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Luiz Henrique de A. Dutra
behavior. He begins by examining the problem o f the meaning o f observation sentences. Two individuais who assent to the same observation sentence are supposed to have the same stimulation. This is possible because of the same standards of stimulation in both subjects. Quine maintains that stimulation in the one individual has to be equivalent to the stimulation in the other, but this does not imply we must interpret any standards of stimulation in terms of a homology between the receptors in both subjects. He says, first, that such a homology is impossible and, second, that it does not matter at ali (p. 157). 16 The most interesting as regards our evaluation ofQuine's conception ofrnind is the reason he adduces to hold that such a homology does not rnatter. Quine resorts to an analogy with machines (p. 157). Consider two different machines; the input for each one of them has nothing to do with their exact physical constitution; it has to do with how simple is the theory we use to program them. Now, the analogy Quine aims at is immediately understandable: two organ.isms may be physiologically very different, but even so, we can say they have the same stimulation; for wbat counts, says Quine, is only surface stimulation (p. 158). Thus, from a behavioristic point o f view, in order to understand a word uttered by someone, for in.stance, it is necessary that an object in the neighborhood is referred to and that we perceive that the speaker is seeing it as well. In this case we are merely referring to tbe individual's surface stimulation; we are not referring to "deep events in his body," says Quine (p. 158). Despite Chomsky 's protests, indeed, according to Quine it is how we can imagine the possibility o f commun.icating with other intelligent beings if ever we meet them. Quine writes as follows: Thc bodily surface would thus seem to bc, for an activity ever subject to social adjustrnent as language is, thc bcst boundary at wlĂşch to define input. And yet, wben we come to the seem.ingly essential business of saying what it is for two people to be srimulated alike, wc tangle with the myth o f homologous nerve cndings. What will wc do when wc get to Mars? Just becausc we and the Martians cannot match up nerve endings, must we despair o f relating our Janguages? There is an odd irony here. We had been worrying whcther scicntific sense could be made ofmentalistic idioms ofpropositional attitudc,