Mumbai: Terrorist Tactics Hinder Rescue Operations by Firefighter Christian M. Zisel
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n November 22, 2008, at least 10 members of Lashkar-eTayyiba (LeT), a Pakistani-based terrorist organization, set sail from Karachi, Pakistan, aboard the cargo vessel, AlHusseine. Carrying automatic weapons, hand grenades, improvised explosive devises (IEDs) and communications equipment, the terrorists plugged in the GPS coordinates for Mumbai, India, and traveled more than 550 nautical miles to stage a complex, coordinated and extremely lethal terrorist attack. The resulting siege on Mumbai lasted more than three days, left 172 dead, caused untold economic damage and strained the relations between India and Pakistan, both nuclear powers. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (Army of the Pure and Righteous) originally was formed in the 1980s as the military wing of Markaz-udDawwal-Irshad, a missionary organization that opposed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Since the Soviet withdrawal, however, LeT since has taken on the role of seeking to “liberate” Muslims in Indian-administered Kashmir. Long a source of contention between Pakistan and India, Kashmir borders both nations and the two continue to dispute control of the territory. In its quest, LeT-one of the most professional and well-trained terrorist organizations--has been implicated in numerous terrorist attacks against India, including the July 2006 Mumbai commuter train bombings, which killed more than 200, and the December 2001 armed assault against the Indian Parliament building. The goal of this most recent terrorist attack was to strike at the heart of India’s financial, commercial and entertainment capital (Mumbai), thereby drawing worldwide attention to the LeT cause. Some experts have argued that LeT may have been motivated by a stronger interest in the larger, radical, Islamic movement, as they specifically targeted westerners in this attack. Others have theorized that LeT, acting in concert with al-Qaeda, may have intended to ratchet up the tension between India and Pakistan, thereby drawing Pakistani forces away from al-Qaeda strongholds, as they would be
re-directed to the Pakistani/Indian border. Regardless of their motivations, the tactical components of the attack were extremely successful in creating a state of fear and confusion, which served to facilitate the attack and complicate the rescue efforts. As the terrorist cell reached the shores of Mumbai, they broke up into small, two- to four-man units and attacked multiple, preselected targets. These targets were chosen months before the attack in order to ensure the operation’s maximum lethality and efficiency. The first team took a taxi to the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus Train Station, which serves 3.5 million people daily, and began to indiscriminately fire upon the unsuspecting commuters. After killing 58 and wounding more than 104, the team then moved by foot to attack the nearby Cama & Albless Hospital. After a protracted gun battle, however, the Mumbai Police eventually were able to neutralize the team, killing one terrorist and capturing another. The captured terrorist, Mohammad Ajmal Amir Kasab, subsequently has been interrogated and was one of the primary sources of information regarding the details of the attack. A second team, traveling by foot, simultaneously attacked a bar and restaurant popular with western tourists. The team fired automatic weapons and threw grenades inside the Café Leopold, killing 10 people instantly. After the assault, the team then moved by foot to the Taj Mahal Hotel, which was situated approximately one half a kilometer away from the Café. The Taj Mahal, constructed in 1903, contained a total of 565 rooms and is considered one of India’s most prestigious landmarks. Another two-man team, entering from the rear entrance, joined this team and both began to fire upon the unsuspecting hotel patrons and employees. At some point during the assault, the teams placed IEDs near the entrance and exit of the hotel. As the siege at the Taj Mahal took place, another team traveled to the Oberoi-Trident Hotel and also began to fire upon the unsuspecting hotel patrons and employees. After the initial assault, the terrorists then took up defensive positions on the upper floors of the hotel, from which they targeted additional victims with automatic weapons and hand grenades. As this event unfolded, another team traveled by foot to the Nariman House, a residential housing complex for the orthodox Jewish organization, the Chabad Liberation Movement of Hasidic Jews. By first attacking the perimeter, the team eventually was able to gain access to the complex and took several members hostage before executing five of them. In each of these locations, the terrorists were able to deploy and detonate one IED. As the siege of Mumbai unfolded, Indian security forces eventually were mobilized and called into action. Although they were able to secure the other target locations and neutralize the terrorist threat, they were met with heavy resistance at the Taj Mahal. The siege at the Taj lasted more than three days and received worldwide The fear and confusion fomented by the November 22, 2008, terror attack hampered rescue efforts. press coverage. Many recall with horror and Indian security forces were charged with protecting the Mumbai Fire Brigade during firefighting.
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The New York City Landmarks Plot • Orchestrated by Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, aka “The Blind Sheikh.” • Called for several tactical teams to strike Manhattan, using small arms, grenades and IEDs. • Multiple targets were selected to be attacked in a coordinated fashion in order to create fear and confusion. • Target list included the Lincoln Tunnel, Holland Tunnel, Waldorf Astoria, St. Regis Hotel, United Nations and 26 Federal Plaza. • For additional information, see “The Mumbai Terrorist Attack” in Fireguard.
sorrow the images of the Taj burning. Ironically, however, that same coverage also may have aided the terrorists and complicated the rescue efforts. As the terrorists set up defensive positions at the Taj-just as they did at the Oberoi-Trident--they contacted their handlers in Pakistan via cell phone. The handlers were watching the event unfold on live television and gave them tactical advice with regard to counteracting the measures employed by Indian security forces. It also has been revealed that at this point, the terrorists were ordered to set the Taj on fire in order to create a state of fear and chaos among the rescuers, victims and viewing audience. Along with security personnel, the Mumbai Fire Brigade also was called into action to help with the rescue operations. However, they were confronted with serious challenges related to firefighting and rescue operations, particularly at the Taj Mahal. As they arrived on the scene, the first challenge with which they were confronted was that although many of the victims were visibly awaiting rescue, the fire brigade first had to establish 360degree security zones. This was an immediate and necessary step because as they arrived, the terrorist operation still was unfolding. Compounding the confusion and danger was the terrorists’ ability to attack from multiple locations, which necessitated the initial, additional safety precautions. The second challenge that the fire brigade faced was the discovery of the IEDs that the terrorists placed at the target locations. As these devices had yet to detonate at the Taj Mahal, additional safety precautions had to be employed before they could commence rescue operations. An examination of one of the safely rendered IEDs revealed that they were composed of 10-11 lbs. of RDX, a high-powered military explosive, encased inside metal boxes that were packed with ball bearings. (It should be noted that according to the Department of Defense, a 10-lb. explosive charge requires a minimum outdoor evacuation distance of 1080 feet.) The IEDs then were disguised inside backpacks, commonly used by commuters and students and set to detonate five hours after they were deployed. The five-hour detonation time suggests that the terrorists either had specifically targeted first responders, as operation posts would have been set up by then, or that they were to facilitate the attackers’ escape, as they could have blended into the fleeing crowds following detonations. The third challenge the Mumbai Fire Brigade faced was the systematic targeting of their forces by the terrorists with small arms fire. This occurred as the fire brigade rescued victims with portable and tower ladders, as well as while they conducted inside operations. The fire brigade ultimately was requested to conduct inside operations as security forces were unable to advance inside the hotel due to the advancing fire and smoke conditions. As a result, security forces worked in tandem with the fire brigade, providing for their security while they conducted the firefighting and rescue operations. The coordinated effort between the fire brigade and security forces lasted more than 60 hours, during which time 450 victims were rescued, the hotel eventually was secured, the terrorist threat eliminated and the fires extinguished. For more information about terrorism, including the FDNY’s weekly intelligence report, The Watchline, members are urged to go to the Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness’ web site, located on the Department’s intranet.
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Map provides a visual of the areas mentioned in this article about the Mumbai terrorist attack.
The Mumbai terrorist attack raised some eyebrows with respect to the terrorist tactics employed. It has been suggested that the coordinated, armed assault had differed from coordinated bombings in the past and thus represented a shift in terrorist tactics and thinking. This line of reasoning, however, may be incorrect as a similar plot was planned to be conducted in New York City following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. (See the New York City Landmarks Plot box above.) Nevertheless, the attacks on Mumbai presented the Mumbai Fire Brigade, as well as Indian security forces, with serious challenges. The coordinated, armed assault created a state of confusion and chaos, which the first responders had to define before they could conduct rescue operations. Added into the equation were the placement of IEDs and the systematic targeting of their forces with small arms fire. These factors undoubtedly complicated the firefighting and rescue operations. The events in Mumbai also stress the importance of agency cooperation and coordination while operating at complex emergencies and terrorist attacks. The overriding issue at multi-agency, emergency operations is to increase public safety, as well as that of the first responders, without reducing an individual organization’s baseline capabilities. Contributing to this mission is the development of decision-making and operational skills that overcome the inherent complexities associated with multi-agency emergency operations. The desired end state is one in which multiagency synergy enhances the overall effectiveness of an emergency operation greater than the sum of its individual parts. FDNY members can learn from the challenges faced by the Mumbai Fire Brigade. About the Author... FF Christian Zisel is a six-year veteran with the FDNY. He is assigned to Ladder 125 and currently detailed to the Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness. He served in the Marine Corps and was assigned to an anti-terrorism unit. He holds a BA degree in Political Science from Long Island University and an MIA degree in International Security Policy from Columbia University. This is his first article for WNYF.
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