moving in to London. I would not be over-optimistic. I think nationalism is a very strong force, and as I look back at my time in the Embassy, I doubt whether my reporting sparked greater interest or deepened understanding. RYCROFT: You are being very modest. The question was a bit of fun, but it had a serious intent behind it which was how do you actually measure the impact of something as intrinsically difficult to measure as diplomacy? It is something that we grapple with in the Foreign Office Board every month when we look at the impact of not just our Paris Embassy, but of all our network of embassies around the world. We are – as current members of staff – we are pushing people to try to answer that sort of question not necessarily with a number out of ten which is glib and gimmicky, but with some sort of specific and measurable, ‘Yes, this had a strategic impact’, or ‘This had a tactical impact’, and try to push people to separate out the bits which are absolutely, as David was suggesting, outside of our control completely, versus those parts where we do at least have the possibility of either preventing awful stuff from happening or making the most of the good things. So that was just a bit of fun at the end there. The final five minutes of this bit goes to Sir Christopher Mallaby in case there is anything that you would like to add in addition to the other stuff? Any other business, any other points that you would like to get out there that haven’t popped up so far. MALLABY: I have one other point which has been around in this discussion but has not been articulated , namely the perennial question which has been going the rounds since 1870 – ‘Do you not find at the Embassy that ministers have so much contact together that you have nothing of importance to do anymore?’ There are three points in the answer. The first point is, ‘Yes, top-slicing happens. Some of the most important and difficult decisions are taken in direct contact between British and French ministers.’ The second point is that the range and variety of the work of the Embassy – as has been said here – are infinitely greater now than in traditional diplomacy. In compensation for losing the top slice of the cake you get a much bigger cake to deal with. And, finally, do not forget that these ministerial contacts are carefully prepared in their substance by officials. You do not get a minister walking in to meet his French opposite number to talk about any subject, even a simple one, without having official advice about how best to put the subject to the French, about the French views, about what the French minister is really like- his family, his hobbies, his attitude to Britain. This information comes from the Embassy which therefore has an influence on the minister’s handling of the meeting. HOLMES: I just want to respond to what you just said, Matthew – at the risk of sounding like a real old fogey – about measuring the impact of Embassies. I honestly do not think you can do it. I know you have to try, and the Treasury will push you to try. But if you play on that ground and if you try and measure it – and it is the same problem as measuring the impact of the Foreign Office – you cannot win. You cannot prove it. The things that you prove may not be the most important things. Maybe there is no choice, but just do not expect any meaningful results out of it would be my strong advice. RYCROFT: I am not going to prolong this debate because it is not really about the British Embassy in Paris, but it is not the Treasury that asked us. It is ourselves. Thank you to the panellists. In anticipation of the next session, are there people in the audience who currently work in the Embassy in Paris or recently worked there? One person … 47