.AndreHatchett(thena20-yearoldblackmalewithspecialneeds)wasgivenasentenceof25yearstolifeafter beingfalselyconvictedofsecond-degreemurderbasedoneyewitnessidentification.10 Thissupposedeyewitnesshadbeenanindividualarrestedforburglarywho,after providingastatementaboutwitnessingthehomicidebeinginvestigatedandinitially identifyinganothermanwhowasnotHatchett,wasreleasedfrompolicecustody.11 Hatchettwasnotcleareduntil2016afteraninvestigationconcludedtheconviction void,aprimaryreasonbeingthequestionableeyewitnessidentificationwhichacted asthedrivingforcefortheprosecution’sargument.12 Thisunfortunatestoryseems toberepeatedduetothelegalsystem’scontinuousdisregardfortheevidenceagainst theaccuracyofthepracticethatpsychologicalstudieshaveproduced.Asfarback as1975,psychologistshavedeterminedthepracticeofeyewitnessinvestigationsis easilyinfluencedbyminorfactorssuchasthewordingofaquestion.13 Countless individualshavebeenfalselyaccused,wronglyconvicted,andlosttheirlivessince then,andonemustreckonwiththesoberingreality:manyoftheseinjusticescould havebeenavoidedifpsychologyhadgreaterinfluenceinlegalproceedings.

Theextentofwhatpsychologyhasbeenabletodoforthelawhasbeenlimited duetothecriminaljusticesystem’ssometimesrigidframework.Initsmostexplicit form,thesilencingofinputfrompsychologistsisdemonstratedinRule702ofthe FederalRulesofEvidence.14 Rule702grantstrialjudgestheroleof“gatekeeper,” inthecaseofallowingexpertopinionintothecourt.15 Theruleconsistsoffive considerationscourtjudgesshouldmakewhendecidingwhetheranexpertwitness cantestifyinatrial.KnownastheDaubertStandard,theseincludefalsifiabilityof

10 Peoplev.Hatchett,225A.D.2d634,639N.Y.S.2d114(N.Y.App.Div.1996).

11 TodayMarks3YearsofFreedomforAndreHatchett,InnocenceProject.

12 Ibid.

13 ElizabethF.Loftus&GuidoZanni, EyewitnessTestimony:TheInfluenceoftheWordingof aQuestion,5BulletinofthePsychonomicSociety86(1975).

14 CornellLawSchool,Rule702.TestimonybyExpertWitnesses,LegalInformationInstitute, 2011.

15 NationalCenterforStateCourts, CivilAction,2006.

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theexpert’stechnique,whetherithasgonethroughpeerreview,knownstandards ofcontrolforthetechnique,thescientificcommunity’sacceptanceofthetechnique, andtheknownerrorrate.16 Whilethisrestrictiononthepermissibilityofexpert witnessesincourthasbeenframedasawaytoreduceunreliabletestimony(a“legal safeguard”),itlacksconsiderationforthebiasesofjudgesandtheirunfamiliaritywiththewayscienceapproachesconclusions.Researchsuggestsqualityexpert testimoniesareoftendisregardedasevidencealongwiththeadmittanceoffaulty scientificevidence.PsychologistsMargaretKoveraandBradleyMcAuliffrevealsignificantresultsintheirstudycomparingtheperceptionofscientificallytrainedand untrainedjudgesofexpertresearchwithdifferencesinpeerreviewstatusandinternalvalidity;only17%ofthejudgeschosetoadmitvalidscientificevidencewith correlationbeingseenbetweenthedecisiontoadmitandjudges’perceptionsofthe study,aswellastheirscientifictraining.17 Thisrevealseitheraclearbiasagainst socialscienceinthecourtoralackofunderstandingofwhatvalidscientificexpertise lookslike.Itappearsthatthelimitationsofthemostbasicroleapsychologistcan playinthelegalfield(actingasanexpertwitness)aredesignedinsuchawayasto reducetheinfluencepsychologyhasinguidinginformedverdicts.

Thelegalworld’sacceptanceandcontinualconsiderationoffaultyevidenceand misinformedpracticesdonotendateyewitnesstestimony.ChristopherOchoa,only 22atthetime,falselyconfessedtorapeandmurderandwasconvictedin1989,serving13yearsuntilbeingreleasedin2002duetotheadventofimprovedDNAtests.18

Thejusticesystem’sinterrogationmethod,knownastheReidTechnique,hasbeen researched,alongwithotherinterviewandinterrogationmethods,tounderstand whatmayleadanindividualtoclaimacrimetheydidnotcommit.19 TheverynatureoftheReidTechniqueisaccusatory,withthegoalofconfession.Themodern interrogationtechniqueincludes9steps,withitemssuchas,“directconfrontation,” “minimizethefrequencyofsuspectdenials,”and“ifsuspectcries...inferguilt.”20 Basedonknowledgeofhisover30yearsstudyingfalseconfessions,psychologyprofessorSaulKassinremarked,“...inAmericanstyleinterrogation,peoplecanbecome sostressedandsobrokendownandtheystarttofeelsohopelessabouttheircurrent situationthattheycometobelieveinarationalwayaconfessionisintheirbest

16 MeghanRyan, DaubertStandard,LII/LegalInformationInstitute,2018.

17 MargaretKovera&BradleyMcAuliff, TheEffectsofPeerReviewandEvidenceQualityon JudgeEvaluationsofPsychologicalScience:AreJudgesEffectiveGatekeepers?,psycnet.apa.org, 2000.

18 MauricePossley,ChristopherOchoa—NationalRegistryofExonerations, www.law.umich.edu,2012.

19 JamesOrlando, InterrogationTechniques,ConnecticutGeneralAssembly,2013.

20 AldertVrij, ReidTechnique—anoverview,ScienceDirectTopics,2004.

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interest...theygetsoconfusedbythefactthatAmericanpolicearepermittedto lie...thatinsomecasespeopleaccusedofcrimes...becomesoconfusedbythelies thattheyactuallycometobelievetheyhavecommittedthiscrime”inresponseto aninterviewquestiononthefactorscontributingtofalseconfessions.21 Itisdifficult toreplicatethereal-lifescenariosleadingtofalseconfessions,butpsychologistshave beenabletoargueforinterrogationreformsthatwouldmitigatetheriskoffalse confessionsandexploreinterrogationtechniquesthatwouldincreasethenumberof trueconfessionsofcrimes.22 Despitepsychology’sattemptstoassistandtheacknowledgmentofthelegalsystem’sshortcomingsindeliveringjustice,socialscience remainsunderutilized,andthesystemremainsstagnant.

Historyrevealstheinitialreactionsgarneredwhenpsychologistsdaretocritique theinsufficienciesofthelegalsystem.HugoM¨unsterberg,apioneerofpsychology, isachiefexampleofthescornthatlawoccasionallyextendstosocialscience.23

M¨unsterberg’sOntheWitnessStandexploredtopicssuchaswitnessmemory,false confessions,andthepreventionofcrime.24 Heexpressedtheneed“toadjust[psychological]researchtothepracticalproblemsthemselvesandthus,forinstance, wheneducationisinquestion,tostartpsychologicalexperimentsdirectlyfromeducationalproblems,”specificallyaddressingthelegalfield.25 BothM¨unsterbergand hiscalltotheintegrationofpsychologyandlawweremetwithcriticismandmockerybyJohnWigmore,aprominentlegalscholaratthetime,andothercolleagues.

WigmoredescribedM¨unsterberg’sclaimsofthenecessityofanalliancebetweenlaw andpsychologyas“erroneous,incorrect,anduntrue”inWigmore’sresponsearticle to OntheWitnessStand 26 Theunderminingofpsychologicalfindingsasitrelates topresent-daylegalproceedingssuchastheReidtechniqueforinterrogationsand eyewitnessidentificationcombinedwiththeheftylimitationsofexperttestimonyin courtparalleltheinconsiderationthatwasoncegivenatthesimplesuggestionofa psychology-informedlegalsystem.

21 GisliH.Gudjonsson&JohnPearse,SuspectInterviewsandFalseConfessions,20Current DirectionsinPsychologicalScience33,2011.

22 EvanNesterak,CoercedtoConfess:ThePsychologyofFalseConfessions,BehavioralScientist, 2014.

23 BrianBornstein&JeffreyNeuschatz,HugoM¨unsterberg’sPsychologyandLaw:AHistorical andContemporaryAssessment,Oup.com,2023.

24 HugoMunsterberg, OntheWitnessStand,1908.

25 Ibid.

26 JohnWigmore,ProfessorMuensterbergandThePsychologyofTestimony,3IllinoisLaw Review,1909.

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IVConclusion

Thecoreoflawreliesonlegalprecedent,renderingtheapplicationofaconsiderableamountofneededandinformedchangestothestructureoflegaltrialsdifficult. Inadditiontofuelingthelegalsystem’sresistancetochange,theseprecedentscan leadtothewastedpotentialofaunionbetweenpsychologyandlaw.Thetrend ofpsychologicalexpertsprofferingprovendatarelevanttolegaltrialsandpolicy andbeingmetwithresistancebythoseinthelegalfieldcontinuestoruinlivesand impedereform.Althoughthelegalsystemstrivesforfairnessandobjectivity,there arenumerouscases—someofwhichcouldhavebeenpreventedwithpriorappeals forchange—wherethelawhasfailedtofulfillthispromisetothepublic.Thelegal worldrequiresastrongerpartnershipwithsocialsciencetoinformlegalproceedings basedontestedempiricalevidenceanddata;despitetheelevatedpositionofsocial sciencewithinthelawduetolandmarkcasessuchas Brownv.BoardofEducation, thereremainunreasonablerestrictionsandbiasesagainstthefieldofsocialscience thatprohibitthegrowthofitsinfluence.Alackofattentiontopsychologicalfindingspermitsfaultypracticestocontinuetoobstructtruejustice.Whileincreased awarenessofthelegalandjusticesystems’flawshasforcedpolicychanges,psychology’sabilitytoleadthelegalsystemtobeamodeoftruth,justice,andsafety remainslargelyunexplored.

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WorksCited

Bornstein,BrianandJeffreyNeuschatz. HugoM¨unsterberg’sPsychologyandLaw:AHistorical andContemporaryAssessment,Oup.com(2023).Source.

BrandeisBrief.Encyclopedia.com.Source.

Brownv.BoardofEducationofTopeka,347U.S.483(1954).Source.

CarolineCollier. U.S.SupremeCourtJusticesUseSocialScienceResearchinRulings.TCUMagazine(2022).Source.

CornellLawSchool. Rule702.TestimonybyExpertWitnesses.LegalInformationInstitute(2011). Source.

Gudjonsson,GisliH.,andJohnPearse. SuspectInterviewsandFalseConfessions.20Current DirectionsinPsychologicalScience33(2011).

Haward,L.R.C.PsychologistasExpertWitness(FromPsychology,LawandLegalProcesses,P 44-53,1979,byDPFarrington,etal-SeeNCJ-70738).OfficeofJusticePrograms.Source.

Kovera,Margaret,andBradleyMcAuliff. TheEffectsofPeerReviewandEvidenceQualityon JudgeEvaluationsofPsychologicalScience:AreJudgesEffectiveGatekeepers?.psycnet.apa.org (2000).Source.

LegalDefenseFund.Brownv.Board:TheSignificanceofthe“DollTest.”NAACPLegalDefense andEducationalFund(2024).Source.

LegalRealism.Encyclopedia.com.Source.

Loftus,ElizabethF.,andGuidoZanni. Eyewitnesstestimony:TheInfluenceoftheWordingofa Question.5BulletinofthePsychonomicSociety86(1975).Source.

Monahan,John,andLaurensWalker. SocialScienceinLaw:CasesandMaterials.Officeof JusticePrograms,www.ojp.gov.Source.

Mullerv.Oregon,208U.S.412(1908),JustiaLaw.Source.

Munsterberg,Hugo. OntheWitnessStand.(1908).Source.

NationalCenterforStateCourts. CivilAction.(2006).Source.

Nesterak,Evan. CoercedtoConfess:ThePsychologyofFalseConfessions,BehavioralScientist (2014).Source.

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Orlando,James. InterrogationTechniques.ConnecticutGeneralAssembly(2013).Source.

Peoplev.Hatchett,225A.D.2d634,639N.Y.S.2d114(N.Y.App.Div.1996).

Possley,Maurice. ChristopherOchoa.NationalRegistryofExonerations,www.law.umich.edu (2012).Source.

Ryan,Meghan. DaubertStandard.LII/LegalInformationInstitute(2018).Source.

TheLikelyVoter. AmicusBriefs:WhatTheyAreandHowTheyImpactCourtCases.Sutherland Institute(2023).Source.

TodayMarks3YearsofFreedomforAndreHatchett.InnocenceProject.Source.

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Haskell,K.(2006,March9). CenturyTower.Flickr.

Florida Undergraduate Law Review | Volume 1 | Spring 2024

FloridaUndergraduateLaw Review

Vol.1

OurMission

TableofContents

MASTHEAD

GraphicDesigner

WhatItMeanstoEngagein

Insurrection:ASynthesisoftheDebate

OverDefinition

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Abstract

IIntroduction

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IIHistoricalBackgroundforSection3oftheFour-

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IIIExaminingDefinitionsof“EngaginginInsurrection”

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IVExaminingtheEventsofJanuary6,2021with aNewDefinition

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VConclusion

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Disney,DeSantis,andtheFutureofFree Speech

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Abstract

IIntroduction

IITroubleintheMagicKingdom

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IIITheFirstAmendment

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IVInterpretingIntent

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VCauseandEffectDoctrine

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VIConclusion

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Abstract

IIntroduction

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IIBackground

IIIRulings

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IVAnalysisandImplications

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VConclusion

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RegionalClimateRefugeePolicies: ExpandingLegalFrameworks

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Abstract

IIntroduction

IIUnderstandingthePitfallsofanInternational DefinitionofaClimateRefugee

IIIAnalyzingtheFeasibilityofCurrentCaribbean RegionFMA

IVJustificationfortheExpansionoftheCaribbean

FMAtoaWiderRegion

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VConclusion

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LostinaDivide:TheRelationship BetweenPoliticsandPrecedent AmeliaGarvey‘26

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Abstract

IIntroduction

IIIdeologyinanInternationalContext

IIIComparingCasesOvertheYears

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IVCurrentPrecedentandPolitics

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VConclusion

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WorksCited

Lawrithms;PredictiveRegressionModels inJudicialSystems

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